

# Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics

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VOLUME I  
A—ART

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## PREFACE

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THERE is at the present time an unusual demand for works of reference. It may be due partly to a higher general standard of education, increasing the number of readers, and compelling teachers, whether they are writers or speakers, to 'verify their references.' But it may be due also to the great increase of knowledge in our time. We must possess ourselves of dictionaries and encyclopædias, because it is not possible otherwise to have at our command the vast stores of learning which have accumulated.

But the enormous increase of knowledge in our time has not only created a demand for general works of reference; it has also made known the necessity for dictionaries or encyclopædias of a more special character. Musicians have found the need of a Dictionary of Music, painters of Painting, engineers of Engineering, and they have had their wants supplied. The present work is an attempt to meet the necessity for an Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.

### Scope of the Encyclopædia.

The words 'Religion' and 'Ethics' are both used in their most comprehensive meaning, as the contents of this volume will show. The Encyclopædia will contain articles on all the Religions of the world and on all the great systems of Ethics. It will aim, further, at containing articles on every religious belief or custom, and on every ethical movement, every philosophical idea, every moral practice. Such persons and places as are famous in the history of religion and morals will be included. The Encyclopædia will thus embrace the whole range of Theology and Philosophy, together with the relevant portions of Anthropology, Mythology, Folklore, Biology, Psychology, Economics, and Sociology. It is a wide field, but its limits are clearly defined. Only once or twice throughout the course of this volume has the question been raised whether a particular topic should be included or not.

### Subjects and Authors.

Very great care has been taken to make the list of subjects complete, and to assign each subject to the right author. If mistakes have been made they will be pointed out by readers and reviewers; and the Editor will welcome every suggestion that is offered towards the improvement of the succeeding volumes. In order to

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avoid overlapping, and yet to have every topic treated with sufficient fulness, the method has occasionally been adopted of describing a subject comprehensively in one general article, and then taking one or more particular topics embraced by the general article and dealing with them separately and more fully. Thus there will be a general sketch of the Socialistic Communities of America, out of which the Amana Community has been selected to be separately and fully described. Again, there are articles on Aphrodisia and Apollonia in addition to the general article on Greek Festivals; and in the second volume there will be an article on the Arval Brothers, while the Roman Priesthood will be treated comprehensively afterwards.

It is not necessary to draw attention here to the series of comparative articles on such topics as Adoption, Adultery, Ages of the World, Altar, Ancestor-Worship, Anointing, Architecture, and Art.

The important subject of cross-references is referred to on another page.

### Editors and Assistants.

How can due acknowledgment be made to all those who have been counsellors and colleagues, and have assisted so willingly to make the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* an authoritative work of reference throughout the whole of its great and difficult field of study? Professor A. S. Geden, Dr. Louis H. Gray, and Professor D. B. Macdonald have worked over every article from the beginning. Next to them must come Principal Iverach, Canon J. A. MacCulloch, Mr. Crooke, Professor Rhys Davids, Dr. Grierson, and Sir C. J. Lyall. Then follow Professor Wenley, Dr. J. G. Frazer, Mr. Sidney Hartland, Dr. Keane, Mr. W. H. Holmes, Mr. J. Mooney, Mr. E. E. Sikes, Professor Riess, Professor Poussin, Professor Anesaki, Dr. Aston, Mr. Cornaby, Professor Macdonell, Professor Lloyd, Mr. Nutt, Mr. Watson, Mr. Gait, Principal Fairbairn, Professor Jacobi, Professor Takakusu, Professor Bonet-Maury, Colonel Sir R. C. Temple, Bart., Professor Nöldeke, Dr. Moulton, Dr. Macpherson, Baron Friedrich von Hügel, Professor Lawlor, Professor Schaff, Abbot E. C. Butler, Professor Sanday, Professor Hillebrandt, Professor Seth, Professor Sorley, Professor Woodhouse, Principal Stewart, Professor Swete, and Colonel Waddell. These all have suggested authors, read manuscripts, corrected proofs, or in some other way taken a helpful interest in the work. And the list could be doubled without exhausting their number.

Acknowledgment is due also to the Right Hon. the Secretary of State for India and the Librarian of the India Office; to Sir A. H. L. Fraser, K.C.S.I., LL.D., Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal; to the Right Hon. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, G.C.M.G., Premier of Canada; and to the Chief of the Bureau of Ethnology of the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, for the use of valuable books.

After six years' exacting labour this first volume goes forth in the earnest hope that it will be found worthy of a place among the rapidly increasing number of books devoted to the study of Religion and Ethics, and that it will help forward that study along the right lines. The work will consist of about ten volumes.



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Altruism.
- JACKSON (A. V. WILLIAMS), Litt.D., Ph.D., LL.D.  
Professor of Indo-Iranian Languages in  
Columbia University, New York.  
Afghanistan, Ahriman, Amesha Spentas,  
Architecture (Persian), Art (Persian).
- JACKSON (HENRY), Litt.D. (Camb.), Hon. LL.D.  
(Aber. and Glas.).  
Of the Order of Merit; Regius Professor of  
Greek in the University of Cambridge;  
Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, of  
Winchester College, and of the British  
Academy; Foreign Honorary Member of the  
American Academy of Arts and Sciences.  
Aristotle.
- JACOBI (HERMANN), Ph.D.  
Professor der Sanskr. u. vergleich. Wissensch.  
an der Universität zu Bonn; Geheimer  
Regierungsrat.  
Agastya, Ages of the World (Indian).
- JASTROW (MORRIS, jun.), Ph.D. (Leipzig).  
Professor of Semitic Languages and Librarian  
of the University of Pennsylvania.  
Anointing (Semitic).
- JEREMIAS (Lic. Dr. ALFRED).  
Pfarrer der Lutherkirche und Privatdozent  
an der Universität zu Leipzig.  
Ages of the World (Babylonian).
- JEVONS (FRANK BYRON), M.A., Litt.D., F.R.E.S.  
Principal of Bishop Hatfield's Hall, and Sub-  
Warden of the University of Durham.  
Anthropomorphism.
- JOLLY (JULIUS), Ph.D. (Munich), Hon. M.D.  
(Göttingen), Hon. D.Litt. (Oxford).  
Hon. Member R.A.S. (London); Correspond-  
ing Member of the R. Bavarian Academy of  
Science, Munich, and of the K. Gesellschaft  
der Wissenschaften, Göttingen; Ord. Pro-  
fessor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology  
and Director of the Linguistic Seminary in  
the University of Würzburg; formerly Tagore  
Professor of Law in the University of Cal-  
cutta.  
Abandonment and Exposure (Hindu),  
Adoption (Hindu), Altar (Hindu).
- JOYCE (GILBERT CUNNINGHAM), M.A., B.D.  
Warden of St. Deiniol's Library, Hawarden.  
Analogy, Annihilation.
- JUYNBOLL (TH. W.), Dr. juris. et phil.  
Adjutor interpretis: 'Legati Warneriani,'  
Leiden.  
Adoption (Muhammadian), Adultery  
(Muh.), Apostasy (Muh.).
- KALWEIT (PAUL), Lic. der Theol., D.Phil.  
Director des evangelischen Predigerseminars  
in Naumburg a. Queis, und Pfarrer.  
A Priori.
- KARO (GEORG), D.Phil.  
Secretary of the German Archaeological Insti-  
tute, Athens.  
Architecture and Art (Etruscan and Early  
Italian).
- KEANE (AUGUSTUS HENRY), LL.D., F.R.G.S.,  
F.R.A.I.  
Late Vice-President of the Anthropological  
Institute; late Professor of Hindustani in  
University College, London; Hon. Member  
of the Paris, Florence, Rome, and Washing-  
ton Anthropological Societies; Hon. Member  
of the Virginia Historic Society, and Poly-  
nesian Society; author of *Ethnology, Man  
Past and Present*.  
Aborigines, Africa, Air and Gods of the  
Air, America.
- KENNETT (Rev. ROBERT HATCH), B.D.  
Regius Professor of Hebrew in the University  
of Cambridge; Canon of Ely; Fellow and  
Chaplain of Queens' College, Cambridge;  
Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Ely.  
Ark.
- KILPATRICK (Rev. THOMAS B.), M.A., B.D., D.D.  
Professor of Systematic Theology in Knox  
College, Toronto; author of the articles  
'Conscience' and 'Philosophy' in the  
*Dictionary of the Bible*, and of 'Character  
of Christ' and 'Incarnation' in the *Dictio-  
nary of Christ and the Gospels*.  
Anger (Wrath) of God.
- KROHN (KAARLE LEOPOLD), D.Phil.  
Professor der finnischen und vergleichenden  
Folk-Lore an der Universität zu Helsingfors.  
Ancestor-Worship and Cult of the Dead  
(Ugro-Finnic).
- KROLL (Dr. WILHELM), D.Phil.  
Professor der Klass. Philologie an der Uni-  
versität zu Münster.  
Apathy.
- LEGER (LOUIS).  
Membre de l'Institut de France; Professeur  
au Collège de France; Professeur honoraire  
à l'École des langues orientales.  
Altar (Slavonic), Ancestor-Worship and  
Cult of the Dead (Slavonic), Architec-  
ture and Art (Slavonic).
- LEHMANN (EDVARD), D.Phil.  
Docent i religionshistorie v. Universitetet i  
København.  
Ancestor-Worship and Cult of the Dead  
(Iranian).
- LÉVI (SYLVAIN).  
Professeur au Collège de France; Directeur  
d'Études à l'École des Hautes Études.  
Abhidharma Kosa Vyakhya.
- LIDZBARSKI (MARK), Ph.D.  
Ord. Professor der Semit. Philologie an der  
Universität zu Greifswald.  
Ahiqar.
- LINDSAY (THOMAS MARTIN), D.D., LL.D.  
Principal of the United Free Church College,  
Glasgow, and Professor of Church History;  
author of *The History of the Reformation* in  
the 'International Theological Library.'  
Amyraldism.
- LITTMANN (ENNO), Ph.D.  
Professor der Semit. Philologie an der Uni-  
versität zu Strassburg.  
Abyssinia.
- MACCULLOCH (JOHN ARNOTT).  
Rector of St. Columba's, Portree, Isle of Skye;  
Canon of the Cathedral of the Holy Spirit,  
Cumbrae; author of *Comparative Theology,  
Religion: its Origin and Forms, The Child-  
hood of Fiction*.  
Adultery (Primitive and Savage), Agaos,  
Art (Note on Painting).

- MACDONALD (DUNCAN B.), M.A., B.D.**  
Sometime Scholar and Fellow of the University of Glasgow; Professor of Semitic Languages in Hartford Theological Seminary; Haskell Lecturer on Comparative Religion in the University of Chicago, 1906; Lamson Lecturer on Muhammadanism in Hartford Seminary, 1908-1909  
Allah.
- MCGIFFERT (ARTHUR CUSHMAN), Ph.D., D.D.**  
Washburn Professor of Church History in Union Theological Seminary, New York; author of the *History of Christianity in the Apostolic Age* (I. T. L.).  
Apostolic Age.
- MCGLOTHLIN (WILLIAM JOSEPH), Ph.D., D.D.**  
Professor of Church History in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville.  
Anabaptism.
- MCINTYRE (JAMES LEWIS), M.A. (Edin. and Oxon.), D.Sc. (Edin.).**  
Anderson Lecturer in Comparative Psychology to the University of Aberdeen; formerly Examiner in Philosophy to the University of Edinburgh; author of *Giordano Bruno* (1903).  
Activity (Psychological and Ethical), Apperception.
- MACKICHAN (Rev. D.), M.A., D.D., LL.D.**  
Principal of Wilson College and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Bombay.  
Advaita.
- MACKINTOSH (HUGH ROSS), M.A., D.Phil., D.D. (Edin.).**  
Professor of Systematic Theology in the New College, Edinburgh.  
Note on Ages of the World (N.T.).
- MACLAGAN (EDWARD DOUGLAS), M.A.**  
Of the Indian Civil Service, Simla; Chief Secretary to the Government of the Panjab, India.  
Amritsar.
- MACLEAN (Right Rev. ARTHUR JOHN), D.D. (Camb.), Hon. D.D. (Glas.).**  
Bishop of Moray, Ross, and Caithness.  
Abrenuntio, Agape.
- MACLER (FRÉDÉRIC).**  
Ancien Attaché à la Bibliothèque Nationale; Lauréat de l'Institut; Professeur chargé du cours d'Arménien à l'École des Langues orientales vivantes.  
Armenia (Christian).
- MACPHERSON (JOHN), M.D., F.R.C.P.E.**  
Commissioner in Lunacy for Scotland.  
Abnormalities (Psychological).
- MARGOLIOUTH (Rev. GEORGE), M.A. (Cantab.).**  
Senior Assistant in the Department of Ancient Printed Books and MSS in the British Museum.  
Ancestor-Worship and Cult of the Dead (Babylonian, Hebrew, Jewish).
- MARKHAM (Sir CLEMENTS), K.C.B., D.Sc. (Camb.), F.R.C., F.S.A., V.P.R.G.S.**  
President of the Hakluyt Society.  
Andeans.
- MARSHALL (JOHN TURNER), M.A., D.D.**  
Principal of Manchester Baptist College; Lecturer in History of Christian Doctrine in Manchester University.  
Adoration (Biblical).
- MILLS (LAWRENCE HEPWORTH), D.D. (N.Y.), Hon. M.A. (Oxon.).**  
Professor of Zend Philology in the University of Oxford.  
Ahuna Vairya.
- MODI (SHAMS-UL-ULMA JIVANJI JAMSHEDJI), B.A.**  
Fellow of the University of Bombay; Officier d'Académie (1898); Officier de l'Instruction Publique (1902); Vice-President of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.  
Adultery (Parsi).
- MORRISON (WILLIAM DOUGLAS), LL.D.**  
Rector of St. Marylebone, London; author of *The Jews under the Roman Empire, Crime and its Causes*.  
Abduction, Abetment, Admonition.
- MOSS (Rev. RICHARD WADDY), D.D.**  
Professor of Systematic Theology in Didsbury College, Manchester.  
Alexander the Great.
- MULLINGER (J. BASS), M.A. (Camb.).**  
University Lecturer in History; formerly Lecturer and Librarian of St. John's College, Cambridge.  
Albigenses.
- MUNRO (ROBERT), M.A., M.D., LL.D.**  
Vice-President of the Royal Society of Edinburgh; Hon. Vice-President of the Royal Archaeological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland; Hon. Member of the Royal Irish Academy, and of numerous Foreign Societies; author of *The Lake-Dwellings of Europe*.  
Anthropology.
- MURRAY (JOHN CLARK), LL.D. (Glas.), F.R.S.C.**  
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy in McGill University, Montreal.  
Agniology, Amiability.
- MYRES (JOHN L.), M.A., F.S.A., F.R.G.S.**  
Gladstone Professor of Greek, and Lecturer in Ancient Geography in the University of Liverpool; formerly student of Christ Church, Oxford, and Lecturer in Archaeology in the University of Oxford.  
Archæology.
- NEWMAN (ALBERT HENRY), D.D., LL.D., Litt.D.**  
Professor of Church History in Baylor University; author of *A History of the Baptist Churches in the United States, A Manual of Church History*.  
Æons.
- NICHOLSON (REYNOLD ALLEYNE), M.A.**  
Lecturer in Persian in the University of Cambridge; sometime Fellow of Trinity College.  
Abd ar-Razzaq.
- NÜLDEKE (THEODOR), Ph.D., LL.D. (Edin.).**  
Professor emeritus an der Kaiser-Wilhelms-Universität zu Strassburg.  
Arabs (Ancient).
- OESTERLEY (Rev. W. O. E.), D.D. (Cantab.).**  
Organizing Secretary to the Parochial Missions to the Jews at Home and Abroad; Lecturer to the Palestine Exploration Fund; joint-author of *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*.  
A and Ω, Adoration (Post-Biblical).
- OWEN (MARY ALICIA).**  
President of the Missouri Folklore Society; Councillor of the American Folklore Society; admitted to Tribal Membership with the Indians, 1892.  
Algonquins (Prairie Tribes).

- PASS (H. LEONARD), M.A.  
Formerly Scholar and Hutchinson Student of St. John's College, Cambridge; Tyrwhitt Scholar, 1902; 'Recognized Lecturer' in Theology in the University of Cambridge.  
Altar (Christian), Am Ha-Ares.
- PATON (REV. LEWIS BAYLES), Ph.D., D.D.  
Nettleton Professor of Old Testament Exegesis and Criticism, and Instructor in Assyrian in the Hartford Theological Seminary; late Director of the American School of Archaeology in Jerusalem.  
Ammi, Ammonites.
- PATRICK (MARY MILLS), A.M. (Jena), Ph.D. (Berne).  
President of the American College for Girls at Constantinople.  
Anaxagoras.
- PEARSON (A. C.), M.A.  
Late Scholar of Christ's College, Cambridge.  
Achelous, Achilles, Æther.
- PETRIE (WILLIAM MATTHEW FLINDERS), D.C.L. (Oxon.), LL.D. (Edin., Aber.), Litt.D. (Camb.), Ph.D. (Strassburg).  
Fellow of the Royal Society and of the British Academy; Edwards Professor of Egyptology in the University of London.  
Architecture (Egyptian), Art (Egyptian).
- PINCHES (THEOPHILUS GOLDRIDGE), LL.D. (Glas.), M.R.A.S.  
Lecturer in Assyrian at University College, London, and at the Institute of Archaeology, Liverpool; Hon. Member of the Société Asiatique.  
Architecture (Assyro-Babylonian, Phœnician), Art (Assyro-Babylonian, Phœnician).
- PLATT (REV. FREDERIC), M.A., B.D.  
Tutor in Old Testament Languages and Literature, and in Philosophy, in the Wesleyan College, Didsbury, Manchester.  
Arminianism.
- POUSSIN (LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE), Docteur en philosophie et lettres (Liège), en langues orientales (Louvain).  
Professeur de sanscrit à l'université de Gand; Co-directeur du Musée; Membre de R.A.S. et de la Société Asiatique.  
Adibuddha, Ages of the World (Buddhist), Agnosticism (Buddhist).
- PRINCE (J. DYNELEY), B.A., Ph.D.  
Professor of Semitic Languages in Columbia University, N.Y.; Member of the New Jersey Legislature; Advisory Commissioner on Crime and Dependency for New Jersey Legislative Committee on Education.  
Algonquins (Eastern).
- REYON (MICHEL), LL.D., D.Lit.  
Late Professor of Law in the Imperial University of Tokyo and Legal Adviser to the Japanese Government; Professor of History of the Civilization of the Far East in the University of Paris; author of *Le Shinntoisme*.  
Ancestor-Worship and Cult of the Dead (Japanese).
- RIESS (ERNST), M.A., Ph.D.  
Assistant Professor of Latin in the University of New York.  
Alchemy (Greek and Roman).
- ROBERTSON (CHARLES DONALD), M.A.  
Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.  
Ambition.
- ROSE (H. A.), I.C.S.  
Superintendent of Ethnography, Panjab, India.  
Abandonment and Exposure (Hindu), Akalis.
- ROSS (G. R. T.), M.A., D.Phil.  
Lecturer in Philosophy and Education in Hartley University College, Southampton; author of *Aristotle's De Sensu and De Memoria*.  
Accidents, Arbitrariness.
- SALADIN (HENRI).  
Architecte du Gouvernement, chargé de Missions Archéologiques en Tunisie; Membre de la Commission archéologique de l'Afrique du Nord au Ministère de l'Instruction Publique de France.  
Architecture (Muhammadian).
- SAYCE (ARCHIBALD HENRY), Hon. D.Litt. (Oxon.), LL.D. (Dublin), Hon. D.D. (Edin. and Aber.).  
Fellow of Queen's College and Professor of Assyriology in the University of Oxford; President of the Society of Biblical Archaeology.  
Armenia (Early Vannic).
- SCOTT (ERNEST FINDLAY), M.A. (Glas.), B.A. (Oxon.).  
Professor of Church History in Queen's University, Kingston, Canada.  
Æons.
- SHAMBAUGH (BERTHA MAUD HORACK).  
Author of *Amana: The Community of True Inspiration*.  
Amana Society.
- SIMPSON (SIR ALEXANDER RUSSELL), M.D., D.Sc., LL.D.  
Emeritus Professor of Midwifery and Diseases of Women and Children, and formerly Dean of the Faculty of Medicine in the University of Edinburgh.  
Anæsthesia.
- SIMPSON (ANDREW FINDLATER), M.A.  
Professor of New Testament Exegesis and Criticism in the Congregational Theological Hall, Edinburgh.  
Acceptance, Access.
- SIMPSON (JAMES GILLILAND), M.A.  
Lecturer of Leeds Parish Church; Principal of the Clergy School; Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Argyll and the Isles.  
Apostolic Succession.
- SMITH (KIRBY FLOWER), Ph.D. (Johns Hopkins).  
Professor of Latin in the Johns Hopkins University.  
Ages of the World (Greek).
- SMITH (VINCENT ARTHUR), M.A.  
Of the Indian Civil Service (retired); author of *Asoka in 'Rulers of India'*.  
Amaravati, Architecture (Hindu), Art (Hindu).
- SÖDERBLOM (REV. NATHAN), D.D. (Paris).  
Elève diplômé de l'École des Hautes Études; Ord. Professor of the University of Upsala; Member of the Chapter of Upsala; Prebendary of Holy Trinity in Upsala.  
Ages of the World (Zoroastr.), Ardashir I.
- SEAWLEY (REV. JAMES HERBERT), D.D.  
Tutor and Theological Lecturer in Selwyn College, Cambridge; Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Lichfield.  
Antiochene Theology.

STAWELL (FLORENCE MELIAN).  
 Certificated Student of Newnham College,  
 Cambridge (Classical Tripos, 1892, Part I.  
 Class I. Div. I.); sometime Lecturer in  
 Classics at Newnham College.  
 Abasement, Adoration.

STERRETT (Rev. J. MACBRIDE), D.D.  
 Professor of Philosophy in the George Wash-  
 ington University, Washington.  
 Antinomianism, Antinomies.

STOKES (GEORGE J.), M.A. (T.C.D.).  
 Of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Professor  
 of Mental and Social Science in Queen's  
 College, Cork.  
 Accident, Ætiology.

STRACK (HERMANN L.), Ph.D., D.D.  
 Professor der Theologie an der Universität zu  
 Berlin.  
 Anti-Semitism.

STRONG (Very Rev. THOMAS BANKS), D.D.  
 Dean of Christ Church, Oxford; author of  
*A Manual of Theology*; Bampton Lecturer  
 in 1896.  
 Absolution.

STRZYGOWSKI (HOFRAAT DR. JOSEF).  
 Professor der Kunstgeschichte an der Univer-  
 sität zu Graz.  
 Art (Muhammadan).

TASKER (Rev. JOHN G.), D.D.  
 Professor of Theology in the Wesleyan College,  
 Handsworth, Birmingham.  
 Abandonment, Advocate.

TAYLOR (Rev. CHARLES), D.D., Hon. LL.D.  
 (Harvard).  
 Master of St. John's College, Cambridge;  
 Vice-Chancellor of the University, 1887-1888.  
 Accidie, Acrostic.

TAYLOR (Rev. JOHN), D.Lit., M.A., B.D.  
 Vicar and Rural Dean of Winchcombe, Gloucs.  
 Abyss.

TAYLOR (Rev. ROBERT BRUCE), M.A.  
 Examiner in Economics to the University of  
 Glasgow.  
 Anarchism.

TEMPLE (Lt.-Col. Sir RICHARD), Bart., C.I.E.  
 Hon. Fellow of Trinity Hall, Cambridge; late  
 of the Indian Army; Chief Commissioner  
 Andaman and Nicobar Islands, 1894.  
 Andamans.

THOMAS (FREDERICK WILLIAM), M.A.  
 Librarian of the India Office; late Fellow of  
 Trinity College, Cambridge.  
 Abhiseka.

THOMAS (NORTHCOTE WHITRIDGE).  
 Élève diplômé de l'École pratique des Hautes  
 Études; Corresponding Member of the  
 Société d'Anthropologie de Paris; Member  
 of Council of the Folklore Society; author  
 of *Thought Transference, Kinship Organiza-  
 tion and Group Marriage in Australia*.  
 Alcheringa, Animals.

THOMSON (BASIL HOME).  
 Barrister-at-Law; formerly Acting Native  
 Commissioner in Fiji.  
 Ancestor-Worship and Cult of the Dead  
 (Fijian).

THOMSON (J. ARTHUR), M.A.  
 Regius Professor of Natural History in the  
 University of Aberdeen; author of *The  
 Study of Animal Life, The Science of Life,  
 Outlines of Zoology, Heredity*.  
 Abiogenesis, Adaptation, Age.

VIDYABHUSANA (SATIS CHANDRA), M.A., Ph.D.,  
 M.R.A.S.  
 Professor of Sanskrit and Pali and Indian  
 Philosophy in the Presidency College, Cal-  
 cutta; Joint Secretary of the Buddhist Text  
 Society of India.  
 Absolute (Vedanta and Buddhist).

WADDELL (L. AUSTINE), C.B., C.I.E., LL.D.,  
 F.L.S., F.R.A.I., Lt.-Colonel, I.M.S.  
 Professor of Tibetan in University College,  
 London; author of *The Buddhism of Tibet,  
 Lhasa and its Mysteries*.  
 Abbot (Tibetan), Amitayus.

WALSHE (Rev. W. GILBERT), B.A.  
 Recording Secretary of the Society for the  
 Diffusion of Christian and General Know-  
 ledge among the Chinese, Shanghai.  
 Altar (Chinese).

WENLEY (ROBERT MARK), D.Phil., Sc.D., Litt.D.,  
 LL.D.  
 Professor of Philosophy in the University of  
 Michigan; author of *Contemporary Theology  
 and Theism*.  
 Acosmism.

WHIBLEY (LEONARD), M.A.  
 Fellow of Pembroke College, Cambridge;  
 University Lecturer in Ancient History.  
 Amphictyony.

WHYTE (J. MACKIE), M.A., M.D. (Edin.),  
 M.R.C.S. (Eng.).  
 Physician to the Dundee Royal Infirmary;  
 Lecturer on Clinical Medicine in St. Andrews  
 University.  
 Alcohol.

WILDE (NORMAN), Ph.D.  
 Professor of Philosophy and Psychology in the  
 University of Minnesota.  
 Æstheticism.

WOODHOUSE (WILLIAM J.), M.A.  
 Professor of Greek in the University of Sydney,  
 New South Wales.  
 Adoption (Greek, Roman), Amnesty,  
 Aphrodisia, Apollonia.

WOODS (Rev. FRANCIS HENRY), M.A., B.D.  
 Rector of Bainton, Yorkshire; late Fellow  
 and Theological Lecturer of St. John's  
 College, Oxford.  
 Antediluvians.

WORKMAN (Rev. HERBERT B.), D.Lit.  
 Principal of the Westminster Training College.  
 Abelard, Ambrose of Milan, Anselm of  
 Canterbury.

DE WULF (MAURICE), Docteur en droit, Docteur  
 en philosophie et lettres.  
 Professeur de Logique, de Critériologie,  
 d'Histoire de la Philosophie à l'Université  
 de Louvain; Membre de l'Académie royale  
 de Belgique, et du Conseil d'administration  
 de la Bibliothèque royale de Belgique;  
 Secrétaire de Rédaction de la Revue Néo-  
 Scolastique.  
 Æsthetics.



SCHEME OF transliteration

I. HEBREW

CONSONANTS			
'	א	l	ל
b, bh	ב	m	מ
g, gh	ג	n	נ
d, dh	ד	s	ס
h	ה	.	ע
v, w	ו	p, ph	פ
z	ז	q	ק
h or ch	ח	r	ר
t	ט	ś, sh	ש
y or j	י	t, th	ת
k, kh	כ		

VOWELS			
Short.	Long and Diphthongal.		Sh'vas.
a	ā	ā	ā
e	ē, ē	ē, ē	ē
i	i	i	i
o	ō, ō	ō, ō	ō
u	ū	ū	ū

Composite sh'vas.  
(simple sh'va).

II. ARABIC

CONSONANTS			
.	أ	d	ض
b	ب	t	ط
t	ت	z	ظ
th	ث	.	ع
j	ي	gh	غ
h	ه	f	ف
q	ق	q	ق
d	د	k	ك
dh	ذ	l	ل
r	ر	m	م
.	.	n	ن
s	س	h	ه
sh	ش	v, w	و
q	ع	y	ي

## SCHEME OF TRANSLITERATION

## II. ARABIC—continued

VOWELS		
Short.	Long.	Diphthong.
a    ا	ā    اَ	ai    اِيْ
i    اِ	ī    اِيْ	au    اُوْ
u    اُ	ū    اُوْ	

III. PERSIAN AND HINDUSTANI<sup>1</sup>

The following in addition to the Arabic transliteration above

p    پ	z    ز
t    ت	r    ر
s    س	zh    ذ
ch    چ	z    ض
ḡ    گ	g    گ

<sup>1</sup> The diacritical marks in this scheme are sometimes omitted in transliteration when absolute accuracy is not required, the pronunciation of ṣ being the same as that of s, while z, z, ṣ, are all pronounced alike.

## IV. SANSKRIT

## CONSONANTS

Gutturals—k, kh; g, gh; ṅ (=ng in finger).

Palatals—ch (=ch in church), chh; j, jh; ñ (=n in onion).

Cerebrals—ṭ, ṭh; ḍ, ḍh; ṇ (a sound peculiar to India).

Dentals—t, th; d, dh; n (=n in not).

Labials—p, ph; b, bh; m.

Semi-vowels—y; r; l; v.

Sibilants—ś or sh; ṣ or sh; s.

Aspirate—h.

anunāsika (◌ं); anusvāra, ṁ; visarga, ḥ; avagraha (◌).

## VOWELS

SIMPLE.		DIPHTHONGAL.	
a	ā or â	e	āi
i	ī or î	o	āu
u	ū or û		
ṛ	ṝ		
ḷ			

# LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS

## I. GENERAL

A.H. = Anno Hijrae (A.D. 622).  
 Ak. = Akkadian.  
 Alex. = Alexandrian.  
 Amer. = American.  
 Apoc. = Apocalypse, Apocalyptic.  
 Apocr. = Apocrypha.  
 Aq. = Aquila.  
 Arab. = Arabic.  
 Aram. = Aramaic.  
 Arm. = Armenian.  
 Ary. = Aryan.  
 As. = Asiatic.  
 Assy. = Assyrian.  
 AT = *Altes Testament*.  
 AV = Authorized Version.  
 AVm = Authorized Version margin.  
 A.Y. = Anno Yazdagird (A.D. 639).  
 Bab. = Babylonian.  
 c. = *circa*, about.  
 Can. = Canaanite.  
 cf. = compare.  
 ct. = contrast.  
 D = Deuteronomist.  
 E = Elohist.  
 edd. = editions or editors.  
 Egypt. = Egyptian.  
 Eng. = English.  
 Eth. = Ethiopic.  
 EV, EVV = English Version, Versions.  
 f. = and following verse or page.  
 ff. = and following verses or pages.  
 Fr. = French.  
 Germ. = German.  
 Gr. = Greek.  
 H = Law of Holiness.  
 Heb. = Hebrew.  
 Hel. = Hellenistic.  
 Hex. = Hexateuch.  
 Himy. = Himyaritic.  
 Ir. = Irish.  
 Iran. = Iranian.

Isr. = Israelite.  
 J = Jahwist.  
 J" = Jehovah.  
 Jerus. = Jerusalem.  
 Jos. = Josephus.  
 LXX = Septuagint.  
 Min. = Minæan.  
 MSS = Manuscripts.  
 MT = Massoretic Text.  
 n. = note.  
 NT = New Testament.  
 Onk. = Onkelos.  
 OT = Old Testament.  
 P = Priestly Narrative.  
 Pal. = Palestine, Palestinian.  
 Pent. = Pentateuch.  
 Pers. = Persian.  
 Phil. = Philistine.  
 Phœn. = Phœnician.  
 Pr. Bk. = Prayer Book.  
 R = Redactor.  
 Rom. = Roman.  
 RV = Revised Version.  
 RVm = Revised Version margin.  
 Sab. = Sabæan.  
 Sam. = Samaritan.  
 Sem. = Semitic.  
 Sept. = Septuagint.  
 Sin. = Sinaitic.  
 Skr. = Sanskrit.  
 Symm. = Symmachus.  
 Syr. = Syriac.  
 t. (following a number) = times.  
 Talm. = Talmud.  
 Targ. = Targum.  
 Theod. = Theodotion.  
 TR = Textus Receptus, Received Text.  
 tr. = translated or translation.  
 VSS = Versions.  
 Vulg., Vg. = Vulgate.  
 WH = Westcott and Hort's text.

## II. BOOKS OF THE BIBLE

### Old Testament.

Gn = Genesis.	Ca = Canticles.
Ex = Exodus.	Is = Isaiah.
Lv = Leviticus.	Jer = Jeremiah.
Nu = Numbers.	La = Lamentations.
Dt = Deuteronomy.	Ezk = Ezekiel.
Jos = Joshua.	Dn = Daniel.
Jg = Judges.	Hos = Hosea.
Ru = Ruth.	Jl = Joel.
1 S, 2 S = 1 and 2 Samuel.	Am = Amos.
1 K, 2 K = 1 and 2 Kings.	Ob = Obadiah.
1 Ch, 2 Ch = 1 and 2 Chronicles.	Jon = Jonah.
Ezr = Ezra.	Mic = Micah.
Neh = Nehemiah.	Nah = Nahum.
Est = Esther.	Hab = Habakkuk.
Job.	Zeph = Zephaniah.
Ps = Psalms.	Hag = Haggai.
Pr = Proverbs.	Zec = Zechariah.
Ec = Ecclesiastes.	Mal = Malachi.

### Apocrypha.

1 Es, 2 Es = 1 and 2 Esdras.	To = Tobit.
	Jth = Judith.

Ad. Est = Additions to Esther.	Sus = Susanna.
Wis = Wisdom.	Bel = Bel and the Dragon.
Sir = Sirach or Ecclesiasticus.	Pr. Man = Prayer of Manasses.
Bar = Baruch.	1 Mac, 2 Mac = 1 and 2 Maccabees.
Three = Song of the Three Children.	

### New Testament.

Mt = Matthew.	1 Th, 2 Th = 1 and 2 Thessalonians.
Mk = Mark.	1 Ti, 2 Ti = 1 and 2 Timothy.
Lk = Luke.	Tit = Titus.
Jn = John.	Philem = Philemon.
Ac = Acts.	He = Hebrews.
Ro = Romans.	Ja = James.
1 Co, 2 Co = 1 and 2 Corinthians.	1 P, 2 P = 1 and 2 Peter.
Gal = Galatians.	1 Jn, 2 Jn, 3 Jn = 1, 2, and 3 John.
Eph = Ephesians.	Jude.
Ph = Philippians.	Rev = Revelation.
Col = Colossians.	

## III. FOR THE LITERATURE

## 1. The following authors' names, when unaccompanied by the title of a book, stand for the works in the list below.

- Baethgen=*Beiträge zur sem. Religionsgesch.*, 1888.  
 Baldwin=*Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology*, 3 vols. 1901-05.  
 Barth=*Nominalbildung in den sem. Sprachen*, 2 vols. 1889, 1891 (2 1894).  
 Benzinger=*Heb. Archäologie*, 1894.  
 Brockelmann=*Gesch. d. arab. Literatur*, 2 vols. 1897-1902.  
 Bruns-Sachau=*Syr.-Röm. Rechtsbuch aus dem fünften Jahrhundert*, 1880.  
 Budge=*Gods of the Egyptians*, 2 vols. 1903.  
 Daremberg-Saglio=*Dict. des ant. grec. et rom.*, 1886-90.  
 De la Saussaye=*Lehrbuch der Religionsgesch.*, 1905.  
 Denzinger=*Enchiridion Symbolorum*<sup>11</sup>, Freiburg im Br., 1911.  
 Deussen=*Die Philos. d. Upanishads*, 1899 [Eng. tr., 1906].  
 Doughty=*Arabia Deserta*, 2 vols. 1888.  
 Grimm=*Deutsche Mythologie*<sup>4</sup>, 3 vols. 1875-78, Eng. tr. *Teutonic Mythology*, 4 vols. 1882-88.  
 Hamburger=*Realencyclopädie für Bibel u. Talmud*, i. 1870 (2 1892), ii. 1883, suppl. 1886, 1891 f., 1897.  
 Holder=*Altceltischer Sprachschatz*, 1891 ff.  
 Holtzmann-Zöpfel=*Lexicon f. Theol. u. Kirchenwesen*<sup>2</sup>, 1895.  
 Howitt=*Native Tribes of S.E. Australia*, 1904.  
 Jubainville=*Cours de Litt. celtique*, i.-xii., 1883 ff.  
 Lagrange=*Études sur les religions sémitiques*<sup>2</sup>, 1904.  
 Lane=*An Arabic-English Lexicon*, 1863 ff.  
 Lang=*Myth, Ritual, and Religion*<sup>2</sup>, 2 vols. 1899.  
 Lepsius=*Denkmäler aus Aegypten u. Aethiopien*, 1849-60.  
 Lichtenberger=*Encyc. des sciences religieuses*, 1876.  
 Lidzbarski=*Handbuch der nordsem. Epigraphik*, 1898.  
 McCurdy=*History, Prophecy, and the Monuments*, 2 vols. 1894-96.  
 Muir=*Orig. Sanskrit Texts*, 1858-72.  
 Muss-Arnolt=*A Concise Dict. of the Assyrian Language*, 1894 ff.  
 Nowack=*Lehrbuch d. heb. Archäologie*, 2 vols. 1894.  
 Pauly-Wissowa=*Realencyc. der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 1894 ff.  
 Perrot-Chipiez=*Hist. de l'art dans l'antiquité*, 1881 ff.  
 Preller=*Römische Mythologie*, 1858.  
 Réville=*Religion des peuples non-civilisés*, 1883.  
 Riehm=*Handwörterbuch d. bibl. Altertums*<sup>2</sup>, 1893-94.  
 Robinson=*Biblical Researches in Palestine*<sup>2</sup>, 1856.  
 Roscher=*Lex. d. gr. u. röm. Mythologie*, 1884 ff.  
 Schaff-Herzog=*The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge*, 1908 ff.  
 Schenkel=*Bibel-Lexicon*, 5 vols. 1869-75.  
 Schürer=*GJV*<sup>3</sup>, 3 vols. 1898-1901 [*HJP*, 5 vols. 1890 ff.].  
 Schwally=*Leben nach dem Tode*, 1892.  
 Siegfried-Stade=*Heb. Wörterbuch zum AT*, 1893.  
 Smend=*Lehrbuch der alttest. Religionsgesch.*<sup>2</sup>, 1899.  
 Smith (G. A.)=*Historical Geography of the Holy Land*<sup>4</sup>, 1897.  
 Smith (W. R.)=*Religion of the Semites*<sup>2</sup>, 1894.  
 Spencer (H.)=*Principles of Sociology*<sup>2</sup>, 1885-96.  
 Spencer-Gillen<sup>a</sup>=*Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 1899.  
 Spencer-Gillen<sup>b</sup>=*Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, 1904.  
 Swete=*The OT in Greek*, 3 vols. 1893 ff.  
 Tylor (E. B.)=*Primitive Culture*<sup>2</sup>, 1891 [4 1903].  
 Ueberweg=*Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., 2 vols. 1872-74.  
 Weber=*Jüdische Theologie auf Grund des Talmud u. verwandten Schriften*<sup>2</sup>, 1897.  
 Wiedemann=*Die Religion der alten Aegypter*, 1890 [Eng. tr., revised, *Religion of the Anc. Egyptians*, 1897].  
 Wilkinson=*Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians*, 3 vols. 1878.  
 Zanz=*Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der Juden*<sup>2</sup>, 1892.

## 2. Periodicals, Dictionaries, Encyclopædias, and other standard works frequently cited.

- AA=Archiv für Anthropologie.  
 AAOJ=American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal.  
 ABAW=Abhandlungen d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.  
 AE=Archiv für Ethnographie.  
 AEG=Assyr. and Eng. Glossary (Johns Hopkins University).  
 AGG=Abhandlungen der Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.  
 AGPh=Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.  
 AHR=American Historical Review.  
 AHT=Ancient Hebrew Tradition (Hommel).  
 AJPh=American Journal of Philology.  
 AJP=American Journal of Psychology.  
 AJRPE=American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education.  
 AJSL=American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature.  
 AJTh=American Journal of Theology.  
 AMG=Annales du Musée Guimet.  
 APES=American Palestine Exploration Society.  
 APF=Archiv für Papyrusforschung.  
 AR=Anthropological Review.  
 ARW=Archiv für Religionswissenschaft.  
 AS=Acta Sanctorum (Bollandus).  
 ASG=Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.  
 ASoc=L'Année Sociologique.  
 ASWI=Archæological Survey of W. India.  
 AZ=Allgemeine Zeitung.  
 BAG=Beiträge zur alten Geschichte.  
 BASS=Beiträge zur Assyriologie u. sem. Sprachwissenschaft (edd. Delitzsch und Haupt).  
 BCH=Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique.  
 BE=Bureau of Ethnology.  
 BG=Bombay Gazetteer.  
 BJ=Bellum Judaicum (Josephus).  
 BL=Bampton Lectures.  
 BLE=Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique.  
 BOR=Bab. and Oriental Record.  
 BS=Bibliotheca Sacra.  
 BSA=Annual of the British School at Athens.  
 BSAA=Bulletin de la Soc. archéologique à Alexandrie.  
 BSAL=Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie de Lyon.  
 BSAP=Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie, etc., Paris.  
 BSG=Bulletin de la Soc. de Géographie.  
 BTS=Buddhist Text Society.  
 BW=Biblical World.  
 BZ=Biblische Zeitschrift.

- CAIBL* = Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.  
*CBTS* = Calcutta Buddhist Text Society.  
*CE* = Catholic Encyclopedia.  
*CF* = Childhood of Fiction (MacCulloch).  
*CGS* = Cults of the Greek States (Farnell).  
*CI* = Census of India.  
*CIA* = Corpus Inscript. Atticarum.  
*CIE* = Corpus Inscript. Etruscarum.  
*CIG* = Corpus Inscript. Græcarum.  
*CIL* = Corpus Inscript. Latinarum.  
*CIS* = Corpus Inscript. Semiticarum.  
*COT* = Cuneiform Inscriptions and the OT [Eng. tr. of *KAT*<sup>2</sup>; see below].  
*CR* = Contemporary Review.  
*CeR* = Celtic Review.  
*CR* = Classical Review.  
*CQR* = Church Quarterly Review.  
*CSEL* = Corpus Script. Eccles. Latinarum.  
*DAC* = Dict. of the Apostolic Church.  
*DACL* = Dict. d'Archéologie chrétienne et de Liturgie (Cabrol).  
*DB* = Dict. of the Bible.  
*DCA* = Dict. of Christian Antiquities (Smith-Cheetham).  
*DCB* = Dict. of Christian Biography (Smith-Wace).  
*DGG* = Dict. of Christ and the Gospels.  
*DI* = Dict. of Islam (Hughes).  
*DNB* = Dict. of National Biography.  
*DPhP* = Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology.  
*DWA W* = Denkschriften der Wiener Akad. der Wissenschaften.  
*Ebi* = Encyclopædia Biblica.  
*EBR* = Encyclopædia Britannica.  
*EEFM* = Egyp. Explor. Fund Memoirs.  
*EI* = Encyclopædia of Islâm.  
*ERE* = The present work.  
*Exp* = Expositor.  
*ExpT* = Expository Times.  
*FHG* = Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum (coll. C. Müller, Paris, 1855).  
*FL* = Folklore.  
*FLJ* = Folklore Journal.  
*FLR* = Folklore Record.  
*GA* = Gazette Archéologique.  
*GB* = Golden Bough (Frazer).  
*GGA* = Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen.  
*GGN* = Göttingische Gelehrte Nachrichten (Nachrichten der königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen).  
*GIAP* = Grundriss d. Indo-Arischen Philologie.  
*GrP* = Grundriss d. Iranischen Philologie.  
*GJV* = Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes.  
*GVI* = Geschichte des Volkes Israel.  
*HAI* = Handbook of American Indians.  
*HDB* = Hastings' Dict. of the Bible.  
*HE* = Historia Ecclesiastica.  
*HGHL* = Historical Geography of the Holy Land (G. A. Smith).  
*HI* = History of Israel.  
*HJ* = Hibbert Journal.  
*HJP* = History of the Jewish People.  
*HL* = Hibbert Lectures.  
*HN* = Historia Naturalis (Pliny).  
*HWB* = Handwörterbuch.  
*IA* = Indian Antiquary.  
*ICC* = International Critical Commentary.  
*ICO* = International Congress of Orientalists.  
*ICR* = Indian Census Report.  
*IG* = Inscript. Græcæ (publ. under auspices of Berlin Academy, 1873 ff.).  
*IGA* = Inscript. Græcæ Antiquissimæ.  
*IGI* = Imperial Gazetteer of India<sup>2</sup> (1885); new edition (1908-09).  
*IJE* = International Journal of Ethics.  
*ITL* = International Theological Library.  
*JAS* = Journal Asiatique.  
*JAFI* = Journal of American Folklore.  
*JAI* = Journal of the Anthropological Institute.  
*JAOS* = Journal of the American Oriental Society.  
*JASB* = Journal of the Anthropological Society of Bombay.  
*JASBe* = Journ. of As. Soc. of Bengal.  
*JBL* = Journal of Biblical Literature.  
*JBTS* = Journal of the Buddhist Text Society.  
*JD* = Journal des Débats.  
*JDTh* = Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie.  
*JE* = Jewish Encyclopedia.  
*JGOS* = Journal of the German Oriental Society.  
*JHC* = Johns Hopkins University Circulars.  
*JHS* = Journal of Hellenic Studies.  
*JLZ* = Jenäer Literaturzeitung.  
*JPh* = Journal of Philology.  
*JPTb* = Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie.  
*JPTS* = Journal of the Pali Text Society.  
*JQR* = Jewish Quarterly Review.  
*JRAI* = Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute.  
*JRAS* = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.  
*JRASB* = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay branch.  
*JRASC* = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Ceylon branch.  
*JRASK* = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Korean branch.  
*JRGS* = Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.  
*JRS* = Journal of Roman Studies.  
*JThSt* = Journal of Theological Studies.  
*KAT<sup>2</sup>* = Die Keilinschriften und das AT<sup>2</sup> (Schrader), 1883.  
*KAT<sup>3</sup>* = Zimmern-Winckler's ed. of the preceding (really a totally distinct work), 1903.  
*KB* or *KLB* = Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek (Schrader), 1889 ff.  
*KGF* = Keilinschriften und die Geschichtsforschung, 1878.  
*LCBl* = Literarisches Centralblatt.  
*LOPh* = Literaturblatt für Oriental. Philologie.  
*LOT* = Introduction to Literature of OT (Driver).  
*LP* = Legend of Perseus (Hartland).  
*LSS* = Leipziger sem. Studien.  
*M* = Mélusine.  
*MAIBL* = Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.  
*MBAW* = Monatsbericht d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.  
*MGH* = Monumenta Germaniæ Historica (Pertz).  
*MGGJV* = Mittheilungen der Gesellschaft für jüdische Volkskunde.  
*MGWJ* = Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums.  
*MI* = Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas (Westermarck).  
*MNDPV* = Mittheilungen u. Nachrichten des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.  
*MB* = Methodist Review.  
*MVG* = Mittheilungen der vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft.  
*MWJ* = Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judentums.  
*NBAC* = Nuovo Bullettino di Archeologia Cristiana.  
*NC* = Nineteenth Century.  
*NHWB* = Neuhebräisches Wörterbuch.  
*NINQ* = North Indian Notes and Queries.  
*NKZ* = Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift.  
*NQ* = Notes and Queries.  
*NR* = Native Races of the Pacific States (Bancroft).  
*NTZG* = Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte.  
*OED* = Oxford English Dictionary.  
*OLZ* = Orientalische Literaturzeitung.  
*OS* = Onomastica Sacra.  
*OTJC* = Old Testament in the Jewish Church (W. R. Smith).  
*OTP* = Oriental Translation Fund Publications.  
*PAOS* = Proceedings of American Oriental Society.

*PASB* = Proceedings of the Anthropological Soc. of Bombay.  
*PB* = Polychrome Bible (English).  
*PBE* = Publications of the Bureau of Ethnology.  
*PC* = Primitive Culture (Tylor).  
*PEFM* = Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Memoirs.  
*PEFSt* = Palestine Exploration Fund Statement.  
*PG* = Patrologia Graeca (Migne).  
*PJB* = Preussische Jahrbücher.  
*PL* = Patrologia Latina (Migne).  
*PJQ* = Punjab Notes and Queries.  
*PR* = Popular Religion and Folklore of N. India (Crooke).  
*PRE*<sup>3</sup> = Prot. Realencyclopädie (Herzog-Hauck).  
*PRR* = Presbyterian and Reformed Review.  
*PRS* = Proceedings of the Royal Society.  
*PRSE* = Proceedings Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.  
*PSBA* = Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology.  
*PTS* = Pali Text Society.  
*RA* = Revue Archéologique.  
*RAnth* = Revue d'Anthropologie.  
*RAS* = Royal Asiatic Society.  
*RAssyr* = Revue d'Assyriologie.  
*RB* = Revue Biblique.  
*RBEW* = Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology (Washington).  
*RC* = Revue Critique.  
*RCel* = Revue Celtique.  
*RCh* = Revue Chrétienne.  
*RDM* = Revue des Deux Mondes.  
*RE* = Realencyclopädie.  
*REG* = Revue des Études Grecques.  
*REg* = Revue Égyptologique.  
*REJ* = Revue des Études Juives.  
*Reth* = Revue d'Ethnographie.  
*RGG* = Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.  
*RHLR* = Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature religieuses.  
*RHR* = Revue de l'Histoire des Religions.  
*RMM* = Revue du monde musulman.  
*RN* = Revue Numismatique.  
*RP* = Records of the Past.  
*RPh* = Revue Philosophique.  
*RQ* = Römische Quartalschrift.  
*RS* = Revue sémitique d'Épigraphie et d'Hist. ancienne.  
*RSA* = Recueil de la Soc. archéologique.  
*RSI* = Reports of the Smithsonian Institution.  
*RTAP* = Recueil de Travaux relatifs à l'Archéologie et à la Philologie.  
*RTP* = Revue des traditions populaires.  
*RThPh* = Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie.  
*RTr* = Recueil de Travaux.  
*RVV* = Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten.  
*RWB* = Realwörterbuch.

*SBAW* = Sitzungsberichte d. Berliner Akademie d. Wissenschaften.  
*SBB* = Sacred Books of the Buddhists.  
*SBE* = Sacred Books of the East.  
*SBOT* = Sacred Books of the OT (Hebrew).  
*SDB* = Single-vol. Dict. of the Bible (Hastings).  
*SK* = Studien und Kritiken.  
*SMA* = Sitzungsberichte d. Münchener Akademie.  
*SSGW* = Sitzungsberichte d. Kgl. Sächs. Gesellsch. d. Wissenschaften.  
*SWAW* = Sitzungsberichte d. Wiener Akademie d. Wissenschaften.  
*TAPA* = Transactions of American Philological Association.  
*TASJ* = Transactions of the Asiatic Soc. of Japan.  
*TC* = Tribes and Castes.  
*TES* = Transactions of Ethnological Society.  
*ThLZ* = Theologische Literaturzeitung.  
*ThT* = Theol. Tijdschrift.  
*TRHS* = Transactions of Royal Historical Society.  
*TRSE* = Transactions of Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.  
*TS* = Texts and Studies.  
*TSBA* = Transactions of the Soc. of Biblical Archaeology.  
*TU* = Texte und Untersuchungen.  
*WAI* = Western Asiatic Inscriptions.  
*WZKM* = Wiener Zeitschrift f. Kunde des Morgenlandes.  
*ZA* = Zeitschrift für Assyriologie.  
*ZÄ* = Zeitschrift für ägypt. Sprache u. Altertumswissenschaft.  
*ZATW* = Zeitschrift für die alttest. Wissenschaft.  
*ZCK* = Zeitschrift für christliche Kunst.  
*ZCP* = Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie.  
*ZDA* = Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum.  
*ZDMG* = Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.  
*ZDPV* = Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.  
*ZE* = Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.  
*ZKF* = Zeitschrift für Keilschriftforschung.  
*ZKG* = Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte.  
*ZKT* = Zeitschrift für kathol. Theologie.  
*ZKWL* = Zeitschrift für kirchl. Wissenschaft und kirchl. Leben.  
*ZM* = Zeitschrift für die Mythologie.  
*ZNTW* = Zeitschrift für die neutest. Wissenschaft.  
*ZPhP* = Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Pädagogik.  
*ZTK* = Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.  
*ZVK* = Zeitschrift für Volkskunde.  
*ZVRW* = Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.  
*ZWT* = Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie.

[A small superior number designates the particular edition of the work referred to, as *KAT*<sup>2</sup>, *LOT*<sup>6</sup>, etc.]

# ENCYCLOPÆDIA

## OF

### RELIGION AND ETHICS

#### A

**A AND Ω.**—1. The meaning of this phrase is expressed in Rev 21<sup>6</sup> 22<sup>13</sup> as 'the beginning and the end' (ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος). The conception is to be traced to such passages as Is 41<sup>4</sup> 44<sup>6</sup> 48<sup>12</sup>. And it would appear that the thought was taken from the Hebrew rather than from the Septuagint, for in the former each of the three passages expresses finality (אֵלֶּכָּם), which is in accordance with Rev 21<sup>6</sup> 22<sup>13</sup>; while in the Septuagint the Greek equivalent, though differing in each case, emphasizes the idea of something further (τὰ ἐπερχόμενα, μετὰ ταῦτα, εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα). The point, though a small one, is significant, as it affords a piece of subsidiary evidence for a Hebrew original of the Apocalypse (see below).

2. The origin of the phrase is to be sought in pre-Christian times. Among the Jews, the first and last letters of the Hebrew alphabet, א נ, were used to express totality; thus in *Yalkut Rubeni*, fol. 3, 2, where the words of Gn 1<sup>1</sup> 'the heavens' (רָקִיעַ אֶמֶת) are commented upon, it is said that א נ, which includes all the letters, implies that all the heavens are meant, their beginning and their end; again, it is said that Adam sinned from א to נ, meaning that he was guilty of every sin; or, once more, Abraham kept the Torah from א to נ, i.e. he kept the whole Law.\* There is a well-known Rabbinical saying, 'The seal of God is *'Emeth'* (אֱמֶת = 'truth'); and in *Jerus. Sanh.* i. 18a, *'Emeth'* is said to be the name of God, who includes all things: the beginning (א), the middle (ע) is approximately the middle letter of the Hebrew alphabet, and the end (ת). א נ might then well correspond to the δ ω, δ ἦρ, δ ἐρχόμενος, 'who is, who was, who is to come,' of Rev 1<sup>8</sup>. Logically, indeed, the order should be δ ἦρ, etc.; but to a Hebrew (as the original writer of the book must have been) δ ω, as being equivalent to יהוה (Jahweh), would probably on that account come first. The Hebrew א נ, being a well-known formula expressive of entirety, may therefore have been the prototype of ΑΩ. It is, however, necessary to state that the phrase 'א and נ' is never (in pre-Christian times) used of God in the way that ΑΩ

is; it is once used of the Shekinah in the Talmud,<sup>1</sup> but as applied to God it occurs first in the Peshittā, which in each case renders Α and Ω by *ܐܠܐ ܐܠܐ*.

3. It is noticeable that wherever the expression occurs in the Apocalypse it is written *τὸ Αλφα καὶ τὸ Ω*, i.e. the first letter is written out in full, while the second is represented only by its sign; there must have been some reason for this, and possibly it is to be accounted for in the following way. It is generally held that parts of the Apocalypse were originally written in Hebrew; in this case the form of the expression would be *א נ*. Now, the Hebrew characters, as used in the 1st cent., might well have appeared to the Greek translator as representing the *'Aleph'* written in full, and the *Tau* as the letter *Omega*. Thus, in 1st cent. script: *א נ*; the similarity in both languages of the written first letter might have suggested that the second one was intended for an *Omega*. The phrase was thus imitated direct from the Hebrew manner of writing the equivalent expression. This would also account for the fact that in the vast majority of instances (certainly in *all* the earliest) the symbol was written Αω, i.e. an uncial Alpha and a cursive Omega.

4. *Use of the symbol in the Christian Church.*—A great variety of objects have been found with this symbol inscribed upon them; it figures on tombstones, as well as on other monuments, on mosaics, frescoes, and bricks, also on vases, cups, lamps, and on rings; it appears also on coins, its earliest occurrence on these being of the time of Constantine and Constantius, the sons of Constantine the Great.† These all belong to different ages and different countries; in its earliest known form (Rome, A.D. 295)† it appears as 'ω et Α,' but this is exceptional, and is perhaps of Gnostic origin. The symbol in its usual form is found on objects

\* 'Particula א נ quoque est nomen Schechinæ, q.d. Ezech. 1<sup>26</sup> Et andivi א נ vocem loquentem mecum' (Schoettgen, *op. cit.* p. 1086). It is interesting to note that א נ ('the last') is, in Midrashic literature, used as a name of the Messiah, and is identified with the מָלִיךְ ('Redeemer') of Job 19<sup>23</sup>.

† See Cabrol's *DACL*, art. 'ΑΩ.'  
; *OX. PRF*<sup>2</sup>, art. 'Α und Ω.'

\* See also *Yalk. Rub.* fol. 17, 4, fol. 48, 4, quoted in Schoettgen's *Horæ Hebraicæ et Talmudicæ*, i. pp. 1086, 1087, and *Yoma* 69b, *Sanh.* 64a, *Jerus. Yeb.* xii. 18a, *Jerus. Sanh.* i. 18a, quoted in *J.E.* i. pp. 438, 439; also *Sanh.* 55a.

belonging to the 3rd cent. in Rome and N. Africa; on objects belonging to the 4th cent. it has been found in Asia Minor, Sicily, Upper and Lower Italy, and Gaul; by the beginning of the Middle Ages it must have become known in most of the countries of Central Europe.

The combinations in which the symbol is found are very varied,\* the most frequent being the following: with a cross, with a cross and the Christ-monogram (A ✕ ω), surrounded by a wreath (symbolic of the victory over death), within a circle (symbolic of eternity), in combination with a triangle (the symbol of the Trinity). It will be seen, therefore, that, generally speaking, the letters are combined with figures which have reference to Christ, not to the other Persons of the Trinity (but see below); so that they were clearly used as inculcating the doctrine of Christ's Divinity; for this reason the letters, in this form, were avoided, as far as our knowledge goes, by the Arians.

Among the Gnostics the symbol was used for figure-jugglery and for mysterious doctrines of various kinds; e.g., when written backwards, Ω and A have the numerical value 801, which is likewise the sum of the letters of the word *περιστερά* ('dove'); therefore, they taught, Christ called Himself A and Ω because the Holy Spirit came down upon Him at His baptism in the form of a dove.† This is doubtless the reason why Aω is found in combination with a dove; not infrequently two doves figure, one on either side of the letters. Examples of this are the two little golden boxes, found in Vatican graves, which have inscribed on them the device A ✕ ω and a dove (5th cent.).‡ The like device is seen on a silver *capsella*, found at Trèves, belonging to the 4th or 5th cent.; indeed, this combination would almost appear to have been the normal form of the symbol in Trèves, judging by the frequency of its occurrence there.§

5. There is one other point that is worth alluding to. In the Apocalypse A and Ω is explained as signifying ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος, 'the beginning and the end' (21<sup>9</sup>). This is the simplest, and no doubt the earliest, form of explanation; in 22<sup>13</sup> the same form is preceded by a parallel one, 'the first and the last' (ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ὁ ἔσχατος, ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος); these two forms of explanation agree closely with the OT prototype, as seen in Is 44<sup>6</sup> 48<sup>12</sup>; the explanatory clause given in Rev 1<sup>8</sup> (ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, ὁ παντοκράτωρ) is unquestionably a developed, and therefore a later, form. The title with its explanatory clause is applied to Christ, as indicating His eternal Being. Now, it must strike one at first sight as strange that a title should be used for this purpose which contains the idea of finality, the very reverse of eternal being.¶ But on a closer examination of the passages 21<sup>1-7</sup> 22<sup>10-15</sup> it appears that the 'end' is to be the herald of a new beginning. We have here, that is to say, the echo of the eschatological belief that the 'last times' shall be parallel to the 'beginning.' This idea is brought out with great clearness in a passage cited (from some unknown work) in Ep. Barn. 6<sup>13</sup> 'Behold, I make the last things as the first' (ὁδοῦ ποιῶ τὰ ἔσχατα ὡς τὰ πρῶτα). He, the Alpha and the Omega, the First and the Last, makes the

last things as the first.\* Thus, so far from Ω denoting 'the last' or 'the end' in the usual sense of the words, it really implies the beginning of a new era. From this point of view one can well understand the frequency of the symbol Ω on tombstones; for, when experience had proved that the belief in Christ's imminent *Parousia* was a mistaken one, the hopes of Christians would naturally be transferred to the life beyond the grave.

LITERATURE.—Schoettgen, *Hor. Heb. et Talmud.* (1733-42); N. Müller, art. 'Ω' in *PRE<sup>3</sup>*; F. X. Kraus, *Die christlichen Inschriften der Rheinlande* (1890, 1894); Cabrol, art. 'Ω' in *DACL* (1903 . . .); art. 'Alpha and Omega' in *Hastings' DB* and *DCG*, and in *JE*; *CIL* xiv.

W. O. E. OESTERLEY.

**ABANDONMENT.**—In considering the ethical and religious uses of this word, we have to remember that abandonment has an active, a reflexive, and a passive meaning. It may signify (1) the action of abandoning; (2) self-abandonment, defined by Murray as 'the surrender of oneself to an influence'; (3) the condition of being abandoned.

1. The abandonment of infants, sick persons, and aged parents, now rightly condemned as immoral, was not always prompted by motives of inhumanity. Westermarck (*The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, 1906, vol. 1. ch. xvii.) has accumulated a mass of evidence which proves that practices regarded by us as atrocious, are 'largely explained by the pitiful condition of the invalid, the hardships of a wandering life, and the superstitious opinions of ignorant men.' Amongst the testimonies cited, especially important are those which show that 'the most common motive for abandoning or destroying sick people seems to be fear of infection, or of demoniacal possession, which is regarded as the cause of various diseases.' Abandonment often meant death, but not always; exposed infants were sometimes adopted into families, but they were also sometimes saved for a life of infamy. Justin Martyr, in his *First Apology*, charges (ch. xxix.) those who abandon children with the crime of murder, if the waifs 'be not picked up, but die'; he also dwells (ch. xxvii.) on the wickedness of exposing children to the peril of being kept alive for immoral purposes. See following articles.

2. There may be an abandonment of self to influences good or bad, holy or unholy. Our language testifies against us when, without saying whether there has been surrender to virtue or to vice, we describe a profligate as an abandoned youth, or a harlot as an abandoned woman. Stanhope (*Paraph.* xi. 476) calls Judas 'an abandoned disciple,' not because Jesus had abandoned him, but because the betrayer had surrendered himself to the evil one.

The Mystics understood by abandonment the complete surrender of the soul to the influences of the Divine Spirit, its entire absorption in the contemplation of the Divine glory, and its absolute devotion to the Divine will. In the dialogue narrated by Doctor Eckhart (Vaughan, *Hours with the Mystics*, bk. vi. ch. i.), a learned man asks a beggar, 'Where hast thou found God?' and the answer is, 'Where I abandoned all creatures.' To the scholar's greeting, 'God give thee good morrow,' the poor man's response is, 'I never had an ill morrow.' Whereupon the scholar says, 'But if God were to cast thee into hell, what wouldst thou do then?' The beggar's reply closes with the words, 'I would sooner be in hell and have God, than in heaven and not have Him.' Doctor Eckhart's comment is, 'Then understood this Master that true Abandonment, with utter Abasement, was the nearest way to God.'

3. When abandonment means 'the condition of being abandoned,' the reference is usually to the

\* See the exhaustive list of symbols in Cabrol, *op. cit.* I. pp. 7-23.

† Irenæus, *adv. Hæres.* I. xiv. 6, xv. 1, quoted in *PRE<sup>3</sup>*. In the Egyptian Museum in Berlin there can be seen, on both papyrus and parchment leaves, magical formulae in combination with Ω and a cross; they were most probably worn as amulets.

‡ *Bullett. crist.* 1872, 12 ff., t. 2, 2, 3.

§ See the fine plates in F. X. Kraus, *Die christlichen Inschr. der Rheinlande*, I. (Nachtrag); in one case a horse takes the place of the dove; is this an instance of syncretism?

¶ The later form of explanation (1<sup>8</sup>) was perhaps due to this.

\* Cf. Gunkel, *Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit*, p. 369.



absence of any consciousness of the Divine presence, such as finds expression in the Psalmist's cry, reiterated by Christ upon the cross, 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' (Ps 22<sup>1</sup>, Mt 27<sup>46</sup>). But the condition of one who is abandoned by his friends also involves moral issues, as, e.g., the degree in which he is himself to blame for his isolation. Martensen treats the subject luminously (*Christian Ethics*, vol. i. [Individual] p. 358 ff.) in the chapter which assigns to domestic happiness and friendship a high place among 'the relative goods of life.' But in proportion to the pleasure, of which our friends may be the legitimate sources, is the pain occasioned, when by those friends 'we are morally abandoned . . . because we, in their consciousness, in their love, as it were, die, and are buried; or, what is the same thing, because we are changed in their idea, and become other than we were before, although in reality we are still the same. Such an abandonment is, in many cases, not without guilt on our side; and, had we a richer measure of love, we would in no case so easily feel ourselves lonely and forsaken.'

The foregoing considerations cast light upon questions involved in the experience of devout souls whose complaint is 'Jehovah hath forsaken me, and the Lord hath forgotten me' (Is 49<sup>14</sup>).<sup>\*</sup> On the one hand, expression is repeatedly given in the OT to the truth which lies at the foundation of the Hebrew religion: 'The Lord will not forsake his people for his great name's sake' (1 S 12<sup>2</sup>, cf. Dt 31<sup>6</sup>, Ps 91<sup>9</sup> 37<sup>23</sup>, Is 41<sup>17</sup> 42<sup>16</sup>). Broad-based on the history of God's dealings with Israel was the 'strength and comfort' which 'fell with weight' upon John Bunyan's spirit, as he took courage from the noble words of Sir 21<sup>0</sup> 'Look at the generations of old and see; did ever any trust in the Lord, and was confounded? or did any abide in his fear, and was forsaken?' (*Grace Abounding*, § 62 ff.). On the other hand, the OT recognizes that God's promise is conditional. The message of God's Spirit through the prophets is, 'If ye forsake him, he will forsake you' (2 Ch 15<sup>2</sup>, cf. 24<sup>20</sup>). But this forsaking is not to be understood as implying that God would cast off His people for ever (Ps 94<sup>14</sup>, Jer 33<sup>24a</sup>); even when He seems to have abandoned 'the sheep of his pasture,' a voice is raised beseeching Him to 'have respect unto the covenant' (Ps 74<sup>1-20</sup>). The question, 'Will the Lord cast off from age to age?' passes into the more hopeful cry, 'Will he not once again show favour?' (Ps 77<sup>7</sup>, cf. Is 54<sup>7</sup>).

The biographies of devout believers bear witness, however, to a sense of abandonment by some who can reproach themselves neither on account of their departing from God, nor on account of their doubting His faithfulness. Martensen (*op. cit.* p. 391 ff.) describes this condition as one in which 'the individual is, in a relative sense, left to himself.' In the religious life he distinguishes two states of holiness: one in which 'the blessing of the Divine grace is perceptibly revealed,' and another in which 'grace, as it were, retires and remains hidden.' The latter state is one of 'inward drought and abandonment,' and may be the result of bodily indisposition or mental weariness. At such times 'we should hold to God's word, whose truth and grace are independent of our changing moods and feelings; and remain confident that even in states of deepest abandonment God the Lord is with us, although with veiled face.'

A sense of abandonment by the Father was the experience of Christ during the darkness that shrouded Calvary; to this fact witness is borne in the earliest Gospel, for St. Mark records none of the Seven Sayings from the Cross save this: 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' (Mk 15<sup>34</sup>, Mt 27<sup>46</sup>). Professor Schmiedel accepts this as one of the five 'absolutely credible passages' in the Gospels concerning Christ (*EBI*, vol. ii. col. 1881). Bengel (*Com. in loc.*) lays stress on the preterite tense of *ἐγκατέλιπες*, and renders, 'why didst thou forsake me?' In his view, 'at that very instant the dereliction came to an end. . . . In the deepest moment of dereliction He was silent.' This suggestion need not be pressed; the cry itself testifies to an actual feeling of abandonment by Him whose spirit never lost its faith in God. The mystery it expresses is unrelieved unless He who uttered it was the sinless Saviour, who in His infinite love was bearing 'our sins in his body upon the tree' (1 P 2<sup>24</sup>). In a lucid exposition of this Word from the Cross, W. L. Walker says: 'Our Lord felt Himself in this supreme moment forsaken, even by His Father. . . . We here see Christ suffering that which is the last consequence of sin—the sense of separation from God. . . . It is in entire keeping with, and indeed appears as the natural culmination of, His thought of giving His life as "a ransom for many," as a sacrifice for sin, or "a guilt-offering"' (*The Cross and the Kingdom* [1902], p. 138 f.). [See art. 'Dereliction' in Hastings' *DCCG*. J. G. TASKER.]

## ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE.

THE most helpless of mankind are those who have just begun life, and those who, through old age or infirmity, are about to leave it. Unable to provide for their own needs, they are entirely dependent upon the love or the compassion of others. Individual cases of neglect of infancy and age are not unknown in any country, but in some cases this neglect passes beyond an individual idiosyncrasy and becomes a national custom. When this neglect of children takes the form of removing them from the mother's habitation and leaving them unprotected to perish by starvation, the elements, or wild beasts, or to be rescued by the chance passer-by, it is called *Exposure*. The similar treatment of the aged and infirm is called *Abandonment*.

1. *Exposure*. — For the exposure of children there are several causes, which require to be treated independently. In different countries different causes often bring about the same result.

(1) In most countries the commonest cause of

the exposure of infants is *shame*, the child being the offspring either of an unmarried woman or of a union not recognized as regular by the customs of her country. Less frequently, the shame may be occasioned by some malformation of the infant itself, the parents regarding it as a reproach to them to be associated with a monster. In the legends of most countries great heroes are often represented as having been exposed to conceal the shame of their mothers. The exposure may be the act of the mother herself, as in the case of Evadne exposing Iamos (Pindar, *Olympian*. vi. 44 ff.; cf. the exposure of Ion in Euripides' *Ion*, 18 ff.), or it may be ordered or executed by the parents of the mother. Acrisius, in the fragment of Simonides, sends Danae and Perseus together adrift; in Roman legend, Romulus and Remus, the twin children of Rhea Sylvia, are exposed by the orders of the cruel uncle, Amulius (Livy, i. 4). In cases of this kind children are exposed without regard to sex.

(2) Children are exposed from *fear that the means of subsistence will not be sufficient to maintain a larger population*. Here exposure is often only

<sup>\*</sup> The words 'abandon' and 'abandonment' are not found in the EV, but the essential thought is expressed in such passages as are quoted above.

one of many methods of infanticide. The populations among which it is most common are those which live by hunting or as nomad herdsmen. Thus, amongst the native tribes of South-East Australia it is usual to kill infants by starvation, first by depriving them of food in the camp, and, when they become peevish, removing them to a distance and leaving them to die. The death, however, is assigned to *muparn* (magic) (Howitt, *Native Tribes of S. E. Australia*, p. 748). In the South Sea Islands the same end is achieved by drowning or burying alive (Turner, *Samoa*, pp. 286, 333). The Koniagas, a tribe of Eskimos, abandon girls in the wilderness after stuffing grass into their mouths (Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States of America*, i. p. 81, cf. pp. 131, 566, etc., and see foll. art.). Amongst the Arabs before Muhammad the same system prevailed, and is referred to frequently in the Qur'an as a practice to be forbidden. Here sons were preserved, but daughters were usually buried alive. 'They attribute daughters unto God (far be it from Him!); but unto themselves children of the sex which they desire. And when any of them is told the news of the birth of a female, his face becometh black, and he is deeply afflicted . . . considering within himself whether he shall keep it with disgrace, or whether he shall bury it in the dust. Do they not make an ill judgment?' (Qur'an, *Sur.* xvi. 59. 60; cf. also *Sur.* vi. 43. 81; Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, ch. iv. and especially note c). In tribes of this kind the carrying about of the weak and helpless causes great difficulty; hence many nomad tribes abandon the old as well as expose the young. Where such practices prevail, if the religion of the tribe includes ancestor-worship, daughters only will be exposed. In the patriarchal system only a son can properly present the sacrifice to the dead ancestors. On the other hand, where wives are purchased, a large family of daughters is a profitable possession, and naturally they will not be exposed. Hence in Homeric Greece, where girls are described as *παρθέναι ἀφαιεσθόαι*, 'maidens that win cattle,' because cattle were, at any rate originally, the bride-price, it was only boys that were exposed. The only exceptions are cases like the Arcadian Atalanta, who was exposed by the orders of her father Iasios, because he was disappointed that she was not a boy.\* In Sarawak it is considered specially fortunate to have a large family of girls, because the successful suitors for the daughters come to live in their parents' house and work on their sugar plantations, while sons expect their parents to help them with the wedding portion, and leave them in order to work for their father-in-law (H. Ling Roth, *Sarawak*, p. 125). Exposure in Sarawak, presumably of male children, is practised by hanging them up in a basket on a tree (*op. cit.* p. 101, note).

(3) *Exposure for other economic reasons.* Amongst those reasons which prevail especially among agricultural populations, perhaps the chief is the serious drain upon family resources in providing dowries for a large number of daughters. In modern India, exposure and other methods of infanticide have on this account been widely employed to reduce the number of daughters. Although the British Government has made every effort to stop the practice, it is doubtful if it has entirely succeeded (H. H. Risley, *Census of India*, 1901, vol. i. p. 115f.). Exposure of female infants is common in most parts of the East, nowhere more so than in China, where the founding hospital is a regular institution. The practice was very prevalent at Rome, where, after the Second Punic

War, it was considered unnecessary to have a *praenomen* for the daughters of the family, as generally only one, or at most two, were reared. Full discretion in this matter lay with the father, who took up (*sustulit*) the newborn child laid at his feet, if he wished it reared. If he did not, it was exposed. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (ii. 15), a law of Romulus forbade the exposing of sons or of the eldest daughter. If five neighbours gave their consent after viewing the child, any infant might be exposed. Otherwise exposure made the father liable to various pains and penalties, including the loss of half his property. In historical times this law had apparently fallen into desuetude. A similar practice prevailed amongst the ancient Germans. If the father did not take up the newborn babe from the floor, it was not reared. When once its lips had been smeared with honey or milk, however, it could not be exposed. By tasting of the family food, it became a member of the family. Even so, in Greek legend, Aristaeus becomes a god by having nectar and ambrosia dropped upon his lips by deities (Pindar, *Pythian.* ix. 68). The exposure was carried out by placing the child under a tree or committing it to the waves in a rude boat (Grimm, *Rechtsalterthümer*, p. 456; Gummere, *Germanic Origins*, p. 188 ff.). In a much more remote antiquity the same practice prevailed among the Hindus. In the Yajur Veda mention is made of exposing female children and of lifting up a son\* (Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, p. 319 f.). Among most tribes, however primitive, even amongst the natives of Australia, it is the father that decides whether a child is to be reared or not, though he is not infrequently beguiled by the mother (Lumboltz, *Among Cannibals*, p. 272).

(4) *Superstitious reasons* may be of various kinds: an oracle, as in the case of Oedipus, that the child will be dangerous to his sire; a dream, either of the mother, as in the case of Paris, whose mother dreamt that she had been delivered of a firebrand which consumed Troy; or of some other relative, as in the case of Cyrus, founder of the Persian Empire, who was exposed by the orders of his maternal grandfather, Astyages, because Astyages dreamt that his daughter gave birth to a deluge which flooded, and afterwards to a vine which overshadowed, all Asia (Herod. i. 107-108). In modern India, till recently, a child was exposed if it happened to be born on a certain day which the professional astrologer declared to be unlucky (Dubois and Beauchamp, *Hindu Manners*, p. 606). In many countries twins are looked upon as ill-omened. Even where, as in Uganda, the birth of twins is regarded as lucky, it is considered 'rather a tempting of providence' (Sir H. H. Johnston, *Uganda Protectorate*, p. 878). Even in mediæval Scotland it was considered impossible that the mother of twins should have been faithful to her husband, for two children implied two fathers. Exposure is sometimes employed in order to avert continuous misfortune. In the Kavirondo country and amongst the Nilotic negroes, a woman who has already lost several children leaves the next child on the road at dawn. Presently it is brought back by a friendly neighbour, who is regarded and looked on henceforth as the child's foster-mother (*Uganda Protectorate*, pp. 748, 793). The exposure of emaciated children for a night on a stone altar, which is still practised, though now only surreptitiously, amongst the Greeks of the island of Melos (Bent, *Cyclades*, p. 64), is a survival of the ancient *ἐγκολιγμός* in a temple to be cured by the god.

(5) *Care of the race character.* The best known example of this is the practice of Sparta, where children regarded as physically unfit were ex-

\* The evidence for this, however, is late; Aelian, *Varia Historia*, xiii. 1.

\* But see Jolly, below, p. 6 f.

posed in a ravine called Apotheta near Mt. Taygetus after they had been examined and rejected by the elders of the tribe (φύλη) (Plutarch, *Lycurgus*, c. 16). A similar procedure is recommended by Plato in the *Republic* (461 C and elsewhere; see Appendix IV. to bk. v. in Adam's edition). In a State like Sparta, where, as Aristotle remarks, all its neighbours were enemies (Aristotle, *Politics*, ii. 9. 3), and where the Spartans proper were only a small governing caste amid a hostile population, the need for such a regulation is obvious. But in a less stringent measure the regulation no doubt existed in other States. At Athens, if the father did not celebrate the *amphidromia* for his child, it was not reared. No State save Thebes, and this apparently only at a late date, forbade exposure (Aelian, *Varia Historia*, ii. 7). The child was to be taken to the authorities, who disposed of it to a person willing to undertake to bring it up as a slave, and recoup himself for his outlay by the child's services when it grew up.

(6) *Luxury and selfishness*. Although luxury is supposed to characterize only States which are highly civilized, selfishness can be found in all lands. Among the native Australians, where the children are often nursed for several years, it is inconvenient for the mother to have a younger child on her hands. Such a child is either killed immediately after birth or left behind when the camp is changed (Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 1899, p. 51; Howitt, *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, 1904, p. 750). In many countries, ancient and modern, an improvement in the standard of living is accompanied by a disinclination to rear children. From the 4th cent. B.C. onwards, this was conspicuous in Greece, and in Rome it formed a theme of discussion for philosophers and satirists. How common the practice of exposure was, may be gathered from the frequency with which the heroines of the New Comedy, who come before us in the Latin versions of Plautus and Terence, are represented as having been exposed. They are, of course, recognized at the critical moment by the trinkets (*crepundia*) which were attached to the exposed infant. Under the Roman Empire, Musonius Rufus (p. 77, Hense) discusses whether all the children born should be reared; and Pliny (*Epp.* x. 74 f.) consults the emperor Trajan as to the legal position of the exposed children reared by others (*opæτροι*) in his province of Bithynia. As the Roman comedy shows, the persons who thus reared exposed children were not moved by philanthropy; their aim was to make them slaves or courtesans (cf. e.g. Terence, *Heautontimorumenos*, 640; Plautus, *Cistellaria*, ii. 3. 543-630). Only when a child was exposed for superstitious reasons which made its death desirable, was it exposed where it was not likely to be found. As the Athenians exposed children in a pot (χυτρίσιον, ἐγχυτρίσιον), and as first-fruits were offered to the household gods in pots, it has been suggested that putting a child in a pot was a way of entrusting it to the gods. This is possible, but there is at present no sufficient evidence to prove it.

Besides these categories, exposure may be due, in isolated cases, to other causes, e.g. domestic persecution. This led to the expulsion of Hagar and her child from the family of Abraham, and her temporary abandonment of Ishmael (Gn 21<sup>15-22</sup>). Temporary national persecution also may lead to exposure, as in the case of Moses (Ex 2<sup>2-3</sup>). But neither is an example of a practice pursued by a nation in ordinary circumstances.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works referred to in the text, there is an article upon exposure amongst the Indo-Germanic peoples in Schrader's *Reallexikon der idg. Altertumskunde* (s.r. 'Aussetzung'), and a very full article in Daremberg-Saglio's

*Dict. des Antiquités grecques et romaines* (s.v. 'Expositio'). For general treatment of the subject see Platz, *Gesch. des Verbrechens der Aussetzung* (Stuttgart, 1876 [mostly modern legal procedure]), and Lallemand, *Hist. des enfants abandonnés et délaissés* (Paris, 1885). See also Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage* (1891), pp. 311-314; Floss, *Das Kind* (1884), vol. ii. pp. 242-275.

2. Abandonment.—Abandonment of the aged seems to arise simply from dread of the food supply running short, or the difficulty amongst nomad peoples of carrying about with them those who are no longer able to share in the work of the tribe or to shift for themselves. The practice, however, does not prevail amongst all wandering tribes. Among the native Australians the aged and infirm are treated with special kindness and provided with a share of the food (Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 1899, p. 51). On the other hand, the natives of South Africa in their primitive state abandoned the old. 'I have seen,' says Moffat (*Missionary Labours and Scenes in Southern Africa*, 1842, p. 132), 'a small circle of stakes fastened in the ground, within which were still lying the bones of a parent bleached in the sun, who had been thus abandoned.' Amongst the American Indians of the Pacific coast the old are generally neglected, and when helpless are abandoned (Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States of America*, i. pp. 120, 131, 205, 390, and elsewhere). Among many tribes the duty of looking after the old belongs only to their own descendants. Hence the members of such tribes pray for large families, in order that when old they may have some one to support them (H. Ling Roth, *Benin*, p. 47). In the Qur'an, Muhammad combines the injunction to be kind to parents with a warning not to kill the children (*Sur.* vi. 150). Amongst the Indo-Germanic peoples, abandonment of the old is mentioned in the Vedas (*Rig Veda*, viii. 51. 52 [1020]; *Atharva Veda*, xviii. 2. 34; Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, p. 327 ff.). In ancient Persia and Armenia, cripples were left to shift for themselves; and Strabo, who is supported by other authorities, tells us that the Bactrians left the old and infirm to be eaten by dogs; and the Avesta itself recognizes the practice of setting a portion of food by such persons and leaving them to die (Strabo, xi. 11. 3; Vendidad, iii. 18 [in this case a person ceremonially impure is thus shut up for life]; Spiegel, *Iranische Altertumskunde*, iii. p. 682). The Caspians allowed those over seventy to die of hunger, and exposed their bodies in the desert to wild animals (Strabo, xi. 11. 3). Still more gruesome stories are told by Herodotus (i. 216, iii. 99, iv. 26) of the Massagetae, of the Padæi (an Indian tribe), and of the Issedones. Even among the Greeks the removal of the old was not unknown. Most remarkable was the law of Ceos, which prevented 'him who was unable to live well from living ill.' By it all over sixty years of age were poisoned with hemlock (Strabo, x. 5-6). Amongst the Romans, sexagenarians are supposed to have been in early days cast over a bridge (the *pons publicus*) into the Tiber ('Sexagenarii de ponte,' cf. Cicero, *pro Roscio Amerino*, § 100). The northern nations were equally cruel (Gummere, *Germanic Origins*, p. 203). When, however, such a custom prevails in a nation from time immemorial, its action is looked upon as natural, and is borne with resignation. And even in Britain, till recent times, seventy was regarded as extreme old age, and few reached it. In the New Hebrides, Turner found that the aged were buried alive at their own request (*Samoa*, p. 335), and it was considered a disgrace to their family if they were not. Not infrequently persons in delirium or very ill are abandoned by their relatives (H. Ling Roth, *Saravak*, i. p. 311), no doubt because they are supposed to be under

the influence of an evil power, generally a ghost (Codrington, *The Melanesians*, p. 194).

LITERATURE.—For the Indo-Germanic peoples a general account is given in Schrader's *Reallexicon der idg. Altertums-kunde*, s.v. 'Alte Leute.' See also G. H. Jones, *Dawn of Europ. Civilization* (1903), 163 ff.; E. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, I. (1906) 388 ff.; L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution* (1906), I. 349. P. GILES.

**ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE (American).**—1. The practice of infant-exposure was widespread throughout North America. The usual motive, especially in the North, was the lack of food, and the consequent difficulty of supporting a family. This practice is recorded among the Eskimos of Smith Sound in the extreme north-east of the American continent, where all children above the number of two are either strangled or exposed to die of hunger or cold, without regard to sex. Infanticide, both before and after birth, which is but another form of exposure, is also common, as when the women of the Kutchins, an Athapascan tribe, kill their female children to save them from the misery which their mothers must endure (Ploss, *Das Kind*, ii. 251, 252). Among the Koniagas, a tribe of the Pacific coast, boys were highly prized, but girls were often taken to the wilderness, where their mouths were stuffed with grass, and they were left to perish. Certain Columbian tribes usually treated both children and the aged with kindness, yet abandoned and even killed them in time of dire need, while exposure was not uncommon among the Yulan tribe of Cochimis in New Mexico (Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States*, San Francisco, 1883, i. 81, 279, 566). That this practice is by no means modern, is shown by the fact that the Indians of Acadia in the 17th cent. frequently abandoned their children for lack of time to take care of them, and in Quebec orphans were often exposed. An interesting case is also recorded of a Huron mother who regarded the circumstances associated with her unborn child as uncanny, and therefore procured an abortion. The fetus proved, however, to be viable and later she took it back, although it grew up to be a 'medicine-man' (*Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, i. 256, ix. 28, xiii. 106).

Abandonment of the sick and the aged, sparing neither sex, rank, nor kinship, seems to have been common among the American Indians of all times and localities. In Acadia (New France), those who were exhausted with age or protracted illness were frequently killed, this act being deemed, as it doubtless was in many instances, a kindness. Old men were abandoned to die, especially when sick; but if they did not expire within three days, they were killed by sucking blood from incisions made in the abdomen, and then dashing quantities of cold water on the navel. During this process and at the first desertion the victims wrapped themselves in their mantles and formally chanted the death-hymn. Among the Hurons and Iroquois the sick were left to their fate, and in the latter tribe even husband and wife deserted each other in an illness deemed mortal. Old women were abandoned among the Hurons, and the Abenakis deserted their medicine-men with equal readiness. The custom of abandoning the sick is said to have been especially common among the Algonquins. Not only the old but the young were deserted in time of serious illness, whether the sick were boys or girls. Such desertions were practised with special frequency in time of sudden alarm or removal, although they were also common for the simple reason that the old and sick were deemed a burden, and the *Jesuit Relations* (63 vols., Cincinnati, 1896-1901) abound in pathetic instances (i. 211, 258, 274, ii. 14, 18, 250, iii. 122, iv. 198, v. 102, 140-142, vii. 280, xiv. 72, 152, xv. 134, xviii. 136, xix. 100, xxiv. 42, xxix. 84,

xxx. 134, xxxi. 196, etc.). As late as the 19th cent. the Utes abandoned the old and sick when they became encumbrances, while aged parents were murdered in most cold-blooded fashion among the Californian Gallineros; and in Lower California the aged sick were abandoned, being killed if they survived their desertion too long (Bancroft, *op. cit.* i. 83, 390, 437, 568).

2. In South America, in like manner, the exposure of infants was and is extremely common. Among the Salivas and the Manaos, malformed children are put to death, since their deformity is supposed to be the work of a demon. Guaycuran women under the age of thirty killed the majority of their children, thus seeking to retain the good will of their husbands, who were denied all marital relations during the long period of suckling, and consequently frequently married other wives. The Abipones put to death all but two children in a family, though girls were given preference over boys, since wooers paid large sums for brides, while sons, for this very reason, were a heavy expense to their parents. In Patagonia the parents decided whether to adopt their children or not; and if the resolve was adverse, the infant was either strangled or exposed to the dogs. (See Ploss, *op. cit.* ii. 252-253). The women of the Amazon tribes frequently procure abortion rather than endure the pangs of childbirth (von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens*, Berlin, 1894, pp. 334, 503); and among the Indians of the Paraguayan Chaco fully half the children born are put to death, especially if they are deformed or posthumous, or if their fathers or mothers die about the time the offspring in question are born; while girls, if born before boys, are invariably killed (W. B. Grubb, *Among the Indians of Paraguayan Chaco*, London, 1904, p. 64). The same tribes abandon the sick or bury them alive, the invalid frequently hastening his own end by refusing food (*ib.* p. 41). Abandonment probably prevails more generally in South America, however, than the relatively scanty data would seem to imply.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

**ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE (Hindu).**—The ancient Sanskrit literature of India appears to have preserved some remnants of the time when the *patria potestas* gave the father a right to abandon and expose his children, especially daughters. Thus it is stated in the lawbook of *Vasistha* (xv. 2), that 'the father and the mother have power to give, to sell, and to abandon their son.' More ambiguous is a text in the Yajur Veda, to the effect that 'they put aside a girl immediately after her birth.' It is by no means certain that this 'putting aside' of a daughter is an equivalent for exposing her, as was supposed by some writers. Others explain the term as referring to the delivery of a girl to her nurse or attendant (see Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, p. 328; Böhtlingk's art. 'Pflegeten die Inder Töchter aussetzen', in *JGOS* xlv. 494 ff.; also Schrader, *Reallexicon*, p. 53). It is true that female infanticide has been a common practice with some castes up to very recent times, and the barbarous custom of widow-burning (*sati*) would seem to show that sentiment could not have stood in the way if it was thought expedient to do away with female children as soon as born. As regards the desertion of sons, there are, particularly, the law-texts referring to the rights and position of the *apavidha*, or son cast off, one of the twelve species of sons that are enumerated and described by Indian legislators. Thus in the Code of Manu (ix. 171), the *apavidha* is described as one deserted by his parents or by either of them. The old commentator (Medhātithi) adds that the reason of the desertion may be either extreme distress of the

parents, or the committing of some fault on the part of the boy. If some one else takes pity on the helpless child and brings him up, he is reckoned as his adopted child, though taking a rather low rank in the series of secondary sons. The *pālaka-putra* or foster son of the present day may perhaps be viewed as a relic of the ancient usage. On the other hand, there seems to have been a strong feeling against abandoning sons or other relatives without a just cause. *Yājñavalkya* (ii. 237) says: 'Whoever, being father and son, sister and brother, husband and wife, preceptor and pupil, abandon each other when not degraded (put out of caste), shall be fined 100 panas.' Analogous rules are laid down by *Viṣṇu*, v. 113, and *Manu*, viii. 389. The practice of buying or selling children is specially reprobated (see *Apastamba*, ii. 13. 11). The desertion or repudiation of a wife is frequently referred to in the lawbooks as a punishment for misconduct on her part, but it appears that in most cases she was not to be deprived of a bare maintenance. In a modern text, the repudiation of a wife for any offence short of adultery is characterized as a practice no longer fit for the present (or Kali) age. The higher Hindu castes of the present day do not admit divorce or repudiation except for very stringent reasons, if at all; but it is common enough among the lower castes, especially those of Dravidian origin, where the marriage tie is very loose. For the supposed abandonment and exposure of old people, Sanskrit literature seems to contain no other evidence than a text of the *Atharva Veda* (xviii. 2. 34), in which the spirits of exposed ancestors are invoked side by side with those buried or burnt. However, the term 'exposed' (*uddhita*) is ambiguous, and may refer either to dead bodies exposed on the summits of hills or to those on trees, according to Persian fashion. Exposure of old people, in a certain way, may be found in the barbarous custom, suppressed by the British Government, of taking persons supposed to be dying to the banks of the Ganges and immersing them in water.

LITERATURE.—Jolly, *Recht u. Sitt.*, Strassburg, 1896; Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, Berlin, 1879; Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1894; *Census of India* 1901, *General Report*, Calcutta, 1903. J. JOLLY.

There is statistical evidence\* that in the Panjab female infant life is still culpably neglected in comparison with male; and that, using the term in a wide sense, female infanticide still prevails in that part of India on a large scale, chiefly among the Jāts, and, despite the prohibition of the Sikh teachers, especially among those of that caste who profess Sikhism. H. A. ROSE.

**ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE** (Japanese).—There is no evidence of the existence in Japan of the custom of abandoning the aged. Isolated cases of the practice of exposure of infants occur in Japan, as in other countries, but it has never approached recognition as a general custom. From the myth of the god Hiruko (leech-child), it may be inferred that the abandonment of deformed infants was not uncommon in the earliest times. The *Nihongi* tells us that when this god had completed his third year he was still unable to walk. His parents therefore placed him in the rock-camphor-boat of heaven and sent him adrift. We may compare the stories of Moses and Sargon.

W. G. ASTON.

**ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE** (Persian).—The data concerning the exposure of infants in Persia are scanty. According to the *Avesta* (*Vendidad*, ii. 29), all deformities were regarded as

\* Punjab Census Reports, 1881, 1891, 1901; also Sanitary Commissioner's Reports for the Panjab, 1905 § 22, 1904 § 20, 1901 § 14, 1897 § 20, and earlier Reports.

the work of the Evil One. It is not impossible, therefore, that deformed children and viable monsters were exposed with more or less frequency; and this is expressly stated to have been the case with Zal, who was exposed by order of his father Sam, because he was born with white hair, which distinctly marked him, in his parent's eyes, as the offspring of Ahriman (*Shah-Namah*, ed. Vullers-Landauer, pp. 131-135). There is, on the other hand, no reason to suppose that such exposure was the rule. Cyrus the Great, in like manner, according to Herod. i. 107f., was by his grandfather exposed and ordered to be killed because of a dream which prophesied that the infant would be the future lord of Asia. Nor can it be inferred, from the marked preference given in the *Avesta* to sons rather than daughters (Geiger, *Ostiran. Kultur*, pp. 234, 235), that the latter were exposed, the entire spirit of Zoroastrianism making such a conclusion most improbable. Even in the case of an illegitimate child, it was regarded as a heinous offence to procure an abortion (*Vendidad*, xv. 5-16). On the contrary, the prospective mother of an illegitimate child must be carefully protected by the man responsible for her condition, lest some harm might come to the fetus. This undoubtedly implies that, despite sporadic instances of exposure, the desertion of infants was abhorrent to the noblest minds of Persia. The Pahlavi *Shayast la-Shayast*, dating perhaps from the 7th cent., states that the father of children by a concubine 'shall accept all those who are male as sons; but those who are female are no advantage' (xii. 14). This does not, however, imply that female bastards were exposed. In the book of Arda-Viraf the failure of a father to acknowledge his illegitimate offspring condemned them to a piteous life in hell, while at the feet of such a parent 'several children fell, and ever screamed; and demons, just like dogs, ever fell upon and tore him.' The punishments of hell also awaited the mother who destroyed her infant and threw away its corpse, or left it crying for cold and hunger; while those who, in their greed for wealth, withheld their milk from their own infants that they might act as wet-nurses to the offspring of others, likewise suffered punishment in the future life (ed. Haug and West, xlii-xliv, lix, lxxxvii, xciv).

LOUIS H. GRAY.

**ABASEMENT.**—Abasement in religious experience is closely connected with Adoration and Humility (see these articles). It appears to be essentially relative, and the essence of it to lie in a recognition of the comparative worthlessness of the self in the presence of a superior. In those religions which give great room to prayer and to the sense of God, abasement has always been an important element; its influence is marked in the Hebrew (see, for instance, the penitential psalms), and in all forms of the Christian, e.g. in St. Paul's determination to know nothing but Christ crucified (1 Co 2<sup>7</sup>), in Luther's conviction that the soul was weak though Christ was strong (letter to Pope Leo X. concerning Christian liberty), in Thomas à Kempis' warning never to esteem oneself as anything because of any good works (*de Imit. Chr.* bk. iii. ch. 4), in Wesley's demand that the sinner should first and foremost empty himself of his own righteousness in order to trust only in the blood of the Redeemer (*Journal*, 8th Sept. 1746).

Extravagances have been common, and in modern times there has been a great reaction. Ibsen, Nietzsche, Walt Whitman, preach in different ways the need of man's 'pride in himself.' A strong common-sense expression of this feeling is given by Jowett:

'The abasement of the individual before the Divine Being is really a sort of Pantheism, so far that in the moral world God is

everything and man nothing. But man thus abased before God is no proper or rational worshipper of Him. There is a want of proportion in this sort of religion. God who is everything is not really so much as if He allowed the most exalted free agencies to exist side by side with Him' (*Life of Jowett*, by Abbott and Campbell, vol. II. p. 161. London: Murray, 1897).

But this should not blind us to the fact that prayer and the religions of prayer seem bound up with the belief that man *depends* on God, and does not merely exist *side by side* with Him. Now, in the last analysis, humility and the abasement that is its intenser form appear as a reflexion in conduct and emotion of this belief. The sense that man does no good thing of himself alone, but always as flinging himself on the Eternal Love, is, in especial, a leading characteristic of Christianity. The repentant Publican is set above the moral Pharisee precisely because he would not attempt to justify himself (Lk 18<sup>9-14</sup>).

Even those religions—those systems of aspiration and effort—which do not recognize this kind of dependence, would still find room for some abasement in the recognition of the gap between what the individual is and what he wishes to be. But, from their point of view, why should not a man pride himself on such good as he has already attained? Yet to the religious consciousness of many the presence of this pride would appear to vitiate it all. The theoretic justification for this must lie in the conviction that man does depend for his goodness on something greater than himself. To a certain extent, no doubt, this might be found in the good elements of the order that has produced and surrounds the individual. But the Christian hatred of self-complacency seems to go further still, and to imply a belief that in the very assimilation by the individual of these good elements another power than himself is active.

It would be idle to deny the difficulties in this conception, or to pretend that they have ever yet been solved. The paradox of St. Paul—'Work out your own salvation . . . for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to work' (Ph 2<sup>12-13</sup>)—has remained a paradox even for those who maintain it. But conviction of some truth in the paradox is, at bottom, the same as the conviction of Ruskin that, if the Greeks were great at Thermopylæ, greater still were the Hebrews at the Red Sea, trusting not in the resolution they had taken, but in the hand they held (see *Modern Painters*, Part III. § i. ch. 7). F. M. STAWELL.

**ABBOT** (Christian).—'Abbot,' in Latin *abba* or *abbas* (Old Eng. by-form 12th to 17th cent. *abbat*), from the Syriac ܐܒܬܐ, meaning 'father' (cf. Mk 14<sup>36</sup>, Ro 8<sup>15</sup>, Gal 4<sup>9</sup>), was used in the earliest religious communities for the older or more venerated monks (cf. Jerome in *Gal.* 4<sup>9</sup> and in *Matt.* 23<sup>9</sup>, vol. vii. 451, 185, and the *Collationes* of Cassian, *passim*). The superior was not called abbot, but *πρεσβυτερος*, *ἀρχιμανδρίτης* or *ἡγούμενος*, and in the West *praepositus* (Cassian, etc.). The prevailing Byzantine term was *ἡγούμενος* (translit. *igumenus* in Latin), while an archimandrite was often a superior kind of abbot, and this title was also given to various ecclesiastical functionaries (see *Dict. d'Arch. Chrét. et de Lit.* s.v. 'Archimandrite,' 1906). In the East *ἄσπας* appears as a tr. from the Latin, or as an honorific title, e.g. in the Acts of St. Maximus Conf. in the 7th century. In the West, however, *abbas* must have become the regular title of the superior of a monastery during the 5th cent., since this sense is taken for granted by St. Benedict in the first half of the 6th cent., and from that period this usage became universal. St. Benedict assumes that *praepositus* will be understood of the second in command, who was later always called prior, even by Benedictines. The name *abbas* is also applied, it seems, by Gregory of Tours to what we

should call a rector with many curates, and it was extended in Merovingian times to chaplains of the king, the army, etc. (*abbas curiae, palatinus, castrensis*, etc.). A layman holding an abbey in *commendam* in the 9th or 10th cent. was called *abbacomus* or *abbas miles*. When considerable dignity had come to attach to the name, the heads of smaller communities were called priors. The Camaldolese branch of Benedictines called their superior *major*, and neither the Carthusians nor any of the orders of friars which arose in the 13th cent., nor any subsequent religious congregation, have ever taken up the title of abbot, though 'abbess' was retained in the second order of Franciscans (Poor Clares). At the present day the Benedictines (black monks), with their branches, the Cistercians, reformed and unreformed, and the black and white canons regular (canons reg. of the Lateran and Premonstratensians) are governed by abbots.

The first mention of an abbess (*abbatissa*) is said to be in an inscription set up by an Abbess Serena at St. Agnes *extra muros* in 514.

Some heads of congregations have the title abbot general, archabbot, abbot president. The Abbot of Montecassino has the honorific title of archabbot, and in the Middle Ages, when head of a congregation, was called *Abbas Abbatum*. A new title, *Abbas Primas*, was given in 1893 to the Abbot of St. Anselmo, Rome (built by Leo XIII.), as president of the new union of all black Benedictines.

The government of an abbot or an abbess is strictly monarchical. Before St. Benedict (c. 530) the abbot was the living rule, guided, if he chose, by the traditions of the Fathers of the desert, by the rules of Pachomius, or Basil, or Augustine, or by the customs of Lerins or Marmoutier. From St. Benedict's time (whose Rule was propagated in Italy by Gregory the Great, and became approximately universal soon afterwards) the abbot's government is constitutional, for he is bound by the Rule (*Regula*, cap. 64), which was gradually supplemented by decrees of popes, and of councils, and by regulations like those in England of Lanfranc. When branch congregations were formed (as Cluniacs, Cistercians, Camaldolese, etc.) of many monasteries, or congregations of black monks (as those of Bursfeld, St. Justina, etc.), the Rule was supplemented by *constitutiones* or commentaries on portions of the Rule, and by the regulations enforced by visitors or general chapters. All this applies also *mutatis mutandis* to the government of the canons regular. But the supremacy of the abbot was never seriously weakened, and the monarchical character of abbatial government is the distinguishing feature of the older orders as compared with the later friars, clerks regular, brothers, etc.

As it gradually became customary for many monks to be clerics, it also became the rule for abbots to be priests—in the East from the 5th cent., in the West from about the 7th. A council under Eugenius II. at Rome in 826 made this obligatory (Mansi, *Conc. xiv.* 1007). It seems that by *ordinatio abbatis* St. Benedict meant the 'appointment,' not the 'ordination,' i.e. 'blessing' of an abbot. St. Gregory the Great speaks of a bishop 'ordaining' an abbot (*Ep.* ix. 91), and also of the decision as to the ordination of an abbot being made by the abbot of another monastery (*Ep.* xi. 48). The latter had changed his mind and appointed another man in the afternoon of the same day. Gregory orders him to invite a bishop to 'ordain' the monk first designated during the celebration of Mass. St. Theodore of Canterbury orders that an abbot shall be 'ordained' by a bishop, who must sing the Mass, in the presence of two or three of the abbot's (not the bishop's) brethren, *et donet ei baculum et pedules*. This is the earliest form of the abbatial blessing. The Pontifical of Egbert of York (732-768) gives a *consecratio Abbatis vel Abbatissae*. There are now two forms provided in the Roman Pontifical for the blessing of an abbot, one for an *Abbas simplex*, the other for a mitred abbot. The former appears to be no longer used. The latter is largely modelled on the order of consecration of a bishop, and the officiating bishop is assisted by two mitred abbots.

The blessing of an abbess is permitted to a priest by Theodore.



The form in the Pontifical is simple, but many abbesses have had, and still have, the privilege of being invested with ring and crozier. When temporary abbots were introduced in the 15th cent., the blessing was dispensed with, but Benedict xiv. severely censured the omission to obtain the blessing on the part of abbots elected for life.

At an early date abbots took an important place in ecclesiastical affairs. In the 5th cent. we find 23 abbots signing the condemnation of Eutyches at the council held by Flavian of Constantinople in 448, and these were probably regular members of the patriarch's *synodus ἐκδημοῦσα*. In Spain and Gaul they appear at councils to represent absent bishops, but in 653 ten abbots are found sitting in their own right at a council of Toledo, and they sign before the representatives of absent bishops (Mansi, x. 1222). It became the custom throughout the Middle Ages for abbots to attend councils. At the Vatican Council of 1869 only those abbots who were heads of congregations were invited, naturally without a vote.

Abbots, being the administrators of the temporal goods of their monastery, attained considerable worldly importance. They were often envoys of monarchs and of popes. They sat in Parliaments, ranking in England next after barons. Like barons, the abbots were originally called to Parliament at the good pleasure of the king, but by custom a certain number gained the right of sitting. On the last occasion when the abbots as a body sat in Parliament (28th June 1539), 17 were present. In the first Parliament of Elizabeth, however, Abbot Fecknam of Westminster had a seat and vote, since that abbey had been restored to all its privileges under Queen Mary.

The worldly grandeur assumed by abbots has been frequently censured,—for instance, by St. Bernard. In England their position as great land-owners and peers of Parliament necessitated considerable state. The sons of the nobility were sent to be brought up under their care. Monasteries were hotels, and all guests of gentle birth were entertained in the abbot's hall. The Abbot of Glastonbury administered a revenue larger than that of the Archbishop of Canterbury. The Abbot of Bury St. Edmunds had a mint of his own. Yet such a position was not incompatible with personal sanctity, as may be seen in the case of Richard Whiting (Gasquet, *The Last Abbot of Glastonbury*, 1895, p. 56 f.). This external state of abbots lasted in Austria into the 19th cent., and to some extent is still to be seen.

Exemption of abbots from episcopal control became the rule only when they were joined together in congregations, but it was often granted as an exceptional privilege, and early traces of it are found. A council held at Arles, c. 455, exempted Faustus of Lerins from the Bishop of Fréjus, so far as the government of his abbey was concerned (Mansi, vii. 907; Duchesne, *Fastes épisc.* i. 124). Westminster is said to have received the privilege from John xiii. (c. 970). Some of the greatest English monasteries were never exempt, as Glastonbury, and only five Benedictine houses had the privilege at the Reformation, apart from the Clunacs, Cistercians, etc. Christ Church, Oxford, still retains its papal exemption from the bishop. Grants of *Pontificalia*, or episcopal ornaments, mitre, ring, gloves, sandals, were made by the pope to the principal abbots (e.g. to Westminster in 1276, to the Prior of the Cathedral Abbey of Ely in 1413). These privileges eventually became general, but were limited by a decree of Alexander vii. in 1659. Since then further privileges have been granted or confirmed. In some cases a number of parishes are subject to an abbot, who acts as their bishop, as at Montecassino, Cava, etc. The small diocese once administered by the Abbot of Westminster is still under the dean and chapter, and is independent of the Bishop of London. In the case of such abbots, who are called *Abbatēs nullius dioeceseos*, permission is usually given to administer confirmation. Since the monastic state was anciently equivalent to the clerical, and the monastic tonsure to the clerical tonsure, it became the custom to allow abbots to confer tonsure and minor orders on their own subjects, and this is still in force. The Second Council of Nicea (787) permitted *hegumeni* to ordain *lectores* for their monasteries. Abbots were sometimes also allowed to give the subdiaconate, but this is obsolete. The supposed permission of Innocent viii. to Cistercian abbots to confer the diaconate is too much opposed to the theological opinions of the period to be probably authentic.

The elections of abbots by their monks were

often interfered with by the civil power. St. Benedict permits neighbouring bishops or laymen to interfere if a bad man is elected. Charles Martel gave abbots to his officers; even Charlemagne disposed of them at will. The king's *congé d'élire* had to be obtained for an election in England. In France and elsewhere abbacies came to be in the royal gift. The habit of giving abbacies to seculars in *commendam* in the 8th to 10th cents. unhappily revived in the 15th to 18th. The goods of the community were usually already divided with the abbot, and the latter had a fine house in which to receive guests. When these were in the hands of seculars, the monasteries were greatly impoverished, and suffered much in regularity. The congregation of St. Justina of Padua (afterwards called the Cassinese) introduced abbots elected for a short period in order to avoid the granting away of abbacies. Other congregations followed. The famous French congregations of St. Maur and of St. Vannes and St. Hidulpe preferred to be governed by priors appointed by the general chapter for the same reason. When it had become the rule for all ecclesiastics of good family to possess at least one abbey in *commendam*, it became customary to presume this in all ecclesiastics, and to address them as Monsieur l'abbé. Hence in France, and to some extent in Italy, even youths in seminaries, not yet in minor orders or even tonsured, are regularly addressed by this title, which in the Middle Ages had been considered too dignified for even the generals of the Carthusians or the Friars.\*

LITERATURE.—See further under MONASTICISM. For Canon Law, Ferraris, *Bibliotheca*, s.v. 'Abbas,' 'Abbatiss,' and the collections of decrees. JOHN CHAPMAN.

ABBOT (Tibetan).†—The head of the monastery in Tibet is called 'teacher' or *K'an-po* (the literal equivalent of the Sanskrit *upādhyāya*). He is superior to the ordinary monastic teacher or professor (*lob-pōn*), and is credited with being endowed, by direct transmission from saints, with the three prerogatives for consecration, namely, spiritual power (*dbang*), thorough knowledge of the precepts (*lung*), and capability of expounding the same (*k'rid*), which confer on him the authority to empower others. He has under him all the common monks, scholars, and novices, and is strictly the only one entitled to be called a Lama. The lady superior of a convent bears the corresponding title of *K'an-mo*; the most celebrated of these is the 'Thunderbolt Sow,' a Tibetan Circe residing at Samding on the inland sea of Yamdok.

LITERATURE.—H. A. Jäschke, *Tibetan-English Dictionary*, 1882, p. 53; W. W. Rockhill, *Journey through Mongolia and Tibet*, 1894, p. 359; L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, 1895, p. 172, and *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, 1905, pp. 219, 226, 403. L. A. WADDELL.

ABBOT OF UNREASON.—This title was given in Scotland to one of the mimic dignitaries who presided over the Christmas revels. In England he had the title of Abbot or Lord of Misrule. In France the Abbé de Liesse held the same office. The Abbé de Liesse was the chief of a confraternity established at Lille. He was appointed by the magistrates and the people. He wore a cross of silver-gilt in his hat, and was accompanied by the officers of his mimic household. A banner of rich silk was carried before him, and his duty was to preside at the games which were celebrated at Arras and the neighbouring cities at the carnival. Ducange in his *Glossarium* says he also bore the titles of *Rex Stultorum* and *Facetiarum Princeps*.

\* It may be noted here that for centuries in Ireland the abbots had all ecclesiastical power in their hands; the Church was organized not by dioceses but by tribes, and the bishop was in reality a subject of the abbot.

† The 'Abbot' in Buddhism generally will be described under MONASTICISM (Bud.), and the Muhammadan Abbot under MUHAMMADANISM.

At Rouen and Evreux the leader of the frolics was called *Abbas Conardorum*. Another title was *Abbas Juvenum*. In certain cathedral chapters in France he was called *l'Abbé des Foux*. He was the monastic representative of the Boy Bishop, or *Episcopus Puerorum*, whose office is recognized in the service 'in die Sanctorum Innocentium' in the *Sarum Processionale* of 1555. In some cathedral churches he was styled *Episcopus* or *Archiepiscopus Fatuorum*. In churches exempt from diocesan jurisdiction he had the exalted title *Papa Fatuorum*.

In every case these mimic dignitaries represented the highest authority in the Church. They masqueraded in the vestments of the clergy, and exercised for the time being some of the functions of the higher clergy. The clergy themselves gave their sanction to the mimic rites: 'Deinde episcopus puerorum conversus ad clerum elevet brachium suum dicens hanc benedictionem: Crucis signo vos consigno' (*Sarum Process.* fol. xiv). In the York Inventory of 1530 a little mitre and a ring are mentioned, evidently for the *Episcopus Puerorum*.

These titles are all closely connected with the Feast of Fools, the *Festum Fatuorum*, in the mediæval Church. There is little doubt that their privileges go back to much earlier times. The standard authority for the whole subject is the treatise *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la Fête des Foux*, by M. du Tilliot, published at Lausanne and Geneva, 1741. Du Tilliot, with good reason, traces them back to the Saturnalia, the *Libertas Decembris* of which Horace (*Sat.* II. vii. 5 f.) speaks when he bids his slave Davus exercise his annual privilege of masquerading as master:

'Age, libertate Decembri,  
Quando ita majores voluerunt, utere, narra.'

Du Tilliot says:

'Car comme dans les Saturnales, les Valets faisoient les fonctions de leurs Maîtres, de même dans la Fête des Foux les jeunes Clercs et les autres Ministres inférieurs de l'Eglise officioient publiquement et solennement, pendant certains jours consacrés à honorer les Mystères du Christianisme.'

The policy of the early Church was to divert the people from their pagan customs by consecrating them, as far as possible, to Christian use. The month of December was dedicated to Saturn. The Saturnalia were originally held on Dec. 17. Augustus extended the holiday to three days, Dec. 17-19. Martial (ob. 101) speaks of it as lasting five days. Lucian, in the 2nd cent., says it lasted a week, and that mimic kings were chosen. Duchesne (*Origines*, p. 265) allows that the Mithraic festival of *Natalis Invicti*, on Dec. 25, may have had some influence in fixing the date of Christmas in the Western Church. He hesitates as to the Saturnalia. Yet the Christianized festivities of the Saturnalia were probably slowly transferred to the Christmas season by the appointment of the Advent fast. A relic of this still lingers on in North Staffordshire, where the farm-servants' annual holiday extends from Christmas to New Year.

The Boy Bishop (*Episcopus Puerorum*) was elected on St. Nicholas' Day, Dec. 6, and his authority lasted till Childermas, or Holy Innocents' Day. Edward I., in 1299, permitted him to say vespers in the royal presence on Dec. 7. The Santa Claus of to-day still keeps alive the tradition of the Boy Bishop and the Abbot of Unreason.

The concessions of the early Church did not succeed in checking the abuses which had been associated with the Saturnalia. The 'Liberty of December' extended to New Year and Epiphany, covering the whole of the Christmas festival. The 'Misrule' called forth constant protests. Pseudo-Aug. (*Serm.* 265) condemns the dances, which afterwards became a recognized feature of the Feast of Fools: 'Isti enim infelices et miseri homines, qui orationes et saltationes ante ipsas basilicas Sanctorum exercere nec metuunt nec erubescunt, etsi

Christiani ad Ecclesiam venerint, Pagani de Ecclesia revertuntur.' The sermon has been ascribed to Caesarius of Arles (ob. 547). The description of the Feast of Fools at Antiles in 1644, quoted by du Tilliot from a contemporary letter to Gassendi, shows that the custom was too deeply rooted in the same district to yield to the censures of the Church. The excesses connected with the Calends Brumalia and other festivals were condemned in Can. lxii. of the Council in Trullo in 692. The mimic pageantry of bishop and abbot was specially censured in Sessio xxi. of the Council of Basel in 1435:

'Turpem etiam illum abusum in quibusdam frequentatum ecclesiasticis cum certis et abbatibus cum mitra, et benedictum. Im vel Innocentium vel puerorum in quibusdam regionibus nuncupatur, ut alii larvales et theatrales jocos.'

Tilliot also mentions the condemnation of these abuses by the Council of Rouen in 1435, Soissons in 1455, Sens in 1485, Paris in 1528, and Cologne in 1536. In England they were abolished by proclamation of Henry VIII., July 22, 1542, though restored by Mary in 1554.

In Scotland the annual burlesque presided over by the Abbot of Unreason was suppressed in 1555. The guisers, who in Scotland play the part of the mummers in the Christmas revels in England, wear mitre-shaped caps of brown paper, which are derived either from the Boy Bishops or from the Abbots of Unreason. In fiction, Sir Walter Scott has left a vivid picture of the 'right reverend Abbot of Unreason' in the *Abbot*.

LITERATURE.—Du Tilliot, *Mémoires*; Ducange, *Glossarium*; *Sarum Processionale*, 1555; Sir W. Scott, *The Abbot*, with historical note; Chambers, *Book of Days*; Jamieson, *Scottish Dict.*; *Dict. Larousse*. THOMAS BARNES.

'ABD AL-QĀDIR AL-JILĀNĪ. — I. *Life*. — Sidi 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jilānī, one of the greatest religious personalities of Islām, ascetic, wonder-worker, teacher, and founder of a brotherhood, was born in 471 A.H. [1078 A.D.]. The Muslims make him a *sharif* of the blood of the Prophet and a descendant of 'Alī; but this claim has little likelihood, for he was probably of Persian origin. His complete name reads Muḥyī ad-Dīn 'Abd al-Qādir, son of Abū Sālih, son of Jenki-Dost al-Jilī or Jilānī. Jenki-Dost is a Persian name. Historians, such as Abū-l-Maḥāsīn (ed. Juynboll, i. p. 698), tell us that his national name (Jilānī, 'the Jilānite') came to him not from the Persian province Jilān, but from Jil, a locality near Baghdad. Various legends, however, call him 'the 'Ajamī,' i.e. the Persian. He came to Baghdad in 488 to study Ḥanbalite law. He learnt the Qur'ān from Abū Sa'īd al-Mubārak al-Muḥarrimī, and polite literature from Abū Zakaryā Yahyā of Tabriz. His master in asceticism was Hammād ad-Dabbās; he spent long years in the deserts and among the ruins around Baghdad, leading a hermit's life. In 521 he felt himself called back into the world, and returned to Baghdad, where the Qādi, Abū Sa'īd al-Muḥarrimī, gave him charge of the school which he had been directing in Bāb el-Āzaj (Le Strange, *Baghdad*, Map viii. No. 29, and p. 296 ff.). His teaching met with very great success; the school had to be enlarged time after time; it was finally completed in 528, and took the name of Sidi Jilānī. He spoke there three times a week—twice in the school, on law, and once in his oratory, on mysticism. He drew many hearers from all parts of Mesopotamia, Persia, and even Egypt. It is affirmed that he converted Jews and Christians. He gave legal decisions, which became authoritative among both the Ḥanbalites and the Shāfi'ites. Among his hearers might be mentioned the juriconsult Muwaffaq ad-Dīn ibn Qudāma al-Maḥdī and the famous mystic Shihāb ad-Dīn as-Suhra-



ward. He married and had many children—thirteen, according to a tradition reported by Depont and Coppolani (p. 298); forty-nine, of whom twenty-seven were sons, according to another tradition, which seems to be legendary. Many of his children went, during his lifetime, to preach his doctrine in Egypt, Arabia, Turkestan, and India. He died at Baghdad on the 8th of the month of Rabi' ii., 581 A.H. [1166 A.D.].

2. *Legend*.—Besides the above facts, the numerous traditions which have been preserved concerning 'Abd al-Qādir are for the most part of a legendary character. They deal with his austerities, his visions, and his miracles. Among them are the following:—His mother bore him when she was sixty years old. As a nursing he declined to take the breast in the month of Ramaḍān. When he came to Baghdad to study, the prophet Ḥidr appeared to him and prevented him from entering the city; he remained seven years before the walls, practising asceticism and living on herbs. When he withdrew into the deserts around Baghdad, he was visited by the same prophet Ḥidr, and was fed miraculously. He also received cakes, herbs, and water from the heavens, on his pilgrimage to Mecca. In the desert he was tormented by Satan, who appeared to him under various forms. From time to time he fixed his abode in the ruins of Aiwān Kīsrā, the famous palace of Chosroës (Le Strange, *Eastern Caliphate*, p. 34). One tradition makes him spend eleven years in a tower which ever since bears the name of *Burj al-'Ajami*, 'the tower of the Persian.' One day Satan tried to seduce him by a false vision. While he stood on the seashore with a great thirst, a cloud sailed towards him from which fell a kind of dew. He quenched his thirst with this dew, and then a great light appeared, and a form, and he heard a voice saying to him, 'I allow thee that which is forbidden.' 'May God preserve us from Satan, the accursed one,' replied the ascetic. At once the light gave place to darkness, and the form became smoke. He was asked later how he had recognized the deceitfulness of this vision. He answered: 'By the fact that God does not advise to do shameful things.' While he taught, he was often seen lifted up from the ground; he would walk a few paces through the air and then return to his pulpit. Once, as he was speaking in the Nizāmīya school, a Jinn appeared in the form of a snake, which wound itself around his body and exchanged a few words with him. One year the river Tigris rose high, and the inhabitants of Baghdad, fearing their city would be flooded, came to implore the protection of the wonder-worker. Al-Jilāni advanced to the bank of the river, planted his stick in the ground, saying, 'Thus far.' From that moment the waters decreased. Many of these legends have a close resemblance to those of Christian hagiography.

3. *Works*.—Many works, mystical treatises, collections of prayers and sermons, are ascribed to him. Brockelmann (*Arab. Litt.* i. 435 f.) mentions twenty-four titles of his books still existing in MS. in the libraries of Europe. The two most important are:—*Al-ghunya li'lālib tariq al-haqq*, 'Sufficiency for the seeker of the way of truth,' and the *Futūḥ al-ghaib*, 'The conquests of the mystery.' The latter work contains his mystical teaching, collected by his son 'Abd ar-Razzāq. It was printed in Persian at Lucknow in 1880; in Arabic at Cairo in 1303 A.H. A collection of sermons (*Ḥuṭab*) and of 'Sessions' (*Majālis*) was printed at Cairo in 1302, a *Ḥizb* at Alexandria in 1304. In the language of the dervish orders, a *ḥizb* is a kind of service composed in great part of passages from the Qur'ān. Le Châtelier (*Confr. Murid. du Hedjaz*, p. 23, n. 1) cites also a collection of prayers named in Turkish

*Evrādi Sherifeh*, printed at Constantinople in 1869 A.D. A *wird* (plu. *awrād*; Turk. *evrād*) is a short invocation. His remaining works include exhortations, prayers, a treatise on the Divine names, mystical poems, one of which is on the author's being lifted up into the higher spheres. Ibn Taimiyya commented on some of his maxims.

4. *Teaching*.—His teaching may be gathered from the above-mentioned works (cf. also the *Lawāiqh al-anwār* of ash-Sha'rānī, ed. of Cairo, 1316, i. pp. 100-105) and from the tradition of his order. It is that of orthodox Muslim mysticism. One cannot fail to recognize a certain Christian influence in it, especially in the importance given to the virtues of charity, humility, meekness, in his precept of obedience to the spiritual director, and in the aim held before an ascetic, which is spiritual death and the entire self-surrender of the soul to God. Al-Jilāni's respect for Jesus was very great, and the tradition of this respect is still kept in his order. His love of poverty recalls that of St. Francis of Assisi. In all parts of the Muslim world the poor put themselves under his protection, and ask for alms in his name. His mystical teaching is expounded in his book, *Futūḥ al-ghaib*. Among the titles of its 78 chapters, the following are characteristic:—Spiritual death; unconsciousness of created things; the banishment of cares from the heart; drawing near unto God; unveiling and vision; the soul and its states; self-surrender to God; fear and hope; how to reach God through the medium of a spiritual director; poverty. The book contains expressions that are altogether Christian. Commending the excellence of becoming dead to created things and to one's own will, the author says, 'The sign that you have died to your lusts is that you are like a child in the arms of its mother; the sign that you have died to your own will is that you wish nothing but the will of God.' Exhorting the soul to search after God, he hits upon an expression of St. Augustine: 'Rise and hasten to fly unto Him.' A little further on, he appropriates the famous comparison of the corpse: 'Be in the hands of God like a dead body in the hands of the washer.' The effect of this self-surrender of the soul is spiritual clear-mindedness and joy.

It is a custom in Muslim mysticism to ascribe the essence of the teaching of the founder of an order to some anterior personages, by means of a chain of intermediaries who go as far back even as Muhammad. Among the predecessors, thus cited, of al-Jilāni should be named the famous ascetic Abū-l-Qāsim al-Junaid (died A.H. 268).

Certain traditions attribute to our mystic, especially while on his deathbed, some very proud words which contrast with what we have just said about his feelings and his doctrine. They are thus reported by al-Biqā'ī (*Goldziher, Muḥ. Stud.* ii. p. 289): 'The sun greets me before he rises; the year greets me before it begins, and it unveils to me all things that shall happen in its course . . . I plunge into the sea of God's knowledge, and I have seen Him with my eyes. I am the living evidence of God's existence . . .' Similar sayings are ascribed to many of the great mystics of Islām. It is probable that they are the work of enthusiastic disciples, and that they express only the close union of the mystic with God in a symbolic fashion.

5. *Order*.—The order, or brotherhood, founded by 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jilāni bears the name al-Qādiriyya. It has great importance in Islām. After the death of the founder it was led by his sons and then by their descendants. The majority of his sons became disciples of their father, ascetics, missionaries, and men of learning like him. The eldest was 'Abd ar-Razzāq (A.H. 528-603), the youngest Yahya (550-600). It was 'Abd ar-Razzāq

who succeeded his father in the leadership of the order, and who built over the tomb of the founder the mosque with seven gilt domes, once celebrated by historians and poets, but to-day lying in ruins (Le Strange, *Baghdad*, p. 348 f.). Along with the order the posterity of al-Jilānī's children have spread all over the Muslim world. Branches of this family can be found especially in Baghdad, Cairo, Hamāh, and Yā'ū in the district of Aleppo. A Western tradition claims that one son of al-Jilānī, 'Abd al-'Aziz (532-602), emigrated to Fez; but this is contradicted by another tradition (*Qalā'id al-jawāhir*, p. 54), according to which 'Abd al-'Aziz emigrated only to the province of Jibāl. Baghdad has remained the moral centre of the order. But the jurisdiction of the mother-house does not extend beyond Mesopotamia, Syria, and Turkey. In the other Muslim countries the brotherhood went through a process of disintegration, and the congregations have ceased to be subordinate to the mother-house. The monastery (*zāwiya*) of Baghdad was destroyed by Shah Ismail, and restored by Sultan Sulaiman.

The branches of the brotherhood reach out as far as the Farther East, into the Dutch East Indies and Chinese Yunnan. In India there are many kinds of Qādiriyyas. The Qādiriyya Akbariyya, the best-known, founded at the end of the 6th cent. A.H. by Shaiḥ al-Akbar Muḥyī ad-Dīn ibn al-'Arabī al-Kātimī, forms a distinct order; the *Bi Nawā* are begging *faqīrs*, recruited from the inferior castes of Muslims, and connected with the Qādiriyya. In Arabia the brotherhood is powerful. It possesses important *zāwiya*s in Jiddah and Medina, and has thirty *muqaddims* (prefects of congregations) in Mecca. In Constantinople it owns forty houses (*takyas*). It is widespread in Egypt, at Cairo, all along the Nile Valley; and its missions have advanced as far as Khartum, Kordofan, Darfur, Wadai, Bornu, and Sokoto. There are *zāwiya*s at Tripoli and Ghadames. In Algeria and Morocco the order consists of various decentralized congregations whose membership reaches a high figure. 24,000 are reckoned in Algeria (Depont and Coppolani), and in the province of Oran alone two hundred chapels (*qubbās*), under the name of Sidi al-Jilānī, are to be found (Rinn). The brotherhood makes great efforts to convert the Berbers to Islām.

The *dhikr* of the order is nothing but the Muslim confession of faith: *la ilāh illā-llāh*, 'There is no God but Allah.' But according to a usage, probably instituted by al-Jilānī himself, these words are not always pronounced entirely. During the prayer in common, which is accompanied by motions of the head and of the body, and in which the dervishes endeavour to attain a state of ecstatic excitement, after having already pronounced the whole formula, they say only *Allāh, Allāh!* and finally, when the rhythm becomes more rapid, they pronounce nothing but *hū, hū, hū*, the sound being sustained until loss of breath.

Many orders or brotherhoods have separated themselves from the Qādirite order. The most famous, besides the above-mentioned Akbariyyas of India, are the Rifā'iyyas, commonly called the 'Howling Dervishes,' founded by Ahmad ar-Rifā'a (died A.H. 570), a nephew of al-Jilānī; the Bada'iyyas, an Egyptian order, and the 'Isāwiyyas. The other orders are those of the Bakka'iyyas, Jabāwiyyas, Jishtiyyas, Baiyūmiyyas, Dasūqiyyas, Maulaniyyas, 'Arusiya-Salāmiyyas, Bū-'Alīyyas, 'Ammāriyyas (cf. MUHAMMADANISM, § viii.).

LITERATURE.—(1) ORIENTAL: *Bahja al-arār*, by 'All b. Yūsuf ash-Shatnūfi (A.H. 647-713), Cairo, 1304; *Qalā'id al-jawāhir fī manāqib ash-Shaiḥ 'Abd al-Qādir*, by Muhammad b. Yahya at-Tādifi (died A.H. 963), Cairo, 1303. These two are the most important. Brockelmann (*Arab. Litt.* i. p. 435) mentions three other biographies still in MS. Colas translated

a MS by Shaiḥ as-Sanūsī, used also by Rinn. Rinn mentions also the *Anwār an-nāzir*, by 'Abd allāh al-Bakrī as-Saddiqī, and the *Nuzha an-nāzir*, by 'Abd al-Latif al-Hāshimī. Cl. Harat (*Litt. Arab.* pp. 344, 383) mentions that 'Afīf ad-Dīn al-Yāfi'ī (died 1367 A.D.) and Shihāb ad-Dīn al-Qastallānī (died 1517 A.D.) collected a number of interesting stories relating to Sidi Jilānī. The *Natīja al-tahqīq*, by Muhammad ad-Dīlātī, lithographed at Fez, A.H. 1209, is translated by T. H. Weir in *J.R.A.S.* 1903, p. 155 ff. His *Life* by Dhabābī is printed, trans., and commented on by D. S. Margoliouth in *J.R.A.S.* 1907, p. 267 ff.

On the mystics generally see the *Nafahāt* of Jāmi, Calcutta, A.D. 1859; the *Wafayāt* of Ibn Hallikān, Bulaq, 2 vols., A.H. 1299 (Eng. trans., Paris, 1843-1871); a recent Turkish work on the origin of the principal Muslim orders and their doctrines is *Ḥikāyat al-Maqāsid fī daft-i-mafāsīd*, by Ahmed Rifā'at Effendi, Constantinople, n.d.

(2) WESTERN: Rinn, *Marabouts et Khouan*, Algiers, 1834; *Religieuses musulmanes*, Cambron, Algiers, 1837; *Annales du Heddaz*, Paris, 1837; Carra de Vaux, *Gazali*, Paris, Alcan, 1902; Brockelmann, *Gesch. der Arab. Litt.*, Berlin, 1897. Among older publications, Général de Neuve, *Les Khouans*, 1845; Mercier, 'Études sur la confrérie des Khouan de Sidi Abd el-Kader el-Djilani', *RSA de Constantine*, III (1893).

BON CARRA DE VAUX.

'ABD AR-RAZZAQ.—1. *Life*.—The well-known Sufi, Kamāl ad-Dīn 'Abd ar-Razzāq Abū 'l-Ghannā'im ibn Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Qāshānī (Kāshānī, Kāshī), was a native of Qāshān (Kāshān), a considerable town in the Jibāl province of Persia, situated about half-way between Teherān and Isfahān. The year of his birth is not recorded, but Ḥājji Ḥalifa (iv. p. 427) gives as the date of his death A.H. 730 = A.D. 1329-30. Elsewhere he gives A.H. 887 = A.D. 1482-83; but this is manifestly an error due to confusion with the historian Kamāl ad-Dīn 'Abd ar-Razzāq of Samarcand. The former date is confirmed by the following anecdote (Jāmi, *Nafahāt al-uns*, Calcutta, 1859, p. 557). On one occasion 'Abd ar-Razzāq was accompanying the Emir Iqbāl Sīstānī on the road to Sulṭāniyya, and asked him in the course of conversation what his shaiḥ—meaning Ahmad ibn Muṣṭafā Rukn ad-Dīn 'Alā' ad-Daula of Simnān—thought of the celebrated Sufi Muḥyī ad-Dīn Ibn 'Arabī. The Emir replied that Rukn ad-Dīn regarded him as a master of mystical science, but believed him to be mistaken in his pantheistic doctrine touching the unity of the Divine substance; whereupon 'Abd ar-Razzāq retorted that the doctrine in question was the foundation of Ibn 'Arabī's philosophy, that it was the most excellent he had ever heard, and that it was held by all the saints and prophets. These remarks were communicated by the Emir Iqbāl to his shaiḥ, Rukn ad-Dīn, who stigmatized Ibn 'Arabī's doctrine as abominable and far worse than avowed materialism. Jāmi has preserved the correspondence which ensued between 'Abd ar-Razzāq and his adversary (*Nafahāt*, pp. 558-568).

This dispute enables us to fix the epoch at which 'Abd ar-Razzāq flourished, since the shaiḥ Rukn ad-Dīn, his contemporary, was charged with a political mission to the court of Abū Sa'id, son of Uljaitu, the Mongol sovereign of Persia (A.D. 1316-1335), and we know, moreover, that he composed one of his works, entitled the *Urwa*, in 1321 (*JA* for 1873, p. 133). This book was read by 'Abd ar-Razzāq, who addressed to the author a letter on the subject (Nūr Allāh of Shustar in the *Maḥālis al-mu'minin*, ib. p. 135, also British Museum MSS add. No. 26,716, fol. 331 vo. and No. 23,541, fol. 364 vo.). This letter, with the answer of Rukn ad-Dīn, is extant in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge (*Catalogue of the Arabic, Persian, and Turkish Manuscripts in the Library of Trinity College*, by E. H. Palmer, p. 116). Consequently there can be little doubt that the closing years of 'Abd ar-Razzāq's life fall within the reign of Abū Sa'id, and he may well have died, according to the earlier date mentioned by Ḥājji Ḥalifa, in A.H. 730 = A.D. 1329-30.

Concerning the outward events of his life we

possess scarcely any information. Jāmi states (*Nafahāt*, p. 557) that he was a disciple of shaiḥ Nūr ad-Dīn ‘Abd aṣ-Ṣamad of Naṭanz, through whom, as appears from the articles on that shaiḥ and his teacher, shaiḥ Najīb ad-Dīn ‘Alī ibn Buzghush (*Nafahāt*, pp. 554 f., 546 ff.), he traced his spiritual descent to the illustrious ṣūfīs Shihāb ad-Dīn ‘Umar as-Suhrawardī and Muḥyī ad-Dīn ibn ‘Arabi. It is related by Yāfi‘i (*Raud ar-rayāḥin*, 106th anecdote: p. 65 of ed. of Cairo, 1315) that one day while ‘Abd ar-Razzāq was discoursing in the mosque at Medina, a dervish among his audience withdrew into a corner and gave himself up to meditation. On being asked why he did not listen like the rest, he answered: ‘They are hearing the servant (‘abd) of the Provider (ar-Razzāq),\* but I am hearing the Provider, not His servant.’

2. *Writings*.—The most famous work of ‘Abd ar-Razzāq is his dictionary of the technical terms of the ṣūfīs, *Iṣṭilāḥāt aṣ-Ṣūfiya*. It is divided into two parts, the first on the technical expressions (*muṣṭalahāt*), and the second on the so-called ‘stations’ (*maqāmāt*). ‘Abd ar-Razzāq states in his preface that he composed it for the instruction of his friends who, not being ṣūfīs, could not understand the technical terms which he had employed in some of his other works. The *Iṣṭilāḥāt* was largely utilized by Saiyid ‘Alī al-Jurjānī, the author of the *Ta’rīfāt* or ‘Definitions,’ a well-known treatise of the same kind, and the first part has been edited by Sprenger (Calcutta, 1845). The *Laṭā’if al-‘ilām fī ishārātī ahl al-ilhām*, of which Tholuck has made use, is also devoted to explaining the peculiar Ṣūfiistic terminology. Some account will be given below of the *Risālat fī ‘l-qaḍā wa ‘l-qadar* or ‘Tract on Predestination and Free-will,’ which has been published, analyzed, and translated by Guyard. ‘Abd ar-Razzāq wrote several books of less importance, such as his allegorical interpretation of the 38th chapter of the Qur’ān (*Ta’wīlāt al-Qur’ān*) and his commentaries on the *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* of Ibn ‘Arabi, on the *Tā’īyat al-kubrā* of Ibn al-Fārīd, and on the *Manāzil as-sā’irīn* of ‘Abdullāh al-Anṣārī.

3. *Doctrine*.—Like the later ṣūfīs generally, ‘Abd ar-Razzāq finds a basis for his system in the Neo-Platonic philosophy as expounded to the Muslims by Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), and Ghazālī. He is a thoroughgoing pantheist, in the sense that he considers the whole universe, spiritual and material, to be an emanation from God. From the Absolute Being, who alone exists, and who is known solely to Himself, there radiates a spiritual substance, the Primal Intelligence (*al-‘Aql al-Awwal*) or Universal Reason, which answers to the *vous* of Plotinus and the *λόγος* of Philo. This substance contains the types or ideas of all existing things, and by a further process of emanation these types descend into the world of the Universal Soul, the Plotinian *ψυχή*, where they become individualized and are transmitted to the material world. Here begins an upward movement by which all individual souls are drawn back to the Primal Intelligence and ultimately reabsorbed. ‘Abd ar-Razzāq distinguishes three classes of mankind: the slaves of passion (*ahlī nafs*) and sense, who are ignorant of God and of His attributes, and say, ‘The Qur’ān is the word of Muhammad,’ but are saved from hell if they have faith; secondly, the men of intellect (*ahlī qalb*), who attain to the knowledge of the Divine attributes by means of reflexion and argument; and, thirdly, the spiritualists (*ahlī rūḥ*), who pierce through the veil of plurality into the presence of the eternal Oneness and contemplate God as He really is (*Nafahāt*, p. 559 f.).

Much of this doctrine is not peculiar to ‘Abd ar-Razzāq, but belongs to the philosophical

school of Ṣūfiism. His originality lies in the fact that he combined his pantheistic principles with an assertion of moral freedom which at first sight appears to be incompatible with them. His theory on this subject is set forth in the *Risālat fī ‘l-qaḍā wa ‘l-qadar* (see Guyard’s article in *JA* vii. i. p. 125 ff.), and may be summarized as follows: Everything that exists in the terrestrial world is the manifestation of some universal type prefigured in the world of decree (*qaḍā*), i.e. in the Primal Intelligence, and undergoes a process of creation, development, and destruction which is pre-determined in every particular. How then, we may ask, is it possible for men to have any power over actions emanating from a Divine source, and governed by immutable laws? What is the use of commands and prohibitions, of rewards and punishments, if there is no liberty to choose good or reject evil? ‘Abd ar-Razzāq, diverging at this point from Ibn ‘Arabi, solves the difficulty by declaring that all actions are the result of direct or indirect causes, themselves predetermined, one of which is Free-will itself. In other words, it is foreknown to God and inevitably decreed that every human act shall be produced by the united operation of certain causes, at a certain time, in a certain place, and in a certain form; but it is also decreed, no less inevitably, that the agent shall exercise his free choice (*ḥiṭṭiyār*) in the production of the act. Therefore every act is at once fatal and free. The Qadarites (Mu’tazilites), who maintain that men are the authors of their own actions, regard only the proximate causes; while the Jabarites, who hold that all actions are created by God, regard only the remote causes (cf. MUHAMMADANISM, §ii.). Both parties see but half the truth, which, as Ja’far Ṣādiq remarked, is neither absolute fatalism nor absolute liberty, but something between those two extremes. Hence the utility of religion and morals, whereby men are incited to good actions and deterred from evil. The Prophet said of Abū Huraira: ‘The pen which has written his destiny is dry,’ meaning that what should happen was already fixed; but to the question, ‘Why then do aught?’ he replied: ‘Nay, do it; every one of you has received the capacity of doing that for which he was created.’ ‘Abd ar-Razzāq next proceeds to deal with the objection that, if our acts are determined in advance and produced, though willingly, by us, we should all have an equal share of good and evil. He argues that the injustice is only apparent, as, for example, in the story of Moses and Hār (Qur. xviii. 59 ff.), and that ‘whatever is, is right’; for if God could have created a better world, He would have done so. Moreover, the distinction of good and evil is essential to the perfection of the Divine scheme, which demands all possible varieties of aptitude, disposition, and endowment. If the beggar were a sultan, and if the ignorant knave were wise and virtuous, the harmony of the universe would be destroyed. None is responsible for his natural deficiencies—God pardons an ugly man for not resembling Joseph, the Muslim example of masculine beauty, or a wicked man for not behaving like Muhammad; but those are justly condemned who follow their evil bent in defiance of the promptings of reason and religion. As regards the future life, all shall receive such retribution as they deserve, and shall enjoy that degree of felicity of which each is capable according to his spiritual rank. ‘Abd ar-Razzāq affirms that the wicked shall not suffer eternal punishment, though he adds the saving clause, ‘unless God will otherwise.’

LITERATURE.—See, in addition to the references in the article, Tholuck, *Die speculative Trinitätslehre des späteren Orients*, Berlin, 1824, pp. 13 ff., 23 ff. [extracts from the *Laṭā’if al-‘ilām*, with German translation: see Dory’s *Catalogue of the Oriental MSS in the Library of the University of Leyden*, vol. i. pp.

\* Ar-Razzāq, ‘the Provider,’ is one of the names of Allāh.

Among some races abduction was the ordinary legal method of procuring a wife, and the parents of the abducted woman were liable to punishment if they attempted to get back their daughter. Among other races abduction led to blood feuds, and it is possible, as Herbert Spencer suggests, that the fear of vengeance led to the offer of compensation by the abductor, and prepared the way for the more advanced matrimonial custom of marriage by purchase. After the decay of marriage by capture, many traces of it still remained in marriage customs and ceremonies. In some cases the bridegroom is expected to go through the form of carrying off the bride by stratagem or force; in other cases the bride conceals herself in a hiding-place, and has to be discovered by her future husband; in some marriage ceremonies it is considered a point of honour with the bride to resist and struggle, no matter how willing she may be to enter into the marriage compact. With the advance of civilization, and more especially in those forms of society where marriage became a matter of mutual consent, and in this way assumed an ethical character, abduction, from being a tolerated custom, descended to the position of a crime. In

\* This spelling would seem more nearly to correspond to the original form (see Poole, *op. cit.* 137 n.). For its proposed derivations see Ducange, *s.v.* 'baisare' (cf. Poole, *op. cit.* 364), and the pun on the Fr. *abeille* below. Cf. also Rémusat, *op. cit.* l. 14 n.  
† Hence the name by which he was called, *Peripalætiſus Palatinus* (John of Salisbury, *Metaph.* II. 10).

into a nunnery, Abelard, at the age of thirty-four, put himself under the most famous theologian of the day, Anselm of Laon (c. 1113, Deutsch, *op. cit.* 30 n.). The venture, whether due to religious impulse or to ambition, was not a success. A few lectures convinced Abelard that he would find little fruit 'on this barren fig-tree.'

'Anselm,' continues Abelard, 'was that sort of man that if any one went to him in uncertainty, he returned more uncertain still. He was wonderful to hear, but at once failed if you questioned him. He kindled a fire not to give light, but to fill the house with smoke' (*Hist. Cal.* c. 3).

Abelard soon shocked his fellow-students by expressing the opinion that educated men should be able to study the Scriptures for themselves with the help of the 'glosses' alone. (As a matter of fact, the 'gloss' in universal use was his tutor Anselm's amended form of the *Glossa Ordinaria* of Walafrid Strabo (†849) [Poole, *op. cit.* 135 n.]). In proof of his view, he gave, at their request, a series of lectures on *Ezekiel*. Such was his success, if we may accept his own statement, that it was only by expelling him from Laon as an unauthorized teacher, as in theology he certainly was, that the authorities were able to check the rush to his classroom. 'Anselm,' says Abelard, in a characteristic sentence, 'had the impudence to suppress me' (*Hist. Cal.* cc. 3, 4).

On his return to Paris, Abelard resumed his lectures, though whether in the cathedral or in St. Geneviève is uncertain. Scholars from every land (Fulk of Deuil, *Ep. ad Abalardum* in Migne, *PL* clxxviii. 371, gives an interesting catalogue) hastened to sit at the feet of this wonder of the age—philosopher, poet, musician, and theologian in one. The Church smiled on his success, and appointed him, though not yet a sub-deacon, a canon of Notre Dame (Poole, *op. cit.* 145 n.; Rémusat, i. 39 n.). Abelard had reached the zenith of his fame. Henceforth the story of his life is one of 'calamity,' not the least element in which was his own moral downfall, the conscious deliberateness of which, however, in our judgment, he characteristically exaggerates in his later reminiscences (*Hist. Cal.* c. 6; cf. Rémusat, i. 49, as against Cotter Morison, *St. Bernard*, 263). Into the romance of his connexion with Heloise (Heloïssa=Louise) we need not enter. The repetition of this well-known story distracts attention from the real greatness of Abelard in the history of thought. In spite of the protests of Heloise that 'Abelard was created for mankind, and should not be sacrificed for the sake of a single woman,' Abelard privately married the woman he had seduced, and, when the secret was out, removed her to the convent of Argenteuil, the discipline of which was very lax. In Abelard's opinion, as reported for us by one of his students, marriage was lawful for such of the clergy as had not been ordained priests (*Sententia*, c. xxxi.; cf. Poole, 147 n.). We draw a veil over the story of the revenge of Fulbert, his wife's uncle. Abelard in an agony of soul and body fled to St. Denys, while Heloise, on his demand, tried to transfer her passions to more spiritual objects, and took the veil at Argenteuil, chanting, as she did so, a verse out of Lucan's *Pharsalia* (c. 1119). Their boy, to whom the parents had given the curious name of Astrolabe, was left with Abelard's sister, Denys (*Hist. Cal.* c. 8. For his career see Rémusat, i. 269).

Abelard found the abbey of St. Denys worldly and dissolute. He retired in disgust to a cell of the house in Champagne, the exact location of which is a little uncertain (*Recueil*, xiv. 290 n.; Rémusat, *op. cit.* i. 73 n.; Poole, *op. cit.* 156 n.), and opened a school of theology. Very soon the throng of his students made it difficult to procure either food or shelter. His lectures were as daring as they were brilliant. In his *Tractatus de Unitate*

*et Trinitate Divina*, a work recently discovered and edited by Dr. Stölzle (Freiburg, 1891), and afterwards recast into his *Theologia Christiana*, he discussed the great mystery. His line of thought may be gathered from his position: a doctrine is not believed merely because God has said it; but because we are convinced by reason that it is so (cf. *Int. ad Theol.* ii. 18). We need not wonder that he was summoned by the legate, Cardinal Cuno of Preneste, to answer for his teaching before a Synod at Soissons (1121) at the instance, curiously, of his first master, the aged Roscelin (on this see Rémusat, i. 81 n.), and of two rival masters of theology, Alberic of Rheims and Lotulf of Novara, the leading spirits in his former expulsion from Laon. The charge against him of Sabellianism seems to have had little justification (Rashdall, i. 53; Deutsch, 265). In reality the chief cause of offence lay in his appeal to reason. According to Abelard, the Synod, without either reading or inquiring, in spite also of the efforts of bp. Geoffrey of Chartres to secure an adjournment, 'compelled me to burn the book with my own hands. So it was burnt amid general silence.' He was not allowed to justify his orthodoxy. A copy was handed to him of the Athanasian Creed, 'the which I read amid sobs and tears as well as I might.' He was then sent to St. Medard, a convent near Soissons, which had acquired the reputation of a penitentiary through the stern discipline of its abbot Geoffrey and his frequent use of the whip (*Hist. Cal.* cc. 9, 10). 'Good Jesus,' cried Abelard in his distress, 'where wert Thou?' There he suffered much from the zeal of its prior, the rude but canonized Goswin (*Recueil des historiens des Gaules*, xiv. 445), who had previously come into conflict with him at St. Geneviève, 'as David with Goliath' (ib. 442). (The student should note that the records of the Synod of Soissons have been lost. We are dependent on Abelard, Otto of Freising, and St. Bernard).

Abelard was soon permitted to return to St. Denys. There his love for truth overwhelmed him in a new calamity. He had been led by Bede (*Expos. in Acts*, xvii. 34) to doubt whether the foundation was indeed due, as the monks proclaimed, to Dionysius the Areopagite. Characteristically Abelard 'showed the passage in a joke to some of the monks.' Alarmed by their threats of handing him over to the king, the patron of the abbey, Abelard fled by night to St. Ayoul's, a priory near Provins in Champagne. Efforts were made to secure his return, if necessary by force. He himself became willing to explain away the authority of Bede (Deutsch, *op. cit.* 38, for a defence of Abelard). Fortunately at this stage abbot Adam of St. Denys died (Feb. 19, 1122). He was succeeded by the famous Suger (1081-1152), at that time not the saint and reformer he became later through the influence of St. Bernard (1127), but one of the king's trusted ministers. At the instance of certain courtiers, Suger gave permission to Abelard to seek any refuge he liked, provided he did not become the subject of any other monastery. Abelard thus became a hermit, or unattached member of the house. But his eager pupils soon found out his retreat. His hut of wattles and stubble 'in a solitude abandoned to wild beasts and robbers' on the Ardusson, near Troyes, became the crowded monastery of the Paraclete. 'The whole world,' wrote Abelard, 'is gone out after me. By their persecutions they have prevailed nothing.' Nor was his monastery one to escape suspicion. It was rather a school of philosophers, where disputations took the place of constant devotions, where there were neither vows nor rigid rules. The very title of Paraclete, 'the Comforter' of his sad life, was an innovation; 'dedications should

be either to the Trinity, or to the Son alone' (*Hist. Cal.* c. 11). That Abelard maintained strict order among his flock is shown, however, by a curious surviving fragment of verse (Rémusat, i. 111).

In 1125, Abelard was invited to be the abbot of the lonely monastery of St. Gildas de Rhuys, near Vannes, the oldest monastery in his native Brittany. Abelard accepted, either urged by his fears of further councils (for Clairvaux, the monastery of the ever vigilant St. Bernard, was at no great distance from Paraclete; while he dreaded also an attack from Norbert of Magdeburg, the founder of the Premonstratensians), or in one of his frequent moods. 'God knows,' he writes, 'that at times I fell into such despair that I proposed to myself to go off and live the life of a Christian among the enemies of Christ.' His life there for the next six, or possibly eight, years (Poole, 158 n.), was one of almost unrelieved misery. The abbey was poor in resources, shameless in its depravity; the monks unscrupulous in their determination to get rid of any reformer. They tried to poison Abelard, first in his food, then in the cup of the Eucharist. After several abortive attempts, Abelard succeeded in flight. But Paraclete was no longer open to him. In 1129 he had formally handed it over—with the added sanction (Nov. 28, 1131) of a Bull, which he had obtained from Pope Innocent II. on his stay at Morigny, near Etampes (*Recueil*, xii. 80)—to Heloise 'the prioress, and the other sisters in the oratory of the Holy Trinity.' Heloise had been expelled from Argentueil in 1128 (*Recueil*, xii. 215) by the mingled rapacity and reforming zeal of Suger, who had made good at Rome the claims of St. Denys to the convent.

The movements of Abelard for the next three or four years are a little uncertain, the more so as he seems to have maintained the rank and title of abbot of St. Gildas. Probably he lived near Paraclete, engaged in collecting and publishing his writings, including his *Historia Calamitatum*, and in resolving for Heloise the various problems which arose in the establishment of Paraclete as a nunnery. To this period belongs also his famous correspondence with Heloise. To pass from these impassioned letters to the scholastic trifling of many of the *Problemata Heloise* is chiefly of interest as a study in repression. He resumed also his teaching at St. Geneviève, though perhaps fitfully. From the enthusiastic description of John of Salisbury in 1136 we learn that the master had lost none of his power (*Metaphysicus*, ii. 10, 'contuli me ad peripateticum palatinum'). But for this mention, Abelard's history at this time would be almost a blank. We know, however, that about this date Arnold of Brescia attached himself to Abelard.

When next Abelard appears before us, he is at fatal theological strife with St. Bernard, whom he had first met at Morigny when in quest of the papal grant of the Paraclete (Jan. 20th, 1131). The differences of the two men were fundamental, of the kind that no argument or personal intercourse can remove. That Bernard was a realist goes without saying. Realism in those days was almost identical with orthodoxy. But this was not the difference. The two were representatives of opposing forces. Abelard summed up in himself the spirit of a premature revolt against unreasoning authority. Bernard, the last of the Fathers, was the supreme representative to the age of all that was best in the old faith: a reformer in morals and life, a rigid conservative in creed and ritual. Abelard, profoundly religious in his way, was the representative of a creed full of dry light and clear of cant, but destitute of spiritual warmth; and which had shown, both at St. Denys and St. Gildas, little power in turning men from their sins

to the higher life. With all his narrowness of intellectual vision compared with Abelard, put St. Bernard down at St. Gildas, and that abode of loose livers would have felt at once the purifying power of his zeal. Bernard's was that baptism with fire which not only cleanses but warms; but of this the cold, subtle, intellectual religion of Abelard knew little or nothing. To Bernard—'Faith is not an opinion but a certitude. "The substance of things hoped for," says the Apostle, not the phantasies of empty conjecture. You hear, the substance. You may not dispute on the faith as you please, you may not wander here and there through the wastes of opinion, the byways of error. By the name "substance" something certain and fixed is placed before you; you are enclosed within boundaries, you are restrained within unchanging limits' (*Tractatus de erroribus Abelardi*, iv. 9).

Abelard, on the contrary, argued that reason was of God, and had, as philosophy showed, found God. He argued that 'he that is hasty to trust is light-minded' (Sir 19). Conflict between the two was inevitable; it had already broken out. In one of his letters, Bernard inveighs with his customary rhetoric against 'Peter Abelard disputing with boys, conversing with women . . . who does not approach alone, as Moses did, towards the darkness in which God was, but advances attended by a crowd of disciples' (Bernard, *Ep.* cccxxii.). On his part, Abelard had attacked the saint for preferring the usual form of the Lord's Prayer to that in use at Paraclete (ὁν ἄπρον τὸν ἐκκοινων, which Abelard translates *supersubstantialem*; see Abelard, *Ep.* x. in Migne, *op. cit.* col. 337). Nor would the attachment to Abelard of his former pupil, the daring revolutionary Arnold of Brescia, tend to lessen the suspicions against him.

The two representatives of systems whose conflict from the nature of things is as inevitable as it is unending, were now to meet in fierce combat at Sens, in the province of whose archbishop both Paris and Clairvaux lay. The challenge seems to have come from Abelard; for we may dismiss as fiction the statement of Bernard's biographer, Geoffrey of Auxerre, that Bernard privately visited Abelard and secured his repentance (*Recueil*, xiv. 370). Abelard felt the need of publicly clearing himself from the charges of heterodoxy brought against him by William of St. Thierry in collusion, as some think, with Bernard himself (Bernard, *Ep.* cccxxvii.). In this challenge Abelard once more shows that neither misfortune nor years had taught him wisdom. 'He entered the lists against authority where authority was supreme—in a general council. At issue with the deep devotional spirit of the age, he chose his time when all minds were excited by the most solemn action of devotion—the Crusade: he appealed to reason when reason was least likely to be heard' (Milman, *Latin Christianity*, iv. 355). His one advantage would appear to have been that Henry le Sanglier, the archbishop of Sens, had a grudge against Bernard (Rémusat, i. 210-211). Perhaps for this reason Bernard at first was unwilling to come to the duel. Such contests, he pleaded, were vain; the verities of faith could not be submitted to their decision (*Ep.* clxxxix. 4). At length Bernard yielded to the representations of his friends and the summons of his metropolitan, and set out for Sens, Whitsuntide 1141 (for date, not 1140 as Poole, Rémusat, see Deutsch, *Die Synode v. Sens*, Berlin, 1880). Hardly had the council opened (June 4), and Bernard demanded the recital of Abelard's heresies, than Abelard, whether from characteristic irresolution, fear of the people of Sens, loss of nerve, or revulsion of feeling, appealed from the very tribunal he had chosen to the judgment of the Pope, and left the assembly to mumble out over its wine-cups its *condemnamus*, already decided upon, it seems, on the previous day (Berengar of Poitiers, *Apologeticus pro Magistro* in Migne, *PL*



clxxviii. col. 1857 ff.; to be read with caution). The folly of Abelard's appeal is shown by the haste with which (July 16, 1141) Pope Innocent II. ratified the sentence of Sens, largely as the result of the invectives of Bernard against 'the French bee' (*abeille*) and 'Goliath's weapon-bearer, Arnold of Brescia' (*Épp. clxxxviii., xciii., cccxxxi.-cccxxvi., cccxxviii., Poole, 166 n.*), who seems, in fact, to have appealed to the Pope, even before the condemnation of Abelard—a matter scarcely to the credit of Bernard (*Rémusat, i. 223*). For the condemnation see Migne, *PL clxxix. cols. 515-517*. The records of Sens have not been preserved).

Abelard had appealed unto Cæsar, but it was before a different tribunal that he was to stand. After lingering some days in Paris, he set off for Rome, but on his way old age came upon him suddenly; so in the monastery of Clugny, 'renouncing the tumult of schools and lectures, he awaited the end.' Through the efforts of the abbot, Peter the Venerable, Abelard was reconciled to St. Bernard (see possibly his *confessio*, Migne, *op. cit.* 105). His increasing weakness led to his removal to the dependent priory of St. Marcel at Châlons-sur-Saône. There, in the spring of 1142 (April 21), as the abbot wrote to 'his dear sister,' the sorrowing Heloise:—

'The advent of the Divine Visitor found him not sleeping, as it does many, but on the watch. . . . A long letter would not unfold the humility and devotion of his conversation while among us. If I mistake not, I never remember to have seen one so humble in manners and habit. Thus Master Peter finished his days, and he who throughout the world was famed for his knowledge persevered in meekness and humility, and, as we may believe, passed to the Lord' (Peter the Venerable, *Ep. ad Heloisam*, Migne, *PL clxxix. col. 347 ff.*).

His body was secretly conveyed by Peter to the Paraclete, and buried in the crypt of the church. Heloise survived his death 21 years, and was buried near him; not, however, until Nov. 6, 1817, did they rest together in Père Lachaise ('*des souvenirs*,' *Rémusat, i. 268*).

2. Influence.—Abelard was no heretic, nor was his a deathbed repentance. He always maintained that he was the devoted son of the Church. He was, in the verdict of Peter the Venerable, 'ever to be named with honour as the servant of Christ, and verily Christ's philosopher' (*Petrus Ven. ut supra*). In his last letter to Heloise, Abelard had pleaded: 'I would not be an Aristotle if this should keep me away from Christ' (Migne, *PL clxxviii. col. 375*). He owes his importance not to his heresies, but to his demand for reverent, though thorough, inquiry into matters of religion. Modern Catholics have no hesitation in saying that both the Synods, Soissons and Sens, were conspicuous for zeal rather than knowledge. It is well known also that the work of his disciple, the famous *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, a work that is largely the *Sic et Non* in a more reverent form, became the accredited textbook in theology, the very canon of orthodoxy of the later Middle Ages, though many of its views were those for which Abelard had been condemned. But we need not marvel at the misfortunes of Abelard. In part they were the results of an ill-balanced judgment, always in extremes, in part the necessary outcome of his real greatness.

For Abelard was so great intellectually, so completely in advance of his age, both in the extent of his knowledge and the width of his outlook, that his positions were bound to seem heterodox to a generation that leaned wholly on the past. Abelard, in fact, belonged to the future. The very spirit of Protestantism is contained in his declaration that the 'doctors of the Church should be read not with the necessity to believe, but with liberty to judge' (*Sic et Non*, prol. in Migne, *op. cit.* p. 1347). We seem transported to the 20th cent. when Abelard claims that the interpretation of Scripture may err or the text be faulty (*l.c.*). In

the preface to his *Sic et Non*—a collection of contradictory opinions from the Fathers on all the leading disputes of theology, the prologue of which was probably written not later than 1121 (Deutsch, 462)—he lays down a defence of all criticism: 'By doubting we are led to inquire, by inquiry we perceive the truth.' Of those who argue that we must not reason on matters of faith, Abelard asks:

'How, then, is the faith of any people, however false, to be refuted, though it may have arrived at such a pitch of blindness as to confess some idol to be the creator both of heaven and earth? As, according to your own admission, you cannot reason upon matters of faith, you have no right to attack others upon a matter with regard to which you think you ought yourself to be unassailed' (*Introd. Theol. ii. c. 3*, Migne, *op. cit.* col. 1050).

The dilemma of unreasoning pietism has never been better exposed.

The circumstances of the times flung Abelard into conflict with Bernard. Intellectually, the only foeman worthy of his steel would have been Anselm of Canterbury. At first sight there seems to be between these two philosophers an impassable abyss, unconsciously summed up by Anselm in the preface to his *Cur Deus Homo*. Some men seek for reasons because they do not believe; we seek for them because we do believe! 'This is my belief, that, if I believe not, neither shall I understand' (*credo ut intelligam*). The rule of Abelard is the exact opposite. He argues that men believe not because of authority but because of conviction. Doubt is his starting-point, reason his guide to certitude. But a deeper study reveals that the differences between the two may be exaggerated, as in Abelard's own generation they certainly were. Abelard owns that the highest truths of theology stand above the proof of our understanding; they can only be hinted at by analogies, as, for instance, his favourite analogy of the seal and the Trinity. But through knowledge faith is made perfect (Deutsch, *op. cit.* 96 ff., 433 ff.). Anselm was less anxious to satisfy reason than Abelard, only he wanted to make sure of its limits before he began. Thus the difference between the two great thinkers was one rather of order of thought than real divergence. If the chronological order be regarded, Anselm is right; if the logical, Abelard. In the order of experience faith precedes reason; in the maturer life reason leads up to faith (see some excellent remarks in Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* 120 ff., on the contrast; cf. also Deutsch, *op. cit.* 172). It is in the clear perception of this last that the true greatness of Abelard lies. But, like Bacon, he had to leave his name and memory to the next age, that age which he had done more than any man to usher in. The school in which he taught developed within a generation into the greatest university of Europe, largely through his influence. With Abelard also closes the first period of Scholasticism. In the next generation James of Venice translated the works of Aristotle, hitherto for the most part unknown, into Latin. Henceforth the 'New Logic,' the basis of which in many ways was the same as that which led Abelard in his protests, dominated Europe. In the place of St. Bernard we have Aristotle as the all but canonized leader of the Church.

In nothing is Abelard's influence more visible than in his scholars. Of his pupils, twenty-five, it is said, became cardinals, including Pope Alexander III., and more than fifty were bishops. Through Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, founded on the model of Abelard's *Sic et Non*, Abelard swayed and moulded the theology of the next three hundred years. As Abelard was the incarnation of the new spirit claiming for itself the freedom of thought, so in his pupil Arnold of Brescia we find the leader in the new claim for freedom of will in an ideal Christian republic. Another pupil, William of Conches, made a firm though ineffectual protest

against the growing neglect of literature (John of Salisbury, *Metaph.* i. 24 in Migne, *PL* clxxviii. col. 856).

Of particular doctrines which illustrate Abelard's influence or drift, we select the following as of special theological interest:—

(a) *Inspiration*.—He limits inspiration to matters concerning 'faith, hope, charity, and the sacraments.' The rest is largely 'for the adornment or enlargement of the Church' (see his *Prol.* in *Ep. Rom.*, Migne, *op. cit.* 785). Even 'prophets and apostles may err' (*Prol.* in *Sic et Non*, Migne, *op. cit.* 1345), while a place must be found in the evolution of life and doctrine for revelation given to the heathen philosophers, especially Plato (*Theol. Christ.* lib. ii. *passim*, e.g. Migne, *op. cit.* 1179. Cf. *Epit. Theol. Christ.* c. 11).

(b) *The humanity of Christ*.—This he claims to be essentially real. He goes so far even as to claim that it includes 'humanæ infirmitatis veros defectus' (*Epit. Theol. Christ.* c. 25). In his emphasis on the real humanity of Jesus, Abelard is a complete contrast to his age.

(c) He claimed that *sin lies in the intention*, the consent of the will to an action which is not of itself evil. Virtue cannot be attained except by conflict. Ignorance in the case of the unenlightened does not constitute sin, and the Jews who ignorantly crucified Jesus must be judged accordingly. (Abelard's doctrine of sin may be best gathered from his *Scito te ipsum*, esp. cc. 2, 3, 13. Its very title shows the emphasis he places on self-knowledge or intention). Original sin is thus the penal consequence of sin and not sin itself. 'It is inconceivable that God should damn a man for the sin of his parents' (*Ep. Rom.*, Migne, *op. cit.* 866 ff.).

(d) From this it is an easy transition to Abelard's *moral theory of the Atonement*—Christ's creating within us by His passion a love which itself delivers from sin (*Exp. Ep. Rom.* in Migne, *op. cit.* 836, 859). He rejects totally any theory that makes the Atonement a redemption from the right of the devil (*Epit. Theol. Christ.* c. 23).

Abelard's influence in the field of Logic was very great, amounting almost to a revolution. He struck out a theory which to-day we should call Conceptualism, midway between the Nominalism of Roscelin and the crude Realism of William of Champeaux. He held that we arrive at the general from the particular by an effort of thought. Thus he allowed the reality of the individual, and the reality also of the universals, in so far, that is, as they were the necessary creations of the intellect. Abelard thus returned to the position of Aristotle, probably without any direct knowledge of Aristotle's arguments (Poole, 142 n.). Hence the reputation of Abelard in dialectics in the following centuries, when Aristotle had become dominant. (For a full discussion see Rémusat, vol. ii., or von Prantl, or Ueberweg, i. 392 f.).

Abelard's versatility was very great. In dialectics and theology he was the master without a rival; he also lectured on the great classical law-texts (Rashdall, i. 63 n.). His vernacular songs have perished; the religious hymns (in Migne, 1759 ff.) give little indication of the great power that he exercised in this matter. As a humanist, his qualifications, as also in the case of Heloise, have been exaggerated. His knowledge of Latin literature was considerable, of Greek slight, and of Hebrew nil (Rémusat, i. 30; Deutsch, 58 ff.). Of all mathematics he professes his complete ignorance. His citations from the Fathers are extensive (Deutsch, 69 ff.), as the reader may see for himself by turning over the pages of *Sic et Non*, though many no doubt are second-hand. His eloquence, wit, and charm of manner, added to a culture that covered almost the whole range of knowledge as

then conceived, were acknowledged by his enemies.

To this we have the witness of his epitaph:—

'Est satis in titulo: Petrus hic jacet Abailardus  
Huic soli patuit scibile quidquid erat'

(Poole, 145 n.; for different and inferior reading, Migne, 103; Rémusat, i. 259 n.).

But the truest estimate of Abelard's greatness is that unconsciously given by William of St. Thierry in his invective against him in 1139:—

'His books pass the seas, cross the Alps. His new notions and dogmas about the faith are carried through kingdom and province; they are preached before many and publicly defended, inasmuch that they are reported even to have influence at the court of Rome' (*Op. Bernard*, Ep. cccxxvi.).

Abelard's spirit lived in the victories and movements of later thought.

LITERATURE.—A. The chief source for the life of Abelard will be found in his autobiography, the *Historia Calamitatum*. In addition, we have stray references in Otto of Freising's *de Gestis Frederici* (ed. Pertz, v. 20), esp. l. cc. 47-48, with reference to the Synods of Soissons and Sens; John of Salisbury, *Metaphisicus* (in Migne, *PL* v. 193, or Bouquet, *Recueil*, xiv.), and, of course, the *Letters* of St. Bernard. We may add the *Vita b. Gosuini* (in Bouquet or Brial, *Recueil des Hist. des Gaules*, xiv.), and Suger's *de rebus in admin. sua gestis* (in Duchesne's *Script. Franc.* iv.). Of modern Lives the best sketch in English is by R. L. Poole in his *Illustr. of Hist. of Med. Thought* (1884); Abelard's connexion with the University is judiciously dealt with by Rashdall, *Univ. in M.* A. (1895) i. ch. 1; Compayré's *Abelard and the Origin of Universities* (1893) is altogether misnamed; M. Caba's *Peter Abélard* (1901) is the work of a partisan; the chapter in Cotter Morison's *St. Bernard* (many eds.) is not altogether satisfactory. In French we have the admirable *Abélard*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1845), of Charles de Rémusat. In German: Deutsch, *Peter Abälard* (Leipzig, 1883), has given us a thorough criticism of Abelard's theology which may be compared by the student with that in Rémusat. Deutsch has added much to our knowledge of Abelard's closing years by his *Die Synode von Sens* (Berlin, 1889). Adolf Hausrath's *Peter Abälard* (Leipzig, 1893) is concise yet full. For the philosophy of Abelard, in addition to the exhaustive discussion in Rémusat, we have Reuter, *Gesch. der relig. Entklärung* (2 vols. 1876-1877); Hauréau, *Hist. de la Philosophie scolastique* (Paris, 1872); and, more especially for his Logic, von Prantl, *Gesch. d. Logik im Abendlande* (4 vols., Leipzig, 1855-1870).

B. Of the works of Abelard we have the following editions: Migne, *PL* v. clxxviii. (1855), but without the *Tractatus de Unitate et Trinitate*, first published by Stölze (Freiburg, 1891). On p. 375 of Migne's edition there is an amazing suppression of 'what would shock Catholic ears.' Migne's edition contains the *Sic et Non* first edited in full by Henke and Lindenköhl (Marburg, 1851), as also all the works of Abelard, for the first editing of which we are indebted to Victor Cousin; *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard* (Paris, 1836), and the later *Petri Abailardi Opera*, ed. V. Cousin, G. Jourdain, and E. Despois (Paris, 1849). Cousin's contributions to our knowledge of Abelard are very great.

H. B. WORKMAN.

ABETMENT.—In its most general sense 'abetment' means encouragement, countenance, aid; but the word is now used almost entirely in a bad sense as encouragement, counsel, and instigation to commit an offence against the law. When any one 'directly or indirectly counsels, procures, or commands any person to commit any felony or piracy which is committed in consequence of such counselling, procuring, or commandment,' he is described in English law as an accessory before the fact (cf. Stephen, *Digest of the Criminal Law*). In most criminal codes an abettor or accessory is usually described as a person who has in some manner led to, or facilitated the execution of, an offence by rendering material or intellectual assistance. Without being present at the actual perpetration of a crime or an injustice, a man may be useful to the perpetrator of it by assisting him to plan it, or by placing information before him which will facilitate the offence or enable him to escape. Or abetment may take the form of rendering material assistance to the principal agent, such as procuring for him the instruments or physical means by which he is enabled or assisted to commit an offence.

In China, complicity of a purely moral character is punished with the same severity as if the accomplice were the actual agent, and an offender found guilty of counselling the perpetration of murder receives the same punishment (namely, decapitation) as if he had committed it. (Cf. Letourneau, *L'Evolution juridique*, p. 169). In Roman law, in ancient German law, in old French law, and in



English and American law, no distinction is made, in cases of serious crime, between an accessory and a principal. 'Each in English law may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished as if he alone and independently' (Stephen) had committed the offence (cf. Post, *Ethnologische Jurisprudenz*, 1894, ii. 296 f.). In ancient Jewish law, any one inciting or seducing the people to commit idolatry was ordered to be stoned to death (Dt 13<sup>6-11</sup>). Idolatry was regarded as an act of supreme treason against the theocracy, and every sort of incitement to commit it was visited with the severest penalties. In primitive penal law, abetment does not appear to have been a punishable offence (Post), and in Talmudic jurisprudence no cognizance is taken of incitement by thoughts or words (*JE*, i. p. 54).

In recent years, certain Italian jurists (e.g. Sighele, *Teoria positiva della complicità*, Torino, 1894) have contended that no distinction should be made between accessories and principals, on the ground that a crime committed by persons acting in concert is more dangerous in character than a crime committed by a single individual, and that men united for the common purpose of committing a crime ought to share the responsibility for it in common. Habitual offenders, it is contended, frequently act together; it is often a mere accident which of them shall be the actual perpetrator; therefore all of them ought to be held equally responsible. The supreme object of the law should be to strike at the association, and not merely at the individuals of which it is composed. It is the association that is the danger.

W. D. MORRISON.

**ABHAYAGIRI.**—Name of a celebrated monastery at Anurādhapura, the ancient capital of Ceylon. *Giri* means 'mountain,' and *Abhaya* was one of the names of king Vatta Gamini, who erected the monastery close to the *stūpa*, or solid dome-like structure built over supposed relics of the Buddha. It was this *stūpa* that was called a mountain or hill, and the simile was not extravagant, as the *stūpa* was nearly the height of St. Paul's, and its ruins are still one of the sights of Anurādhapura.

There was considerable rivalry from the outset between the monks at this establishment and those at the much older Mahā Vihāra (the Great Minster), founded 217 years earlier. The rivalry was mainly personal, but developed into differences of doctrinal opinion. Of the nature of these latter we have no exact information, and they were probably not of much importance. On one occasion, in the reign of Mahāsena (A.D. 275-302), the Great Minster was abolished, and its materials removed to the Abhayagiri. But the former was soon afterwards restored to its previous position, and throughout the long history of Ceylon maintained its pre-eminence.

LITERATURE.—H. W. Cave, *Ruined Cities of Ceylon*, London, 1900, pp. 91-93, with plates. T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

**ABHIDHAMMA.**—The title of the third (and last) group, or *piṭaka*, of the Buddhist canonical books; a name also for the specific way in which the Dhamma (doctrine) is set forth in those books. It is in that specific treatment, and not in any distinctive subject-matter, that the real use and significance of these books for early Buddhism are to be found. A myth grew up among 19th cent. Indologists, that the Abhidhamma *piṭaka* was the repository of Buddhist metaphysic. Acquaintance with the contents of the *piṭaka* has dispelled this notion. There is, no doubt, an abstruse and abstract suggestiveness in the titles and opening sentences of the books and their divisions, giving a fictitious suggestion of originality and profundity. But, besides this, there is an ancient tra-

dition of superior erudition and higher standing attaching to those of the Buddhist order who were Abhidhammikas, or experts in Abhidhamma. Thus, in the Mihintale rock inscription, dating from about the commencement of our Middle Ages, tithes from 12 villages or farms are allotted to the cave-recluses there who were Abhidhammikas, as against tithes from 7 and 5 respectively allotted to experts in Suttanta and Vinaya (that is, in the Doctrine and in the Rules of the Order). And whereas mastery of these two was held to establish the expert in *sīla* and *samādhi* respectively (that is, in conduct and meditation), knowledge of Abhidhamma involved the development of *paññā*,—constructive imagination and comprehension,—which ranked among the highest virtues. Once more, in the ancient book translated as *The Questions of King Milinda*, the acquisition by the youthful genius Nāgasena of the contents of the Abhidhamma is acclaimed with wonder and delight in earth and heaven, while his rapid attainment of the remaining *piṭakas* excites no such commotion. Finally, the title itself may have helped to mislead Western, and even Eastern notions. *Abhi* can mean *sur*, *super*, and hence suggests an analogy with Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. Buddhaghosa himself, in explaining the title, gives *ati* ('beyond,' 'above,' 'to excess') as the equivalent of the prefix, inasmuch as Abhidhamma goes beyond the Dhamma, and is distinct from it. But he proceeds to explain that this distinction is due, not to any superior profundity of method, or nature of subject-matter, but to the more detailed analysis given to points of doctrine in the Abhidhamma as compared with the Suttanta methods. There was a legend in his day that the Abhidhamma was first uttered by the Buddha in the Tāvātimsa heaven, whither he had transported himself to preach the Dhamma to his deified mother and hosts of devas. It is not consonant with the Buddhist standpoint, that such an audience should be held capable of benefiting by disquisitions on philosophical problems which had been withheld from the stronger intellects of the Buddha's chief disciples, whom he instructs in the Suttanta. In fact, the legend sprang probably from the orthodox anxiety to invest with a sanction, not inferior to that of the two earlier *piṭakas*, a series of compilations which are manifestly of later date, and the work of elaborating scholastics.

Let it, then, be clearly understood that our present knowledge of such philosophy as is revealed in the Buddhist Pāli canon would be practically undiminished if the whole of the Abhidhamma *piṭaka* were non-existent. That philosophy is all to be found in the Sutta *piṭaka*. The Abhidhammika may nevertheless be held to have surpassed his Suttantika *confrère* in two ways. It should always be remembered (and the usually wearisome form of the Abhidhamma books never lets the reader forget it) that the canon was compiled, and for generations learnt, as an unwritten composition. In the first two *piṭakas* the memory is aided by episodes giving occasion for the utterance of rule, doctrine, or discussion, and also by frequent verse. The Abhidhamma gives no such aids. It helps only by catechism; in its last and longest books, not even by that. Hence the call for sustained reconstructive and reproductive effort must have been more severe. And, further, since the work is mainly a recount, with analysis and elaborations and comment, of Suttanta doctrines, to know one's Abhidhamma might be said to involve a knowledge of the gist of the Sutta *piṭaka*.

The burden, then, of Abhidhamma is not any positive contribution to the philosophy of early Buddhism, but analytic and logical and methodological elaboration of what is already given. As

such it might have almost equalled, in value to the world, the contents of the discourses. As a fact it is the *reductio ad absurdum* of formalism. It is impossible to estimate the extent to which the exaggeration of the Indian temperament and the temperance of the Greek temperament were due to the absence and presence respectively, during the florescence of each, of the written book. Nowhere as in India do we find imagination so elastic and exuberant, running riot through time, space, and the infinite; and nowhere else is seen such determined effort to curb and regulate it. Abhidhamma training was one of the most noteworthy forms of this effort. It was specially calculated (according to Buddhaghosa, *Atthasālinī*, p. 24) to check those excesses over the normal mind (*dhammachitta*) which, in the Buddha's words, tended to loss of balance, craziness, and insanity. The chief methods of that training were: first, the definition and determination of all names or terms entering into the Buddhist scheme of culture; secondly, the enunciation of all doctrines, theoretical and practical, as formulas, with co-ordination of all such as were logically interrelated; and finally, practice in reducing all possible heterodox positions to an absurdity—a method which is confined to the somewhat later fifth book, the *Kathāvatthu*. Even in these lofty aims, however, the want of restraint, helped by the cumbrousness of purely mnemonic compilation, tends to defeat the very objects sought. The logic of definition is not the same as we have inherited, and the propositions yield strings of alternatives that have often little or no relation to facts.

Of the seven books of the Abhidhamma *piṭaka*, the first five have been published by the Pālī Text Society, viz. *Dhammasaṅgani*, *Vibhaṅga*, *Dhātu-kathā*, *Puggala-paññatti* and *Kathāvatthu*; the sixth, or *Yamaka*, is not yet edited; the seventh, the *Paṭṭhāna*, is [1907] in the press. The first book has been translated by the present writer under the title, *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*, London, 1900. Besides these seven, there still survive, in Chinese or Tibetan translations, other seven books, which form the Abhidhamma literature of the Sarvāstivādin—a school which split off from the original nucleus of Buddhist culture. A very full index to the contents of these seven is given by Professor Takakusu in *JPTS*, 1905. But the books themselves have not as yet been edited or translated. Their date also is not yet settled, but they are certainly earlier than the Christian era. These works form the basis of the celebrated, but as yet undiscovered, *Abhidharma-kośa*, or Dictionary of Abhidhamma, written in Sanskrit, as well as that of its Commentaries, and other separate works, some of which survive in Chinese and others in Chinese or Tibetan versions, and which constitute the development of Abhidhamma down to the 2nd or 3rd cent. A.D. Professor Bunyiu Nanjio, in his catalogue of Chinese Buddhist literature (Oxford, 1883), gives the titles of no fewer than thirty-seven of these works still extant. In the later developments of Buddhism in India, notably in the so-called 'Great Vehicle,' the use of the term Abhidhamma gradually died out. But in other Buddhist countries, where Pālī has remained the literary language, books on Abhidhamma have continued to be written down to the present day, the best known being the *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*, published in 1884 by the Pālī Text Society.

C. RHYS DAVIDS.

**ABHIDHARMA KOŚA VYĀKHYĀ.**—One of the most important Buddhist texts preserved in Nepal. It is a commentary, written by a scholar named Yaśomitra, on a classical account of Buddhist metaphysics: *Abhidharma-kośa*, 'the treasure of Abhidharma.' The Sanskrit original of the Kośa seems to be irrevocably lost; but there still exist Chinese and Tibetan versions, of which the Chinese are the oldest. The earliest of these is the work of a Hindu monk, Paramārtha, dated A.D. 563-567; the second, being a revised translation, was made by Hsüen-tsiang, the celebrated pilgrim, A.D. 651-654. The author of the Kośa is Vasubandhu, one of the most illustrious doctors of the Buddhist Church, who flourished about the end of the 5th cent. A.D.

The Kośa itself consists of two parts: (1) a summary account of the doctrine in 602 verses (*kārikās*); (2) an illustrative commentary (*vṛtti*) on these

verses. The subject-matter is discussed in eight sections, viz.: the first principles (*dhātus*), the senses (*indriyas*), the worlds (*lokas*), the inclinations (*anuśayas*), the saint (*ārya pudgala*), the science (*jñāna*), the trance (*samādhi*), the individuality (*pudgala*). Vasubandhu belongs to the school of the Sarvāstivādin, who affirm the existence of all things,—a school of the Hinayāna, or 'Little Vehicle.' The Kośa has nevertheless been admitted as an authority by all schools of Buddhism; the author of the Vyākhyā, Yaśomitra, is a Sautrāntika, and Chinese and Japanese Mahāyānists have always employed it as a text-book. A huge literature of notes and glosses on the Kośa has grown up. In India, before Yaśomitra, Sthiramati, Guṇamati, and Vasumitra wrote commentaries on it, which still exist in Tibetan versions. In China, two pupils of Hsüen-tsiang, Fu-koang and Fa-pao, compiled the lectures and explanations given by their master. It would be easy to-day to fill a whole library with the Kośa literature. That the work achieved so great popularity is due to the rare merits of the author. Familiar with the pedantic intricacies of each school, Vasubandhu elucidates them by the strength of his genius; he brings order, clearness, precision, and cohesion into the whole, combining in a harmonious synthesis the tenets sanctioned by general consent of Buddhists.

SYLVAIN LÉVI.

**ABHISEKA** (literally 'pouring upon' [from *abhi* + *sich*]).—A compound which, without definite ceremonial implications, occurs several times in the Atharva Veda, but not in the Rig or the Sama. In the White Yajur Veda, and in the three Saṁhitās of the Black Yajur Veda, as well as in several Brāhmaṇas and the *śrauta* ritual of all the four Vedas, we find *abhiṣecchanīya* as the name of a rite included in the *rājasūya*, and the last book of the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa has *abhiṣeka* itself for its main topic.

The ceremonial sprinkling, anointing, or baptizing of persons and things is a usage of such antiquity and universality, that its origin and significance could not methodically be made the subject of an inquiry confined to India (see artt. on ANOINTING). If the earliest anointing was with blood, and the object of it to confer vigour, the evidence for the former truth must be sought outside India; and although an invigorating power is in fact ascribed (e.g. Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, v. 4. 2. 2) to the rite, the Brāhmanical theologians were quite capable of arriving at such a conclusion without the help of an old tradition.

We may (A) begin by a statement of the actual employment of such a ceremony, so far as it is known to us from narrative sources, and then (B) append an account of the Brāhmanical prescriptions in connexion with *abhiṣeka*, *vājapeya*, and *rājasūya* ceremonies, and the ritual appertaining to them.

A. 1. Subjects of the ceremony.—The persons who underwent the rite of *abhiṣeka* were in the first place *emperors*. The Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (viii. 15) states as the object of the rite the attainment of paramount power, which it names with a great amplitude of synonyms, and it annexes a list of the famous rulers of former times who had been so distinguished (viii. 21-23). In the Mahābhārata we have two *abhiṣekas* of Yudhiṣṭhira: the first (Sabha Parvan, cc. 33, 45, esp. 45) is preceded by victorious expeditions in all directions and celebrated as part of a *rājasūya* in the presence of subordinate kings, while the second (Śānti Parvan, c. 40) follows the conclusion of the great war. The Buddhist emperor Aśoka was not crowned until four years of conquest had followed his accession (Mahawanso, Turnour, p. 22), and in the case of

Harṣa Silāditya of Ujjain there was a similar postponement (Hüen-tsiang, *Si-Yu-Ki*, tr. Beal, i. pp. 212-213). An imperial *abhiseka* occurs also in Kālidāsa's *Raghuvamśa*, sarga ii., and the inauguration of Naravāhanadatta in the different versions of the *Bṛhatkathā* (Ksemendra, xvii.; Somadeva, xv. 110, esp. v. 89) is that of an emperor; cf. also *Epigraphia Indica*, ii. 4; v. 16.

We have less testimony for the practice in the case of ordinary *mahārājas* or *kings*. But no doubt it would be usual with these also, so long as they retained any measure of independence. For, in the first place, the line between kings and emperors would be very hard to draw, and the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (viii. 14) plainly contemplates also the *abhiseka* of mere kings. Secondly, the *Kauśika Sūtra* of the *Atharva Veda* (xvii. 11-13, ap. Weber, 'Ueber den Rājasūya,' p. 141) distinguishes the *abhiseka* of a simple king (*ekarāja*) from that of a higher (*varṣiyas*). The *Mahābhārata* (Śānti Parvan, v. 2496, ap. Goldstücker, s.v. 'abhiseka,' p. 280) speaks of the *abhisechana* of a king as the most essential matter for any country. The father of Harṣa Silāditya, Prātāpaśila, underwent the rite of *abhiseka*, although he was no universal emperor (Harṣa-Charita, ed. Bombay, 1892, p. 132, ll. 9, 10). See also Jātaka, Nos. 456 and 453; Jacobi, *Erzählungen aus dem Mahārāṣṭrī*, p. 26, l. 5, ll. 13 ff.; the various Rājyābhisekapaddhatis and prayogas, and esp. Bhaṭṭa Nilakantha's *Nitimayūkha*, where a full ritual is given (*sub init.*).

We may mention here that the *Atharva Veda* includes a coronation (*rājasūya*) hymn (iv. 8).

The anointing of an heir-apparent (*yuvārāja*) by his father is supported by several examples from the *Epics* (Goldstücker, *op. cit.* p. 282), to which we may add the references in the *Harṣa-Charita*, c. vi. (ed. Bombay, 1892, p. 223, ll. 12, 13), the *Bṛhatkathā* (Ksemendra, vii. 23. 559; Somadeva, vi. 34, 107 ff.), *Epigraphia Indica*, iv. p. 120, l. 2, and *Kalpasūtra* (ed. Jacobi), p. 74, § 211.

The case of Rāma in the *Rāmāyana*, of which the *Ayodhyā-kāṇḍa* (cc. 1-17, with *Yuddha-kāṇḍa*, c. 112) supplies the fullest account of the state and circumstance of a royal inauguration, is peculiar in two respects—the inauguration was initiated as a *yuvārājyābhiseka*, though completed after Rāma's final accession, and it was an example of the *puṣyābhiseka*, which we find fully described in three texts, namely, *Atharva Veda Pāriśiṣṭa*, No. 4, the *Bṛhatsamhitā* of Varāhamihira, c. 48, and the *Kālikā Purāṇa*, c. 89. The special feature of this rite was that it took place at the conjunction of the moon with the asterism *puṣya* (December-January), at which time, we are informed, Indra originally conquered the demons (Rām. ii. 14. 46), while, according to the Buddhists, both the anointing of an heir-apparent and the *abhiniṣkramaṇa* (cf. the *Jaina nekkhamābhiseka* in *Bagavati*, ix. 33, p. 819, a ref. due to Prof. Leumann) of a Bodhisattva befall at the same hour (*Mahāvastu*, vol. ii. p. 153, ll. 2-4). This date is many times cited in the passages from the *Rāmāyana* (e.g. ii. 2. 10, 3. 39, 4. 20, 14. 46, vi. 112. 56, 70), which also mentions a specially adorned chariot (*puṣyāratha*), described by Hemādri, i. 283, 284 (cf. *Sisupalavadha*, iii. 22, and *Epigr. Ind.* iii. 71), and no doubt identical with the *phussaratha* of the *Jātaka* (Nos. 378, 445). The ceremony *puṣyābhiseka* or *puṣyasnāna*, as described in the *Kālikā Purāṇa* and *Bṛhatsamhitā*, presents some very interesting features,—it is by no means confined to the inauguration of sovereignty,—and would probably repay anthropological investigation.

Anointing was also practised in the case of certain ministers of state. The *Harṣa-Charita* speaks of 'anointed counsellors of royal rank' (*mūrdhābhi*

*śiktā amātyā rājānaḥ*, p. 193, ll. 13, 14); and for the *purohita*, or state priest, there was a special ceremony called *bṛhaspatīśava* connected, though somewhat indefinitely, with the *vājapeya* (Eggeling, *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, iii. p. xxv). The account of the *purohita*, which in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* viii. 24 ff., and *Kauśika Sūtra* xvii. 30 ff., immediately follows *abhiseka*, seems not to include a mention of sprinkling. As regards the *senāpati*, or commander-in-chief, Goldstücker has given (*op. cit.* p. 285) quotations from the *Mahābhārata* (Śalya Parvan, adhy. 46) and elsewhere. From *Jaina* sources we may cite the case occurring in Prof. Jacobi's *Erzählungen aus dem Mahārāṣṭrī*, p. 17, l. 29.

The anointing of images at the time of their inauguration (*pratiṣṭhā*), on occasion of festivals or of distress, or regularly, is a custom still prevalent among the Hindus in India and the Buddhists in Nepal. Rules for it are given in many manuals (*Pūjāvidhi*'s and *Pratiṣṭhāvidhi*'s); an earlier allusion to it may be cited from the *Harṣa-Charita* (ed. Bombay, 1892, p. 171, l. 2). The fluid mentioned in this case is milk; but a variety of other substances, including water of various kinds, cow-dung, earth from an anthill, etc. etc., are named by the authorities whom Goldstücker quotes.

Finally, the name *abhisekabhūmi* is given by the Buddhists to the last of their ten *bhūmis* or stages of perfection (*Mahāvastu*, i. 124. 20). And further, the word *abhiseka* was applied to any ceremonial bathing, such as has always been, and still is, practised by Hindus at sacred fords, tanks, etc. etc. For *abhiseka* of neophytes, see *Agnipurāṇa*, c. 90, Poussin, *Études*, 208 ff., and *Rājendralāla Mitra, Notices of Sanskrit MSS.*, No. 1536; of barren women, etc., Hemādri, *Vratakhāṇḍa*.

2. Ritual and occasion of the ceremony.—This is not the place for enlarging on the varying details of the inauguration ceremony as described in the Sanskrit literature. The reader will find in Goldstücker's Dictionary, s.v. 'Abhiseka,' ample material, extracted from the *Mahābhārata* (Śānti Parvan, c. 40), *Rāmāyana*, *Agni-Purāṇa* (c. 209), and *Mānasāra*. Although in these works the special priestly aspect of the ceremony is but little developed, Goldstücker finds (p. 280) that the details as given in the *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyana* show 'that the *vaidik* ceremony had undergone various modifications at the time of their composition,' while (p. 282) 'the inauguration ceremony at the Paurāṇic period has but little affinity with the *vaidik* rite; it is a series of proceedings which are founded on late superstitions, and reflect scarcely any of the ideas which are the groundwork of the ceremony of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*.' Such changes are, of course, far from unnatural; but there may also have been special causes at work, such as the neglect of the old *śrauta* ritual, or the necessity of providing new forms for rulers who were without title to *kṣatriya* rites.

The general features of the ceremony seem to be as follows: Prior to the rite (e.g. on the previous day) the king undergoes a purification, consisting of a bath, etc., no doubt analogous to the Vedic *dikṣā*. Essentials\* are—(1) appointment of the various ministers of state either before or in the course of the inauguration; (2) choice of the other royal *ratnas*, a queen, an elephant, a white horse, a white bull, a white umbrella, a white chowrie or two, etc.; (3) a throne (*bhadrāsana*, *śimhāsana*, *bhadrapiṭha*, *paramāsana*) made of gold and covered with a tiger-skin; (4) one or several

\* See *Rāmāyana*, ll. 15. 4-12; Ksemendra, xvii. 83 ff.; Somadeva, xv. 110. 62 ff.; Jacobi, *op. cit.* p. 26, ll. 13 ff.; Śānti Parvan, c. 40.

golden vessels (or one of them golden), filled with water of various special kinds, honey, milk, clarified butter, *udumbara* shoots, and other very miscellaneous ingredients. In the actual ceremony the king is seated with his queen on the throne, surrounded by his chiefs, and he is sprinkled not only by the *purohit*, but also by other priests, by the ministers and relatives, and by the citizens. In the *Mahābhārata*, Kṛṣṇa is the first to sprinkle Yudhiṣṭhira, representing perhaps the *rājakarṣṇ* mentioned in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*. The rite is performed with prayer to Indra, or after the manner of Indra's inauguration as king of the gods. After the consecration, the king makes presents (cf. *Harṣa-Charita*, ed. Bombay, 1892, c. iii. p. 132, ll. 9, 10), and, of course, the officiating Brāhmanas receive their *dakṣiṇās*. According to the *Agni Purāṇa* and the *Mānasāra*, the king concludes by riding *pradakṣiṇa*-wise round his city. The liberation of prisoners mentioned by the *Agni Purāṇa* is an incident known in other connexions (e.g. the birth of a prince, *Harṣa-Charita*, c. iv. p. 142, ll. 18, 19).

3. Time chosen for the ceremony and substances employed.—In the case of the recorded *abhiseka*, the temporal restrictions seem to have been, except as explained above, merely such as were necessary in order to ensure auspicious conjunctions: for details see Goldstücker, *op. cit.* p. 285. For the *rājasūya* and *vājapeya* there were, as we shall see, fixed periods in the year.

The substances, which varied in the different ceremonies, are mentioned under the several heads (*vid. supra* and *infra*). Water, milk, curds, and honey generally recur.

B. 1. Turning now to the sacred literature, we find that only one Vedic work gives rules for a royal consecration as such. This is the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, where we find distinguished two forms of *abhiseka*, namely, *punarabhiseka* (viii. 5-11) and *aindra mahābhiseka* (viii. 12-20). As the former, which takes place after a sacrifice, has apparently no relation to the installation of a sovereign and refers probably to the *rājasūya*, we may reserve it for consideration in that connexion.

The *aindra mahābhiseka* is so named because it follows the rites whereby Indra was consecrated king of the gods,—we have already seen that the coronation ceremony continued in later times to be associated with Indra. Thereby a priest who wishes universal victory and paramountcy for his king is to consecrate a *ksatriya* who is ambitious of those objects (*aham sarvā jītiṃ jayeyam aham sarvāṇ lokān vindeyam aham sarveṣāṃ rājāṇāṃ śraīṣṭhyam atīṣṭhām paramatām gaccheyam sāmra-ḥyam bhavjyam svārājyam vairājyam pārameṣṭhyam rājyam mähārājyam āhipatyam aham samantaparyāyī syām sārvaabhaumāḥ sārvaṃyusa āntād ā parārdhāt prthivyaī samudraparyantāyā ekarāt*). The requirements for the ceremony are: (1) vessels of *nyagrodha* (*figus indica*), *udumbara* (*figus glomerata*), *āśvattha* (*figus religiosa*), and *plakṣa* (*figus infectoria*) wood—to be used, no doubt, as in the *rājasūya* (see below); (2) blades of rice of two kinds, *priyaṅgu* (*panicum*), and barley—to be put in the consecration liquids; (3) a throne-seat (*āsandi*) of *udumbara* wood (mentioned also in the *Jātaka*, No. 283), a cup (or ladle), and a branch of the same; (4) for the consecration fluid—curds, honey, butter, and water of a sunshine shower. After a mantra addressed to the throne-seat, the king is made to mount it, and then proclaimed aloud by the king-makers (*rājakartārah*). The priest then recites a mantra referring to Varuṇa as *samrāj*, etc., and sprinkles the seated king by pouring the fluid through the interposed *udumbara* branch and a golden *pavitra* (plate) over his head. After receiving a gift from him, he

hands to him a vessel of *surā* (spirit) to drink, identifying the *surā* with *soma*.

Any comments upon this ceremony, which is preceded by an oath of life-long fealty on the part of the king towards the priest, may be reserved for the end of this article. After the description of it, there follows in the *Brāhmaṇa* a list of all the famous kings of old who had been consecrated thereby, together with the names of the consecrating priests. These names may be cited here:—

1. Janamejaya Pārikṣita, consecrated by Tura Kāvaseya;
  2. Śūryāta Mānava, consecrated by Chyavana Bhārgava;
  3. Śālānika Sātrājita, consecrated by Somaśuśman Vājara-tnāyana;
  4. Ambāstya, consecrated by Parvata and Nārada;
  5. Yudhāmśrauṣṭi Augrasalya, consecrated by Parvata and Nārada;
  6. Viśvakarman Bhaṭvāna, consecrated by Kaśyapa;
  7. Sudāsa Paljavana, consecrated by Vasiṣṭha;
  8. Marutta Pārikṣita, consecrated by Sahavarta Āṅgīrasa;
  9. Aṅga, consecrated by Udamaya Atreya;
  10. ... Māmateya.
  11. ... the rite:—
  12. Atyārāṭi Nāntapī (though not a king), having learned it from Vasiṣṭha Śāṭahavya.
- For other lists see Goldstücker, *op. cit.* p. 279.

2. Before dealing with the *rājasūya* proper, we may conveniently take into consideration the other ceremony described in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (viii. 5-11), the *punarabhiseka*, which, though widely differing in procedure, is of an analogous character, as it presents the rite of *abhiseka* in a ritual routine disconnected from the actual accession of a king. It is not, however, as in the *rājasūya*, imbedded in a composite series of rituals, but placed at the end of a sacrifice.

The name *punarabhiseka* implies that the person concerned was an already crowned king, and the object of the rite was probably to reinforce his vigour as such. Thus, it is stated that the royal power is quickened by it (*sūyate ha vā aśya kṣatram yo dikṣate kṣatriyaḥ sar-*—an expression perhaps implying a knowledge of the word *rājasūya*), and the various substances used are said to restore to the king various powers (*brahmakṣatre ūrg annā-dyam apām ośadhīnāṃ raso brahmavarchasam irā puṣṭiḥ prajātiḥ*), which through the sacrifice had passed out of him (§§ 7, 8). It is with this object that the god Savitr is invoked in the mantra *devasya tvā savituh prasave*, etc. (§ 7), which recurs in the *aindra mahābhiseka* and the *rājasūya*.

The actual rites are very similar to those of the *aindra mahābhiseka*. The apparatus consists of: (1) a seat of *udumbara* wood with a covering of tiger-skin, (2) a cup and branch of *udumbara* wood, (3) a consecration fluid of curds, honey, butter, and water of a sunshine shower, with grass, sprouts, *surā*, and *dūrvā*-grass. The sacrificial space (*vedi*) is marked out with a *sphya* (wooden sword), and the seat is placed half within and half without the same. Sitting behind the seat with his right knee bent to the ground, the king takes hold of it with both hands and invites the gods to ascend it, in order that he may after them ascend it 'for royalty, paramountcy, etc. etc.' He then ascends, and the priest, having blessed the consecration fluid, sprinkles him through the interposed *udumbara* branch, and hands to him the cup of *surā*, from which he drinks; then he offers the remains to a friend. He descends from the throne, placing his feet on the *udumbara* branch, and, sitting with his face eastward, utters thrice the words *namo brahmaṇe*. He then presents a gift to the priest, expressing a wish for victory, rises and places fuel upon the fire, and with fuel in his hand takes three steps in a north-easterly direction, i.e. towards the region of Indra, the invincible (*aparājita*) region, to signify his desire for security (*yogakṣema*) and freedom from defeat. Lastly, he goes home and sits behind his house, while the priest offers in a

certain order oblations from the *surā*-cup and pronounces a prayer for progeny of oxen, horses, and men.

3. The *rājasūya* is an elaborate ritual prescribed for a *ksatriya* king desirous of paramountcy. It is brought into connexion with Varuṇa, the first emperor, and after him named *Varuṇasava*. Like the *punarabhiṣeka*, it was applicable to an already consecrated king, although very likely the two ceremonies may have been susceptible of combination. The essential difference between the two is that *abhiṣeka* was a necessary act of State, including priestly rites, while the *rājasūya* was an optional religious rite, undertaken with a certain object, and including a ceremony of consecration. In Sanskrit inscriptions the kings sometimes glory in having performed the rite, which they mention in connexion with the *vajapeya*, *atramedha*, etc. (*Epigraphia Indica*, iv. p. 198, l. 3).

Weber holds ('Über den Rājasūya,' pp. 1-6) that the *rājasūya*, like the *vajapeya*, was originally a simpler popular institution, which subsequently found admission, with many elaborations, into the *śrauta* ritual, and Hillebrandt (*Vedische Opfer und Zauberei*, pp. 141 and 144) agrees with him. On the analogy of the *devasūhaviṃśi* we may explain the word as meaning the *rājasūya* ceremony (the word *rājasūya* occurring in the ritual, see Weber, p. 37), and conclude, in accordance with primitive notions, that the inherent vigour of a king needed from time to time a reinforcement (see above, under *punarabhiṣeka*). In that case the earliest *rājasūya* may have been a regularly repeated (e.g. annual), or an occasional quickening rite undergone by kings.

The actual *rājasūya* consists of seven rites (*paritra* or *abhyārohaniya*, *abhiṣechaniya*, *daśapeya*, *keśavapani*, *vyuṣṭi*, *dvitrātra*, *ksatradhiti*), to which some authorities add (after *daśapeya* or after *ksatradhiti*) an eighth (*sautrāmaṇi*). Concerning the *paritra* we need only say that it must be taken to cover the preparatory and purificatory ceremonies, beginning in the month Phālguna (Feb.-March), and extending over a whole year. It is stated that according to the Mānavas the rite took place in autumn. The *keśavapani* is the formal cutting of the king's hair, which remains unshorn for a whole year after the *abhiṣechaniya*, and the *vyuṣṭi*, etc., need not detain us. Of interest here are only the *abhiṣechaniya* with its preceding *ratnahaviṃśi* and the *daśapeya*. With the first day of the month Phālguna in the second year commence certain introductory rites (*sunāśīrya*, *pañcavatiya*, *indraturīya*, *apāmārgahoma*, *trigāmyukta ratnahaviṃśi*), of which the last and most important is a series of sacrifices on 12 successive days in the houses of the king's *ratnas* (see above), who are variously enumerated. The *abhiṣechaniya*, commencing on the first day of the month Chaitra (March-April), occupies five days. After the completion of eight *devasūhaviṃśi* comes the proclamation of the king by the priest, who, grasping his right arm, pronounces a mantra referring to Savitr, Agni, Brhaspati, Soma, Indra, Varuṇa, etc., and stating the name of the king, his father and mother, and his kingdom. Next are provided for the sprinkling 17 fluids, namely, 13 forms of water, together with honey, embryonic water of a calving cow, milk, and clarified butter, each in a separate vessel of *udumbara* wood, and having *sun-motes* mixed with them. These are then transferred into a single *udumbara* vessel, which, together with four other vessels, of *palāśa* (*Butea frondosa*), *udumbara*, *nyagrodha*, and *atvāttha*, is set down before one of the altars. Next day a tiger-skin is placed in front of the four vessels, into which the consecration liquid is poured: the king is specially arrayed for the ceremony and armed with bow and arrows, then announced to gods and people: to avert evil, a piece of copper is put into the mouth of an eunuch standing by. After taking a step towards each of the four points of the compass and also upwards

(to signify universal dominion), the king kicks away from the tiger-skin a piece of lead; as he stands on the skin, a gold plate is put under his foot, and another, with 9 or 100 holes, upon his head, and he is made to hold forth his arms facing eastward, while with the four vessels severally he is anointed by the *purohita* or *adhvaryu*, a kinsman (brother), a friendly *ksatriya*, and a *vaiśya*. At this point (according to one account) is related to him the story of *Sunahśepa* (a reminiscence of human sacrifice). He then rubs himself with the consecration fluid, after which he takes three steps (reminiscent of Viṣṇu's *trivikrama*) upon the tiger-skin. The remnant of the liquid, poured into the *palāśa* cup, he hands to his dearest son. The latter holds on behind to the *adhvaryu*, who pours the remnant upon the sacrificial fire, mentioning, and once intentionally confusing, the name of the king and his son. There follow: (1) a symbolical seizure of a cow, one of a hundred, belonging to one of the king's relatives, the king driving against them in a war-chariot and ultimately returning to the sacrificial edifice, where, after assuming shoes of pig-skin, he dismounts; (2) enthroning of the king upon a seat of *khadira* (acacia catechu) wood, placed upon the tiger-skin; (3) beating of the king (who holds five dice) by the priests with sticks, in order to expel his sins, after which he is proclaimed as *Brāhman*, *Savitṛ*, *Indra*, and *Rudra*; (4) a symbolical game with dice, in which the king, his brother, his *sūta* (panegyrist or marshal) or *sthapati* ('police magistrate,' according to Weber), a *grāmāni* (village-headman), and a relative take part; (5) various minor ceremonies. On the seventh day of Chaitra takes place the *daśapeya*, a ceremony in which 100 persons, including the king, drink in groups of 10 out of 10 cups: a genealogical test is implied, the qualification being that each must be able to cite 10 generations of soma-drinking ancestors. A year later come the *keśavapani*, etc.

The above account of the *rājasūya* is taken chiefly from Eggeling's tr. of the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* and Weber's translation and exposition of the *Kātyāyana Śrauta-sūtra* ('Über den Rājasūya'), which, as representing the part of the operant priests, is naturally the fullest Sanskrit authority. The *śrauta* ritual of the other Vedas, also cited by Prof. Weber, agrees in the main. The *punarabhiṣeka* of the *Āitareya Brāhmaṇa*, though it has many common features, is distinctly simpler. But it does not follow that the additional matter of the *rājasūya* is necessarily of later origin: that there were various forms of the rite appears from the *Āśvalāyana Śrauta-sūtra*, which employs a plural—*atha rājasūyāḥ*, ix. 3. 3. 1. Weber, who has elaborately discussed the various incidents, regards the references to Varuṇa and Savitr as, from the point of view of Indian religion, remnants of antiquity. Similarly ancient must be the mimic freebooting expedition, game of dice, and *daśapeya*. A general anthropological interest attaches to (1) the association of the king with the *udumbara* tree and with the rain-water, (2) the notion of quickening the royal energy by means of the rite, (3) the reminiscence of human sacrifice in the legend of *Sunahśepa*, which, in connexion with *punarabhiṣeka*, is also related in the *Āitareya Brāhmaṇa* and the *Sāṅkhāyana Śrauta-sūtra*.

4. The *vajapeya*, which is mentioned in the *Atharva Veda* (xi. 7. 7) and the *Āitareya Brāhmaṇa* (iii. 41. 1), and fully described in the *śrauta* ritual of all the Vedas, also includes a form of consecration. At the outset it presents us with a difficulty as to the object with which it was to be celebrated. The *Āśvalāyana Śrauta-sūtra* (ix. 9. 1) prescribes it for 'one desiring supremacy' (*ādhipatyakāma*); the *Sāṅkhāyana* gives, instead, 'one desiring abundance of food' (*annādya*), explaining

the word *vājapeya* as meaning 'food and drink'; the *Lātyāyana* requires it for 'one promoted by the brāhmanas and kings' (*yām brāhmaṇā rājānāś cha brāhmanas and kings*), and forbids *puraskurūran sa vājapeyena yajeta*, and forbids those who have celebrated it to rise before, salute, etc., those who have not; the ritual of the White Yajur Veda states that whoso sacrifices with the *vājapeya* wins *Prajapati*, and so wins everything. According to *Āśvalāyana* (ix. 9. 19), it is reserved for kings and brāhmanas; *Sāṅkhāyana* (xvi. 1. 4) allows it to the three highest castes, the *brhaspatīśava* following in the case of a brāhmaṇ; *Lātyāyana* (viii. 11. 12) mentions a view that it might be preceded and followed by the *brhaspatīśava*; while *Kātyāyana* (xiv. 1. 1), confining it to *kṣatriya* and *vaiśya*, orders it to be both preceded and followed by the *brhaspatīśava*. According to the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* (v. 1. 1), the rite originated with *Indra* and *Brhaspati*, who, both by the aid of *Savitr*, 'won *Prajapati*'. The rank of the rite also is variously estimated: *Āśvalāyana* (ix. 9. 19) would make it a preliminary to the *rājasūya* (for a king) or *brhaspatīśava* (for a priest), while the White Yajur definitely forbids the *rājasūya* to follow, explaining that the latter is inferior, as the effect is to constitute a king, while by the *vājapeya* an emperor is constituted.

The most reasonable solution seems to be that of *Eggeling* and *Hillebrandt*, that the *vājapeya* was originally general for all the ranks, which severally had more special rites, the *rājasūya*, *brhaspatīśava*, *sthapatīśava*, *grāmaṇīśava*, etc. etc. The features of the *vājapeya* itself seem to point to the conclusion of *Weber* that it was originally a popular celebration of victory or promotion.

The most prominent of these features are (1) *āji*, a mimic race; (2) *roha*, mounting a post; and (3) the recurrence of the number 17.

The *vājapeya* takes place in autumn. There are preliminary *dikṣā*, soma-purchase, etc., 17 cups of soma and 17 of *surā* being provided; and the gifts to the priest include 1700 cows, etc., 17 slave-women, 17 elephants, and so on. At the midday ceremony on the final day a racing-car is rolled into the sacrificial area, and to it are yoked four horses, which receive a specially prepared food. Sixteen other cars are arranged outside. Seventeen drums are beaten, the course is marked off by 17 arrow-shots, and an *udumbara* branch serves as goal. The race takes place and the sacrificer wins: the horses of all the cars are fed and, with the cars, presented to the priests. After certain libations, the wife of the sacrificer is brought in and specially dressed. A ladder is placed against the sacrificial post, and the sacrificer, after calling to his wife, 'Come, wife, ascend we to the sky,' mounts until his head overtops the post: he looks forth in all directions, salutes the earth, and descends, alighting on a gold plate placed upon the ground or upon a goat-skin. A subordinate priest covers a seat of *udumbara* wood with a goat-skin, and, taking his arm, seats him thereupon, saying, 'This is thy kingdom.' A mixture of water and milk having been prepared in an *udumbara* vessel and poured in libations, the offerer is sprinkled with the remainder, and thrice proclaimed with the words, 'This man is *Samraj*.' There follow 17 mantras of victory (*ujjiti*).

LITERATURE.—For anointing and consecration in general: *art.* ANOINTING below; cf. also *Frazer*, *Lectures on the Early History of Kingship*, London, 1906.

For *abhiyeka*: *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, viii. 5 ff.; *Mahābhārata* *Sabha Parvan*, cc. 33-45, and *Sānti Parvan*, c. 40; *Rāmāyaṇa* *Ayodhyakāṇḍa*, cc. 1-16, and *Yuddhakāṇḍa*, c. 112; *Agni Purāṇa*, *adhyāya* 209; *Nitinayūkha* and other works cited above, pp. 1544-1546; *Goldstücker*, *Dict. Sanskrit and English*, Berlin and London, 1856, s.v.; *Rājendralāla Mitra*, *Indo-Iranian*, ii. pp. 1-48; *Weber*, 'Über den *Rājasūya*' (*ABAW*, 1833), pp. 114-118.

For the *rājasūya*: *Vājasaneyi Samhitā* (ix. 35-x. 34), *Kāthaka-S.* (xv. 1-13), *Maitrāyaṇi-S.* (ii. 6. 1-13, iv. 3. 1-4. 10),

*Taittirīya-S.* (i. 8. 1-21), *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* (v. 2. 2-5. 6), *Taittirīya Br.* (i. 6. 1-8. 10), *Tāṇḍya Br.* (xviii. 8-11); the *Srauta-Sūtras* of *Āśvalāyana* (ix. 3. 3 ff.), *Sāṅkhāyana* (xv. 12-27, xvi. 18), *Lātyāyana* (ix. 1-3), *Kātyāyana* (xv. 1-10), *Apastamba* (xviii.); the *Vaitāna Sūtra* (xxvii. 1-13), *Kauśika-Sūtra* (xvii.); various *paddhatis* and *prayogas*; *Weber*, *op. cit.* pp. 1-153; *Eggeling's* tr. of the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa*, vol. iii. pp. xxvi, 42-142; *Hillebrandt*, *Vedische Opfer und Zauberei*, pp. 143-147; *Rājendralāla Mitra*, *op. cit.*

For the *vājapeya*: *Vājasaneyi-S.* (ix. 1-34), *Kāthaka-S.* (xiii. 14-xiv. 10), *Maitrāyaṇi-S.* (i. 11. 1-10), *Taittirīya-S.* (i. 7-12), *Satapatha Br.* (v. 1. 1-2. 2), *Taittirīya Br.* (i. 3. 2-9), *Tāṇḍya Br.* (xvii. 6-7); *Āśvalāyana S.S.* (ix. 9), *Sāṅkhāyana S.S.* (xv. 1 and xvi. 17), *Lātyāyana S.S.* (viii. 11 and 12 and v. 12. 8-25), *Kātyāyana S.S.* (xiv. 1 ff.), *Apastamba S.S.* (xviii. 1-7); *Vaitāna S.* (xxvii.); various *paddhatis* and *prayogas*; *Weber*, 'Über den *Vājapeya*' (*SBAW*, 1892, pp. 765-813); *Eggeling*, *op. cit.* pp. 1-41; *Hillebrandt*, *op. cit.* pp. 141-143.

F. W. THOMAS.

ABILITY.—Ability (Lat. *habilitat-tem, habilis*) in its historical usage has two meanings. 1. It signifies material power, wealth, estate, or resources. In this sense it occurs in both the OT and the NT: e.g. 'They gave after their ability unto the treasure of the work' (*Ezr* 2<sup>29</sup>); 'Then the disciples, every man according to his ability, determined to send relief' (*Ac* 11<sup>29</sup>). Similarly, Shakespeare has—

'Out of my lean and low ability

I'll lend you something' (*Twelfth Night*, iii. iv. 351).

In the same sense, the term is used in 16th cent. Poor Law statutes. Thus, by the Act of 1555 the town magistrates, in making orders for the relief of an overburdened parish by its wealthier neighbouring parishes, are directed to 'consider the estate and ability of every parish.' The Act of 1601, too, provides for the taxation of every inhabitant of the parish 'according to the ability of the parish'—'ability' being interpreted to mean property. Later on, however, 'ability' or faculty came to be measured not by property, but by income or revenue. This is the measure adopted in *Adam Smith's* celebrated maxim: 'The subjects of every State ought to contribute towards the support of the Government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the State' (*Wealth of Nations*, bk. v. ch. ii. pt. 2). And since *Adam Smith's* day, the adoption of the utilitarian ideal of 'equality of sacrifice,' and the application of the 'law of diminishing utility'—that the more wealth, *ceteris paribus*, a person has, the less, beyond a certain point, is the utility to him of successive equal increments, and, consequently, the less the disutility of the decrements caused by taxation—have led to income being accepted as the criterion of ability, for the purpose of taxation, subject only to exemptions and abatements at the one extreme, and progressive or graduated taxation at the other (cf. *J. S. Mill*, *Principles of Political Economy*, bk. v. ch. ii. §§ 2, 3; *E. R. A. Seligman*, *Progressive Taxation*). But, apart from this *quasi-technical* use of the term in Economics, in which 'to give,' 'to contribute,' or 'to pay' is understood, the use of 'ability' in the sense of wealth is obsolete, the latest literary instance being probably that in *Goldsmith's Vicar of Wakefield*, ch. xiv.: 'A draft upon my neighbour was to me the same as money; for I was sufficiently convinced of his ability.'

2. It signifies personal power, cleverness, physical or mental, and sometimes a special power of the mind, a faculty (usually, however, in the plural). This usage is also found in both the OT and the NT: 'such as had ability in them' (*Dn* 1<sup>4</sup>); 'If any man minister, let him do it as of the ability which God giveth' (1 *P* 4<sup>11</sup>). So with Shakespeare: 'Though it be fit that *Cassio* have his place,

For, sure, he fills it up with great ability' (*Oth.* iii. iii. 247).

Again—

'Your abilities are too infant-like for doing much alone' (*Cor.* ii. i. 35).



The use of 'ability' as denoting physical strength is now obsolete, save in Scotland; and, in its use with reference to mental power, 'ability' denotes active power, as distinct from 'capacity,' which signifies rather latent power or resources. In general, also, natural ability is to be contrasted with acquired skill. 'For natural abilities are like natural plants that need pruning by study' (Bacon, *Essays*: 'Of Studies'). The distinction is important in Economics, in which natural ability is regarded as yielding an income of the nature of rent, while acquired skill yields profits. Again, general ability, natural or acquired, is often contrasted with specialized technical skill. With the growing complexity of industry and the increasing use of machinery, general ability, which is easily transferable from one trade to another, is yearly becoming a relatively more important factor in industrial skill (cf. A. Marshall, *Principles of Economics*, 1898, pp. 284-291, 331-342, 657).

In Theology, the terms 'ability' and 'inability' refer to man's power, or want of power, to do the will of God. 'Man by his fall into a state of sin hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation' (*Westminster Confession*). Here the opposition is to be noted between the doctrine of 'original ability,' as based on the Scriptures, and the 'plenary ability' of the Pelagians, the 'gracious ability' of the Arminians, and the 'natural ability' of the New School (or Edwardian) theologians (cf. A. H. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, 1886, pp. 342-345).

ARCH. B. CLARK.

**ABIOTENESIS (I).**—*Abiogenesis* (from Gr. *ἄβιος*, 'without life,' and *γενεσις*, 'birth') is the theory of the origin of living from not-living matter. It is more commonly known as the theory of 'spontaneous generation.' So far as the beginnings of life on the earth are concerned, the doctrine of abiogenesis is generally accepted by biologists. For, in its passage from the nebulous to the more or less solid state, our globe reached a temperature and general conditions which made possible the evolution of the organic from the inorganic. Life, as Buffon was among the first to suggest, probably originated in the polar regions, these being the earliest to cool. The inter-relation between living and lifeless matter is a fundamental canon of the theory of Evolution, which recognizes no break in continuity, and which also recognizes the ultimate mystery investing all phenomena, whether these be defined in terms of mind or of matter. 'All our philosophy, all our poetry, all our science, all our art—Plato, Shakespeare, Newton, and Raphael—are potential in the fires of the sun,' says Tyndall; and Huxley, while holding abiogenesis to be unproved, added that 'if it were given him to look beyond the abyss of geologically recorded time to the still more remote period when the earth was passing through physical and chemical conditions which it can no more see again than a man can recall his infancy, he should expect to be a witness of the evolution of living protoplasm from not-living matter' (*Coll. Essays*, viii. p. 256). Hence, both physicist and biologist reject the theory of 'Vitalism,' or the existence of a vital principle or energy distinct in kind from other cosmic energies. The problem of abiogenesis is therefore narrowed to this—Given the origin of life from the not-living, do the conditions which resulted in that still prevail, or have they so far passed away that life is now derived only from pre-existing life?—as the phrase has it, *Omne vivum ex vivo*.

Belief in spontaneous generation was unchallenged for above 2000 years. It was on the Ionian seaboard that speculation arose about origins and laws governing phenomena, hence scepticism as to

the validity of old cosmogonies and legends. Anaximander (B.C. 610-547), the friend and pupil of Thales, appears to have been the earliest to speak of life as a product of 'the moist element as it was evaporated by the sun.' Aristotle (B.C. 384-322) accepted abiogenesis with limitations, applying it to parasites, certain invertebrates, and a few vertebrates, as eels (the mode of generation of which was, until recent times, a mystery), but not to animals in which sexual organs are apparent. Lucretius (c. B.C. 95-51) speaks of 'many living creatures, even now, springing out of the earth and taking form by the rains and the heat of the sun' (*de Rerum Natura*, v. 795, 796).

It was not until the latter half of the 17th cent., nearly fifty years after Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood, that the doctrine of spontaneous generation was assailed, and that by the only effective weapon—experiments. These were started by an Italian scholar-naturalist, Francesco Redi (1626-1698), and, like other methods which have led to momentous results, were simplicity itself. Observing how rapidly dead flesh, exposed to the air, swarmed with maggots, he put some pieces of meat into a jar which he covered with fine gauze, leaving other pieces exposed. In the one case no maggots appeared, while, in the other, they were as numerous as usual. The inevitable conclusion was that the maggots were hatched from eggs deposited by blowflies on the dead stuff. A temporary reaction against Redi's conclusions was brought about by Needham (1713-1781) and Buffon (1707-1788), who adduced the case of animalcules which, after a certain lapse of time, appeared in infusions boiled and hermetically sealed. But Spallanzani (1729-1799) showed that the air had not been wholly excluded from the infusions, the animalcules in which, by reason of inadequate heating, remained undestroyed. The discovery of oxygen (by Priestley, in 1776), the presence of which is essential to life, compelled the repetition of experiments 'under conditions which would make sure that neither the oxygen of the air nor the composition of the organic matter was altered in such a manner as to interfere with the existence of life.' Schultze and Schwann (1836-1837), after boiling the infusions, and supplying air passed through red-hot tubes, the properties of its oxygen being unaffected thereby, although organic matter in it would be destroyed, found no animalcules, which, however, were present in the infusions not supplied with purified air. There followed other experiments, carried on by Cagniard de la Tour, the illustrious Helmholtz, and others, which differed from the foregoing only in completeness of detail, and, therefore, do not need recapitulation in this summary. Each in turn was more effective in destroying whatever agents were essential to the reproduction of life in the infusions. Thus were laid slowly, but surely and abidingly, the foundations of the bacteria or germ theory which has revolutionized old theories of diseases and old methods of attacking them. As recently as 1859, Pouchet reported that he had effected the generation of microscopic animals from inorganic substances. This prompted Pasteur and Tyndall to demonstrate, with a precision hitherto unapproached, that, despite the ubiquity of microbes, their activity and reproduction are rendered impossible where sterilization is effectively performed.

Thirty years ago, Dr. Bastian published a series of volumes embodying results of experiments which, he contends, support abiogenesis. In 1904, M. Dubois, of Lyons, reported the production of living germs in a sterilized medium under the agency of radium, and in 1905 the question was reopened by Mr. Butler Burke, of the Cavendish laboratory, Cam-

oridge, who stated that, as the result of experiments made with radium bromide (which appears to have a destructive effect on micro-organisms) and sterilized beef-gelatin in sealed tubes subjected to a temperature above the boiling point of water, there had appeared minute 'cultures' or growths of globe-shaped bodies, which, on reaching a given stage, subdivided. Mr. Butler Burke inclines to the conclusion that they are organisms on the border lines between microbes and crystals, and, provisionally, he names them 'radiobes.' But their organic character is not established to the satisfaction of competent authorities. The fundamental identity of the living and the not-living being admitted (proof of advance thereto being furnished by the production of organic compounds from inorganic matter in our chemical laboratories), there is no warrant for the contention that abiogenesis is impossible in the present or the future. All that can be said is that the experiments which appear to favour the theory do not wholly exclude doubt as to complete sterilization, and consequent exclusion or destruction, of life-producing germs.

It is the demonstration of the universality of these micro-organisms in their innumerable myriads that has given impetus to antiseptic and prophylactic methods whereby unspeakable benefits have accrued to man and the lower animals. Louis Pasteur—warrior in the noblest of campaigns—was the benefactor not only of France, but of the world, in his application of remedies for diseases in plants and animals which threatened large industries with extinction. In the case of chicken cholera, he reduced the death-rate from ten per cent. to one per cent.; in that of anthrax or wool-comber's disease, which had killed off millions of cattle, the economic gain has been enormous; while perhaps his greatest victory was won in the treatment of those dread evils, rabies and hydrophobia. Lord Lister has acknowledged that Pasteur's germ-theory of putrefaction furnished him 'with the principle upon which alone the antiseptic system can be carried on.' Armed with antitoxins, the physician battles successfully with human ills, and one by one reduces the number of diseases hitherto ranked as inevitable and incurable. See also next art. and BIOTENESIS.

*See also: "The Beginnings of Life" (1872), The Nature and Origin of Living Matter (1895); Butschli, Investigations on Protoplasm (1894); J. A. Thomson, The Science of Life (1899), ch. vii.; René Vallery-Radot, The Life of Pasteur, 2 vols. (1901); Chunder Bose, Response in the Living and Non-Living (1902); Meldola, The Chemical Synthesis of Vital Products (1904); J. Butler Burke, 'The Origin of Life,' Fortnightly Review, Sept. 1905.*

EDWARD CLODD.

**ABIOTENESIS (II.).**—During the early phases of the earth's existence, before it cooled and consolidated, the conditions were such that no living creature like any we now know could have then lived there. At an uncertain but inconceivably distant date, after the earth became fit to be a home of organic life, living creatures somehow appeared.

(a) Preyer and others have suggested that germs of life, confessedly unlike any we now know, may have existed from the beginning even in nebulous masses, and that the origin of life is as futile a question as the origin of motion. It was not, indeed, the protoplasm we know that was encradled in the fire-mist; it was a kind of movement, a particular dance of corpuscles, different in its measures from inorganic dances. But there does not seem much utility in discussing a hypothetical kind of organism which could live in nebulae; our conception of organic life must be based on the organisms we know. It is interesting, however, to note that

Preyer strongly opposed the view that organic substance could arise or could have arisen from inorganic substance, the living from the not-living; the reverse supposition seemed to him more tenable.

(b) As far back as 1865, H. E. Richter started the idea that germs of life are continually being thrown off from the heavenly bodies, and that some of these found lodgment on the earth when it was ready for them. He also could not think of life beginning; his dictum was, 'Omne vivum ab æternitate e cellula.' To Helmholtz (1884) and to Sir William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) the same idea occurred, that germs of life may have come to the earth embosomed in meteorites. 'I cannot contend,' Helmholtz said, 'against one who would regard this hypothesis as highly or wholly improbable. But it appears to me to be a wholly correct scientific procedure, when all our endeavours to produce organisms out of lifeless substance are thwarted, to question whether, after all, life has ever arisen, whether it may not be even as old as matter, and whether its germs, passed from one world to another, may not have developed where they found favourable soil. . . . The true alternative is evident: organic life has either begun to exist at some one time, or has existed from eternity.' On the other hand, we may note that the word 'eternal' is somewhat irrelevant in scientific discourse, that the notion of such complex substances as proteids (essentially involved in every organism we know) being primitive is quite against the tenor of modern theories of inorganic evolution; and that, though we cannot deny the possibility, it is difficult to conceive of anything like the protoplasm we know surviving transport in a meteorite through the intense cold in space and through intense heat when passing through our atmosphere. The milder form of the hypothesis associated with the name of Lord Kelvin was simply one of transport; he wisely said nothing about 'eternal cells' or any such thing; he simply shifted the responsibility for the problem of the origin of living organisms off the shoulders of our planet.

So far, then, the suggestions are (a) that the physical basis of life is as old as the cosmos, and (b) that germs of organisms may have come from elsewhere to our earth. Apart from an abandonment of the problem as scientifically insoluble,—apart, that is to say, from the view that living creatures began to be in some way which we cannot hope to formulate in terms of the scientific 'universe of discourse,'—there is but one other possible view, namely, that what we call living evolved in Nature's laboratory from what we call not-living—a view to which the whole trend of evolutionist thinking attracts us. There are few living biologists who doubt the present universality of the induction from all sufficiently careful experiment and observation—*omne vivum e vivo*; Dr. Bastian is practically alone in believing that creatures like Infusorians and Amœbæ (highly complex individualities in their own way) can now arise from not-living material; but it is quite another thing to say that abiogenesis may not have occurred in the past or may not occur in the future.

But though many thoughtful biologists, such as Huxley and Spencer, Nägeli and Hæckel, have accepted the hypothesis that living organisms of a very simple sort were originally evolved from not-living material, they have done so rather in their faith in a continuous natural evolution than from any apprehension of the possible sequences which might lead up to such a remarkable result. The hypothesis of abiogenesis may be suggested on *a priori* grounds, but few have ventured to offer any concrete indication of how the process might conceivably come about. To postulate abiogenesis



as if it were a matter of course, seems to betray an extraordinarily easy-going scientific mood.

One of the few concrete suggestions is due to the physiologist Pflüger (1875), whose views are clearly summarized in Verworn's *General Physiology* (translation). Pflüger suggested that it is the cyanogen radical (CN) that gives the 'living' proteid molecule its characteristic properties of self-decomposition and reconstruction. He indicated the similarities between cyanic acid (HCNO)—a product of the oxidation of cyanogen—and proteid material, which is admitted to be an essential part, at least, of all living matter. 'This similarity is so great,' he said, 'that I might term cyanic acid a half-living molecule.' As cyanogen and its compounds arise in an incandescent heat when the necessary nitrogenous compounds are present, they may have been formed when the earth was still an incandescent ball. 'If now we consider the immeasurably long time during which the cooling of the earth's surface dragged itself slowly along, cyanogen and the compounds that contain cyanogen- and hydrocarbon- substances had time and opportunity to indulge extensively in their great tendency towards transformation and polymerization, and to pass over with the aid of oxygen, and later of water and salts, into that self-destructive proteid, living matter.' Verworn adopts and elaborates this suggestion. Compounds of cyanogen were formed while the earth was still incandescent; with their property of ready decomposition they were forced into correlation with various other carbon compounds likewise due to the great heat; when water was precipitated as liquid upon the earth, these compounds entered into chemical relations with the water and its dissolved salts and gases, and thus originated extremely labile, very simple, undifferentiated living substance.

Professor E. Ray Lankester, in his art. 'Protozoa' in the *Encyc. Brit.*, makes the suggestion, 'that a vast amount of albuminoids and other such compounds had been brought into existence by those processes which culminated in the development of the first protoplasm, and it seems therefore likely enough that the first protoplasm fed upon these antecedent steps in its own evolution.'

Dr. H. Charlton Bastian suggests, in regard to the first origin of living matter upon the earth, that the nitrate of ammonia which is known to be produced in the air during thunderstorms, and is discovered in the thunder-shower, may have played an important part in the mixture of ingredients from which the hypothetical natural synthesis of living matter was effected. Mr. J. Butler Burke postulates original vital units or 'bio-elements,' which 'may have existed throughout the universe for an almost indefinite time,' which are probably 'elements possessing many of the chemical properties of carbon and the radio-active properties of the more unstable elements,' and which, by interacting on otherwise present carbon-compounds, probably gave rise to cellular life as we know it to-day.

It must be admitted that, in spite of these and other concrete suggestions, we are still far from being able to imagine how living matter could arise from not-living matter. In postulating possible processes which may have occurred long ago in Nature's laboratory, it seems desirable that we should be able to back these up with evidence of analogous processes now occurring in Nature,—the usual mode of argument in evolutionist discourse,—but these analogues are not forthcoming at present. It is usual to refer to the achievements of the synthetic chemist, who can now manufacture artificially such natural organic pro-

ducts as urea, alcohol, grape sugar, indigo, oxalic acid, tartaric acid, salicylic acid, and caffeine. But three facts should be borne in mind: (1) the directive agency of the intelligent chemist is an essential factor in these syntheses; (2) no one supposes that a living organism makes its organic compounds in the way in which many of these can be made in the chemical laboratory; and (3) no one has yet come near the artificial synthesis of proteids, which are the most characteristic substances in living matter.

We are in the habit of comparing what man can do in the way of evolving domesticated animals and cultivated plants with what we believe Nature has done in the distant past. Why, then, should we not argue from what the intelligent chemist can do in the way of evolving carbon compounds to what Nature may have done before there was anything animate? There is this difference, among others, in the two cases, that in the former we can actually observe the process of Natural Selection which in Nature takes the place of the breeder, while we are at a loss to suggest what in Nature's as yet very hypothetical laboratory of chemical synthesis could take the place of the directive chemist.

Thus Professor F. R. Japp, following Pasteur, pointed out in a memorable British Association address that natural organic compounds are 'optically active' (a characteristic property which cannot be here discussed), that artificially prepared organic compounds are primarily 'optically inactive,' that by a selective process the intelligent operator can obtain the former from the latter, but . . . it is difficult to conceive of any mechanism in nature which could effect this. 'No fortuitous concurrence of atoms, even with all eternity for them to clash and combine in, could compass this feat of the formation of the first optically active organic compound.' 'The chance synthesis of the simplest optically active compound from inorganic materials is absolutely inconceivable.'

Not content, however, with indicating the difficulty which the believer in abiogenesis has here to face, Professor Japp went on to say—perhaps, in so doing, leaving the rigidly scientific position: 'I see no escape from the conclusion that, at the moment when life first arose, a directive force came into play—a force of precisely the same character as that which enables the intelligent operator, by the exercise of his will, to select out one crystallized enantiomorph and reject its asymmetric opposite.' After prolonged discussion, and in view of various suggestions of possible origins, he wrote: 'Although I no longer venture to speak of the inconceivability of any mechanical explanation of the production of single optically active compounds asymmetric always in the same sense, I am as convinced as ever of the enormous improbability of any such production under chance conditions.'

Apart, then, from the fact that the synthesis of proteids seems still far off, apart also from the fact that there is a great gap between a drop of proteid and the simplest organism, we have perhaps said enough to show that the hypothesis of abiogenesis is not to be held with an easy mind, attracted as we may be to it by the general evolutionist argument.

In thinking over this difficult question, there are two cautions which should be borne in mind. We must not exaggerate the apartness of the animate from the inanimate, nor must we deprecate it. On the one hand, we must recognize that modern progress in chemistry and physics has given us a much more vital conception of what has been labelled as 'dead matter'; we must not belittle the powers of growth and regrowth which we observe in crystals, the series of form-changes

through which many inorganic things, even drops of water, may pass; the behaviour of ferments; the intricate internal activity of even the dust. When we consider, too, such phenomena as 'latent life' and 'local life,' and the relatively great simplicity of many forms and kinds of life, we do not find it altogether easy to discover absolute, universal, and invariable criteria to distinguish between animate and inanimate systems, or between the quick and the dead. To some extent, also, the artificial synthesis of complex organic compounds, and the ingenious construction of 'artificial cells' which closely mimic the structure of living cells, though no one supposes that they are in the faintest degree 'alive,' serve to lessen the gap which seems at first so wide.

On the other hand, it is the verdict of common sense and exact science alike that living creatures stand apart from inanimate systems. The living creature feeds and grows; it undergoes ceaseless change or metabolism, and passes through a cycle of changes, yet has a marvellous power of retaining its integrity; it is not merely a self-stoking, self-repairing engine, but a self-reproducing engine; it has a self-regulative development; it gives effective response to external stimuli; it profits by experience; it co-ordinates its activities into unified behaviour, it may be into intelligent deeds and rational conduct; even in very simple animals (Infusorians) there are hints of mind. Allowing for the gradual realization of potentialities in the course of evolution, we cannot but feel that if the living emerged from the not-living then our respect for not-living matter must be greatly enhanced. As a matter of fact, however, we cannot at present re-describe any vital behaviour in terms of physical and chemical categories, and the secret of the organism has to be admitted as such whether we advance to a vitalistic statement of it or not.

Finally, let us suppose that some bold experimenter in the border-land between chemistry and biology, a man like Prof. Jacques Loeb of Chicago, succeeded this year or next year in making, not merely a corpuscle of proteid, but a little living thing, by some ingenious synthesis. What then?

(a) It is quite likely that the steps leading to this hypothetical achievement might be as unlike those which, on the hypothesis of abiogenesis, once occurred in Nature's laboratory, as the artificial synthesis of, say, oxalic acid is unlike what takes place in the sorrel in the wood. (b) At present we cannot assert that the laws of the movements of organic corpuscles can be deduced from the laws of motion of not-living corpuscles,—continuous as we may believe cosmic evolution to have been,—and the artificial production of a living creature would not enable us to make this assertion. What simplification of descriptive formulæ the future has in store for us no one can predict. We may have to simplify the conceptual formulæ which we use in describing animate behaviour, and we may have to modify the conceptual formulæ which we use in describing inanimate sequences, but at present the two sets of formulæ remain distinct, and they would so remain even if a little living creature were manufactured to-morrow. (c) If we discovered a method of artificially producing an organism, as Loeb has discovered a method of inducing an egg to develop without fertilization, it would render the hypothesis of abiogenesis more credible. We would then know, what no naturalist at present knows, however strongly he may believe it, that what we call not-living has in it the potentiality of giving origin to what we call living. But the hypothetical discovery would in no way affect the dignity and value of living creatures, or of our own life. (d) If it came about that we were able to

bring materials and energies together in such a way that living creatures of a simple sort resulted, we should still have to remember that we had acted as directive agents in the synthesis. (e) Finally, if the experiment succeeded, we should not have arrived at any *explanation* of life. We should be able to say that, given certain antecedent conditions, certain consequences ensue, but we should still be unable to answer the question *how* or *why*. We should have a genetic description of an occurrence, but no explanation of it. For that is what science never supplies.

In conclusion, to quote Principal Lloyd Morgan, 'Those who would concentrate the mystery of existence on the pin-point of the genesis of protoplasm, do violence alike to philosophy and to religion. Those who would single out from among the multitudinous differentiations of an evolving universe this alone for special interposition, would seem to do little honour to the Divinity they profess to serve. Theodore Parker gave expression to a broader and more reverent theology when he said: "The universe, broad and deep and high, is a handful of dust which God enchants. He is the mysterious magic which possesses,"—not protoplasm merely, but—"the world."'

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J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

ABIPONES.—A tribe of South American Indians, of Guaycuran stock, who formerly roved from the head waters of the Rio Grande in Bolivia to the Vermejo in Argentina, although their central habitat was the Gran Chaco, west of the Paraguay River, in Northern Argentina and Paraguay. About 1780 the tribe numbered some 5000, but it is now supposed to be extinct, like the kindred Caduves, Payaguas, Lenguas, and their own destroyers, the Mocovis (J. Deniker, *Races of Man*, London, 1901, pp. 572-573). Practically the only information concerning them is that given by Martin Dobrizhoffer, a Jesuit missionary who resided among them for seven years. They are described as tall and well formed, while in their habits they were nomads and hunters. They were well clad, and were fond of adornment and of painting themselves. Both sexes were tattooed by pricking the skin with thorns and smearing the bleeding wound with fresh ashes, thus leaving an indelible black outline. The males were tattooed with a cross on the forehead, and the women with the cross, as well as an ornamental design, on the face, breast, and arms. This operation was performed at the age of puberty, and was designed to render a girl sufficiently attractive to win a husband, and also to test her courage. Males above the age of seven wore labrets, the most esteemed being of brass or (for the chiefs) of a sort of gum. These adornments came down to the breast; and both sexes distended the lobes of the ears until they almost reached the shoulder. Dobrizhoffer ascribes to them an ethical system of singular attractiveness. Their chastity was remarkable, and they observed the uttermost decorum and modesty in clothing, deportment, and conversation. Their courtesy was invariable; captives were treated with all kindness, and the torture of prisoners was unknown, although for trophies they cut off the heads or skinned the faces of those slain in war. Annual feasts in honour of victories were celebrated with merrymaking and with copious indulgence in wine made of *alfaroba* or

honey, the only vice of the Abipones being intoxication. In temperament they were somewhat phlegmatic, not being reckless in war, despite their undoubted bravery.

Their superb physique was due, in great measure, to the fact that consanguineous marriages were forbidden, and that early sexual excess was said to be unknown, while men did not marry under the age of thirty, or women under twenty. At the birth of a child the father practised the *couvade* (*q.v.*). Infanticide and abortion were common, each woman killing all her children but two. The custom of infanticide was increased by the suckling of infants for three years, during which time the husband was denied all marital rights, and consequently often married again—marriage being terminable at his will. On the other hand, polygamy was rare, and even when practised the wives were not required to live together lest they should become jealous. Fidelity in marriage was almost invariable. A curious deviation from the ordinary usage of infanticide is found in the fact that girls were killed less often than boys, since parents received large sums for giving their daughters in marriage, while sons were required to pay heavy dowries to the parents of their brides.

In their religion, Dobrizhoffer states that the Abipones had little taste for meditation, speculation, or reasoning, although they were cunning imitators. According to him, they had no word for God, but revered an 'evil spirit' (who seems, however, to have had no qualities essentially evil). This deity was called Aharaigichi or Queevet, and also 'grandfather' (Groaperike), and it was he who gave the Abipones valour and the Spaniards riches. Aharaigichi was represented by the Pleiades. When this constellation disappeared from the horizon, the Abipones thought him sick and in danger of extinction; so they celebrated the rising of the Pleiades in May by feasting, dancing, and singing. The cult was maintained by priests (*keebet*), to whom Aharaigichi had given supernatural power. These 'jugglers,' as the good Jesuit calls them, were much feared, since when angry they could transform themselves into invisible and invulnerable tigers. To the malice of the *keebet* was ascribed death, and the Abipones quaintly said that were it not for the *keebet* and the Spaniards, they would never die. Thunder and lightning were supposed to be obsequies of a dead *keebet*, and bones and other relics of these medicine-men were carried by the Abipones in their wanderings. In addition to thunder and lightning, comets and eclipses of the sun and of the moon were objects of terror. Besides the *keebet*, old women, who gathered in bands to perform secret rites with wailing and discordant drumming, were dreaded, especially as they were able to conjure up the dead.

Immediately after death, the heart and tongue of the deceased were boiled and given to a dog to eat, in order that the *keebet* who had caused the dissolution might himself perish. Relatives and friends shaved their heads in sign of mourning, and the women wailed for nine days and nights, the nocturnal lamentations being restricted to those who were specially invited for the purpose. A woman might also wail whenever she remembered a dead ancestor, whereupon all others of her sex who heard her were expected to unite with her in howling lugubriously. All mention of the name of the dead was avoided; his house was destroyed, and his relatives and friends changed their names. The soul was believed to survive the body, although the Abipones had no clear idea of its fate. The ghosts of the dead, however, were the objects of intense dread, and were supposed to enter into small ducks called *ruilile*, which fly in flocks by

night, and have a doleful hissing note. On the grave were placed, for the use of the dead, a water-pot, a garment, weapons, and the bodies of his horses and cattle which had been killed at the time of his death. The graves of ancestors were venerated,—thus clearly implying the existence of ancestor-worship,—and their bones were often repeatedly exhumed by the Abipones in the course of their wanderings, and carried from place to place, until they could finally be buried in the family burial-ground which contained the bodies of their kin.

LITERATURE.—M. Dobrizhoffer's *Historia de Abiponibus, equestri bellicosaque Paraguariz natione* (3 vols., Vienna, 1784; English translation: *Account of the Abipones, an Equestrian People of Paraguay*, by Sara Coleridge, 3 vols., London, 1822). LOUIS H. GRAY.

**ABNORMALITIES (Biological).**—In biology, the term 'abnormality' is used in a comprehensive sense to describe forms of life, or parts or structures thereof, differing in appearance or constitution from such of their fellows as are shown by statistics to be so closely similar that for general purposes they may be regarded as identical, or, in other words, normal. It is now acknowledged that all organisms are variable, and that, while we tacitly ignore the smaller degrees of variation from the mean,\* yet we do recognize the variations of higher degree, and these we call abnormalities. Once again, abnormalities may be defined as the more aberrant of the variations to which every organism, and every structure, is liable or subject. The most extreme cases of abnormality will be described separately as 'monsters' (cf. art. MONSTERS), though it must be remembered that no true line of distinction exists, and that, as has just been stated, they are really the extreme instances of abnormalities.

With the exclusion of monsters, the field of our subject is somewhat narrowed. It remains to review briefly the classes of these aberrant forms, and to indicate the importance of their study in biology. Abnormalities may be classified in various ways. One of the most comprehensive schemes is that proposed by Professor Macalister in his *Boyle Lecture* (1894). It includes nine categories or classes, viz.: the abnormalities of (1) quantity (2) material, (3) repetition, (4) cohesion, (5) alteration, (6) position, (7) series, (8) inheritance, (9) new formation. For present purposes it is, however, most convenient to review briefly (1) the origin of abnormalities, and (2) their transmission from parent to offspring.

1. **Origin of abnormalities.**—In some cases an origin can be discerned and a cause assigned. Thus (a) interference with the normal course of development is evidently the determining cause in certain instances. A typical example met with in medical practice is the individual in whom the development of the partitions within the heart has been affected. In such instances the blood is not properly aerated, and the patient has a 'cyanotic' aspect, i.e. he looks blue and cold. The study of the developmental history of animals has shown that any interference can produce more profound and extensive changes when acting in the earlier stages of growth than in the later period. And progress in embryological science has shown how some of the observed effects may be produced. Thus in the higher animals, for instance, an aberration of growth can be referred to defects in the body of the embryo itself, though in other cases the membranes immediately surrounding the embryo or the adjacent maternal tissues are capable, if themselves imperfect, of reacting on the embryo so as to modify its form. The effect may seem to be produced either directly or

\* In a fuller discussion of this part of the subject, attention would have to be directed to the difference between what are termed respectively the 'mean' and the 'mode' of any series.

mechanically, or yet again, the result may be due to an indirect cause in turn determined by interference with nutrition. Again, (b) the nutrition, and the quantity and quality of the food, are alone capable, if altered, of leading to deviations from the ordinary course of events, sufficiently marked to come within the definition of abnormality. Cases of hypertrophy, overgrowth, or gigantism fall under this heading. (c) In other cases, no such obvious interference can be detected or held accountable. And among these, even if those examples are eliminated in which by analogy there is a fair show of reason for believing that they fall under heading (a) or (b) as above (though the acting cause is not quite so clear), there is a remnant of instances in which it does not seem justifiable to invoke causes of this kind. Pending the discovery of a more intelligible explanation, the only course open to biologists in such cases is to recognize in living matter an inherent power, or capability, of producing abnormalities, or, as they are sometimes termed, 'sports.'

2. Transmission from parent to offspring.—The transmission of abnormalities from parent to offspring is inconstant and uncertain. The study of this question is inseparably connected with that of the transmission of those more constant features which distinguish the normal individual. The discussion of this problem is beyond the scope of this article, and it will suffice to state that abnormalities can even be classified according as they are constantly transmitted, or not so constantly transmitted, from parent to offspring. It is thus possible to distinguish the former, or constantly transmitted varieties, now termed 'mutations,' from the latter, not so constantly transmitted, now called 'fluctuations.' The importance of this distinction depends on the relation of this subject to the problem of the origin of the species met with in organic nature. In nature the occurrence of abnormalities, and the difference (just remarked) concerning their transmissibility, are facts of observation concerning which there is nothing speculative. But, granted the production of abnormalities, and the greater capability for propagation of some (through inheritance), with, at the same time, the lesser tendency to persistence shown by others, the ground is cleared for the erection of a theory of the origin of organic species through transformation. This seems to depend further upon the postulate that certain kinds of abnormality confer upon the individual exhibiting them an advantage not shared by his congeners. Hence, were the advantage to be maintained, the abnormal stock might in time outnumber the original stock. But the latter would then no longer be the normal stock, for by definition the normal must be in a majority, so that the type of the organism would have changed. Such a process, if it occurred on a large scale, would lead to the production of forms so different from their ancestors that they might well be classified as new species. It is not proposed to embark upon an examination of this position here, the main object in view being to draw attention to the importance of the study of abnormalities in biology.

LITERATURE (selected works in chronological order).—Darwin, *Origin of Species*, etc., 1859; Mendel, *Experiments in Plant Hybridisation*, 1885 (tr. by Bateson in Mendel's *Principles of Heredity*, 1902); Darwin, *Variations of Animals and Plants under Domestication*, 1867; Bateson, *Materials for the Study of Variation*, 1894; De Vries, *Species and Varieties, their origin by Mutation*, 1905; Punnett, *Mendelism*, 1907; Lock, *Recent Progress in the Study of Variation, Heredity, and Evolution*, 1906.

W. L. H. DUCKWORTH.

**ABNORMALITIES (Psychological).**—Human abnormalities, psychologically considered, are included within the great class of mental affections which owe their origin to arrested development of

the brain. The development of the brain may be arrested, as the result of congenital malformation, or from the effect of disease in the earlier periods of existence. As a rule, it is by no means easy to differentiate congenital defect from that arising from interference with the natural course of development immediately before or after birth, but there is reason to believe that congenital malformation accounts for much the larger number of cases of feeble-mindedness.

Congenital mental defect is wholly or in part correlated with the development of the physical organization, especially with that of the nervous system; and it is rare to meet with imperfect congenital structure of the nervous system in the absence of other imperfections of the body. These imperfections of the body are technically known as physical stigmata. They are the outward signs of the nervous imperfections. It is acknowledged on all hands that the more grave the mental defect, the more numerous and the more grave are the physical malformations. Thus, as we pass up the scale from monsters to idiots, imbeciles, and the higher class of the latter, we find a gradually diminishing number of bodily malformations, quantitatively and qualitatively, until they disappear altogether and we emerge upon the apparently normal plane of the race so far as regards mental functions and bodily structure.

Besides the physical stigmata, there are certain well recognized mental stigmata, such as epilepsy, hysteria, alcoholism, chorea, and the various tics and obsessions which are the outward manifestations of underlying defects in the nervous system, especially in the brain. Although we know that every functional peculiarity must have an underlying organic basis, we are still very far from a knowledge of the intimate correlation between structure and function. The most important attempt to correlate mental power with the structure of the cortex cerebri has been made by Dr. J. S. Bolton, writing in Mott's *Archives of Neurology* for 1903. His observations, as yet unconfirmed, show that the pyramidal layer (second layer) of nerve cells in the pre-frontal cortex varies inversely in depth with the degree of amentia or dementia present in each case. This is the only layer that appreciably varies in depth in normal brains; the degree of its development in normal infants and in congenital aments (idiots) varies directly with the mental endowment of the individual, and the degree of its retrogression in demented patients varies directly with the amount of existing dementia.

Idiocy and imbecility are abnormalities connected by gradation with the more pronounced class of human monsters which are either non-viable or, owing to defective organization, unable to survive for any considerable time after birth. As the non-viable monsters and those which, owing to imperfect development, are unable to live through infancy, are all mindless, a description of them does not fall under the scope of the present article.

The present divisions of congenital mental abnormalities are (1) Idiocy, (2) Intellectual Imbecility, and (3) Moral Imbecility. It must be borne in mind that the following descriptions refer to types only, and that the forms of the various classes referred to merge into one another insensibly without any fast dividing differences.

1. Idiocy.—For clinical purposes and convenience of description, idiocy is frequently subdivided into (a) complete idiocy, and (b) ordinary idiocy.

(a) *Complete Idiocy*.—The greater number of the members of this group manifest scarcely any signs of psychical life. Their intelligence is of a very low order, and all the ordinary mental faculties are practically absent. There remains at the most a species of local memory, applicable to simple

habitual wants, and to the requirements of the moment. There is no will-power and no faculty of initiative. They have no command of articulate language, but some of them are able to make their few desires known by signs, cries, or sounds understood only by those in immediate attendance upon them. The presence of the ordinary instincts and sentiments is not revealed by such cases. Many of them do not appear even to be conscious of their own existence, much less of the ordinary feelings of pleasure, pain, fear, or love. In the great majority of instances the sexual instinct is absent. The only instinct they exhibit is that of hunger, and it is expressed only when food is presented before them.

On the physical side, the facial expression is marked by the most complete hebetude, relieved only by the occasional appearance of passing emotions of a superficial and vague kind. The general impression left upon the observer of one of these faces is one of a peculiar mingling of youth and old age. The form of the head is very variable, being microcephalic or macrocephalic, and the size of the face is generally disproportionate to that of the head, being in the former case too large and in the latter too small. The lips are thick, the tongue has a swollen appearance, and the saliva constantly overflows. The skin has an earthy colour, and is covered with an oily secretion which gives off an offensive odour. Most of these idiots are unable to walk, and when they can do so, the gait is tottering and uncertain, and all the muscular movements are in-coördinate and ungainly. Among the disorders of motility to which they are subject may be mentioned: general and local spasms, chorea, and epileptic convulsions; while contractures of the limbs, hemiplegia, and local paralyses are very common. They exhibit in abundance the ordinary stigmata of degeneration, such as cleft palate, hare-lip, disordered and irregular dentition, and dwarfism.

(b) *Ordinary Idiocy.*—Idiots of this class are, as a rule, fairly conversant with their immediate surroundings. Although they may know their own names and respond when addressed, their command of language is extremely limited; they are able to pronounce only a few words, or at most a few phrases, the correct significance of which they understand. They make particular use of interjections and nouns in conversation. It is impossible to train them either to read or write beyond the simplest words. Some of them show an aptitude for drawing imperfect resemblances of natural objects; but they are unable to count beyond certain limited figures, and arithmetic is entirely beyond their power. A great many idiots possess the faculty of imitation very strongly, but in most of them the imitative art is imperfect and grotesque. Many of them manifest affection to those with whom they live and who treat them kindly, but this feeling bears a stronger affinity to dog-like attachment than to the more reasoned human instinct of friendship. In short, their sentiments are usually confined to a crude appreciation of pleasure and pain, expressed emotionally in an unrestrained barbaric manner. They are, however, capable of a certain amount of training and discipline, as regards external behaviour. Thus, if properly trained, they may learn to dress themselves more or less tidily, to eat inoffensively, and to control their animal impulses; but if for any reason supervision is for long relaxed, they are apt to become degraded and repulsive in their habits.

In this class, as in the former, the body is stunted, and most of the individuals are ungainly and ugly in appearance. A great variety of physical stigmata and malformations are manifested by the subjects. In addition to micro-

cephalism and macrocephalism, the shape of the head may be altered in one or other of the following ways,—namely, flattening of the cranial vertex or occiput, low or swiftly receding forehead, asymmetry of opposite sides of the head or face, prognathism and extreme vaulting, flattening, or asymmetry of the palate. The teeth are liable to numerous malformations; the second dentition may fail altogether, or, if it does occur, the teeth are badly formed and carious. In the eyes, strabismus, astigmatism, and anomalous pigmentation are frequent; in some cases the distance between the eyes is narrowed, while in others, as in the Mongolian type of idiot, they present the true Oriental appearance, being set far apart and almond-shaped. Idiots are subject to various disorders of the gastrointestinal tract, especially to inflammatory conditions of the mucous membranes. The skin is usually pigmented and unhealthy-looking, and gives off an offensive odour.

About 25 per cent. of all idiots are subject to epilepsy. Most of them exhibit a tendency to instinctive impulses, irritability of temper, and occasionally to maniacal excitement. The physical resistance to disease of all kinds is extremely low, and tuberculosis is one of the most frequent causes of death. Few of them live longer than thirty years; in complete idiocy the duration of life is very much shorter.

2. *Intellectual Imbecility.*—It is often impossible to detect in early childhood any outstanding difference between imbeciles and normal children. In many instances it is only when education begins to be communicated that a radical difference shows itself in the greater inaptness of the feeble-minded to assimilate ordinary elementary instruction. As imbeciles approach the age of puberty, their mental defects become more apparent; besides being slow of apprehension and dull-witted, they are deficient in ordinary interest, in judgment, and in common-sense. Listlessness, inattention, and a tendency to become absorbed in subjective thought—commonly called 'day-dreaming'—are frequent symptoms of their intellectual feebleness, in addition to the symptoms which result from imperfect cerebral development. In a certain sense it may be said of them that they do not grow old with their years, and when they approach adolescence they do so without any appreciable increase of responsibility. They remain childish, easily satisfied with trifles, and display an interest and curiosity in things which have long ceased to interest people of the same age. The sexual instinct is early developed, and often manifests itself as an exaggeration or perversion of the normal condition. Mental conceptions, the association of ideas, and power of initiative are slow and difficult. Within their somewhat limited sphere of reasoning, which never passes into abstruse consideration, they think and act in a normally logical manner; yet they lamentably fail either in foreseeing the consequences of their actions or in understanding the more complicated actions of their normal fellow-creatures. The moral aberrations are as pronounced as the intellectual. Imbeciles are prone to be egotistic, vain, and sensitively proud. Family ties are apt to be loosely felt; the ordinary affection for relatives is generally feeble, and, although they may be capable of forming strong attachments to individuals, such feelings rapidly yield after short periods of separation. Religious and altruistic ideas as well as moral discrimination are not, as a rule, based upon conviction so much as upon habit and the discipline exercised by other people. Most imbeciles are untruthful and unreliable, more especially in small matters such as the appropriation of trifling articles, the property of other people. They are often irritable, and are subject to out-

bursts of rage or excitement, for inadequate reasons. Many imbeciles are able to earn a somewhat precarious livelihood by ordinary manual labour, or by working at some trade which they may have learned indifferently well, but the technique of which they are able to execute only imperfectly. Whatever work they do requires the active supervision and guidance of others. Their artistic sense is rarely developed to an exceptional degree, although a few of them are musical; while others exhibit an extraordinary memory for detail, or arithmetical powers wholly disproportionate to their general mental development.

Imbeciles are subject to attacks of mental excitement or depression, which have a tendency to recur periodically. It is during these attacks, especially of excitement, that they are prone to commit criminal or morbidly impulsive acts. A considerable proportion of them are afflicted with epilepsy.

The physical characteristics of imbecility are neither numerous nor important. The subjects are usually well developed, and their outward conformation differs but slightly from that of normal individuals. The facial expression, however, usually indicates a want of mental power; and certain speech-defects, such as lisping, stammering, and imperfect pronunciation, are common, to which may be added a tendency to misapply the meaning of certain words, and to misunderstand the grammatical use of certain parts of speech, such as adverbs and the infinitive mood of verbs. The physical resistance is lowered, and the activity of the various bodily functions is much less vigorous than in normal individuals. Hence it is that imbeciles succumb more easily to bodily diseases, especially such as are of infectious origin, and that a considerable number of them die of phthisis.

3. Moral Imbecility.—Whether or not congenital moral defect can exist independently of intellectual defect is a disputed question. We have already seen that moral defect is a concomitant of congenital intellectual weakness; but there undoubtedly occur cases of moral non-development in which the intellectual faculties are as vigorous as, or even surpass, those of ordinary individuals. We are therefore compelled to admit that congenital perversion of the moral nature may exist without any apparent intellectual defect. But a closer observation of such cases shows not only that they are non-moral in one or more particulars, but that they also exhibit eccentricities of conduct or singular and absurd habits, or the tendency to perform the common actions of life in an unconventional manner. Moreover, a prolonged observation of such persons reveals a liability in them to various forms of intellectual perversions, such as unfounded suspicions, gross superstitions, obsessions, delusions, hallucinations, and even confirmed insanity.

In the more pronounced forms of moral imbecility without apparent intellectual defect we find a wayward and impracticable temper, an absence of social instincts and of normal affection, which may even express itself as a positive aversion to relatives and friends. Such persons are incapable of realizing the value of truth, and become so notorious in this respect among the people who know them, that their statements on the most ordinary matters of fact are never believed. They steal systematically without shame, the only restraint being the fear of being found out. Perhaps their most prominent characteristic is their cruelty. It is not so much that they are ruthless in the pursuit of objects which they desire, as that they go out of their way to inflict pain presumably for the pleasure of witnessing suffering. They are, however, apt to be extremely resentful of injury to themselves, and seldom forget to avenge

an insult. They are also vain, proud, and supercilious. They yield to the worst impulses of their lower nature without any evident desire to resist them, and they never express sincere contrition for any action. As might be expected, they cause endless grief and anxiety to their relatives, and their lives are lamentable failures from the point of view of worldly success. Their intellectual faculties, often very acute, are exercised in the gratification of their selfish desires or in the justification of their conduct, rather than in the pursuit of any continuous honest endeavours. As a rule, their affinity for evil courses leads them to indulgence in habits which tend to accelerate their degeneration and to terminate life prematurely.

In the case of children and young adolescents it is unwise to pass too hasty a judgment, for it may happen that the moral sense is not absent but only tardily manifested. In such cases the children may be bright, intelligent, quickly receptive, often emotionally impressionable,—perhaps to a morbid degree,—but lacking in the very elements of moral perception. Many of these individuals, as they approach adult life, begin to change radically in their moral nature, and some of them have even attained to saintliness and canonization.

There are, finally, many persons who never attain to the average moral sense, and whom no appeal based on moral grounds can touch, yet who are possessed of such clear reasoning powers and self-control, that they successfully conceal their non-morality by a rigid observance of the conventions of their fellow-men.

*Pathology.*—In congenital mental defect, especially in its more pronounced forms, such as idiocy, the brain convolutions present a simple arrangement suggestive of a tendency to revert to the type of the higher mammalia; thus they may either present few secondary folds, or be small, slender, and curling (*microgyri*). Arrested development of certain convolutions is frequently observed, especially in the frontal and parietal regions, which gives to the brain a peculiar and irregular appearance.

The size of the cerebrum relative to that of the cerebellum may be deficient, so that the latter is not covered over by the occipital lobes, as is the case in the carnivora and higher herbivora. Parts of the brain, most frequently the *corpus callosum*, may be absent, and many inequalities in the development of the two hemispheres have been recorded.

In the second and third layers of the cortex of the ape and in a similar situation in the cortex of the pig, Bevan Lewis (*Text Book of Mental Diseases*, 1899, p. 70) describes a perfectly globose cell, with a single delicate apex process and two or more, extremely delicate basal processes without any angular projection from the rounded contour of the cell. These cells occur in man only in cases of idiocy and imbecility. Hammarberg (quoted by Ireland, *Mental Affections of Children*) found the pyramidal cells fewer in number than in normal man. This confirms to a certain extent the observations of Bolton, referred to at the commencement of this article. If only small portions of the brain presented this paucity of cell development, while the remaining portions were normal, though having fewer cells than usual, the individual was, according to Hammarberg, not idiotic, but imbecile or weak-minded. Where the cells were not only abnormal in shape, but also, generally, very few in number, the idiocy was profound; where the cells were more numerous, though at places globose, badly developed or degenerate, there was more intellectual development, though the individual was still idiotic. Concomitant with these arrests in the development of nerve cells there is a corresponding diminution in cell pro-



cesses, and consequently in the number of the nerve fibres of the cortex. We thus see that the essential pathological condition in idiocy and imbecility is an arrest in the development of the cortical neurous, and that the degree of mental weakness depends upon the extent of the imperfect development of these elements.

JOHN MACPHERSON.

**ABOR, ABOR-MIRI.**—A title applied to a group of hill tribes of the Mongolian type, on the N. frontier of the Indian province of Assam.

The word *Abor* or *Abor* seems to mean 'barbarous' or 'independent.' The Miris, according to Dalton (p. 22), are so called because they acted as mediators between the Assamese and the more isolated Abors; and he suggests (p. 29) that the word is identical with the *miria* or *miria* of Orissa, which, according to him, has originated the title applied to the Meriah victim by the Kandhs (which see). But this is more than doubtful; and Dr. Grierson, to whom the question was recently referred, with more probability suggests that the word is *Mi-ri*, of which the first syllable in Tibetan means 'man,' and the whole compound may possibly mean 'nobleman' or 'gentleman.'

The Abors or Abars occupy a tract of country on both banks of the Dihang river, which is the upper course of the Brahmaputra. To the W. of this is the Miri country. Most of the Abors live outside British territory, within the Tibetan border, only 321 being recorded as British subjects at the Census of 1901. Of these, 53 were described as Hindus, 7 as Buddhists, and the remaining 261 as Animists. Of the Miris, 46,720 persons were enumerated within British territory at the same Census, of whom about half represented themselves as Hindu and half as Animist. They seem, like the tribes which occupy the hills on both sides of this group, the Mishmis (wh. see) to the E. and the Daphlas (wh. see) to the W., to be little affected by either Hinduism or Buddhism, and to be in the main Animists. Dalton (p. 25) states that when their children are lost, probably being kidnapped by the Mishmis, the Abors attribute their disappearance to the wood-spirits, in whom they firmly believe, and to each of whom some particular department in the destiny of man is assigned. Each disease has a spirit of its own, and, as they have no medicine for the sick, the only remedy is a sacrifice to the spirit to whom the illness is attributed. The favourite haunt of these spirits is a mountain called *Rigam*, which is held in awe by them. No one can return from it, hence its mysteries have never been disclosed. They acknowledge and adore one Supreme Being as the father of all, and have some vague belief in a future state; but their ideas on the subject are ill-defined, and Dalton, who heard them speak of a Judge of the Dead under the name of *Jam*, who is clearly the Hindu *Yama*, reasonably inferred that much of this belief had been borrowed from Hindu sources. Needham (*Assam Census*, 1901, i. 48) adds that the chief of the malignant spirits whom it is the main object of their religion to propitiate, is called *Apom* or *Epom*, and his younger brother *Pomsa*, both of whom inhabit the rubber tree, and must be propitiated in times of sickness. *Urom* is another malignant spirit who resides in unclean places, attacks people after dark, and causes stomachic pains and headaches. He is generally propitiated with an offering of some dry bones and spirits. *Kilu Delé*, who represent the male and female earth spirits of the Dravidians (which see), live underground, and destroy crops and other field produce. A sacrifice of two cooked fowls, rice, and other delicacies must be offered to them under the farm granary. *Nipong* is an evil spirit to whose malignity all female diseases are attributed, and he attacks men also with hæmorrhage and colic, which cause the sufferer to roll about like a woman in travail. He is said to live in plantain groves or amongst stinging nettles, on the seeds of which it is believed that he exists.

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Dalton notices one peculiarity in their sacrifices, that, when an animal is offered to the spirits, no one is allowed to have a share of the meat except the old and infirm, who may be regarded as being provided for in this way. They have no hereditary priesthood, but there are certain persons called *deodars* who gain the position of soothsayers, from their superior knowledge of the science of omens. These officials practise divination by observing the entrails of birds and the liver of a pig.

One of these men informed Dalton that the whole human race is descended from a single mother, who had two sons, the elder a bold hunter, the younger a clever craftsman and his mother's favourite. She migrated to the W., taking her younger son with her and all the household utensils, arms, and implements. The people of the land who remained behind thus lost all knowledge of arts and handicrafts, and from them sprang the present Abors. The Western nations, including the English, are descended from the younger son.

The beliefs of the hill Miris closely resemble those of the Abors. But those who have migrated to the Assam plains have, to a large extent, abandoned the more savage beliefs of their wilder kinsmen. They have now come under the influence of the Order of Gussains (wh. see) or of Brāhman priests, who have induced them to adopt, in some degree, the ordinary Hindu beliefs, but they have failed to wean them from their impure manner of living, such as the eating of fowls, pork, and beef, the use of intoxicating liquor, and the neglect of caste rules in the preparation of their food—all gross offences in the eyes of the Hindu, and much more dangerous than any heretical belief. Allen records that some Miris asserted that they believed in a future life, but they were careful to add that they had never heard of a dead man who returned to this earth. Their belief in the survival of the spirit is shown by the care taken that the dead shall be buried as if equipped for a long journey—with food, cooking utensils, arms, and ornaments suitable to his position in life, so that his rank may be made manifest to the Judge of the Dead. They also attach great importance to the burial of the corpse near the graves of its ancestors, and if a man of rank dies in the plains of a disease not regarded as contagious, they take pains to send his body to the family cemetery in the hills.

LITERATURE.—Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, 21 ff.; JASS xiv. 496 ff.; Gait, *Census Report Assam*, 1891, i. 221 f.; Allen, *ib.* 1901, i. 471 f.; Peal, JASS xli. 27; Hodgson, *ib.* xviii. pt. ii. 987; Robinson, *ib.* xviii. pt. i. 230.

W. CROOKE.

**ABORIGINES.**—In the article ETHNOLOGY it is pointed out that the four main divisions of mankind 'have not remained stationary in their respective original homes, but have been subject to great fluctuations during historic times.' But no rigid parting-line can be drawn between the historic and the prehistoric ages, which everywhere tend to merge imperceptibly one in the other. Hence the remark may confidently be extended to all times since early man first began those migratory movements by which he has replenished the earth. We know, for instance, that, during the Stone Ages, Europe was occupied by both long-headed and short-headed races, and Señor F. Outes has now shown that the same two types had already reached Austral-America in Pleistocene times (*La Edad de la Piedra en Patagonia*, 1905). It follows that the two primary divisions recognized by anthropologists have been intimately associated together for countless generations, and consequently that there are no more any pure stocks, except perhaps a few isolated groups, still surviving in some remote and hitherto inaccessible corners of the world, such as the Andamanese Islanders, the recently-discovered Toálas of Celebes, and the Fijian Kai-Colos.

The term 'Aborigines' is therefore generally to be taken in a purely relative sense, and the

claim often made by them to be regarded as true autochthones must be unhesitatingly rejected. They are normally 'mestizos,' in whom the physical and psychic characters of two or more races are intermingled in varying proportions. But the psychic character of primitive peoples finds its chief expression in their religious concepts, since their whole conduct is almost exclusively controlled by their views regarding the unseen world. Put in this way, the statement that their religious systems have been influenced by foreign contact follows of itself, and the inference that, as there are no longer any unmixed races, so there are no longer any unmixed religions, becomes almost a truism. The inference is certainly not quite obvious at first sight, although the analogous somatic mixtures, as between whites and blacks, are often self-evident. But that is only because mental are necessarily more subtle and elusive than material phenomena. The savage may hide his inmost thoughts regarding the supernatural, as he often does to casual visitors; but he cannot hide the constituent elements of his outward form from the searching eye of intelligent observers.

1. Thus the main physical features of the Australian aborigines have long been determined, while the source of many of their religious ideas is still the subject of heated discussions between the Spencers, Gillens, Langs, Frazers, and other serious students of primitive psychologies. The Narrinyeri people of South-East Australia have a 'god' or mythical being, Nurunderi, who dwells in a shadowy Elysium in the far west; and to reach this abode of bliss the souls of the dead have to pass under the sea and over a fiery pit, into which the wicked fall while the good escape. But such abodes of bliss and misery form no part of the genuine beliefs of the natives, who do not distinguish between morally good and wicked people; and careful inquiry has now shown that these are merely distorted reminiscences of the heaven and hell preached to the Narrinyeri tribe by the early missionaries.

The same god Nurunderi (Ngurunderi) plays a great part in the myths of the kindred Tanganarin people of the Lower Murray River, and also affords a curious illustration of the way in which the Biblical stories get perverted in the minds of the natives.

This great King of Wyr (Heaven) had two wives, who caught a large and a small fish, keeping the first for themselves and giving him the little one. Discovering the fraud, he was very angry, and said, 'You shall die for this, and all Tanganarin shall die; and there shall be fighting and sickness, and evil spirits until then.' Ngurunderi had created and done everything for them, giving them knowledge and skill in hunting, fishing, and fighting. But after the sentence of death for the trick played upon him by his wives, he took away their knowledge and power, left them, and ascended into heaven. Then they became ignorant and blind, and lived like the beasts of the field for a long time, till of a virgin was born a good and wise man named Wyngare. He gave them back their lost wisdom and power, and taught them sorcery; and when he had regenerated all the tribe, he was taken up to heaven by Ngurunderi, and now reigns there as second King. And when a Tanganarin dies, Wyngare takes his spirit up to heaven, and gets him to that place, through his influence, that he might be called the Australian.

The first man is more detailed than that of Scripture. The people of the present Melbourne district say that Punjil, Creator of all things, made two male blacks by cutting three large strips of bark with his big knife, and on one of them kneading a quantity of clay to the required consistency. Then he carried some of the dough to another of the strips, and began to mould it into a man, beginning at the feet and working upwards to the head. This he repeated on the third strip; and being well pleased with his work, he danced round about the two figures. He next made some hair out of stringy bark, curled for one man and straight for the other; and, being again pleased with his work, once more danced round about them. After smoothing their bodies with his hands, he lay upon them and blew hard into their mouths and nostrils until they stirred, when he danced round them a third time. He then made them speak and walk about, and they were finished.

The Dieris tell it differently. In the beginning Mōra-Mōra, the Good Spirit, made a number of small black lizards, and being pleased with them, promised them power over all creeping things. He divided their feet into toes and fingers, and with his forefinger added nose, eyes, mouth, and ears. Then he stood one on end, but it toppled over; so he cut off its tail, after which the lizard walked erect like a man. He did the same with another, which happened to be a female, and so the race was perpetuated. After a time mankind became very numerous and wicked, whereat Punjil, being angry, raised storms and fierce winds, which shook the big trees on the hill-tops. And Punjil went about with his big knife, cutting this way and that way, and men, women, and children he cut into very little pieces. But the pieces were alive, and wriggled about like worms, whereupon great gales came, and blew them about like snowflakes. They were wafted into the clouds, and by the clouds borne hither and thither all over the earth, and thus was mankind dispersed. But the good men and women were carried upwards and became stars, which still shine in the heavens.

Death came in this way. The first pair were told not to go near a certain tree, in which lived a bat which was not to be disturbed. But one day the women were getting fuel, and were tempted to go near the tree. Thereupon the bat flew away, and so death came into the world.

It should be noted that all these Creation myths have been gathered from tribes which have long been in association with the whites, and probably derived the substance and the moral tendency from the missionaries. The local colouring would gradually be supplied as the stories passed from tribe to tribe.

2. Similar Biblical legends are widespread among the Masai of East Africa, and here the parallelisms are so striking that Captain Merker can account for them only by supposing that the Masai nomads are a Semitic people who dwelt originally with the kindred Israelites in North Arabia, whence they migrated some 6000 or 7000 years ago to their present domain east of Lake Victoria Nyanza. Surprising coincidences are pointed out between the traditions, myths, legends, and religious observances of the two nations. The Masai *el-Eberel* is equated with Eber (Gn 10<sup>21</sup>); *Hau*, 'Great,' with *Jahweh*; *Nabe* with *Abel*; *Narabū* with *Abraham*; and it is shown that the Masai have also their ten commandments, the first of which is: 'There is one only God; heretofore you called Him *E'magelani*, "Almighty"; henceforth you shall call Him *Ngai*'; just as in Ex 6<sup>3</sup> *Shaddai* is replaced by *Jahweh*. Here we have unquestionably many Jewish religious notions superimposed on the primitive Masai animism. These were not, however, brought from Arabia thousands of years ago, but are obviously due to contact with the Judaizing Falashas of the neighbouring Abyssinian uplands (cf. M. Merker, *Die Masai*, Berlin, 1904).

3. In *Senaar* there is a curious intermingling of Muslim and animistic beliefs, which corresponds completely with the Negro and Semitic interminglings of its Funj inhabitants. These pass for fairly good Muhammadans; practise circumcision, make the pilgrimage to Mecca, have zealous faqirs and dervishes (who act as teachers and scribes in the towns), and conform to most of the other Qur'anic precepts. Yet beneath this thin Muslim veneer these Negroid natives are still sheer pagans, firmly believing in the gross superstitions which are associated with the wer-wolf notions referred to in art. ETHNOLOGY. Their much-dreaded *sāhirs* (magicians) are credited with the power of transforming themselves at night into hyenas and hippopotami, which roam about seeking to destroy their enemies, and inflict injuries even on the most devout Musalmāns. The *marafils*, as the metamorphized human hyenas are called, hold unhallowed cannibal feasts in the recesses of the woodlands, indicating their presence by their terrible howlings, just as wayfarers were stricken with awe by the midnight roar of the transformed human jaguars amongst the Aztecs of pre-Columbian times. In the daytime the *marafils* again



assume their human form, but are still dangerous, since a glance from their evil eye suffices to wither the limbs, the heart, or the entrails of their victims, who thus perish in the most horrible torments. To counteract these dire machinations, the scribes write passages of the Qur'an on slips of paper, which are then burnt, and the smoke inhaled by those who suppose themselves threatened by the hostile *sāhirs*. It would be difficult to imagine a more complete fusion of higher and lower religious forms than this inhaling of Qur'anic texts against evil influences opposed to Qur'anic teachings (see E. Marno, *Reisen im Gebiete des blauen u. weissen Nil*, 1874).

Featherman aptly remarks that 'Muhammadanism, introduced by the Arabs, has been adopted by some of the Nigritian nationalities of higher mental capacities, but they are Muhammadans in their own way. Christianity has also made some converts in isolated localities, but they are Christians only in name' (*Social History*, etc., i. p. 12). In some places, as in the West Sudan, the primitive pagan substratum has been partly overlaid by both of these higher religions, with the curious result that, for instance, some of the Senegal Wolofs have charms with texts from the Qur'an which they cannot read, while others have medals and scapulars of the 'Seven Dolours,' or of the Trinity, which they cannot understand. Other violent contrasts are seen in the lofty conception of *Takhar*, 'god of justice,' associated amongst the neighbouring Serers with lowly household gods, such as the lizard, for whom the daily milk-bowl is set apart. Here again the fusion of higher and lower ideals is obvious enough, and so it is throughout Negroland, wherever the seething masses of heathendom have been touched by higher influences.

4. Turning to India, in this fathomless ocean of heterogeneous elements we are at once confronted with perhaps the saddest tragedy ever witnessed anywhere in the whole history of human development. Here are seen, not so much gross anthropomorphic systems leavened by contact with superior ideals, as the very reverse process of these ideals being themselves gradually contaminated and utterly debased by submersion in the great flood of aboriginal heathendom. The present writer has elsewhere shown (*East and West*, April 1905) that the whole of the peninsula, from the Himalayas to Ceylon, was occupied by these aborigines—Kolarians and Dravidians—ages before the advent of the tribes of Aryan (Sanskritic) speech, who may have reached the Panjāb from the north-west, some 5000 or at most 6000 years ago. It is clear from the Vedic texts (see *VEDAS*) that these proto-Aryans drew their inspiration from above; that their deities—Varuna, Indra, Agni, Sūrya, Dyaus, the Maruts—were all personifications of the forces of the upper regions, and were looked upon in the main as beneficent beings, who associated almost on a familiar footing with their votaries, from whom they accepted mild offerings of soma and the fruits of the earth, without exacting any gross or cruel sacrifices. On the other hand, the Dravido-Kolarian aborigines drew, and for the most part still draw, their inspiration from below, and their chthonic gods were really demons, ever hostile to mortals, and to be appeased by sanguinary rites and the sacrifice of everything most prized by the living. But, as the Vedic Aryans ranged farther and farther into the Indo-Gangetic plains, there took place those inevitable religious and racial intermixtures which resulted in the present Hindu populations and in the degraded forms of religion which collectively we call Brahmanism or Hinduism. Over this monstrous system the triumphant Aryans spread the prestige of their language and general culture; but in the struggle

they forfeited their heaven-born pantheon, which was replaced by the chthonic gods of the aborigines. As *Gracia capla ferum victorem cepit*, so here the Vedic Sun-god and Sky-god, Rain-god and Wind-gods were vanquished by the Dravido-Kolarian Viṣṇu, the Preserver, Mahādeva (Śiva, the Destroyer, with his wife Durgā or Kālī), Birmha Devi (the Fire Goddess), the gross symbolism typified by the *linga* and the rest. However disguised by a Sanskrit nomenclature, the true parentage of these entities is clearly seen, for instance, in the Śiva of the later Hindu triad, who is evolved out of the later Vedic Rudra, the Roarer or Storm-god, who guides and controls the destroying cyclone.

Thus was constituted the present Hindu system, in which, as we now see, the higher forms have been not merely influenced or modified by, but almost completely submerged in, the lower. Since the expulsion of Buddhism, which had prevailed for about 1000 years (B.C. 250 to A.D. 750), this exceptional process has again been reversed, and during the last 2000 years Brahmanism has spread over the whole peninsula, absorbing or driving to the uplands all the primitive beliefs, and even attacking them in their last retreats in the Vindhyan range and the extreme southern highlands. Hence it is that even in these less accessible tracts unalloyed primitive forms are gradually disappearing. Still, enough remains to enable us to discriminate between the original Dravido-Kolarian and the intruding Hindu elements. Thus Mr. A. Krishna Iyer writes that the Malayars of Cochin 'are pure animists, but, owing to their association with the low-caste men of the plains and their attendance at the neighbouring village festivals, they have been imbibing the higher forms of worship.' Of their six gods two are demoniacal (chthonic), and four are merely different names for the Hindu Kālī, who was originally borrowed by the Hindus from the natives. From the higher castes are also taken Bhagavati Bhadrakālī and Nagasāmi, who have penetrated into the neighbouring Kollencode forests, and are there worshipped with semi-Hindu rites, jointly with Muniappan and the other demon-gods, for all these aborigines are still everywhere at heart devil-worshippers. But these demons themselves, as well as all preternatural beings, are really human like the suppliants, only invisible and more potent. Hence 'they are held in fear and pious reverence, and their favour can be sought by sacrifice alone' (Iyer, MS. notes). Much the same account is given of the Eravallars of the Chittur forests, who also include Kālī amongst their demoniacal gods, and seek her protection with like offerings.

Amongst the Bhils, Kols, Gonds, and other *Pahāriās* of the Vindhyan uplands, great respect is paid to Mahādeva, to whom have been consecrated the Mahādeo heights east of the Satpuras. He is even confounded with the chthonic Tiger-god, and associated with Bhīma, Arjuna, and other heroes or demi-gods of the Mahābhārata epic. Yet these almost Hinduized hillmen offered till lately human sacrifices to the various members of their limitless pantheon, which includes sun, moon, rocks, trees, torrents, the passing winds, and especially the departed spirits who return in the form of nightmare, sit on the chest, squeeze the throat, and suck the blood, like the vampires of the popular Slav legend (see *ETHNOLOGY*). So intermingled are the higher and lower forms throughout Goudwāna and the Southern highlands, that the Census agents are often puzzled how to return certain ethnic groups, whether as outcaste Hindus or Hinduized outcastes.

5. But this new field of research is boundless, and we must hasten through Indo-China, where

the superficial Buddhism is everywhere intimately associated with the never-dying animism, eastwards to the *Malay* lands, where analogous associations crop out everywhere between Islām and the still rampant heathenism of Borneo, Celebes, Gilolo, and Mindanao. Much light has recently been thrown on this religious syncretism in Celebes by the brothers F. and P. Sarasin, in whose *Reisen* (Berlin, 1905) the reader will find much instructive matter. The prevalent relations in the hitherto almost absolutely unknown island of Mindanao have also been revealed by N. M. Saleeby in his *Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion*, vol. iv. of the Philippine Ethnological Survey Publications (Manila, 1905). Here the 'authentic' genealogies of the Moro (Muhammadan) dynastic families are interwoven with curious pagan elements, and we read of orthodox Sultans descended from unions not only with houris sent down from heaven, but also with a native princess found inside a bamboo stalk. This occurred at the time Tabunaway and Mamalu were cutting bamboo to build their fish corral. When the last tree was felled, out came a child who was called Putri Tunina, and whose little finger was wounded, the *bolo* having cut through the bamboo, and from her sprang Malang-sa-Ingud, third *datu* (king) of the Bwayan dynasty. The Mindanao Muslims have also assimilated some of the pagan folk-lore, and firmly believe in the Balbal vampire, a huge night bird, whose screech is supposed to be distinctly heard after sunset. It is really 'a human being who transforms at night into an evil spirit which devours dead people,' in this differing from other vampires, which come out of the dead and prey on the living. But so detested is the creature, that in the local Muhammadan code, here published in full, anyone calling another *balbal* is fined one slave or his value (p. 68). Thus in Mindanao it is again the higher Muslim system that is affected by the lower ideals of the aborigines, many of whom have withdrawn to the uplands of the interior, where interesting discoveries await future explorers in primitive psychologies.

6. Once more the balance is redressed in *Oceania*, where the more civilized Eastern Polynesians have inoculated the Western Melanesian cannibal head-hunters with their *mana* and other subtle religious essences. But in the process modifications naturally take place, and the Maori or Samoan *mana* is not, perhaps, quite the same thing as that of the New Hebrides savages. The Maori *mana*, brought from Hawaiki (Samoa?) to New Zealand by the kaka bird, is not easily distinguished from the forest, the human, and the other local *mauri*, and is generally defined as 'power, authority, influence, prestige' (A. Hamilton, *Maori Art*, p. 396). But the Melanesian *mana* is more spiritual, analogous to the Augustinian 'grace,' without which no works avail, but with which all things superhuman can be achieved. Thus a person may have *mana*, but is not himself *mana*,—a force which 'is present in the atmosphere of life, attaches itself to persons and to things, and is manifested by results which can only be ascribed to its operation'; and again: 'a force altogether distinct from physical power, which acts in all kinds of ways for good and evil, and which it is of the greatest advantage to possess or control' (Codrington, *The Melanesians*, pp. 118-119). But however homologous with, or divergent from, the Maori *mana*, this impersonal essence permeates the whole religious thought of the Melanesians, whose religion 'consists, in fact, in getting this *mana* for oneself, or getting it used for one's benefit—all religion, that is, as far as religious practices go, prayers and sacrifices' (*ib.*). And as the principle is admittedly derived from

the more highly cultured Polynesians, we have here again a primitive system influenced, and, in this instance, somewhat elevated, by a more advanced line of thought. How primitive in other respects is the Melanesian system, may be seen from the belief current in the Banks' Islands that people may become *talamaur*, a kind of vampire which prowls about at night, and, like the Mindanao *balbal*, devours the bodies of the dead. In this and several other Melanesian groups lycanthropy also (see ETHNOLOGY) is widely prevalent, only here the non-existent wolf is replaced by sharks, owls, eagles, and blow-flies. These last are perhaps the most dreaded, since magicians assuming such minute forms can buzz about, penetrate unseen into the houses, and torment their victims with impunity. How such childish notions can persist side by side with the subtleties of the *mana* doctrine is a psychological puzzle awaiting solution.

7. Perhaps even more inexplicable is the pure animism of the crudest type still everywhere surviving amongst the cool-headed and practical Chinese, beneath, or rather almost above, several layers of higher forms, such as ancestor-worship, Buddhism, Taoism, and the common-sense ethical teachings of Confucius. It is impossible here to dwell on these different systems which are elsewhere fully described (see art. CHINA [RELIGION OF]). It will suffice for our purpose to point out that in China the various religions, or so-called religions, are, so to say, stratified or superimposed one on the other rather than intermingled, as mostly elsewhere. Hence the curious phenomenon that the Government recognizes three official religions,—Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism,—to all of which, in virtue of his position, the Emperor himself belongs, and whose observances he scrupulously fulfils, while millions of his subjects simultaneously profess these, and perhaps others, without any sense of incongruity. The several beliefs do not contradict each other, but lie peacefully side by side; and the devout Buddhist, after duly burning his tapers and incense to the innumerable idols of the joss-house, proceeds as an incurable Animist to take active measures to baffle the *Feng-shui* (evil spirits) by effacing the straight lines affected by them, and to encourage the *Fung-shui* (good spirits) by developing the curves along which they prefer to travel.

8. Coming westwards, we find the early and the late again amalgamated, and indeed so inextricably that only in recent years have folk-lorists and classical students begun to distinguish between the coarse chthonic gods of the Pelasgians and the bright Aryan deities of the Hellenes, which have so long been merged together in the Greek mythologies, as typified, for instance, by the marriage of the Uranian Aphrodite with the hirsute and deformed cave-dwelling Hephæstus. But the fusion of the pre-Aryan Pelasgians with the proto-Aryan Hellenes was a slow process, lasting for many generations, as is evident from the different social and religious institutions prevailing in various parts of Greece during the early historic period. Thus, of fetishism we find no trace in Homer, who represents the Achæan (Hellenic) side, whereas fetish worship long persisted in Arcadia, Attica, and other distinctly Pelasgic lands. So also with totemism and the dark Poseidon of the Pelasgians, who was finally eclipsed by the fair Apollo, Zeus, and the other Aryan gods of the Achæoi. After, or perhaps during, the fusion, other religious contacts took place, as shown by the Greek Adonis borrowed with another Aphrodite (Astarte) from the Semites. The conflicting accounts of these and other deities are but the results of the unconscious efforts of the ancient folk-lorists to harmonize the various legends of

originally distinct personalities, and are themselves a clear indication of the higher Aryan and Semitic influences brought to bear on the primitive religion of the Pelasgian aborigines. But these influences must not be pushed too far, as when Eduard Glaser imports the Vedic *Dyaus* into Greece (Zeus) and Italy (Jove), as well as into Israel (Jahweh). It is clear from the compound forms *Dyauspiter*, (Vedic Sanskrit), *Zeṽ pater* (Gr.), *Juvepater*, *Jupater* (Umbrian), *Diespiter*, *Jupiter* (Latin), that this personification of the bright sky had already found expression in the Aryan mother-tongue, and was consequently a common inheritance of all the proto-Aryans who, after the dispersion, brought it independently into their Indian, Hellenic, and Italic settlements. Thus we have here no reciprocal influence of Aryans upon Aryans; but as to the same root belong the Avestan *daēva*, the Lithuanian and Lettic *Dēvas*, *Dēus*, 'God,' and other Western variants, it follows that the pantheons of the Iranian and European aborigines were enlarged and otherwise modified in remote prehistoric times by their proto-Aryan conquerors. What other early interminglings of religious systems may have taken place, as between Aryans and Ligurians in Italy, or Aryans (Celts) and Iberians in Spain, Gaul, and the British Isles, is a subject of too speculative a nature to be here discussed. One point, however, seems fairly well established, that the Semitic Phœnicians reached the far west with their Baal, who was adopted as one of their chief deities by the Ibero-Celtic peoples of Britain and Ireland. The expressions *Bal mhaith art*, 'may Baal prosper thee,' and *Bal Dhia dhuit*, 'God Baal be with thee,' were not so many years ago still addressed to strangers on the banks of the Suir in Tipperary (see J. Bonwick, *Irish Druids and Old Irish Religions*; H. O'Brien, *Phœnician Ireland*; D'Arbois de Jubainville, *Cours de Littérature Celtique*).

9. In the *New World*, effectively cut off from the Old most probably since Neolithic times, the interchanges of cultures and religious notions can have been only between the American aborigines themselves. But here also there were very great local developments, in virtue of which some, such as the Aztecs, Mayas, Zapotecs, Chibchas, Peruvians, and Aymaras reached a relatively high degree of civilization, while most of the others lagged behind, and are still at the barbaric or even pure savage state. These last have, till recently, stood for the most part aloof from all extraneous contacts, so that many, such as the Mexican Seris, the Caribs and Arawaks of British Guiana, the Brazilian Botocudos, and the Fuegian Yaghans, afford excellent object-lessons for the study of the earliest types of unmodified religious thought, but for that very reason do not come within the scope of the present inquiry. Thus, in America, the mutual influences are confined mainly to the more advanced cultural peoples, amongst whom interminglings appear to have been more the rule than the exception. Apart from the much discussed subject of the long-extinct Toltecs, it may be stated in a general way that the two great Aztec and Maya cultures betray undoubted proofs of endless borrowings, especially in matters associated with astrology, divination, and religious observances. Who were the givers and who the recipients may still be a moot point, but the contacts are not open to question.

E. Förstemann, who takes the Maya side against Selser and others, holds that 'the Aztecs adopted many things which they learned from the Mayas, especially their deities, whose names they simply translated. The translation of Kukulcan into Quetzalcoatl is a very typical case, for *kuk* and *quetzal* designate the bird *Trogon resplendens*, and *can* and *coatl* mean the snake. The Aztecs first came in contact with the higher civilization not very long before the arrival of the Spaniards, so that they did not have time to establish their supremacy and so absorb

the Mayas, but, on the contrary, were absorbed by them' (*Mexican and Central American Antiquities*, Washington, 1904, p. 542). It is also shown that the *tonalamatls* which were common to all Central American cultured peoples, and were not calendars, but horoscopes covering a period of 260 days, the period of gestation, originated with the Mayas, and were slavishly copied by the Aztecs (ib. p. 627; see also Keane's Eng. ed. of Selser's *Elucidation of the Aztec Tonalamatli*, 1901).

Dealing with the wall-paintings of Mitla in the Zapotec domain (the present State of Oaxaca), Professor Selser shows that this cultured nation drew many of its religious inspirations from the neighbouring Aztecs. 'The conclusion seems inevitable that the cosmogonic representations referring to Quetzalcoatl, as well as the Olympus with its many personages occurring in the picture-writings, were not strictly national, did not have their roots in the Zapotec country, but represented a superimposed culture which owes its origin to the influence of Nahua tribes dating back to prehistoric times' (*Wandmalereien von Mitla*, Berlin, 1895).

On the other hand, the views advanced by the late Mr. Leland in *The Algonquin Legends of New England* regarding the old Norse origin of the north-eastern Indian mythology cannot be upheld. But although they are now shown to be untenable, later European influences have been at work, and Mr. Andrew Lang has found clear traces of Irish, French, and a few Anglo-American strains in many of the Passamaquoddy legends. Still, Prof. J. D. Prince, of Columbia University, holds that what is genuinely native 'stands forth with unmistakable distinctness in some of the Kulóskap tales,' that is, the witchcraft and other stories recorded in *Kulóskap the Master*, the joint work of himself and Mr. Leland. A. H. KEANE.

# ABORTION.—See FÆTICIDE.

ABOULIA.—A mental disorder characterized by loss of volitional control over action or thought. There are three general types of *aboulia*. (1) In the purely ideational field it may occur as a result of the loss of inhibitive powers or of control of attention. In such cases, when a motive or impulse appears in consciousness with a preponderating force, there is an ill-balanced tendency to immediate action. The suggestion is without natural check, and rash and inconsiderate execution of it follows. The limiting cases of such disorder (sometimes termed *hyperboulia*) are to be found in the obsessions of fixed ideas, in hypnotic suggestion, etc., where the force of the suggested idea is so strong that there is no consciousness of competitive motor impulse (and hence none of volition). (2) Distinguished from this, but still in the ideational field, is *aboulia* which takes the form of extreme hesitancy. Where a series of ideas or impulses is presented to consciousness as alternatives,—that is, with equal or nearly equal suggestive power,—the loss of ability to inhibit prevents selection, and irresolution and failure to act at all are the result. It is probable that conduct which is often interpreted as extreme scrupulousness, or conscientiousness in affairs of no real moral moment, taking the form of indecision, is merely a manifestation of this type of *aboulia*. (3) *Aboulia* due to ideomotor derangement should be sharply discriminated from the preceding. It is due not to failure to make rational choice, but to inability to execute the choice made. Its psychical form is failure of the kinæsthetic equivalent, or motor image adequate to action, and its physiological basis is probably lesion or loss of tone in the association tracts. It shows itself in a sort of muscular stammering, repeated efforts being required to perform some ordinarily easy action. *Aboulia* is a characteristic neurasthenic condition, appearing in connexion with multiple personality, automatism, etc. It is the natural pre-condition of excessive susceptibility to suggestion.

LITERATURE.—Ribot, *Les maladies de la volonté* (1883); Janet, *Névroses et déviations* (1893); Duprat, *Morale* (1903); Jastrow, *The Subconscious* (1906). H. B. ALEXANDER.

**ABRAHAM-MEN.**—A class of sturdy beggars, who feigned to have been mad, and to have been kept in Bedlam for a term of years. 'Bedlam'—a lunatic asylum or madhouse—is a contraction for *Bethlehem*, the name of a religious house in London, founded as a priory in 1247, and in 1547 converted into a hospital for lunatics. Originally 'Abraham man' or 'Abraham cove' denoted an inmate of the lunacy ward under the patronage of the patriarch Abraham. On discharge from hospital he wore a badge for identification, and was formally permitted to roam the country as a 'Tom o' Bedlam' and solicit alms.

This character was personated by vagabonds and sturdy rogues, who wandered over England in a disorderly manner, feigning lunacy and preying upon the charitable. Hence the slang phrase, 'to sham Abraham.' Where begging failed they did not hesitate to live by pilfering, and, when detected in any depredation, they would plead the immunities and privileges of a Bedlamite. The character is common in Shakespeare's time, and seems to have survived till the period of the Civil Wars.

For a specimen of the language and demeanour of the Abraham-men, see speech of Edgar in *King Lear*, Act ii. sc. 3; for synonyms, Beaumont and Fletcher's *Beggars Bush*, ii. sc. 1:—

'And these, what name or title e'er they bear,  
Jackman, or Patricio, Cranke, or Clappier-dudgeon,  
Fraier, or Abram-man, I speak to all!'

Cl. Awdeley's *Fraternity of Vagabonds*, 1565: 'An Abraham man is he that walketh bare-armed and bare-legged, and faineth himself mad, and carryeth a pack of wool, or a stycke with baken on it, or such lyke toy, and nameth himself "Poor Tom" (ed. Early Eng. Text Soc. p. 3). See also Dekker's *Belman of London*, 1608: 'Of all the mad rascalls the Abraham man is the most phantastick. . . . The fellow that sat half naked (at table to-day) is the best Abraham man that ever came into my house, the notablest villain: he swears he hath been in Bedlam, and will you see pinnes stuck in sundry places in his arms . . . only to make you . . . he calls himself by the name of

Poore Tom. . . . Of these Abraham men some be exceeding merry, and doe nothing but sing songs: some will dance: other will doe nothing but laugh or weep: other are dogged and so sullen both in look and speech, that, spying but small company in a house, they boldly and bluntly enter, compelling the servants through fear to give them what they demand, which is commonly bacon or something that will yield ready money.'

The great authority is Harman's *Caveat, or Warning for Common Corsetors*, 2nd ed., 1567. W. W. FULTON.

**ABRAVANEL (or ABARBANEL)**, Isaac (1437–1508).—Statesman and author, Don Isaac Abravanel shared in the general expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492. He had been in the service of King Alfonso v. of Portugal and Queen Isabella of Castile, and after his banishment acted as finance minister in the states of Naples and Venice. His fame now rests chiefly on his Commentaries on the Bible. He wrote on the Pentateuch, the Historical Books, and the Prophets, but not on the Hagio-grapha. Among the characteristics of his Commentaries, mention must be made first of his general prefaces to the various books. In this respect he deserves to be considered 'a pioneer of the modern science of Bible propædæutics' (Ginzberg). In addition, his Commentaries are remarkable for the use made of the knowledge of the world which the author had acquired in the vicissitudes of his public career. He thus takes account, in his exegesis of the Biblical histories, of political conditions and social life, and attempts to explain the Bible from the standpoint of its actual contemporaries. In this respect, too, Abravanel was an innovator, for he anticipated the modern principle which relies not solely on literary exegesis, but calls into play all available historical and archeological materials. Again, Abravanel makes free use of Christian Commentaries; he quotes Jerome, Augustine, Nicholas of Lyra, Paul of Burgos, and others. Thus he deserves credit for perceiving that there is room for an unsectarian exegesis—for an exegesis which shall attempt to explain Scripture without theological prejudice.

In all these points Abravanel's services were appreciated by Christians as well as Jews. 'No less than thirty Christian writers of this period—among them men of eminence, like the younger Buxtorf, Buddeus, Carpov, and others—occupied themselves with the close study of Abravanel's exegetical writings, which they condensed and translated, and thus introduced to the world of Christian scholarship' (Ginzberg). Certainly Abravanel gains by compression, for his works are very prolix. They were often written in great haste. Thus his long Commentaries on Joshua, Judges, and Samuel occupied him only six months. Yet these Commentaries include some of his very best work.

The philosophical works of Abravanel are of less importance than the exegetical. His *Rōsh Amānah* ('Pinnacle of Faith') is a treatise which aims at dissociating Jewish theology from philosophy; he upheld, against Maimonides, the view of miraculous inspiration. His Messianic books were very popular, and were often reprinted. In these he disputes alike the views of Christian and of Jewish rationalists. His *Yeshuoth Meshicho* ('Salvation of His Anointed') is a clear and full account of the Rabbinic doctrines concerning the Messiah. Abravanel himself claimed descent from the royal house of David.

LITERATURE.—Graetz, *History of the Jews*, Eng. tr., vol. iv. ch. xi.; M. H. Friedländer, *Die Juden in Portugal*; L. Ginzberg in *Jewish* an alfab. list of A.'s w. . . . Short History of Jewish . . . ter, *Studies in Judaism* (1899), ch. on 'The Dogmas of Judaism.'

I. ABRAHAMS.

**ABRENUNTIO.**—The renunciation of the devil at baptism is a custom which goes back certainly to the 2nd century. At first, as we see from the Patristic references, the renunciation was thought of as intellectual as well as moral, as a repudiation of heathenism with its teachings as well as with its vices and abuses; while later, after the triumph of Christianity (and so at the present day), the renunciation is thought of almost entirely as moral, as a promise to lead a good life.

The custom of interrogating the candidates to see whether they really gave up heathenism and believed in Jesus Christ probably goes back to Apostolic times; it would be a necessary precaution which could scarcely be dispensed with. Perhaps the earliest certain reference to it is the gloss of Ac 8<sup>7</sup> AV, the confession of faith by the Ethiopian eunuch, which, though probably no part of the original text, is found in Irenæus and Cyprian, and must therefore reflect the usage of at least the 2nd century. It is quite probable, however, that the 'interrogation' (ἐπερώτημα, not ἐπερώτησις) of a good conscience' in 1 P 3<sup>21</sup> refers to the practice in question.

For our present purpose it is more important to know how the early Church interpreted 1 P 3<sup>21</sup> than how it was intended by its writer; but as to the early interpretation we have no evidence. The commentators vary in their views. Almost all take εἰς θεόν with συνηθισμένους ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα, and so the Peshitta ('not washing away . . . but confessing God with a clear conscience') and the Vulgate ('conscientia bona interrogatio in Deum'); some, like Alford, denying any reference to the baptismal interrogations, and rendering 'inquiry of a good conscience after God' (so RVm; cf. 2 S 11<sup>7</sup>),—but if so, one would expect ἐπερώτησις; and others taking ἐπερώτημα to be the baptismal questions, as Oecumenius (11th cent.?), Hooker (*Eccles. Pol.* v. 63), Estius (*Com. in loc.*), de Wette, and others. Dr. Bigg (*ICC, in loc.*) also upholds the reference to the baptismal questions, but gives a strong argument for taking εἰς θεόν with σῶσαι, as corresponding to εἰς ἡν ἀναβαίνοντες, just as δὲ ἀναβάσκοντες corresponds to δὲ ἕλκοντες. The translation in that case would be: ' . . . the ark into which few . . . were brought safely through water, which also after a true likeness doth now bring you safely to God, even baptism (not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the interrogation of a good conscience), through the resurrection of Jesus Christ.'

Turning to the Patristic evidence, we may notice that Justin Martyr speaks (*Apol.* i. 61) of those who are being prepared for baptism 'promising to

be able to live according [to the truth].’ The first witness for renunciations, however, is Tertullian. He says (*de Spect.* 4):—

‘When entering the water, we make profession of the Christian faith in the words of its rule, we bear public testimony that we have renounced the devil, his pomp, and his angels. Well, is it not in connexion with idolatry, above all, that you have the devil with his pomp and his angels? . . . Our renunciatory testimony in the laver of baptism has reference to the shows, which through their idolatry have been given over to the devil and his pomp and his angels.’

Elsewhere (*de Idol.* 6) he says that idol-making is prohibited to Christians by the very fact of their baptism. ‘For how have we renounced the devil and his angels if we make them?’ In *de Cor.* 3, after describing the act of disowning ‘the devil and his pomp and his angels,’ he says: ‘Hereupon we are thrice immersed, making a somewhat ampler pledge than the Lord has appointed in the Gospel.’ So in the *Canons of Hippolytus*, which probably represent Roman or Alexandrian usage early in the 3rd cent., the candidate for baptism turns to the West and says: ‘I renounce thee, Satan, with all thy pomp.’ He is then anointed by the presbyter, and before being baptized turns to the East and says: ‘I believe and bow myself in thy presence and in the presence of all thy pomp, O Father, Son, and Holy Ghost’ [for the meaning of ‘pomp’ see below]. Other 3rd cent. writers mention the interrogations, but not the renunciations in particular. Cyprian (*Ep.* lxxix. 2, [Oxford ed., lxx.] *ad Januarium*) gives the interrogations thus: ‘Dost thou believe in eternal life and remission of sins in the holy Church?’ So Firmilian (Cyprian, *Ep.* lxxiv. 10, [Oxford, lxxv.]) speaks of a prophesies in Cappadocia, 22 years before, who had baptized many, ‘making use of the usual and lawful words of interrogation.’ And Dionysius of Alexandria, writing to Pope Xystus (ap. Euseb. *HE* vii. 9), speaks of the questions and answers (τῶν ἐπερωτησέων καὶ τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ὑπακούσας). It is clear, then, that in the 3rd and probably in the 2nd cent. the candidates made an act of submission to God at baptism as well as a renunciation of the devil.

The same thing is also evident in the 4th century. The act of submission might be the recital of a creed (‘reditio symboli’), which had been taught to the candidates during their catechumenate (‘traditio symboli’); or it might be a simple formula, or both the formula and the creed. In Cyril of Jerusalem (*Cat. Lect.* xix. 2-9) we read of the candidate first facing West, because ‘the West is the region of sensible darkness,’ and Satan, ‘being darkness, has his dominion also in darkness,’ whereas the East is ‘the place of light.’ He says, stretching out his hand: ‘I renounce thee, Satan, and all thy works, and all thy\* pomp, and all thy service (or worship, λατρεία).’ The word ‘pomp’ is explained as being the shows, horse races, hunting, and all such vanity; the word ‘service’ as idolatry, prayer in idol temples, etc. Then the candidate faces East and says: ‘I believe in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost, and in one baptism of repentance,’ and is anointed and baptized. The renunciation and submission are pronounced in the outer chamber; the anointing and baptism follow in the baptistery, where the candidate is again asked whether he believes in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost (xx. 4). It does not appear that at Jerusalem in Cyril’s time the Creed was recited at baptism. Of the 4th cent. *Church Orders* we may first cite the Egyptian and Ethiopic *Orders*, which are almost alike. The candidate says: ‘I renounce thee, Satan, and all thy service and all thy works’ (Ethiopic: ‘all thy angels and all thy unclean works’); he is then anointed, and a long

\* Cyril has ‘his’ here, probably by error.

creed takes the place of the formula of submission. Turning to the West and East is not mentioned in these two *Church Orders*. In the corresponding part of the *Verona Latin Fragments of the Didascalia* (ed. Hauler) there is a lacuna. In the *Testament of our Lord* (ii. 8) the candidate turns to the West and says: ‘I renounce thee, Satan, and all thy service (lit. ‘military service’), and thy shows (lit. ‘theatres’), and thy pleasures, and all thy works.’ After being anointed, he turns to the East and says: ‘I submit to thee, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,’ etc.\* In the *Apostolic Constitutions* the form is somewhat different (vii. 41). The renunciation is: ‘I renounce (ἀπορρέσκω) Satan, and his works, and his pomps, and his workshops, and his angels, and his inventions, and all things that are under him.’ This is immediately followed by the act of submission: ‘I associate myself (συγγενομαι) with Christ, and believe and am baptized into one unbegotten Being,’ etc. (a long creed); then come the anointing and baptism. Turning to the West and East is not mentioned; but later, after confirmation, the neophyte is directed to ‘pray towards the East’ (vii. 44). We have some confirmatory evidence from other 4th cent. writers. St. Basil (*de Spir. Sancto*, xi. [27]) says: ‘[Apostates] have set at naught their own confessions . . . belief in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost, when they renounced the devil and his angels, and uttered those saving words.’ The *Pilgrimage of Siltia* (or of *Etheria*) does not mention the renunciation, but says that the ‘reditio symboli’ was made publicly. Pseudo-Ambrose in *de Sacramentis* (ii. 7, c. 400 A.D.) also does not mention the renunciation, but gives the interrogations at the time of the trine immersion: ‘Dost thou believe in God the Father Almighty?’—‘Dost thou believe also in our Lord Jesus Christ and in His cross?’—‘Dost thou believe in the Holy Ghost?’

When the candidates were too young to make the answers to the interrogations and to say the renunciations themselves, this was done for them by the sponsor, or the parents, or a relation (*Canons of Hippolytus*, 113; *Egyptian Church Order*, § 46; *Testament of our Lord*, ii. 8; for sponsors see also Tertullian, *de Bapt.* 18, and the allusion to them—‘inde suscepti’—in *de Cor.* 3).

The custom of renouncing the devil has persistently remained. Duchesne (*Origines du culte chrétien*, Eng. tr. [*Christian Worship*] p. 304), gives the form long in use at Rome. At the seventh and last scrutiny, after the ‘Efleta’ and anointing on the breast and back, the candidate was asked: ‘Dost thou renounce Satan?’—‘And all his works?’—‘And all his pomps?’ To each question he answered, ‘I renounce (abrenuntio).’ The candidate recited the Creed publicly, but in the 8th cent. the priest recited it for him.

In the Gallican use, the candidate, facing West, was asked: ‘Dost thou renounce Satan, the pomps of the world and its pleasures?’ The candidate replied, entered the font, and answered a threefold interrogatory on the faith with ‘I believe,’ and was baptized (*Missale Gallicanum*, see Duchesne, *op. cit.* p. 324).

In the *Sarum Manual* the renunciations were as at Rome (see above); after the anointing the priest asks the candidate a threefold interrogatory which is a short form of the Apostles’ Creed, to each part of which he answers ‘I believe,’ and the baptism follows (Maskell, *Monumenta*, i. 22f.).

The custom in the Eastern Churches is much the same as in the West. In the Orthodox Eastern Church the renunciations come in the ‘Office for

\* In the *Testament*, the *Verona Fragments*, and in the *Canons of Hippolytus*, a form of the Apostles’ Creed is put before the candidates in the shape of three questions at the act of baptism.

Making a Catechumen,' which is separate from the baptismal service. The candidate, or (if he be a 'barbarian or a child') his sponsor, is asked thrice: 'Dost thou renounce Satan, and all his works, and all his angels, and all his service, and all his pomp?' and answers: 'I renounce.' He is thrice asked: 'Hast thou renounced Satan?' and answers: 'I have renounced,' and is bidden to blow upon him and spit upon him. Then he is thrice asked: 'Dost thou join Christ?' The Nicene Creed follows here, and after some repetition of the same question the candidate says: 'I bow myself to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost, to the consubstantial and undivided Trinity' (Shann, *Book of Needs*, p. 19; Littledale, *Offices of the H. E. Church*, p. 134). In the Armenian baptismal rite the catechumen says: 'We (*sic*) renounce thee, Satan, and all thy deceitfulness, and thy wiles, and thy service, and thy paths, and thy angels.' He is asked, with some repetition, if he believes in the Holy Trinity, and the Nicene Creed is said in full (Conybeare-Maclean, *Rituale Armenorum*, p. 92; Denzinger, *Ritus Orientalium*, i. 385, also p. 392, where there is a longer profession of belief). The Coptic and Ethiopic customs are almost the same (Denzinger, i. 198, 223; see a shorter form at p. 234, where the renunciation is explained as a purely moral one, without reference to heathenism). For the Jacobite Syrians see Denzinger, i. 273, 321 (the latter is the 'rite of St. Basil'). In the 6th cent. James of Edessa describes the catechumens as renouncing 'Satan and all that belong to him,' and as professing their belief (*ib.* i. 279); and Severus of Antioch gives the form as, 'I renounce Satan, and all his angels, and all his works, and all his worship,' followed by an act of submission (*ib.* p. 304). For the Maronites see Denzinger, i. 340, 354. In all these rites the turning to the West and East is emphasized, and the acts of renunciation and of submission are recorded.

*Meaning of 'pomp.'*—The word *πομπή* (from *εμπεμναι*) means properly 'a sending under an escort,' and so 'a company,' and then 'a solemn procession' (Liddell and Scott). It was taken into Latin (*pompā*) as meaning 'a procession,' and so (a) 'a train' or 'suite,' and (b) 'parade,' 'display.' Both these last meanings are found in the formulas of renunciation. In Tertullian and the *Canons of Hippolytus* the meaning is apparently neutral, 'a retinue'; it is used in the *Canon* in a good sense, 'the pomp (i.e. retinue) of God' (see above). But from the 4th cent. the bad sense of the word, 'display,' 'pride,' comes to the front, as in Cyril of Jerusalem and the later *Church Orders*; the plural is often used with this meaning to this day in the phrase 'pomp and vanities of this wicked world' of the Book of Common Prayer. A late Latin usage of *pompā* is recorded by Ducange; it was used for a kind of cake given on Christmas Eve by sponsors to their godchildren until they grew up, apparently (says Ducange, *s.v.*) to remind them of their having renounced the pomps of the devil.

Thus we see a most persistent survival of a formula which dates back at least to the 2nd century. The case is exactly parallel with the survival of the *Sursum Corda* in the Eucharistic Liturgy. There is, however, one exception to the universal use of the Renunciation. The Nestorians or Eastern Syrians appear not to have it. Their baptismal service is drawn up in a form closely resembling the Eucharistic Liturgy, with lections, creed, *Sursum Corda*, invocation, etc., and presents many unique features. The Renunciation among the Nestorians probably formed part of a separate office (as in many other Churches), and this office has now perished and the Renunciation with it. But the Nicene Creed, recited in the baptismal service on the analogy of the Liturgy, serves the purpose of a profession of faith.

A. J. MACLEAN.

**ABSOLUTE.**—1. *Meaning of the term.*—The term 'absolute' (*absolutum* = 'unrestricted,' 'set free,' and hence what can subsist by itself in that condition, what is complete as it stands) is used either as an adjective or as a substantive, and, in

either case, takes on a variety of allied but distinct meanings. It seems probable that the adjectival use is grammatically prior. One of the first writers to use the term is Cicero, who (in *de Finibus*) employs it to describe a characteristic of the blessed life, and also a form of necessity. As an adjective it may be predicated of any substantive which has or can have the qualification of subsisting by itself. This qualification may be given either negatively, in the form of the absence of all relation of dependence on anything else; or positively, when stress is laid on its internal coherence and self-sufficiency. We find it employed not merely in philosophy, but in science and in everyday experience. Characteristic uses in science are, *e.g.*, 'absolute temperature,' 'absolute alcohol,' 'absolute position,' or again 'absolute space.' In common thought it is found in the expressions 'absolute fact,' 'absolutely false.' As a substantive it is primarily a philosophical term, and is in general used to designate the basis or fundamental principle of all reality, that which in some sense is or contains all the variety that exists. It is with the philosophical use of the term that we are mainly concerned here; but it will be of service to introduce the discussion of its philosophical significance by a general analysis of its various meanings.

The meaning of the term may be brought out negatively or positively, or both. Sometimes one is emphasized, sometimes another, as circumstances require. This is possible, because the term has, even etymologically, a negative nuance, and a negative qualification implies a positive ground. In general, it seems safe to say that the negative aspect is the more prominent. That is 'absolute' which does not require for its existence, or for its meaning, that supplementary facts or factors should be brought into consideration. And any one using the term will in general be satisfied to take it as simply equivalent to 'without qualification,' i.e. without positive relation to something which lies beyond what is described or stated, and limits or restricts its meaning. In such a case, what is spoken of as 'absolute' can appear in a variety of settings, and yet be unaffected by the process. This is always implied when the negative character is emphasized. What is absolute is not merely so at a given time and in given circumstances; but, however it is shifted about, it will remain permanently what it is, it will preserve its content, and defy internal alteration by external associations. 'Absolute' here means simply out of relation. An example is the expression 'absolute freedom,' as employed, *e.g.*, by indeterminists. Sometimes this is true only up to a certain point; sometimes it is held to be true indefinitely. Thus, when it is said that such and such is an 'absolute fact' or is 'absolutely true,' it is not always implied that, no matter where the 'fact' is placed, it will remain unaltered, but that within a certain range of reality or range of truth it will defy alteration. It is clear that something particular may be, in this sense, quite legitimately spoken of as an 'absolute fact,' *e.g.* 'the accident is an absolute fact,' i.e. something that has an independent place of its own in a certain range of history, no matter whether we look at it in association with other particular events or not. Of course, when we go beyond a certain range, and put this 'accident' in a wide and comprehensive system, its individual independence will disappear, and we shall then in general speak of it, not as an 'absolute fact,' but as one whose nature and meaning are constituted by other related elements. There are, however, aspects or factors of experience to which the adjective 'absolute' could and would be applied indefinitely. When we speak, for example, of an Absolute Being, Absolute Reality, here it is implied that no amount of change



of relation whatsoever will alter its permanent independence. In the long run, as we shall see, this is the only consistent form in which the term can be used, and is indeed the basis for all other uses of it. But, when describing common usage, it is desirable to indicate other ways in which the term is employed.

This independence of alteration by external association, to which we have referred, already contains within its negative expression the positive character which the term 'absolute' also possesses, and which in certain cases is more particularly emphasized. By 'absolute' is then meant that quality in virtue of which an object can stand by itself, has an internal constitution of its own, is controlled and determined from within by its very nature. This positive character is really the ground of that negative meaning above described; and the latter is in strictness inseparable from the other. But for certain purposes it is of importance to lay special stress on the positive character *per se*. In this case, the term 'absolute' refers to what is included rather than to what is excluded; to the inner nature of the object so qualified rather than to its possible relation to other objects; to its individual constitution rather than to its connexion with other individuals. Examples of this use would be such expressions as an 'absolute system,' an 'absolute unit,' 'absolute equality.' This positive significance may be taken in specifically different senses. It may refer simply to what, in virtue of the internal constitution of the object, can stand by itself or hold good; and we may know its internal constitution so completely as to justify us in applying the term 'absolute' to it. This is one meaning of the expression, 'Such and such an absolute possibility,' or 'absolutely possible.' Its contents, the predicates we can apply to the object, are internally consistent. This is the least we can say of anything which we can think—its lowest claim to be something *per se*. This is 'absolute' as opposed to 'relative.' On the other hand, we may mean that the object maintains its being, not in spite of relation to all other things, but in every possible relation to other objects in which it may stand. We may compare it with other objects as we please, may subject it to any condition, and find its meaning unaffected. This is 'absolute' as opposed to 'comparative.' The expression 'absolutely possible,' in this sense, is the utmost we can say of anything when taken by itself. Other examples of this sense are: the 'absolute impenetrability' of matter; 'absolute dominion' over individuals in a society; 'absolute simplicity' of physical elements; an 'absolute subject,' i.e. a subject which, in every possible sphere, remains a subject, and cannot be a predicate of anything. Sometimes, indeed, we may use the term to cover simultaneously both of the forms of its positive meaning. But in general they would not be true together; for while, e.g., the least we could say of anything can also be said of it if we first state the most we can say of it, the reverse of this would not be true. The expression, an 'Absolute Being,' taken positively, is a case in point. Another, and an important positive use of the term, is when it is employed to designate not what has being simply by itself, or what maintains its being in every possible relation, but what is the ultimate ground of all possible relations. This is the meaning often attached to the expression 'Absolute Reality.' The use of the term 'Absolute Space' to signify that which is the ground of the possibility of all determinate spatial relations, of phenomena appearing in spatial form, is another example. Here 'absolute' is nearly equivalent to 'ultimate,' or the logical prius. The object in question here contains all relations, and is absolute in that sense. In the other positive senses an object

was absolute either as existing by itself in spite of relation, or as subsisting throughout all relation.

The foregoing analysis of the negative and positive significance of the term has already, no doubt, indicated that neither sense alone is really adequate as a complete expression of its meaning. Each is in strictness one-sided. Indeed, each implies the other, and is more or less consciously present when, for certain purposes, stress is laid on one side rather than another. It is clear that 'absolute,' in the sense of 'out of relation,' 'without qualification,' is predicable of a particular object only in virtue of relation. A negative relation is still a relation, and a relation cannot exist unless both terms constituting it are affected and involved. Strictly, 'absolute' is never meant to convey that the object is really outside all relation; but either that the effect of the relation may be ignored or that the object has so secure a place in a general system, that the whole system stands and falls with its individual subsistence. Thus, when a particular statement is said to be 'absolutely true,' we shall find that one or other of these assumptions is made. But it is evident that 'absolute' in this sense really implies relations which are merely unexpressed. In short, since 'absolute,' negatively considered, means simply *without* the qualifications which specific relations would bring, these qualifications, and therefore these relations, must be *there* to give it its meaning. Relation thus enters into the constitution of the term in its negative aspect; and, with it, the positive content which the term related must possess to enter into a relation at all. In the limiting case, when by hypothesis there is no other term with which to constitute a relation, the positive aspect explicitly coincides completely with the negative. This is found when we speak of the 'absolute whole.'

Similarly, when we take the positive meaning by itself and apply it to a specific object, it contains, as part of its significance, a reference to other objects. An object cannot be conceived as something in *itself* without *ipso facto* implying a distinction from other things. What it is in itself logically implies others from which it is at least abstracted in order to be by itself. This is still more obvious when, as in the case, e.g., of 'absolute simplicity' above mentioned, it is what it 'absolutely' is only through relation to other things. The same is true again when it is the 'ultimate ground' of other things. In the limiting case the positive explicitly coincides with its negative, when the reality contains all possible otherness, and is in itself, not through others, but through itself.

If, then, the negative meaning in this way implies the positive and *vice versa*, we seem forced to the conclusion that what is really involved in either use of the term is the whole which contains both aspects, and that this alone is truly absolute. For, between them, positive and negative in strictness exhaust all that is to be said. When we predicate the term 'absolute' positively or negatively, it is implied that there is no restriction as to what is excluded or included. Absolute in the sense of, e.g., without qualification, is in principle unrestricted in its range of negations. If, therefore, the positive, fully understood, involves the entirety of what is negated and conversely, this means that it is a whole, and one and the same whole, that is implied in every use of the term 'absolute.' This whole, then, is what the use of the term 'absolute' in any given case refers to, and this alone is absolute. If this is not admitted, we are bound to conclude that the predicate 'absolute' is in every case through and through affected by relativity. But a relative absolute is a contradic-

tion in terms; and if this is meant, we must give up the use of the term altogether, except as a way of being emphatic. Otherwise we must accept the view that in every strict use of the term it is logically a single whole that is involved, and that this is alone absolute.

The above analysis certainly compels us to accept this interpretation. If we admit it, we can at once give a logically valid meaning to the use of the term in its positive form and in its negative form. For in either case it means that the object so qualified has a necessary place in the one whole, and that without it also the whole would not be what it is. Or, in other words, the whole and the parts stand together. The predication of the term 'absolute' of any specific part is thus merely our way of affirming our conviction of its necessary place in the one totality, the one systematic unity. The whole being the absolute, each part, of whose place in it we are assured, can be 'absolutized.' And this is done by us in a negative or a positive way according to circumstances. If we apply this interpretation to any current use of the term, we shall find that it gives an intelligible and justifiable meaning to the idea we have in mind. The denial of this view involves the denial of all absoluteness in experience. This is the position of those who maintain the doctrine of thoroughgoing *Relativity*.

2. Philosophical application of the term.—So far we have merely considered the various uses of the term, and have not considered the application of the conception of absoluteness to specific philosophical problems. There are two such problems which are historically important and philosophically fundamental: (1) the problem of absoluteness in human knowledge, which raises in part the question of the 'relativity of knowledge'; (2) the problem of the Absolute in metaphysics. We must deal with each of these separately, so far as they can be separated.

1. *ABSOLUTE AS APPLIED TO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE*.—There are two distinct ways in which the term 'absolute' may be applied to human knowledge. Both start from the position that in all knowledge we aim at an ideal, and that the consummation of our knowledge would be the explicit articulation of that ideal in systematic form. The term 'ideal,' however, may or may not be used, and may be variously interpreted.

(a) We may call it 'complete' truth, and regard this as the complete 'agreement' of our thoughts with the 'nature of things.' If we attempt to express with systematic fulness what this ideal as such contains, to give in some sense the whole truth, the knowledge so supplied would be spoken of as 'absolute' knowledge. In general it is also implied that in such a case we are at the point of view of the whole ideal as such; that we do not rise to it gradually and give the content of the ideal at the end of our journey, so to speak, but rather that we start our exposition of what the ideal contains by occupying at the outset the position of an absolute knowing mind. We interpret the ideal as an objective system of truth in virtue of our taking up an objective or trans-individualistic attitude, where all the perspective of specific individual minds is eliminated. This point of view is essential, because an ideal of knowledge in this sense involves the disappearance of finite qualifications and reservations.

This conception of absolute knowledge may be regarded in two ways. (a) It has been taken to mean an exposition of the general elements constituting the supreme or whole truth, a systematic development of the fundamental conceptions or principles involved in, and making possible, the different forms of knowledge. Spinoza's *Ethics* or Hegel's *Logic* would be an illustration of absolute

knowledge in this sense. (β) It has also been taken to mean an exposition of the whole truth both in its general content and in its particular details—a system, in fact, not simply of principles, but of conceptions with their details in all their manifold form. Absolute knowledge in this sense has generally been considered impossible of achievement, and certainly there is no historical example of a single system which claims to give so much. These two senses of the term 'absolute knowledge' may be conveniently characterized in the language of a recent philosophical work (Laurie's *Synthetica*) as, respectively, knowledge which gives a 'synthesis of the absolute,' and knowledge which gives an 'absolute synthesis.'

(b) Another use of the term as applied to knowledge is found when we speak of knowledge in a given case being 'absolute knowledge,' or conveying 'absolute truth.' This need not refer directly or even at all to any absolute system of knowledge. It can be applied to any case where, as we sometimes say, we are 'absolutely certain,' or where the judgment does not contradict itself or any other judgment. From this point of view, many or most of the judgments making up our knowledge can be spoken of as absolute, whether the knowledge be given in the form of a scientific statement, like 'two and two are four'; or even in the case of a judgment of perception: 'this paper is white.' The latter may be said to be 'absolutely true,' to convey as absolute knowledge of this specific area of perceptive experience, as the former type of judgment. Indeed, the assertion of any ultimate fact, from this point of view, becomes an 'absolute truth,' a case of 'absolute knowledge'; and all the steps in the attainment of the complete truth, the complete systematic ideal of knowledge, are at least capable of being characterized in this way, whether we ever attain to the complete system or not. Hence the term can be applied in this second sense to knowledge without any implication of the possibility of 'absolute knowledge' in the first sense. Indeed, it may be denied in the latter sense, and asserted only in the former.

In considering the question as to the validity of the idea of absolute knowledge, we have to bear in mind this difference in the use and application of the term. It may, no doubt, be said with some truth that absolute in the second sense really implies in the long run the admission of absolute in the first sense. But, at any rate, that is not explicitly maintained, and can even be fairly denied. This comes out in the controversy between 'absolute' and 'relative' truth. It is often held that all our knowledge is relative to us, and therefore absolute knowledge is impossible to man. By this is meant that the attainment of an 'absolute system of truth' is impossible, and not that our knowledge, 'so far as it goes,' is not absolutely true. Thus relativity of knowledge may be maintained along with the assertion that we do possess absolutely valid knowledge. This is in general the position of the narrowly scientific mind. Relativity may, indeed, also be asserted of all forms of our knowledge. In this case absolute knowledge is denied in both senses of the term. Relativity, then, logically leads either to pure scepticism or to individualistic anthropomorphism. It is thus important, in discussing the 'relativity' of knowledge, to determine both what kind of relativity is asserted and with what kind of absoluteness it stands in contrast. Nothing but confusion can result, e.g., when defending relativity in opposition to absoluteness of knowledge, if one disputant is using 'absolute' in the first sense and the other in the second.

*Justification of (a).*—The argument in defence of absolute knowledge, in the sense of a complete



system of the fundamental conceptions constituting the ideal of knowledge, rests on the simple proposition that knowledge as such can be an object of knowledge. When knowledge is itself an object of consideration, all that it implies must be offered up without reserve for critical analysis. If this cannot be done, the discussion of knowledge as such is futile; for to assert at the outset that we can know only a part of an object which we set out to know, is to check our knowledge in advance by the hand of scepticism. We should never attempt to know any object if we consciously assumed as a fact that in its entirety it could not be known. The edge would be taken off the seriousness of the problem at once, and neither common sense nor the scientific mood would sanction the effort. But, indeed, it would require an interpretation of knowledge to prove such an assumption to be valid: and hence this hypothesis may be dismissed as logically impossible, because self-contradictory. But if knowledge as such can be an object of knowledge, it must have the rounded completeness of a determinate object to justify the attempt. That completeness lies in the ideal unity of knowledge and nowhere else. This ideal, therefore, must be capable of analysis, of criticism, and, because a unity, of systematic expression. It may very well be that we are incapable of exhausting its content in all its manifold detail. For the limitation of our command over the particulars of our experience is one form in which finitude of intelligence appears. There still remain, however, the ground principles which constitute the general or typical forms in which the unity of knowledge is specifically realized. These we may grasp and systematically arrange. They may be as general, and as numerous, or as few, as the growth of the various sciences and the advancement of human intellectual activity determine. But, as such, they are an expression in every case of the general forms in which this ultimate unity is realized. To state in some connected way, therefore, the constituent general conceptions which the ideal unity of knowledge contains, is always a possible achievement. That ideal unity is at once the logically implied beginning and the final end of all knowledge in its various forms. The knowledge of it is the self-knowledge of knowledge; and that is absolute knowledge in both the negative and positive senses of the term 'absolute.' This kind of knowledge may, of course, be supplied in different ways, and with different degrees of success. These must always vary with the variation which is at once the privilege and the limitation of the individual thinker. But such peculiarities do not concern the question as to the possibility of truly achieving the result. What relation exists between the various forms which absolute knowledge in this sense has historically assumed, is a further question, which lies beyond that of the justification of its possibility.

*Justification of (b).*—The position that knowledge may be absolute without being at the same time a finished system, or without at least waiting till a finished system is obtained, rests on different grounds. It is maintained that every true judgment is absolute as knowledge, just as it stands. An isolated judgment is absolutely valid without any other judgment being implied to guarantee or ratify its truth. The addition of other judgments may or may not modify its truth, but it will only be in so far as it is *not* true that it is capable of supplementation. And, even at the worst, this will always leave what truth it does contain unaffected. It is maintained that this does not involve relativity in the sense of scepticism or individualism; for there is a distinction between a judgment which stands in a relation and judgment which is relatively valid.

The first may, in virtue of the internal coherence of its content, hold a necessary and unalterable place in a series, or in a whole, from which it is inseparable; in the second, the content is incompletely determined, and therefore the judgment is only approximately coherent: its stability is liable to be disturbed by external agencies. The first may well be described as absolute, since, on the one hand, such judgments are not subject to alteration, but only to supplementation; and, on the other, it is out of such judgments that any system, even one claiming to be the complete ideal, has to be built up, if there is to be a system at all. Such judgments do not require to wait for the complete system to be evolved before claiming to be absolute, and hence, it is held, they possess that character whether or not the system be ever arrived at. A type of these judgments is found in mathematical truth; but, indeed, any scientific judgment tends to claim this attribute. That such judgments may be absolute *per se*, can also be justified by pointing out that, even if it be a system that makes them in the long run absolutely true by giving them a place in the absolute system, then each is absolutely valid at least by means of it, and may therefore legitimately be spoken of as an absolute judgment. A system must be a system of different parts, and the character of the whole is present in each part. This, however, would not justify the claim to regard each as absolute independently of a system. For it seems clearly paradoxical to maintain that a judgment can be absolute both because of its place in a system and yet *in spite of* that system. It is only in the case of certain judgments that the attribute can be applied. And it will be found that only when a judgment has an individuality of its own does it possess that completeness and internal coherence which justify the use of the term 'absolute.' Individuality, however, is precisely the characteristic of system, whether the range of the system be all-comprehensive or not. Moreover, it is impossible to state a judgment which is definite and restricted in meaning without at the same time by implication excluding from its content other equally definite judgments. What it does *not* say determines its meaning as well as what it does affirm. To be, therefore, completely true, it involves and is maintained by a wider whole than it *explicitly* asserts.

II. *THE ABSOLUTE IN METAPHYSICS.*—This must be treated apart from the question just considered. The term is applied in metaphysics to the whole of 'Reality,' and whether or not it is true that knowledge contains or covers all Reality, certainly it is true that Reality as a whole includes knowledge.

Hitherto the term has been discussed mainly as an attribute of a subject. In metaphysics it is used as a subject of all possible predication, and therefore itself incapable of being a predicate. The transition to the substantive use of the term is fairly obvious. It consists simply in transforming a supreme quality into the name for the supreme subject of all qualities, much as is done in the case of 'cause'; for example, when we speak of the 'first cause.' When we use the term 'absolute' in this connexion, we have in mind primarily the general ideas of 'all-containing,' 'ultimate,' in the sense of logical prius, the 'one ground of all finitude,' and such like,—all of them, in the long run, implying that the Reality so described combines in itself those positive and negative characteristics above mentioned. The Absolute so understood may be said to be the vaguest of terms, and little better than meaningless. But that criticism is over hasty, since it is the aim of a metaphysical theory to determine what the full meaning of the

term is; and obviously that meaning cannot be given in the mere description of the signification of a word, which can in point of fact be used by a great variety of theories. Indeed, to regard the term as wholly and essentially indeterminate, is legitimately possible only as the result of a theory.

When the Absolute, then, is said to be the object-matter of metaphysics, we have to understand the term as the designation of the one all-inclusive uniting principle of whatever experience contains. From the point of view of metaphysical knowledge it is, at least to begin with, little or nothing more than the existential counterpart of the unity of experience, which such knowledge postulates as a precondition of its progress, and the elucidation of which constitutes the achievement of the aim and ideal of metaphysics. It is therefore at the outset quite colourless; any more definite specification of its nature is possible only in virtue of a metaphysical theory. Thus for metaphysics it is simply a problem, and not an assumption, whether the Absolute is 'personal' or a 'cause,' or 'real' or an 'appearance,' or all or none of these. Only metaphysical inquiry can determine legitimately how far the Absolute contains any of these features, and which of them, if any, it is primarily. It is evident that this must be so, when we reflect that if it were not true, the mere meaning of the Absolute would give a solution to all metaphysical questions. Certainly we sometimes find more, and sometimes less, imported into the idea. But if this is done *before* the inquiry, we must regard the fact as merely a peculiarity of the thinker, which does not affect the principle here laid down; while, if it is done at the *end* of the inquiry, that is quite legitimate, a necessary result, indeed, of having a theory at all.

If we bear this in mind, we can see at once the distinction between the metaphysical conception of the Absolute and the religious idea of God. The latter always involves personality—at least, spirituality in some form or other; the former does not. Both name the whole, and the same whole. But whereas religion is bound to do it by a certain category, to satisfy certain human needs, metaphysics is not committed to any category at all. It may well be that the legitimate conclusion of metaphysics satisfies the demands of the religious consciousness. But it may not. Hence the possibility of conflict between the two, which we find historically as a fact. In the long run, the term 'God' in religion and 'the Absolute' in metaphysics must, if the religious mood is valid, be the same in meaning; if not, one of them will inevitably condemn the claims of the other, for both seek to express the same whole. But it has to be borne in mind at the outset, that while the God of religion must be the Absolute, the Absolute of metaphysics may or may not be conceived of as the God that will satisfy the religious mind: that will depend entirely on how the Absolute is interpreted by metaphysics.

The metaphysical problem, then, regarding the Absolute, resolves itself into the question how to conceive the nature of the principle which is at once single and realized in the manifold ways that make up experience. The problem is one of interpretation, not of discovery; for it is assumed that knowledge by which we conceive and think the nature of the Absolute itself falls within its compass. To try to demonstrate the actual existence of the Absolute, which a process of discovery seeks to do, is thus logically absurd. At the same time, since the knowledge, which interprets, falls by hypothesis within the one-all, the relatively subordinate question, regarding the relation between our knowledge and the whole

which contains it, may well press for solution before the interpretation of the whole in the strict sense is given. Thus, in general, the metaphysical problem is found to have two parts—(1) The relation of our knowledge to the Absolute; (2) the nature of the principle constituting the Absolute.

(1) *Relation of knowledge to Absolute Reality.*—On this point different views have been held. We must be content here to indicate the source of these differences.

(a) In the first place, it is held that, because our knowledge falls within the whole, is a factor or process in it, and works by its own peculiar conditions, it is not merely unequal to grasping the whole, but that it is logically meaningless to attempt the task. We can think it possible only by making the Absolute a part with which our knowledge, as another part, stands in relation. But the Absolute, being the whole, cannot logically be treated as a part in any sense. Or the same position is maintained when it is said that the unity of the whole cannot be itself an object for the subject thinking or knowing. The distinction between subject and object is fundamental for knowledge, and the object must in some sense be 'given' to the subject before it can be known. But a whole which *includes* by hypothesis the subject cannot be presented or given in this way. Therefore the Absolute cannot be known consistently with the nature and naming of knowledge. And since there is no other way of knowing than by way of a relation between subject and object, the attempt to know the Absolute in any sense is logically impossible.

The issue here is what may be called metaphysical agnosticism resting on the basis of epistemological 'criticism.' A recent representative of this view is Adamson (see *Development of Modern Philosophy and other Lectures*). It admits only empiricism or 'naturalism' and epistemology within the range of positive human knowledge. The line of argument against this position would be—(1) That the distinction and relation of subject and object must itself imply in some sense a unity between them, which is not simply imagined as *outside* the two terms, but is constitutive of this connexion, and necessary to it; (2) that the apprehension of this unity cannot logically be denied, asserted, or criticised by reference to the relational process which this unity constitutes; (3) that the unity is, from our point of view, an ideal; and an ideal in the nature of the case cannot be *given* or *presented* as a fact, either at the beginning of experience as such, or even at the end as such: for it determines and embraces the entire content from first to last, and must therefore be grasped in that sense.

(b) Another view of the relation of knowledge to an Absolute which contains it, is that which regards the subject-mind and its processes, among which falls knowledge, as forming an ultimate element in the unity of the whole. The other element, in itself generically distinct from the former, may be described as the object world of 'nature' and natural processes. These two between them exhaust the content of the Absolute so far as our experience is concerned. The Absolute *per se* is not one any more than the other; it is both, but may be either one or other. In any case it is known only in and through these aspects or appearances; but it still has a nature of its own behind the appearances, its being *per se*. Our knowledge belongs to and has to do with the sphere of appearances only. There is no ground for supposing it adequate to what the Ultimate Reality is *per se*; on the contrary, its origin and its processes necessarily

confine it to the phenomenal. Still, the absence of knowledge does not involve an entirely negative attitude to the Absolute. The mere fact that knowledge belongs to the sphere of appearance points the way towards, or indicates the need for, the actual existence of an attitude distinct from knowledge, and one which can be concerned with the Absolute *per se*. We may call this attitude belief, or mystical intuition, or what not, so long as we bear in mind that its purport is to deal with this Ultimate Reality. Hence, while from the point of view of reflexion or knowledge in its various forms, scientific or otherwise, there is no approach to the Absolute, there is a way open in another direction, and this may constitute a specific mood of our lives, the mood, *e.g.*, of religion.

This is the point of view of metaphysical agnosticism, which appeals for its justification to the anthropomorphic character of knowledge, and rests, on the one hand, upon a psychological analysis of knowledge, and, on the other, upon the necessary limitations of scientific reflexion by which alone knowledge is to be had. One of its best-known representatives in recent times is Spencer (see his *First Principles*). The argument against this view takes the form of showing (1) the radical contradiction in the twofold-aspect conception of an Ultimate Reality, in the idea of appearances *per se*, which leave the noumenal reality unrevealed, *i.e.* appearances of what does not appear; (2) that the Absolute is so far known in that it is *conceived* to have certain characteristics, and at least to be related to its appearances in a certain way; (3) that the psychological history of knowledge, and even the essential anthropomorphism of knowledge, do not necessarily prove either that Spirit may not express the Ultimate Reality more truly than Force, or that Spirit and Force have equal value as forms of the Absolute.

(c) A third view of the relation of knowledge to the Absolute finds a typical expression in the interpretation developed by Bradley in his *Appearance and Reality*. Basing his conception of knowledge partly on psychological, partly on logical and epistemological considerations, he insists that knowledge strictly understood is relational in character. It requires for its operation something given, an existential fact over against thought or the ideal process. This antithesis and duality of the terms in the process of knowledge both creates and limits the range of the value in experience of the function of reflective knowledge. It can, for example, never exhaust the given, the 'that,' without *ipso facto* destroying the very condition of its own operation and so disappearing. If it had the 'that' within itself, the operation would be both unnecessary and impossible. Since this falls without itself, there always remains, so far as reflective knowledge is concerned, a surd in our experience. The distinction between knowledge and the real never passes into an existential continuity of content. 'Knowledge is unequal to the real': it is relational, is not inherently self-complete, is not self-sufficient; it is an 'appearance' of the Absolute. Hence by reflective knowledge the Absolute cannot be expressed. But just as psychologically there is an infra-relational level of feeling-experience out of which knowledge arises, by the development of the distinction of the 'what' from the 'that,' so there is a supra-relational level of experience which transcends knowledge. This supra-relational level is akin or analogous to the infra-relational level, in that positively there is in both a direct continuity of experience, and negatively both are realized apart from the distinctions which characterize relational thought. But, while the former has the character of mere feeling, the latter consists rather of mystical insight or intuition.

At this highest level the apprehension of the Absolute as such is possible and is attained. It does not abolish the distinctions determined by the procedure of relational thought; it retains them, not, however, as distinctions, but as elements or constituents in the unique acts which characterize the intuitive apprehension of the whole as such. Hence, while the Absolute is thus beyond knowledge, it is not beyond conscious experience at its highest level. It gives us the Absolute with and in its appearances, and not apart from them.

The general objection to this view of the relation of knowledge to the Absolute is its emphasis on the discontinuity between relational and supra-relational 'thought.' It seems to refuse with one hand what it gives with the other. A supra-relational thought transcending the conditions of that critical reflexion which works by distinctions, lays itself open to the attack of sceptical negation by its very attempt to transcend it. Either it is justified or it is not. In the former case it cannot adopt the methods of systematic reflexion to defend its position; in the second, there is nothing to distinguish its attitude from caprice and mere dogmatic assertion. Moreover, even the apprehension of the 'higher unity' must prove itself coherent. But a coherent whole is a whole of parts distinct from one another and claiming recognition as distinct. The privileges of mere mysticism are inseparable from the dangers of pure individualism. From mysticism, as the professed negation of knowledge, the transition is easy to sheer scepticism, which makes the same profession.

(2) *The nature of the Absolute.*—The metaphysical interpretation of the Absolute is determined in the long run by the emphasis laid on the essential factors involved in the problem of construing its meaning. The factors are: subject in relation to object within a unity which holds those ultimate elements in their relation, whatever that relation be. The problem is to determine this unity with the elements which stand thus related. We shall merely indicate the different interpretations given, without developing those interpretations into any detailed system. The systems in all their detail constitute the various metaphysical theories which make up the history of philosophy.

(a) We may take our stand on the subject with its activity and processes, and from this basis show that the object-world falls within the range of the subject's activity, which by implication, therefore, also contains all that constitutes the unity in virtue of which object and subject are bound up together. We may accomplish this result in various ways, but the essential principle is the same. (α) We may so resolve the object into the being of the subject as to destroy even the semblance of distinction, and certainly all the opposition they may *prima facie* present. This is the position adopted by pure Solipsism. (β) We may again seek to secure to the object its claim to be distinctive, but may endeavour to show that the ground of that distinctiveness which it possesses, falls within the scope of the activity of the subject and is determined altogether by the action of the subject. This is the position of Subjective Idealism. It may take two forms. (αα) We may regard the objectivity of the object as a *fact*, and resolve its characteristic nature into ideal elements in the subject's life. This has been done primarily in the case of the external world revealed to 'outer' perception, which presents a peculiarly stubborn problem to Subjective Idealism. The historical representative of this form of Subjective Idealism is Berkeley. (ββ) On the other hand, we may regard the objectivity as a *result*, and 'deduce' it from an ultimate act of spontaneity on the part of the subject. Objectivity

is here conceived in a much wider sense than that involved in the case of the external world. It embraces all forms of objectivity, that of other selves, and society, as well as the 'outer world' found by perception. The last, in fact, is merely a particular realization of a more fundamental objectivity which we meet with primarily in the social order of 'free wills.' This more thoroughgoing and more comprehensive expression of Subjective Idealism is found in Fichte.

(b) Again, we may start from the basis of the object as such, and resolve the subject's life, and with that the unity containing subject and object, into the forms and processes of the object-world. Everything will here depend on what constituents of the object-world are regarded as ultimate and primary. This will determine the form assumed by the interpretation. The strongest case historically has been made for the theory which takes physical matter and physical energy as the fundamental elements with which we have to deal. The developed expression of this view takes the form of what is called variously *Materialism*, *Naturalism*, or *Physical Realism*.

(c) Once more, we may start explicitly by laying primary stress neither on the subject nor on the object, but on their unity as such. This may take different forms. (a) We may take subject and object to be, from the point of view of the unity, of equal significance in its constitution. The unity being neither specially, *as such* equally indifferent to each. But since these, nevertheless, are all it does contain, it is *per se* indeterminate; it is the indifferent neutrum in which both merely subsist. So far as any interpretation of it is to be given, we can express its nature either from the side of the object or from the side of the subject. Either point of view is equally valid, since a neutral unity, which is indifferently one factor as much as the other, is equally both. It must be expressible in either way, for, if it were neither, it would be nothing. This is in the main the position of Schelling.

(β) Again, we may start from the unity and develop an interpretation of it by taking the unity to be one factor *more than* the other. In this case there is for the unity an inequality of value between the two elements which constitute it. It is therefore not one as much as the other, and is not indifferent to either. It is one more than the other. It is thus not a colourless neutrum, but a concrete whole, of which each is a distinct mode or level of realization. It is not interpretable in two forms, distinct or even separate from one another, as in the former case; but in one form, and that form is adequate and complete as an expression of the entire concrete unity. From this point of view it is clear that there may be two ways of stating its meaning, according as we take the object side to be primary, or the subject side. Either view will present the whole concretely; but will interpret it in a different manner, and the dominant principle or category for determining the whole will be different. Starting from the object side, we will look on the whole as determinable by objective categories, and the kind of connexion amongst the parts of the whole will have the character which objective categories require. The supreme form of objectivity is what we call the order of 'Nature'; the supreme objective category that of 'Substance'; and the primary form of connexion among the parts will be that of relation by external necessity. The unity will thus be conceived of as nature in its totality, as working by natural processes of connexion, physical and spatial—*natura naturans*. The various elements constituting it will be the realization of this supreme unity in its pheno-

menal character, as a product in natural form of natural activity—*natura naturata*. The subject world will be a mode of this realization—one way in which Nature is phenomenalized or made determinate. But Nature as such is, in its very meaning, a resolution of differences into a single continuous identity, the identity of the one substance, the one 'nature.' Relatively to this all else is accident, an essentially negative moment, not a permanent expression. All explicit specific determination is implicit universal negation. There are no differences of degree in the contents; all are on the same footing *relatively* to the whole, and therefore relatively to one another. There are merely different modes of manifesting the one and only Reality. *Inter se*, these modes are generically distinct, and hence, in their modal manifestation of the one Reality, are merely side by side, parallel to one another, converging only at infinity, where they disappear or coincide. The external necessity, connecting the parts in each mode and the modes in the whole, involves, and is merely a finite expression of, this essential continuity into which they are dissipated. This interpretation of the Absolute finds its great historical representative in Spinoza.

(γ) But we may also conceive the problem in the same concrete way, and take the subject factor as primary, and the object reality as subsidiary. Here we shall proceed by another principle, by another category, and by another method of connecting the elements involved. We lay stress, not on the impersonal attitude towards objectivity, which characterizes the physical and mathematical consideration of the object-world, and which dissipates the subject-life into its processes, but on the personal attitude, which is found in its highest expressions in morality and religion. In these the object-world, so far from being primary, is subsidiary to personal or spiritual ends. We shall therefore take the principle to be, not Nature, but Spirit. The ultimate category will be not 'Substance,' but 'Subject.' The essential method of establishing connexion with the whole will be not external necessity, but internal necessity, the necessity of ideals and purposes, the necessity which is Freedom. The process of connecting the factors inside the unity of the whole will be that which, accepting the ethical and religious insistence on the subordination of the object-world, shows the latter to be in its essence an imperfect realization of the nature of Spirit, and shows Spirit therefore as at once arising out of, rising above, realizing and so retaining the true significance of Nature. This will be done by showing the content of the whole in its different moments to be simply the logically necessary evolution of the one final principle; which would not be itself unless it manifested itself in varying degrees of completeness of expression. These degrees form distinct and seemingly separate areas of reality to finite experience, but to the one supreme Reality they are merely stages in the realization of its single and self-complete spiritual existence. Such an interpretation, expressed essentially in the same general form by Plato, Aristotle, and Leibniz, finds its most impressive historical representative in Hegel.

These various ways of construing the meaning of the Absolute have doubtless each its value and place in the history of man's higher spiritual life, and amongst them seem to exhaust the possible interpretations of the supreme unity of experience. It would be out of place here to try to consider their respective merits, since we are not concerned to give a metaphysical theory of the Absolute, but to indicate what theories have been propounded.

LITERATURE.—The literature on the Absolute is almost co-extensive with the history of philosophical speculation.

I. **THE TERM 'ABSOLUTE'.**—A discussion of the meaning of the term, and of the relation of the Absolute to knowledge, will be found in Hamilton's *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature*; see also Laurie's *Syntheticæ*, vol. ii. p. 392 ff.

II. **'ABSOLUTE' AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLE.**—(a) **DISCUSSIONS.**—Bosanquet, 'Time and the Absolute' in *Proc. of Aristot. Society*, 1896; Braun, 'La Logique de l'Absolu' in *Revue Philosophique*, xxiv. (1887); Haldar, 'The Conception of the Absolute' in *Philos. Review*, viii. (1899); James, 'Absolutism and Empiricism' in *Mind*, O. S. ix. (1884); Joachim, 'Absolute and Relative Truth,' *ib.*, Jan. 1905; Logan, 'The Absolute as Ethical Postulate' in *Philos. Review*, viii. (1899); Powell, 'The Absolute and the Relative' in *Science*, iii. (1896); Renouvier, 'Les Catégories de la raison et la métaphysique de l'Absolu' in *L'Année philosophique*, vii. (1897); Rogers, 'The Absolute of Hegelianism' in *Mind*, N. S. ix. (1900); Russell, A., on 'The Absolute' in *CR* xvii. (1871); Schwarz, 'Die verschied. Fassung d. Substantialität d. Absoluten' in *Ztschr. f. Philos. u. phil. Krit.* xxi. (1883); Vaihinger, 'Der Begriff d. Absoluten mit Rücksicht auf Spencer,' *ib.* xxi. (1883); Watson, 'The Absolute and the Time Process' in *Philos. Rev.* ix. (1895).

(b) **INTERPRETATIONS.**—Aristotle, *Metaphys.*; Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*; Fichte, *Wissenschaftslehre*; Hegel, *Encyclopædie*; Plato, *Timæus*, Republic; Royce, *World and the Individual*; Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*; Spinoza, *Ethica*. For 1 . . . . . pt. ii. 597.

J. B. BAILLIE.

**ABSOLUTE (Vedantic and Buddhistic).**—In India a broad conception of the Absolute is first met with in the Upanisads, compiled about B.C. 500. There Brahma, the All-pervading Being, is described as the One Reality, or the Absolute, who is self-supporting and self-existent.

'He has no hands or legs, but He can catch and move; He has no eyes, but He can see, has no ears but can hear; He knows all, but there is none who knows Him; He is called the Good and Great Being. Upon Him the sun cannot shine, nor the moon nor the stars; the lightning cannot flash on Him, how can the fire? They all reflect His radiant light, and through His light they are illumined.'

Since B.C. 500 the doctrine of the Absolute has been considerably developed in the Vedānta and Buddhist systems of philosophy. In the Brahmasūtra, the first work of the Vedānta philosophy composed before the Christian era, Brahma is spoken of as the pure 'Being' who, associated with the principle of illusion (*māyā*), is enabled to project the appearance of the world, just as a magician is enabled to produce illusory appearances of animate and inanimate beings.† When the veil of illusion is withdrawn, the phenomenal world vanishes, and Brahma asserts himself in his true nature, which is nothing but the Self-existent Absolute Being. In the Vedānta philosophy the doctrine of the Absolute is styled monism (*advaita-vāda*). It underwent further developments at the hands of Śaṅkarācārya (A.D. 785), Rāmānuja (12th cent. A.D.), Madhvācārya (13th cent. A.D.), Vallabhācārya (A.D. 1479), and others.

But the philosopher who most firmly grasped the doctrine of the Absolute was Buddha-Śākya-Siṃha, the eminent founder of Buddhism, who flourished about B.C. 500. In the Sutta and Abhidhamma *pitakas* of the Pāli Scriptures, supposed to have been delivered by Buddha himself, the doctrine of the Absolute is designated as the philosophy of the Void (*śūnya-vāda*) or the Middle Path (*madhyamā paṭipadā*), according to which the world is neither real nor unreal, nor both, nor neither.‡ In the Sanskrit works of the Mahāyāna Buddhists, such as in the Mādhyamika-Sūtra (of Nāgārjuna, about A.D. 200), Lankāvatāra-Sūtra (about A.D. 400), Lalitavistara (about A.D. 100), Prajñāpāramitā (about A.D. 200), etc., the doctrine has been further developed, and has often been styled the 'phenomenal doctrine' (*nairātma-vāda*) or the 'perfection of wisdom' (*prajñāpāramitā*).§

In order to understand the Buddhist doctrine of the Absolute, we may suppose that Indian philo-

sophers are mainly divided\* into three classes: (1) Realists (*āstika*), (2) Nihilists (*nāstika*), and (3) Absolutists (*advaya-vādin*). Some sections of the Chārvākas, who maintain that the world is not permanent, not real, and not existent,—that is, who emphasize the negative aspect of the world,—are designated Nihilists or Negativists. The propounders of the six orthodox systems of Hindu philosophy, viz. the Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta, who maintain that the world is somehow permanent, real, and existent,—that is, who emphasize the positive aspect of the world,—are designated the Realists. According to them, there is at least one reality on which the fabric of the world stands. Thus the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika hold that the material atoms, sky, space, and time, are the permanent entities in the external world, while the souls are the eternal realities in the internal world. The Sāṅkhya and Yoga maintain that nature (*prakṛti*) is the permanent reality in the external world, while the souls (*puruṣa*) are the eternal realities in the internal world. The Vedānta school affirms that Brahma, the All-pervading Being, is the one eternal reality in the external as well as in the internal world. So we find that the various branches of the Realistic philosophy, in spite of their mutual differences in other respects, agree in maintaining that there is at least one permanent reality on which the whole world hinges.

The Buddhists, who maintain† that the world is neither real nor unreal, that it is neither an existence nor a non-existence, but transcends both,—that is, who emphasize neither the negative nor the positive aspect of the world, but go beyond both,—are designated the Transcendentalists, Absolutists, Phenomenalists, Voidists, Agnostics, or the Followers of the Middle Path.

The world, according to the Buddhists,‡ is an aggregate of conditions or relations. Things come into existence in virtue of these relations or conditions. There are infinite kinds of relation, such as the relation of substance and quality, part and whole, cause and effect, etc. Taking the relation of substance and quality, we find that the substance exists only in relation to its qualities, and the latter exist only in relation to the former. Take, for instance, a table. It has a certain weight, colour, taste, smell, size. The table exists only as the repository of these qualities, and the latter exist only as inherent in the former. We cannot conceive a table which has no size, weight, colour, etc., nor can we think of size, weight, etc., apart from the table in which they inhere. Arguing in this way, we find that the parts exist only in relation to the whole, and the whole exists only in relation to the parts. So the eye exists in relation to the colour, and the colour exists only in relation to the eye. Similarly, the fire exists in relation to the fuel, and the fuel exists in relation to the fire. Proceeding in this way, we find that the whole world is resolvable into infinite kinds of relation or condition. The relations or conditions themselves are dependent upon one another. The very notions of 'existence' and 'non-existence' are interdependent, for the one is possible only in relation to the other.

Origination and cessation, persistence and discontinuance, unity and plurality, coming and going—these are the eight principal relative conceptions which are the fundamental faults of ignorant minds, from which most of our prejudices and wrong judgments arise. People think that the law of coming and going actually operates in the world, that there are in reality persistence and

\* Śvetāsvatara-Upaniṣad and Kathopaniṣad.

† Tilthaut, *Introd. to Vedānta Sūtra*, l. p. xxv (SBE).

‡ Cf. *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*‡, Cowell and Gough's tr., 221.

§ *Lankāvatāra-sūtra*, p. 1; *Aṣṭa-sūtramāla Prajñā-pāramitā*, p. 1.

\* *Mādhyamika-vṛtti*.

† *ib.* ch. xv.

‡ *ib.* ch. I. (Cf. also Vidyabhusana in *JBTS* iii. pt. 3).



### ABSOLUTION (religious and ethical value of).

—1. The idea of Absolution, as it appears in the Christian Church, is closely connected with two other ideas—the idea of sin, and the idea of the Church as a society. It is maintained, and may be true, that many of the practices and associations connected with Absolution took their origin in a state of mind to which ceremonial uncleanness seemed the thing most to be dreaded; but this fact, if it be a fact, does not affect the Christian view of Absolution. To the Christian mind, absolution is required when sin has been committed; i.e., when some deliberate and voluntary defiance has been given to a moral law, which expresses the will of God, and the breach of which tends to separation from God. A soul, when it has sinned, requires to be forgiven; otherwise it remains in a permanent condition of alienation from God; and the authoritative declaration of its freedom from guilt, and reconciliation with God, is its absolution.

2. It is important that this should not be confused with the consciousness in the sinner that his sin is forgiven. The declaration of his freedom, however conveyed, may fail to carry conviction to his mind; or, again, he may have the strongest possible sense of forgiven sin without any decisive declaration of absolution at all. In other words, authoritative absolution and consciousness of forgiveness do not necessarily coexist: they may do so, but it is not necessary that they should.

3. It is obvious that, so far, we have considered only the relation of the individual soul and God. We have imagined the soul standing, as it were, alone in the world before the eyes of God, and receiving from Him the declaration of absolution. We have abstracted altogether this one relation from all its concomitants, the nature of sin, the ground of forgiveness, and the like. But it is plain that this abstract isolation is not the normal condition of any human soul. Every soul has an environment, which it affects, and by which it is affected; and no question of guilt or innocence, forgiveness or condemnation, is limited to the individual by himself. This truth, which goes far back into the history of man's ideas about himself, is emphatically presented in the Bible. Thus Ps 51, which gives expression most poignantly to the sense of personal guilt, also represents the sinner as born in a sinful environment: and again, Isaiah (6<sup>th</sup>) is conscious not only that he is a man of unclean lips, but that he dwells among a people of unclean lips. Not only is sin a personal act of rebellion, but it produces a sinful atmosphere, a condition of alienation from God. In like manner, the absolution or declaration of freedom from sin cannot concern the individual alone: it must have an eye also to the society in which he lives and to his relations towards it.

4. We are not here concerned with the nature or process of forgiveness, or even with the conditions of it as regards God. The idea of Absolution brings forward only the place of sin and forgiveness in the Christian Society. It is not hard to illustrate this from the NT. We may notice, at once, the following points:—(1) It can scarcely be questioned that the Christian Society set out with an ethical purpose. Admission to it was by repentance, and by submitting to the rite which figured forth the remission of sins; and those who had become members of it were expected to lead a new life, abstaining from the sins which beset them in their 'former conversation.' It is but the corollary of this to say that sin after baptism involved a breach of the principle upon which the society was founded, no less than an outrage upon the Divine Law. All sin is lawlessness, the breach of some commandment enacted by God; and sin within the Church is more than this: it is a wilful disloyalty to the

gifts which come through union with Christ, and, if carried on persistently, may place a man outside the reach of the sacrifice for sin (He 6<sup>th</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> 27<sup>th</sup>). (2) It is not less plain that the existence of post-baptismal sin forced a problem upon the attention of the Church with which its representatives were not slow to deal. In doing so, they doubtless rested for their authority upon words of Christ, such as we find in Mt 18<sup>th</sup> 18 or Jn 20<sup>th</sup>. The Epistles of St. Paul give instances of directions on disciplinary matters (1 Th 5<sup>th</sup>, Ro 16<sup>th</sup> 17, 1 Ti 4<sup>th</sup> 15, and the like). St. Paul clearly contemplates the action of the Society in repressing evil, and even excluding evil-doers. But, of course, the clearer and most fully described case is that of the incestuous man at Corinth (1 Co 5). Here we find that the Corinthian Church had at first shown laxity in leaving the sin unrebuked. St. Paul, in the most solemn way, announces his decision in the matter (1 Co 5<sup>th</sup>); the Corinthians clearly give effect to it in some way not recorded; and St. Paul (2 Co 2<sup>nd</sup> 11) exhorts them to comfort and restore the offender on his submission. The language used by St. Paul is not free from ambiguity. Though absent, he claims to act as if present at Corinth in association with the Church as a whole. And his judgment is to deliver 'such a one unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord' (1 Co 5<sup>th</sup>). It is not clear what exactly is meant by this delivery to Satan, either here or in 1 Ti 1<sup>st</sup>; but in both cases it seems to have been intended for discipline—for reformation with a view to restoration, not a final severance from the Society. Though, therefore, we cannot give any detailed description of the disciplinary measures of St. Paul, it is perfectly clear that he claimed to exercise such powers, that in so doing he assumed the co-operation of the Church, and that he regarded his judgments as valid: they are not merely strong expressions of reprobation, but judgments which will have consequences.

5. It has been necessary to approach the subject of Absolution indirectly as a special case of the exercise of discipline, because there is no direct discussion of it in Scripture, and the actual word never occurs. We do find, however, cases in which the Society exercises functions of discipline, such as those above alluded to, and these, when they take the form of a declaration of freedom from sin, correspond with the idea of Absolution. With these in view, it becomes necessary now to ask, what indications there are, if any, as to its meaning and validity. In answer to this we think that the following points may be safely asserted:

(1) The acts of the Society in discipline, and so in the exercise of Absolution, are spiritual acts, and have validity in the spiritual world. So much as this appears to follow from such words as Mt 18<sup>th</sup> 18 and Jn 20<sup>th</sup>: what is bound on earth is bound in heaven: whosoever sins the Society remits or retains, they are remitted or retained. It is true that the overt indication in the world of this disciplinary power consists merely of the confirmation or the withdrawal of the privilege to use the advantages of membership of the Society, to participate in the sacraments and so forth. But the functions of the Society cannot be limited to this. It is a spiritual society formed of persons held, in Christ, in certain close spiritual relations: not a loose aggregate of people individually in union with Christ, and casually connected in an outward society in the world. Such a division of the inward and outward relations of men in Christ is not Scriptural: the Church is a spiritual society of which the acts take place in the spiritual world: they have effect upon occasion in the world of sense, because they are already spiritually valid, not vice versa.



(2) The view of sin which makes the whole conception of Absolution possible is ethical and not legal. That is, the Church considers as requiring Absolution not merely overt acts which carry legal consequences in the State, but inward conditions, of which there is nothing more to be said than that they imply a tendency to rebellion against God. The State, like the Church, condemns thieves and murderers, because they are detrimental to its interests: the Church condemns also those who walk disorderly, who are proud, or impure in heart. If it were merely a casual aggregate of persons on its outward and social side, it could have no more concern with these things than the State: it claims that inward sins of the heart must be put away before the man can enjoy its privileges, because it is a spiritual society acting in the spiritual world.

(3) The exercise of discipline upon such conditions as these depends upon the voluntary acquiescence of the members of the Society. The Church is, no doubt, at liberty to say that it will not grant membership except upon condition of such acquiescence, and will punish any disloyalty to the principle. But it must trust ultimately to the voluntary submission of its members to the rule. The mode in which the rule is administered may vary widely from time to time: it is carried out by a general formula of confession and absolution, by a private particular confession to, and absolution by, an accredited minister, or by open individual confession and absolution in the public service of the Church. But the Church cannot, so long as it claims to be a spiritual society, disclaim or relinquish responsibility for the spiritual condition of its members.

It lies outside the scope of this article to consider the various casuistical questions which have arisen in the course of history over this matter. We will only add here the following remarks: (1) It in no way conflicts with the view here adopted that absolution may be, and has been, fraudulently administered. The whole problem of the visible Church is, and has always been, to make the outward order correspond with the spiritual reality it expresses: and it has always been impeded by sin. The individual who seeks absolution without penitence, or the priest who fraudulently declares him absolved, commits a great sin: just as *Amiens* and *Caen* did the fraud of *Amiens* and *Caen*.  
absolution has  
general char-... and principles, than did the fraud of *Amiens* and *Caen*.  
... of the Church.

(2) It is impossible to deny that the gravest evils have come from the misuse of the disciplinary power of the Church, especially of one particular mode of administering it: and the existence of these has brought the whole subject into disrepute. At the same time, it is difficult to read the Epistles of St. Paul, especially those chapters in which he lets us see into the internal conditions of the early Societies of Christians, without feeling how largely the Church depended for its advance upon a strong discipline, fearlessly exercised over its members. The case at Corinth, to which we have already referred, was, we may hope, exceptional. Yet a very serious situation would clearly have arisen if it had not been for St. Paul's action. The sin was one which public opinion among the pagans condemned (1 Co 5), but the machinery of the Church, as it was, provided apparently no means of dealing drastically with it. St. Paul's strong denunciation was required to rouse the Corinthians to the necessary severity. It is easy to see from this, and the impression is continually confirmed by early Church history, that a weak discipline implies a feeble consciousness of the Church's moral standard, and allows the existence within its pale of a variety of lower and more worldly ideals beside its own. It would be difficult to deny that the almost total absence of discipline of any kind in modern Christian communities bears a similar implication.

LITERATURE.—See under CONFESSION AND PENITENCE.

THOMAS B. STRONG.

**ABSOLUTISM.**—(a) *In philosophical speculation*: a method of interpreting reality which starts from the point of view of, and constructs a system by direct reference to, the complete unity of the whole. This self-contained unity is in metaphysics named the Absolute (q.v.). (b) *In aesthetics*: a view of the nature of Beauty which regards the quality of the beautiful as a constitutive character

of the object as such, and in itself, independently of the judgments or emotions of the subject. This is 'æsthetic absolutism.' (c) *In politics*: a form of political government from, or by means of, a single supreme source of authority concentrated in the will of a specific individual, and executing its demands from itself and for itself, with or without the consent of the will of the community. It is in the main identical with Despotism (see GOVERNMENT).  
J. B. BAILLIE.

ABSTINENCE.—See ASCETICISM.

**ABSTRACTION** (*abs-trahere*, 'to draw off or separate') is the separation or detachment of one part or element in a total experience from the whole to which it belongs. To abstract is thus to isolate any portion of the content of experience from its setting, and to consider it for the time being as it is in itself, 'loose and separate' from the structural and functional relations which belong to it in the concrete conscious life. Psychologically, Abstraction is the necessary condition and accompaniment of Attention (*which see*). To attend to one object of experience implies the withdrawal of attention from other objects.

Professor James (*Princ. of Psychology*, I. 403) says: Attention 'is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness is of its es. . . some things in order to deal . . . Sir William Hamilton (*Logi.* . . Attention, by concentrating the mind upon certain qualities, is thus to withdraw or abstract it from all else. In technical language, we are said to *precind* the phenomena we exclusively consider. To *precind*, to *attend*, and to *abstract* are merely different but correlative names for the same process; and the first two are nearly convertible. When we are said to *precind* a quality, we are supposed to attend to that quality exclusively; and when we *abstract*, we are properly said to *abstract from*, that is, to throw other attributes out of account. I may observe that the term *abstraction* is very often abusively employed. By *Abstraction* we are frequently said to attend exclusively to certain phenomena—those, to wit, which we *abstract*; whereas the term *abstraction* is properly applied to the qualities which we *abstract from*; and by *abstracting* from some we are enabled to consider others more attentively. Attention and Abstraction are only the same process viewed in different relations. They are, as it were, the positive and negative poles of the same act.'

In spite of Hamilton's protest against using the term 'abstraction' as applying to the elements to which we attend,—a protest previously made by Kant (*Logik*, § 6),—the usage has persisted. As we shall presently notice, abstraction plays a part in the formation of concepts or general ideas. It is usually said that by abstraction the identical or similar elements or attributes in a number of different objects are singled out and combined into a general concept. Thus by abstracting from the objects denoted by man, horse, bird, fish, etc., the common property or identity of structure, we form the concept of 'vertebrate.' Without now raising the question whether concepts are formed solely by abstraction, we may notice that the essential element in abstraction is not the omission of the characteristics which are unlike, but the focussing of consciousness on what is similar in the different cases. This Kant himself admits, and in applying the term 'abstraction' to the process of separating out the common elements, the usage of logic agrees with that of grammar and of ordinary life.

It is essential in considering the nature of abstraction, to distinguish carefully the psychological from the logical discussion of the subject. We may describe abstraction psychologically as a process of isolation, closely correlated with active attention, and go on to exhibit its various forms and characteristics in terms of the structural mechanism of the conscious elements. From the logical point of view, however, abstraction has to be considered as playing a part in knowledge. Here we have to deal, not with its psychological form or



structure, but with its function or purpose in the development of the intellectual life. This distinction of standpoint does much to clear away the difficulties and confusions which attended the older discussions of the subject. For example, it puts in a new light the point at issue between Locke and Berkeley regarding the existence of abstract general ideas. It is possible to grant Berkeley's contention that abstract ideas must exist psychologically as particulars in individual form, and at the same time to maintain that as functions of the knowledge-process, i.e. as logical ideas, they necessarily transcend their individual mode of existence and are real universals.

The question then arises as to the relation of the knowledge-process to the ideas viewed as psychical content. Can the psychological states of consciousness be regarded as the original form from which the logical idea is derived by abstraction? This has been very commonly maintained. Mr. F. H. Bradley tells us that a logical meaning 'consists of a part of the content (original or acquired) cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart from the existence of the sign.' The whole trend of modern logic (including Mr. Bradley's own work) shows conclusively, however, that it is impossible to begin with 'mental states' and pass by way of abstraction to logical ideas. The view of the cognitive side of consciousness, as at first made up of particular images or ideas, is now acknowledged to be a fiction. And similarly we must reject the quasi-mechanical account of the formation of general ideas which is based on this fiction, according to which we are said first to abstract the common element from the particular images and then proceed further to generalize it, thus in some mysterious way transforming it into a logical idea. But we cannot derive knowledge from an aetioetic process, and therefore must postulate that consciousness is from its first beginnings a process of interpretation and generalization. It starts from a content that is a vague presentation continuum, lacking both differentiation and integration, and, as such, not yet either particular or universal. It is the work of intelligence to transform this into a coherent system of parts. Now it must constantly be borne in mind that it is within this total knowledge-process, and as contributory to it, that abstraction finds its function and justification. It is not the end or essence of thinking, but a process or method which thought uses in the accomplishment of its own ends. The purpose which it fulfils is closely related to that of Analysis, though the specific method of abstraction has its own differentia. 'The reflective idea which guides it,' says Bosanquet, 'is the equivalent in general knowledge of the mathematical axiom that if equals be taken from equals the remainders are equal.' But, as within any real whole the withdrawal of one part never leaves the other parts unaffected, the guiding idea of abstraction is only provisional. 'It amounts to no more than this, that within known wholes known changes may appear to leave remainders known as unchanged' (Logic, ii. 22 f.).

Abstraction as a specific process is thus only a provisional expedient; and, unless corrected by a more adequate conception of the nature of the whole, it is likely in most fields to lead to error. But thinking proceeds both by concretion and abstraction, and these two moments are never entirely distinct and separate. Aristotle, and the formal logicians following him, have seemed to oppose Abstraction (*ἀφαίρεσις*) and Determination (*πρόσθεσις*). When, however, we emphasize the unity of the intellectual process within which both these functions operate, we see that the opposition can never be more than relative. Abstraction and Determination, like Analysis and

Synthesis (within which they may be said to be included), imply each other as complementary moments of real thinking. The goal which thought seeks is not to be gained by passing to the highest abstraction; for this is the emptiest of all thoughts. Nor can it be reached by the determination of a plurality of particulars. But the methods of abstraction and determination must unite in defining experience in terms of a concrete universal. It is against the abuse of abstraction, against making isolation and mutilation the final goal of thinking, and thus neglecting the organic wholeness and unity of things, that Hegel's criticism is chiefly directed. The process of abstraction is for him never an end in itself, but only a means in the progress towards greater unity and concreteness.

LITERATURE.—B. Maennel, *Ueber Abstraktion* (1890); A. Meinong, *Viertelehrschr. f. wisen. Phil.* (1893) 329 ff., and *ZP* xxiv. 84 ff.; Bosanquet, *Logic*, 1893, ii. 21 f.; J. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism* (1903), i. 255 ff.; Baldwin, *DPhil.*, s.v., and the literature under *Abstraction*, *Psychology*.

J. E. CREIGHTON.

ĀBŪ (Mount).—A famous mountain and place of Hindu and Jain pilgrimage, rising like an island out of the great plain of Rājputāna, in the native State of Sirohi. The name is derived from its Skr. title *Ārbuda*, 'a serpent,' 'a long round mass,' perhaps from the root *arb*, 'to go,' 'to hurt,' probably with reference to its form. Its summit, *Guru Sīkhara*, 'Peak of the Teacher,' rises to a height of 5,653 feet above the level of the sea.

'It is hardly to be wondered at,' writes Fergusson (*History of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, ed. 1899, p. 234), 'that Mount Ābū was early fixed upon by the Hindus and Jains as one of their sacred spots. Rising from the desert as abruptly as an island from the ocean, it presents on every side inaccessible scarps 5000 ft. or 6000 ft. high, and the summit can be approached only by ravines cut into its sides. When the summit is reached, it opens out into one of the loveliest valleys imaginable, 6 or 7 miles long by 2 or 3 miles in width, cut up everywhere by granite rocks of the most fantastic shapes, and the spaces between covered with trees and luxuriant vegetation. The little Nucki Talao (properly Nakhi Talao, as it was supposed to have been excavated by the nails (Skr. *nakha*) of the gods) is one of the loveliest gems of its class in India, and it is near to it, at Dilwarra, that the Jains selected a place for their Tirth (Skr. *tirtha*) or sacred place of rendezvous. It cannot, however, be said that it has been a favourite place of worship in modern times. Its distance and inaccessibility are probably the causes of this, and it consequently cannot rival Pālitāna or Gīrnār in the extent of its buildings.'

Tod styles Mount Ābū 'the Olympus of India,' because in olden times it was reputed to be the favourite residence of the gods, and was believed to be the scene of two famous events in Hindu mythology. Here the *munis* (or sages), of whom Vasiṣṭha, a worshipper of Śiva, was the leader, practised austerities, living on milk and the fruits of the earth. There was then no mountain, but only a cleft in the plain, into which the cow that supplied the wants of the sage fell, and was miraculously floated out by a rise of water from beneath. To prevent the recurrence of such an accident, the sage prayed to Śiva, then enthroned on the Kailāsa peak of the Himālaya. He called on the sons of Himāchal, the deified mountain range, to relieve the saint. The youngest son of Himāchal volunteered to exile himself, and, mounted on the serpent Takshaka, he journeyed to the holy land. At the behest of the sage he leaped into the cleft, embraced, as he fell, by the serpent god. Within the cleft the snake writhed so violently that Vasiṣṭha appealed again to Śiva, who from the depths of Pātāla, the nether-world, raised his toe until it appeared at the top of the mountain, which was thus formed by the god. Hence, under the title of *Achala Īśvara*, 'Immovable Lord,' Śiva has become the patron deity of the hill. But in accordance with the eclectic spirit of Hinduism, this does not prevent the place from becoming a site sacred both to Vaiṣṇavas and Jains. The second legend tells of the creation of the *Agnikūla*, or 'fire-born' septs of the Rājputs. The *Dāityas*, or demons, it is

said, disturbed the performance of the rites of Śiva on the hill. Viśvāmītra, another sage, appealed to the gods, who proceeded to the spot, and out of the *Agnikūṇḍa*, or fire-pit, in which the fire-sacrifice was performed, created the four *Agnikūla*, or 'fire-born' septs—Chauhān, Parihāra, Solanki, and Pramāra, who, destroyed the Daityas, and restored the cult of Śiva. Both these legends seem to indicate some early conflict of rival cults, the nature of which is unknown.

The chief Hindu religious sites are, first, the crowning peak of Gura Śikhara, where in a cavern are to be seen the footprints of the saint Dātuvrija, presided over by some dissolute-looking Gaṇapati priests, and those of Rāmānanda, the great apostle of the Vaiṣṇava cultus. At the temple of Achala Iāvāra, which is now, according to Cousens, in a state of deplorable decay and neglect, is shown the toe-nail of Śiva in a cleft of the rock. His female counterpart is worshipped as Adharā Devi and Arbuda Mātā, the Mother-goddess of the hill. The sage Vasistha is honoured at a shrine called *Bastoni*, or *Gaumukha*, 'Cow-mouth,' where a fountain falls from a spot shaped like a cow's head. To the W. of this is the shrine of the saint Gotamjī, or Gautama Rishi, containing two images, one of Viṣṇu and the other of a female beside a male bearded figure. The temples at Devāṅga, 'Court of the Gods,' have not been fully described, if they have ever been visited, by an European, the approach being over rugged, dangerous rocks. The largest is dedicated to Viṣṇu, and close to it is Narasimha, the fourth Avatāra, or incarnation of the god, said to be one of the finest images on the hill.

Of the Jain temples at Delvāda or Devalvāda, 'place of temples,' two are described by Fergusson as 'unrivalled for certain qualities by any temples in India.' The first was built by Vimala, a merchant Jain prince, about A.D. 1032, two years after the death of that arch-raider Mahmūd of Ghazni, who desecrated the older temples. It is dedicated to Rishabhadeva, the first Jaina *arhat*, or saint. The original image was destroyed by the Musalmāns, and that now in the temple is the second or perhaps the third in succession. The second great temple was built by the brothers Tejapāla and Vastupāla between A.D. 1197 and 1247. It is in honour of the 23rd *arhat*, Pārśvanātha, the only one in the series readily identifiable by the many-headed serpent's hood which rises above him. Both these temples are built of white marble, though no quarry of this material is known to exist within 300 miles of the spot, and the stone could have been conveyed up the rugged slopes of the hill only by incredible exertions and at enormous cost. Both these remarkable buildings have been fully described by Fergusson, whose account is supplemented and in part corrected by that of Cousens.

Abū was once the haunt of a colony of those loathsome ascetics, the Aghoris, but they have long since disappeared.

LITERATURE.—Tod, *Annals of Rajasthan*, Calcutta reprint, l. 93 ff.; *Travels in W. India*, 101 ff.; Fergusson, *Picturesque Illustrations of Architecture in Hindostan*, 391; *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, ed. 1899, 234 ff.; Cousens, *Progress Report, Arch. Survey of W. India*, for 1901, p. 2 ff.; Rowland, *Indian Antiquary*, ii. 249 ff. In the editor's note to the last article, some of the Abū inscriptions are given as a supplement to those recorded by H. H. Wilson, *Asiatic Researches*, xvi. 234 ff. The place has been well described by Major C. A. Bayly in *Rajputana Gazetteer* (1880), iii. 129 ff., to which this article is largely indebted.

W. CROOKE.

**ABUSE, ABUSIVE LANGUAGE** (Gr. *λοιδόρειν*; Lat. *contumeliā afficere, conviciari*; Ger. *schimpfen, lästern*; Fr. *maudire*).—Abuse in general denotes an evil use of a thing caused by excess or injustice; in law it denotes 'to injure, diminish in value or wear away by using improperly.' Examples of such abuse are signified in the phrases

'abuse of authority,' 'abuse of confidence,' 'abuse of privilege,' 'abuse of legal process,' in all of which the use is assumed as determined by corrective justice, and its opposite, the *abuse*, is a departure, either in the way of defect or excess, from the mean laid down by corrective justice. In this article we are concerned, however, only with a narrower signification of the term 'abuse,' viz. that which deals with the improper use of language, and yet more narrowly with such an improper use as tends to the injury or harm of another human being. Abuse in this narrower and colloquial sense, then, denotes all that class of injuries which are inflicted on others by the means of language, under the sway of passion or any other motive opposed to the principle of justice, or of love, or of both. It ranges from blasphemy at the one end to the 'jesting which is not convenient' at the other, and varies according to the spirit which produces it or the means adopted for its manifestation. It is usefully classed by Aquinas under the heads of contumely (*contumelia*), detraction (*detractio*), backbiting (*susurrus*), ridicule (*derisio*), and cursing (*maledictio*).

1. Contumely is an injury inflicted in words, whereby there is denied to a man some good quality on account of which he is held in honour, or whereby some concealed fact to his discredit is unnecessarily and uncharitably made public. If, for example, it is said of a man that he is blind, this is abuse indeed, but of less gravity than if he were charged with being a thief. Another and more venial form of abuse is to reflect needlessly on a man's defect, as, e.g., that he is of lowly birth, or that he has been badly educated, or that he spent a wild and profligate youth, such things being said in order to deprive the person of whom they are said of some honour he has won for himself by virtuous conduct or public service. Such language is to be placed under the general head of *contumely*, as a form of abusive language which has its root in anger and has pride for its foster-mother. It is a kind of revenge, and is indeed the readiest and easiest form in which revengeful feelings find expression.

2. Detraction differs from contumely both in its object and in its source. It does not seek so much to rob a man of his honour as to blacken his reputation, and it springs from envy rather than from anger. It effects its purpose (1) directly by bringing a false charge, by exaggerating a fault, by revealing a hidden defect, or by imputing an evil motive; and (2) indirectly by denying, concealing, or minimizing what is meritorious. 'He that filches from me my good name robs me of that which not enriches him, and makes me poor indeed.' The words used may not be contumelious—in the case of Iago they included both contumely and detraction—but they are abuse, and abuse of the worst kind.

3. Backbiting, whispering, or innuendo is another form of abusive language which has for its object the separating of friends. The detractor abuses language by saying what is evil about his neighbour *simpliciter*; the whisperer injures him *secundum quid*, viz. by saying of a man what will alienate his friend. 'Sin against our neighbour is so much the greater as the greater loss is inflicted, and the loss is the greater as the good taken away is greater. But the loss of a friend is a great loss, and therefore the whisperer is a great sinner.'

4. Ridicule, when apart from love, is a further abuse of language. The three forms of abuse mentioned above tend to deprive a man of some external good, such as honour, reputation, or friends. Derision, however, goes to deprive a man of his inward peace, the testimony of a good conscience. It is to be classed with contumely, de-

traction, and whispering as abusive language, but it differs from them in its end. It holds a man up to scorn for some evil in him or some defect, and springs from contempt for him,—a contempt which is rooted in pride and finds enjoyment in the contrast between the person who is ridiculed and the ridiculer. It is this special form of abusive language which is condemned by Jesus Christ in the sayings (Mt 5<sup>22</sup>) in which He forbids contempt for a man's intellectual qualities (expressed by *raca*), or for his moral qualities (expressed by *moreh*).

5. Cursing is abusive language whereby evil is pronounced against a man in the imperative or the optative mood. Words which inflict deserved punishment (as in the case of Gehazi, 2 K 5<sup>27</sup>), or state a fact (as in the case of Adam and Eve, Gn 3<sup>14,22</sup>), or express abhorrence of evil in itself (as David and the mountains of Gilboa, 2 S 1<sup>21</sup>), or are used symbolically ('*Dominus maledixit fulcrum in significationem Judææ*'), do not come under this definition, and are not, therefore, of the nature of abusive language. To curse is 'to pronounce against anyone, in the name of religion, or under the impulse of some violent movement of the soul, words of reprobation or of condemnation.' God's name is either explicitly used, or lies implicit in the current forms, especially those in use among the more uncultured classes. To this it seems necessary to add that in these classes sexual processes or aberrations are largely drawn on for the purpose of supplying the vocabulary of abuse, a fact which serves the purpose of demonstrating incidentally the close connexion between sensual indulgence and contempt or hatred or scorn of our fellows. The peevishness which finds expression in abusive language directed against others is at bottom a deep-seated discontent with self.

The subject of blasphemy (q. v.) is beyond the scope of this article, and the only remark to be made here about it is that cursing any creature as a creature comes under that head.

Abusive language, when it is used in the hearing of several persons in a public place (even when the name of God is not uttered, but words importing an imprecation of future Divine vengeance only), may constitute profane swearing, and is a nuisance at common law. Blasphemy and profane swearing differ at law only in this, that blasphemy is a word of larger meaning.

LITERATURE.—Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, n. ii. 13 and 72-76; Aristotle, *Eth. Nicom.* viii. 9; Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, s.v. 'Schimpfen'; Migne, *Encyc. tom.* xxxii. col. 283 ff.; *American and English Encyc. of Law*, s.v. 'Abuse'; *Profane Oaths Act*, 1745; Stephen, *Com. on the Laws of England*, iv. 193-194; Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, § 23.

W. F. COBB.

ABYSS (ἄβυσσος).—The Greek word, of which our 'abyss' is a transliteration, occurs in the classics as an adjective signifying 'bottomless,' 'boundless.' It is composed of the intensive *ā*, and *βυθός*=*βυθός*, 'depth.' In the LXX it represents *tēhōm* (תְּהוֹם) and *sīlāh* (סִיָּלָה). Most of the passages in the Bible where it is employed belong to the poetical books, and are of late date. Seeing also that the Pentateuch was the first part of the Bible to be turned into Greek, we must regard Gn 1<sup>2</sup> as the earliest instance of its use, so far as our investigation is concerned. What, then, is the meaning of *tēhōm* (תְּהוֹם), the word for which it stands? The answer must be sought outside the limits of our extant Heb. literature. Dillmann and others have, indeed, been inclined to derive it from *hām* (חָם), 'to roar or rage'; but it is so obviously cognate with the *Tiāmat* of Bab. cosmogony that we must look on the *t* as part of the root. Jensen's suggestion (adopted in *KAT* 492) is that the root is *tāham* (תָּחַם), 'to stink.' The *Oxf. Heb. Lex.* argues that *tāh* is probably the root, 'in

view of As. *tiāmtu*, *tāmtu*.' In any case, *Tēhōm*, like *Tiāmat*, was a proper noun, 'Deep,' not 'the deep.' Frequent as are its appearances in the OT, it is almost invariably without the article. Turning now to that Babylonian conception, of which the Heb., if a derivative,\* is a greatly modified one, we find that *Tiāmat* was the dark and watery chaos, the primeval undifferentiated matter, out of which gods and men, heaven and earth sprang. Berosus (c. 275 B.C.) conveys the idea (τὸ πᾶν σκοτεινὸν καὶ ὕδωρ), and Wis 11<sup>17</sup> has the same in view (ὁλὴ ἀμυρότος). Such a chaos is postulated in the myths of Egyptians, Phœnicians, Indians, and Greeks. Hesiod, *e.g.*, *Theog.* 115, asserts: *ἦτοι μὲν πρῶτα χᾶος γένετ' κ.τ.λ.* The well-known Bab. legend opens thus:

'When on high the heavens were unnamed,  
Beneath, the earth bore not a name;  
The primeval ocean (*apsū rēti*) was their producer;  
Mummu Tiamtu was she who begat the whole of them.  
Their waters in one united themselves, and  
The plains were not outlined, marshes were not to be seen.'  
(Pinches, *Old Test.* etc., p. 16).

There is a substantially correct reproduction of this legend in the Syrian writer Damascius (6th cent. A.D.), who states that the Babylonians believed in two principles of the universe, Tauthé and Apason, the latter being Tauthé's husband. Apason, here, is evidently the same as *Apsū* (=the waters under, around, and above the earth, especially the sweet waters in contrast to *Tiāmat*, the salt), whilst Tauthé (Berosus, *Θαυτή*) is *Tiāmat*. The latter also sometimes bears the name *Bahu* (the *ba* *bōhū*= 'emptiness,' of Gn 1<sup>2</sup>, LXX ἀκατάσκεπτος), the Phœnician *Baau*, mother of the first men. Here we have the origin of the Heb. idea of the abyss. Gunkel (*Schöpfung u. Chaos*, 15) has pointed out that such a picture of the primal state of the universe would naturally present itself in a land like Babylonia, where the winter rains pour down from heaven and, uniting with the streams and rivers, turn all things into chaos: only when spring returns do land and water take their separate places. This idea reached the Hebrews through the medium of Phœnicians and Canaanites, and was reinforced by a similar Egyptian idea of a boundless primeval water (*Nun*), which filled the universe and contained the germ of all existence. We may therefore say, with Trevisa (1398): 'The primordiall and fyrste matere in the begynnyng of the worlde not dystinguyd by certayn fourme is called Abyssus.' In it were the potencies of the life that would hereafter appear.† The process, according to the Bab. theory, was one of evolution; according to Gn 1, it was determined wholly by the creative fiat of God.

The memory of the original abyss was kept up by the 'seas' and 'abysses' which were common in the temples of Babylonia. Urnā of Lagas (c. 4000 B.C.) set up a greater and a smaller *apsū* (Gunkel, pp. 23, 153). Argum (c. 17th cent. B.C.) placed a *tāmtu*, or sea, in Marduk's shrine. 'This was, no doubt, a large basin or "laver," similar to the brazen sea of Solomon's temple which stood upon twelve oxen' (King, *Bab. Rel.* (1899) p. 109).

The recalcitrancy of matter and the struggle of darkness against light are portrayed in the myth of *Tiāmat*, as a dragon-like monster, fighting with Marduk, but slain by him. Out of one half of her body he constructed a vault (the earth), the two ends of which rest on the ocean (*apsū*). A similar picture of the position of the earth is present to the Heb. poet's mind when he declares that

\* A. Jeremias declares (*Das AT im Lichte der Alten Oriente*) that borrowing on either side, or direct dependence, is not to be thought of.

† Didron (*Christian Iconog.* ii. 127) copies a miniature from a 10th cent. MS—a small, conical mound, divided into stages by spiral bands. The lowest zone contains birds, the next fishes, then vegetation, finally a human head issues from the summit. By the side is written 'Abissus.'

Jahweh has 'founded it upon seas and established it upon floods' (Ps 24<sup>2</sup>). The disc of the earth rests on the all-surrounding ocean, and the 'waters under the earth' are called *tēhōm* or *tēhōm rabbā*, 'abyss,' 'great abyss' (Gn 7<sup>11</sup> 8<sup>2</sup>, Dt 8<sup>7</sup> 33<sup>13</sup>, Am 7<sup>4</sup>, Pr 3<sup>30</sup> 8<sup>24</sup>), whose fountains are broken up at the Flood, from which well up the sources that fertilize the land and (Ezk 31<sup>4</sup>) refresh the trees. It is in this sense that Clem. Rom. (I. xx.) speaks of the inscrutable depths of the abysses (*ἀβύσσων τε ἀνεξιχνίαστα*). Trevisa also says: 'Abyssus is depnesse of water vnseen, and therof come and springe welles and ryuers.'

*Tēhōm* or 'Abyss' is a frequent designation of the oceans and seas, without any reference to their being 'under the earth.' And although there is no trace of the refractoriness of matter in the narrative of Gn 1, this comes out strongly in many references to the sea (Is 50<sup>2</sup> 51<sup>10</sup>, Jer 5<sup>22</sup>, Ps 77<sup>16</sup> 104<sup>6-9</sup> 106<sup>9</sup> 107<sup>24</sup> 135<sup>6</sup> 148<sup>7</sup>, Pr 8<sup>32</sup>, Job 7<sup>12</sup> 26<sup>12</sup> 38<sup>16</sup>, Sir 43<sup>23</sup>, Pr. Man 3, En 60<sup>7-9</sup>, Rev 21<sup>1</sup>).

The question has been raised whether the *תְּהוֹם* of Ps 71<sup>20</sup> should not be corrected to *תַּרְטָרֹס* (cf. Ps 63<sup>10</sup> 139<sup>15</sup>, Is 44<sup>23</sup>). However that may be, the LXX has 'abysses' (*ἀβύσσοι*), which word, either in the sing. or the plur., became one of the names for Hades. In the verse in question it points to the profound depths of the invisible world, from which the persecuted are to be brought back again. The Bab. scheme of the universe also locates the abode of the dead in the heart of the earth, making the entrance thereto lie in the extreme west (*KAT* 3 636), designating it 'the country whence none return,' dividing it into seven zones, corresponding to the seven planetary spheres (Lenormant, *Chald. Magic*, 165, 169); cf. Mt 12<sup>40</sup>, Ph 2<sup>10</sup>. Enoch (17<sup>6</sup>) sees in the west the great streams and the great flood, and enters into the great darkness [of Hades], into which all flesh comes. In the only classical passage where *ἀβύσσος* is a noun, it is employed for Hades (Diog. Laert. *Epig.* iv. 27, *χοῦτω κατ' ἡλδης εἰς μέλαιναν Πιλοντίως ἀβύσσον*).

To take yet another step is easy. *οὐκ ἦν* (Job 41<sup>23</sup>) is represented in the LXX by *τὸν δὲ τάρταρον τῆς ἀβύσσου*. This is a free translation by an Alexandrian Hellenist, who knew his classics (Swete, *Introd. to OT in Greek*, pp. 256, 318), and remembered that Tartarus was a prison, a murky pit, into which Zeus threatens to cast any god who may venture to oppose him (*Il.* viii. 11-16), as far beneath Hades as this is below the earth (cf. *Τάρταρόν τ' ἡμετέοντα μυχῷ χθονὸς εὐρυδοκίης*, Hes. *Theog.* 120). Now at Job 38<sup>16</sup> *Sheol* is at the bottom of the sea, and we here (41<sup>23</sup> LXX) find hell in the same locality, for the sea-monster Leviathan considers the Tartarus of the abyss his captive. The Book of Enoch often speaks of the abyss as a place of punishment. The traveller reaches a deep abyss, in which are lofty pillars of fire, some of them prostrate (18<sup>11-16</sup>). Here is the prison of the rebellious angels; he sees a place with a cleft or chasm (*διακοπή*) running down into the abyss. Uriel informs him that the angels are imprisoned there for ever (21<sup>7-11</sup>); judgment began with the stars, which were found guilty and cast into an abyss full of fire (90<sup>24</sup>). English writers have freely used the word as an equivalent for 'hell.' Lydgate (1413) says: 'This pytte is the chyef and the manoyr of helle that is clepid Abissus.'

We pass to the NT. The abyss is the ordinary abode of demons who, having been permitted to take temporary possession of a man, now deprecate being remanded to their own place, because their power of doing mischief is thus terminated (Lk 8<sup>21</sup>); it is Hades, where the spirits of the departed dwell, where Christ spent the interval between death and resurrection (Ro 10<sup>7</sup>). 'Ipsa anima fuit in abyssu' (Ambrose). The impression con-

veyed by St. Paul's language is of the vastness of that realm, as of one that we should vainly attempt to explore. The abyss communicates with our earth by a pit or shaft (*φρέαρ*), Rev 9<sup>1-11</sup>, with which the *διακοπή* of En 21<sup>7</sup> should be compared. According to the Tractate *Sukkah* of the Talmud, the mouth of this pit is under the foundations of the temple, and can be closed by magical formulæ: 'Qua hora David fodiebat fundamenta templi, exundavit abyssus mundum submersurus. Dixit David: Estne hic, qui sciat, an liceat testæ inscribere nomen ineffabile, et projiciemus illam in abyssum, ut quiescat?' (Bousset, *Die Offenbarung Johannis*, p. 251). When the *φρέαρ* of Rev 9 is opened, there issue from it poisonous, stinging locusts, which cause exquisite anguish to men. Over them is a king, 'the angel of the abyss,' whose Greek name, *Apollyon*, represents pretty accurately his Heb. title *Abaddon*. This is a different point of view from that of En 20<sup>1</sup>, where *Uriel* is designated the holy angel who presides over both the angelic host and Tartarus. At Pr 15<sup>11</sup> 27<sup>20</sup> etc., Abaddon is parallel to Sheol, and the Rabbis make it a name of the lowest pit of hell. The abyss, then, in the present passage, as in Lk 8<sup>21</sup>, is the abode of the ministers of torment, from which they go forth to do hurt. In the Bab. documents, demons and spirits of disease proceed from hell:

'They, the productions of the infernal regions,

On high they bring trouble, and below they bring confusion. (Lenormant, *Chald. Magic*, p. 30).

The Rabbis, too, represent Sammael and his angels as emerging thence (Eisenmenger, *Entdeckt. Jud.* ii. 336 f.). The abyss of Rev 11<sup>7</sup> 17<sup>8</sup> is put in the same light: a beast which occasions calamities to the saints arises out of it. The dragon, 'that old serpent, which is the devil, and Satan,' is shut up therein, and its mouth is sealed for a thousand years (20<sup>3</sup>). The language in which this is set forth should be compared with Prayer of Manasses 3:

ὁ πεδήσας τὴν θάλασσαν τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ  
προσταγματος αὐτοῦ,

ὁ κλείσας τὴν ἀβύσσον καὶ σφραγισάμενος

αὐτὴν τῷ φοβερῷ καὶ ἐνδόξῳ ὀνόματι σου.

In the *Rituale Romanum*, part of the formula of Exorcism runs: 'Cede Ergo Deo + qui te, et malitiam tuam in pharaone, et in exercitu ejus per Moysen servum suum in abyssum demersit': with this cf. Jubilees 48<sup>14</sup>.

The Gnostics, as might have been expected, made an altogether different use of the idea of the abyss. Their special name for it was *Βυθός*, *Bythus*, and by this they meant the Divine first principle, the fountain of all existence, the infinite, unfathomable, inscrutable abyss of Deity:

'A vast, unfathomable sea,

Where all our thoughts are drowned.'

Λέγουσι γάρ τινα εἶναι ἐν ἀράτοις καὶ ἀκατονομήστοις ὑψώμασι τέλειον Αἰῶνα πρόβντα· τοῦτον δὲ καὶ [προαρχὴν καὶ] προπατόρα καὶ βυθὸν καλοῦσιν (Iren. *adv. Hær.* i. 1: 'For they say that in the invisible and nameless heights there is a certain perfect, pre-existing Æon. And they call him [first principle and] progenitor and Bythus'). Hippolytus (vi. 37) bears the same testimony: speaking of Valentinus, he says: *ὑπεστήκατο τὸν πάντων βασιλεῖα δν ἐφη Ἰλδάνων, οὗτος πατέρα καὶ βυθὸν καὶ [προαρχὴν ?] τῶν ὅλων αἰώνων* ('He whom Plato spoke of as King of all, this man postulated as father and Bythus and first principle [?] of all the æons'). The Valentinians held that by a process of self-limitation the *Bythus* evolved a series of pairs of æons, male and female, any pair of which may be called the *pleroma*, the latter name being also given to the whole series taken together, which then stands to the *Bythus* in the feminine relation, as *Tiāmat* did to *Apsil*. But Gnosticism never formed a homogeneous body of opinion. There were, as Hippolytus warns us,

many varying opinions concerning the *Bythus* itself. According to some thinkers, he was outside the *pleroma*: others held him to be within it, but separated from the rest by *Horus* ('*Opos*'), a personified boundary (Lightfoot, *Coloss.* p. 332). There were some who actually deposed him from his place at the head of the series, and made him follow the first ogdoad. Some thought of him as unwedded, and neither male nor female; whilst others again gave him *Sigē* as his consort, or the two powers Thought and Will (Hippol. *loc. cit.*). The relation of Gnostic speculation on the *Bythus* to later philosophical thought is perhaps sufficiently indicated in one sentence of Irenæus, *ap. Epiph.* xxxii. 7: *Οὐ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐγγονὸν λέγουσιν, μήτε ἄρρενα, μήτε θήλειαν, μήτε ὄντα τι.* ('For some say that he is unwedded and is neither male nor female, nor, in fact, anything at all'). He was exalted above all contraries—the Absolute, identical with Nothing, the Being of whom even existence might not be predicated. No wonder that the Mystics took up both the thought and the term: 'I saw and knew the being of all things, the Byss and the Abyss, and the eternal generation of the Holy Trinity, the descent and original of the world and of all creatures through the Divine wisdom' (Jacob Behmen, quoted by James, *Varieties of Rel. Experience*, p. 411).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works mentioned above, see Jensen, *Kosmogonie der Babylonier*; Sayce, *Hilbert Lectures*, 1887; Smythe Palmer, *Tihom and Tiāmat*, 1897, and art. in *Guardian*, Feb. 6, 1907; Driver on *Genesis*, 1904; Neander, *Hist. of the Christian Church*, vol. ii. (for the Gnostics); *New English Dictionary* (for the words 'Abime', 'Abyrme', 'Abyss' in Eng. literature). JOHN TAYLOR.

**ABYSSINIA.**—The peoples of Abyssinia belong to three distinct races, viz. the African aborigines, the Hamitic (Cushitic) tribes, and the Semitic immigrants.

(a) The African aborigines are now found only in the western and north-western part of Abyssinia; they are called by the other Abyssinians *Shangalā* or *Shanqelā*. Originally the name of a certain tribe, this has come to be a generic term for all non-Semitic or non-Hamitic people of probably negro origin. The largest aggregation of these Abyssinian 'negroes' are the Kunamas or Bāzēns, and the Bārās, whose languages also are entirely different from those of the Cushites and the Semites. They inhabit the country around the Takkazē and the Gash Rivers, mostly in the present Italian Colonia Eritrea. The Christian Abyssinians call them sometimes by the derogatory term 'mouse-eaters'; *bārā* in Amharic means also 'slave,' because these aborigines are taken as slaves all over Abyssinia. This part of the population is, to a large extent, pagan; others, like the Bārās, have become Muhammadans; some of them, especially the slaves among the Christians, have adopted the Christian faith.

(b) The Hamitic or Cushitic tribes form the stock of the population of Abyssinia. They immigrated into that country at some remote period of which we have no record. There is scarcely a part of Abyssinia where the Semites, who imposed their language almost everywhere, did not intermingle with them. In the south the Semitic blood was almost absorbed by the Hamitic; in the north the Hamitic tribes seem to have been kept a little more separate. The main tribes of the Cushites or Abyssinian Hamites are the Somalis and the Gallas in Southern Abyssinia; the 'Afar' (called by the Arabs *Danakil*, perhaps of Arab origin, but speaking a Cushitic language) in the east; the Agaos (with several subdivisions) all over the centre; the Sahos in the north-east, the Bogos (also called Billin after the name of their language, of Agao origin), finally, the Bedawin in the north, who extend

into the Egyptian Sudan. The Gallas, or Oromos, are very numerous, and are divided into many tribes, some of which extend as far as the equatorial lakes. Their language is a Hamitic one, and the Abyssinians make a distinction between them and the Shangalās. Since, however, many Gallas whom the writer has seen (in Northern Abyssinia) have pronounced negroid features, it may be that a part of this nation is of negro origin and has adopted a Hamitic language. Similar cases occur very frequently, as, for instance, with the Celts in Bavaria, who speak German, and the negroes in the United States of America, who have adopted the English language. The Gallas are partly pagan, partly Muhammadan. Some of them became Christians, but the wholesale baptism of Galla people by King Theodore I. (1855-1868) met with little success. The Somalis and the 'Afar' are practically Muhammadan; the Sahos and the Bedawin are Muhammadan; the Bogos partly Christian, partly Muhammadan.

(c) The Semitic population of Abyssinia is strongest in the north, i.e. in the region of the ancient kingdom of Aksum. There is no doubt that these Semites came to Abyssinia from Arabia. The bulk of them may have come within the last cents. B.C., but the Semitic immigration never stopped. It was rather, as Renan has said, a 'gradual infiltration,' and even in our days an Arab tribe, the Rashāida, has crossed to the other side of the Red Sea and is beginning to be nationalized in Africa; they still speak Arabic, but have commenced to use the Tigrē language as well. The Semites have been, beyond doubt, the civilizers of, or at least the bearers of some civilization to, Abyssinia. They founded an empire, they built temples, palaces, and entire cities, as well as dams and reservoirs; they originated and carried on the only literature that Abyssinia ever had. When they came they were, of course, pagan, but after some centuries they became Christian; and, whatever their Christianity is, or may have been, it has always tended to a higher state of morals and religion than that which native Africa, south of Egypt and the other countries along the north shore, has ever been capable of producing. The Semitic language which was first written (after the Sabeian) is the Ethiopic or Ge'ez. A few pagan and Christian inscriptions and almost the entire Christian literature are committed to writing in this language, which must have died out before the 10th cent. A.D. At present there are three main Semitic languages in Abyssinia: Amharic, Tigrīna, and Tigrē. Amharic is the language of the south and the centre; Tigrīna that of the region of the old Aksumitic kingdom; Tigrē is spoken by the half-nomadic tribes of the north, and has been adopted by many of the Hamites of that region. The majority of those who speak Amharic and Tigrīna are Christians; Tigrīna is often called *zārāwā kheshtān* (in Tña) or *hīgā keshān* (in Tē), i.e. the language of the Christians. The Tigrē tribes are now mostly Muhammadans, but about half of the Mānes' tribe have retained Christianity.

We have therefore, in speaking of the religions of Abyssinia, to deal with Paganism, Islām, and Christianity. Paganism is at the bottom of all of them, and even the religious ideas of the common people in Christian and Muhammadan districts are more like pagan superstitions than like the ideas of the founder of Christianity or of the prophet of Islām. We may here dispense entirely with official Islām or Christianity. It will suffice to record the following facts: Islām in Abyssinia is Sunnite, the Muhammadans living in Christian surroundings are called Djabarti, the people who do missionary work there at present are mostly of the Senūsī order. The Confession

of the Christian Church of Abyssinia is that of Jacobus Baradaeus,—in other words, the Abyssinians are Monophysites. A few remarks on the history of Christianity in this country will be found below.

Still another religion exists in Abyssinia,—the country of many races, languages, and religions,—viz. *Judaism*. There are a number of Jewish communities, mainly in the region between Aksum and Gondar. They are called Falashas, and they speak an Agao dialect; their books are in Ge'ez. Their origin is altogether unknown to us. According to Abyssinian tradition, the Queen of Sheba, who was a princess of Aksum, was at Jerusalem instructed in the Jewish religion by Solomon and then introduced it into her own country. This is, of course, legendary, for the oldest inscriptions prove—if we need any proof—that the official religion of the Aksumitic kingdom, before it became Christian, was pagan. But this curious legend seems to reflect some historical events of which no other records have come down to our time. For a number of OT practices and ideas are integral parts of Abyssinian Christianity, and, what is more significant, the Aramaic loan-words in Ge'ez, mostly denoting religious ideas and objects, are probably of Jewish-Aramaean, not of Christian-Aramaean, origin.

1. *PAGAN ABYSSINIA*.—I. *PAGAN RELIGION OF THE AFRICAN ABORIGINES*.—As far as we know the religion of the Kunamas, it may be characterized as animistic or as ancestor-worship. For the spirits or the souls of their forefathers play the most important rôle in their religious life. Above all spirits there is the unknown Great Spirit, with whom man comes little into contact. This idea of one mysterious, almighty, supernatural being seems to pervade almost all pagan religions. The Great Spirit is far away, the other spirits are near, and are in a way mediators between mankind and the Great Spirit. He it is that gives rain, the most important and vital thing for the agricultural Kunamas, and he is probably the god of heaven, just as Wāq is among the Gallas (see below). To him only the chief of the tribe may sacrifice. At the beginning of the ploughing season the chief has a revelation bidding him immolate a red goat and a white sheep, and in return promising abundance of rain. The animals are killed, the blood is sprinkled on the ground, and the chief says: 'Behold, thou hast the blood that we have offered; now give us rain.' After that, the chief and priest eat the meat in communion with the spirits, whereupon mankind and spirit world are reconciled and friendly.

It is only upon important occasions that the priest or chief enters into action: the religious affairs of everyday life are in the hands of sorcerers and witches, i.e. men and women who are believed to have communication with the spirits, or even to be possessed by them. Sorcerers and witches are in contact with, or in the service of, either good or evil spirits. The latter form no separate caste; certain persons are believed to be poisoners or to have the evil eye. Against their power the people take refuge, or protect themselves by using a branch of the 'ghost-tree.' Naturally, members of the sorcerers' caste sometimes make ill use of their power,—and then the same remedies are used against them; but generally their work is that of prophesying, healing, and doing other miracles; in general, mediating between the people and the spirits.

The sorcerers wear women's clothes, decorate themselves with necklaces, bracelets, anklets, rings, beads, and pearls of many colours. They receive revelations from the spirits about diseases, ordinary perils, and the like, and they remedy them—or not—in return for high payment. The

witches do their duty only at a certain period, viz. the harvest time. Then the people wish to 'greet' their ancestors and to give them mead. These demoniac women all of a sudden are possessed by the spirits, fall to the ground in a state of ecstasy, and begin to speak and sing in foreign tongues. After that, they put on their trinkets, and the people 'greet' their ancestors and pour mead for them. When all have done so, a special sacrifice is offered to free the women from their possessors, and every one returns to his usual life.

Remedies against the influence of malevolent spirits are incantations and the twigs of the ghost-tree. The spirits and the tree have the same name, and in this identity of name lies the power of the latter. For instance, at the time of childbirth twigs of this tree are placed crosswise over the door of the house to protect the child. The first night after someone has died, all the spirits visit the house of the dead and drink mead: the living sit outside, with the magic twigs around the neck or the arms. Again, the next day, when a libation is offered at the grave, they protect themselves in the same way. Other trees or bushes are used to protect the cattle or the crops. The spirits of the ancestors rule and regulate the entire life of these people. They have established the laws of social and political life; in other words, these laws are based on tradition and custom. For this reason the spirits watch over the laws and punish transgressions,—above all, the omission of taking blood-vengeance.

2. *PAGAN RELIGION OF THE HAMITES*.—The pagan religion of the Hamitic tribes of Abyssinia does not seem to differ essentially from that of the aborigines. According to our sources, however, it appears that the Gallas, who nowadays are practically the only pagan Hamites in Abyssinia, have outgrown the stage of crude animism, and have developed a sort of polytheism with one highest god, and that with them, partly at least, true religiosity has taken the place of torpid fear and awe. That highest god is called Wāq (or Wāqayo), and many say he is their only god. This being seems to be 'deity' or *numen* in general, in a way to be compared, therefore, with the Semitic *ʾēl*. The noun *wāq* originally means 'heaven,' and thus the god Wāq is also named *Guracā*—a word which, as an adjective, denotes 'dark-blue,' and as a substantive 'heaven' or 'sky.' Wāq is the god of heaven, but he is omnipresent; he is everywhere in nature; he lives on mountain peaks, in high trees, near springs, in rivers, and in caves. In all these places he is worshipped with sacrifices and prayers. There are various kinds of offerings, but it seems most natural to assume that the communion between men and their god is the main idea of these offerings. This communion is effected by (a) the blood covenant; (b) the sacrificial meal. The blood is, on the one hand, poured out for the deity; on the other hand, it is smeared on the doorposts and on the foreheads of the offerers (in a line or crosswise), or sprinkled on them. The sacrificial meal is shared by deity and men: for a part is burned, the rest is eaten by men. The sacrificial animals are cattle and sheep; we even hear of 'expiatory cows.' There is also a recollection of human sacrifices among the people. The libations consist of milk and mead. All sacrifices are offered by the *pater familias*,—the head of the family,—who is at the same time their priest. On special occasions the chief of the tribe takes his place. After the animal is killed, the *ogēsa*,—'the wise man,'—the *haruspez*, comes in order to inspect the entrails and to interpret the omen. These 'wise men' form a kind of sacerdotal caste, and officiate at all important political affairs; they also interpret the flight of birds; they are *haru-*



*spices and augurs* at the same time. Of course, they consider themselves much better than the ordinary sorcerers. There seem to be certain sects among them, e.g. the sect of Abba Muda, who lives in a mysterious cave with a serpent to which offerings are made. When the members of this sect make pilgrimages to the famous cave, they wear women's clothes, let their hair grow, and perform some well-known religious duties. An example of a Galla prayer is the following: 'Thou hast made the corn to grow, and shown it to our eyes; the hungry man beholdeth it and is consoled. When the corn is ripening, thou sendest caterpillars and locusts into it, locusts and pigeons. Everything cometh from thee, thou allowest it to happen: why thou doest this, thou knowest.'

Besides Wāq, there is a host of lesser deities, who fall into two groups, viz. the 'good spirits,' named *ayāna*, and the 'evil spirits,' named *jinni*. The *ayāna* live in all places where Wāq lives, especially in rivers; but they also comprise the house-gods (*penates*) and the souls of the ancestors (*manes*). Even in a newly built house there is an *ayāna*, and crumbs are thrown on the floor for him when the people first enter the house. Individual members of this class of gods are *Kūṣa*, the god of war and of the winds; and *Atēle*, the goddess who protects women, like the Greek Eileithyia. It seems that even the personified Sabbath, called Sambata, is known as a goddess to the pagan Gallas, who must have borrowed her worship from the Falashas. Among the 'evil spirits' the *buda*, or the devil of the evil eye, is the most feared. It is well known that this superstition, so common over all Southern and Eastern countries, is particularly deep-rooted in Abyssinia. Other evil demons seem to be the monsters *banda* and *bulgu*. The former is the wolf, a demoniac animal among various peoples; the latter is explained as 'man-eater.' A special caste of sorcerers has to do with these evil spirits. Among them there are different degrees and specialists, some of whom predict the future, others cure diseases by driving out the devils, and others know the art of making good weather and of producing rain.

Sacred animals are, among others, the hyæna, the snake, the crocodile, and the owl. The hyænas eat the dead, and thus the souls enter their bodies; hence the spirits who are in the hyænas enter living men, and men—especially blacksmiths, who know magic art—change into hyænas. The snake is worshipped by almost all primitive peoples. The crocodile is sacred because it lives in the sacred rivers. Again, a certain owl is believed to be the bird of the dead; these owls are the souls of people who died unavenged. Life after death is, according to the belief of the pagan Gallas, a shadow-like existence in a sort of Hades or Sheol, called *ekerā* (taken from the Arabic *al-āhira*, 'the other,' *scil.* world, but adapted to Galla ideas).

3. PAGAN RELIGION OF THE SEMITES.—What we know about the religion of the Semitic conquerors of Abyssinia is very little indeed—scarcely anything more than a few names. Our sources are the ancient inscriptions and native tradition. According to the famous Greek inscription copied at Adulis by Kosmas Indikopleustes, the king of Aksum, who had this inscription written (1st cent. A.D.), sacrificed *τῷ Διὶ καὶ τῷ Ἀπεί καὶ τῷ Ποσειδῶνι* and erected a throne in honour of his god Ἀπρῆ. The next earliest document is that of King Aizanas, who reigned about A.D. 350. This inscription is carved in Greek, Sabæan, and Old Ethiopic. The Greek part speaks only of the god Ἀπρῆ, the Sabæan of Mahrem, 'Astar and Behēr, the Old Ethiopic of Mahrem, 'Astar and Medr. A Greek fragment from Abbā Pantaleon, a Chris-

tian shrine near Aksum, built over an ancient Sabæan sanctuary, mentions the Ἀπρῆ ἀνικητὸς of Aksum. But in only one case are all these gods found together, viz. in the first inscription of (Tā)zānā, written perhaps about A.D. 450. There the throne is dedicated to 'Astar, Behēr, and Medr; and thanks are rendered to Mahrem, the god 'who begat the king.' From this it appears that the Semites who came from South Arabia to found the Aksumitic empire worshipped the ancient triad of Heaven, Sea, and Earth. 'Astar in Tigrē means 'heaven,' and Atar-Samain (Atar, i.e. 'Astar in Aramaic, of the heavens) as well as Ištar bēlīt samā (Ishtar Lady of the Heavens) are known in Semitic mythology. Thus 'Astar is the Aksumitic god of heaven translated into Greek by Zeus. *Medr* is the Ethiopic word for 'earth,' and here it must necessarily mean the god (or goddess) of the earth. Now, if the Adulitan inscription mentions Poseidon together with Zeus, the conclusion is unavoidable that Behēr is the god of the sea, in spite of the fact that the Ethiopic word *behēr* means 'land,' and is even used in this sense in our inscriptions. We must connect it with the word *baḥr* ('sea'), and assume that, being a proper name, it retained its ancient meaning even after the common noun corresponding to it had received a different meaning of its own. Besides this triad, Ares-Mahrem, the tribal or ancestral god of the kings of Aksum, was worshipped. Since they fought many wars to establish their empire and to protect their dominions, it was most natural that they should identify Mahrem with Ares, the war-god. From the inscription of (Tā)zānā it seems that bulls and captives were sacrificed to this god. From other texts it appears that 'thrones' and statues were erected to him and the other gods. [Drawings and photographs of the thrones will be found in the publications of the German Expedition to Aksum].

In a way Mahrem-Ares may be connected with the native tradition. For the Abyssinians tell that before their ancestors adopted King Solomon's religion they worshipped a dragon, and that this dragon was their king. According to Greek mythology, Ares begat, in a cave near Thebes, a dragon, his own image. It is therefore not impossible that a similar association existed between Mahrem-Ares and the dragon, but of this no record has come down to us thus far. (A study of the Abyssinian dragon legends was published in the writer's *Bibliotheca Abyssinica*, I, pp. 17-31).

Another hint with regard to the cult of the ancient Aksumites may be taken from the great monuments of Aksum. Hitherto they have been called 'obelisks,' but they should rather be termed 'stelæ,'—stelæ, it is true, of huge dimensions, as may be seen from the illustrations in the late Mr. Bent's book, *The Sacred City of the Ethiopians*, and in the publications of the German Expedition. The stelæ is an integral part of a South Semitic tomb, and there is a certain mysterious connexion between the stone and the personality of the dead, for the stelæ is called *nephesh* ('soul'). If, then, at Aksum we find a large number of such stelæ, and among them huge highly decorated monoliths, ranging in height from 15 to 33 metres, and in front of them, or rather around them, large slabs representing, in all likelihood, altars, we may conclude, with a certain degree of probability, that these monuments served for 'ancestor-worship,' that form of religion which, as we have seen, is at the bottom of the pagan religions of Abyssinia.

II. CHRISTIAN ABYSSINIA.—Christianity became the religion of the Aksumitic empire about A.D. 450. The king (Tā)zānā was the Constantine of Abyssinia; for in his first inscription he is pagan, in the second he is Christian. In the latter he speaks of only one god, the 'Lord of Heaven,' or the 'Lord of the Land' (*egzi'a behēr*,—in Ethiopic the word for the Christian God), who enthroned him and gave him victory over his enemies. But in the king's own mind this 'Lord of Heaven' was probably not very different from 'Astar. We have no contemporaneous records of the first appearance of Christianity in Abyssinia, nor do we know whether the Jewish communities were older, or whether they had anything to do with preparing Abyssinia for the Christian faith. However this may be, the Christian kings soon regarded themselves as the protectors of the new faith, and when

the Christians in South Arabia were persecuted by a king who had adopted Judaism, a king of Aksum fought against the latter, although his main object was probably to aggrandize his empire. South Arabia had been partly Christianized by Syrian missionaries, and it is most likely that Abyssinia, too, received its Christian religion from Syria. The first missionaries are said to have been *Edesius* and *Frumentius* from Antioch, and the 'nine saints,' who about A.D. 500 strengthened Christianity, probably came from Syria. They may even have influenced the style of church architecture, since basilical plans are to be recognized in some of the most ancient churches of Abyssinia. The ancient shrines were now changed into Christian sanctuaries, the high places were dedicated to saints, and the sacred sycamore trees to the Virgin Mary. Within the first centuries of its history in Abyssinia, Christianity probably did not spread beyond the borders of the kingdom of Aksum, and it scarcely reached as far south as the Tānā Lake. In the 7th or 8th cent. great political changes must have taken place; but the history of Abyssinia, from about 650 until 1270, is shrouded in darkness. During this time many wars must have been fought between Christians and pagans, and also between Christians and Muhammadans. The outcome was that political conquest and missionary activity spread far to the south, and that the centre of the empire was transferred to the southern provinces. Abyssinian legendary history tells of many miracles performed by the saints who converted the pagan Hamites and negroes. Among them *Takla Haimānōt* (Plant of Faith), and *Gabra Manfas Qeddūs* (Servant of the Holy Ghost), were the most famous and popular. Meanwhile Abyssinia had been cut off from South Arabia, which had become Muhammadan, and had sought and found close contact with the Coptic Church of Egypt. In the Abyssinian empire itself Christianity has been the official religion ever since, and many conquered tribes have been forced to be baptized. But outside of these limits Islām made rapid progress, and at present the Christians are surrounded by Muhammadans on all sides. Many Muhammadans even live among the Christians, although the building of mosques is not allowed. The country has seen many internal quarrels concerning dogmas or ecclesiastical and secular power, and has also witnessed repeated struggles against Roman Catholicism (about 1550-1635). The greatest dangers that the Church experienced were the wars waged by *Muhammad Grān*, the Muhammadan conqueror who overran Abyssinia from 1525 to 1540. From these perils Abyssinian Christianity was finally saved by the Portuguese.

The Christian religion of Abyssinia became more and more degenerate, the more it was shut off from the rest of the civilized world, and the more the Semitic element was absorbed by other races. From time to time a king or a patriarch who was more enlightened and energetic than his fellow-countrymen tried to introduce reforms; but although they did their best, it was not very much. An altogether exceptional case is that of the monk *Zar'a-Ya'qōb* (1599-1692), who evolved a rationalistic system of religious philosophy (pub. and tr. by the present writer under the title *Philosophi Abessinii*, Paris and Leipzig, 1904).

In conclusion, it may be stated that at present there are three main divisions in the Ethiopian Church. These are: (a) those who profess *ya-segā lej* ('son of the flesh'), i.e. that Jesus was in the flesh Son of Mary only, not of God, and that the Divine nature was later infused into Him by God, but do not admit Christ's Divinity as a man; (b) the followers of the *geb'at* ('unction'), who profess that Christ, when He was anointed with the Holy Ghost

in the Jordan after His baptism, became a participant of Divinity, even as man; (c) the true Monophysites or followers of the *tawāhedō* (unity) doctrine.

*Possible Jewish traces in Abyssinian Christianity.*—As has been said above, there seems to be some connexion between Judaism and Christianity in Abyssinia. The Aramaic words in Ethiopic denoting religious ideas were apparently taken from the Jewish Aramaic rather than from the Christian Syriac. Besides this, there are traces that may indicate a Jewish influence, unless they be regarded as general Semitic, or more specially Sabæan. These are chiefly (a) the observance of the Sabbath ('Sanbat' has even been personified, and is considered a female saint. In a church at Adua, the picture of a woman with a halo, soaring in the sky over a crescent, with an angel on either side, was by some declared to be 'Sanbat,' whereas others asserted that this was the picture of the assumption of Mary); (b) the distinction between clean and unclean animals, in the main following the OT; (c) the idea of ritual uncleanness of persons who have had sexual intercourse (even if legitimate) during the day, or of women during menstruation; (d) the duty of a man to marry his deceased brother's wife, if this brother dies without a son. Among the Christians a man who has his own and his brother's wife is not considered or treated as a bigamist. On the other hand, the practice of circumcision is general, being Semitic and Hamitic (even the girls are circumcised and infibulated), and the sacred dance may just as well be pagan as Jewish. With regard to images, the Ethiopian Church allows painted pictures, but no graven images.

*Pagan traces in Abyssinian Christianity and Islām.*—The excessive and unbounded cult of the Virgin Mary, which even the Muhammadans share to some extent, must in a way reflect the cult of a deposed pagan goddess. Mary lives on high mountains, at springs, and in the sycamore trees, which in ancient Egypt were sacred to Hathor. Who the pagan prototype of Mary was we cannot determine; she may have been Allāt of the Arabs, or 'Earth Mother,' scarcely Ishtar, the 'Lady of Heaven,' since 'Astar was a male deity in ancient Abyssinia. Furthermore, there is a large number of saints who have performed, and still perform, miracles of all sorts; one of them, the famous *Gabra Manfas Qeddūs* (see above), commonly called *Gāber*, even opposed successfully the will of God. Again, the Christians and Muhammadans believe in a host of evil spirits in the same way as the pagans do. These spirits live in dark places or near the cemeteries; they gather around the doors or haunt barren spots where no grass grows (like the elves in Northern Germany), or, finally, they possess animals, like the hyæna, the wolf, and the snake, and especially human beings. The devil that usually enters into people and makes them mad or sick is called *Waddegenni* (demon's son) among the Tigre, and *Tegerti* (probably of African origin) in Tigrina. Then there is the famous Abyssinian Lilit, called *Werzelyā*, the demoness who makes a business of killing little children, etc. These spirits are driven out by burning the root (or a branch) of the ghost-tree. They are 'smoked out,' or they are exorcised by incantations. Magic prayers, written on scrolls or small booklets, and carried in little leather cases around the neck or the arms, are exceedingly common in Abyssinia. They deal with all possible dangers, and are good not only against many different diseases caused by the demons, but also against snakes, leopards, hyænas, drought, hail, locusts, and the like. Even the animal world has to suffer from devils in its midst, for the *debbi* or *dūbbi*, described as somewhat smaller than a



dog, drives every other animal away wherever it goes.

It deserves to be mentioned also that among the Tigré tribes, tales about the doings of certain stars—star-myths, so to speak—are to be found which may possibly reflect ancient star-worship. The remnants of moon-worship among the same people are more pronounced.

A very conspicuous remnant of paganism is the idea of a nether world, where the shades live until the Day of Judgment. The shades or 'people of below' (*sab tahat* in Tigré) often appear to the living in dreams, or they punish a man by beating him, if he does not fulfil his duty of blood-vengeance, or is niggardly enough not to offer the proper sacrifices to the dead. The souls of those who die unavenged or before they have attained their desires, are changed into a kind of owl (*gân* in Tigré), and howl and screech until they are avenged, or until some descendant or relative carries out their designs.

LITERATURE.—Nilsson in *Vorles. Ljus* (Nordisk Missionsskälender) for 1905, pp. 159-164; Panitzske, *Ethnographische Nordost-Afrika*, also *Harar*; Cecchi, *Da Zeila alle frontiere del Caffa*; Dillmann, 'Über die Anfänge des Axumitischen Reiches' (*ABA W.*, 1878), also 'Zur Gesch. des Axumit. Reiches im vierten bis sechsten Jahrhundert' (ib. 1880); Müller, 'Epigraphische Denkmäler aus Abessinien' (*ABA W.*, 1894); Basset, *Les Apocryphes Ethiopiens*; Littmann, 'The Princeton Ethiopic Magic Scroll' (*Princeton University Bulletin*, 1903-1904), also 'Arde'et, the Magic Book of the Disciples' (*JAOS.*, 1904). Other material will be found in the Publications of the German Expedition to Aksum (preliminary report in *ABA W.*, 1906), edited by the present writer, and in the Publications of the Princeton University Expedition to Abyssinia, by the same.

E. LITTMANN.

**ACADEMY, ACADEMICS.**—The Academy ('*Ἀκαδημία*, older form '*Ἐκαδήμεια*, later '*Ἀκαδημία*'), so called from the local hero Akademos or Hekademos, was one of the three great gymnasia outside the walls of Athens, the others being the Lyceum and the Cynosarges. It was situated less than a mile from the Dipylon Gate, off the road which ran N.W. through the outer Ceramicus, among the olive groves below Colonus Hippius. As a gymnasium it already existed in the time of the Pisistratids, but it was Cimon that laid it out as a public park with shady avenues of plane trees (*Plut. Cim.* 13). Here was the precinct of Athena with the twelve sacred olives (*μυριαί*), and the ancient pedestal (*ἀρχαία βάσις*) with representations of Herakles and Prometheus, which formed the starting-point of the torch-race at the Lampadēdromia (Apollodorus *ap. schol. Soph. Œd. Col.* 57). This last worship gave rise to several features of the Prometheus myth.

It was in the Academy that Plato founded the first Athenian philosophical school, the idea being doubtless suggested to him by the Pythagorean societies, such as those of Thebes and Phlius (cf. the *Phædo*), and possibly by that of his friend Euclides at Megara. The school possessed a shrine of the Muses (*μουσεῖον*), at which votive statues (*ἀναθήματα*) were dedicated (*Diog. Laert.* iii. 25, iv. 1, 19), and Antigonus of Carystus (*ap. Athen.* xii. 547 f., 548a) spoke of a 'sacrificer' (*ιεροποιός*) and an 'attendant of the Muses' (*Μουσῶν ἐπιμελητής*) as officials of the school. He also spoke of the monthly common meals (*συσείτια*) as religious acts (*ἵνα φαίνωνται τὸ θεῖον τιμῶντες*). From all this it has been inferred by Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (*Philol. Unters.* iv. 263 ff.) that the legal status of the Academy was that of a religious association (*θίασος*). That, indeed, was the only form which a corporation could take at Athens, and it was of great importance that membership of such associations was open to others than Athenian citizens.

The original property of the society was a house and garden, in which Plato and most of his successors lived. It is not quite certain whether the place of teaching was here or in the actual gymnasium; for the name 'Academy' is given to

both. A semicircular marble bench (*exedra, sessio*) still existed in Cicero's days, which was at least as old as the scholararchate of Polemo (*Cic. de Fin.* v. 2, 4). It is not certain whether the scholararchs (*σχολάρχαι*) were elected or selected by their predecessors. The official title seems to have been *diadochus* (*διδάχος*, 'successor'). After the siege of Athens by Sulla (86 B.C.), the suburbs became unhealthy, and the school was moved into the town; but the house and garden remained in its possession to the end.

From an early date it was customary to distinguish the Old and the New Academy, though Philo (see below) objected to this (*Cic. Acad.* i. 13). The Old Academy includes the immediate followers of Plato, the New begins with Arcesilas, who introduced the sceptical doctrine for which the school was best known from the 3rd to the 1st cent. B.C. Later writers speak of three Academies, beginning the Middle with Arcesilas and the New with Carneades. Others added a fourth consisting of Philo and his followers, and a fifth consisting of Antiochus and his (*Sext. Pyrrh.* i. 220). All these divisions only mark stages in a continuous history.

1. The 'Old Academy' carried on the discussion of the problems which Plato had raised in his oral teaching. In the main, these were mathematical, and concerned with the distinction between continuous and discrete quantity. The former Plato calls in the *Philebus* the 'unlimited' (*ἄπειρον*), but we know from Aristotle that in his oral teaching it was called 'the great-and-small' (*τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρόν*). The problem was to show how discrete or 'ideal' numbers (*εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί*) could arise from this, and similarly how 'magnitudes' (*μεγέθη*) could arise from continuous and infinitely divisible space by the introduction of limit (*τὸ πέρας*). If once we get to magnitudes, it may be possible to give at least a tentative mathematical construction of the 'elements,' and even of the things of sense.

The true glory of the Old Academy is the impulse which it gave to mathematical science by the study of these problems. Solid geometry, trigonometry, and conic sections all took their rise from this source, and the new conception of continuous quantity led to the solution of many old difficulties. Eudoxus of Cnidus and Heraclides Ponticus, both members of the Academy in Plato's time, attacked the problem of the solar system with extraordinary boldness, and prepared the way for the great discovery of the sun's central position by Aristarchus of Samos (c. 160 B.C.). It is unfortunate that most of our knowledge of the Old Academy comes from Aristotle, who was not in sympathy with the mathematical movement of his time.

Plato was succeeded by his nephew Speusippus (scholarch 347-339 B.C.). Xenocrates and Aristotle at once left Athens, the former returning later to succeed Speusippus, the latter to found a rival society.

Speusippus regarded number as arising from the union of unity (*τὸ εἷς*) and plurality (*τὸ πλῆθος*), but he made no attempt to derive magnitudes and other forms of reality (*ὄντα*) from numbers. He explained them instead as parallel series formed on the analogy of number. Magnitudes, for instance, arose from the union of 'something like unity' (the point) with 'something like' plurality, and so on with souls and sensible things (*Arist. Met.* 1028b, 9 ff., 1075b, 37 ff., 1085a, 31 ff., 1090b, 13 ff.). His most characteristic doctrine, however, was his denial of the identity of the Good and the One. The Good was not 'in the beginning' (*ἐν ἀρχῇ*), but reveals itself (*ἐμφανίζεται*) in the process of development. As in the case of plants and animals, it is only in the 'full-grown' (*τὸ τέλειον*) that we see the Good (*Arist. Met.* 1072b, 30 ff., 1091b, 14 ff.). Speusippus is thus the originator of the 'teleologi-

cal' (derived from *τέλειον*, 'full-grown') or evolutionary view of the world, and this explains the fact that he wrote chiefly on biological subjects. We know from the quotations of Athenæus that in his ten books of 'Similars' (*Ὅμοια*) he discussed shellfish and mushrooms. It is in accordance, too, with this evolutionary standpoint that he regarded sense-perception as rudimentary science (*ἐπιστημονική αίσθησις*), and that he defined happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*) as the 'full-grown state' (*ἐξῆς τελεία*) of those in a natural condition (*ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν*). It was not pleasure; for pleasure and pain were two evils, opposed to one another, and also to the middle state of 'imperturbability' (*ἀσχησία*), which is the happiness aimed at by good men (Clem. *Strom.* ii. 21).

Xenocrates of Chalcodon (scholarch 339-314 B.C.) spoke of the limit and the unlimited as the 'unit' (*μονάς*) and the 'indeterminate dyad' (*ἀόριστος δυάς*), and he reverted to the strictly Platonic view of the 'ideal numbers' (*εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί*). It is characteristic of him that he was fond of religious language, calling the unit the Father, and the dyad the Mother, of the gods. The heaven of the fixed stars was also a god, and so were the planets. When we come to the 'sublunary' (*ὑποσέληνος*) sphere, however, we find 'demons' (*δαίμονες*)—beings who, like Eros in the *Symposium*, are intermediate between gods and men. The souls of men were also 'demons' (Arist. *Top.* 112a, 37), though the scientific definition of a soul was 'a self-moving number.' This theory of 'demons' had, of course, an enormous influence upon later theology, both Platonist and Christian, and marks Xenocrates as the originator of the 'emanationist' view of the world, as opposed to the 'evolutionary' view of Speusippus. It is important to notice, however, that he was quite conscious of the allegorical character of this doctrine. He asserted that his account of the creation was only a device intended to make his theory clear for purposes of instruction. Really, the creation of the world was eternal or timeless, a view which, he maintained, had also been that of Plato (Plut. *An. Procr.* 3).

Like Speusippus, Xenocrates was inclined to attach much value to rudimentary forms of knowledge. He distinguished *φρόνησις* as the wisdom possible to man from *σοφία* or complete knowledge, and he thought that even irrational animals might have the idea of God and immortality. In his ethics he was less ascetic than Speusippus, and attached importance to the possession of the power which ministers to goodness (*πνευματική δύναμις*), that is, to 'external goods' (Clem. *Strom.* ii. 22, v. 13).

The next two scholars, Polemo and Crates, seem to have busied themselves almost entirely with popular ethics. The most distinguished member of the Academy in their time was Crantor, who wrote a much admired treatise on mourning (*Περὶ πένθους*). He was a disciple of Xenocrates, but died before Crates, and was never scholarch.

2. The 'New Academy' ('Middle Academy' according to those who reckon the New from Carneades) begins with Arcesilas (scholarch 270?-241 B.C.), who made use of the weapons provided by scepticism to combat the Stoic theory of 'comprehension' (*κατάληψις*) as a criterion of truth intermediate between knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) and belief (*δόξα*). As he appears to have left no writings, we cannot tell how far his scepticism really went, though Cicero certainly states that he denied the possibility of knowledge (*Acad.* i. 44). On the other hand, Sextus Empiricus says that his Pyrrhonism was merely apparent, and that he taught Platonic dogmatism to the inner circle of his disciples, quoting in support of this a verse of his contemporary Ariston of Chios, describing him as a sort of Chimæra, 'Plato in front, Pyrrho behind,

and Diodorus in the middle.' In any case, we must remember that Plato himself had denied the possibility of knowledge as regards the world of sense, and it was quite natural that this side of his teaching should become the most prominent in an age of dogmatic materialism. The next scholarch, Lacydes (241-215 B.C.), continued the tradition of Arcesilas. Of his successors, Telecles, Euander, and Hegesinus, we know nothing.

The most distinguished head of the New Academy was Carneades of Cyrene (214-129 B.C.), who threw himself whole-heartedly into the attack on Stoicism as represented by Chrysippus. In 156 B.C. he came to Rome as ambassador, with the Stoic Diogenes and the Peripatetic Critolaus, and astonished the Romans by his power of arguing both for and against justice and the like (*in utramque partem disputare*). Like Arcesilas, he wrote nothing, but his arguments were preserved by his successor Clitomachus. They were directed against all theories which admitted a 'criterion' of truth; but, on the other hand, he himself set up three criteria of probability as necessary for practical life and the pursuit of happiness. In ordinary matters we take 'probable impression' (*πιθανή φαντασία*) as our criterion; in important matters the impression must also be 'incapable of distortion' by other impressions (*ἀπερίσπαστος*), while in those which pertain to our happiness, it must also be 'tested and approved' (*διεξωδευμένη*). The Stoic doctrine of 'assent' (*συγκατάθεσις*) to a 'comprehending impression' (*καταληπτική φαντασία*) can yield no more than this.

Carneades died in his eighty-fifth year (129 B.C.), and was succeeded by Clitomachus of Carthage, who was succeeded by Philo of Larissa. During the Mithridatic war (88 B.C.), Philo took refuge at Rome, where he had Cicero as an enthusiastic student. Sextus tells us distinctly (*Pyrrh.* i. 235) that he held things were in their own nature 'comprehensible' (*καταληπτά*), though 'incomprehensible' (*ἀκατάληπτα*) so far as the Stoic criterion went. His disciple Antiochus of Ascalon broke with the tradition of Carneades altogether, and even with the teaching of Philo, whom he succeeded. He held that all Stoic doctrines were to be found in Plato, and that the differences of the Peripatetics and Stoics from the Academy were merely verbal. Cicero heard him at Athens in 79 B.C., and it was on his teaching that he based his own Academic eclecticism.

After Antiochus the history of the Academy is a blank for many generations. Neoplatonism did not originate within it, and was not introduced into it till the 5th cent. A.D. by Plutarch of Athens († c. 430 A.D.). His successor Proclus is an important figure in the history of philosophy and religion, but he does not concern us here. The school produced in its last days some distinguished commentators on Plato and Aristotle, notably Simplicius the Cilician and Damascius the Syrian. Damascius was the last scholarch; for, in 529 A.D., Justinian closed the school and confiscated its revenues, amounting to 1000 gold pieces, of which Plato's garden brought in only three. Damascius, with Simplicius and some others, took refuge at the court of Chosroës, king of Persia, who was supposed to be devoted to philosophy. They were disappointed in him, however, and returned on the conclusion of peace, when Chosroës made it a condition that they should not be molested in their religious faith and observances (Agath. *Hist.* ii. 30). Simplicius speaks with excusable bitterness of Christian theology; but the best of Platonism, as then understood, had already been absorbed by that very theology, and the work of the Academy was done, at least for the time. When Justinian closed it, it had lasted over nine hundred years.

LITERATURE (in addition to the histories of philosophy).—On the topography, see Wachsmuth, *Stadt Athen*, i. 255 ff., 270 f., 290 f.; on the organization, *Academicorum philosophorum index Herculaneensis*, ed. Bücheler (Greifswald, 1869-1870); Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Philol. Unters.* iv. 263 ff. For Speusippus, see Ravaisson, *Speusippi de primis rerum principis* (Paris, 1833); for Xenocrates, Heinze, *Xenocrates* (Leipzig, 1892); for New Academy, Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften*, Leipzig, 1877-1883.

JOHN BURNET.

**ACCEPTANCE.**—'Acceptance,' as a Scriptural and theological term, may be said to denote a state of favour in the sight of God which men may enjoy when they fulfil the conditions upon which such favour depends. The gracious purpose of God which the mission of His Son fully reveals, has in view the establishing of a state of reconciliation in which men may find abiding acceptance for themselves and their service, and share in all the benefits of redemption. But the idea of acceptance, as presented in Scripture, does not depend either upon redemption actually accomplished, or upon any prescribed measure of knowledge or of character. It is everywhere taken for granted that the way to the Divine favour has always been open, and that it may be secured everywhere by a true heart and an obedient spirit, in which there is always the pledge that all available means will be used to attain to a life well-pleasing to God. There can be no barrier to forgiveness and acceptance but in the sin and unbelief of men.

Yet the actual conditions in which this state is reached in Scripture cover a wide field of experience, and belong to all stages of revelation, and are described in various terms which give prominence to different aspects of the conception. A cursory glance at the numerous instances in which the persons or the conduct of men are spoken of as finding acceptance with God, will show that this favour has been open to men in all ages and in all conditions of human life. Yet there are special means calculated to secure it which revelation seeks to make known, along with the objective grounds upon which, in the economy of redemption, it is established and guaranteed to men. The full knowledge of these was not possible before Christian times, yet it is clear that God has always and everywhere been gracious and friendly in His relations with men. Nowhere is it taught that He is by nature hostile, as heathen gods were often supposed to be, or that His favour can be procured by costly gifts or sacrifices. On the contrary, the gift and sacrifice of His Son are the highest proof of His love that could be given (Jn 3<sup>16</sup>, Ro 5<sup>8</sup>).

(1) There is the wide sphere of religious experience which the worship of God by sacrifice may be said to cover; of which Gn 8<sup>21</sup> may be taken as a type. Of Noah's sacrifice it is said: 'The Lord smelled a sweet savour; and the Lord said in his heart, I will not again curse the ground any more for man's sake.' This language shows the favour with which this sacrifice was regarded, and the effect it had upon the future course of the world. It was an act which consecrated a new world. Similar phraseology is frequently used, both of the purpose which sacrifice had in view, and of the result which it effected in procuring favour for the worshipper. Whether all worship in the earlier ages was expressed by sacrifice or not, it is obvious that sacrifice constituted the central and essential feature of it, and genuine piety would naturally seek satisfaction in the faithful observance of all prescribed forms. This tendency exposed the worshipper to the danger of externalism and mere work-righteousness. The religious consciousness in its OT form was based on the thought that sacrifice was the appropriate form for acknowledging God and mediating His favour. In the different kinds of offerings and in a ritual appropriate to each, the Law provided for

a wide variety of religious need; and in the faithful observance of what the Law had prescribed, the true Israelite could assure himself of acceptance in the presence of Jahweh.

(2) To what extent the character of the worshipper was an essential element in acts of sacrifice in early times, it is not easy to determine. It is not likely that the religious acts even of primitive men would stand out of all relation to their habitual life. With the advance of culture, however, increased importance would come to be attached to the spirit of worship as contrasted with the form. And once it became clear that the two might be not only different but even opposed, as was manifest in the time of the Prophets, then the call would begin to be made for mercy and not sacrifice, for righteousness in life and conduct rather than multitudes of sacrifices. Yet the maxim that obedience is better than sacrifice (1 S 15<sup>22</sup>, Is 1<sup>16</sup>, Mic 6<sup>8</sup>) was not new in the time of Isaiah. It was an element in the regulation of worship from the first, and its importance increased with a deepening sense of the inner character of religion; especially when it began to be felt that the outward forms of worship were subject to change. The movement to restrict worship by sacrifice to one central sanctuary, whenever or however it originated, is a sure sign of the decadence of the old belief, and shows that sacrifice was unsuitable as a general and universal medium of worship. That the Prophets were against all sacrifices, wherever they might be offered, cannot be made out. Yet the old corruptions of the high places, which had invaded the Temple in their day, gave point to their loud rebukes and increased the longing for a new and better time. It cannot be said, however, that the Prophets taught indifference to sacrifice as such. In any case, the worth of the latter as a religious act was always dependent upon the moral state of the worshipper, and this circumstance explains their insistence upon moral conditions, upon 'clean hands and a pure heart' as necessary to acceptance with God.

(3) The broad principle of acceptance in its widest universality may be inferred from the spiritual nature of God, as in Christ's words to the woman of Samaria (Jn 4<sup>24</sup> 'God is spirit, and they that worship him must worship in spirit and in truth'). It is well expressed by St. Peter in the case of Cornelius (Ac 10<sup>44-45</sup> 'Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons: but in every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him').

(4) But, while the broad principle of acceptance is contained implicitly in the revealed character of God, and was boldly proclaimed by the Prophets, it is never realized as a living experience except in the life of faith and obedience, in the life which, based on the redeeming work of Christ, seeks for and accepts all available helps both to know and to do the will of God.

LITERATURE.—Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, vi. (Eng. tr. 1899) pp. 196 f., 203 f.; Morris, *Theology of the Westminster Symbols* (1900), p. 442 f.; A. Stewart in Hastings' *DB*; E. B. Pollard in *DCC*. See also ACCEPTILATION, ACCESS, ATONEMENT, FORGIVENESS, JUSTIFICATION.

A. F. SIMPSON.

**ACCEPTILATION** is a term which, like many others, has passed from Roman law to Christian theology. According to its derivation, *acceptilatio* means 'a reckoning as received,' *acceptum* being the proper name for the credit side of the ledger. In Roman law, however, the term had a special technical use. It meant the discharge of an obligation by the use of a solemn and prescribed form of words, in which the debtor asked the creditor if he had received payment, and the creditor replied that he had—no real payment, however, having taken place. Gaius consequently says that acceptilation

resembles an imaginary payment. This method of discharge was properly applicable only to obligations contracted verbally by stipulation, i.e. by the use of a similar solemn form of words, in which the creditor asked the debtor to own his debt, and the debtor did so. Obligations contracted in other ways could, however, be transformed into verbal obligations by the use of a special stipulation invented for the purpose, named the Aquilian, and could thus be made terminable by acceptilation. See Gaius, *Inst.* iii. 169; Justinian, *Inst.* iii. 29. 1 and 2, *Digest.* 'de Acceptilatione,' xlv. 4.

In Christian theology, the term 'acceptilation' is commonly used in a loose sense to denote the principle of that theory of the Atonement, in which the merit of Christ's work is regarded as depending simply on the Divine acceptance, and not on its own intrinsic worth. This theory was taught by Duns Scotus, who says that 'every created offering is worth what God accepts it at, and no more,' and further, that Christ's human merit was in itself strictly limited, but God in His good pleasure accepted it as sufficient for our salvation (*Com. in Sent.* lib. iii. dest. 19). Fisher accordingly says of Duns Scotus: 'He holds to what is termed the theory of "acceptilation." The Saviour's work becomes an equivalent (for the debt of sin) simply because God graciously wills to accept it as such' (*Hist. of the Chr. Church*, 1894, p. 222). Ritschl has sharply criticised the description of the doctrine of Duns as one of acceptilation. He says: 'It is incredible, but it is a fact that the expression "acceptilatio" is used almost universally as equivalent to "acceptatio," as though it presupposed a verb *acceptilare*. For instance, Schneckenburger (*Lehrbegriffe der kl. prot. Kirchenparteien*, p. 18) speaks of the acceptilation of the merit of Christ in Duns Scotus' (*Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, i. p. 323, note). The theory of Duns Scotus is certainly not very suitably spoken of as one of acceptilation. In the solution of an obligation by acceptilation there is no payment at all; whereas, in the theory of Duns there is a payment, though it is accepted beyond its intrinsic value. But the usage of applying the name 'acceptilation' to Duns's theory is probably too confirmed to be done away with. It is to be understood, then, that the term is used only loosely. The danger of such usage is, however, shown by the fact that Shedd (*Hist. of Christ. Doct.* 1862, vol. ii. p. 348) not merely states that Duns Scotus taught a doctrine of acceptilation, but actually speaks of him as having transferred the term 'acceptilatio' to the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction—a statement which is historically quite inaccurate.

The confusion which has gathered round the term does not, however, end here. It has been used even more indefensibly than in the case of Duns Scotus to describe the doctrine of the Atonement taught by Socinus. The only excuse for this is that Socinus states his preference for the view of Duns Scotus just described, in contrast to the orthodox Protestant view according to which the death of Christ was a strict satisfaction for sin ('de Jesu Christo Servatore,' Pars Tertia, cap. vi. in *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*, 1656). His positive teaching is, however, quite different. 'Jesus Christ is our Saviour because He announced to us the way of life eternal, confirmed it (by His miracles and His death), and showed clearly in His own Person, both by the example of His life and by His resurrection from the dead, that He would give us life eternal, if we put faith in Him' (Pars Prima, cap. i.; cf. cap. iii.). Grotius, however, accuses Socinus of applying the legal word 'acceptilation' to the remission of sins, which God grants us, and then waxes eloquent upon the fallacies involved in such usage (*Defensio Fidei Catholicæ de Satisfactione*

*Christi*, cap. iii. Oxon. 1637). The only explanation of the language of Grotius seems to be that he had misread or misunderstood a passage in Socinus, where he criticises Beza for using the word 'acceptilation' in explaining St. Paul's doctrine of imputation ('de Jesu Christo Servatore,' Pars Quarta, cap. ii.). The Socinian theologian Crell points out the mistake in his 'Responsio ad Grotium' (ad cap. iii. in *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*, 1656); it is he who tells us that it was Beza whom Socinus had in view. Crell, however, did not succeed in preventing the general impression that Socinus taught a doctrine of acceptilation. We still find Turretin saying (*de Satisfactionis Christi Necessitate*, Disp. xx. cap. x.): 'We admit no Socinian acceptilation'; though his Disputations on the Satisfaction of Christ did not appear till 1666 (enlarged edition, 1687; see Turretin's *Works*, Edin. 1848, vol. i. p. xlii).

ROBERT S. FRANKS.

ACCESS.—'Access' is the term used in the NT to denote the privilege and right of approach to God which men have through Jesus Christ. The term occurs in three places (Ro 5<sup>2</sup>, Eph 2<sup>18</sup> and 3<sup>12</sup>), and in each of these as the tr. of προσ-αγγιγή. The importance of the conception may be inferred from the circumstance that the article accompanies the term in two of these instances, indicating that the thing spoken of has an acknowledged and familiar place in Christian faith. In classical literature the transitive use of προσ-αγγιγή is by far the more common; and several commentators of note maintain that it should be so read in the texts cited. It would thus = 'introduction,' and, so taken, the term will have a narrower meaning than that associated with 'access.' The usage of courts in which access to kings was obtained through a προσάγγελος or sequester, if taken to explain our 'introduction' to the Father, does certainly suggest something less than seems implied in the above given texts.

It is quite true that the word is often used both of persons and things in the sense of leading up to or towards, and this much at least Christ accomplishes for us in bringing us to God. Yet the introduction which we have in Him implies not a passing event or incident at the beginning of the Christian life, but something which is always valid, and which establishes and secures for us an open way of approach together with all the privileges of children of God. Even if we hold strictly to the transitive meaning of the term, we must so explain it as to imply the further blessings and privileges which introduction brings and secures; and this Meyer readily does. This consideration has doubtless inclined most commentators to favour the intransitive sense of the word and to render it by 'access.' This use of προσάγγιγή, though rare, is not without support (see Plutarch, *Æmil. P.* 13; Polyb. x. 1. 6). Most of the versions take this view; the RV adhering to 'access' of the AV; and the same view appears in some of the older English versions. Tindale has 'a way in through faith,' 'an open way in'; Cranmer and the Geneva, 'an entrance,' 'an open way in.' The Rheims version, like the RV, adheres to 'access.' Luther and various German versions render by Zugang, similar in meaning to 'access'; and this term is now consecrated by long usage in English, and could not easily be supplanted by another.

Though the passive aspect of the conception is more prominent in 'access,' as the active is in προσάγγιγή, there is in the associations of the word a blending of the two which must be kept in mind in order to realize the full force of the Apostle's use of it. The essential points in the conception are obvious in the three texts where the word stands.

(1) In Ro 5<sup>2</sup> it is used of the entrance upon, or the introduction to, the state of grace, or the Christian state, which in the context is described as that of justification, of acceptance and peace. This state is a new relation to God which is established and constituted by the Redeemer's gracious and atoning sacrifice, the benefits of which are immediately secured by faith. These benefits embrace the whole content of the Christian salvation—justification, acceptance, all the privileges of Divine sonship, with the hope of coming glory.

Our access to this state has been established through the incarnation and death of the Son of God, who bears away the sins of men and gives them power to become sons of God. It is not merely an open way; it is an actual leading of men into this blessed state by One who takes them in hand and conducts them into the blessedness and peace of the Divine kingdom.

(2) In Eph 2<sup>18</sup> it is clear that much more is meant than the open way to God. It is an actual and effectual introduction of a personal kind which begins a state of friendship and fellowship by means of the indwelling spirit common to all believers. In the former text the Christian state as a whole is in view, as that to which Christ introduces us; here we are shown the still higher sphere of Divine fellowship, of filial privilege and power which Christ opens up to us, and into which He conducts us. Jew and Gentile have their access to the Father through the Son by one Spirit. All outward differences which separate and divide men fall away in presence of the higher unity which is produced by the life of God mediated by Christ and the Spirit of Christ.

(3) In Eph 3<sup>12</sup> access is viewed as a standing condition of the life of faith, a state of exalted confidence, boldness, and freedom which faith in Christ ever sustains and renews. It secures all the possibilities of a free and joyous fellowship, and provides the power by which the energies and needs of the higher life may be sustained and filled. The filial spirit is nourished and enlarged from the fulness of the Divine life and love.

The idea of access to God through Christ differs in many respects from that access which must be open to man as a spiritual being. This latter is never denied but rather taken for granted in Scripture. Compared with the former, however, it can never come into competition with it, or supply its place. In the light about God which Christianity reveals, it soon becomes clear that none but Christ can lead us to Him. The Father whom the Son reveals can never be known or approached through any save the Son. The incarnation and mission of the Son, accepted and believed, must henceforth determine the character of our access to God. This St. Paul has very clearly perceived, and he has brought the thought to clear formal expression. It appears in various parts of the NT: in the Fourth Gospel as a general principle of Christianity (Jn 14<sup>6</sup>), in Hebrews and 1 Peter in closer relation to St. Paul. As a broad principle, we readily see that we cannot have real access to God except amid the conditions which Christianity has established, both as to the character of God and the way of acceptable service and worship. Yet it is important to keep in mind that the NT ascribes our access specifically to the great sacrifice which removes the barrier of sin and establishes peace and friendship between God and men (He 10<sup>19, 20</sup>, 1 P 3<sup>18</sup>).

A use of the word 'access,' different from, but related to that given above, is found in some liturgical writers, by whom the term is employed to characterize and describe certain prayers in the old Liturgies and in the Roman service of the Mass. It is applied to one of the prayers offered by the officiating priest in approaching the altar at the commencement of the service, and also to brief prayers for people and priest which immediately precede the act of communion. In some editions these prayers are noted in the margin as 'Prayer of Access' or 'Prayer of humble Access.' The prayers in question express generally deep humility in presence of the Divine greatness, and ask for the necessary preparation. It is to be noted, however, that the term does not stand in the text of the Liturgies, either in the prayers or in the rubrics which direct the order of the service. It is a word of the editors and commentators, and one has difficulty in discovering the special aptness of the term with reference to the prayers which are so described, there being many others of the same character throughout the service. The explanation probably is that the approach of the priest to the altar at the commencement, and the nearing of the wor-

shippers to the Divine presence in the consecrated and now transformed elements, are the two points in which access to Deity now present in the great Sacrament begins and culminates. In this sense the term is apt enough, as it expresses the view of the Supper which is already latent in the old Liturgies and is seen fully developed in the Roman Missal. (See Hammond's *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, Clarendon Press, 1878).

LITERATURE.—J. O. F. Murray in *Hastings' DBI* i. 22; D. A. Mackinnon in *OGG* i. 12; the Comm., esp. B. F. Westcott on *Hebrews* and J. A. Robinson on *Ephesians*; *Expos.* iv. (1890) ii. 131, n. [1882] iv. 321; W. Robertson Nicoll, *The Church's One Foundation* (1901), 43; J. G. Tasker, *Spiritual Religion* (Fernley Lect. 1901), pp. 105, 123; W. P. Du Bose, *The Gospel acc. to St. Paul* (1907), 143.

A. F. SIMPSON.

**ACCIDENT** (*accidens*, συμβεβηκός).—1. One of the five *Predicables* (*accidens prædicabile*).—According to Mill, under *accidens* 'are included all attributes of a thing which are neither involved in the signification of the name, nor have, so far as we know, any necessary connexion with attributes which are so involved' (*Logic*, vol. i. p. 149). This, allowing for the Nominalist standpoint of Mill, is the same view as that contained in Aldrich's definition, 'that which is predicated as contingently joined to the essence,' as contrasted with *proprium* which is predicated as necessarily joined. Some such definition or its equivalent is given by most writers on *Logic*, and is, according to Mansel, (*Aldrich*, 4th ed. p. 25), found in Albertus Magnus (*de Prædicat.* Tract ii. cap. 1).

The view taken by Aristotle is different. The attribute of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right angles, which on the ordinary view would be a *proprium*, is by him regarded as an accident (*Metaphys.* iv. 30). The distinction between property and accident in Aristotle turns on the convertibility or non-convertibility of the attribute. It is essential to the Aristotelian property (*ἰδιότης*) that it should be present in certain objects and in them alone. If present in other objects, it is either identical with the genus, or it is not. If not, it is an accident. The test of an accident is that it is common to heterogeneous things. Aristotle at the same time recognizes that that which, simply considered, is an accident may become in a certain relation and at a certain time a property. He gives two definitions of 'accident': (1) 'that which is neither definition nor property nor genus, but is in the thing'; (2) 'that which is able to be in and not to be in one and the same individual' (*Top.* i. 5). Porphyry gives a third definition: 'that which is present and absent without destruction of the subject' (*Isagoge*, v.).

Aristotle recognizes two classes of 'accidents': those which are necessarily connected with the essence and deducible from it (*συμβεβηκός καὶ αὐτό*); and those which are not (cf. Ueberweg, *Hist. of Philos.*, Eng. tr. vol. i. p. 155, and Grote's *Aristotle*, vol. i. p. 142 note). Sanderson in his *Logic* (*Works*, vol. vi. p. 10) distinguishes separable and inseparable accident thus: Separable—that which can be actually separated from its subject, as cold from water; Inseparable—that which cannot be separated except in the intellect, as wetness from water. Aldrich gives a similar distinction. Mansel and most logicians define the inseparable accidents of a class as those accidents which, though not connected with the essence either by way of cause or consequence, are as a matter of fact found in all the members of the class; the separable accidents as those found in some members of the class and not in others. The inseparable accidents of an individual are those which can be predicated of their subject at all times; the separable only at certain times.

2. *Accident, Fallacy of*.—This fallacy is generally considered as arising when we infer that whatever agrees with a thing considered simply in itself agrees with the same thing when qualified

by some accident. Aristotle's view of the fallacy was different. He defines it as arising 'when it is held that anything belongs in a similar way to a subject and to the accident of that subject.' This definition does not mean merely that the attribute is assumed to exist along with both subject and accident, but that the mode of attachment is the same (*Soph. Elench.* v.). The condition of valid reasoning which Aristotle here lays down, is precisely the same as Herbert Spencer (*Psychology*, vol. ii. ch. v.) has in view when he speaks of 'connature.' Aristotle regards the nine categories which follow substance as accidents, and the classification itself may be regarded as a classification of 'connatures.'

3. *Accident in relation to substance.*—Sir W. Hamilton (*Lectures*, vol. i. p. 150) says 'accident' is employed in reference to a substance as existing; the terms 'phenomenon,' 'appearance' in reference to it as known. The Scholastics distinguished 'accident' in this sense as *accidens prædicamentale* or categorical accident from *accidens prædicabile* or logical accident (Aquinas, *Summ. Theol.* i. q. 77, a. 1-5). The former is the wider term. 'Accident' in this sense is defined as *ens entis*, or *ens in alio*, substance being *ens per se*. Thomas Aquinas (*ib.* iii. q. 77, a. 1) says the proper definition is not actual inherence in a subject, but aptitude to inhere. The chief reason of this definition is that in the doctrine of Transubstantiation the accidents of bread and wine remain when the substance is changed. The substance of the body and blood cannot be affected by the accidents, therefore these must be capable of existing apart from their substance, being supported by Divine power. This has led to a distinction of three kinds of accidents: (1) *metaphysical*, accident which, although we may conceive the substance without it, is nevertheless identified with it. There is a *distinctio rationis ratiocinata* between them. Opposed to this is physical accident, which, if different from the substance itself as thing or entity, is (2) *absolute* or real, as quantity, motion. If it signifies merely a state of being, as to sit or stand, it is (3) a *modal* accident. It is for the absolute accidents that the capacity of being miraculously sustained in the Eucharist is claimed (Zigliara, *Summa Philos.* i. 441; Pesch, *Institutiones Logicales*, Pars II. vol. ii. p. 281). Aquinas maintained the real distinction of absolute accidents from the substance of both mind and matter. (For list of opponents with regard to mental faculties, see Sir W. Hamilton, *Lectures*, ii. pp. 5-8. The question is still disputed by Roman Catholic theologians). Leibnitz supported the view of Aquinas (*System of Theology*, tr. by Russell, pp. 112-114; *Opera Philosophica*, ed. Erdmann, pp. 680, 686, etc.). He distinguishes mass as an absolute accident from substance (*System of Theology*, p. 115).

Accidents, according to Locke, are qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us (*Essay*, bk. ii. ch. xxiii.).

According to Kant, accidents are the determinations of a substance which are nothing else than its particular modes to exist; or the mode in which the existence of a substance is positively determined (*Werke*, ed. Rosenkrantz, vol. ii. p. 160).

In Hegel, accidents are the determinations which unconditioned Being has in so far as it has immediate existence (*Philosoph. Propädeutik*, p. 105).

4. 'Accident' in the sense of that which happens by chance, is defined by Aristotle as that which occurs neither always, nor from necessity, nor for the most part (*Metaph.* x. (xi.) 8). Elsewhere (*Metaph.* iv. (v.) 30) he gives, as illustration, finding a treasure when digging a hole for a plant.

LITERATURE.—Aristotle, *Organon, Metaphysics*; Petrus Hispanus, *Summula Logicales*, with exposition of Versorius;

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*; Sanderson, *Logic* (*Works*, vol. vi.); Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*; Mansel, *Aldrich's 'Artis Logicae Rudimenta'*; J. S. Mill, *Logic*; Schouppe, *Elem. Theol. Dogmaticæ*.

G. J. STOKES.

**ACCIDENTALISM.**—The theory that events may happen without a cause. This is a view of the world which characterizes a pre-scientific period of thought. With the rise of the scientific method and spirit all events come to be regarded as connected in a causal manner, and no single event whatsoever is conceived as possibly falling without the closed circle of cause and effect relations. Chance or accident, therefore, is not to be considered as opposed to the idea of causation, so that it could be possible to say, 'This event happened by chance, but that event was evidently the effect of some cause.' There is no such antithesis, for every event is caused. The accidental event is merely one whose cause is so complex that it cannot be determined, and, therefore, it affords no basis for any exact prediction of the re-occurrence of the event in question. It becomes a matter of treatment according to the theory of probability. Chance, in the theory of probability, means always a complex combination of possible causal relations, whose interaction sometimes produces a certain event, and sometimes fails to produce it. The interacting causes may co-operate and reinforce, and, again, may oppose and neutralize one another, and therefore the resulting combinations are not predictable. This is the scientific view of chance, which is not free in any sense of the law of causation.

In the early Greek philosophy the idea of a certain kind of accidentalism in the world of events was a very persistent one. It appears in Plato, and even in Aristotle; and it was not until the Stoics emphasized the scientific view of the universe that the unscientific nature of accidentalism became fully recognized. Aristotle held that single events may be referred to universal laws of cause and effect, but he did not commit himself to this conception wholly without reservation. He ascribes events to a causal order 'for the most part' (*ἐπὶ τὸ πλεονέχον*), and insists upon the contingent in nature, that which is without cause and without law (*Met.* 1065a, 4). Plato finds a place for chance in the economy of the universe. 'God governs all things, and chance and opportunity co-operate with Him in the government of human affairs' (*Laws*, iv. 709). And yet among the Greeks there was an instinctive shrinking from the idea of chance as the antithesis of cause and law. The Fates were, after all, the daughters of Necessity. Of them Plato remarks: 'Lachesis or the giver of lots is the first of them, and Clotho or the spinner is the second of them, and Atropos or the unchanging one is the third of them; and she is the preserver of the things of which we have spoken, and which have been compared in a figure to things woven by fire, they both (i.e. Atropos and the fire) producing the quality of unchangeableness' (*Laws*, xii. 960). This quality of unchangeableness is opposed alike to the caprice or whim of a goddess, and to the chance control of the destinies of man.

Moreover, accidentalism in the field of ethics appears in the theory of indeterminism. Epicurus, for instance, regards the uncaused will of man as analogous to the accidental deviation of atoms from the direct line of their fall. The uncaused event and the uncaused will both present the same general characteristics and the same difficulties also.

JOHN GRIER HIBBEN.

**ACCIDENTS** (from the theological point of view).—Accidents, to a teleological theology, must be not merely what they are to logic, viz. occurrences which do not fall under a general law of nature. The laws of nature are, from the teleo-



logical point of view, rules expressing the purposes of a conscious Being, and accidents will be occurrences not conforming to such purposes.

The theologian who adopts the theory that contingency in the natural world is an illusion due to our ignorance of general causes, must hold that there is *no event not in conformity with Divine design*; the very illusion of contingency must itself be the result of purpose. The difficulties that attend this subject are the same as surround the problem of Evil (wh. see). Practically, the belief that there are real influences in the world thwarting the Divine design is an incitement towards activity; the opposite doctrine—that accidents are, after all, part of the Divine purpose, gives consolation in failure. On the whole, Christian theology tends to maintain that the solution of such difficulties falls outside the province of reason, and does not attempt such a synthesis of contradictory opinions as constitutes the Hegelian treatment of the contingent.

G. R. T. ROSS.

**ACCIDENTS (Injurious).**—Accidents, in the general sense of the term as popularly employed, may be defined as unforeseen occurrences in human experience. Obviously the accidental character of events will thus be relative to the knowledge and reasoning power of different individuals. In order to mitigate the consequences of *injurious* accidents, the method of insurance (wh. see) is the most effective. By this means the consequences of an injurious accident, in so far as they can be expressed in terms of money, may be entirely deprived of their momentary and future effect by a previous economy, much less in most cases than would be necessary to equalize, as a sum of payments, the damage sustained. Not only so, but the diffusion of the evil results of contingency over a lengthened period, and their transference to a corporation, prevent them from having that cumulative effect which may lead to further disaster of new and increasing nature.

Injurious accidents may lead to legal action, wherever the occurrences so styled are the result of the agency of at least one individual other than the sufferer, and that other agency can be distinguished from society in general.

(a) In the first class of such suits—actions for damages at common law—the first plea to be established by the prosecutor is substantially the proposition that the occurrence, which relatively to him was accidental, was not so to the defender, but fell within the scope of the latter's knowledge and foresight. But there are numerous circumstances which might neutralize the effect even of the establishment of such a contention.

(b) Claims for compensation may be brought in cases where the injurious accident occurs in an enterprise concerning which there was a previous contract or agreement between the litigating parties. In numerous classes of such joint enterprise the extent to which the risk of accident is borne by either party is laid down by law. For each species of relation a different rule may obtain. Thus in British law the liability for damage to goods entrusted to their care differs in the cases of warehousemen and of common carriers. The relation involving joint enterprise to which Parliamentary enactment has most recently extended delimitation of the risk of the contracting parties, is that of employer and employed. In consequence of the Workmen's Compensation Acts of 1897, 1900, and 1906, in a great number of industries, and not merely in those involving an unusual amount of danger to workers, the employer now bears the risk of injury to his workmen. Every workman may claim compensation from his employer for injury through accident, unless the accident be

caused by his own serious and wilful misconduct. The result of these enactments is practically to make the employer bear the cost of the insurance of his employees against accident. It is only to be expected, however, that, though the immediate consequence will be a diminution of the revenue of employers, in time the expense of this system will fall partly upon the workmen, in the shape of a diminution or absence of increase in wages.

LITERATURE.—Willis, *Workmen's Compensation Acts, 1897 and 1900*, 8th ed. pp. 1-7; Baylis, *Workmen's Comp. Acts* (1906); Emery, *Handbook to Workmen's Comp. Act, 1906*.

G. R. T. ROSS.

**ACCIDIE.**—The obsolete 'accidie,' from ἀκηδία, *incuria, torpor* (Hippocr.), through med. Lat. *accidia* (as if from *accidere*), was once current as the name of a quality related on one side to sloth, which has superseded it in some lists of the principal vices. Chaucer in the *Parson's Tale*, dilating upon the 'Seven Mortal Sins,' *Superbia, Invidia, Ira, Accidia, Avaritia, Gula, Luxuria*, writes of the fourth: 'Agayns this roten-herted sinne of Accidie and Slouthe sholde men exercise hem-self to doon gode werkes, and manly and vertuously cacchen corage well to doon' (Skeat, *Student's Chaucer*, p. 700). In Dante see *accidia* and adj. *accidioso* (*Purg.* xviii. 132; *Inf.* vii. 123). The Patristic uses of ἀκηδία rest upon the Old Testament. The earliest of them is not noticed by the authorities mentioned below. The correct Latin form is *acedia*. Bp. Hall is quoted for 'acedy' (1623).

Ἀκηδία, ἀκηδίαν are found as below in the LXX: the renderings in brackets are from the Vulgate. (1) Ps 118<sup>28</sup> ἐπιστρεφὲς ἡ ψυχὴ μου ἀπὸ ἀκηδίας (pro tadio). (2) Is 61<sup>3</sup> ἀπὸ πνεύματος ἀκηδίας (maeroris). (3) Sir 29<sup>5</sup> ἀποδώσει λόγους ἀκηδίας (tadio). (4) Ps 60<sup>3</sup> ἐν τῇ ἀκηδίᾳ τῇ καρδίᾳ μου (dum anxiaretur). (5) Ps 101<sup>1</sup> προσευνήγῃ τῷ πνεύματι ὅταν ἀκηδίῃ (cum anxius fuerit). (6) Ps 142<sup>4</sup> καὶ ἠρπάξαμεν ἐξ ἐμοῦ τὸ πνεῦμά μου (anxius est). (7) Dn 7<sup>13</sup> LXX, ἀκηδίασεν ἐπὶ Δαυὶδ. Theod. ἐβρίβεν (horruit). (8) Bar 3<sup>1</sup> ψυχὴ ἐν σπέρσι καὶ σπέρμα ἀκηδίας (anxius) (Schleusener, s.v. ἀκηδία, anxiatum). (9) Sir 6<sup>2</sup> μὴ ἐπὶ σπασχέῃ (ne acedieris). (10) Sir 22<sup>13</sup> καὶ οὐ μὴ ἀκηδίῃς (non acedaberis).

The phrase 'spirit of acedy' is from (2) above; Antioch. *Hom.* 26 alludes also to (1), (4), (6), (8); and (9), (10) in the Latin are cited by Alardus Gazæus on Cassian.

In Vis. iii. of *Hermæ Pastor* it is explained that the Church appeared first as old, 'because your spirit was aged and already faded and powerless from your ailings and doubts. For as the aged, having no hope any more to renew their youth, expect nothing but their last sleep; so ye, being weakened by worldly affairs, yielded yourselves up to *acedies* (τὰς ἀκηδίας), and cast not your cares upon the Lord, but your spirit was broken, and ye were worn out with your griefs (λύπαι).' Thus acedy is associated with sadness (λύπη), one of the four *plus* eight principal vices in *Sim.* ix. 15; which is *more wicked than all the spirits*, and destroys the power of prayer (*Mand.* v., x.). The parable of the Unclean Spirit which takes to it *seven other spirits more wicked than itself* (Mt 12<sup>45</sup>, Lk 11<sup>25</sup>) serves as a proof-text for the number eight (afterwards seven) of the *principalia vitia*. Nilus of Sinai calls them the 'Eight Principalities of Wickedness' (Zöckler, *op. cit. inf.* p. 65).

In Cassian's *Collat.* v. 'De octo principalibus Vitiis,' which embodies the teaching of Serapion, the eight vices are said to be *Gastrimargia, Fornicatio, Philargyria, Ira, Tristitia, Acedia sive tedium cordis, Cenodoxia, Superbia*. They are referred to in Lk 11<sup>25</sup>, and they correspond to the like number of nations hostile to Israel. Why eight vices, when Moses enumerates only seven such nations? (Dt 7). Egypt, corresponding to the first vice (Nu 11<sup>1</sup>), makes up the number: the land of Egypt was to be forsaken, and the lands of the seven taken. Acedy, the besetting sin of the monk, was of two kinds: it sent him to sleep in his cell, or drove him out of it. The same vices



attack all men, but not all in the same manner and order. This remark foreshadows the disagreement of later moralists in their accounts of the vices, which are all more or less subjective.

Cassian, in *Cenob. Inst.* x. 'De Spiritu Acediæ' (cf. Evagr. ap. Zöckler; Antioch. *Hom.* 26), details the effects of acedy, beginning: 'Sextum nobis certamen est quod Græci ἀκρίδιαν vocant, quam nos tædium sive anxietatem cordis possumus nuncupare.' It is akin to *Tristitia*; is most felt by recluses; and attacks chiefly about the sixth hour, so that it has been called the 'midday demon' (Ps 90<sup>6</sup>). Then, heated and famished, the monk is as if wearied by long travel or toil, or as if he had fasted two or three days. Impatient for the repast, he leaves his cell again and again to look at the sun, which seems to 'hasten too slowly to its setting.' Through 'not-caring' he is remiss at his tasks, and finds it a weariness even to listen to the voice of the reader. Solitude impels him to gad about visiting the brethren or the sick. Discontented with his surroundings, he vainly imagines that he would do better in some distant monastery.

To replace the complex acedy by sadness or sloth is to evade a difficulty. In Serapion's octad it is distinct from *Tristitia* and different from mere *pigritia*. Briefly, it was the state of mind of a monk who had mistaken his vocation: the natural effect in him of the 'religious' life, with its fastings from food and 'from the world.'

LITERATURE.—*Oxford New English Dictionary*, s.v.; *Encyc. Brit.* 9 art. 'Ethics' (by R. Sidgwick); E. Moore, *Studies in Dante*, ser. 2 (1899); O. Zöckler, *Die Tugendlehre des Christentums* (1904); F. Paget, *Spirit of Discipline* (1891), 1; C. J. Vaughan, *Authorized or Reviled?* (1882), 115; T. B. Strong, *Christian Ethics* (1896), 231, 256, 263 f.; J. O. Hannay, *Christian Monasticism* (1903), 153 ff.; Sir J. T. Coleridge's *Memoir*, 66, 68; J. S. Carroll, *Prisoners of Hope* (1906), 224 ff.

C. TAYLOR.

**ACCOMMODATION** (in Biology and Psychology).—The process of organic or psychological adjustment understood in an individual and functional sense. The concept of accommodation has arisen in the group of genetic sciences by a process of growing specialization of problems. The old problem of 'adaptation' (*q.v.*) was one concerned with the adjustments of organisms to their environment, understood in a very static or agenetic way. Each adaptation was looked upon largely as a definite structural arrangement whereby the organism responded effectively to the conditions of the world. The theory of evolution, and with it that of individual development, has made necessary a more functional statement of the whole series of problems involved in the notion of adaptation. The description of the 'organs' involved and the 'ends' they serve—as in the case of the eye—has given place to the functional problem of the reactions and evolving functions through which the organ has come to be part of the endowment of the organism. This has given rise to a distinction between 'adaptation' proper and 'accommodation.' Adaptation is, by the terms of this distinction, restricted to the congenital adjustments for which the organism inherits structures adequate and fit; accommodation is applied to the adjustments which the organism, in the lifetime of the individual, achieves and perfects. Instinct in the animals is, in many cases, an adaptation; the adjustments of the senses to their appropriate stimulations are likewise adaptations: such processes, on the contrary, as modifications of instinct to meet special conditions, the special reactions learned by the individual, such as handwriting, together with the functional effects of conditions in the environment upon the organism, are accommodations.

The importance of the problem of accommodation is seen in Biology in all cases in which the endeavour is made to interpret the influence of

individual behaviour and individual modification upon the organism and upon the next and following generations. As early as the work of Lamarck, this factor was made very prominent in evolution theory, in the Lamarckian hypothesis that the results of accommodation—of 'use and disuse'—were inherited. This was also maintained by Darwin, as subsidiary to his main principle of Natural Selection. Weismann and the neo-Darwinians reject this direct influence of the accommodation factor; they deny its hereditary transmission, but still admit its importance as a constant process in successive generations of essential learning, whereby the individuals of each generation grow up to be competent and fertile—this position being that known as 'Intra-Selection' (Weismann). A more recent theory, called by the present writer 'Organic Selection,' discovers the importance of accommodations in *directing* the line of evolution. It is pointed out that, even though the modifications due to accommodation are not inherited, they still so effectively aid and protect individuals against the action of natural selection, that certain lines of adaptations and correlated characters are preserved and accumulated rather than others. The trend of evolution is thus in the lines marked out in advance by accommodations, natural selection following up and clinching the results first secured by accommodation.

The effects of accommodation on the structure of the organism are technically known as 'modifications'; they are contrasted with 'variations,' which are differences of structure of the 'adaptive' and congenital sort. Individuals are born different by variation; they become different during their lives by modification.

In Psychology the theory of accommodation is of even greater importance. The remarkable range and importance of the learning processes are never made matter of question. The problem of accommodation becomes therefore in Psychology—as also in Biology—that of the possibility of learning anything new. Thus stated, the fact of accommodation is set over against that of 'habit.' If we call all those functions, of whatever sort, that the individual is already able to perform, his 'habits,' it then becomes necessary to explain the process by which habit is modified, cancelled, and added to: this is accommodation.

The present solutions of this problem are in line with the requirements of genetic science as science of function. It is no longer considered possible that an individual may simply, by an act of will, do a thing that he has not learned to do; only certain fixed instincts work in that way, and that because they are fixed as habits by the gift of heredity. No muscular combination is possible, even when it involves the voluntary muscles—as, for example, those for moving the ear in man—that has not been learned, and the process of learning is a slow and effortful one. The theory most current, and having the greater weight because held by both biologists and psychologists, is that known as 'theory of excess discharge,' of 'trial and error,' or of 'persistent imitation,' etc. In effect it considers any act of accommodation or learning as due to the excessive and varied exercise of habits already formed, the element of learning arising from the modifications that come through the happy hits, the successful imitations, the pleasurable results, etc., of the muscular or other combinations thus set in movement. The writer has illustrated this in many ways, treating of the acquisition of handwriting as a typical case in *Mental Development in the Child and the Race* (1895). Spencer and Bain worked out a similar conception. In Biology, the movements of unicellular organisms, as well as the accommodations of grosser function

in higher animals, are being fruitfully interpreted in accordance with this view (see L. I. Morgan, *Animal Behaviour*; Jennings, *Behaviour of the Lower Organisms*).

In the higher reaches of psychic function, the analogous problem is that of 'Selective Thinking,' together with the theory of adjustment to various non-physical environments. There is the social life, to which each individual must be accommodated; there is the environment of truth, to which all our processes of thinking selectively must conform. All this carries the problem of accommodation up into the realms of Social Psychology, Ethics, and Theory of Knowledge.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works cited in the text, see the general discussions of evolution, such as Conn, *Method of Evolution* (1901); Gulick, *Evolution Racial and Habitual* (1905); Headley, *Problems of Evolution* (1901). On Organic Selection see Lloyd Morgan, *Habit and Instinct* (1896); and Baldwin, *Development and Evolution* (1903), and *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, where lists of selected works are given under artt. 'Accommodation,' 'Adaptation,' 'Evolution,' etc.  
J. MARK BALDWIN.

**ACCUMULATION.**—'Accumulation' (Lat. *ad* 'to,' *cumulus* 'a heap') signifies (1) a heap, mass, or pile; (2) the process of growing into a heap, e.g. the growth of a debt, or of a deposit at the bank, through the continuous addition of interest to principal; (3) the action of heaping, piling or storing up, amassing, as in the case—important from the standpoint of the present article—of the growth of capital.

The accumulation of capital is the result of saving. This, however, does not necessarily imply abstinence, privation, or sacrifice, in the ordinary sense. Saving on the part of the great capitalist involves no personal abstinence from immediate consumption, no sacrifice of present gratifications. His immediate expenditure is limited only by his tastes. Often the pleasure of accumulation is greater than that of careless extravagance, and at times the dominant idea is the increase of wealth for the sake of power. 'Abstinence here means abstinence from senseless waste; it is a negative not a positive merit' (E. R. A. Seligman, *Principles of Economics*, p. 320). This much must be conceded to Karl Marx and his followers. Hence the neutral term 'waiting' has been suggested as a substitute for 'abstinence.'

In the case of smaller incomes the subordination of present to future utility often involves real sacrifice, forbearance, prudence, forethought. But even here it must be borne in mind that anything that increases the productive power of labour so far increases the amount which can be saved. 'To increase capital there is another way besides consuming less, namely, to produce more' (J. S. Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, Bk. I. ch. v. § 4). Thus, in general, all that we can say is that saving implies an excess of production over consumption—a favourable state of that balance 'which, according as it happens to be either favourable or unfavourable, necessarily occasions the prosperity or decay of every nation' (Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, Bk. IV. ch. iii.).

To say that capital is the result of saving does not mean that it is not consumed. Saving is not hoarding. All capital is consumed. It fulfils its primary function—the satisfaction of future needs—only in being consumed, that is, used; but it is not immediately consumed by the person who saves it. Saving thus simply implies that productive power is directed to the satisfaction of prospective or future needs. In general, this is done through saving 'money,' not, however, as a hoard, but as giving, through the banking system, the power of directing national industry into particular channels. In this way, saving gives an increase in the productive power, and consequently in the

consuming power of the society (see Nicholson, *Principles of Political Economy*, Bk. I. ch. xii. § 4).

In this connexion, Mill points out the erroneous nature of the popular idea that the greater part of a nation's capital has been inherited from the distant past in which it was accumulated, and that no part was produced in any given year save that year's addition to the total amount. The fact, he says, is far otherwise. 'The greater part in value of the wealth now existing in England has been produced by human hands within the last twelve months.' The growth of capital is similar in many respects to the growth of population. Each is kept in existence, and increases from age to age, not by preservation but by perpetual consumption and reproduction. It is only the value of the capital that remains and grows; the things themselves are ever changing (see Mill, *Principles*, Bk. I. ch. v. § 6).

This consideration helps us to understand the, at first sight, amazing rapidity with which countries often recover from the effects of a devastating war. The material capital destroyed or removed would, for the most part, have required reproduction in any case; while the land and its *quasi*-permanent improvements subsist. So long, therefore, as the country has not been depopulated, and the necessities of a working life remain, the character and skill of the people being unchanged, there are all the essential conditions of a speedy recovery (*ib.* Bk. I. ch. v. § 7).

Here the relatively greater importance of what is known as *personal* or *immaterial*—i.e. mental and moral—capital, as compared with material capital, is apparent. It is indeed this immaterial capital that constitutes our great inheritance from the past. 'The present state of the nations,' says List, the German protectionist, 'is the result of the accumulation of all discoveries, inventions, improvements, perfections, and exertions of all generations that have lived before us; they form the mental capital of the present human race' (*National System of Political Economy*, Eng. tr. p. 140). The economic condition of a country depends far more on the mental and moral qualities of its inhabitants than on their accumulation of dead material capital.

It is thus with reason that Adam Smith includes the acquired skill of the people in the fixed capital of the nation. 'The improved dexterity of a workman may be considered in the same light as a machine or instrument of trade which facilitates and abridges labour, and which, though it costs a certain expense, repays that expense with a profit' (*W. of N.*, Bk. II. ch. i.). The successors of Adam Smith, however, lacked his comprehensive grasp of the realities of industrial life; and much of the popular antipathy to the teaching of the English economists of the early part of the 19th cent.—the followers of Ricardo—may be traced to their use of narrow and faulty abstractions, and in particular to their intensely materialistic conception of capital, which ignored altogether the skill of the worker. The force of attention was thus misdirected. Regard was had to the quantity rather than to the quality of labour, and consequently the influence of efficiency on wages was overlooked. Every proposed reform, e.g. the Factory Acts, was judged by reference to its probable immediate effect on the accumulation of dead material wealth. It was not seen that the capital of a country may be as profitably invested in the physical, mental, and moral training of its inhabitants as in the accumulation of dead material wealth in the shape of machinery, factory buildings, and the like.

To take but one other example of immaterial capital, and that a characteristic product of the mental and moral qualities of the people of these

islands, the British money market—that marvellous banking and credit organization through which the capital of the country finds its way into the hands of those who can turn it to the most productive purposes—has been described by Bagehot as ‘the greatest combination of economical power and economical delicacy that the world has ever seen’ (see *Lombard Street*, ch. i.).

Some idea of the relative importance of immaterial capital is given by Professor Nicholson, who estimates the ‘living capital’ of the United Kingdom as worth about five times the value of its dead material capital (see *Strikes and Social Problems*, pp. 97–116). Enough has been said to show that, for an explanation of the rise and fall of nations, we should look to the growth and decay of their immaterial rather than their material capital.

To return to material capital, the state of the balance of production and consumption, or, in other words, the accumulation of capital—which in a modern industrial society, with its vast and increasing variety of forms and substitutes, is necessarily measured in terms of money—depends on causes which naturally fall into two groups, those, namely, which determine the amount of the fund from which saving can be made, or, in other words, the *power to save*, and those which determine the strength of the dispositions which prompt to saving, or, in brief, the *will to save*.

1. The power to save is necessarily limited to the amount of the national dividend or real net produce of the society, i.e. the surplus of the annual produce over what is required to supply the efficiency-necessaries of the producers, including those engaged in replacing raw material, repairing the auxiliary capital (e.g. machinery, buildings, etc.), and keeping up the consumption capital (e.g. dwelling houses, museums, etc.). The amount of this national dividend depends on (a) the *natural resources* of the country, (b) the *state of the arts of production* in the widest sense, including not only the means of communication and transport, but also the machinery of exchange; for under the modern system of division of labour production involves exchange, and thus the state of the credit institutions must also be considered.

The causes embraced under these two heads together determine the amount produced within the country. But the amount of the national dividend is further affected by (c) the *state of foreign trade*, which determines the amount of imports obtained in return for exports. (d) The *amount taken by Government for public purposes*, whether in the form of taxes or burdens like conscription, must also be considered (see Nicholson, *Elements of Political Economy*, p. 86).

These causes determine the annual national dividend or maximum which can be saved. But the amount annually added to capital always falls short, and generally far short, of this, depending as it does on the *will to save*.

2. The will to save is the resultant of a complexity of causes, amongst the most important of which are: (a) *Security*. To induce saving there must be some reasonable expectation that the owner will be allowed to enjoy the fruits of his saving. This involves protection by the Government against force and fraud, which includes the enforcement of freely made contracts; and protection against the Government, e.g. against oppressive and, above all, arbitrary taxation (see Mill, *Principles*, Bk. I. ch. vii. § 6; Nicholson, *Principles*, Bk. I. ch. xii. § 3). The importance of security in both these forms finds abundant illustration in the history of all nations and ages. Compare, for example, Egypt or India under British rule with

Armenia or Macedonia under the dominion of the Turk, or the present state of Russia under the government of the Czar. The British credit system, already referred to, is the outcome of security and good government, just as the hoarding so prevalent in the East is the natural fruit of the uncertainty so often associated with Oriental systems of taxation and government. Even in India the influence of the *pax Britannica* has not yet sufficed to eradicate from the native mind the traditional tendency to hoard, engendered by centuries of turbulence and insecurity.

There must also be a sense of security against the violence of the powers of nature. In balancing the advantages of present and future utilities the uncertainty of the future is an important factor. Where a country has an unhealthy climate, and is liable to plagues, or is subject to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tornadoes, or other physical disasters, the consequent uncertainty of life does, so far, tend to check accumulation by lessening the will to save, apart altogether from the influence of such disasters on the power to save. On the occasion of great plagues, popular practice follows the maxim of pagan philosophy: ‘Let us eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die.’

(b) The effect of the *rate of interest* on saving is somewhat complex. A high rate, security being unchanged, affords a greater reward for saving, and thus, so far, a greater inducement to save. But the higher the rate of interest the lower, *ceteris paribus*, the rate of wages; and thus a high rate may react on the efficiency of labour and may check enterprise, and thus lessen the power to save. At the same time, those who merely wish to obtain a certain annuity need save less if the rate of interest is high. In general, however, a fall in the rate of interest will tend to check accumulation. But some accumulation would go on even if the rate of interest became negative (see Nicholson, *Principles*, Bk. I. ch. xii. § 3; Marshall, *Principles of Economics*, Bk. IV. ch. vii. §§ 8, 9).

(c) The accumulation of capital is affected also by the existing *facilities for investment*. The multiplication of branch banks in Scotland has undoubtedly contributed to increase both the power and the will to save. The more recent extension of savings banks and the growth of joint stock companies with limited liability have also greatly stimulated saving throughout the community.

(d) The *distribution of national wealth* amongst the different economic classes has likewise a certain influence on accumulation. When the bulk of the wealth of England was in the hands of the feudal landowners, extravagance prevailed, as explained by Adam Smith (*W. of N.* Bk. III. ch. iv.), and it is only after the revolution of 1688 that, with the rise of the mercantile class, we find a rapid accumulation of wealth. Similarly in France the contrast is striking between the extravagance of the *ancien régime* and the thrift of the peasantry in modern times. Amongst the latter the effective desire of accumulation appears to be excessive. The living or immaterial capital is sacrificed to the dead. ‘In England,’ says Lady Verney, ‘thrift appears to be a great virtue. Here one hates the very mention of it. . . . The sordid, unclean, hideous existence which is the result of all this saving and self-denial, the repulsive absence of any ideal but that of *cacher de petits sous dans de grands bas* as object for life, is incredible if it is not seen and studied’ (*Peasant Properties*, p. 151).

(e) The *effective desire of accumulation* is compounded of many elements, intellectual and moral, including the development of the ‘telescopic faculty’ (Marshall), the growth of the family affections, the hope of rising in the world, and the

social and other advantages attendant on the possession of wealth. The strength of this desire may be weak from intellectual deficiency. The wants of the present are vividly realized, those of the future are but dimly imagined. There is frequent lack of the power of imagination necessary to the proper appreciation of the importance of future benefits, as in the case, mentioned by Dr. Rae, of the Indians on the banks of the St. Lawrence, who, when a speedy result was to be obtained, would toil even more assiduously than the white man, but would undertake no work for which the return was at all remote (see Rae, *The Sociological Theory of Capital* [ed. Mixer, pp. 71-73]; also Mill, *Principles*, Bk. I. ch. xi. § 3). As we go lower in the scale, this weakness becomes more pronounced. The Australian native, in respect of foresight in providing for the future, is inferior to many of the lower animals (see Letourneau, *Property*, Eng. tr. p. 30).

Often, however, the effective desire of accumulation is weak, not so much from intellectual as from moral deficiency. Even in the most highly civilized nations, there are too many instances of men of the most vivid imagination—men who are in no way defective in the telescopic faculty—who yet, through lack of will power, interest in others, family affection or sense of independence, are unable to resist the temptations of the present sufficiently to provide for the clearly foreseen needs of the future, or unwilling to make any provision for the welfare of wife and children or for their own independence in old age or disablement. Amongst the unskilled labour class in this country the average degree of providence and self-restraint is not much above that of uncivilized man. It is this that constitutes the chief difficulty of the problem of unemployment. But amongst the professional, manufacturing, trading, and skilled artisan classes, on the other hand, the effective desire of accumulation is strong. The vastness of the sums yearly paid as premiums to life insurance companies—only one form of saving—affords sufficient proof of this.

The movement of progressive societies from status to contract, emphasized by Sir Henry Maine (*Ancient Law*, p. 170), accompanied and promoted, as it has been, by the extension of money payments in place of services and payments in kind, has greatly contributed to the accumulation of capital. The introduction of a money economy made it possible for a person to store up capital which would yield him an income in money, and was therefore capable of being turned to the satisfaction of any want whatever. At the same time, the displacement of a state of things in which a man's position in society is fixed at his birth according to the rigid rule of caste, by a state in which he makes his own position in society by contract with his fellow-men, has enormously increased the inducement to save, by affording full scope for that hope of raising oneself and one's family in the social scale, than which there are few stronger incentives to energy, enterprise, and the accumulation of wealth. 'The principle which prompts to save,' says Adam Smith, 'is the desire of bettering our condition, a desire which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave' (*W. of N.* Bk. II. ch. iii.).

Mill asserts that to get out of one rank in society into the next above it is the great aim of English middle-class life, and that to this end it is necessary to save enough to admit of retiring from business, and living on the interest of capital (*Principles*, Bk. I. ch. xi. § 4). In America, on the other hand, success in business itself is often the dominant idea. Many of the most successful business men

in the United States seem to be wholly absorbed in the acquisition and accumulation of capital, simply and solely as a necessary condition of pre-eminence in the world of business. They know no other goal. In some cases, indeed, the means is mistaken for the end, and the mere accumulation of wealth becomes the mainspring of life; or it may be that the habit of accumulating, acquired in time of need, maintains its sway when the need has passed.

But though the effective desire of accumulation is thus sometimes in excess of what reason would justify, there is much more danger in the other extreme. Nations may be ruined by extravagance, never by parsimony.

The popular idea of the social effects of extravagant expenditure is based on reasoning the fallacious nature of which has often been exposed. Saving is identified with selfish hoarding, while the spendthrift is regarded as benefiting all around him. It is admitted that he may be ruining himself and his family, but it is not generally recognized that he is almost equally the enemy of society. The lavish outlay of the spendthrift makes money circulate, and increases the profits and wages of wine-merchants, tailors, domestic servants, and others. That is *what we see*. What we do not so readily see is that, had the money not been thus squandered, the capital which it represents would not have lain idle, but would have found its way, through the medium of our banking organization, into the hands of some manufacturer or ship-builder, say, to be employed by him in productive industry. The spendthrift, then, does not benefit trade, or give employment to labour; he simply alters the direction of the employment of capital, and he renders the nation poorer by the amount of the wealth he thus wastefully consumes. The saving person, on the other hand, creates a fund which, in its consumption, affords an equal employment for labour, and yet is continually renewed (see Mill, *Principles*, Bk. I. ch. v. §§ 3, 5). Economy, in short, enriches, while extravagance impoverishes, the individual and the nation.

And in this, as in most other cases, good economy is good morality. The accumulation of wealth implies, in the normal case, forethought, self-restraint, energy, and enterprise on the part of the individual, and it is an essential condition of his economic freedom. For the nation, it is an essential prerequisite of the highest civilization. It means increased scope for Division of Labour. 'As the accumulation of stock must, in the nature of things, be previous to the division of labour, so labour can be more and more subdivided in proportion only as stock is previously more and more accumulated' (Adam Smith, *W. of N.*, Bk. II. Introd.). It thus means increase in man's power over nature, with consequent economy of human effort in the satisfaction of the primary needs, and increased leisure for the culture of Art and Science and Literature. Nations, like men, may grow rich without culture, but the highest civilization is impossible in the absence of a sound economic basis of accumulated capital.

ARCH. B. CLARK.

**ACHÆMENIANS.**—A dynasty which ruled in Persia from B.C. 558 to 330, and whose religion is important for the study of the development of Zoroastrianism. The monarchs of the line were as follows: Cyrus the Great (558-530), Cambyses (530-522), Darius I. (522-486), Xerxes I. (486-465), Artaxerxes I. (465-424), Xerxes II. (424), Sogdianus (424), Darius II. (424-404), Artaxerxes II. (404-358), Artaxerxes III. (358-337), and Darius III. (337-330). The scanty data concerning their religion are contained in classical writings, in inscriptions in Babylonian, Egyptian, and Greek, and above all

in their own inscriptions, which were written in Old Persian, with Babylonian and New Elamitic translations. The only kings of this dynasty who come into consideration here are Cyrus, Cambyses, Darius I., Xerxes I., and Artaxerxes II. and III.

1. **Cyrus the Great.**—The material for a knowledge of the religion of this monarch is restricted to the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon, the OT, and the Babylonian inscriptions. The *Cyropædia*, as is well known, is a historical romance, and its statements, therefore, can be accepted only with caution, unless they can be controlled by the Avesta or other sources. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that Xenophon had exceptional opportunities for observing the Achæmenian religion, through his long association with Cyrus the Younger, so that under his apparent Hellenic veneer there may lurk some true elements of Achæmenian belief. In this romance Cyrus is repeatedly represented as offering sacrifices, and it is noteworthy that he invokes the assistance of the magi (iv. 5. 14, vi. 5. 57, viii. 1. 23). The deities to whom he rendered sacrifice appear under the Greek nomenclature of Zeus, Helios, Ge, and Hestia (i. 6. 1, iii. 3. 22, viii. 7. 3), and in addition to them he worshipped 'the other gods' or 'all the gods' (the latter phrase is interesting as being a striking, though doubtless accidental, parallel with a phrase of similar meaning in the Old Persian inscriptions of Darius) and the tutelary divinities (*špəwer*) of Assyria, Syria, Media, and Persia. With this list must be compared the statement of Herodotus (i. 131) and of Strabo (xv. 3. 13) that the Persians worshipped the sun, the moon, earth, fire, water, the winds, Aphrodite, and, above all, the sky, which they called Zeus. It thus becomes evident that the worship ascribed to Cyrus by Xenophon was a nature-worship closely akin to the Iranian cult which finds its revival in the so-called Younger Avesta. The deities honoured by him were doubtless identical with Ahura Mazda, Mithra, Atarš (the sacred fire), and Anahita (apparently identified with the earth as being a goddess of fertility). The identification of Hestia with the sacred fire receives its confirmation in the rôle ascribed to fire in the sacrifice recounted in *Cyrop.* viii. 3. 12, but the equation of Ge with Anahita is more doubtful. This goddess is represented by the Aphrodite of Strabo, and the divine personification of earth in Iranian mythology was Spenta Armaiti (Gray, *ARW* vii. 364-370). If, however, the identification here proposed be accepted, it finds a striking parallel in the collocation of Ahura Mazda, Mithra, and Anahita in the Old Persian inscription of Artaxerxes II. The tutelary divinities whom Cyrus is represented as worshipping are none other than the *fravashis*, who were originally the ghosts of the dead, yet who later came to be protecting godlings, and are thus invoked in *Yasna*, xxiii. 1: 'I invoke to worship those *fravashis* who aforetime were of the houses, and of the villages, and of the districts, and of the lands; who sustain the heaven, who sustain the water, who sustain the earth, who sustain the kine, who sustain children in the wombs to be conceived that they die not.' In the instructions of the dying Cyrus concerning the disposal of his body, on the other hand (*Cyrop.* viii. 7. 25), he departed widely from Zoroastrian usage when he requested that he be buried in earth, a request whose accuracy is confirmed by the elaborate description of his tomb as given by Strabo (xv. 3. 7), which agrees strikingly with the so-called Tomb of Cyrus at Pasargadae. It may be noted in this connexion that the Achæmenian kings were entombed in rock sepulchres, as is evidenced by their tombs at Persepolis and elsewhere; while Herodotus (i. 140) states that the Persians, after exposing the corpse

to birds or dogs, coated it with wax and placed it in the ground. It would seem, therefore, that the data of Xenophon concerning the founder of the Achæmenian dynasty are not so valueless as is sometimes supposed. They agree remarkably with the statements of the Younger Avesta, which, despite its comparatively late date, doubtless represents in its main outlines the religion of the Iranians before the reform associated with the name of Zoroaster.

Turning to the Babylonian inscriptions of Cyrus, we find that the religion of Cyrus is mentioned in the two texts of the Nabuna'id-Cyrus Chronicle and the Cylinder Inscription. In both Cyrus declares that Nabuna'id, the last native sovereign of Babylon, had brought the gods of Sumer and Akkad from their own temples to his capital, while he, on the other hand, as the chosen of Marduk, restored them to their homes. The view has been advanced that Marduk and his son Nabu, who are mentioned in close association in both these inscriptions, were regarded by Cyrus merely as other names for Ahura Mazda and his son Atarš (the sacred fire). This theory seems, on the whole, scarcely tenable; and a general consideration of the character of the Achæmenian, so far as it can be traced, leads to the interpretation that he acted as a clever politician, and not as a religious leader. Nor can the famous passage in Is 44<sup>26</sup>-45<sup>4</sup> be construed as casting any real light on the religion of Cyrus. Though the Persian king is addressed as 'the shepherd of Jahweh,' as His 'anointed,' before whom all nations should be subdued, and as the one whom Jahweh had called and in whom He took delight, this implies nothing more than a recognition of the close sympathy existing between Israel and Persia, and the conviction that the conqueror of Babylon would free the Jews from their exile. It is, in other words, the eulogy of the enthusiastic and hopeful prophet in honour of the political victor.

Of these three sources, the Greek, even making all allowances for possible inaccuracies, seems to be the most reliable. The most that can be said, in the light of the data now available, is that the religion of Cyrus approximated closely to that contained in the Younger Avesta. There is no evidence whatever to show that he was a Zoroastrian.

2. **Cambyses.**—The religious records concerning this monarch are extremely scanty. Herodotus (iii. 16) mentions his impiety in burning the corpse of Amasis, 'since the Persians regard fire as a god . . . , saying that it is not right to give the corpse of a man to a god.' Both in Persia and in the home of the Avesta the defilement of the fire by contact with dead matter was regarded as a most grievous sin (cf. *Vendidad*, vi. 73-81). The only other document which throws light on the religion of Cambyses is an Egyptian text on a naophoric statue in the Vatican. According to this inscription, the strangers had intruded within the precincts of the goddess Neit at Sais and had placed various obstructions there. In answer to a petition received by him, Cambyses commanded that the fane be purified and that its worship be restored. He himself then went to Sais, restored all offerings to the goddess and also to Osiris, while he likewise 'worshipped before the holiness of Neit with much devotion, as all the kings had done; he made great offering of all good things to Neit, the great, the divine mother, and to all the gods who dwell in Sais, as all the pious kings had done' (Petrie, *History of Egypt*, 1905, iii. 361, 362). Though Cambyses was, as is universally acknowledged, a madman, his policy with regard to this temple was thoroughly in accord with that pursued by Cyrus before him and Darius after him. His stabbing of the Apis bull, on the

other hand, was the act of a maniac's cruelty, and was not inspired by any devotion to religious tenets of his own.

3. Darius I.—The chief source for a study of the religion of this monarch is furnished by his inscriptions in Old Persian, with their Babylonian and New Elamitic versions. The texts are found at Behistun, Persepolis, Naqš-e-Rustam, Elvand, Susa, Kirman, and Suez. In his inscriptions the king constantly ascribes the source of his authority to the 'grace of Ahura Mazda,' declaring: 'Auramazda brought me the kingdom; Auramazda bore me aid until this kingdom was held; by the grace of Auramazda I hold this kingdom' (Bh. i. 24-26). All evil in the realm is regarded as due to the malignant influence of the 'Lie' (*drauga*), which is to be compared with the *druf* of the Avesta. The 'Lie' was the cause of rebellion, while the power of Darius was due, in his opinion, largely to the fact that he had not been a 'liar.' The 'Lie' is thus closely parallel with the Anra Mainyu of the Avesta, and it is not impossible that it is a euphemistic term for the arch-fiend, thus accounting for the omission of all mention of Anra Mainyu in the Old Persian inscriptions. The fact that the Pahlavi translation of *Yasna*, xxx. 10, identifies the *druf* with Ahriman cannot, however, be cited in support of this hypothesis. Ahura Mazda is frequently described in the texts of the Achaemenian kings as 'a great god who created this earth, who created yon heaven, who created man, who created peace for man, who made Darius [or, Xerxes, Artaxerxes] king, the one king of many, the one ruler of many.' This passage is very similar to the Gāthā Avesta *Yasna*, xxxvii. 1: 'Here praise we Ahura Mazda, who created both kine and holiness, and created waters, created both good trees and light, both the earth and all good things.' This is but one of a number of parallels between the Old Persian texts and the Avesta which might be cited (cf. Windischmann, *Zoroastr. Studien*, 121-125); yet, on the other hand, an equal mass of coincidences exists between the Achaemenian inscriptions and the Assyrian records (cf. Gray, *AJSL* xvii. 151-159).

It has been suggested that Ahura Mazda was regarded, in a sense, as the author of evil as well as of good, since Darius says (Bh. iv. 57-59): 'If thou hidest this tablet, (and) tellst it not to the people, may Auramazda be thy slayer, (and) may thy family be not.' This is not, however, altogether certain, for Ahura Mazda, as the god of the king, might fairly be invoked to destroy his enemies, such an act scarcely being regarded as evil. On the other hand, the only direct allusion to Ahriman in connexion with an Achaemenian monarch is found in Plutarch's Life of Themistocles, iii., where Xerxes prays that 'Apollonius may always give the Greeks the mad impulse to drive their best men from them. Yet one can hardly give much weight to an isolated statement of a late and somewhat rhetorical author, especially as he was well acquainted with orthodox Zoroastrianism (see his *de Iside et Osiride*, xli.).

The course which the upright man should pursue is termed 'the right path' *paθim* (*tyām rāstām*), an idea which recurs not only in the Avesta (*Yasna*, lxxii. 11; *Yast*, x. 3, 86; *Vendidad*, iv. 43), but also in the OT, the Veda, and especially in Buddhism. In this spirit Darius declares, in a much-disputed passage, that 'I walked according to rectitude' (*upariy arštām upariyāyām*, Bh. iv. 64; for the establishment of this text see Jackson, *JAOS* xxiv. 90-92), the Arštā here mentioned being doubtless identical with the Arštāt of the Younger Avesta, 'who furthereth creatures, prospereth creatures, giveth health unto creatures' (*Yast*, xi. 16). If these two beneficent powers are represented both in Old Persian and in the Avesta, the two sources agree in their view of the demon of drought, for the Dušiyārā against whom Darius invokes the protection of Ahura Mazda is to be identified with the Dužyāiryā, for whose destruction, according to the Younger Avesta (*Yast*, viii. 50-56), Tistrya, the Dog-Star, was especially created by Ormazd (note also the mention of the

'horde,' Old Persian *hainā*, Avesta *haēnā*, in both texts in close association with 'drought').

It is thus evident that the Old Persian inscriptions of Darius represent him as a worshipper of Ahura Mazda and as filled with abhorrence of the 'Lie.' One beneficent godling (Arštā) and one maleficent fiend (Dušiyārā) are mentioned under the same names in the Younger Avesta. The stylistic parallels which may undoubtedly be traced between the Achaemenian texts and the Avesta, on the other hand, are counterbalanced by the Assyrian-Bab. inscriptions from which Darius and his successors manifestly drew. His policy towards other faiths than his own was that of Cyrus. In his reconstruction of the kingdom on his accession, he states that he 'restored the places of worship which Gaumata had digged down' (Bh. i. 64). He thus appears as an opponent of rigid Magian orthodoxy, for the 'places of worship' (*āyadanā*) are shown by the Bab. version to have been 'houses of the gods' (*bitāti ša ilāni*). That these were fire temples, like the Magian structures described by Strabo (733) as existing in Cappadocia, seems less probable than that they were temples of the gods of non-Persian peoples.

This view receives confirmation from a Greek and an Egyptian inscription of Darius. In the former text, found in 1886 at Deirmenjik (ed. Cousin and Deschamps, *BCH* xiii.), the king reproves his subject Gadates, who had sought to efface all traces of the royal attitude towards the gods, which, Darius expressly states, had been that of his predecessors, and who had exacted a tax from the priests of 'Apollo.' Who 'Apollo' was is doubtful. Cousin and Deschamps, somewhat strangely, identify him with Atar (the sacred fire), who appears in Greek, as noted above, under the name of Hestia. He is probably, however, the Greek divinity Apollo, who in times past had given a favourable oracle to Cyrus, perhaps during his Lycian campaign, and who was consequently honoured by the Achaemenian dynasty. At all events, the inscription is non-Zoroastrian in tone.

Still more polytheistic is the stele of Darius at Tell el-Maskhuta (ed. Golénischeff, *RTAP* xiii. 108-107), which contains the following words: '(Darius) born of Neit, the lady of Neit, the lady of Sala, image of the god Ra who hath put him on his throne to accomplish what he hath begun . . . (master) of all the sphere of the solar disc. When he (Darius) was in the womb (of his mother) and had not yet appeared upon earth, she (the goddess Neit) recognized him as her son . . . she hath (extended) her arm to him with the bow before her to overthrow for ever his enemies, as she had done for her own son, the god Ra. He is strong . . . (he hath destroyed) his enemies in all lands, king of Upper and Lower Egypt, Darius who liveth for ever, the great, the prince of princes . . . (the son) of Hystaspes, the Achaemenian, the mighty. He is her son (of the goddess Neit), powerful and wise to enlarge his boundaries.'

Devout and noble though his inscriptions show him to be, Darius seems to have been by no means a strict monotheist. This statement is borne out by the old Persian texts themselves, which show that he felt merely that Ahura Mazda was, as he himself says, 'the greatest of gods.' A Persepolitan inscription thrice contains the words *hadā vīdaitibis bagaitibis*, which were formerly rendered 'with the clan-gods,' but which are now regarded as meaning 'with all the gods.' This interpretation is confirmed by the Bab. *itī ilāni gabbi* and the New Elamitic *annap marpepta-itaka* ('with all the gods') in texts of closely similar content and phraseology. The plural of *baya* ('god') occurs in the Avesta only in *Yast*, x. 141, which states that Mithra 'is the wisest of gods,' but its Pahlavi form occurs at least thrice, an undoubtedly Zoroastrian passage (*Dēmkarī*, viii. 15. 1) being especially interesting in this connexion, since it speaks of the 'worship of Anahmazd, the highest of divinities.' This phrase is strikingly similar to passages in the inscriptions of Darius and Xerxes which describe Ahura Mazda as 'the greatest of gods.' That such a phrase is not necessarily polytheistic is clear from such passages of the OT as Ps 82, 95, and 97. In the New Elamitic version, however, occurs the statement, which may be significant, that Ahura Mazda was 'the god of the Aryans.' If stress may be laid on this (a fact which is by no means certain),



it may serve as a partial explanation of the policy pursued by the Achæmenians with regard to the gods of the Babylonians, Egyptians, and Greeks. This view of Ahura Mazda as a national deity in the eyes of the Persian kings may readily be paralleled from other Oriental nations of antiquity. It may also explain the collocation of Ahura Mazda 'with all the gods,' of whom he was the greatest. In the light of this, the epithet *παρπός*, applied by Cyrus, according to Xenophon, to Zeus (Ahura Mazda) and Hestia (Atarš, the sacred fire), possibly likewise becomes explicable (cf., however, the same epithet given by Greek poets to Æther, Apollo, Hekate, Hermes, and Zeus; see Bruchmann, *Epitheta Deorum quæ apud Poetas Græcos leguntur*, Leipzig, 1893). Under any explanation it is a far cry from the nationalistic Ahura Mazda of the politic Achæmenians to the god of the Avesta, who brooks no rivals and urges his follower to 'convert all men living' (*Yasna*, xxxi. 3).

4. Xerxes I.—The chief source for a knowledge of the religion of Xerxes I. is Herodotus, who states (vii. 43, 53, 54) that this king, when he arrived at the Hellespont in his expedition against Greece, sacrificed a thousand oxen to 'Athene of Ilium,' and also made a libation to the sun, and gave an offering to the sea. 'Athene of Ilium' seems to be the Persian Anahita, who is mentioned in the inscriptions of Artaxerxes II., and to whom were offered, according to the Younger Avesta (*Yast*, v.), 'a hundred stallions, a thousand bulls, and ten thousand sheep.' The correspondence in the number of oxen offered in both accounts is surely noteworthy. The homage to the sun (Mithra) and the waters is too well known to require further elucidation (cf. Strabo, xv. 3. 13). If Herodotus may be believed, moreover, Xerxes sacrificed at a place called Nine Roads nine Greek boys and nine Greek girls, and he adds (vii. 114) that it was customary for the Persians to offer victims by burying them alive. In view of the fact that this custom is mentioned nowhere else, and of the defilement of the sacred element earth which it would cause, the statement of the Greek historian seems too improbable to be accepted as authentic. A passage of much interest, however, is that in which Herodotus says (vii. 40) that Xerxes was accompanied in his march by the 'sacred chariot of Zeus,' which was drawn by eight white horses, whose driver went on foot, 'for no man mounteth on this throne' (cf. Quintus Curtius, iii. 8-12). This 'chariot of Zeus' was, it may be conjectured, none other than the shrine in which dwelt Ahura Mazda, the national deity, who thus escorted the king to victory quite as Jahveh did in His ark carried by the Israelites.

5, 6. Artaxerxes II. and III.—The brief texts of Artaxerxes II. and III. are interesting solely as adding the names of Mithra and Anahita to that of Ahura Mazda. That this was a real innovation seems far from probable, in the light of the religion ascribed by the allusions in the classics to Cyrus and Xerxes. It is noteworthy, in this connexion, that Plutarch, who was by no means unacquainted with true Zoroastrianism, confirms the testimony of the inscriptions. In his *Life of Artaxerxes II.* he mentions the king's worship of Anahita, his paths in the name of Mithra, as well as his coronation in a temple of 'Minerva' (a deity of uncertain identification).

The Achæmenians are curiously, and perhaps significantly, ignored in the Middle Persian writings. The theory has been advanced that Artaxerxes I. Longimanus is mentioned in the Pahlavi texts under the name of 'Ardashir the Kayan, whom they call Vohuman, son of Spend-dad,' who, according to *Bahman Yasht*, ii. 17, 'separates the demons from men, scatters them about, and makes the

religion current in the whole world.' This hypothesis lacks all foundation. The Zoroastrian Artaxerxes was the son of Spend-dad; the Achæmenian was the son of Xerxes; al-Birûni rightly distinguishes between them, and the identification of the two in the *Shâh-Nâmâh* and other sources is properly regarded as contrary to history, since it is due to the accidental coincidence that the grandfather of each was named Darius. Again, according to the *Denkâr* (iv. 23), 'Darai, son of Darai, ordered the preservation of two written copies of the whole Avesta and Zand.' This Darius, who was the son of Darius, is identified with the Achæmenian Darius III. Codomanus, who was the son of Arsanes. Al-Birûni once more carefully distinguishes between the two, and it is not unlikely that he is right in so doing (cf. Nöldeke in Geiger-Kuhn's *Grundriss der iran. Philologie*, ii. 141), even though other Oriental sources identify the two. At all events, the equation is too doubtful, with the data now available, to serve as a basis for any hypothesis, either for or against the Zoroastrianism of the Achæmenians.

In this connexion, however, mention may be made of the very plausible hypothesis of the Paris scholar Desai, who supposes (*Cama Memorial Volume*, Bombay, 1900, 37) that this Darius and his immediate predecessors were transferred from the one dynasty to the other by the Pahlavi writers 'in their attempt to palm off some of the last kings of the Achæmenian house mentioned above, as the last Kayanian monarchs, the successors of king Gushtasp.' If this may be accepted (and it is by no means improbable), it would readily follow as a matter of course that the undoubted Zoroastrianism of the dynasty of Vishtaspa should be attributed to the added kings, whatever their own faith may have been. The lack of agreement between the monarchs recorded in the Pahlavi texts and the dynasty of the Achæmenians must, however, be taken into account in any attempt to solve this problem.

In the light of what has been said, it would appear that the Achæmenians were pre-eminently worshippers of Ahura Mazda, though they did not refuse to recognize other Iranian deities, such as the sun, the fire, and the waters, or even hesitate to honour the divinities of other countries, rebuild their temples, and restore their cult. Ahura Mazda was to them a purely national god, surrounded by subordinate deities who were clearly nature-divinities. Numerous parallels may be drawn, both in concept and in phraseology, between the Old Persian inscriptions and the Avesta, although it is most significant that these coincidences are with the Younger Avesta, with its probable recrudescence of the pre-Zoroastrian nature-cult, rather than with the Gâthâs; and it must also be remembered that equally striking analogues exist between the Old Persian and the Assyr.-Bab. texts. The Old Persian inscriptions must be supplemented by all available sources, whether in Greek, Egyptian, Babylonian, or New Elamitic. From a careful study of all these documents, it becomes clear that the only conclusion which can safely be reached concerning the religion of the kings of this dynasty is that they were Mazdayasnians, not Zoroastrians.

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**ACHELOUS.**—The name of the greatest river in Greece. Flowing from the watershed of Pindus in a southerly direction, it forms in its lower waters the boundary-line between Ætolia and Acarnania before falling into the Ionian Sea. The river-god who presided over it was reputed the son of Oceanus and Tethys (Hes. *Theog.* 340); he was the eldest of 3000 brothers and supreme amongst them, in power second only to Oceanus himself (Acusilaus fr. 11a, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* i. 101). Other legends, after the manner of Euhemerus, represent him as a man in consequence of whose sorrows the river first gushed forth as a divine solace (see, e.g., Prop. ii. 25, 33). Tradition regarded him as the king of streams, from whom are derived the waters of all other rivers (Zenodotus on Hom. *Il.* xxi. 195), and as such he was worshipped throughout the Greek world, from Athens and Oropus as far as Rhodes and Metapontum. Thus it is not surprising that smaller streams besides the Ætolian river bore his name—in Thessaly, Achæra, Arcadia, and elsewhere. Further, we find the word Achelous generalized in the sense of water (Eur. *Bacch.* 625, etc.); this occurs especially in the ceremonial phraseology of sacrifices and oaths—proving that the identification is not a poetical refinement, but the survival of an old religious formula (Ephorus fr. 27; *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* i. 239). Again, Achelous is the father of a numerous progeny of water-nymphs, such as Peirene, Castalia, and Dirce, the guardian spirits of local Hellenic streams. The appropriateness is less obvious when the Sirens appear as his daughters (Pausan. ix. 34, 2): perhaps they are so viewed in their aspect as the windless calm of the southern sea in summer (cf. *Od.* xii. 168). For it has been held that Achelous was not only a river-god, but, as signifying water in general, also the lord of the sea (Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, Eur. *Herakles*<sup>2</sup>, i. p. 23). His most famous appearance in mythical story is as the suitor of Deianeira, who was vanquished by Herakles after a fierce struggle. Like Proteus, he possessed the power of metamorphosis, and in this battle he assumed the form of a wild bull (Soph. *Trach.* 9 ff., 507 ff.). In the course of the fight, one of his horns was broken off by Herakles, and, according to one account, he ransomed it from his conqueror by giving in exchange for it the horn of Amaltheia or cornucopia (Apollod. *Bibl.* ii. 7, 5). The ancients gave a rationalistic explanation of the story: Herakles represents the growing power of civilization, which reclaimed the marsh-land for agriculture by damming and diverting the wild exuberance of the river (Strabo, x. p. 458). It seems rather as if Achelous was a name consecrated in primitive ritual to express the principle of moisture as the source of life and growth. Further, since to a nation of cowherds the bull is typical of generative power, the fostering river-god was worshipped in bull form. Whatever be the explanation, it should not be forgotten that the bull shape is common to all river-gods and is not limited to Achelous (cf. Eur. *Ion* 1261). A symbolical connexion between the two aspects of divinity was found in the horn of plenty, which, as we have seen, was mythically associated with Achelous.

In art, Achelous is represented either as an old man with horns, as a sea-serpent with human head

and arms and bull's horns, or as a bull with human face and long dripping beard.

The etymology of the word is unknown, and inferences based merely upon conjectural explanations of it should be unhesitatingly rejected.

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A. C. PEARSON.

**ACHILLES** was extensively worshipped throughout the Hellenic world. Numerous guesses have been made at the derivation of his name both in ancient and in modern times, but the etymology remains quite uncertain. Nor does it appear possible to attribute to him with confidence any exclusively naturalistic significance, though he has been claimed as a river-god, as a god of light, and even as a moon-god; for us, he is merely the chief of the heroic figures of Greek myth who were deified by later generations as transcending the normal powers of humanity. Nevertheless, there are certain prominent features in his worship which claim recognition.

He appears most conspicuously as a sea-god, whose temple was placed on promontories or navigable coasts, and whose help as a pilot would secure a safe anchorage, or, in time of stress, would assuage the violence of the storm. The contrary winds, with which his spirit visited the Greeks after the capture of Troy, ceased when Polyxena had been sacrificed (Eur. *Hec.* 109, 1267). In this capacity his name was perpetuated, and honours were paid to him at harbours, as at Tainaron and Skyros. The popularity of his worship amongst the Greek settlers in Asia Minor accords with this; at Miletus a spring was called by his name, and in his temple at Sigem in the Troad offerings were made to him as a hero. But the most significant testimony to the high estimation in which he was held is the extension of his cult to the shores of the Euxine, where he was honoured as Pontarches (*CIG* ii. p. 87 n. 2076). To this neighbourhood it seems to have been carried by the earliest Greek navigators in their adventurous voyages of discovery. His chief temple in this region was situated at Olbia on the mouth of the Hypanis, where a college of priests was devoted to his service (Dio Chrys. xxxvi. 80 ff.); facing the narrowest part of the Cimmerian Bosphorus a village settlement had grown up round another of his precincts (Strabo, xi. p. 494). The most interesting and celebrated of his local cults was connected with the lonely shrine in the uninhabited island of Leuke (or Achilles Island, sometimes confused with Ἀχιλλείος ὄρος, which Strabo places at the mouth of the Borysthenes), opposite to the mouth of the Danube (Eur. *Andr.* 1260; Pind. *Nem.* iv. 48). Here the only ministrants were the sea-birds, and though navigators, for whom the temple served as a beacon, might land to sacrifice, they were obliged to leave at sunset. Here also Helen and Achilles were believed to consort together; for sounds of high revelry and the noise of armed men were heard by night, proceeding from the sanctuary, and filling with awe and amazement those who had been rash enough to anchor near (Philostr. *Her.* xx. 32–40).

In another aspect, Achilles was recognized as a god of healing (Gruppe, see below). This is inferred from the association of his worship with that of Asklepios, from the healing properties of his spear, from his connexion with healing goddesses such as Medea and Iphigenia, from his detection of the magician and thief Pharmakos, and from his victory over the Amazons. There are also distinct traces of his beneficent power in cases of ceremonial purification: the clearest is to be found in the story of Poimandros, who successfully obtained his help

when suffering from the pollution of accidental homicide (Plat. *Quest. Gr.* 37, p. 299 C-E).  
**LITERATURE**—Arist. by C. Fleischer in *Recher.* and by J. Escher in *Philosophica*; O. Gruppe, *Griech. Mythol. u. Lit.* (1907) 122, pp. 616-618; J. B. Bury in *CR* xiii. (1906) p. 357. A. C. PEARSON.

**ACOSMISM** (Gr. a privative, and *kosmos*, 'the universe,' in the sense of an ordered or arranged whole).—This term belongs primarily to the field of Ontology, i.e. the theory of the ultimate nature of Being and Reality; but it has ethical bearings also. Allowing for several possible differences of theoretical interpretation, the doctrine of Acosmism implies that the universe, as known to human experience, possesses no reality in itself, but is dependent upon, or is a manifestation of, an underlying real being. In a word, the universe must be viewed as a semblance. In the history of modern thought the classical example of the doctrine may be described as the metaphysical parallel to Hume's psychological scepticism. For Hume, *Cogito, ergo video esse*. And just as he thus fixes illusion upon the experience of the individual man, so the acosmist holds the universe as a whole to be illusory. This conclusion, while defensible, as in Spinoza's case, from the standpoint of the historical and speculative conditions of the time, may be controverted on the strictly theoretical side. For it is obvious that the reality constituting the substratum of the universe must be regarded as *the real*; it is no less obvious, however, that the only reality attributable to it must be derived, as concerns human experience, from the universe already declared to be illusory. For example, Spinoza's Absolute Substance—the reality underlying the universe—is known to man in the two 'attributes' Thought and Extension. These in turn differentiate themselves into 'modes,' each mode of Thought being the correspondent of a mode of Extension. God is, therefore, at once the 'Thing' which thinks and the 'Thing' which is extended. Hence (as the conditions of his age prevented him from seeing fully) any attribute of God, whether known to man or not, is a *method* of perceiving substance. 'By attribute I understand what intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence' (cf. *Ethics*, ii. 21, Schol.). Between this conclusion and Hegelian idealism there may be, doubtless, a distinction, but without fundamental difference. And the reason lies open. Only from human experience can Spinoza, or any one, derive reality and meaning to inject into the so-called substratum or 'Unknownable.' In other words, either the reality underlying the cosmos is nothing, or it achieves reality just to the extent to which it may be viewed as an effective component of human experience.

One need not do more than indicate the importance of this as bearing upon theological problems, especially those raised by the religions of India; or upon ethical questions, particularly those connected with Quietism (wh. see).

The *feeling* of the overwhelming nature of the Ultimate Being tends naturally to Acosmism; so, too, does undue emphasis upon the transcendence of Deity. In both cases, however, the conclusion follows usually from a more or less vague ethical attitude, rather than from metaphysical analysis and logical argument.

**LITERATURE**—G. B. Jäsche, *Der Pantheismus nach seinen verschiedenen Hauptformen* (1826-27), vol. iii.; Dorner, *Syst. of Chr. Theol.* (Eng. tr.) vol. i. 341f., vol. ii. 247f.; F. Paulsen, *Einleitung in d. Philosophie*, 221f.; F. C. S. Schiller, *Riddles of De Spinoza*, ch. x.; A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, 101f.; Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, § 10 ('Logic of Hegel,' tr. W. Wallace, 1871, 2nd ed. 1876); H. L. Mansel, *Prolegomena Logica* (1858) 233; J. Martineau, *Essays* (1829), vol. ii. 223; R. A. Duff, *Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy* (1903), ch. v.; R. Flint, *Anti-Theistic Theories* (1879), 491f.; G. H. Lewis, *Hist. of Philosophy*, vol. ii. 176 (ed. of 1867); the *Hil-*

*ories of Modern Philosophy* (under 'Spinoza' of J. E. Erdmann (Eng. tr.), Kuno Fischer (German only), W. Windelband (Eng. tr.), H. Hoffding (Eng. tr.); *Alind* (O. S.), vol. iii. 203f., 28 (N. S.) vol. v. 181f.; P. Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads* (Eng. tr. 1906), 33-50, 226f. See PANTHEISM.

R. M. WENLEY.

**ACOSTA**.—Uriel (or, as he was originally named, Gabriel) da Costa is an interesting but overrated personality. Interest in his career is due mainly to the similarity between his life and that of another Amsterdam Jew of the same period—Spinoza. It may even be said that the harsh treatment which the latter received from the Jewish community was the result of the vagaries of Acosta; but there was no real parallel between the two men. Acosta did not possess the strength or originality of character which enables a religious thinker to stand alone, yet he was gifted with enough independence to render it impossible for him to submit to the restraint of authority. Acosta was born about 1590 at Oporto, of a Marano family, i.e. a family of Jewish origin forced to conform to Roman Catholicism. Carefully educated in the new faith, he had every prospect of advancement; but, as he tells us, his studies of the OT left him dissatisfied with Catholicism. Determined to resume Judaism, Acosta with other members of his family contrived to escape to Amsterdam in 1617. Here he lived openly as a Jew; but, as was to be expected, he found Judaism less ideally perfect than he had dreamed. He soon came into conflict with the Synagogue as he had done with the Church, was excommunicated, recanted, again defied the authorities, was again excommunicated, and finally submitted to a public and degrading penance in the Synagogue, shortly after which he shot himself. This was probably in 1647; Spinoza was a boy of fifteen at the time.

Gutzkow, author of the well-known drama on the subject, represents Uriel Acosta as a youth at the time of his suicide: he was certainly over 50; and if the dates given above be correct (as is most probable), he was nearer 60. Thus we are not dealing with a persecuted youth, but with a man of advanced years, who deserves sympathy rather for what he was than for what he endured. His brief autobiography, written just before his death, is indeed a pathetic document. He called it *Exemplar humane vite*; it was published in Latin by Philip Limborch on pp. 346-354 of his *de Veritate Religionis Christianae* (Gouda, 1687, since reprinted), and in a German translation by H. Jelinek in *Acostas Leben und Lehre* (Zerbst, 1874). In this autobiography he tells us most of what we know of his career. He abjures both Christianity and Judaism, expressing himself with peculiar bitterness against the latter, whose teachers he repeatedly terms Pharisees. The only authority that he admits is the 'lex naturæ,' thus placing himself among the Deists. Nature, he says, teaches all human virtue and fraternity, while revealed religion produces strife. He speaks sympathetically of Jesus. Strangely enough, he finds all necessary rules for conduct in the Noachian laws formulated by the Talmudists: these were seven in number; and though the details differ in different Rabbinic sources, they include belief in God, the avoidance of adultery, murder, and robbery. These Acosta considers to be 'laws of nature.'

As a contributor to religious thought, Acosta was not original. But he belongs to the direct line of rationalists who were subsequently to attain to so much significance in religious history. He lived in an age when tolerance was little understood even in free Amsterdam, and though his troubles were mainly self-inflicted, he must always enjoy the sympathy of those who condemn the attempt of public authority to regulate belief and compel conformity. As a champion of freedom,

LITERATURE.—Whiston, *The Remarkable Life of Uriel Acosta, an Eminent Freethinker* (1740); Uriel Acosta, *Leben und Lehre* (1847); I. da Costa, *Israel en de Verrekening der Wereld* (1869); I. da Costa, *Acosta's Leben und Lehre* (1874); F. A. Schlegel, *Uriel Acosta* (1891).  
I. ABRAHAMSON

1. Bickell and others find fifteen complete alphabets or remains of them in the Heb. OT and Sirach, viz. in the following Psalms or chapters: (1-8) Pss 9-10. 25. 34. 37. 111. 112. 119. 145; (9) Pr 31; (10-13) La 1. 2. 3. 4; (14) Nah 1-2; (15) Sir 51.

(2) Ps 25.—An alphabet minus *p*, with a letter from each verse, except that the *y* is included in the 7 verse. To restore the *p*, begin *r*.<sup>18</sup> with 'Arise' (Ps 101<sup>2</sup>). An appended *נ' מר* makes up the number of the verses to the alphabetic etc., two. 'Carmina alphabeticantia,' like Ps 33, La 5, etc., are such as have that number of verses or sections, but are not alphabets (Bickell).

(4) Pa 37.—An alphabet *minus* γ, formed like (1). To complete it, read in v.<sup>23</sup> עילוט (עילוט) with *daketh* for *resh*, the word in brackets for LXX A ἀρωμα. In v.<sup>23</sup> ממשנת *minus* 1 gives the η.

(7) Ps 119.—Known as *ספר שמע*, 'the great alphabet' (Buxtorf, *Lex. s. v.* *ספר*). Eight verses begin with *aleph*, eight with *beth*, and so on. The names of the letters are given in the English Bible, but not in the LXX. Note, however, that the Psalm is missing in B; and see the variants from the Psalters R and T (Sweete).

(9) Pr 31<sup>10-31</sup>.—An alphabet with a letter from each verse; but in LXX B the  $\rho$  verse precedes the  $\gamma$  verse.

(11, 12, 13) La 21-22 31-48 41-22.—Three alphabets, of which every verse gives a letter, that in (12) being of the form AAA, BBB, etc. Heb.  $\delta$  before  $\psi$ ; but in the LXX, which here also names the letters, B gives  $\Delta$  and  $\Phi$  wrongly as titles of the  $\pi$  and  $\alpha$  in verses.

(15) Sir 61:13-23. — From the Versions, before the discovery of the Cairene Hebrew, Bickell saw that Ben Sira's poem on Wisdom was an alphabet, but he did not satisfactorily determine all the letters. In the LXX B (ed. Swete) supplies materials for the beginnings of all but the yod verse in their right order. In v.<sup>18</sup> begin יסכתי (סְוֵרֶסְרֶס); in v.<sup>19</sup> סכתי (סֵרֶסְרֶס); and supply the yod line from the Hebrew. The other letters may then be found without difficulty. Comparing (2) and (3), Bickell retranslated v.<sup>30</sup> as an added pe line, but in the Heb. it begins rightly or wrongly with *mem*.

\* Some find the names *Pedahel*, *Pedaiah*, *Simon* in Ps 25<sup>23</sup> 110<sup>1-4</sup>. *Pesikt. Rab.* detects *Moses* in Ps 92<sup>1</sup>, and so from Ps. 96<sup>11</sup> we may spell out יְהוָה יִרָא. The Midrash knows also of Greek ἀλφασμάρια.

3. Alphabets and other acrostics are found in Jewish Prayer Books and secular writings. Famous names were shortened acrostically, as in RaMBaM for Rabbi Moses Maimonides (ben Maim.). A name given by acrostic verses may settle a question of authorship, as in the case of R. Jacob Ben Shimson's commentary on *Aboth*, often found ascribed to a better known writer. The mistake may have arisen partly from his name having been written ע"י for Rabbi Jacob Shimshoni, and then read "ר" *Rashi*.

5. That acrostics were used in oracles is thought to be indicated by their occurrence in the pretended oracles of the Sibyl. These make the name 'Αδάμ an acrostic of east, west, north, south in the line 'Αντολήνη τε Δάσνι τε Μεσημβρίη τε καὶ Ἀρκτον (iii. 26, viii. 321; cf. ii. 195, xi. 3). Romulus and Remus are alluded to by the word ἑκατόν (xi. 114), the Greek R standing for a hundred. The initials of the lines viii. 217-250 give the Greek for 'Jesus Christ God's Son Saviour Cross,' whence, without *Cross*, as an acrostic of an acrostic, comes ΙΧΘΥΣ, 'fish,' a mystic name of Christ (Aug. *Civ. Dei*, xviii. 23).

7. Professor H. A. Giles, of Cambridge, informs the writer that 'the Chinese have several forms of the acoustic. The simplest is that in which the hidden sentence is revealed by taking the first word in each line of a short poem. This form is often still further elaborated by using, not the actual words required to make sense, but homophones of a more or less misleading character; Anglicé, "*Boughs* are made," etc., where *Bois* is required for the sense. Other kinds of acoustic are produced by the dissection of words, to which the Chinese script readily lends itself, much as we form charades.'

1. *Umlautregeln*.—Gustav Bickell, *Carmina Vet. Test. Metrica* (1882), and 'Ein alphabetisches Lied Jesu Sirachs' (1882) in *Archiv. art. 'Acroestic'* in *Oxford New Eng. Dict.*, i. Abraham, art. 'Acroestics' in *JE*; Lagarde, *Symmetria*, i. 107 (1877); Bingham, *Works*, Bk. xiv. s. 12 (vol. v. 7, Oxford, 1855); Driver, *LOT*, ch. vii.; Karl Krumbacher, *Gesch. der Byzant. Literatur*, § 257 (1897), and Index, art. 'Acrostichis', 'Alphabethe'; Orac. Sibyll. ed. Rzach (1891), Gefickken (1902); *J.P.A.* No. lix. art. 'The Alphabet of Ben Sirach' (1906); Appendix (1900) to C. Taylor's *Sayings of the Jewish Fathers*, p. 931.; *Offrida von Weissenburg Evangelienbuch*, ed. Johann Heide, vol. 1 (1556), see, after the Introduction, pp. 31, 121, 380-294.; Wilhelm Braune, *Althochdeutsches Lesebuch* (1897), pp. 401, 82-88, 167, 176 f.

C. TAYLOR.

**ACT, ACTION.**—The English word 'action' is used very widely. We speak of the 'action' of one body upon another as readily as of a man's action, and we have no word like the Greek *πρᾶξις* or the German *Handlung, das Handeln*, to designate human agency as such, both in general and in the particular instance. In the word 'conduct' we have a general term for human action as such, when we speak of it in a more or less comprehensive way, but in speaking of the particular instance

we must have recourse to the words 'act' and 'action.' Hence, when we wish to designate the agency of man in its peculiar character, we must prefix the epithet. The peculiar character of human action, as the phrase is ordinarily used to mark the distinction from any sort of physical action, is that the former is an expression of consciousness. But in making this broad distinction we must notice, first, that it applies equally to all animal action as distinguished from physical and merely physiological action; and, second, in the discussion of human action the phrase is often used more widely to include unconscious actions exhibited by the human organism. The fact is, of course, that the human organism exhibits all grades of action, physical, animal, and human in the strictest sense. The only physical actions of the organism, however, which concern us in relation to our study of conscious actions, are those which are like the latter in depending directly upon the nervous system, but unlike them in not expressing consciousness, whether in the form of feeling or purpose. Of such actions of the nervous system, not expressive of consciousness, two grades are distinguished: the simple Reflex action, and the more complex Instinctive action in which a number of movements are co-ordinated in the production of a single result—though it should be observed that the range of true instincts is very limited in the case of man. When we say that these actions are not expressive of consciousness, we do not necessarily imply that they have no conscious accompaniments, but only that the nature of the action is not determined by these conscious accompaniments even when present. The reflex action of sneezing is not determined by the sensations which accompany it. And similarly, though an instinctive action may be accompanied by sensation and feeling, the purposive character which it displays is not due to conscious forethought.

Of human actions, in the stricter sense, which are expressive of consciousness—or which, to use the technical term of psychology, are 'conations'—the most obvious type is the purposed action, in which the performance of the action is preceded by an idea of the thing to be done. But it is evident that such purposed action cannot be psychologically primitive, since those ideas or images of movements to be executed, which are implied in purposed action, could have been formed only after previous experience of the same movements brought about in some other way. Consequently, either we must fall back upon reflex actions for a beginning, or we must hold that, in the most primitive phase of conation, a change of sense-perception, or the feeling which accompanies it, finds immediate expression in movement. To the former course, which is apt to be favoured by physiologists, there is the objection that reflexes, even though they may be primitive for the individual in the sense of being inherited nervous arrangements, must have been developed at some time in the experience of the race. In our present experience of the formation of a habit, we can trace the degradation of conative action into action that resembles the reflex type. And unless we are prepared to assume that our inherited reflexes were originally formed by some similar process of degradation, the beginnings of action are left psychologically inexplicable. From the psychological point of view, then, we must prefer the other course, and regard as the original type of action that in which a change of sense-perception or feeling finds immediate expression in movement (cf. Ward's art. 'Psychology' in *EBr*, vol. xx, pp. 42-43). And this view will appear all the more plausible if we remember two points.

First, such 'impulsive' action, as we call it—the terminology of the subject is very confused—although as a rule definite enough in the adult (e.g. in warding off a blow), is to be conceived as having been originally vague, diffused, and uncertain, as the movements of an infant are in comparison with those of an adult. Second, it is now recognized, and has been shown experimentally, that all mental states have this impulsive quality, this tendency to affect movement, although in our present experience these motor effects are to a great extent either quite inappreciable or else inhibited (cf. James, *Principles of Psychology* [1890], ii. ch. xxi.). And the difficulty of a psychological theory of action is thus greatly diminished when we see that action does not begin with particular and isolated definite movements, but that these, whether they be inherited reflexes or acquired impulses, must have been developed by the progressive restriction or specialization of movement that was originally more diffused.

Although it is with purposed rather than impulsive action that the moralist is mainly concerned, it seems a mistake to confine the epithet 'voluntary' to the former, and the practice of those psychologists is rather to be followed who tend to apply the epithet widely to all action that is expressive of consciousness. There are, of course, objections to such a usage. We use the noun 'will' in a much narrower sense. And the term 'voluntary' no doubt seems paradoxical as applied to the simpler expressive movements which are hardly to be distinguished from mechanical reactions. But we have to remember that the impulsive actions of the adult are usually of a higher type. The hasty words of an angry man may burst from him without any previous distinct idea of what he is going to say, and yet there accompanies his utterance a consciousness of its meaning, in virtue of which we hold him responsible for what he has said. The more definite and significant an impulse is, the more it must be regarded as an expression of character. One man will say things in anger which would be impossible to another however enraged. And the very fact that he permits himself to go on, that he is not brought to a halt by the consciousness of what he is saying, shows a basis for the impulse in the man's general character which forbids us to regard the outburst, however devoid of previous purpose, as simply involuntary. What we must rather say, then, is that all impulsive action is also in a broad sense voluntary action, but that voluntariness has many degrees, and that, the lower down we go in the scale, the less possible it becomes to distinguish voluntary from involuntary action in character.

Before proceeding to the consideration of purposed action, we may refer very briefly to a general conception of human action, which, if true, would profoundly modify the significance to be attached to the element of conscious foresight in man's life. It is a conception which is apt to find a ready acceptance with those who look upon human conduct from the point of view of biological evolution, or, again, from the point of view, not very dissimilar, of a philosophy like Schopenhauer's or v. Hartmann's, which sees in blind will the ultimate principle of all existence. Human action, it is sometimes argued, is not really determined by the transient desires, the petty motives and calculations of interest, of which an introspective psychology makes so much. All this constant fluctuation and transition from one object of desire to another is only so much surface play. The true forces lie far deeper, in the strong instinctive tendencies of man's nature. It is these that have the real shaping of his life, these that use for their own hidden ends all the superficial activity of

desire and feeling and calculating intellect, to which the reflexion of the individual naturally but mistakenly attributes the direction of his life. Now, such a conception of human life may have an appearance of profundity, but it conveys no real insight. It does not aid, on the contrary it obstructs, the work of scientific analysis and explanation. To appeal to instinctive tendencies is only to involve ourselves in empty mystery, unless we can definitely characterize these tendencies, and show how they operate, and why they manifest themselves in just such ways as they do. Yet for such concrete analysis we must, of course, return to the very surface processes of consciousness which we had affected to despise, and must seek in their definite modes of interconnexion, and not in the vague and mysterious depths of instinctive tendencies, the definite explanation of the course of human life.

When these two conditions are fulfilled, first, that definite movements have begun to emerge from the earlier stage of diffused movement—an emergence which may be greatly facilitated by the existence of inherited nervous co-ordinations; and, second, that images have begun to be formed, then the higher stage of purposed action becomes possible, in which the idea or image of a movement to be executed precedes and directs its actual execution. The idea of movement may be prompted by a present object (with whose attainment or avoidance the movement must, of course, have been already associated), and, as so prompting, the object is an object of desire or aversion. But the range and significance of desire are vastly widened when not merely present objects, but objects that are themselves represented only in idea or imagination, are sufficient to prompt ideas of movement. For the agent is thereby delivered from his former bondage to the immediate present, and is enabled both to modify his present situation by the aid of ideas derived from his past experience, and to anticipate the future by present preparation. With the development of such desire-prompted action there is bound to emerge the situation described as a conflict of desires, with its need for a voluntary decision between them. This decision has often been represented by psychologists and moralists of the Associationist school as brought about in a quasi-mechanical way: it is the strongest desire that prevails, and the conflict is simply a conflict of opposed intensities. Now it is true that, as in the case of impulse, so here, if we take desires of a very simple kind, the epithet 'voluntary' seems hardly to mark any essential peculiarity of the process so described. The voluntary decision between two desires of a very simple kind, depending as it does merely on their relative strength, seems hardly to be distinguished in character (save for the fact that the process goes on in consciousness) from the mechanical result of a conflict between two forces. But here, too, we must remember that the simplest type of choice, say the choice of a child between an apple and an orange, is not really representative of the more important choices which the adult has constantly to make. And it is just in proportion as the 'conflicting' desires are not simple or low-grade, but complex and significant, that the choice becomes an expression of character, and becomes therefore in a fuller degree voluntary. Now, the more complex and significant the desires are, the less is it possible to picture their 'conflict' as a mere collision between two forces of different intensities. The man who has to decide whether he will continue in his present accustomed vocation or accept a new career that has opened out for him, is not simply distracted between a love of ease and a love of gain. He is deciding ultimately between two complex

schemes of life, and to represent such a decision in terms of a simple quantitative difference would be a caricature. The factors which do admit of quantitative measurement in money value may even be the least influential of all.

It is evident, of course, that in an example like this we have gone far beyond the range of the desires that merely reproduce past experience in imagery. We are at a level at which conceptual thinking has long been at work upon the materials which memory supplies, a level at which the agent habitually thinks in terms of generalized purposes, to which he refers, and by which he guides, his particular actions. The desires of the adult are nearly always more or less significant. That is to say, the desired object is desired not merely for its own sake, but because it fits in with some wider purpose. And the more intelligent and thoughtful the agent is, the more his desires and purposes will be organized in this way, and rendered subservient to the scheme or type of life in which he sees the completest realization of his powers.

We must indicate the psychological processes involved in this higher development of conation and action. One practical relation that must soon be forced upon the attention of an agent trying to bring about an ideally represented state of things, is that of means and end. With the fuller recognition of this relationship among objects comes the process of deliberation, in which the agent seeks to discover the means of attaining an end, or to determine which of two or more ways of attaining it is the best. In Aristotle's classical analysis of the deliberative process (*Nic. Ethics*, III. iii.), choice is expressly characterized as choice of the means. Such a view of choice will not, however, apply to all cases without straining. For, although in every choice between two objects or courses of action some end or criterion is implicitly assumed, there is an obvious difference between the case in which the end or criterion is explicit from the start of the deliberative process, and the case in which it emerges only as a balance of advantage at the end. And we must further recognize the possibility, of which Aristotle takes no account, that even where we start with a certain end explicitly before us, our deliberation may, by bringing out other elements of significance in our end which we had not before fully appreciated, cause us to modify or abandon it altogether. In short, the more important the matter for decision is, the more does the choice tend to express, not an isolated desire for a particular end, but the whole character of the agent, or, what is the same thing, his ultimate and all-inclusive desire for the kind of life which is to him best. And the more strenuously a man lives, the more will the unity of his character tend to work itself out in even the simpler actions of his daily life.

It is for choices of a more or less deliberate kind that the term 'will' is often reserved in psychological and ethical discussions. But we must not suppose that the new term denotes a new faculty or energy of mind. The expression 'fiat of will' often used in this connexion is very misleading. The man who seriously sets himself to deliberate must mean to come to a decision. He starts, that is to say, with some sort of decision already vaguely outlined in the shape of possible alternatives, and the only function of deliberation is to eliminate what is doubtful and make the proper course of action clear. This being done, nothing more is needed: if the man was impatient to act, the obstacles in his way have now been removed, and he will act at once. The general purpose of acting was present all through, and by means of the deliberative process this general purpose takes shape in a definite volition. A fiat of will, additional

and subsequent to the phase of conation in which the deliberative process was complete, would be otiose if it merely gave its consent, and wholly arbitrary if it withheld it. For, if any reason remained for withholding consent, the deliberation could not have been complete, and it is only a sense of such incompleteness that could make the agent hesitate and hold himself back from action. Thus, if we are to give this notion of a fiat of will any meaning at all, we must regard it as merely emphasizing the last or finally decisive element in the deliberative process itself, the thought that clinches the slowly forming decision and issues at once in action.

In our consideration of the development of conation in the individual, we have so far been abstracting from those aspects of the individual's action which depend upon the essentially social character of human life. In point of fact, however, the actions of the individual for the most part do either explicitly contain or not remotely imply a reference to other persons, and to their agency in relation to himself as well as to his own agency in relation to them. And this social factor in individual action manifests itself not merely in the social content of the action, but in the definite control which social influences exert over the will of the agent. The child is no sooner able to understand a particular prohibition or command, than he begins to experience this social control, which in varying forms is to continue all through his life. At first it comes to him from without as a constraint upon his desires, but more and more it tends to become an internal factor in his own will and character, and so not more society's law than that of his own nature. At first it comes to him in the form of particular injunctions to refrain from particular objects or to do particular acts, and his obedience is an obedience given merely to particular persons, but more and more it tends to take the generalized and impersonal form of rules of action to be obeyed merely as such. These rules become concrete, of course, only in the personal claims and expectations which they warrant, but their control reaches out beyond every particular case, and pervades the whole practical thinking of the individual. Hence the important consequence that action constantly expresses, not a consideration of means and ends at all, but a simple obedience to rule, and that, even where it does express a consideration of means and ends, this consideration itself is controlled through and through by the habitual regard which we pay to social rules in all our practical thinking.

To complete our sketch, we may ask as a final question, how far we can bring the whole development of conation and action under a single formula. Various attempts have been made to find an explanatory formula applicable to action at all stages. Many psychologists and moralists have sought such a formula in the connexion of action with feeling, i.e. with pleasure and pain. This connexion has been asserted in two forms which it is important to distinguish clearly from each other. On the one hand, it may be held that feeling is the efficient cause of action. This doctrine is applied over the whole range of human action, and means that between various impulses, desires, or aims, that one will always tend to be realized which gives the greatest present pleasure or relieves the greatest present uneasiness. And we must, of course, observe that present pleasure or uneasiness may be caused not merely by present events and objects, but also by the mere images or thoughts of distant events and possibilities. On the other hand, it may be held that feeling is the end or final cause of action. This doctrine (technically known as Psychological Hedonism) is obviously narrower in range, since it applies only to purposed and not

to impulsive action. It means that of various possible courses of action represented before the mind, that one will always be chosen which promises most future pleasure or least future pain, pleasure being thus regarded as the only real object of desire. This doctrine is now almost universally abandoned in psychology and ethics. For it is quite evident that there is a great deal of purposed action, at all levels of conduct, which is not determined by calculations of future pleasure and pain at all. The hungry man seeks food not for the pleasure of eating, but for the mere satisfaction of his hunger. The honest man desires to pay his just debts not for the pleasure of having been honest, but merely because he is honest and wants to remain so. The other form of doctrine, according to which we do what continues present pleasure or relieves present uneasiness, is more plausible (cf. the change of view in the chapter on 'The Idea of Power' in Locke's *Essay*, Fraser's ed. vol. i. p. 332). Nevertheless it is open to objection on grounds both of fact and of principle. The objections of fact are: (1) that action often goes on for a considerable stretch in a practically neutral state of feeling, (2) that we may persist in painful actions in spite of their painfulness. Now we may, of course, to save our theory, attribute this persistence to the greater uneasiness experienced on stopping. But such uneasiness would seem itself to imply a direct interest of corresponding strength in the object of our action, and it is surely simpler, therefore, to refer the persistence to this interest directly. Moreover, as a matter of principle, it seems impossible to explain in terms of merely quantitative variations of feeling the definite forms which action takes. What we have to explain is not simply varying degrees of one fundamental type of action, but many actions of widely different types, and the particularity of the action can be explained only by the particularity of the interest which it expresses. There is thus a good deal to be said for a view which seems to be finding increasing favour with recent psychologists (e.g. Stout, *Analytic Psychology* (1896), i. 224 ff.; Titchener, *Outline of Psychology* (1898), § 38), viz., that pleasure and pain, agreeableness and uneasiness, are not so much factors in the causation of activity as the feeling-tone which accompanies and reflects its varying fortunes.

Another well-known formula for purposed action affirms that in all choice the object or course of action chosen is conceived as realizing what is there and then the agent's good (so, e.g., Green in his *Prolegomena to Ethics*). The same meaning is negatively expressed in the Socratic maxim, that no one willingly chooses what is evil; and this famous paradox, when rightly interpreted, only says what cannot well be denied, that a man's actions, not his professions, are the test and index of his real convictions. The formula, as it stands, however, is not sufficiently comprehensive, for many actions are done without any *explicit* reference to the agent's personal good at all, e.g. assistance given to a person in distress from the mere pity felt on seeing it.

The defect of such formulæ is apt to be that they are framed with a too exclusive regard for special types of action. If we want a formula which applies to all human action, we must fall back on the more generalized conception used above, and say that all human action is as such expressive of consciousness, and that in proportion as the immediate consciousness expressed, be it impulse, desire, or general aim, is intelligent and significant, in the same proportion is the action voluntary and expressive of character.

LITERATURE.—In the text-books of psychology the various phases of conation or action are apt to be treated in detached

sections. For a comprehensive and continuous account, see Sully, *Human Mind* (1892), vol. II. H. BARKER.

**ACTION SERMON.**—The designation given by Presbyterians in Scotland, and where Scottish communities exist, to the sermon which immediately precedes the celebration of the Lord's Supper.\* The name is derived directly from John Knox's *Book of Common Order*† and from the Westminster *Directory for the Public Worship of God*.‡ In both these works the celebration of the Holy Communion is described as 'the Action.' The use of the phrase in the earlier document may be traced partly (1) to the Liturgy of Calvin, which was largely the basis of the *Book of Common Order*, and in which the section entitled 'Mode of celebrating the Lord's Supper' contains this rubric: 'The ministers distribute the bread and the cup to the people . . . finally, *on use d'action de grâce*';§ (2) to the pre-Reformation use of the word *actio* to denote what was regarded as the essential part of the Eucharist, the Sacrifice of the Mass, wherein 'Sacramenta conficiuntur Dominica.'|| Knox, of course, and those who followed him, while retaining the word 'Action,' used it with a different signification, applying it to the celebration as a whole, or to the sanctification and distribution of the sacred symbols, without reference to any 'sacrifice.' While Calvin's 'action de grâce' was probably the chief cause (although indirectly) of the term 'Action Sermon' being introduced in Scotland, the long and popular retention of this term is due, doubtless, to the broader application of the word 'action' to the entire sacramental celebration; for the designation 'Eucharist' (Thanksgiving) has never been widespread among Scottish Presbyterians.

The employment of the phrase 'Action Sermon,' while still frequent, has within living memory declined, owing (1) to the somewhat diminished relative importance now attached to the pre-Communion sermon, as compared with the devotional parts of the pre-Communion service; (2) to the prevalence in towns of additional Communion services (in the afternoon and evening), which are not immediately preceded by any sermon.

LITERATURE (in addition to works quoted).—Du Cange, *Glossarium*; Jamieson, *Scottish Dictionary*, &c.

HENRY COWAN.

**ACTIVITY** (Psychological and Ethical).—No definition can be given of Activity which does not involve the term itself in some concealed or overt form; we can only (1) indicate the wider class of things or events to which it belongs; (2) describe the general conditions of its genesis or occurrence, and the general nature of its expressions or consequences; (3) distinguish one form of activity from another, as bodily from mental; and (4) describe the conditions of our knowledge of that form with which we are concerned.

1. (a) Activity belongs, within the world of existence, to the class not of things and qualities, or substances and attributes, but of events, processes, or changes: an activity has a beginning and an end;

\* Two notable examples of the designation being used may be quoted. (1) In 1674, during the persecution of the Covenanters, John Welsh, great-grandson of John Knox, is stated to have 'preached the Action Sermon' at a conventicle held near the bank of the Whitadder, in Teviotdale (see Blackadder's contemporary *Memoirs*, p. 205). (2) In the diary of Edward Irving for 1825, the entry occurs, 'I addressed myself to write my Action Sermon' (see Mrs. Oliphant's *Life of Edward Irving*, vol. I, p. 363).

† Chapter on the 'Manner of the Administration of the Lord's Supper.'

‡ Chapter entitled 'Of the Celebration of the Communion.' § *Corpus Reformatorum*, vol. xxxiii. p. 199; cf. Iren. adv. Hæc. iv. xviii. 4, 'panem in quo gratia actus sint.'

|| Valerius Strabo, *de Rerum Eccles. Exordium*, c. 22. *Agere* is used even in classical Latin to denote a sacrificial act (Ovid, *Fasti*, l. i. 823). Honorius of Autun (*Opera*, l. 103) and others derive the sacramental use of *actio* (with less probability) from its employment in legal processes: 'Actio dicitur quod causa populi cum Deo agitur.'

it occurs in time, it has prior conditions and subsequent consequences, and does not occur independently; a pure activity, in the sense of one which expresses itself without conditions and is not subject to time, is therefore a contradiction in terms. On the other hand, a process is always relative to a thing or things, a substance or substances, in or to which it takes place; all change implies something relatively permanent, as Kant pointed out, as a condition not only of its being known, but also of its existence. The activity of a fragment of radium must be referred either to the visible substance itself, or to the physical atoms (however conceived) the interaction of which gives rise to the observed effects. These, in the last resort, are the permanent entities in which the activity inheres. The activity does not occur, however, except under conditions, viz. the presence of other similar or opposite particles, or the like. So mental activity, being a process, is inherent in a substance,—either in the organism as a whole, the union of mind and body, or in the soul or mind as a reality independent (relatively at least) of the body. But neither thinking, nor willing, nor attending, nor any other form of mental activity, occurs without conditions which call it forth, and to which its expression is subject; and these conditions may be either mental or bodily, or both. Activity is not merely a more general 'faculty' in which the other faculties—sensation, memory, imagination, and the rest—are contained (Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, bk. i. ch. 3). The only faculty which really exists in the psychical world is the soul itself, or the individual, as a complex resultant of congenital dispositions and consolidated experiences. On the other hand, processes may be more or less complex, and the problem of mental activity involves the question (5) whether there is any ultimate or fundamental or simple form of activity to which the others may be reduced.

(b) What distinguishes an activity from any other kind of process or change? In actual practice we apply the term (i.) to persistent or repeated process; (ii.) to a process of which the conditions are wholly or partially within the subject of the activity; (iii.) to a process which is transmitted from the active being to others.

(i.) The term may be applied to light, heat, gases, etc., because their action, under given conditions, is continuous; they represent not stores which can at any time be tapped, but supplies which are always running; special conditions only increase or decrease the available flow. In the same way, mental activity is, during waking life, a process which is always going on; it may take different forms and different expressions, but whatever description we apply to it must apply to every phase of waking consciousness. According to some, mental activity is continuous not only during wakefulness, but during life. Sir Arthur Mitchell (*Dreaming, Laughing, and Blushing*, 1905, p. 44, etc.), for example, is of opinion that there 'is no such thing as dreamless sleep'; 'that thinking is involuntary—to the extent at least that we cannot cease to think under any order of the will'; that 'thinking never ceases during life, and is essential to the continuance of life.' And the same conception is to be found in Leibniz, *Monadology*: the function of the monad is to represent or mirror the universe in all its changes, therefore each monad must be continuously having perceptions, although not always conscious perceptions. In another view, the activity of the individual is the outflow of an energy of which the sum is constantly increasing or decreasing, sleep representing the period of maximum recuperation and minimum activity. For this sum of energy the mind is dependent wholly upon the body; it itself determines only the form of the



activity or the expression of activity, and the amount to be put forth at any moment (Fechner, *Psychophysik*, 1860; Höfler, *Psychische Arbeit*, 1895). The activity is continuous because of the constant shocks which the equilibrium of the organism receives from the play of the environing forces. It may be doubted, however, whether the term 'activity' would be applied, e.g., to the movement of a body according to the law of inertia, as Dr. Stout suggests (a body tending to continue its motion with the same velocity in the same direction) (*Analytic Psychology*, i. 146; but cf. 148). Such a body would be described as active only when it impinges upon another body and transmits its own motion, wholly or partially, to the latter. The 'activity' in the continuous movement of the first body would be referred rather to the initial impulse of that force which sent it on its way.

(ii.) The second criterion is that as to the conditions of activity being within the active body. From this point of view, a body is active so far forth as its changes are determined from within itself. Thus Condillac wrote of his statue: 'It is active when it recalls a sensation, because it has in itself the cause of the recall, viz. memory. It is passive at the moment when it experiences a sensation; for the cause which produces the latter is outside of it (the statue), i.e. in the odoriferous bodies which act upon its organ.'\* (At this stage the statue was supposed to have only one sense—that of smell). Substantially, Condillac's statement, that 'a being is active or passive according as the cause of the effect produced is in it or without it,' would be accepted to-day. The difficulty would be (1) to determine what is the cause of a given change, and (2) to determine whether the discovered cause is within or without the active being. If, for example, we refer all actions of the body to purely physical causes,—brain and nerve processes and the rest,—and regard the soul or consciousness as a mere spectator or accompanist of these central processes, without causal efficacy, then there is no such thing as mental activity, but only mental passivity.† The mind would not determine even its own changes, and so be active with respect to them, for the conscious change is always a by-product of certain physical changes. Of theories with regard to the relation of mind and body, neither automatism nor psychophysical parallelism is consistent with the existence of mental activity; the latter is compatible only with spiritualism on the one hand, the interaction theory on the other. The second difficulty—that of determining what is and what is not in the active being—may be illustrated from the controversy as to the existence of mental or psychical dispositions, or tendencies towards action, as opposed to merely physical dispositions, i.e. special arrangements or structures of the brain. Probably nine-tenths of the conditions of any mental act—an act of seeing, for example, or of hearing; an act of imagination or memory, or volition—lie beyond consciousness, or below the threshold of distinct consciousness. Our visual perception at any moment is determined largely by our own experience in the past and the general direction of our interests: the purely sense element,—what is given,—the affection of the retina, or the feeling of the ocular movements, is infinitesimal as a contribution to the resultant perception. Yet the

latter appears instantaneously and as a single act. Are the submerged factors wholly physical—the excitation of special cortical arrangements which in their turn are the direct product of past experience, or are there also mental tendencies actually present, although out of distinct consciousness, and which are re-excited by the given sensation? (Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, bk. i. ch. 2, and *Analytic Psychology*, ch. 2). The analysis of a complex tone into its partials is given as an instance:

\* Dr. Lipps holds that the unanalyzed note is a simple experience. The new tones which analysis discovers are, according to him, not in any sense precontained in the original presentation. The analysis itself brings them into existence, not only as distinguished differences, but as felt differences. According to him, what is analyzed is not an actual experience, but an unconsciously complex mental disposition corresponding to a complex physiological modification of the brain substance' (*Analytic Psychology*, vol. i. p. 61).

The value of the argument here is to show that our idea of mental activity will differ according as we interpret the disposition or tendencies from which acts of perception, of memory, of association flow as psychical or physiological, or both; if they are physiological merely, as many hold, then, not being in the mind, they cannot be regarded as internal causes of mental changes or effects, and therefore the mind is not active so far as their effects are concerned.

(iii.) The third characteristic is much more controversial than either of the others. A being is active, in popular speech, only so far as the effects or consequences of changes in it are transmitted to other beings; in other words, activity is *transient causality*, not *immanent*. In a body moving under the law of inertia, it may be said that the cause of its motion, in a given direction, with a given velocity, at any one moment, is its motion in the same direction and with the same velocity at the previous moment (Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, i. p. 146). Hence its motion at any moment is self-determined, i.e. both cause and effect are within the same being. And, according to many, mental activity exists only when there is self-determination in this full sense. It may be questioned, however, whether immanent activity in this sense ever falls within the scope of human experience: the continuance of a body under the law of inertia is not activity; it is absolute passivity, the movement as a whole being the effect of the original impulse. In mental activity, again, we never find that all the intermediate factors, in a case of self-determination, are within the mind. The volition to recall a name, for example, works itself out only when the necessary physiological substratum is present and uninjured. Even the moral resolution must make use of similar physical aids. It does not appear, then, that immanent activity, so far as our experience goes, is ever anything but indirect: the mind does not act upon itself, except by exciting physiological processes, to which presentations correspond. This conclusion may seem to render introspection, internal perception, or self-observation an impossibility, since knowledge is a form of action. Comte's arguments against introspection are indeed irrefutable, so far as pure introspection is concerned (cf. Miss Martineau's edition of the *Positive Philosophy*, vol. i. pp. 9, 81); but introspection on the basis of experiment is free from these objections, and is, in fact, the first method not of psychology alone, but of all science (Wundt, *Philos. Stud.* iv. 1886). This introspection is merely the analysis of presentations, whether primary (sensations) or secondary (memories, etc.), through repeating the conditions of the experience itself which has given the presentation: introspection is thus in no sense a turning of the mind upon itself, it is not a different process from external perception, it is only a more accurate and detailed perception, so as

\* Condillac, *Traité des Sensations*, ch. ii. § 11. The note may be added here: 'There is in us a principle of our actions which we feel, but which we cannot define: it is called force. We are active alike in respect of all that this force produces in us and outside of us. We are active, for example, when we reflect, or when we cause a body to move. By analogy we suppose, in all bodies which cause change, a force of which we know still less, and we are passive with regard to the impressions they make upon us. Thus a being is active or passive according as the cause of the effect produced is in it or without it' (ib. note a).

† See Huxley's essay on 'Animal Automatism' (*Coll. Essays*, 1895).

to bring out elements not previously or directly experienced. Introspection is thus, as a form of mental activity, indirectly immanent; directly, it is an interaction between the mental and the physical. The first effect of the action is a change in the physiological process (see below); this in turn reacts upon the mind, and a new and modified presentation results. All activity is of this type,—a moving body would be described as active only when it effects a change in another body: no doubt, in such a case, the original body suffers a change, but this change is not that in which the activity is thought to result, or which is referred to the activity. In itself activity is essentially transitive. This does not exclude, of course, the possibility that the highest forms of activity are those which are indirectly immanent, i.e. in which the outcome of the activity is a change in the subject itself or self-determination.

2. *The general conditions of mental activity* are partly physical and partly psychical. Among the former must obviously be included the nature of the cortical systems present, their degree of nutrition, and the like. Among the latter fall all presentations and feelings. The mind is wholly passive, so far as its direct presentations are concerned: it may select among them, give prominence to some and reject others, but their immediate condition is always a cortical process. What is true of presentations is true also of feelings and emotions: a feeling represents on the subjective side the attitude of the individual as a whole in a given situation, while a presentation is representative of changes in his environment, directly or indirectly affecting him. In both, the mind itself is passively affected, but each may be stimulative or directive of its activity. Feeling especially has been throughout mental evolution the stimulant of activity, becoming deeper or more intense or more persistent as the presentational side of mental life received greater expansion and greater differentiation. The activity itself has no presentational or feeling-side. Although an element, it is not one of which the subject himself can be directly aware. The immediate effects of mental activity, on the other hand, are cortical changes and bodily movements, in primitive life diffuse, indefinite, uncoordinated; later, as experience moulds the organism, becoming definite, coordinated, and centralized. It is only through these bodily changes that mental activity produces changes in the mind itself, effecting there the recall of past impressions, or the building up of new and creative mental syntheses. The formation of a moral character, for example, is impossible without the constant practice of moral actions. These outward actions are reflected in the physical organization, and thereby the mental organization as a whole is modified in accordance with them. Without action, a character cannot be formed; nor, being formed, can it be maintained.

3. *The contrast between bodily and mental activity* has been already discussed in what has been said above. We have assumed that body acts upon mind, giving rise to presentations, and mind upon body, producing bodily movements, which in their turn may lead to changes in the cortical system, and thus indirectly to changes in the presentational field. Whether there is any real causation in the one case or the other is a metaphysical question on which we do not touch.

4. It will follow that *mental activity cannot be directly apprehended either through feeling or in any other way*. All that is apprehended is the sequence of conditions and of effects, so far as the latter are represented in consciousness. There is no more ground for assuming a primitive consciousness of activity as the basis of the conception of activity than there is for assuming such in any other case of symbolic knowledge,—for example,

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that of chemical affinity. There are, of course, primitive experiences on which these conceptions are based, but the conceptions are built upon them, not drawn out of them. The most complete description of the phenomena on which our knowledge of mental activity is founded is that of Wundt: 'If we try to find for the "striving" in the will-process itself a substrate corresponding in some degree to this expression, we always come to certain feelings, belonging principally to the class of strain and excitement feelings, and which may most fittingly be called feelings of activity' (*Physiolog. Psychologie*, iii. 249). These 'mediate the consciousness of activity, which is known to all from self-observation, and which, under whatsoever circumstances we find it, whether accompanying an external action, or an act of attention directed upon the contents of consciousness themselves, appears of a uniform nature' (ib. 252). It may be defined as a total-feeling, composed of partial feelings of tension and excitement, following a regular course from beginning to end, the completion being the sudden conversion of one of the partial feelings (that of strain or tension) into its contrast-feeling (ib. 253). They accompany every form of mental activity from the simplest upwards. Thus experiments have shown that an impression requires a certain time in order to penetrate to the focus of consciousness—its 'apperception,' in Wundt's terminology. During this time we always find, according to him, the above-mentioned feeling of activity. It is the more vivid the more the mental vision is concentrated, and continues until the idea has reached perfect clearness of consciousness. It is more distinct, however, in the state of active thought or tension towards some expected impression or idea. In such a case there are always certain sensation-elements accompanying or entering into it,—those of the muscular strain of accommodation of the sense-organ in attention, which Fechner has described (ib. 337; cf. Fechner, *Psychophysik* [2nd ed. 1889], ii. p. 475). There is no such thing as an abstract activity, always the same, but turned, like a searchlight, in different directions, of which, moreover, we are directly aware. What is always the same and is always found, in every case of volition or mental activity, is just the peculiar complex of feelings and sensations referred to. The feeling as a whole is a direct contrast to that which we have when an external impression, or a memory-image, arises, which does not harmonize with or correspond to the present disposition of the attention, but suddenly compels it into a direction opposed to that of its activity up to that moment; this feeling is the feeling of passivity. Each as a whole is simple and indefinable, but each belongs, at the same time, to several of the general classes of feeling, of which Wundt recognizes six (ib. 332). It is clear that for Wundt, as for others, the activity itself, the inward act, is not directly cognized at all; the complex of feelings is merely an index or sign by which we infer the activity to be taking place. With Dr. Ward this is still more definitely stated.

'There is, as Berkeley long ago urged, no resemblance between activity and an idea; nor is it easy to see anything common to pure feeling and an idea, unless it is that both possess intensity. —Instead, then, of the one *summum genus* state of mind or consciousness, with its three coordinate subdivisions,—cognition, emotion, conation,—our analysis seems to lead us to recognize three distinct and irreducible facts,—attention, feelings, and objects or presentations,—as together in a certain connexion, constituting one concrete state of mind or psychosis' (*Encyc. Brit. art. 'Psychology'* [1896], p. 44\*).

Neither activity (attention) nor feeling can accordingly be presented to the mind; we know them only by their presentational conditions, accompaniments, or effects.

'Our activity as such is not presented at all: we are, being active; and further than this psychological analysis will not go. There are two ways in which this activity is manifested,

the receptive or passive, and the motor or active in the stricter sense; and our experience of these we project in predicating the causal relation. But two halves do not make a whole; so we have no complete experience of effectuation, for the simple reason that we cannot be two things at once' (ib. 53\*).

Activity and feeling are present in all states of consciousness, they show no differentiation of parts, possess therefore no marks of individuality by which they may enter into association with other activities, feelings, or presentations: and as they cannot enter into associations, so they cannot be reproduced or recalled in any sense analogous to that in which presentations are recalled (ib. 44\*). It might perhaps be said that, on Dr. Ward's view, activity is a simple unanalyzable phase of experience, but can never be an object or content of experience. Professor James has argued with great force against the conception that there is any peculiar consciousness of activity, more especially in the form of a *feeling of innervation* as it has been called—the feeling of the current of outgoing energy, in volition or attention or other active states,—which is defended by writers otherwise so diverse as Bain, Helmholtz, and Wundt (*Principles of Psychology*, ii. 492 ff.; cf. i. 299 f.). What is *in the mind* in ordinary volition before the act takes place is simply a kinesthetic idea of what the act is to be—'a mental conception, made up of memory images' of the muscular sensations defining which special act it is. All our ideas of movement, including those of the effort which it requires, as well as those of its direction, its extent, its strength, and its velocity, 'are images of peripheral sensations, either "remote," or resident in the moving parts, or in other parts which sympathetically act with them in consequence of the diffuse "wave"' (ib. 494). Wundt himself, as James points out, has come to admit that there are no differences of quality in these feelings of innervation, but only of degree of intensity. 'They are used by the mind as guides, not of *which* movement, but of *how strong* a movement it is making, or shall make. But does not this virtually surrender their existence altogether?' (ib. 500). The fundamental form of mental activity, according to James, is attention, and the fact of attention is known partly through changes undergone by the idea to which we attend, and partly by muscular sensations, in the head and elsewhere, which accompany the strain of accommodation, sensory and mental. Dr. Stout has rightly pointed out that James here separates activity from the process which is active, and makes it consist in another collateral process. It 'is like identifying the velocity of a moving body with the motion of some other body' (*Anal. Psychol.* i. p. 163). James does not, however, identify the activity with the sensations by which we become aware of it; they are indexes of something which directly we cannot know. By Dr. Stout himself this is precisely what is denied: an idea must be based upon some direct experience or sentence—'The thought of succession in time must be based on the direct experience of time-transience, as the thought of red colour is based on the corresponding sensation.' 'The cardinal antithesis between mental activity and passivity is not merely a group of relations ideally cognized by the reflective intelligence. Mental activity exists in being felt.' It may readily be admitted that change or transition is given as a direct experience; but an activity is much more than a transition. It involves (1) direction or tendency of the transition towards an end, and (2) some feeling or knowledge of *effectuation* in the successive phases of the realization of the end. It is impossible to see how either a tendency towards an end, or the effectiveness of a process in furthering the tendency, can be a direct experience or feeling of the mind. Causality cannot

'exist in being felt,' and causality is an essential feature of activity. We conclude, then, (1) that there is no direct consciousness of activity; (2) that the conception of activity is a symbolic knowledge, founded on certain complex groups of feelings and presentations, in which similar elements and arrangements of elements constantly recur.

5. *What is the simplest or primary form of mental activity?* At least three possible answers may be given: (1) Effectuation of physical change, (2) Attention, (3) Apperception. The first identifies activity with conation simply, of which the lowest form is impulse to movement; the second reduces the mental element in conation to the movement of the attention; the third, to the play of apperception. In the first, which is that adopted above, mental activity is self-determination only in an indirect way; the mind cannot act immediately upon itself; it can produce a desired change only by subjecting itself to certain physical conditions or circumstances through which the change may be effected. The question of Liberty and Determinism does not turn in the least upon this of the relation of mental activity to bodily. As has been said, 'Whatever be our opinion about our liberty or our determinism, we accord to the different moments of our mental life a decisive influence upon the nature of the following moments. We consider our actual modifications as acting upon our future modifications.' Even those who feel themselves subject to an inflexible necessity do so not because their will is without efficacy, but, 'on the contrary, because the efficacy of every idea, every feeling, every volition is such that it does not leave the smallest place to contingency' (van Biéma, *Revue de Métaphys. et Morale*, 1900, p. 286). But an idea has efficacy not in itself, but only in so far as it excites feeling, and thereby stimulates activity or striving. Both Dr. Ward and Professor James, from different points of view, regard *attention* as the primary and fundamental phase of mental activity. 'The effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will' (James, ii. p. 562); but 'this *volitional* effort pure and simple must be carefully distinguished from the muscular effort with which it is usually confounded. The latter consists of all those peripheral feelings to which a muscular "exertion" may give rise.' The attention is kept strained upon an object of thought which is out of harmony with the prevailing drift of thought, 'until at last it grows so as to maintain itself before the mind with ease. This strain of the attention is the fundamental act of will. And the will's work is in most cases practically ended when the bare presence to our thought of the naturally unwelcome object has been secured. For the mysterious tie between the thought and the motor centres next comes into play, and, in a way which we cannot even guess at, the obedience of the bodily organs follows as a matter of course' (ib. p. 564). 'Consciousness (or the neural process which goes with it) is in its very nature impulsive' (ib. p. 535). Now, it is in precisely this impulsiveness, this transition from thought to bodily action, that we have sought the primitive or essential form of the activity of mind. The retaining or strengthening of an idea in attention is only an instance of it. Attention is not a pure activity which can be called now to one idea, now to another: it is the interaction between the mind and its presentations, the degree and form of attention being proportional to the mental organization; and the effect of attention is never directly upon the idea, the content of consciousness itself, but upon the motor centres by which the physiological process underlying the idea is strengthened or heightened, and thus the idea itself brought indirectly into clearer consciousness. As Volkman has

said, 'The willing to hold a presentation fast is not the willing of the presentation itself—and cannot therefore be directed immediately upon the presentation, but must take the roundabout way through renewing the stimulus or keeping up the activity of auxiliary (i.e. associated) ideas' (Volkmann, *Lehrbuch der Psychologie* [1894], ii. p. 205). With Wundt, the elementary process is 'the apperception of a psychic content' (i.e. iii. 307), or the bringing of a presentation into the focus of consciousness. Consciousness and will belong together from the beginning onwards, and external action as a volition-process differs from the internal action of apperception only in its consequences, not in its immediate psychological nature. Considered as a phenomenon of consciousness, the former consists in nothing but 'the apperception of an idea of movement' (ib.; on Wundt's 'Theory of Apperception' see Villa, *Contemporary Psychology*, p. 211 ff.). If we analyze this process of apperception, we find there are three steps: (i.) the idea is perceived or enters consciousness; (ii.) it acts as a motive or stimulus, through the feelings connected with it, upon the internal will; (iii.) the will reacts upon it, and it is 'apperceived.' The sole effect of the will upon the ideas is to raise them into the focus of consciousness: all that follows springs from the mechanism of the ideas themselves. Volkmann objects to the theory that it implies a will hanging above the ideas, and striking in among them, but which in itself is wholly inert,—a will which wills nothing, but must wait for stimulation from without (i.e. p. 194). The latter objection holds only if we suppose that perception precedes apperception in time, as Wundt indeed assumes: it fails if we regard the analysis as that of a single process into constituents which can be held apart only by abstraction, but which have no separate conscious existence. The former objection is, however, conclusive: a will which acts upon our ideas and affects them directly is non-existent. We conclude that attention and apperception are alike modes of the more fundamental form of mental activity which consists in the response of the mind to a presentation, through feeling, by effecting some bodily change.

6. *The essence of moral activity* is to be found in that form of mental activity in which an idea is retained before the mind, in spite of its incongruity with tendencies or dispositions already present. In such cases there is a choice or selection of one idea among several possible ones, for realization: to realize an idea is to give it bodily form, or *real* existence—in other words, to carry out the actions which the idea involves. But it is only when an idea is sufficiently strengthened (centrally or peripherally) that it acquires this impulsive force. 'Consent to the idea's undivided presence, this is effort's sole achievement. Its only function is to get this feeling of consent into the mind. And for this there is but one way'—i.e. to keep it steadily before the mind until it fills the mind.—'To sustain a representation, to think, is, in short, the only moral act, for the impulsive and the obstructed, for sane and lunatic alike' (James). The consent of which James writes is a somewhat mythological process—it is a fiat of the mind, a resolve that the act shall ensue (i.e. pp. 501, 567 ff.), 'a subjective experience *sui generis* which we can designate but not define.' Perhaps an ultimate analysis would show it to be not an apparently unmotivated act of the mind, but a function of the ideas themselves in their relation to the mind as an organized system of dispositions and tendencies. The ethical or metaphysical problem of freewill or determinism belongs elsewhere; for psychology the problem does not exist.

7. *Historical*.—The first philosophical treatment

of mental activity occurs in Plato's theory of Ideas. The Ideas, as the ultimate and only realities, have movement and life, soul and intelligence. The finite soul has both a transient and an immanent causality, the former as the cause of the motion and life of its body, the latter through its faculty of knowing, by which it participates in the life of the Ideas and assimilates their active power. Passivity of mind consists in the affecting of the mind by the body, through its senses; passivity thus comes to mean imperfect, inaccurate, confused and inadequate knowledge. The soul is most active when detached from the body, and in the ecstatic union with the infinite and eternal Idea of the Good.

'The soul reasons best when disturbed by none of the senses, whether hearing or sight, or pain or pleasure: when she has dismissed the body and released herself as far as possible from all intercourse or contact with it, and thus, living alone with herself so far as possible, strives after real truth' (*Sophistes*, 248 A ff., *Republic*, vii. 532 ff., *Phaedo*, 65; cf. Zeller, *Phil. der Griechen*, ii. p. 436).

The dualism of soul and body is already partly overcome in Aristotle: it is not the soul in man that thinks or learns of itself, but man thinks through the soul; i.e. the man is an organic whole. On the other hand, the dualism returns within Reason or Intelligence, which is of two kinds, passive and active. All human knowledge depends upon experience, and rational truths are merely the highest inductive generalizations from experience; the mind is passive in the double sense: (1) that it is dependent upon the body for its material, and even the forms into which the material is moulded, through successive impressions; (2) that the separate phases of consciousness are transitory and fleeting. On the other hand, the possibility of these empirical generalizations implies the co-operation of an Active or Creative Intelligence which gives the ideas their reality, as eternal, imperishable existences. This Active Reason is separate from the body, as from all matter, whereas the Passive Reason is merely the essence or form of the body itself: the Passive Reason perishes with the body, the Active Reason is the eternal element in man (*de Anima*, iii. Cf. Siebeck, *Gesch. der Psychologie*, i. 2, pp. 64 f., 72). The difficulties of the theory are: (1) that the Active Reason appears to be simply identical with the Divine Consciousness itself, by which the finite mind is passively affected, so that there is no real activity of the finite consciousness; (2) that from another point of view the Active Reason as a *separate* principle means simply Truth, as an ideal system of knowledge, of which our every thought is a partial realization. It has validity, not real existence. Aristotle's theory suggested, however, that the mind is *active*, the human understanding at work, in *all* knowledge, from sense-experience onwards. This conclusion was brought out first by Alexander of Aphrodisias—2nd cent. A.D.—(ib. p. 202). In Plotinus also (3rd cent.) consciousness is not merely the passive spectator of its own experiences, but a synthetic activity, grasping together, holding together and moulding the impressions it receives (ib. pp. 333, 337). Throughout the Medieval Period controversy as to mental activity resolved itself mainly into the relation of soul to body, or the problem of the relation of the finite to the Divine mind. In Avicenna (A.D. 980-1038) the intelligence is wholly unattached to any bodily organ, and its objects are wholly distinct from those of sense; on the other hand, he distinguishes, with Aristotle, between an active and a passive principle within the intelligence itself. The latter is only in the individual soul and perishes with it; the former is distinct and separate from the individual soul, is universal, one and the same in all, and it alone is immortal (Stöckl, *Gesch. d. Philosophie des Mittelalters*, ii. i. § 12).

The question of ethical activity in its modern form first emerges in Averroës (A.D. 1126-1198). He distinguishes between beings which are active, i.e. act upon other beings, by nature, and those of which the activity is conditional upon desire. 'The powers of the former are determined to one thing, and must, when the corresponding conditions are given, necessarily enter into the act. The latter—beings which act from desire or choice—do not enter into activity necessarily, when a fitting object is presented, but are in themselves indifferent to the object, and may desire or choose the one or the other,' i.e. their choice is an activity acceding to the object and independent of it (ib. § 21). Some of the Muslim dogmatists denied that any source of activity exists in man or in any other finite being: all movement and activity in the created world depends directly and solely upon an external cause—viz. God. That definite events appear to follow upon definite causes is due to the fact that God observes the habit of allowing it so. Each process is an accident, momentarily created by God, according to the custom He has prescribed to Himself. Man does not really will or act, God creates in him the volition and the act; man is thus wholly passive, the blind instrument of God's will. His activity is an illusion. These ideas return in Geulincx and the Occasionalists. The doctrine of the soul as a substance, and therefore a source of activity, was upheld by Albertus Magnus (13th cent.) and Thomas Aquinas (ib.), and prevailed, along with a side current of scepticism, until Descartes (1596-1650). In his metaphysical theory Descartes makes mind the diametrical opposite of body; the former alone is active or free, the body a pure automaton: the soul is nothing that is not spiritual, unextended, immaterial; no intercourse, therefore, is possible between soul and body, except by the Divine interference. The soul produces its sensations from itself, on occasion of, but not through, the bodily excitations. In his Psychology, however, as Weber has pointed out (Weber, *Hist. of Philosophy*, tr. Thilly, p. 316; cf. Descartes, *Traité des Passions, Traité de l'Homme*), Descartes entirely contradicts these principles and speaks of the soul as united to the body, and as acting upon it and acted upon by it in its turn. In both Spinoza and Leibniz the special activity of the soul is knowledge; it is passive just in so far as its ideas or perceptions are inadequate or confused. With Malebranche, as later with Schopenhauer, but from a totally different standpoint, the centre of activity is transferred to the will—the mind in relation to the outward world. In the English Psychologists it is jointly placed in the will and in the inward power of combining, synthesizing, and transforming the ideas. In modern psychology, as we have tried to show above, the tendency has been to reduce one of these different forms of mental activity to the other.

- 1890: Th. Lipps, 'Zur Psychologie der Causalität' in *Zeit. für Psychol.* i.  
1891: H. Höffding, 'Psychische und physische Aktivität' in *Viertelj. f. Wiss. Phil.* xv.; A. D. Waller, 'The Sense of Effort' in *Brain*, xiv.  
1894: Dewey, 'The Ego as Cause' in *Philos. Rev.* iii.; W. Wundt, 'Ueber psychische Causalität,' u.s.w., in *Phil. Stud.* x.; Höfler, 'Psychische Arbeit' in *Zeit. f. Psychol.* viii.  
1895: A. F. Shand, 'Attention and Will' in *Mind*, xx.

- 1897: Dewey, 'Psychology of Effort' in *Philos. Rev.* vi.  
1898: N. J. Grot, 'Die Begriffe der Seele und der psychischen Energie in der Psychologie' in *Arch. Syst. Phil.* iv.  
1899: G. F. Stout, *Manual of Psychology*; J. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 2 vols.  
1900-1: J. Royce, *The World and the Individual*, 2 vols.  
1901: Lipps, 'Psychische Vorgänge und psychische Causalität' in *Zeit. f. Psychol.* xxv.; Loveday, 'Theories of Mental Activity' in *Mind*, N.S. x.  
1902: F. H. Bradley, 'The Definition of Will' in *Mind*, N.S. xi.; H. Bergson, 'L'Effort intellectuel' in *Rev. Philos.* liii.  
1903: C. A. Strong, *Why the Mind has a Body*, N.Y.  
1905: W. James, 'Experience of Activity' in *Psych. Rev.* xii.  
1907: G. F. Stout, 'The Nature of Conation and Mental Activity' in *Brit. Journ. of Psych.*, vol. ii. pt. 1.  
J. L. M'INTYRE.

**ADAM.**—1. The name.—The Heb. אָדָם ('*ādām*') is properly a common noun denoting 'mankind' or 'human being,' *homo* as distinguished from *vir*. In Gn 1<sup>26-28</sup> (P), '*ādām*' = 'mankind'; in 2<sup>4-5</sup> we have *hā-ādām* = 'the man,' i.e. the first man; in 5<sup>1-5</sup> it is used as a proper name. The etymology of 'Adam' is uncertain; Gn 2<sup>7</sup> 'Jahweh Elohim formed man ('*ādām*') of the dust of the ground' ('*ādāmāh*') is not to be taken as a scientific derivation. The usual words for 'man' in the Semitic languages generally are not cognate with '*ādām*'. 'Adam' has been connected with an Assyrian *adum* 'child,' 'one made,' 'created'; with the Heb. root '*dm*' 'red,' the name having originated in a ruddy race; Dillmann on Gn 1. 2 suggests a connexion with an Eth. root = 'pleasant,' 'well-formed,' or an Arab. root = 'to attach oneself,' and so = 'gregarious,' 'sociable.' Any connexion with *Adapa*, the hero of a Babylonian myth, is most improbable.

2. Adam in the OT.—The only references to Adam are in Gn 1-5, and in the dependent passage 1 Ch 1<sup>1</sup>. The common noun '*ādām*' is misread as the name in AV of Dt 32<sup>8</sup> and Job 31<sup>2</sup>; RV corrects Dt. but retains Adam in the text of Job, putting the correction 'after the manner of men' for 'like Adam' in the margin. In view of the OT habit of playing upon words, there may be a secondary reference to Adam in Job and possibly elsewhere; but as 'man' or 'mankind' gives a satisfactory sense, there is not sufficient ground for recognizing a secondary meaning.

In the Priestly narrative (P) of Creation (Gn 1<sup>1-2</sup>) Elohim creates 'mankind' ('*ādām*') in His own image, in two sexes, makes man supreme over all living creatures, bids him multiply, and gives him the fruits and grains for food. He blesses man. But whereas it is said separately of each of the other groups of creatures, 'God saw that it was good,' there is no such separate utterance concerning man; he is simply included in the general statement, 'God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was very good.' In 5<sup>1-5</sup> Adam is the ancestor of the human race; when he is 130 years old he begets Seth 'in his own likeness, after his image.' Afterwards Adam begat other children, and died at the age of 930.

In the Prophetic (J) narrative (Gn 2<sup>4-5</sup>) Jahweh Elohim moulds 'the man' out of dust, gives him life by breathing into his nostrils the breath of life, and places him in Eden to dress and keep it. Jahweh Elohim also makes the animals out of the soil ('*ādāmāh*') in order that 'the man' may find a helpmeet; 'the man' names them but finds no suitable helpmeet, and at last Jahweh Elohim builds up a woman out of a rib taken from 'the man' while he slept: the woman proves a suitable helpmeet. Jahweh Elohim had forbidden 'the man' to eat of the fruit of a certain 'tree of the knowledge of good and evil' planted in the midst of Eden; but, tempted by the serpent, the woman ate of the forbidden fruit, and also persuaded the

\* RV has 'Adam' as proper name in three passages, following MT; but in two (31<sup>2</sup>, 21) the pointing should be slightly altered, and in the third (4<sup>2</sup>) the article should probably be inserted changing it in each case to 'the man.'

man to eat. Thereupon Jahweh Elohim drove them out of Eden, and men became subject to death. After the expulsion the man and the woman became parents of three sons; one of these, Abel, was murdered by his brother Cain; while the other two, Cain and Seth, became the progenitors of the human race.

These two narratives differ markedly in form; the Prophetic narrative is frankly anthropomorphic, but the Priestly narrative minimizes the anthropomorphic element. Both are adapted from ancient Semitic traditions;\* but here again in Gn 1 the mythological element is reduced to language and framework, and is altogether subordinated to the teaching of revelation; whereas in Gn 2-4 the author is evidently glad to retain a picturesque story for its own sake as well as for the sake of its moral. In other words, he uses an ancient tradition as a parable, and we have no right to extract theology from all the details.

The two narratives agree in their pure monotheism, in representing man as the immediate creation of God, without intervention of angels, sons, or other intermediate supernatural beings; in representing him as a creation of God, and not as born of God by any quasi-material process; and in representing the human race as descended from a single pair. They are also substantially at one in other points: man is Godlike; in the Priestly narrative he is made 'in the image and likeness' of God, and passes that 'image and likeness' on to his descendants (Gn 1<sup>26</sup>, 5<sup>12</sup>, cf. below); in the Prophetic narrative man's life is the breath of God (Gn 2); in the Priestly narrative man is given the dominion over all other creatures; in the Prophetic narrative the animals are specially formed for the service of man, and receive their names from him.

It is characteristic of the Priestly narrative that its express moral is found in two points of ritual: man is to be vegetarian, and to observe the Sabbath. The Prophetic narrative, on the other hand, is concerned with the moral life: the marriage tie is to be permanently binding, and marriage is spoken of in terms which imply a preference for monogamy. Man is under a Divine law; God has provided for his welfare, and ordained his abode, his work, his food. There is moral retribution; the disobedience of the man and the woman, wrongdoing, murder on the part of Cain, are punished; but even while Jahweh Elohim punishes, He still cares for men; He clothes the man and the woman, and protects Cain from being put to death.

Passing to other features of the Prophetic narrative, we note the inferior position of woman, corresponding to her status in the East, suggested by her formation after man, from his body, and for his service; she is also the instrument of his ruin. Again, man enjoys immediate fellowship with God; and this is not terminated by the expulsion from Eden, for Jahweh converses in the same fashion with Cain as He does with Adam; and the dwelling-place of the first family *outside* Eden is still thought of as being in the special presence of God. When Cain leaves this dwelling-place, he goes 'out from the presence of Jahweh', and feels that he will 'be hidden from his face' (Gn 4<sup>14, 15</sup>).

The original sin of man, the fatal source of all his misery, was inordinate desire, indulged in contrary to the Divine prohibition. This desire is comprehensive. It is sensual: the woman sees that the tree is 'good for food'; it is aesthetic: 'it was a delight to the eyes.' The desire is also

intellectual: the tree is 'the tree of the knowledge of good and evil'; the serpent promises that by eating it 'their eyes shall be opened . . . to know good and evil,' and the woman sees that the tree is 'to be desired to make one wise.\*' But the desire for 'the knowledge of good and evil' is not merely intellectual, it is also a desire for a deeper, more varied, more exciting experience of life, a desire to 'see life,' to use popular language. And as the serpent promises that by eating they shall become 'like gods,' this desire included ambition. In other words, the first sin consisted in defying God by giving the reins to the various impulses which make for culture and civilization. Similarly, in Gn 4<sup>16-24</sup> progress in civilization is due to the evil race of Cain.

The author of the source which the Prophetic narrator follows regards the life of man as accursed, a life of sordid toil, poorly rewarded, embarrassed by shame arising out of the sexual conditions of human existence, burdened for woman by the pain of travail and by her subjection to her husband. These evils are the punishment of the first sin, the consequences of the unholy appetite for luxury and culture, knowledge and power. Smend (*Alltest. Rel.-Gesch.* 121 f.) has pointed out that this conception of life does not control the patriarchal stories or the other portions of the Prophetic narrative; hence the author must have taken it over from older tradition, and it does not represent his formal and complete judgment on life, though he retains it as expressing one side of the truth.

Similarly, there are other theological implications which might be discerned by pressing details; but such implications are no part of the teaching which the Prophetic narrator intended to enforce; such details also are merely retained from ancient tradition; e.g. the feud between man and the serpent is retained as corresponding to the facts of life, but in the original story it was probably a reminiscence of the contest between Marduk and the primeval Dragon.

Again, the story serves to explain the miserable estate of man and the sense of alienation from God; but it does not profess to explain the origin of evil or of sin. It is indeed implied that sin did not originate in man or from man, but was due to suggestion from outside.

Obviously we are not intended to deduce doctrines by combining features of the two narratives, otherwise we should be confronted by the difficulty that the serpent would be included amongst the creatures whom God pronounced 'very good.'

In the Priestly narrative the fact of sin is not mentioned till the time just before the Flood, when we are told that the earth was corrupt and full of violence (Gn 6<sup>11</sup>); no account is given of the origin of this corruption. It is noteworthy that we are told that Adam transmitted the Divine likeness to Seth (cf. 5<sup>1</sup> and vv. 2-4); but no such statement is made as to Adam's other children. Possibly the Divine likeness was a birthright transmitted from eldest son to eldest son, till it reached Noah, but not possessed by other men, hence their corruption; or again this likeness may have been shared by the descendants of Seth, but not possessed by other races. The Book of Chronicles simply traces the genealogy of Israel from Adam.

3. Adam in the Apocrypha and later Jewish literature.—As the first man, Adam occupies a prominent place in theology and tradition. An immense body of tradition gathered round the brief Scripture narratives. The notices of Adam in the Apocrypha, however, are for the most part mere references to the accounts in Genesis. Thus 2 Es 34-10 is a summary of these accounts, followed in v. 21 by the comment, 'For the first Adam, bear-

\* As far as the Fall and Cain and Abel are concerned, only uncertain hints of such stories have yet been discovered in the inscriptions of Western Asia; but the character of Gn 3-4 shows that the author is adapting ancient tradition.

\* Not as in RVm 'desirable to look upon,' cf. Dillmann.



ing a wicked heart, transgressed, and was overcome; and not he only, but all they also that are born of him.' The author does not explain how the immediate creation of God came to have a 'wicked heart'; but perhaps the term is used proleptically—a heart that became wicked through the Fall. Again, 65<sup>4-66</sup> refers to Adam as the ancestor of the human race (cf. also 71<sup>1-70</sup>); and in 76<sup>5-66</sup> Esdras laments the sin and punishment which Adam has brought on mankind.\*

It is remarkable that when Jesus ben Sirach sets out to 'praise famous men' (Sir 44-50), he passes over Adam and begins with Enoch; then he reviews the series of OT heroes, concluding with Nehemiah, and then (49<sup>14-16</sup>) reverts to Enoch and Joseph, and at last by way of Shem and Seth arrives at Adam: 'Above every living thing in the creation is Adam.'

The position of Sir 49<sup>14-16</sup> suggests that this paragraph was either an afterthought of Ben Sirach, or an addition by a later writer who had noticed the absence of Adam and others. Perhaps Ben Sirach felt that the Fall rendered Adam unfit to figure in a list of ancient worthies.

Adam plays a considerable part in the other Apocalyptic literature. In the *Book of the Secrets of Enoch* (30<sup>8-11</sup>),† for instance, Adam is made of seven substances: his flesh from the earth, his blood from the dew, his eyes from the sun, his bones from the stones, his veins and hair from the grass, his thoughts from the swiftness of the angels and from the clouds, his spirit from the Spirit of God and from the wind. He is 'like a second angel,' endowed with the Divine Wisdom. His name Adam was constructed from the initials of the [Greek] names of the four quarters of the earth: *Anatole* (E.), *Dusis* (W.), *Arktos* (N.), *Mesembria* (S.). He fell through ignorance, because he did not understand his own nature.

We read of a Jewish *Book of Adam*,‡ but it is not now extant.

The other branch of later Jewish literature, Talmud, Midrashim, etc., embellishes the Scripture narrative with a variety of fanciful legends. In the famous *Baraita* of the Talmud on the origin of the books of the OT, Adam is one of the ten elders who contributed to the Psalter. Ibn Ezra explains the birth of children to Adam by suggesting that when he found that the permanent continuance of the race in his own person would be prevented by death, he provided for its continuance by begetting children. Rabbinical traditions also state that the tree of knowledge was a fig-tree, that Eve gave the fruit to the animals, etc. etc.§ Philo expounds and allegorizes the Biblical narratives in *de Opificio Mundi*, *Sacrarum Legum Allegoriae de Cherubim*; pointing out, for instance, that the statement that man was made in the image of God must not be understood in a material sense; it means that the mind in man corresponds to God in the cosmos (*de Opif.* 23); and the narrative of the Fall is an allegory of the disastrous consequences of lust (*ib.* 57, 58).

Josephus (*Ant.* I. i. 2) merely puts the Biblical narrative into what he conceived to be a better literary form, expanding, for instance, the few words of Jahweh Elohim into a speech. It is noteworthy, however, that he speaks in his preface of some of the Mosaic narratives as being allegorical.

The Jewish development of this subject reaches its climax in the mediæval mysticism called the Qabbālā, where the Sephiroth, or emanations by which God creates, are grouped sometimes as the tree of life and sometimes as Adam Qadmon, the primeval man.

\* 2 Esdras (60 Eng. Apocrypha; Vulg. 4 Esdras) is the work of a Palestinian Jew, A.D. 81-86, with Christian interpolations.

† Morfill and Charles attribute the work to a Hellenistic Jew (A.D. 1-50).

‡ See Hastings' *DB*, i. 37, art. 'Adam, Books of.'

§ Hershon, *Rabbinical Commentary on Genesis*.

4. Adam in the NT.—Adam is mentioned in Lk 3<sup>38</sup> as the ancestor of Jesus, thus emphasizing the Incarnation, the reality of our Lord's humanity. In 1 Ti 2<sup>13-14</sup> the authority of the husband over the wife is deduced from the fact that Adam was 'first formed'; and that it was Eve, not Adam, who was deceived by the serpent. The idea that Adam was not deceived probably rests on some Rabbinical exegesis, e.g. the suggestion that Adam did not know that the apple Eve gave him came from the tree of life. Jude<sup>14</sup> has the casual reference, 'Enoch also, the seventh from Adam.' Also, 1 Co 11<sup>2-16</sup> supports the current etiquette as to the way in which women wore their hair, and as to their wearing veils, by the fact that the first woman was created from the man, and for the sake of the man, and not *vice versa*.

But the most important NT passages are Ro 5<sup>12-21</sup> and 1 Co 15<sup>20-22, 45-49</sup>, which state a parallel and a contrast between Adam and Christ. To a certain extent, Adam and Christ stand in the same relation to the human race; in each case the nature and work of the individual affects the whole race; Adam 'is a figure of him that was to come' (Ro 5<sup>14</sup>). But while the one man Adam's one sin introduces sin and guilt and death, the one Christ's one act of righteousness justifies the guilty, restores them to righteousness, and enables them to reign in life. This 'one act of righteousness' is also spoken of as 'the obedience of the one'; the general tenor of St. Paul's teaching identifies this 'act' with the death of Christ (Ro 5<sup>12-21</sup>, 1 Co 15<sup>20-22</sup>). St. Paul does not make it clear how, or in what sense, Adam's sin became the cause of sin, guilt, and death to his posterity. The statement of Ro 5<sup>14</sup>, that 'death reigned from Adam until Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression,' suggests that men were involved in the guilt and punishment of Adam apart from their own sins.

1 Co 15<sup>20-49</sup> is not *prima facie* quite consistent with Romans; and there is nothing to show that St. Paul had correlated the two sets of ideas. In Corinthians, mankind inherits from Adam limitations; and Christ enables mankind to transcend these limitations. 'The first man is of the earth, earthy,' merely a living 'soul' (*ψυχή*); and such were his descendants until Christ came. 'The last man,' 'the second man from heaven,' was 'a life-giving spirit' (*πνεῦμα*), and apparently communicates this *pneuma* to Christians, who are 'heavenly' like their Master, and bear His image. In other words, by the Incarnation human nature was raised to a higher plane. But again it is doubtful how far St. Paul would have been prepared to affirm all that his words imply.\* The idea of a higher and a lower Adam, of a heavenly and an earthy or earthly man, is found in Philo, in some of the Gnostic systems,† and in the Qabbālā.‡

5. Adam in Christian literature.—The Patristic commentaries on the stories of the Creation and the Fall largely follow Jewish precedents; they often allegorize and ornament the narrative by legendary additions; while the Gnostic cosmologies anticipate and pave the way for the mysticism of the Qabbālā. Adam becomes a Gnostic *Æon*.§ The Ophites speak of 'the spiritual seed or *ὁ ἐκ τοῦ ἀρχαίου* as an efflux ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρχαίου πνεύματος ἀνθρώπου' 'Adamardros,'|| Greek equivalents of the Adam Qadmon or Adam Elyon which figure in the Qabbālā.

\* Franz Delitzsch, in his *Brief an die Römer in das Hebräische übersetzt und aus Talmud und Midrasch erläutert*, quotes from Martini a passage from *Sûrâ* (an early Midrash) which contrasts the effects of Adam's sin with those of the vicarious sufferings of the Messiah.

† Harvey's *Irenæus*, i. 134 n. 2.

‡ *Dict. of Christ. Biogr.*, art. 'Cabbalah' by Ginsburg. Philo (*Leg. Allegor.* i. 16) speaks of a higher and a lower man introduced into Paradise; the lower is expelled, the higher remains.

§ Harvey's *Irenæus*, i. 224, n. 1.

|| Harvey, i. 134, n. 2.



To derive these Gnostic ideas from the Qabbālā is an anachronism; both are developments from Rabbinical mysticism. Mediæval and Protestant divines, especially Calvin following Augustine, develop the doctrine of Original Sin from St. Paul's teaching. Thus Calvin: "He (Adam) not only was himself punished . . . but he involved his posterity also. . . . The orthodox, therefore, and more especially Augustine, laboured to show that we are not corrupted by acquired wickedness, but bring an innate corruption from the very womb. It was the greatest impudence to deny this."<sup>†</sup>

6. Adam in Islām.—The Muhammadans accept the Christian Scripture subject to the necessary correction and interpretation; they have also borrowed many of the Jewish legends. Adam, therefore, is an important person in their religious system; and they have adorned his story with legends of their own. For instance, on the site of the Ka'ba at Mecca, Adam, after his expulsion from Eden, first worshipped God in a tent sent down from heaven for the purpose; and Eve's tomb may be seen near Mecca; it shows the outlines of a body 173 ft. by 12 ft.; the head is buried elsewhere.<sup>‡</sup>

LITERATURE.—Comm. on the Biblical passages; Handbooks of OT and NT Theology and of Dogmatics on the doctrines of Man, Creation, and Original Sin; H. G. Smith, 'Adam in the RV,' in *AJTh*, vi. (1902), 758; G. F. Moore, 'The Last Adam,' in *JBL*, xvi. (1897), 158; J. Denney, 'Adam and Christ in St. Paul,' in *Exp.* 6th ser. ix. (1904), 147; Hastings' *DB*, artt. 'Adam,' 'Adam in the NT,' and 'Adam, Books of'; *JE*, artt. 'Adam,' 'Adam, Book of,' 'Adam Qadmon.' W. H. BENNETT.

ADAM'S BRIDGE, or *Rāmasetu* = 'Rāma's causeway.'—A chain of sandbanks over 30 miles in length, extending from the island of Rāmesvaram off the Indian coast, to the island of Manar off the coast of Ceylon. These sandbanks—some dry and others a few feet under the surface of the water—seem to connect India with Ceylon; and this fact has given rise to the tradition that they are portions of a causeway which was constructed by Rāma, the hero of the ancient Indian Epic called the *Rāmāyaṇa*.

The story of the Epic is well known. Rāma, the prince of Ayodhya or Oudh, was banished by the king, his father, for fourteen years, and came and lived in a forest near the sources of the Godāvari, accompanied by his wife Sītā and his younger brother Lakṣmaṇa. During the absence of the two brothers from their cottage, Sītā was taken away by Rāvaṇa, king of Ceylon. After long search Rāma got news of Sītā, and determined to cross over from India to Ceylon with a vast army of monkeys and bears to recover her. It was for this purpose that the causeway across the ocean is said to have been constructed. Rāma crossed over with the army, defeated and killed Rāvaṇa, recovered his wife, and returned to Oudh. The period of exile had expired; Rāma's father was dead; and Rāma ascended the throne.

The building of the causeway across the ocean is described at great length in the epic poem. And after Rāma had killed his foe and recovered his wife, he is described as sailing through the sky in an aerial car—all the way from Ceylon to Oudh. The whole of India was spread below; and few passages in the epic are more striking than the bold attempt to describe the vast continent as seen from the car. It was then that Rāma pointed out to his wife, who was seated by him in the car, the great causeway he had constructed across the ocean.

\* *Institutes*, Bk. II. ch. i. § 5.

† For Christian Apocrypha connected with Adam cf. Hastings' *DB* i. 37 f. For the legend (as old as Origen) that Adam was buried at Golgotha, see Wilson, *Golgotha and the Holy Sepulchre*, 1906, p. 2 ff.

‡ Hadji Khan and Sparrow, *With the Pilgrims to Mecca*, 1905, 1906.

'See, my love, round Ceylon's island  
How the ocean billows roar,  
Hiding pearls in caves of coral,  
Strewing shells upon the shore,  
And the causeway far-extending,—  
Monument of Rāma's fame,—  
*Rāmasetu* unto ages  
Shall our deathless deed proclaim!'

The Hindus regard Rāma as an incarnation of Viṣṇu, the second of the Hindu Trinity—the god who preserves and supports the universe. The island of Rāmesvaram, from which Rāma is supposed to have crossed to Ceylon over the causeway built by him, is therefore a sacred place of pilgrimage, visited by thousands of pious Hindus every year from all parts of India. The famous temple of Rāmesvaram, with its pillared corridors, 700 feet long, is perhaps the finest specimen of Dravidian architecture in India.

LITERATURE.—*Rāmāyaṇa* (Griffith's tr. and Romesh Dutt's condensed tr.). For an account of the temple of Rāmesvaram, see Fergusson, *Indian and Eastern Architecture*.

ROMESH DUTT.

ADAM'S PEAK.—This is the English name, adopted from the Portuguese, of a lofty mountain in Ceylon, called in Sinhalese *Samanala*, and in Pāli *Samanta-kūṭa* or *Sumana-kūṭa*. It rises directly from the plains, at the extreme south-west corner of the central mountainous district, to a height of 7420 feet. The panorama from the summit is one of the grandest in the world, as few other mountains, though surpassing it in altitude, present the same unobstructed view over land and sea. But the peak is best known as a place of pilgrimage to the depression in the rock at its summit, which is supposed to resemble a man's footprint, and is explained by pilgrims of different religions in different ways. It is a most remarkable, and probably unique, sight to see a group of pilgrims gazing solemnly at the depression, each one quite undisturbed in his faith by the knowledge that the pilgrim next to him holds a divergent view—the Buddhist thinking it to be the footprint of the Buddha, the Saivite regarding it as the footprint of Siva, the Christian holding it to be the footprint of St. Thomas, or perhaps admitting the conflicting claims of the nunuch of Queen Candace, and the Muhammadan thinking he beholds the footprint of Adam. The origin of these curious beliefs is at present obscure. None of them can be traced back to its real source, and even in the case of the Buddhist belief, about which we know most, we are left to conjecture in the last, or first, steps.

The earliest mention of the Buddhist belief is in the *Samanta Pāṇḍikā*, a commentary on the Buddhist Canon Law written by Buddhaghosa in the first quarter of the 5th cent. A.D. This work has not yet been published, but the passage is quoted in full, in the original Pāli, by Sken (pp. 50, 51). It runs as follows: 'The Exalted One, in the eighth year after (his attainment of) Wisdom, came attended by five hundred Bhikkhus on the invitation of Maniakkha, king of the Nāgas, to Ceylon; took the meal (to which he had been invited), seated the while in the Ratana Mandapa (Gem Pavilion) put up on the spot where the Kalyāṇi Dāgaba (afterwards) stood, and making his footprint visible on Samanta Kūṭa, went back (to India).' Seeing that Adam's Peak is a hundred miles away from the Kalyāṇi Dāgaba, the clause about Adam's Peak seems abrupt, and looks as if it had been inserted into an older story written originally without it. But it is good evidence that the belief in the Adam's Peak legend was current at Anurādhapura when the passage quoted was written there about A.D. 425. The whole context of the passage is known to have been drawn from a history of Ceylon in Sinhalese prose with mnemonic verses in Pāli.\* Those verses were collected in the still extant work, the *Dīparāṇṇa*, written probably in the previous century. That work (ii. 62-69) gives the account of the Buddha's visit to Maniakkha. It mentions nothing about Adam's Peak. Ought we to conclude that the legend arose between the dates of the two works? Probably not. The argument *ex silentio* is always weak; and in another passage of the *Samanta Pāṇḍikā*, where this visit of the Buddha is mentioned,† nothing is said about Adam's Peak. Neither can it be an interpolation; for in the *Mahāvamsa* (l. 76, p. 7), written about half a century later,‡ also at Anu-

\* Geiger, *Mahāvamsa und Dīparāṇṇa* (Leipzig, 1905), p. 78.

† Printed in Oldenberg, *Vinaya Piṭaka*, vol. III, p. 352.

‡ E. E. Tennent, *Ceylon*, II. 153, dates it 'prior to A.D. 301'!



foliage on which they settle; the parts of flowers are often adapted to ensure that the insect-visitors are dusted with pollen, and thus to secure cross-fertilization; the leaf of the Venus Fly-Trap is adapted to attract, capture, and digest flies; the peacock is adapted to captivate the peahen; the mother mammal is adapted for the prolonged pre-natal life of the young; the so-called 'egg-tooth' at the end of a young bird's bill is adapted to the single operation of breaking the egg-shell,—and so on throughout the whole of the animate world. It is indeed a mistake to dwell upon signal instances of adaptations, since (apart from degenerative changes in old age, morbid processes, perverted instincts, rudimentary or vestigial structures, and certain 'indifferent' characters which are not known to have any vital significance) almost every detail of structure and function may be regarded as adaptive.

To gain a clearer idea of what is one of the most difficult and fundamental problems of biology, it may be useful to consider briefly—(1) effectiveness of response; (2) plasticity; (3) modifiability, which lead on to the conception of adaptiveness.

1. *Effectiveness of response.*—One of the characteristics of organisms, as contrasted with inanimate systems, is their power of *effective response* to environmental stimuli. The barrel of gunpowder can respond to the external stimulus of a spark, but it responds self-destructively; the living creature's responses tend to self-preservation or to species-preservation. A piece of iron reacts to the atmosphere in rusting, it becomes an oxide of iron and ceases to be what it was; a living organism also reacts to the atmosphere, every muscular movement involves a rapid oxidation, but in spite of this and many another change the organism retains its integrity for a more or less prolonged period. Its reactions are effective. Not that the organism can respond successfully to all stimuli, e.g. to a strong current of electricity, for it is not able to live anywhere or anyhow, but only within certain environmental limits which we call the *essential conditions of its life*. We cannot account for this primary and fundamental power of effective response; it is part of our conception of life. In some degree it must have been possessed by the first and simplest organisms, though it has doubtless been improved upon in the course of evolution. Without wresting words, it cannot be said that inanimate systems ever exhibit effectiveness of response. A river carves through a soft rock and circles round a hard one, a glacier circumvents a crag, a crystal may mend itself, but it cannot be said that there is any advantage to river, glacier, or crystal in the way it behaves. The biological concept is plainly irrelevant. The nearest analogues, perhaps, to organic effectiveness of response are to be found in automatically regulated machines, but the analogy is little more than a pleasing conceit, since the machine is a materialization of human ingenuity and without any intrinsic autonomy.

2. *Plasticity.*—But in addition to the primary inherent power of effective response, we must also recognize that living creatures are in different degrees plastic. That is to say, they can adjust their reactions to novel conditions, or they can, as we seem bound to say, 'try' first one mode of reaction and then another, finally persisting in that which is most effective. Thus, Dallinger was able to acclimatize certain Monads to thrive at an extraordinarily high temperature; thus Jennings reports that the behaviour of certain Infusorians may be compared to a pursuance of 'the method of trial and error'; thus some marine fishes are plastic enough to live for days in fresh water. How much of this plasticity is primary or inherent in the very nature of living matter, how much of it is secondary and wrought out by Natural Selection in the course of ages, must remain in great measure a matter of opinion. Each case must be judged on its own merits. It is certain that many unicellular organisms are very plastic, and it seems reasonable to suppose that, as differentiation in-

creased, restrictions were placed on the primary plasticity, while a more specialized secondary plasticity was gained in many cases, where organisms lived in environments liable to frequent vicissitudes. It is convenient to use the term '*accommodation*' for the frequently occurring functional adjustments which many organisms are able to make to new conditions. When a muscle becomes stronger if exercised beyond its wont, we may speak of this temporary individual acquisition as a functional accommodation. See ACCOMMODATION.

3. *Modifiability.*—Advancing a third step, we recognize as a fact of life that organisms often exhibit great *modifiability*. That is to say, in the course of their individual life they are liable to be so impressed by changes in surrounding influences and by changes in function, that, as a direct consequence, modifications of bodily structure or habit are acquired. 'Modifications' may be defined as structural changes in the body of an individual organism, directly induced by changes in function or in environment, which transcend the limit of organic elasticity and persist after the inducing conditions have ceased to operate. They are often inconveniently called '*acquired characters*.' Thus a man's skin may be so thoroughly 'tanned' by the sun during half a lifetime in the tropics, that it never becomes pale again, even after migration to a far from sunny clime. It is a permanent modification, as distinguished (a) from a temporary adjustment, and (b) from congenital swarthinness.

It is admitted by all that both temporary adjustments and more permanent modifications may make for survival or for an increase of well-being that favours survival in the long run. But they may also be indifferent (as far as we can see), or they may even be injurious to the organism as a whole, e.g. when an important organ, in response to inadequate nutrition or stimulus, is arrested at a certain stage in its development. In themselves, however, they seem always in the direction of at least local effectiveness. It is difficult to bring forward any instance where the reaction is in itself in the wrong direction. It may spell degeneration, when judged by the normal level attained in other members of the species or in antecedent species, but the degeneration is in itself an effective response to the conditions thereof. A growing organ which does not receive adequate nutrition and the appropriate liberating stimuli, may stop growing; but while this *may be* injurious to the organism as a whole, it may be actually beneficial, and in any case it is the most effective response the organ as such could give. The change-provoking stimuli may imply conditions with which the organism cannot possibly cope, but the parts primarily affected may be said to do their best within the limits of their modifiability. Even a pathological process like inflammation, set up in response to intrusive microbes, is an effective reaction, and sometimes a life-saving one.

When a mammal taken to a colder climate acquires a thicker coat of hair, when a plant similarly treated acquires a thicker epidermis, when an area of skin much pressed upon becomes hard and callous, when a shoemaker in the course of his trade develops certain skeletal peculiarities,—and hundreds of examples might be given,—we call the results *adaptive modifications*. The changes are effective, useful, fit,—they may even make for the preservation of the individual, when the struggle for existence is keen. And yet these adjustments are not what are usually meant by '*adaptations*.' For this term (used to denote a result, not a process) is most conveniently restricted to racial adjustments, that is, to characters which are inborn, not

acquired; which are expressions of the natural inheritance, not individual gains. It goes without saying that though these adaptations are potentially implicit in the germinal material—in the fertilized ovum—they cannot be expressed without appropriate 'nurture'; that is a condition of all development. But they are theoretically—however difficult the distinction may be in practice—quite different from acquired adaptive modifications, which are not innate though the potentiality of their occurrence necessarily is. According to the Lamarckian hypothesis, adaptations are due to the cumulative inheritance of individually acquired modifications; but as satisfactory evidence of the hereditary transmission of any modification as such or in any representative degree is, to say the least, far to seek, and as it is difficult to conceive of any mechanism whereby such transmission could come about (see HEREDITY), some other origin of adaptations must be sought for.

4. Origin of adaptations.—Within the limits of a short article it is impossible to discuss adequately a problem so difficult as that of the origin of adaptations. Like the correlated, but really distinct problem of the origin of species, it is one of the fundamental—still imperfectly answered—questions which the interpreter of animate nature has to face. We cannot do more than indicate the general tenor of the suggestions which evolutionists have offered.

(a) According to the Lamarckian theory, racial adaptations are due to the cumulative inheritance of individual adaptive modifications. But there is a lack of evidence in support of this interpretation, plausible as it seems; it is difficult to conceive of any internal mechanism whereby a change acquired by a part of the body can affect the germinal material in a manner so precise and representative that the offspring shows a corresponding change in the same direction. Moreover, there are many known cases where any such transmission of modifications certainly does *not* occur.

(b) The general Darwinian theory is that adaptations are due to the selection of those inborn and heritable variations which, by making their possessors better adapted to the conditions of their life, have some survival value. It is a fact of observation that in many groups of organisms the individuals fluctuate continually in various directions. These fluctuating variations appear as if they followed the law of chance. It is also a fact of observation that some of these variations increase the survival value of their possessors. It is inferred that the cumulative inheritance of these favourable variations, fostered by selection in any of its numerous forms, and helped by the elimination—gradual or sudden—of forms lacking the variations in the fit direction, or having others relatively unfit, may lead to the establishment of new adaptations. The greatest difficulty in this argument is to account for the origin of the fit variations, and this has to be met by the accumulation of observational and experimental data bearing on the origin and nature of variations. It is also necessary to accumulate more facts showing that selective processes—acting directly on fluctuating variations—do really bring about the results ascribed to them. To many, furthermore, it appears that more emphasis should be laid upon the power that many animals have of actively seeking out environments for which the variations they possess are adapted. Here, too, it is necessary to refer to the probable importance of some of the many forms of *Isolation*.

(c) The work of recent years—notably that of Bateson and De Vries—has made it plain that, besides the continually occurring 'fluctuating variations,' there are 'discontinuous variations' or 'muta-

tions,' where a new character or group of characters not only appears suddenly, but may come to stay from generation to generation. It cannot be said that we understand the origin of these mutations, in some of which the organism in many of its parts seems suddenly to pass from one position of organic equilibrium to another; but that they do occur is indubitable, and their marked heritability is also certain. Mendel has given at once a demonstration and a rationale of the fact that certain mutations, when once they have arisen, are not likely to be swamped, but are likely to persist, unless, of course, selection is against them. In horticulture, in particular, artificial selection has operated in great part on mutations. If this interpretation be confirmed and extended, it will not be necessary to lay such a heavy burden on the shoulders of selection. But more facts are urgently needed, and how and under what conditions mutations—whether adaptive or non-adaptive—occur, remains an unsolved problem.

(d) In his theory of Germinal Selection, Weismann has elaborated an attractive subsidiary hypothesis. Supposing that the germinal material consists of a complex—a multiplicate—of organ-determining particles (the determinants), he postulates a struggle going on within the arcana of the germ-plasm. Supposing limitations of nutrition within the germ, he pictures an intra-germinal struggle in which the weaker determinants corresponding to any given part will get less food and will become weaker, while the stronger determinants corresponding to the same part will feed better and become stronger. Thus the theory suggests a hypothetical internal selection which will abet the ordinary external selection of individual organisms, and it makes the rise, if not the origin, of adaptations more intelligible. Or, to put it in another way, the theory suggests a possible mechanism by which the survival of any form with a favourable variation may influence the subsequent variational direction of that form. The determinants are supposed to be variable—everything living is; for each character separately heritable there are in the germ multiple determinants (paternal, maternal, grand-parental, ancestral): these are not all of equal strength; there is a germinal struggle and selection, the strongest asserts itself in development, and the resulting determinate corresponds in character to the victorious determinant. If the character of the resulting determinate is of survival value, those organisms which have that character tend to survive, and their progeny will tend to keep up the same strain. But while the external selection is proceeding, it is being continually backed up by the germinal selection. Thus nothing succeeds like success.

(e) Various evolutionists—Professors Mark Baldwin, H. F. Osborn, and C. Lloyd Morgan—have suggested that although individual adaptive modifications may not be transmissible, they may have indirect importance in evolution, by serving as life-preserving screens until coincident inborn or germinal variations in the same direction have time to develop. As Lloyd Morgan puts it—(1) 'Where adaptive variation  $v$  is similar in direction to individual modification  $m$ , the organism has an added chance of survival from the coincidence  $m+v$ ; (2) where the variation is antagonistic in direction to the modification, there is a diminished chance of survival from the opposition  $m-v$ ; hence (3) coincident variations will be fostered while opposing variations will be eliminated.' As Groos expresses it, in reference to some instinctive activities—Imitation may keep 'a species afloat until Natural Selection can substitute the lifeboat heredity for the life-preserver tradition.' As Mark

Baldwin states it, the theory is 'that individual modifications or accommodations may supplement, protect, or screen organic characters and keep them alive until useful congenital variations arise and survive by natural selection.'

Finally, in thinking over this difficult problem of adaptations, we must remember the importance of the active organism itself. As Professor James Ward has well pointed out, it may seek out and even in part make its environment; it is not only selected, it selects; it acts as well as reacts. And although the details and finesse of this may have been elaborated in the course of selection, the primary potentiality of it is an essential part of the secret of that kind of activity which we call Life.

LITERATURE.—J. Mark Baldwin, *Development and Evolution*, New York, 1902; W. K. Brooks, *The Foundations of Zoology*, New York, 1899; C. Lloyd Morgan, *Animal Behaviour*, London, 1900, *Habit and Instinct*, London, 1896, *The Interpretation of Nature*, London, 1905; T. H. Morgan, *Evolution and Adaptation*, New York, 1903; H. Münsterberg, *Die Lehre von der natürlichen Anpassung*, Leipzig, 1885; R. Otto, *Naturalistische und religiöse Weltanschauung*, Tübingen, 1904 (Eng. tr. London, 1906); Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Biology*, revised ed. 1898, Part II. ch. v.; A. Weismann, *The Evolution Theory*, 2 vols. (Eng. tr. London, 1904).

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

ADELARD.—Adelard of Bath (*Philosophus Anglicorum*) occupies a distinctive position among the schoolmen of the 12th cent., as a chief representative of the philosophic doctrine of 'Indifference.' This was one of the mediating theories in the great mediæval conflict as to the nature of universal conceptions (genera and species) and their relation to the individuals comprehended under them. It lies between the extreme Realism on the one hand, which attached substantiality only to the universals, and the extreme Nominalism on the other, according to which generic conceptions were mere names, while reality belonged only to the individuals. It tends, however, to the side of Nominalism, inasmuch as it gives up the substantiality of universals, and makes the universal to consist of the non-different elements (*indifferentia*) in the separate individuals, which alone subsist substantially. Everything depends on the point of view from which the individuals are regarded: according as attention is fixed on their differences or their non-differences, they remain individuals or become for us the species and the genus. Thus Plato as Plato is an individual, as a man the species, as an animal the subordinate genus, as a substance the most universal genus.

This doctrine of Indifference was probably first stated in Adelard's treatise *de Eodem et Diverso*, composed between 1105 and 1116. [It has recently been edited by H. Willner in *Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Philos. des Mittelalters*, ed. by Cl. Bäumker and G. v. Hertling, Münster, 1903.] Adelard seeks to reconcile Plato and Aristotle, and says:

'Since that which we see is at once genus and species and individual, Aristotle rightly insisted that the universals do not exist except in the things of sense. But since those universals, so far as they are called genera and species, cannot be perceived by any one in their purity without the admixture of the things of sense, which they exist and could be perceived in, of sense, to wit, in the Divine mind, words they seem opposed, yet held in reality the same opinion.'

The doctrine of Indifference was also represented by Walter of Mortagne (died as bp. of Laon, 1174), whom some indeed have regarded as its originator, while others again have traced it to a supposed late view of William of Champeaux.

Besides the above-mentioned tractate, Adelard wrote also *Quæstiones Naturales*. He had travelled widely and acquired great physical learning, especially from the Arabs, out of whose language he translated Euclid. He teaches that the knowledge of the laws of nature should be united with the recognition of their dependence on God's will. He

says: 'It is the will of the Creator that herbs should grow from the earth, but this will is not without reason.' Mere authority he compares to a halter, and desiderates that reason should decide between the true and the false.

LITERATURE.—Art. 'Scholasticism' in *EBR* xxi; Erdmann, *Grundriss der Gesch. d. Philos.* (Eng. tr. 1890) I. § 160; Windelband, *Lehrbuch der Gesch. d. Philos.* (1893) § 23; Ueberweg-Heinze, *Grundriss der Gesch. d. Philos.* (1894-5) II. § 25, which see for a fuller bibliography. R. S. FRANKS.

ADIAPHORISM.—Three meanings of this word are given in the dictionaries: (1) the theory that some actions are indifferent, i.e. neither bad nor good, not being either commanded or forbidden by God, either directly or indirectly; so that they may be done or omitted without fault; (2) the theory that certain rites or ceremonies, not having been either commanded or forbidden by God, may freely be used or omitted without fault; (3) the theory that certain doctrines of the Church, though taught in the word of God, are of such minor importance, that they may be disbelieved without injury to the foundation of faith. (Although this use of the word can be found in good authors, it is a question whether it is accurate).

I. Actions.—Very early in the history of the Christian Church the gospel began to be conceived as a new law. Perhaps the wider meaning of the word 'law' had something to do with this. But it was to be expected that those who had grown up under a system of rigid prescription, not only of rites and ceremonies, but also of domestic observances and the details of personal conduct,—a prescription, moreover, that had Divine authority,—should be unable to conceive any other method of moral life. It is not strange, therefore, that St. James (1<sup>2</sup>) speaks of the gospel as 'the perfect law of liberty.' The early converts to the gospel had been heathen; the customs in which they had been bred were abhorrent to a Jew; they were corrupting; and therefore those new-made Christians had to be taught and drilled in the first principles of morality. In the Early Church, before the books of the NT had been written and for many years afterwards, the OT was the word of God read in their assemblies for worship; and its prescriptions for conduct, its rules of common life, and its religious institutions became authoritative. It seems likely that a legalistic conception of Christianity must always preponderate in a community recently won from heathenism. Such converts remain under tutelage, and discipline must be rigidly exercised, until the fundamental principles of right living are wrought into their conscience.

Marcion urged the rejection of the OT Law. As the Church began to spread through all classes of men, and to have part in the whole of their daily life, it began insensibly to accommodate its ascetic rules to the necessities of the case. Gradually there grew up a distinction between a law of morals incumbent upon all men and a higher rule of life voluntarily assumed, but when once assumed, of lasting obligation, and by the observance of which a man might earn a higher reward than was due to the simple observance of the commandments of God (*consilia evangelica*), and might even deserve enough of God to be able to transfer some of his merit to others (*opera supererogativa*). An ascetic life was looked upon as holier than the observance of the duties of one's calling in the world. To the commandments of God were added the commandments of the Church.

The Reformation assailed this notion of an esoteric and artificial righteousness. The moral injunctions of Jesus and His holy example are for all alike. The works of our calling are the sphere in which to serve God. No one can fulfil the law of God, much less can any one exceed it. All are

dependent upon God's mercy; and, forgiven for Christ's sake, depending upon that grace and thankful for it, are to go forth to the performance of daily duty, pleasing Him by childlike faith, not by the excellence of what they do.

It has been charged that the immediate result of the Reformation was a deterioration of morals, especially in regions where the Lutheran doctrine was taught, no efficient external discipline being at hand to take the place of the ecclesiastical rules and jurisdiction of the older time (see Döllinger, *Reformation*). A more successful effort was made under Calvin to introduce in Geneva a complete censorship of morals. The Puritans of England revived the conception of the gospel as a law. The Pietistic movement in Germany forbade as inconsistent with the Christian name all mere enjoyment and all the merely artistic activities of life. To do everything to the glory of God forbade all play. There was a revival of asceticism, which was taken up by the early Methodists in England (see Ritschl, *Geschichte des Pietismus*, 3 vols., 1880-6). In our own day there are many sects, notably the Second Adventists, who regard the OT Law as still in force in all its regulations, even concerning meat and drink.

To appreciate the answer which Christ gave to this question, we must bear in mind that the Pharisaism which He refuted endeavoured to secure the law of God by 'putting a fence around the Law,' consisting of inferential and artificial rules of life. Those who vigorously observed these the Pharisees accounted meritorious; and they put such stress on these comments and additions that by them they made the law of God of no effect. Our Lord rebuked the substitution of a human law for the simple law of God, and also the exaltation of human rules of life to the same sanctity as belonged to the revealed law. He required the inward service of the heart. Jesus was not an ascetic in the usual meaning of that word. He accepted invitations to the table (Lk 7<sup>35</sup>), He honoured a wedding-feast (Jn 2<sup>18</sup>), He spoke sympathetically of the children playing in the streets (Lk 7<sup>32</sup>), He commended Mary's sacrifice of precious ointment (Mt 26<sup>10</sup>, Jn 12<sup>3</sup>), He submitted to be called a wine-bibber and a glutton (Mt 11<sup>19</sup>). Neither was St. Paul an ascetic. It is evident that he did not consider it essential to his personal salvation to make distinctions of meats (Ro 14<sup>2-6</sup>, 14, 1 Co 8<sup>4</sup>, 1 Ti 4<sup>4-5</sup>), to forego the use of wine (1 Ti 5<sup>23</sup>), to raise anxious questions about the material of entertainments (1 Co 10<sup>27</sup>), or to avoid social pleasures (*ibid.*); and he could look upon and talk about the games of Greece with no word of abhorrence or disapproval (1 Co 9<sup>24-27</sup>). In writing to Timothy (1 Ti 4<sup>2-3</sup>) he foretold those errorists who would 'forbid to marry, and command to abstain from meats, which God created to be received with thanksgiving by them which believe and know the truth. For every creature of God is good, and nothing is to be refused, if it be received with thanksgiving: for it is sanctified through the word of God and prayer.' 'Meat will not commend us to God,' he says (1 Co 8<sup>3</sup>); 'neither, if we eat not, are we the worse; nor, if we eat, are we the better' (see also 1 Co 7<sup>25-33</sup>, and cf. He 5<sup>14</sup>). It is evident that a sphere is left for Christian freedom, in which a man may, nay must, use his own judgment, and in reference to which good men may differ, and no man may condemn his brother. Here we have the justification of what are described as merely æsthetic activities of human life, in which the natural delight of man in simple enjoyment has place, and where the law of beauty is supreme rather than the law of duty. No doubt St. Paul would have barred these out, because of 'the present distress' (1 Co 7<sup>26</sup>); but his 'opinion' in contradistinction from 'the com-

mandment of the Lord' allows them, though with the important qualifications we have yet to allude to. They derive a sanction from the constitution of man. Under this category we put the drama, music, art, all recreation. We therefore assert that there is a sphere for the freedom of a Christian. He is not under a positive law which extends to every corner of his life. He does not move in the sphere of a moral necessity. He must exercise judgment and choice. He must abound more and more in knowledge and all discernment, and prove the things that differ (Ph 1<sup>9</sup>). It is wrong for him to hinder and lame his conscience either by the cultivation of rigid unreasoning habits or by the adoption of a formal law (Frank, *Theologie der Concordienformel*, IV. x. 16 ff.).

But Christian freedom has its limits. These limits are external and internal. Our liberty may not 'become a stumblingblock to the weak, sinning against the brethren, wounding their conscience when it is weak' (1 Co 8<sup>2-12</sup>). Some things that are lawful edify not (10<sup>23</sup>); they contribute nothing (6<sup>12</sup>). We are not to live in the moment, wasting the material of everlasting life (7<sup>30</sup>). 'All things are lawful for me, but I will not be brought under the power of any' (6<sup>12</sup>, Gal 5<sup>13</sup>). To watchfulness on his own account the Christian must add a watchful love of his fellow-man.

LITERATURE.—See besides works quoted, writers on Christian Ethics, such as Harless, Wuttke, Martensen, Luthardt, *Gesch. der Christl. Ethik*; Gottschick in *PRE*, and Kübel in *PRE* 2.

2. Rites and ceremonies.—If we take up the second definition of our subject, we find that the same causes led the Early Church to believe that its rites and ceremonies had been commanded by God. The ceremonial laws of the OT doubtless do reveal the essential principles of the worship of God. These principles were enshrined in forms suitable to primitive times and prophetic of the realities by which the redemption of mankind was accomplished by our Lord Jesus Christ. But the OT, applied to forms of worship by way of illustration and explanation, became normative; so that gradually the Church came to have a priesthood, altars, and sacrifices of its own, with vestments and a ritual, and feasts and days; the observance of which was regarded as essential to the validity of its sacraments, and therefore to salvation, and the neglect of which was as deadly as a violation of the Decalogue. This view persists in parts of the Christian Church, and is invoked for the defence of existing institutions and privileges.

The Reformers acknowledged that the Church had a right to institute rites and ceremonies, and even ascribed to the Church the hallowing of the first day of the week instead of the seventh; but they denied that the Church had a right to claim for its institutions the unchangeableness and sanctity of the institutions and commandments of God. Christ left few ordinances—His Word, the two Sacraments, a ministry of the Word and Sacraments, His assured presence with the assembly of His people, the Lord's Prayer, these are all—and for the rest the Church was left to develop its forms of government and its forms of worship to suit the times and places in which it might be found. But what do we mean by 'the Church' in this statement? The clergy only? Or those who have attained to a headship of the clergy? Or, in countries where the State controls the Church, the ministry of worship? Or duly authorized Councils? Or representatives chosen by clergy and laity, expressing their preference by the vote of a majority? None of these. The judgment of the Church may finally decide a matter which has been approved with the concurrence of all these. A rite that once was significant and edifying may fall out of use, or may become harmful in the



lapse of time and under changing circumstances. All rites and ceremonies instituted by men are subject to the judgment of Christian conscience enlightened by the word of God.

In the Silver Age of the Reformation a warm controversy among Lutheran theologians was precipitated by the attempt of Charles V. to compromise the differences between the Evangelical Churches and the Roman Church, in the *Augsburg Interim* of 1548. The controversy raged about the permissibility of a vague formula which might be interpreted in two ways, and the revival of usages which the one side had rejected because they served error, and the other regarded as sacred and necessary. Flacius was the protagonist on the one side; Melancthon was the target. The matter and the true position cannot be set forth more clearly than is done in the *Formula of Concord*, 1580.

'For the settlement of this controversy, we believe, teach, and confess, with one consent, that ceremonies or ecclesiastical rites (which had been neither commanded nor forbidden by the Word of God, but instituted only for the sake of decency and order) are not of themselves Divine Worship or any part of it. For it is written (Mt 15): "In vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men."'

'The Churches of God everywhere throughout the world, and at any time, have the right to change such ceremonies according to the occasion, in whatever way it may seem to the Church most serviceable for its edification.'

'But in so doing all levity should be avoided and all offence, and especially should care be taken to spare those weak in faith (1 Co 6<sup>9</sup>, Ro 14<sup>12</sup>).'

'In times of persecution, when a clear and steadfast confession is required of us, we ought not to yield to the enemies of the Gospel in things indifferent. For the Apostle says (Gal 5<sup>1</sup>): "Stand therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage"; and (2 Co 6<sup>14</sup>): "Be not unequally yoked together with unbelievers. For what fellowship is there between light and darkness?" etc.; also (Gal 2<sup>5</sup>): "To whom we gave place by subjection, no, not for an hour; that the truth of the gospel might continue with you." For in such a state of things the dispute no longer is about things indifferent, but concerning the truth of the Gospel and the preservation and protection of Christian liberty, and how to prevent open idolatry; and the protection of those who are weak in faith against offence. In matters of this sort we ought not to yield anything to our adversaries, but it is our duty to give a faithful and sincere confession, and patiently to bear whatever the Lord may lay upon us and may permit the enemies of His Word to do to us.'

'No Church ought to condemn another because that Church observes more or fewer of outward ceremonies which the Lord did not institute, if only there be between them content in all articles of Doctrine and in the right use of the Sacraments. Well and truly was it said of old: "Disagreement as to fasting does not dissolve agreement in faith."'

'We repudiate and condemn these false teachings, as contrary to the Word of God, viz.: that human traditions and constitutions in matters ecclesiastical are to be considered by themselves a Worship of God or a part of such worship; that such ceremonies and constitutions should be forced upon the Church of God as necessary, against the Christian liberty which the Church of Christ has with reference to outward things of this sort; that in time of persecution, when a clear confession is required, the enemies of the Gospel may be placated by the observance of things of this sort that are in themselves indifferent, and that it is permitted to agree and consent with them—a thing detrimental to heavenly truth; that outward

Book of Concord, ii.; Bieck, *Das Dreyfache Interim*.

There remains the question whether each person has a right to change the ordinances of the Church according to his own judgment and taste, observing such as he pleases, and omitting those of which he disapproves. Inasmuch as these rites and ceremonies are things indifferent, he should conform to the custom of the Church, lest he be disorderly (2 Th 3<sup>6, 11</sup>, 1 Co 11<sup>16</sup>). Again, it may be asked by what test a rite or ceremony handed down in the Church is to be estimated. The *Augsburg Confession* teaches (Art. vii.) that rites should be observed that contribute to unity and good order, and the *Apology for the Confession* (iv. 33), 'that the Church of God of every place and every time has power, according to circumstances, to change such ceremonies in such manner as may

be most useful and edifying to the Church of God.'

A further question may be raised, as to the authority of good taste, of æsthetic canons, in regard to the forms and accessories of Christian worship. In this matter, without doubt, edification is of more value than artistic merit, and all must yield to the instinct of Christian love.

3. Doctrines.—In order to answer the question suggested by the third definition, the distinction between a 'dogma,' a 'doctrine,' and 'the faith' must be clearly apprehended. Dogmas result from an analysis of the faith, and the word is properly restricted to those statements of Christian truth which have been finally declared by the authorities of the Church and accepted by the Church in its Confessions. A dogma is always subject to examination and challenge. Not even a Council of the Universal Church is infallible. Even the Ecumenical Creeds must justify themselves to the Christian consciousness by their evident agreement with the word of God. Doctrine is an explanation and elaboration of the faith which has not yet crystallized into dogma. The Faith is the gospel—the 'faith once delivered to the saints' (Jude<sup>3</sup>).

Dogmas can be understood either in the original sense in which they were approved and confessed by the Church, or in the sense in which they are apprehended by any age. It is conceivable that a student may discover a deflection of popular and universal faith from the idea which the original authors of a Confessional formula meant to set forth in it. Every dogma must be understood in relation to the entirety of the faith. Each age gives especial attention to different aspects of the faith. The 'spirit of the age,' its conception of human duties and human rights, its philosophical notions, colour its explanations of Divine truth and cause the emphasis laid upon different aspects of it to vary. From its own standpoint every age and clime develops first doctrine, then dogma. That, finally, is recognized as Christian dogma *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditur. Securur judicat orbis terrarum*.

EDWARD T. HORN.

ADIBUDDHA (the theistic system of Nepāl, including its Buddhist antecedents, Dhyanibuddhas, etc.).—*Introduction*.—Abel Rémusat stated in 1831 that 'the learned of Europe were indebted to Mr. Hodgson for the name of Adibuddha.\*' And it might almost be said with truth still that nowhere else do we find such a systematic and complete account of the theory of the theistic Buddhists of Nepāl (*Aśvavrikas*)† as Hodgson has given in his *Essays*.

Unitarian and theistic Buddhism, after having aroused keen interest, fell later into neglect, when attention was drawn to primitive or ancient Buddhism, especially by the works of Spence Hardy and Burnouf. The result of the iconographic discoveries and the Tibetan studies of the last few years seems to have been to bring it again into greater prominence. It is well worth examining, because, although more 'Alexandrian' than Buddhist, Buddhist in fact only in name and in so far as it employs Buddhist terminology, it nevertheless is, as it were, the consummation of the philosophical, mystical, and mythological speculations of the Great Vehicle, and differs from several other systems, widespread in the Buddhist world, only by its markedly 'theistic' colouring. The system of the *Aśvavrikas* is, in effect, merely the half-*naïyāyika* (i.e. theistic), half-*Sārvite* (i.e. pantheistic) interpretation of the ontological and religious speculation of the Great Vehicle in the last

\* See Hodgson, *Essays*, p. 110.

† From *Īśvara*, the personal and supreme god. (See THURM)

‡ See Schmidt, *Grundlehre*; Burnouf, *Introduction*.



stage of its development. It differs from it sufficiently clearly, however, to justify Burnouf in recognizing in the system of the *Ādibuddha* a new kind of Buddhism—a third (or a fourth) Buddhism\*; and, in order to give the reader a just appreciation of the significance of this new interpretation of Buddhism, before unheard of, it will suffice to state that the old formula, 'Of all that proceeds from causes the Tathāgata has explained the cause,' was transformed into, 'Of all that proceeds from causes the Tathāgata is the cause.'†

A further characteristic of the *Aisvarikas* of Hodgson, in which they stand apart from Hindu or Nepalese thought, is the absence from their theology of every feminine, tantric, and magical element. It is well known that Hodgson had recourse for his information to native scholars, whom he ceremoniously styles 'living oracles,' and who, in support of their statements, supplied him with fragments of texts, which were not all authentic. These mutilated testimonies, this tradition arranged with a view to meet questions conceived in an altogether European spirit, are, as far as the absence of the above-mentioned element is concerned, confirmed by the *Svayambhūpurāṇa*, which is not very tantric. We do not, however, believe that, even apart from the wide and comprehensive nature of its mythology, Nepalese theism has in reality ever been quite free from intermixture of Saivite thought.

*Plan and division.*—As the problem has not been examined in its entirety for a long time, and as much light has been thrown upon it by recent research, we propose to state it here, as completely as possible, from the doctrinal point of view, of course; for we shall willingly dispense with legendary, iconographic, and ritual details.‡

The interest of *Ādibuddha* systems (for there are at least two of them) lies chiefly in their relation to genuine Buddhism and to Hinduism. It will be most convenient (I.) to give a brief account of those *Ādibuddha* systems which are more or less well known, and (II.) to inquire into their antecedents, often obscure and problematic, beginning with the sources, so that we may be able in this way (III.) to 'locate' the systems in question, doctrinally and historically, and to present a more accurate appreciation of them.

As most of these antecedents will demand separate treatment (see *ĀVALOKITEŚVARA*, *LOTUS OF THE TRUE LAW*, *MAHĀYĀNA*, *MAÑJUŚRĪ*), a brief reference will here suffice. We shall confine ourselves to Buddhist ground, for, although this long elaboration of the elements of the Buddhist systems of *Ādibuddha* may be inexplicable without Hinduism, it will be sufficient to note, in passing, the points of contact.

I. *ĀDIBUDDHA SYSTEMS.*—I. *Aisvarika system* (Hodgson's sources).—There is an *Ādibuddha* or *Paramādibuddha* (Tib. *dan-poi saṅs-rgyas*, *mchog-gi dan-poi* . . . , § *thog-mai* . . . ||), i.e. first Buddha, primary Buddha, Buddha from the beginning, Buddha unoriginated.¶ He exists by himself, and in fact is called *Svayambhū*,\*\* like

\* Introduction, p. 581.

† For the ancient formula see Kern, *Manual*, pp. 25, 49; Hodgson, *Essays*, p. 111.

‡ See NEPXL, LĀMAISM, ICONOGRAPHY (BUDDHIST).

§ Csoma's and Grünwedel's sources (Mongol. *Angh'an burh'an*).

¶ Waddell's sources.

\*\* *Urbuddha* (Lassen, *Ind. Alt.* 2 ii. 1103), Buddha of the Buddhas (Wass. p. 134); *ādibuddha* = *ādau buddha* (Nāmasaṅgīti, 100), or = *anādibuddha*. He appears at the beginning of time (at the commencement of the *Kalpa*), the crystal jewel in the lotus (*maṇi* . . . *padme*). *Adinātha* = *Ādibuddha*; it is also the name of a more or less historical (?) personage (Wilson, i. 214; see *ĀVALOKITEŚVARA*, note ad *ān*).

\*\*\* *Svayambhūlokanātha*, 'self-existing protector of the world,' also *Sambhū* (a name of Śiva), and *Adinātha*, 'first protector.' See a beautiful hymn addressed to him, *Svayambhūpurāṇa*, p. 56. The term *Svayambhū* has been from ancient times an epithet of Buddhas, because Buddhas have obtained Buddhahood without any external help, and also because Buddhahood is uncaused.

Brahmā, and is worshipped under this name in his great temple at Kāthmāṇḍu.\* He has never been seen;† he is in *nirvāṇa*. Nevertheless, he is 'pure light'; he issues from the 'void' (*śūnyatā*); and his names are innumerable. It is said that prayers are not addressed to him; yet he is worshipped in his temple. He dwells in the *Akanīṣṭhabhavana*, that is, in the upper region of the world of forms;‡ symbolized by the apex of the *chaitya*, as if it had been forgotten that in the Buddhist cosmology there are numerous formless heavens.§ He has, besides, like every divinity, a *maṇḍala*, or mystic circle, for conjunctory or mystical purposes.

By five acts of his contemplative power (*dhyāna*), the *Ādibuddha* or *Mahābuddha* creates five Buddhas called Buddhas of contemplation or *Dhyānibuddhas*.¶ They are *Vairocana*, *Akṣobhya*, *Ratnasambhava*, *Amitābha*, and *Amoghasiddha*.\*\* These are in the world of becoming (*prapṛtī*). Prayers are not addressed to them (so Hodgson); but they have temples called *chaityas*, like those of *Ādibuddha*. By the twofold power of knowledge and contemplation, to which they owe their existence, they give birth to 'Bodhisattvas of contemplation,' *dhyānibodhisattvas*,†† viz., *Samantabhadra*, *Vajrapāṇi*, *Ratnapāṇi*, *Avalokita* or *Padmapāṇi*, and *Viśvapāṇi* respectively. These are the actual creators of the physical universe, but the worlds which they produce are perishable, and three of these creations have already ceased to exist. That of which we form a part is the fourth, i.e. it is the work of *Avalokiteśvara*, the fourth *Bodhisattva*, the 'Providence' of the present; and has as its special Buddha, 'protector' and 'conqueror' (*nātha*, *jina*) *Amitābha*, who is enthroned in the midst of his elect. For its instructor it has had *Sākyamuni*, the fourth human Buddha. There are five human Buddhas (*maṇuṣībuddhas*),‡‡ who correspond to the

Even in late texts we find *Svayambhū* explained as follows: *svayambhūvati svayambhū bhāvanābalaḥ bhavati arhaḥ* (Nāmasaṅgīti, 10); *svayambhū sarvaśaktiparipūṣitā* (ib. 60). See *Aṣṭasahasrikā prajñāpāramitā*, 2 ff., 10; *tathāgatatvam buddhatvān svayambhūtvān sarvaśaktatvam*.

\* The temple is described in Fergusson, *Hist. of Ind. Arch.* fig. 170; Wright, *Hist. of Nepāl*; Bendall and S. Lévi, *Nepāl*. It is represented in the miniatures of MSS of the 11th cent. (Foucher, *Icon. Bouddhique*, i.). Köppen (ii. p. 367) recalls the fact that, according to Kirkpatrick (*An Account*, p. 148), the Great Lāma for a long time maintained relations with the temple.

† The *Ādibuddha* is sometimes called *Vīśvarūpa*, 'who takes every form,' and is so represented (Hodgson, *Essays*, 83; Foucher, *Catalogue*, pp. 12, 13).

‡ The world to which those saints ascend, who, being comparatively little advanced, must wait many centuries before attaining to *nirvāṇa*, although they are not on that account condemned to a new earthly existence; they are the fifth class of the *Anāgāminis*, according to the Little Vehicle.

§ It is not clear that the *Ādibuddha* of the Nepalese extends his reign beyond the present *Kalpa* (Age of the World). He is father of five Buddhas only. It seems to be forgotten that there are millions of *Kalpas* and millions of Buddhas.

¶ That is a *nakṣatramāṇḍal*—a 'constellation' . . . . . Recalling the triad, Buddha, Dhī . . . . . *Svayambhūpurāṇa*, *Ādibuddha* is . . . . . : ree gems embodied.'

\*\* The present writer has never, in any Sanskrit or Tibetan text, met with the expression 'dhyānibuddha.' The five Buddhas are called the 'five Jinas' or the 'five Buddhas' in the Sanskrit texts as well as in Tibet, in Cambodia, and in Java. He is inclined to believe that we have to do here either with an invention due to Hodgson's pandita or with a very late source. As the St. Petersburg Dictionary observes, *Dhyānibuddha*, if rightly contrasted with . . . . . *maṇuṣīkanyā* ought to be *Ādibuddha* and not *dhyānibuddha*. We k

(*ye-tes saṅs-rgyas*, *ye-tes byan-chub-sems-dpa*), who cannot be distinguished from the *Vajrabuddhas*. They correspond to the five jñānas or mystic sciences. These are the five so-called *Dhyānibuddhas*, regarded from the tantric point of view (*jñānam bhagam iti smṛtam*).

\*\*\* Sometimes a sixth, *Vajrasattva*, who creates (or causes to be created) immaterial substances, while the five others create corporeal forms.

†† The same may be said of them as of the 'Dhyānibuddhas'; since the *Bodhisattvas* are not in *Dhyāna*, the word can only mean 'born of dhyāna.'

‡‡ There is a list in the Little Vehicle of seven human Buddhas who are also worshipped in Nepāl (Wilson ii., *Buddha tracts*).

five Buddhas of contemplation. They are not, however, incarnations of them, but rather 'reflexes,' *pratibimba*, 'magical projections,' *nirmāṇa-kāya*.

2. It is difficult to date Hodgson's sources.\* The same difficulty exists with regard to the poetical version of the *Kāraṇḍavyūha*, of which the *terminus a quo* will perhaps be supplied by the date of the Tibetan translation of the prose version of the same text. In this prose edition, the only one which the Tibetans have known or have cared about, there is, indeed, a passage wanting, namely the passage of the verse edition where Adibuddha, Svayambhū, Adinātha (first protector) appears at

of the five Buddhas.†

3. The name 'Adibuddha' or 'Paramādibuddha' appears in more ancient documents. According to Csoma, who was the first and only one to determine this chronology, this name and the system to which it is attached are closely connected with the Śrīkālachakratāntara, a tantra openly Śaivite in its inspiration, which was probably introduced (?) into India in the 10th cent. and into Tibet in the 11th century.‡

Now, however, it is a recognized fact that the Tantras are much older than used to be thought.§ It should at least be noticed that Mañjuśrī (q.v.) is called Adibuddha in the *Nāmasaṅgīti* (vv. 55. 100), a book undoubtedly earlier than the 10th cent., if it is the case, as Tāranātha believes, that Chandragomin, a contemporary of Chandrakīrti (7th cent.) wrote a commentary upon it.¶ It is not necessary to discuss the question whether the interpretation, given in the commentaries of the *Nāmasaṅgīti* and numerous tantric works,‡ was accepted at the time when, according to this tradition, the work itself was composed.

There were good reasons for ascribing to Mañjuśrī the character of an Adibuddha, inasmuch as he is the personification of the knowledge whence Buddhas originate, and since he is more than a Bodhisattva, viz., a 'Jñānasattva,' in other words

\* Especially the *Svayambhūpurāṇa* (ed. *Bibl. Indica*). See on its date Haraprasād Śāstri, *JBTS* N. 2, p. 33, and Lévi (later than 1460); and for the contents Rajendralāl, 249; Hodgson, 115; Burnout, 539, 540; Lévi, *Népal*, t. 212; Foucher, *Cat. des peintures népalaises*, pp. 17 ff. Hodgson mentions also the *Nāmasaṅgīti*, *Sāhjanamālā*, *Dhadrakṣapavādāna*, *Divyāvādāna*.

† See Burnout, *Introd.* pp. 211-230.

‡ See Benelli, *Catalogue*, p. 69; Cowell and Eggeling, *Catalogue*, No. 49; Kandjur, *Rgyud*, I. 8: *Paramādibuddhodhrasīkālachakra nāma tantrasaṅgī* (Csoma-Foe, p. 292); the *Esays* by Csoma; Rémusat, *Mélanges*, p. 421; and on a Hindu *Kālachakra*, Haraprasād, *Cat. Durrar Library*, 1905, p. ix; last, but not least, Grünwedel, *Myth.*, pp. 44, 45, 60. Suchandra, who has the title of Kulika (*rigs-lān*), the title of the Zambhala kings, received it from Buddha at Dhānyakataka (Orissa), and, returning to his own country, he composed the *Kālachakra mūlatāntara* in 965 A.D. The *Sambhala* (Grünwedel has *Zambhala*); the Tibetan is *bde-hbyun*, corresponding to *bde-byed*, *Saṅkara*; then *hbyun*=*bhara*=*bhala* (Dr. P. Cordier); see Sarat Chandra, *Tib. Diet.* pp. 1251 and 670; MS Hodgson, *RAS*, 49, i., st. 28, 150, 156, etc.] should be located on the Jaxartes. It is from that country that the Tibetan calendar comes, and every one admits the influence of Upper Asia (Khotan, etc., or Mahāchīna, as the Chinese say) on the fate of Buddhism. According to Grünwedel, the book presents a distinctly Vajrayāṇite appearance; the date is fixed by the mention of Islām and Muḥammad (*Madhumatī*), and of Mecca (*Makha*), where the religion of the Barbarians (*mlechha*) is prevalent. Tāranātha, p. 305.

recension of the *Adibuddha* (tantra), and the honour of being the first to explain the *kūṭāpāda*, and the god *Kālachakra* (rabharī, jinajanaka, arer of the Universe; ie the son of all the Buddhas, just as he remains young in spite of his old age, *vyādho 'pi tram kumārāḥ sakalajinasuto 'py adibuddhas* tram *ādau*).

§ Haraprasād Śāstri, *Report*, 1895-1900; *Proc. Be. RAS*, 1900, August (*Nivāsasattvasaṁhitā*, about 800 A.D.).

¶ Tāranātha, p. 152.

‡ Namely, in the *Piṇḍikrama*, published as the first chapter of the *Pañcākrama* (Ghent, 1896).

the *Dharmakāya* (see below) or the *Dharmadhātuvāgīśvara*. His attributes, in iconography, are the sword which destroys ignorance and the book of the *Prajñāparamitā*, 'the supreme book.' King of sages (*Vādirāj*), Lord of the Holy Word (*Vagīśvara*), he is in his eternity (*trikāla*) a symbolic Adibuddha, with a symbolism transparent enough, in the same way as the *Prajñāparamitā* (later known as the *Ādiprajñā*) in very orthodox texts is called the mother of the Buddhas. Even if, as the texts inform us, he is 'made up of a part of the *Tathāgatas*,' or, conversely, the five Buddhas emanate from his person; or if the icons place the five Buddhas on his head, or in the halo of radiance with which he is crowned; if his four faces, together with the fact that he is the spouse of *Sarasvatī*, bring him singularly close to *Brahmā*,\* these are conceptions which do not alter his original character any more than does his accidental identification with *Ananga*, the god of Love, or with *Siva*, etc. Mañjuśrī is Adibuddha, because he is the king of the *Prajñā*.†

4. Although in certain documents Mañjuśrī is a tantric Adibuddha, his origin is on the side of purely philosophical speculation. The Tantras have an Adibuddha of a different nature, nearer to *Siva-Brahmā* than to *Brahmā* or *Viṣṇu*, viz. *Vajrasattva-Vajradhara*, whom later on we shall have occasion briefly to discuss.

## II. ANTECEDENTS OF THE ADIBUDDHA SYSTEM.

—By more or less well-defined steps we can follow the evolution of Buddhism from its origin (Little Vehicle) down to the conceptions which have just been discussed. There remain for examination the conceptions of the Buddha in *nirvāṇa*, and of the *Bodhisattva*, the confusion of the Buddha and the *Bodhisattva*, the doctrine of the three bodies and the *Dhyānibuddhas*.

1. *Buddha in quasi-nirvāṇa*.—(1) We shall see (AGNOSTICISM [in Buddhism]) that, according to the doctrine of the *Vaiśvāṇaravādins*, and perhaps the *Sthāviras*, *nirvāṇa* can scarcely be anything else than annihilation. The canonical texts, however, are much less definite. It is said that 'the Buddha in *nirvāṇa* evades the grasp of the intelligence, just as it is impossible to measure the waters of the ocean, they are too many.' From this the conclusion may be, and has been, drawn that *nirvāṇa* is an undefinable state, but very different from nothingness. This is, moreover, the old meaning of the word *nirvāṇa*.

(2) It is not, however, necessary, as a matter of fact, to sift the question of *nirvāṇa*, and to solve it in an unorthodox and Brāhmanical way, in order to people the heavens with divine Buddhas. For a 'sutta' of the first order represents Śākyamuni as possessed of the power of prolonging his earthly existence to the end of the *kalpa* (see AGES OF THE WORLD [Buddhist]). There is no doubt that it was early believed that he continued to live 'invisible to gods and men,' and the new theology proved less timid than the old. According to the *Sukkhāvatī* (§2), a Buddha lives for a hundred thousand *niyutas* (millions) of *koṭis* (ten millions) of *kalpas*, or more, without the beauty of his complexion being marred. Śākyamuni did not live eighty years! Only the *Tathāgatas* understand the vast duration of his life.‡

(3) The *Mahāvastu* relates that Śākyamuni, and as a rule any Buddha, or even a future Buddha

\* *Devatidra*: *brahmātmakatāt*, elsewhere *devendra*: *ciṣṇu-srabhātāt*.

† See Foucher, *Iconographie bouddhique*, Part II., and *Rgyud* 61. Mañjuśrī image-makers; see vii.

‡ The life and work of a Buddha before *nirvāṇa*, according to the Little Vehicle, see *Dieya*, 150, 17; *Mahāvastu*, I. 61; compare and contrast the vows of *Amitābha* in the *Sukkhāvatīyūla*.

(Bodhisattva) during his last existence, has the appearance of hesitating, thinking, speaking, acting, suffering as we do. This, however, is wholly due to his condescension. In reality this marvellous being is superior to all such emotions, and remains a stranger to them. To maintain the contrary is heresy. The body of the future Buddhas is entirely spiritual. There is nothing 'mundane' in them. A Bodhisattva has really no father, no mother, no son, etc.

This 'hyperphysical' system (*lokottaravāda*) is more precisely set forth in the Vetulyaka school. According to their teaching, Śākyamuni did not appear in person in the world, but deputed an image of himself to represent him (cf. DOCTICISM).

(4) The Mahāvastu says that many ages ago Śākyamuni took the vow of Bodhi in the presence of another ancient Śākyamuni. The same book speaks of eight thousand Buddhas of the name of Dipaṅkara, . . . of three hundred millions of Śākyamunis.\* If we identify this ancient Buddha with ours, make all the Dipaṅkaras, all the Śākyamunis, all the Dhvajottamas, etc., into one single Dipaṅkara, one single Śākyamuni, and adopt the doctetic theory of the Vetulyakas, we obtain the system of the 'Lotus of the True Law.' Countless ages ago, nay rather in the beginning, Śākyamuni became Buddha; his appearances on earth, in which he seems to become Buddha, to enter into *nirvāṇa*, etc., are purely magical.†

Although it was quite late when the Mahāvastu received its final shape, the characteristics to which we have drawn attention seem to be ancient. For the Lotus the *terminus ad quem* is A.D. 265. As for the doctetic theory, it is held to have been condemned at the Council of Pāṭaliputra (circa B.C. 246). Although the historical existence of the Council may be doubtful, the impression remains that the Buddhists had early reached the following conceptions:—

(a) Śākyamuni survives his earthly *parinirvāṇa*, and prolongs the 'trance' (*dhyāna*), from which he has never in reality issued since the moment that he became Buddha. There is no occasion, therefore, for reference, in addition, to the moment when he will enter really into *nirvāṇa*. 'The Blessed Buddhas, well equipped with knowledge and merit, fields of benevolence and compassion, shelters of the multitudes of beings, holding a perpetual concentration of mind, are neither in the *samsāra* (world of becoming) nor in *nirvāṇa*' (*samsāra-nirvāṇavimuktāḥ*). So it is said in the Dharmaśāṅgītiśāstra.‡

(b) In the orthodox theory (Vaibhājyavādin), Śākyamuni on becoming Buddha entered '*nirvāṇa* with residue,' the residue being the body without an active 'soul' or thinking organism, which nevertheless continues to live and speak. But no speaking is possible in *dhyāna*, therefore this body is only magical. Very probably the Buddhists soon came to believe that Śākyamuni during the whole of his earthly existence had only been the magical substitute of the real Śākyamuni, who had long since entered into eternal Buddhahood.

The steps are as follows:—The Bodhisattva comes from the heaven of the Tūṣitas to enter a human womb. The Buddha remains in the Tūṣita heaven [Is it there that he became Buddha? We do not know], and produces a double of himself. The Buddha, who has been Buddha from all time, or for such a long time that it comes to the same thing, reigns high up far beyond the Tūṣitas; if he acts and saves creatures, it is because

he is not deprived of all compassion by becoming Buddha, and is, in fact, still a 'Bodhisattva' (cf. Waddell, 'Sambhogakāya,' in *Buddhism of Tibet*, pp. 127, 347).

2. *The celestial Bodhisattvas*.—It will be seen that one of the principal doctrines of the Great Vehicle is that of the Bodhisattva, a compassionate being, who, out of pure love, refrains from entering into *nirvāṇa* in order to save created beings and to act the part of Providence (see BODHISATTVA and AVALOKITEŚVARA). In strict orthodoxy, the worship of a Buddha produces spiritual results only by a process which is entirely subjective and in which the Buddha counts for nothing; for the Buddha is either extinct or plunged in egoistic *dhyāna*. It is different with the Bodhisattvas, and Chandrakīrti says in so many words that, just as the new moon is celebrated and not the full moon, so must the Bodhisattvas be worshipped and not the Buddhas, even though the latter are of greater dignity. The Buddhas have more majesty, the Bodhisattvas more influence.†

The Buddhas derive their origin from the Bodhisattvas. For, in the first place, every Buddha has been a Bodhisattva before becoming a Buddha; and secondly, it is through the intervention of the celestial Bodhisattva (Mañjuśrī) that the future Buddha takes the vow to become a Buddha.‡

On the other hand, the Bodhisattvas are sons of the Buddhas (*jinaputra*), for, unlike the Pratyekabuddhas, they owe their knowledge of the Buddhist truth to the teaching of the Buddhas; they are, 'spiritually' speaking, begotten by the Buddhas.

In the doctrine of the Little Vehicle every future Buddha receives from a Buddha the announcement that he is to become a Buddha (*vyākaraṇa*). It is the mere statement of a fact. To the *vyākaraṇa*, however, might be, and has been, assigned an effective share in the attainment of the end in view. In the Lankavatāra the Bodhisattva receives not only an announcement but a consecration (*abhiśeka*). Conversely, it will be noticed in the Gāndhāra sculptures that the Bodhisattvas bear the phial which is to become the phial of consecration; and in the later iconography the same Amitābha, sometimes in the form of the meditating Buddha, sometimes in the form of Bodhisattva, is seen carrying the same phial.§

In theory, every Buddha begets innumerable Bodhisattvas to a spiritual life. But the Bodhisattvas, the usual companions of a Buddha, his associates in the spiritual administration of a *Buddhakṣetra*, a 'field of Buddha,' do not very often appear as his spiritual sons; they are, we might rather say, younger brothers, since they commence their long term of existence as Bodhisattvas about the same time that the future Buddha enters upon his career.

In certain texts which recall the two great Śrāvakas of the Little Vehicle, every Buddha has two chief Bodhisattvas (*Śārnāpundarika*). The Amitāyurdhyānasūtra connects Avalokiteśvara (q.v.) and Mañjuśrī with Amitābha; and Śākyamuni with Gayā is represented between Avalokiteśvara and Maitreya. Sometimes a Buddha is seen surrounded by eight Bodhisattvas; and even when the system of the five 'Dhyanī-

\* Celestial Buddhas are, in fact, no more real than their magical reflexes. From the very moment that a Bodhisattva becomes Buddha he is merged in '*nirvāṇa*' or 'voidness'; but, owing to his merits, he still appears as a brilliant body among the Bodhisattvas who behold him. Thus it can be said with Waddell (*Buddhism of Tibet*, p. 357) that the Buddhas have two 'real' bodies, a *nirvāṇa*-body (= a non-body) and a glorious body. See art. MAHĀYĀNA.

† The Bodhisattvas tend to become real gods, superior to the Buddhas, bearing the same relation to the Buddhas as Śākyamuni bore to the Arhats.

‡ Contrast *Lalitā*, 184. 19, where the Bodhisattva has to be 'excited' by the Buddhas of the ten regions.

§ Concerning the phial *kalasa*, see Grünwedel, *Buddh. Art in India*, p. 191 ff.; Foucher, *Art bouddhique*, p. 34. The consecration of a Bodhisattva as crown-prince is the fifth and last duty of a Buddha (*Mahāvastu*, I. 51. 5).

\* See Kern, *Manual*, 68, n. 2. The buddhology and mythology of the Mahāvastu are confused; see, for instance, iii. 508, where the five (human) Buddhas are confronted with the thousand Buddhas. Cf. Barth, *Journ. des Savants*, 1899.

† The same doctrine is found in the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa*.

‡ Śikṣā, p. 322. Cf. na buddhaḥ parinirvātī na dharmāḥ parihīyāt (*Suvarṇaprabhāsa*). The identification of '*nirvāṇa*' with some state of beatific meditation is clearly indicated by the Lotus of the True Law, ch. xi; cf. Kern, *Geschiedenis*, II. 145. Elsewhere *dharmakāya* = *samādhi-kāya*.

buddhas' was fixed, the number was not very uniformly observed. At one time eight or nine Bodhisattvas of the first rank are shared very unequally among the Buddhas; at another, each Buddha has a single Bodhisattva, whose name is usually colourless and seems to be derived from the sculptures.

3. *Confusion of the Buddha and the Bodhisattva.*—From the preceding discussion it follows that the relations between Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are complex and do not lend themselves to precise definition; there is often a confusion between the two concepts, and traces of this confusion are early found. In the Mahāvastu the Bodhisattvas, from the very first stages of their spiritual development, receive the title of 'perfect Buddhas.' In the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the work of a very careful theologian, the Jinas, or the Buddhas who have attained Buddhahood and are in enjoyment of a *quasi-nirvāṇa*, endeavour to save the world; they are entreated to delay their *parinirvāṇa*. Avalokita, a Bodhisattva by nature, is at least once termed Bhagavat, and there are numerous texts in which the Buddhas are active. Perhaps, however, it is necessary to come down as far as the Kāraṇḍavyūha (p. 91, 8) to read in so many words that *nirvāṇa* is accompanied by thought.

We have seen that, spiritually regarded, the Buddhas are at the same time the fathers and the sons of the Bodhisattvas. This relationship, from the mystic and ontological point of view, may be, and has been, interpreted upon a twofold principle. The first, which is at one and the same time Buddhist and Brāhmanical (see p. 98\*), is that of the identity of the Jina and the Jinaputra; the second, genuinely Hindu, is that of procession or emanation (see p. 100). These two principles are in other respects very closely connected.

Concerning this mysterious relationship between the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas there is valuable information to be got, on the one hand, from the sculptures of Gandhāra, Magadha, etc.; and, on the other, from texts clearly related to iconography, whether they inspired the latter or were themselves inspired by it. We shall begin with the evidence of the texts.

In the Amitāyurdhyānasūtra, Avalokita, who is only a Bodhisattva, besides the hundreds of 'magical' Buddhas (see p. 98\*) radiating from his body, bears on his head a colossal Buddha, also magical, that is to say, emanating from Avalokita.

Mañjuśrī, a Bodhisattva raised to the dignity of Adibuddha, sometimes bears on his head small figures of the five Dhyānibuddhas, to signify that he proceeds from them and comprehends them. Conversely, the five Buddhas separate themselves from him (*sphuratpañcathāgata*); and the carving that illustrates this expression actually represents them ranged above his head, following the profile of the statue; which is merely another way of setting them in order in the generating halo.\*

On the other hand, the ancient sculpture places five Buddhas in the attitude of meditation in the frieze above five Bodhisattvas.† It is, we think, reasonable to recognize in these five Buddhas Śākyamuni, his three predecessors, and Maitreya, i.e. the 'historical' Buddhas of our age.‡ They are not saints who have attained *nirvāṇa*, for the Lotus distinguishes clearly between the Buddhas who have passed away and of whom only stūpas remain,§ and the Buddhas 'provisionally eternal,' whose contemplative existence is indefinitely prolonged, such as Amitābha and Śākyamuni. Some would recognize in them the so-called Dhyānibuddhas, and assign to one of them the name of Amitābha. This seems to be a hazardous inference, even when

the idea of 'procession,' which is wrongly attached to the word Dhyānibuddha, is rejected, and it is in harmony with the doctrines of the Lotus to suppose that the Buddhas are here represented in the *quasi-nirvāṇa* which is their rational state. If, further, they assume the attitude of teaching, this is referable to their human double (see p. 98\*); and if they act and save creatures, it is because a Buddha always preserves some of the characteristics of a Bodhisattva.

This activity, however, is not their proper function; and the Bodhisattvas, placed below them in the relief, are their servants for the present and their successors in the future, having entered later and independently of them on the road that leads to Buddhahood. Nevertheless, in these motionless saints, placed above the Bodhisattvas and provided with lotus and thunderbolt, we have the prototypes of the Jinas and Dhyānibodhisattvas of Hodgson.

Somewhat later, apparently, we find in sculpture a symbol which draws closer the bonds between the Buddha and the Bodhisattva. We refer to the practice (perhaps of Greek origin, for it is met with at Palmyra) of placing a miniature image of a Buddha in the tiara of the future Buddha. It was, we believe, first employed in the case of Avalokita, who bears on his head a small figure of Amitābha. We shall see that Avalokita is not even the spiritual son of Amita, but rather his right arm, who provides his paradise, an active Amitābha. The small image, which is perhaps not without some connexion with the colossal Buddha which emanates from the head of Avalokita in the Amitāyurdhyāna, is not that of a Buddha-father, but rather that of a Buddha-patron. And this interpretation, which we believe is founded on the literature, justifies that which we have propounded above regarding the Buddhas in the Gandhāra frieze.

If we come down to the time attested by the *sādhana*s, or tantric incantations, and perhaps it will not be necessary to come down very far, the practice of thus placing a small figure in the tiara has become classical, and the position of the five Dhyānibuddhas is fully established.\* They are seen on the heads of numerous divinities, especially upon those of the Tārās, where undoubtedly they figure as husbands rather than fathers. A sixth Buddha, Vajrasattva, also appears (see p. 99\*). In the case of Mañjuśrī, as we have seen, the five Buddhas are all united in a single head-dress.

4. *Doctrine of the Three Bodies.*—The contradictory data which have just been set forth are fused into a theology, or rather a Buddhology, which, taking them all into account, justifies especially the antithesis of the Dhyānibuddha, the so-called human Buddha, and the Bodhisattva. But this theology goes beyond the mythological and polytheistic conceptions of the Buddhism of the Great Vehicle, and tends towards the unitarian systems which form the subject of this article.

The Buddhology of the Great Vehicle is summarized in the doctrine of the 'three bodies' (*trikāya*). This doctrine has been alluded to above, and we shall now state it in its least unorthodox form, which is undoubtedly the most ancient.

Buddha has three bodies: *dharmakāya*, *sambhogakāya*, *nirmāṇakāya*.†

\* For the five Dhyānibuddhas in Japan, see *Si-do-in-dzou*, Musée Guimet, 1899; at Java, in 779, *Minutes of the Batavian Society*, April 1836, and Takakusu, *I-Tsing*, p. xlviii.

† The Tantras, however, assign to him four or five (see *Tantras*). This doctrine of the three bodies was stated for the first time by Schmidt, *Grundlehre des Buddhismus*. See also Kern, *Inscriptio uit Battambang* (Fr. trans. *Muséon*, 1906, 1), and the present writer's *essai sur le bouddhisme* (p. 112). *Trikāya* (= *trivṛti*) is a name of the identified with the Hindu called Tripurāṣa (Kern, *op. cit.* p. 112). The writer's opinion, this conception of the Triad (Dharma, Buddha,

\* Foucher, *Iconographie*, ii. 34.  
† See Burgess, 'Elura Cave Temples' in *ASW*, vol. 5, pl. 20; Grünwedel, *Buddh. Kunst*, p. 170 (Eng. trans. p. 196).  
‡ Cf. *Mahāvastu*, iii. 330. When the Bodhisattva is going to preach the Law, five thrones miraculously appear.  
§ Kern, *Lotus*, p. 412.

The *dharmakāya*, or 'body of the law,' is the real identical nature of every Buddha, and of every being. The ancients, without using the word, gave to the thing the name of *dharmānam dharmaṃ*, 'the manner of being of that which is,' that is to say, of being produced by a cause and of being transitory. The *Mādhyamika*, one of the two branches of the scholastic Great Vehicle, and evidently the older, made it clear that by this term must be understood the 'void,' *śūnyatā*. There is no difference between *nirvāṇa* and *samsāra*, the latter expressing the successive existence of phenomena which have no true reality. Every character, every individuality, is mere appearance. On entering *nirvāṇa* the individual takes possession of his *dharmakāya*, which is, as we have seen, the 'void.' But under the name of 'void,' which was identical with the 'element of things' (*dharmadhātu*), it was easy to understand a real substratum, free from any form which could be understood or expressed in words. The *Mādhyamikas* themselves are not always on their guard;\* and the *Yogācāras*, who form the other great school of the Great Vehicle, have no hesitation in taking 'void' to mean 'unreality of the phenomena,' 'reality of the absolute,' or the 'mere thing' (*vastumātra*).† Admitting the existence of thought alone, they saw in the *dharmakāya*, which is the 'womb of the Tathāgatas' (*tathāgatagarbha*) and the identical nature of all beings (*bhūtataṭhātā*), in its quiescent state (*ālaya*), by a series of illusions, all characters.

The *nirmāṇakāya*, or magical body, like the different illusions which every magician can produce, is the body which Śākyamuni displays to men from the moment when he became Buddha.‡

The 'real' body of the Buddhas (the body of the law not being a body at all) is the body of bliss (*sambhogakāya*), a supermundane body, marked with the thirty-two signs, etc., in which the Buddhas enjoy their full majesty, virtue, knowledge, and blessedness. It is the privilege of saints to perceive this body, which belongs to the world of form, in the same way as the human Kṛṣṇa (who is only a *nirmāṇakāya*) showed his 'true' form to Arjuna. It is a marvellous sight, a symphony of light and jewels, a symphony of knowledge and sound, for it ceaselessly proclaims the voice of the True Law (*rūtarāśi*). It is the source of the joy of the Bodhisattvas. Its home is in the *Akanisṭha* (*Akanisṭhabhavana*, elsewhere *Sukhāvati*, Vulture Peak, etc.). Yet the first person, from a chronological point of view, to whom a *sambhogakāya*, a 'body of bliss,' is ascribed, is not, as the present writer understands it, a Buddha, but a Bodhisattva, viz. Avalokita. And it is remarkable that the classical doctrine of the three bodies is silent upon the glorious form of the Bodhisattvas in general. These distinctions, however, on which our Western philology is wont to dwell, are, in reality, of no importance. All these conceptions merge into one another, and in exact theology the *sambhogakāya* is just as illusory, on its side, as the *nirmāṇakāya*. The latter is a

*Saṅgha* has nothing to do with the Three Bodies. An icon is raised to the dignity of representing the *dharmakāya* by a special consecration, and particularly by the introduction of 112).

\* This *śūnyatā* is termed *vajra* in the mystic and tantric school.

† 'The real extremity' or 'end of the being,' *bhūtakoti*, the place where the being ceases, that is, the *śūnyatā*, *nirvāṇa*, but at the same time it is the crown of things and their first made of the (primary cause). Compare what the Chinese have said, a creator who

resembl  
‡ If it  
bones, cannot leave any remains; its *nirvāṇa* is only illusion, na buddhaḥ parinirvātī (*Suvarṇaprabhāsa*).

transient illusion imposed upon men; the former is the cosmic illusion, which embraces the Bodhisattvas also, and is similar to the representation which the one Being makes to himself. It is the *ālayavijñāna*, 'quiescent intelligence,' the great and unique substratum, hidden under a glorious and eternal disguise, while ordinary creatures are the same *ālayavijñāna* separated into individual consciousnesses (*prativikalpavijñāna*).\*

5. *Dhyānibuddhas*.—At first, however, the progress made in mythological and religious speculation is neither so great nor so rapid as in ontological. Śākyamuni was at first regarded as a man in whom every germ of rebirth had been by himself destroyed; who survived the destruction of the germ of rebirth as the 'living emancipated one,' and at death entered into *nirvāṇa*, nothingness or mystery. He was afterwards assigned a place among the 'never-reborn saints,'† turned in Pāli *Akanisṭhagāmins*, who attain *nirvāṇa* after having ascended from one heaven to another to the summit of the world of forms. He therefore possessed an acquired and perishable *sambhogakāya*. When it was understood that he had been Buddha almost from the beginning of time, and when the theory of the *kalpas* (Ages of the World) had been largely manipulated to suit this view, the *sambhogakāya* became his permanent and natural body. Mystic speculation, however, did not all at once arrive at unanimous conclusions. In principle there has never been but one *dharmakāya*, while the worlds are inhabited by millions of Buddhas, who have a right to this *dharmakāya*, and succeed more or less in appropriating it, and who in their *sambhogakāya* are so many celestial Jinās or Dhyānibuddhas. Each of them, as such, has control of a 'Buddha field' (*Buddhakṣetra*), of a world more or less blessed according as he has conceived his mission as Bodhisattva. Moreover, every Buddha in his own domain appears, when he pleases, in his magical body (*nirmāṇa*), or is replaced for this purpose by a worthy Bodhisattva.‡

The imagination which runs riot through the universe is subordinated to religious instinct. There must be gods, but there need not be too many. Among the innumerable Buddhas§ there is one, Amitābha, the Buddha of the setting sun, the god of Infinite Light, who, thanks to his ancient vow, has won for himself the happy office of presiding over a universe in which there is no 'evil destiny.' The men of that country are equal to the gods of ours. There are none but Bodhisattvas, and only a few Arhats. That world is a

\* For further details see *JRAS*, 1906, p. 943 ff. The one *brāhman* is at once *Siva*, the various forms of *Siva*, and the multitude of created beings. It is worthy of note that, according to Wassilief, the *Sautrāntikas* (of the Little Vehicle) acknowledge the *sambhogakāya*.

† Köppen (ii. 26) is of opinion that there is some relation between the five so-called Dhyānibuddhas on the one hand and the four trances and the *Anāgāmins* (never-reborn saints) on the other. There is no evidence in support of this view. But the *Anāgāmins* seem to furnish a good illustration of what a Buddha may be after his 'apparent' *nirvāṇa* on this earth.

‡ The doctrinal theories, therefore, undergo several modifications. Amitābha, a visible form, is *sambhogakāya*. He is, however, described as *dharmakāya*, a qualification which belongs to him only in so far as he is *Vajradharma*, according to the passage cited by Foucher, *Iconographie*, ii. 24; and, regarded as *sambhoga*, he receives the name of Amitāyus. In the same way Akṣobhya is the name of the *dharmakāya*, whose beatific appearance is called *prabhāsa*.

§ They are distinguished two: A very unorthodox three bodies and the three worlds of formlessness, of form, and of desire (*arūpa*, *rūpa*, *kāma*). But the *dharmakāya* is in principle quite a different thing from the *arūpa*.

‡ Among the most curious enumerations, that of the thousand Buddhas of our age, published by Schmidt (*Mém. Ac. de St. Pétersb.*, 6th ser. ii.), in which Vairocana recurs four times (Nos. 20, 167, 351, 999), gives a fairly clear idea of the system of the reincarnations of Buddhas are well Records, lxxviii. (iii. 330, where Vai-

'Happy Land,' a *Sukhāvati*, or, as the Viṣṇupurāṇa says, a *Sukhā*. Although Maitreya has a paradise,\* our true paradise is the land to which Amitābha calls his elect, and to which he conveys them with the help of his two 'Great Bodhisattvas.' Amitābha, at one time quite distinct from an eternal Sākyamuni (*Lotus of the True Law*), comes to be regarded as the quasi-eternal Buddha who was incarnated under the illusory appearance of the human Sākyamuni. He will be the *Jina* or *dhyānibuddha* of Sākyamuni. By the side of Amitābha there are four other Buddhas who at different times attracted the attention, now of religion, now of mythology, or again of mysticism. From among the myriads of Buddhas they are chosen to represent at one and the same time the *dharmakāya* and the *sambhogakāya*. As they are connected with the five human Buddhas, the five magical appearances of our age, it may easily be inferred that the number five originates in this ancient enumeration; and that just as the human Buddhas, as such, have no further ontological or religious importance, so their human names seemed ill fitted to designate their sublime 'substrata.'† In the same way as Sākyamuni, as eternal, bears the name of Amitāyus, and as uncreated light, of Amitābha, so also Kaṇakamuni will be called Akṣobhya, and Maitreya Amoghasiddhi.‡ But Kern has warned us repeatedly that it is dangerous to be too euhemeristic; and as the Dhyānibodhisattvas have taken the place of Bodhisattvas, much better attested in literature and more historical, so the Dhyānibuddhas, who are called the Brilliant (Vairocana), the Imperishable (Akṣobhya), the Jewel-born (Ratnasambhava), the Sure-Success (Amoghasiddhi), are in the first instance 'names' (*nomina, numina*). Seeing that there are five Indras, five Rudras, five Kuśikas, Kern suggests that for the same reasons there are five Dhyānibuddhas. And we are quite willing to believe that it is in mysticism, in idolatry, in the solar cosmogony, etc., that we must look for the predominating factors in this divine *tertris*.§

Such is the polytheistic system of the Dhyānibuddhas. Even when Vajradhara is given only a secondary place, as the second body of Akṣobhya, the tantric element always constitutes an integral part of it. Every Buddha, at least in his 'blissful' form (*sambhoga*), has a wife, and begets a Bodhisattva; he is brought into relation with a *mandala*, with a *dhārāṇī*, an element, etc.

III. Harmony was attained in various ways, either by raising to the presidency one of the five Buddhas, usually Vairocana,|| the god of the Zenith,¶ or by interposing a sixth person, whether

\* It is into the paradise of Maitreya that Iḥuen-Tsang would fain be reborn. Sometimes Sākyamuni appears to be the king of Sukhāvati (Csoma-Feér, p. 333).

† Viṣṇu appears at least once in a list of the Dhyānibuddhas.

‡ We have Amitābha (*ena-ba-mtha-yar*), Amitāyus (*tehe-dpag-med*), Amitābha (*hod-dpag-med*)—Grünwedel, *Myth.* 120, 211, p. 81, *Buddhist Art in India*, p. 195.

§ There are sometimes six or seven Dhyānibuddhas, a double or triple Akṣobhya (see Foucher, *Catalogue*, pp. 15, 29). On the other hand, in the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa* (p. 4) there are four Dhyānibuddhas, viz. Akṣobhya (an ancient Dharmachakṣaka),

|| Vairocana (*sar-iti vairocana*).

¶ It is a name of the sun.

|| In the *Vairocanaśābhisambodhitantra* (Wass, p. 187), Vairocana is a great deity who gives to Siddhārtha (?) the Vajrabhīṣeka, and who by meditation creates Vajrabodhisattvas of many kinds (Vajrapāṇi, etc.; Vajrapāśabodhisattva, etc.); but who worships Vajradhara 'of the hundred names,' learns the

ana with his circle (*chakra*) of has no priority over the other

Jinas.

In the Japanese book Kuṇjarakarna, Vairocana is not only the *primus inter pares*, but he is supreme lord to whom other Jinas give heed. The doctrine he teaches is that of identity: 'I am You, You are I'; and if there are, in fact, so few monks who attain emancipation, the reason is that they refuse to

Mañjuśrī (as we saw above), or Vajradhara, or merely the Adibuddha, not otherwise defined. The two last-mentioned conceptions demand a further brief consideration.

1. Vajradhara, 'Holder of the Thunderbolt,' is the *dharmakāya*; Vajrasattva, 'Thunderbolt-being,' is his beatific form; but the two names and the two things become confused (Wassilief, 187). On the other hand, Vajrapāṇi, 'Thunderbolt in hand,' is the Bodhisattva.\* In every instance, however, in the iconography, and usually in magic, the last-named takes the place of his doubles. He is a Bodhisattva of fairly ancient date; for it is certainly he that is represented on a gigantic scale, with four other Bodhisattvas, placed beneath five Buddhas on a Gāndhāra monument. The same sculpture regarded him essentially as merely an acolyte, and the personal attendant of Sākyamuni. He is also an entirely orthodox Bodhisattva, for Śāntideva invokes him with great energy. But he is not a Bodhisattva like the others, since he is by birth the bearer of the thunderbolt. In his person, moreover, the lexicons and Grünwedel recognize Indra.† He is a deity adopted by Buddhism, and not an original Buddhist saint. Vajradhara-Vajrasattva is the same individual raised to the dignity of a Buddha, and a supreme Buddha—the result, in fact, of the word *Vajra*.

'Vajra,' hard as adamant, clear as 'emptiness,' thunderbolt and weapon against the demons, and also a mystic synonym of the *liṅga*, has taken the place of Dharma and of Bodhi.‡ The Tāntrikas superimpose the Vajrakāya upon the Dharmakāya, and without hesitation replace the Bodhisattvas or the Śribodhisattvas by Vajrabodhisattvas. The Vajra is a divine and supernatural thing; Vajradhara, or better still Vajrasattva, who is his incarnation, is a tantric Brahman.

The various Buddhas or Bodhisattvas are, in reality, only this Vajrasattva in different rôles.§ He is, moreover, self-sufficient. To Vairocana and his brethren there correspond an element, a *skandha*, a sense, an object of sense, a wife, a mythological and mystic family (*kula*), accessory divinities and formulae, and above all a special part of the body, a 'vital breath,' knowledge (*jñāna*), and a particular sensation (*ānanda*) of the *maithuna*. Here, then, we are chiefly concerned with the *chakras*, or regions delineated on the body, with *prāṇāyāma*, regulation or suppression of the respiration, and with *lingayit* rites. Vajrasattva is, according to circumstances, a sixth element, a sixth *skandha*, a sixth joy (*ānanda*), a sixth Buddha, or at times a combination of the five elements, the five *skandhas*, or the five Buddhas. His wife is Vajradhātviśvari. The whole of this system may ultimately be reduced to a psychology which is essentially practical, with its physiological presumptions quite clearly defined, and aiming at the reinstatement of the faithful into his true nature, and his transformation into Vajrasattva. He has but to take possession, by means of the combined rites, of the 'body of bliss' (*ānandakāya*), or of the 'thunderbolt-body' (*vajrakāya*) in its most perfect form.¶

2. The Adibuddhasystem consists, properly speaking, in superimposing on the five or six Buddhas (Vajrasattva included) a Being who, however invisible and inactive he may be in principle, is

recognize that Buddha, i.e. Vairocana, is identical with Śiva. On Vairocana as an *Asura*, see Vyut, 171, 5; as a *Nilakāyika* god in Lalitavistara, see Monier-Williams' *Diet*, p. 1025. On the pre-eminence of Vairocana consult also Eitel, *Hand book*, p. 179, and *Si-do-in-dou*; on the Japanese sects, Tendai et Sington, 1272 A.D. (Musée Guimet, *Bibl. d'Étude*, t. viii).

\* According to Waddell, 'the established church of Tibet regards Vajrasattva-Vajradhara as a reflex from Sākyamuni, as a god analogous to the Adibuddha of the old (?) school Waddell himself, however, on the other hand, represents them as 'bodhisat-reflexes' from Akṣobhya (*Lançais*, p. 352).

† *Buddhist Art in India*, pp. 38, 60 f.

‡ See especially Senart, 'Vajrapāṇi dans les sculptures du Gāndhāra,' in *Congrès d'Alger*.

§ Sākyamuni = Mahāvairocana = Vajradhara (Nāmasaṅgiti, v. 23).

¶ This is the more easy because the Guru, *Vajraguru* or *Vajracharya*, is Vajrasattva incarnate. He gives the Vajravratā, the Vajrasattvabhīṣeka, to whomsoever he pleases. In the ultimate analysis, therefore, the whole is comprised in the Gurvārādhanā, in the worship of the teacher, the initiator, the master of the novices.

Information about the

the Nāmasaṅgiti

idānīḥ tanyat-

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nevertheless a god. His body, which is a 'body of law,' is called *samantabhadra*, 'universally propitious,\*' a title borrowed from the Bodhisattva of that name. There are attributed to him the thirty-two marks, etc., of the Buddhas and of Great Men, which are, as we saw, the characteristics of the beatific body.† More fortunate than Brahmā, he is worshipped.‡ The ordinary Buddhas, etc., are not his 'reflections' in an inferior world; he is different from them, for they proceed from him at a fixed moment of his existence. In place, therefore, of the underlying and scarcely veiled identity of the tantric or purely ontological system of the five Buddhas, there is substituted emanation or creation by means of *dhyāna*.

It is evident that such a doctrine of the Adibuddha is as much theistic as Buddhist.

We must not, however, be led astray by words. If there is a shade of difference here, it is only a shade. True theism, as far as Buddhism knew it, is to be found not in the Adibuddha creed of the *Aśvārīkas*, but in the worship of the celestial Bodhisattvas.

The doctrine of emanation, although it has its connecting links and its ultimate origin on the side of Hinduism, has, nevertheless, a *raison d'être* in Buddhism. Here we see the final step of the speculations which transformed Śakyamuni into a magician, and Avalokiteśvara, Vairocana, etc., into still greater magicians, Yogīśvaras, 'lords of the Yogis.' This character becomes evident when it is noticed that cosmic emanation is fashioned on the pattern of the creations by means of *dhyāna*.

What, then, is the ultimate difference between the system of emanation and the orthodox doctrine of the Great Vehicle? The Great Vehicle taught identity and the essential nothingness of things; but, while thus far very orthodox, it considered individual beings to be distinct from their very beginning. The *samsāra* has no beginning; it is the result of ignorance (*avidyā*), which is primeval. The *samsāra* is the same thing as *nirvāṇa*, but *nirvāṇa* will not be realized until the end.§

On the other hand, the Great Vehicle does not confuse magical creations (*nirmitakas*) with real 'beings.' The latter do not actually exist under the form which they adopt and by which they are known. But at least they are known, and they are truly existent illusions; while there is no real thought in magical creations.

As regards the first point, however, nothing was more logical than to suppose the 'womb of the Tathāgatas' originally virgin, to make the cosmos issue therefrom, and to represent it as returning again in *nirvāṇa*. The Brāhmins had paved the way, and this system fitted in admirably with the doctrine of cosmic revolutions in the course of the ages. And, as far as the second point is concerned, although ancient speculation, comparatively sober and self-confident as it was, refused to ascribe thought to the magical creations of magicians, it is doubtful whether we are justified in drawing the same conclusion when the magician is the *dharma-kāya* personified under the form of a meditative Buddha. What he sees in his meditation is real and, as it were, autonomous, since nothing exists except this meditation and we ourselves are thought. || The absolute idealism of the Yogācāras and the nihilistic monism of the Mādhyamikas entail all

\* At least in the Tibetan 'ancient sects,' according to Grünwedel, *Myth.* p. 143; Waddell describes them as 'the wholly unreformed section or the old school.'

† On the other hand, Adibuddha resembles Brahmā. The Tantras issue from his five mouths, as the four Vedas from the four mouths of Brahmā, etc.

‡ Under the name of Svayambhū.

§ In the language of the Brāhmins, it is the system of the *Advaita*, with a *vivarta* conceived as primitive.

|| In the language of the Brāhmins, the system of the *Advaita*.

these consequences whenever they are brought into cosmogonic mythology.

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L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

ADMIRATION.—1. An emotional reaction or feeling in regard to some agent who manifests unusual excellence or worth in the region of human activities. An individual is admired solely on account of his intrinsic worth, and this is determined by reference to an ideal of conduct which is approved in and for itself. Strength or force of will is implied in worth, but mere force of will, regardless of the end to which it is directed, does not excite admiration. The emotion thus indicates the existence of an ultimate ideal of conduct in whose realization we are interested. It concentrates attention on concrete examples, and in this way exercises an important influence on conduct. Wonder is usually a concomitant of admiration, but is not an integral part of the emotion as such. It is a purely intellectual state occasioned by anything striking or unusual. It may, for instance, be aroused by unusual unworthiness, and may therefore be associated with scorn as well as with admiration. See also RESPECT.

2. The term 'admiration' sometimes signifies æsthetic approval. The intimate relation which exists ultimately between the ideals of beauty and goodness partly accounts for this use of the word. See SCORN.

WILK (1875), ch. vii.; Martensen, *Chr.* 886, 152-160; Ribot, *Psych.* ch. xi.; Martensen, *Chr.* DAVID IRONS.

ADMONITION.—Among the repressive measures resorted to by all kinds of societies for the protection of themselves and the discipline of their members, the lightest is the admonition of the offender. Admonition, when addressed to one who has committed an offence, is a punishment of a purely moral character. It does not deprive the offender of his property, like a fine; it does not deprive him of his liberty, like imprisonment; it inflicts no temporary or permanent indignity on his person, like corporal punishment. It is an appeal, a warning, a censure addressed solely to the highest elements in his character,—his reason and conscience. The value and limitations of admonition as an instrument of social order and discipline are admirably expressed in the religious



philosophy of the Hebrews: 'A rebuke entereth deeper into one that hath understanding than an hundred stripes into a fool' (Pr 17<sup>20</sup>).

1. Admonition, as a means of maintaining social discipline, whether in the family or in larger social groups, has occupied a place among the laws and customs of peoples in almost all stages of civilization. It exists among the primitive races of the Indian peninsula; it is a recognized part of Muhammadan penal law, and it held a place in the penal code of ancient Rome (Post, *Ethnol. Jurisprudenz* (1894), ii. 23). When the Christians of Apostolic times began to form themselves into organized communities, admonition was one of the principal methods of upholding and enforcing ecclesiastical discipline. Admonition was a duty that devolved upon all Christian teachers and all Christian communities (Gal 2<sup>24</sup>, 1 Th 2<sup>2</sup>, 1 Ti 4<sup>13</sup>, 2 Ti 4<sup>2</sup>; *Hermas*, Vis. ii. 43), and it was incumbent on every believer to admonish a brother overtaken in a fault (1 Th 5<sup>14</sup>). Admonition in the primitive Church was of two kinds: (a) private, pastoral admonition, and (b) public admonition before the assembled congregation. Public admonition consisted either in a solemn exhortation to the offender to amend (2 Co 2<sup>3</sup>), or, in extreme cases, in a warning to leave the Church (1 Clem. ad Cor. 54. 2; Sohm, *Kirchenrecht*, 33 f.). The object of admonition in the primitive Church was to perfect the Christian character (Col 1<sup>28</sup>), and it was to be administered not in anger, but in a spirit of anxious, paternal, affectionate solicitude (1 Co 4<sup>14</sup>).

2. When we consider the extent and importance of admonition in the primitive Church, as well as the existence of this principle in the ancient Roman penal code, it is natural to expect that admonition would find a place when the Church of later ages ultimately elaborated a complicated and comprehensive legal code of its own. Admonition formed a part of Canon Law; it was not regarded in this system of law as a punishment, but as a warning. This warning preceded the actual punishment, which consisted in the excommunication of the offender, and it was usual in ordinary cases to repeat the warning three days before resorting to the final act of excommunication (*Corpus juris canonici*, Editio Romana, 1582 [editions of Richter, 1839, and Friedberg, 1881]; Kahl, *Lehrsystem des Kirchenrechts und der Kirchenpolitik*, Freiburg, 1894, p. 142; *Actes du Congrès pénitentiaire international*, Rome, tome i. 182-183). Admonition holds a more or less definite place in the ecclesiastical constitution of most Protestant Churches.

3. Admonition as a means of dealing with offences against the secular law exists in several modern penal codes. The old Italian and French systems of criminal law admitted the principle of admonition, and at the present time it exists in a more or less restricted form in the penal codes of a considerable number of European communities. In some States admonition is applicable only when the offence has been committed by a juvenile, in others it is applicable in the case of adults as well. As used in penal law it is not the advice, warning, reprimand or exhortation which a judge is always at liberty to give when a prisoner is before him, whether he has been acquitted or convicted. It is to be regarded as a real punishment, solemnly pronounced by a judicial tribunal, and requiring a proper observance of all the rules of legal procedure. Admonition in this sense does not exist in English law [Prins, *Science pénale* (1899), p. 468; *Alimena*, *Revista penale*, xxvii. p. 557].

Admonition is a form of punishment which must always be of very limited application in cases which come before the criminal courts. Most cases which are of so trivial a character that they

can be satisfactorily disposed of by a resort to admonition, are cases which are seldom brought before a judge at all. Owing to this fact, admonition is very little used in some of the countries where it exists as a penalty on the statute book. The prominence which the practice of admonition has acquired in recent years is to be attributed to a great and growing reaction against the abuse of short terms of imprisonment for petty and insignificant offences. Many of these offences are not, strictly speaking, criminal in character; they are for the most part offences against highway acts, police regulations, education acts, municipal regulations. The growth of large cities has increased offences of this kind enormously, inasmuch as crowded populations require a much more complicated network of regulations than thinly populated communities; and the growth of regulations is always accompanied by an increase in the number of petty offences. Petty offences of this kind are usually dealt with by the infliction of a fine; and when the offender is able to pay the fine, or when the fine falls upon himself, this penalty is perhaps the best and most effective method of dealing with them. But many cases occur in which the offender is unable to pay a fine, or, as in the case of juveniles, in which the fine falls upon the parents; in most of these cases the only alternative to a fine is imprisonment, and imprisonment, inflicting as it does a stigma which can never be removed, is felt to be too severe a penalty for the trivial nature of the offence. Hence the demand for some form of punishment which will avoid the odium of imprisonment for offenders unable to pay a fine. To some extent English law does deal with such cases. For example, where a charge is proved against an accused person, but the offence is so trivial that it is inexpedient to inflict punishment, the court may dismiss the information altogether, or it may convict the offender and discharge him conditionally on his giving security, with or without sureties, to be of good behaviour, or to appear for sentence when called upon (Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, sec. 16; Probation of First Offenders Act, 1887, sec. 1). These humane provisions of the English criminal law to a great extent supply the place of judicial admonition as used in some Continental States, but they do not succeed in abolishing short sentences of imprisonment, which are the bane of all existing penal arrangements, and which perhaps produce more evils than they cure.

W. D. MORRISON.

**ADOLESCENCE** (*adolescere* = 'to grow up').—The period of growth that intervenes between mere childhood and complete adulthood or maturity. The term was formerly restricted to the latter part of this period (from 18 to 25), but later writers have followed a suggestion of Clouston (*Clinical Lectures on Mental Diseases*, Philadelphia, 1884, p. 375 [3rd ed., Lond. 1892]) that the term should be extended so as to cover the entire transition. Accordingly, adolescence extends from about the age of 12, when premonitory mental symptoms of puberty appear, to about 25 for males and 21 for females, when the reproductive powers are ripe. The phenomena of these years display a sufficiently definite progression to justify a subdivision of the period into early, middle, and later adolescence, the middle sub-period covering the two or three years from about the age of 15 during which the transition is most rapid and the mental life most inchoate. All these age-boundaries are necessarily only average and approximate.

1. The most obvious mark of adolescence is the attainment of reproductive power. But this is only a centre for a remarkable group of phenomena. The curve of growth, both for weight and for

height, takes a new direction; the proportions of bodily parts and organs change; hereditary tendencies crop out; new instincts appear; there are characteristic disorders, particularly of the mind and nervous system; new intellectual interests and powers spring up spontaneously; the moral sense is more or less transformed; emotion greatly increases in quantity and variety; and appreciations (literary, artistic, ethical, religious) multiply in number and depth.

These phenomena have the deepest significance for both the organic and the personal life. In respect to the personal life, which is here our chief concern, adolescence presents a peculiar state of flux or plasticity of all the faculties, followed by the assumption of a new type of organization. As a general rule the 'set' that character now takes remains through life. Even the vocational and other special interests that distinguish one's mature years commonly take their rise here. It is a time of peculiar responsiveness to religious impressions, and conversely it is the period when nearly all careers of criminality, viciousness, or incompetency are begun. [The practical importance of adolescence for moral and religious growth is so great that a special article will be devoted to this topic. (See GROWTH [MORAL AND RELIGIOUS, PERIODS OF]). Certain abnormal tendencies of adolescence will be treated in the article on MORBIDNESS. The remainder of the present article offers only such general description as may assist towards a correct perspective for the manifold problems of morals and religion that have their centre here].

2. For *physiology* the importance of adolescence lies in the ripening of a new organic function, that of sex. If we carry forward this physiological notion in the direction of biology, we perceive that adolescence marks a change in the relation of an individual to the species. The significant fact now becomes the attainment of racial, as distinguished from merely individual, functions. Extending our horizon, in the next place, from biology to sociology, we note that adolescence is the period in which individual life becomes socialized. Here begins the possibility of the family and of all the derivatives from family life that are summed up in the terms 'society' and 'the State.' But the genesis of complete social existence is likewise the genesis of complete individuality. In infancy and childhood, though individualistic impulses predominate, there is dependence upon others for nutrition, protection, and knowledge; the mind is receptive rather than critical; conscience is dominated by external authority; and, though spontaneous activities are numerous, in only a minor degree are they self-consciously guided or organized. With the adolescent all this changes. He becomes free from parental control, attains to complete responsibility under the laws of the State, under popular governments acquires the franchise; and all these external facts normally have, as their mental side, a decided access of intellectual and ethical independence, and of self-conscious purposes of relatively wide sweep.

3. Advancing, now, to the *ethical* aspect of these relations, we may say that adolescence tends toward the attainment of complete ethical personality, through release from a predominantly egoistic motivation of life. Self-realization now advances beyond a series of particular egoistic satisfactions (a characteristic of childhood), and requires the organization of the self into a larger whole as a member of it. This involves at once increased self-guidance, yet a deeper sense of obligation; a heightened individualism, yet an individualism that is transfigured into social self-realization. This movement outward from the

merely particular self is of the highest importance for religion. For the movement may, and, wherever adolescence has been carefully studied, does go on to include the individual's relations not only to human society, but also to nature, and to God or the gods. It is characteristic of adolescence to become interested in the whole 'other-than-myself,' to feel its mystery, and to endeavour to construe it in terms of selfhood and sympathy.

Viewed from the standpoint of the Christian consciousness, adolescence is the normal period for attaining complete individual existence in and through the organization of the self into larger social wholes such as the family, society, the State, humanity, and the all-inclusive social relationship that Jesus called the Kingdom of God. But this is only the culmination of a view of adolescence that is present, more or less clearly, in all religions. The custom of signaling the arrival of puberty by initiation into the tribe and its religion by means of symbolic ceremonies, bodily markings and mutilations, or by other civil and religious exercises, is world-wide, and it reaches through all strata of cultural development (see Hall, *Adolescence*, ch. xiii., and an art. by A. H. Daniels, 'The New Life,' in *Amer. Jour. Psy.* vol. vi. p. 61 ff.).

4. The close time-relation here existing between sexual development and the growth of the highest sentiments and impulses cannot be a mere coincidence. It is too constant, and the parallel between the biological and the psychological transformation is too close to permit a serious doubt that these two lines of growth need to be included under a single concept. Living organisms display two fundamental functions, nutrition and reproduction, the former of which attains its immediate end in the individual, the latter in the species. They are the physiological bases of Egoism and Altruism respectively. The physiological and the ethical here present a single law manifesting itself on two planes. In infancy and childhood we have a type of life that, in the main, presents on the physiological side a predominance of the nutritive function, and on the ethical side a predominance of self-regard, while in adolescence nutritive and reproductive functions are blended and unified, just as are also egoistic and social impulses. Of course, childhood is not exclusively egoistic, for family training and the pressure of a social environment guide conduct and even habits of feeling into social channels; but the inner, emotional, self-conscious realization of one's social nature waits for adolescence. Now, the mental states that characterize this change directly reflect the new physiological condition, though they pass beyond it, as though it were only a door of entrance. The new interest in the opposite sex tends to humanize the adolescent's whole world. All heroism becomes lovely, not merely the heroic devotion of a lover; Nature at large begins to reveal her beauty; in fact, all the ideal qualities that a lover aspires to possess in himself or to find in the object of his love,—all the sympathy, purity, truth, fidelity,—these are found or looked for in the whole sphere of being. Thus the ripening of sexual capacity and the coming of the larger ethical and spiritual capacities constitute a single process going on at two distinct levels.

The evidence of this connexion thus derived from normal growth is strengthened by abnormal and pathological phenomena. Persons who are made eunuchs in childhood commonly display a peculiar insensibility to social and religious motives. Further, nothing tends more positively towards the production of morbid moral and religious states during adolescence than defective physiological

conditions or misuse of physiological power (see MORBIDNESS).

The tendency of all these data is towards the view that sexual capacity is in general the physiological basis of all the higher and finer qualities of personality, both ethical and religious. This does not reduce religion to terms of physiology, or subordinate it to something more nearly primary. Rather, it reveals in the biological and physiological realm a spiritual law that tends to transfigure the whole notion of life. We must interpret the whole biological development in the light of its highest stages, and physiological functions by their place in the highest self-consciousness.

The only serious objection to this view has been raised by Henry Drummond, who makes conjugal affection merely a secondary product of maternal affection (*The Ascent of Man*, London, 1894, chs. vii., ix.). However maternal affection originated, it can hardly be the sole origin of the higher sentiments. In the first place, the relation between a mother and a helpless infant lacks too much of mutual responsiveness or reciprocity to be the source of the humanizing of the world, to which reference has been made. Again, a large mass of evidence goes to show that this humanizing process does spring directly from the relationship of sex as its ideal expression. In addition to the evidence already adduced from adolescence, it will be appropriate to add an item from the general evolution of sex. Geddes and Thomson, tracing the evolution of the reproductive process, declare that, from its beginning in simple cell-division, 'the primitive hunger and love become the starting-points of divergent lines of egoistic and altruistic emotion and activity' (*The Evolution of Sex*, London, 1890, ch. xiii.). Consequently, as Mercier says, 'the sexual emotion includes as an integral, fundamental, and preponderating element in its constitution, the desire for self-sacrifice' (*Sanity and Insanity*, London, 1895, p. 220). In the adolescent period this universal law of life comes to self-consciousness, rises to the ethical plane, and goes on to complete itself in the all-inclusive ideas, aspirations, and self-consecrations of religion.

LITERATURE.—Although from of old the bloom-time of youth has been a favourite subject of literary art, scientific analysis of adolescent phenomena goes back little more than two decades. The stimulus for such analysis has come partly from pathology (see work of T. S. Clouston already cited); also his *Journal of Psychology*, 1894, ch. i. on 'Adolescence'; also *Dictionary of Psychology*, 1894, chs. i.-vii. of Hall's *Adolescence*, but more largely from educational needs and the general extension of psychology in physiological and biological directions. In the spheres of education and psychology, the study of adolescence has been greatly stimulated by G. Stanley Hall, President of Clark University, at Worcester, Mass., U.S.A. The *American Journal of Psychology* and the *Pedagogical Seminary*, both founded by him and published at Worcester, have devoted much space to articles on adolescence, largely from Dr. Hall and his immediate pupils. These publications, and others of a more popular sort, have represented and stimulated an extensive child-study movement in America. This movement, which has adolescence as one of its chief foci, is one cause of an extremely active ferment of educational reform. The very large literature of this subject is listed and indexed from year to year since 1893 by Louis N. Wilson in a *Bibliography of Child-Study*, also published at Worcester. In 1904 appeared G. Stanley Hall's *Adolescence: Its Psychology and its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion, and Education*, in two large volumes (New York). The wide range of this work, the fulness of its materials, its abundant citations from sources, and the stimulating points of view of the author (though they often display the heat of an educational reformer), combine to make this by far the most notable product of the movement for the study of adolescence. In addition to these few very general references, consult the Bibliography appended to the articles on GROWTH and MORBIDNESS already referred to.

GEORGE A. COE.

**ADOPTIANISM.**—The name Adoptianism should, strictly speaking, be confined to a heresy which arose in Spain in the 8th century. But the wide circulation of Harnack's *History of Dogma*

has familiarized us with the idea of tracing an Adoptianist Christology to an earlier period. We propose, therefore, to treat of Adoptianism in the broadest sense, bringing under this head all writings which speak of Christ as the adopted Son of God.

1. The keynote of the Christology of the 2nd cent. is struck in the opening words of the ancient homily known as *2 Clement*: 'Brethren, we ought so to think of Jesus Christ, as of God, as of the Judge of quick and dead.' Ignatius asserts the Divinity of the Lord no less emphatically than His true manhood; e.g. *ad Eph.* 18: 'For our God, Jesus the Christ, was conceived in the womb by Mary according to a dispensation, of the seed of David but also of the Holy Ghost.'

Harnack, however, contrasts with such teaching, to which he gives the name 'Pneumatic Christology,' the teaching of such a writer as *Hermas*, whom he claims as a teacher of Adoptianist Christology. Whereas Ignatius and Clement and others carry on the tradition of a pre-existent Christ on the lines of NT writings (*Ep. Hebrews*, *Ephesians*, *Johannine writings*), Harnack regards *Hermas* as a witness to a truer doctrine. According to the *Shepherd* of *Hermas* (see *Sim.* v. and ix. l. 12), in Harnack's words (*Hist. of Dogma* [Eng. tr.] i. 191 n.):

'The Holy Spirit—it is not certain whether He is identified with the chief Archangel—is regarded as the pre-existent Son of God, who is older than creation, nay, was God's counsellor at creation. The Redeemer is the virtuous man chosen by God, with whom that Spirit of God was united. As He did not defile the Spirit, but kept Him constantly as His companion, and carried out the work to which the Deity had called Him, nay, did more than He was commanded, He was, in virtue of a Divine decree, adopted as a son and exalted to *μεγάλη ἐξουσία καὶ κυριότης*.'

We may agree with Lightfoot and others that *Hermas* sometimes confuses the Persons of the Son and of the Spirit, but this is as far as the evidence leads us. Is it surprising that an obscure shop-keeper without philosophical training should make slips in the work of analysis of Christian experience, which is the great task of Christian theology? In *Sim.* v. *Hermas* distinguishes accurately enough between the Lord of the vineyard; the Servant, under which figure *Hermas* speaks of the Son; and the Son, referring to the Holy Ghost. And when he writes (vi. 5) that God sent the Holy Ghost to dwell in the flesh of Christ, he does not mean that the Holy Ghost is the power of the Godhead in Christ, but that the pre-existent Christ was 'a spirit being.' Such teaching is found in Ignatius (*Aristides, Apol.*) and in later writers (Irenaeus, *adv. Her.* v. 1, 2; Tertullian, *Apol.* 21, *adv. Prax.* 8. 26).

As Dorner (*Doct. of Person of Christ* [Eng. tr.], l. i. 131) writes:

'So far is *Hermas* from Ebionism . . . that he rather seeks in part to retract the representation of the Son as a servant in the Similitude, and even to represent His earthly work as power and majesty; whilst what remains of His humiliation, such as His sufferings, he treats as the work of His free love, as the means of the taking away of our sins, and as the point of passage to a higher perfection.'

What Harnack reads into the Christology of *Hermas* is really the teaching of a much later writer, Paul of Samosata. No doubt it is true that the pre-existence of Christ was ignored or denied in some quarters. One class of Ebionites held a low conception of the Person of Christ, regarding Him as an ordinary man though superior to other men (Euseb. *HE* iii. 27). Some writers held that the Baptism was the beginning of His Divine Sonship.

2. This tendency to minimize the Divine glory of Christ reached a climax in the writings of Paul of Samosata, a rationalist Monarchian, who laid stress on the unity of God as a single Person, denying any distinction of the Wisdom or Word

of God. 'A real incarnation of the Logos was thus impossible; He existed in Jesus not essentially or personally, but only as a quality. The personality of Jesus was entirely human; it was not that the Son of God came down from heaven, but that the Son of man ascended up on high' (Bethune-Baker, *Hist. Christian Doctrine* (1903), p. 101). Whether He was deified after His Baptism or His Resurrection was not clearly taught, but the union between God and Christ was, according to this view, one of disposition and will only.

3. The truth is that this tendency to minimize, which comes out again in the later Arians, Nestorians, and Adoptianists, was in continual conflict with its opposite extreme, which recurs in Sabellianism, Apollinarianism, and Eutychianism. But between the two extremes the Church held on her 'tranquil way,' and the ultimate test of her belief in Christ's Divinity lies in the fact that she never ceased to offer prayer to Christ with the Father.

4. We find in the teaching of *Theodore of Mopsuestia* a connecting link with the later Adoptianism as well as the basis of Nestorian teaching, because it is probable that Latin translations of his works were read in Spain from the 6th century.

Theodore discusses the indwelling of God in Christ, in his work 'On the Incarnation.' What is in holy men an indwelling of approval only, was in Christ not merely of a higher degree, but brought Him into a close relation to God on a higher plane. From His Birth the co-operation of the Divine Word with the man Jesus raised Him to the level of perfect virtue. 'The Man Christ . . . is thus the visible image of the invisible Godhead; and on account of His union with the true Son of God, He possesses the privileges of a unique adoption, so that to Him also the title of Son of God belongs' (Swete, *Theod. of Mopsuestia on Minor Epp. of S. Paul*, i. lxxxi). Theodore seems to prefer the term 'conjunction' of natures rather than 'union,' and uses the metaphor of the union of husband and wife in marriage to express the union of two Natures in one Person. But in his desire to avoid Apollinarian error he opened the way for the theories of Nestorius, who taught that there was only 'a conjunction of the two Natures, an indwelling of the Godhead in the manhood united morally or by sympathy.' Such a union is mechanical, not vital. 'I separate the natures,' said Nestorius, 'but the reverence I pay them is just.' The strong point in his theory was the Lord's true manhood. As Bright put it in one aspect, but in disguise, Humanitarist: "Adoptianist" (*Age of the Fathers* (1903), ii. 263).

5. We pass on to consider the links which bound the later Spanish Adoptianism to earlier heresies. There seems no doubt that Muhammadan rulers were inclined to patronize Nestorian Christians as more enlightened than their brethren. When the Arabs overthrew the Persian kingdom, they found Nestorian Christians strong. Muhammad himself is said to have cultivated the literary friendship of a Nestorian monk Sergius, and he gave privileges to Nestorians. They followed the Arabs everywhere, the Khalifs appreciating their learning, and probably followed the Moors into Spain. Gams (*Kirchengesch. Spaniens*, ii. 2. 264) suggests that the mysterious 'Brothers of Cordova,' whom Elipandus, the first teacher of the heresy, quoted as writing much to him (he wrote to Felix in 799), were Nestorians. Alcuin traces the origin of the new error to Cordova (writing to Leidrat, he says: 'Maxime origo hujus perfidie de Corduba civitate processit'). And if they were not fully persuaded Nestorians, they may very well have been students of Theodore of Mopsuestia, whose works were read in the West. Gams also points out (*op. cit.*) that in his controversy with Migetius, Elipandus quoted Efsen (= Ephraim the Syrian), suggesting that knowledge of his works seems to imply the presence of Nestorians in Spain.

6. *Elipandus*, Metropolitan of Toledo, was an old man when the trouble began (c. A.D. 780). It appears that he had successfully opposed the obscure heresy of Migetius, in which we can trace a lurking remnant of Priscillianism. Migetius taught that God was revealed in David (as Father),

in Jesus (as Son), in St. Paul (as Holy Ghost), on the basis of an absurdly literal exegesis. (Thus he quotes David in Ps 44<sup>2</sup> (45<sup>1</sup>), 'Eructavit cor meum uerbum bonum'). From this extreme Elipandus turned to its opposite, and taught what with vehemence he declared to be the teaching of all the Fathers and of the Councils. Both he and his abler ally, Felix, bp. of Urgel, intended to teach the unity of Christ's Person while strictly distinguishing the Natures. They found the term 'adoption' in common use in their Spanish Liturgy,\* and they argued that it was a fitting term to express the raising of the human nature to the dignity of Divinity. They taught that the Son is 'adoptive in His humanity, but not in His Divinity.'

It does not appear that the term 'adoption' in the Liturgy meant more than 'assumption.' Elipandus was rightly concerned to guard the reality of the human nature assumed, but overstated the case in his antithesis, teaching a double Sonship: as God, Christ is *Son genere et natura*; as man, He is *Son adoptione et gratia*. He roundly accused his opponents of teaching Eutychianism, that the manhood was derived from the being of the Father.

7. *Felix* followed on the same path. He transferred to the Person what was true of the nature. He taught that Christ as a servant needed grace, was not omniscient or omnipotent. As the Only-begotten Son, Christ says, 'I and the Father are one' (Jn 10<sup>30</sup>). As the 'First-born among many brethren' (Ro 8<sup>29</sup>) He is adopted with the adopted sons. Only thus can we be certain of our adoption.

Felix applied the phrase 'true and peculiar Son' (*uerus et proprius filius*) to the God-Logos alone, and did not shrink from the proposition 'the Son is believed one in two forms'; he distinguished between 'the one' and 'the other,' 'this one' and 'that,' nay, he called the Son of Man God by adoption (*nuncupativus deus*: meaning that He became God). He taught a dwelling of God in man, of the man who is united with Deity (Harnack, *op. cit.* v. 235). The Son of Man has two births, a natural birth of the Virgin, a spiritual birth by adoption and grace, begun in Baptism, completed in the Resurrection. Felix, indeed, taught that Christ was sinless, but that 'the old man,' i.e. our sinful nature, is regenerated in Him. Alcuin (ii. 18) found it difficult to believe that Felix was sincere when he seemed to regard Christ as needing regeneration.

8. When Elipandus published his theory in letters, the Abbot *Beatus* and the Bishop *Etherius* (Etherius, Heterius) entered the lists against him. He was amazed at their rashness. Toledo was not accustomed to take lessons from Asturias! He called his opponents names, of which 'servants of Antichrist' is a mild specimen. The controversy extended from Spain to France; and the Pope, Hadrian I., was drawn into it, not unwilling to deal with an independent Metropolitan. When Felix joined in the fray, the Synod of Regensburg was summoned, in A.D. 792. Felix defended himself in the presence of Charles the Great, but was vanquished in debate, and was sent in the company of Abbot Angilbert to the Pope. In Rome he signed a recantation; but when he returned to Urgel he repented of it, and fled into Saracen territory.

9. On his return from England, *Alcuin* wrote his first treatise against Felix. About the same time Elipandus and the Spanish bishops sent a treatise to the bishops of Gaul, Aquitaine, and Asturias, and appealed to Charles to reinstate Felix. The Council of Frankfort met in the summer of A.D. 794, and was attended by representatives of the Pope as

\* In the first passage quoted by Elipandus the text was doubtful (Alcuin, *adv. Et.* ii. 7). In others the word did not mean more than *assumption*. In *Missa in ascensione Domini*: 'Hodie salvator noster post adoptionem carnis sedem repulit Deitatis. Hodie hominem suum intulit patri, quem obtulit passioni.'

well as by English theologians. It produced two dogmatic treatises—one by Frankish and German bishops; the other by the bishops of Upper Italy, led by Paulinus of Aquileia. They were sent by Charles to Elipandus, together with a treatise of Pope Hadrian. He begged him not to separate from the unity of the Church. In the spring of A.D. 798, Alcuin received a treatise from Felix, and asked Charles to invite replies from Paulinus of Aquileia, Richbod of Trèves, and Theodulf of Orleans, preparing also a reply of his own.

10. In the meantime Leidrat of Lyons, who with Nefridius of Narbonne and Abbot Benedict of Aniane had been conducting an active mission against the heresy in the district, met Felix and persuaded him to come to Court. In June A.D. 799 he met Alcuin at Aachen, and, after much discussion, was received back into the Church. He was put in charge of Leidrat, and remained at Lyons till his death. But Leidrat's successor, Agobard, after the death of Felix, found a posthumous treatise, in which some of the old errors were restated, and published a refutation, dealing particularly with the erroneous speculations of Felix on our Lord's ignorance (Agnoetism).

The heresy soon died out in the 9th cent. in the Frankish empire, though it is mentioned in the letters of Alvar of Cordova as surviving in his neighbourhood (c. A.D. 850). In the 11th and 12th cents. it was revived by some of the schoolmen, but did not become popular.

11. The chief result of the controversy was the fateful legacy of a theory of transubstantiation of the human personality in Christ, which the orthodox writers bequeathed to their successors, preparing

the way for a theory of transubstantiation in the Eucharist. Alcuin (c. *Felic.* ii. 12) taught that 'in *adsumptione carnis a deo, persona perit hominis, non natura.*' The idea was inherited from the Gallican Faustus of Riez, who had taught: '*Persona personam consumere potest*' (under the name Paschasius, *de Sp. sco.* ii. 4, quoted by Hooker in a famous passage, *Eccl. Pol.* v. 52. 3). Faustus had the legal conception of personality = ownership, most probably, in his mind, not a sort of semi-physical conception of consumption, as when the wick of a candle is consumed in the flame. There is danger in all such metaphors if they are pressed too far.

In every Christological controversy sacramental teaching has been involved. In Arian times, Hilary of Poitiers (*de Trin.* viii. 13) pleaded standard Eucharistic doctrine as a witness against error. Etherius and Beatus were right to show that the assumptions of their opponents brought about serious misunderstandings in Eucharistic teaching. But Harnack overstates their position when he argues that 'even in the instance of Beatus, the realistic conception of the Lord's Supper turns out to be a decisive motive against Adoptionism' (*op. cit.* v. 291).

12. In conclusion, it is pleasant to note that Alcuin (*Ep. ad Elip.*) wrote warmly in praise of the character of Felix, whose charm was also admitted after his death by Agobard (*op. cit.* 2).

LITERATURE.—Letters of Elipandus, *España Sagrada*, v. 624; *Etherii et Beati adv. Elip.* Lib. 2 (Migne, *Patr. Lat.* 96); Alcuinus, *adv. Elip.*, *adv. Felic.* (Migne, 100, 101); Paulinus, *lib. 3* (Migne, 69); Agobardus (Migne, 104); Gams, *Kirchengeschichte Spaniens*, ii. 2, 261 ff.; Baudissin, *Eulogius u. Alvar*; Möller, art. 'Adoptionismus' in *PRE*. A. E. BURN.

## ADOPTION.

**ADOPTION** (among lower races).—1. Artificial kinship is a well-recognized and widely practised mode of strengthening societies founded, as savage and barbarous societies are, on real or pretended community of blood. By means of artificial kinship, strangers are adopted into a clan or kindred. Various methods are employed for this purpose, of which the most celebrated is the Blood Covenant (wh. see). In all societies based on blood-kinship, children are a common asset of great value, for the continuance of the society depends on them. Wealth of children is the supreme desire of families, and it matters comparatively little whether they are legitimate, or even whether they really have the family blood in their veins or not. Where natural means of obtaining children fail, therefore, artificial means are often freely resorted to. Moreover, the importance of children to the society leads to their being regarded with special tenderness and consideration; and even where there is no want of issue, children are adopted from motives of compassion. This is the case, to mention only two examples, among peoples as widely severed by race, environment, and culture as the Papuans and the North American Indians. Of the natives of Logea, an island off the coast of British New Guinea, we are told that on the occasion of a blood-feud after a successful raid, when it is customary to torture to death and eat the prisoners, the leader of the raid, being the owner of the prisoners, will sometimes save their lives and adopt them, according to sex and age, as father, mother, brother, sister, or child (Colonial Rep., No. 168, *Brit. New Guinea Annual Rep.* 1894-1895, p. 51). Elsewhere in New Guinea and the adjacent islands the purchase of children for adoption by women, either childless or with only small families or widows, or by families with children of one sex only, is a common practice (Kohler, in *ZVEW*, xiv. 365).

So among the Osages and Kansas of North America 'children and women taken prisoners are preserved and adopted, especially into such families among their captors as have lost any of their members, either by sickness or war' (Hunter, *Memoirs of a Captivity*, 249). The Omahas practise adoption when a child, grandchild, nephew or niece has died, and some living person bears a real or fancied resemblance to the deceased (Dorsey, in 3rd Report of BE, 265).\*

2. The effect of adoption is to transfer the child from the old kinship to the new. He ceases to be a member of the family to which he belongs by birth. He loses all rights, and is divested of all duties with regard to his real parents and kinsmen, and instead enters upon new duties and acquires new rights as the child of the family to which he is transferred, and of which he is now regarded in all respects as a native-born member. Very early in the development of the family as a social unit, in addition to the care of a parent during sickness and old age, the due performance of his funeral ceremonies and the cult of the ancestral *manes* were reckoned among the most important duties of a child. These are not always mentioned by ethnographical writers among the reasons for adoption; yet, where the religion of the people described lays stress upon them, they must always be taken into account. Thus the old Moravian writer Crantz, in describing the customs of the Eskimos

\* Some of the North American tribes occasionally extended the practice of adoption so as to make it by analogy a transaction between entire groups of persons. Thus the Five Nations adopted the Tuscarora on their expulsion from North Carolina, about the year 1726, and admitted them, first as a boy, then as a man, and finally as a warrior. In both cases the object was of alliance (for such in effect by circumstances (Hewitt in

*Handbk. Amer. Ind.*, art. 'Adoption').

of Greenland, assigns as the only reason for adoption of children that the family has no children or only little ones, and that the husband in such a case adopts one or two orphan boys 'to assist him in providing food and to take care of his family in future times,' adding that 'the wife does the same with a girl or a widow' (Crantz, *History of Greenland*, i. 165); whereas we know from his own statements elsewhere in the book (pp. 205, 237), as well as from others, that an elaborate burial was given to a deceased E-kimo, that ghosts manifested themselves in various ways, asking for food by a singing in the ears; and that the dead were 'a kind of guardian spirits to their children and grandchildren' (Rink, *Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo*, 44, 63). Hence we may be led to infer that the reasons enumerated by Crantz were by no means the only reasons for adoption in Greenland. The inference is greatly strengthened by the express testimony of a careful observer about the Eskimos of Behring Strait, that 'a childless pair frequently adopt a child, either a girl or a boy, preferably the latter. This is done so that when they die there will be some one left whose duty it will be to make the customary feast and offerings to their shades at the festival of the dead. All of the Eskimos appear to have great dread of dying without being assured that their shades will be remembered during the festivals, fearing that, if neglected, they would thereby suffer destitution in the future life' (Nelson, in 18th Report of BE, 290).

3. Whatever may be the case among the Eskimos of Greenland, therefore, it is quite certain that those of Behring Strait practise adoption for reasons which include the perpetuation of the cult of the ancestral *manes*. At the other end of the habitable world the Bantus are distinguished by their devotion to the worship of ancestors. The race is so prolific that it rarely happens that a man dies without issue. When among the Baronga of Delagoa Bay the head of a kraal passes away without leaving a son, it is said that his village has departed, his name is broken. This is regarded as a supreme misfortune; and to avoid it the childless man has one means at his disposal, namely, the adoption of his sister's son. He gets a sister who is expecting to become a mother to come to his village, and there to give birth to her child. If a boy be born, he is made the heir, and is said to have restored his grandfather's village. For this purpose a chief may, it seems (though one below the rank of chief cannot), even adopt a stranger (Junod, *Les Baronga*, 121). The misfortune involved in the breaking of the name by the failure of children appears more clearly from a Zulu prayer to the family *manes*.

The worshipper says: 'Ye of such a place, which did such and such great actions, I ask of you that I may get cattle and children and wives, and have children by them, that your name may not perish, but it may still be said, "That is the village of so-and-so yonder." If I am alone, it may be I shall live long on the earth; if I have no children, at my death my name will come to an end; and you will be in trouble when you have to eat grasshoppers; for at the time of my death my village will come to an end, and you will have no place into which you can enter; you will die of cold on the mountains' (Callaway, *Religious Syst. of the Amazulu*, 224).

The Zulus are a people closely related, as well as geographically contiguous, to the Baronga. From what is here explicitly set forth concerning Zulu ideas, it may be legitimately concluded that the underlying motive for adopting a son in the manner practised by the Baronga, is that of providing for the worship of the dead by means of the sacrifices to be offered from time to time by the adopted son and his descendants.

4. It is, however, among races of higher civilization than the Eskimos or the Bantus that the connexion of adoption with the family cult is most

clearly visible. Without anticipating what will be said below in special articles, it may be noted that the adoption ceremony often bears witness to this connexion. In Cambodia a solemn ceremony, though not absolutely essential to the validity of adoption, is often performed, and plays a great part in Cambodian custom. It is needless to relate the ceremony in detail. Suffice it to say that the following invocation is therein repeated:

'To-day, at a propitious hour, this man who, in consequence no doubt of a mistake on the part of nature, was born of other entrails, asks to be the son of so-and-so. Let so-and-so be his father, so-and-so his mother! It becomes us now to inform you of the matter, O deceased ancestors! Give us your benediction! Grant us favours and prosperity!' The formal adoption then takes place by the adoptive father or some other person on his behalf asperging the adopted son with water, counting nine, and crying: 'Come hither, run, O nineteen vital spirits!' Finally, the cotton threads with which the water has been sprinkled are bound to the wrists of the son thus admitted into the family (Aymonier, in *Excursions et Reconnaissances*, xiv. 180).

5. The ceremony of adoption has varied greatly. There is reason to believe that it originally consisted of a formal simulation of the natural act of birth, or of suckling. The former, as appears from the legend of the adoption of Herakles by Hera, recounted by Diodorus, was known in early times in Greece, and the same writer expressly tells us that it was still the practice of the barbarians. The Roman form seems to have been similar. It is still observed by the Turks in Bosnia; and a Slavonic folksong exhibits an empress as taking the son to be adopted into the palace and passing him through her silken vest that he might be called her heart's child (Krauss, *Sitte und Brauch der Süd-slaven*, 599 f.). The symbolism is, if crude, so natural that we need not be surprised at finding it very widespread. A story of the Tsimshians, a British Columbian tribe, represents a woman who purposed to adopt a child as sitting down and having the child placed between her legs, as if she had just given birth to it (Boas, *Indianische Sagen*, 275). Some of the Indian castes place the child in the lap of the person adopting it (Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, i. 59, 89). Saint Dominic was the adopted son of the Blessed Virgin. Accordingly, Roman Catholic painters have not hesitated to represent 'the whole countless host of Dominicans crowded under her dress' (Milman, *History of Lat. Christianity*, vi. 22 note). Although in England adoption has not been recognized within the historical period, a vulgar belief, which is said to have lingered into recent times, that a mother might legitimate her children born before marriage by taking them under her clothes during the marriage ceremony, seems to point to the existence at an earlier period of a rite of adoption simulating the act of birth.

6. Among the races of the North of Africa the ancient rite was by suckling. It is constantly alluded to in Berber and Kabyle stories. It is mentioned in stories told to-day in Egypt, and was probably the usual form among the ancient Egyptians (Basset, *Nouveaux Contes Berbères*, 128, 339; Wiedemann in *Am Urquell*, iii. 239). The development of the paternal at the expense of the maternal line of descent has in Africa and elsewhere transferred the rite to the man who adopts a son. Among the Gallas at Kambat, in the Eastern Horn of Africa, the son to be adopted sucks blood from the breast of his adoptive father (Paulitschke, *Ethnographie Nordost-Afrikas*, i. 193). In Abyssinia the son to be adopted takes the hand of the adoptive father and sucks one of his fingers, declaring himself to be his child by adoption. Sir George Robertson was thus constituted his adopted father by an old Kafir in the Hindu-Kush. On another occasion a man desirous of being his adopted son smeared butter on his left breast and sucked it (Robertson, *Käfers of the*



*Hindu-Kush*, 203, 30). The Circassians practise adoption by the suckling rite. The woman offers her breast to the son to be adopted. So far is this carried, that if a murderer can by any means, even by force, succeed in sucking the breast of the mother of one whom he has slain, he becomes her son; and it ends a vendetta if the offender can simply manage to plant three kisses on the breast of the mother of the injured man (Darinsky, in *ZVRIV*, xiv. 163; *L'Anthropologie*, vii. 229).

These crude ceremonies, of course, disappeared from the higher culture long before the custom of adoption itself passed away.

E. SIDNEY HARTLAND.

**ADOPTION (Chinese).**—Adoption is in China principally a religious institution, based upon ancestor-worship, which demands perpetuation of the family and the tribe.

The most sacred duty of a child, inculcated by the ancient classics, consists in absolute obedience and submission to the will of its parents, combined with the highest degree of affection and devotion. This duty, called *hiao*, naturally does not terminate with death. Father and mother, having entered the spiritual state, then become the patron divinities of their offspring. They reside in their tombs, and also at home on the altar, in wooden tablets inscribed with their names. The sons and their wives have to feed and clothe them by means of sacrifices prescribed with great precision by formal customary law, in order to protect them from hunger and cold, privation and misery, and themselves from punishment and misfortune. The *hiao* extends also to grandparents, and still more remote ancestors of the family, who likewise are tutelary divinities. Lest the sacrifices should cease, it is both a necessity and a duty for everybody to have sons, in order that they may continue the ancestor-worship. The saying of Mencius, 'Three things are unfilial, and the worst is to have no sons,' is a dogma of social and religious life to this day. Daughters are of no use in this respect; for, in accordance with the peremptory law of exogamy dominating China's social life probably from the earliest times, a daughter leaves her paternal tribe to enter that of her husband, and this secession means the adoption of her husband's ancestors.

A married man who has no son, either by his principal wife or by a concubine, is therefore bound to obtain one by adoption. According to ancient custom, confirmed by the laws of the State, he may adopt only a son of his brother, or a grandson of his father's brother, or a great-grandson of his paternal grand-uncle, and so on; in other words, an adopted successor must be a member of the same tribe, and thus a bearer of the adopter's tribe-name; and moreover, he must be a member of the generation following that of the adopter.

An adopted successor holds the position of a genuine son: he possesses the same rights, and has the same duties to perform.

Adoption is unusual, and at any rate not necessary, for those who have sons of their own; and it is unlawful for any man who has only one son to give him away for adoption.

The adoption of a son may, of course, be sealed by means of a written contract, but in most cases no such contract is made. It is an important event for the family, and, like all such events, is superintended by the elders of the family, whose tacit sanction is necessary. The intervention of the authorities is neither asked nor given, and so long as no glaring transgression of the laws of adoption is committed, and no complaints are lodged by the elders, they will not interfere. The consummation of the event is in the main religious, being solemnly announced to the soul-tablets in

both homes by the respective fathers; and the son has, with prostrations and incense-offering, to take leave of those in his father's house, and in the same way to introduce himself to those in the house of his adoptive father. Should his natural father and his adoptive father have the same family-altar, there is, of course, only the one announcement before it.

J. J. M. DE GROOT.

**ADOPTION (Greek).**—I. Origin and meaning of the institution.—In the minds of the Greeks and Romans there were three things closely, and at first inseparably, connected,—the family organization, the family worship (that is, the worship of the dead ancestors of the family back to the common ancestor of the group of families constituting the clan or *γένος*, *gens*), and the family estate. It was the rule in both Greek and Roman law that the property could not be acquired without the obligations of the cultus, nor the cultus without the property or some share in it (Plato, *Laus*, v. 740, calls the heir *διάδοχος θεῶν*; Isæus, vi. 51: *πότερον δὲ τὸν ἐκ ταύτης τῶν φιλοκτήματος εἶναι κληρόνομον καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ μνημῆατα ἵεναι χεῖμενον καὶ ἐναγιοῦντα*; Cic. *de Leg.* ii. 19). It was imperative that the family should not die out, and the family cultus thus become extinct. To ordinary Greek sentiment, neglect in the grave was a calamity almost as much to be dreaded as the total omission of sepulchral rites (Eur. *Suppl.* 540: *δειλία γὰρ εἰσφέρει τοῖς ἀκλῆμοισιν*, sc. to lie unburied). Hence the prayer of the pious for children, as a guarantee that the spirit should not be 'an unfed and famished citizen of the other world, for lack of friends or kinsmen on earth' (Luc. *de Lucif.* 9). In the perpetuity of the family the corporation of the *gens* and the State itself were both directly interested (Is. vii. 30: *νόμῳ γὰρ τῷ ἀρχοντι τῶν οἰκῶν, ὅπως ἂν μὴ ἐξηρῶνται, προσάττει τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν*—according to the usual interpretation, which is, however, very doubtful). It was, however, a principle equally fundamental that the family and the cult could be continued only through males; a daughter could not continue the cult, because on marriage she passed into her husband's family. A legitimate son was therefore the prime object of marriage. It was from these principles that the regulations concerning inheritance and the institution of adoption sprang.

The institution of adoption was thus a necessary outcome of the desire to perpetuate the family and the family cultus. 'Adoption is the fictitious creation of blood-relationship' (Maline, *Anc. Law*, new ed. 1906, p. 290), and is the earliest and most extensively employed of legal fictions (ib. p. 133). For Greece, adoption is apparently ascribed by Aristotle to Philolaos,\* a Corinthian who migrated to Thebes and gave the Thebans laws respecting parentage, the laws of adoption (*νόμοι ἑτεροῦ*) as they are called. . . . which were meant to preserve the number of allotments without change' (Ar. *Pol.* ii. 9, p. 1274b). In Athens adoption is older than Solon's legislation (u.c. 594), as is clear from the important law several times cited by the orators (e.g. Demos. xlvii. 14: *ὅσοι μὴ ἑτερογένετο, ὅσοι μὴ ἀτελείν μὴ ἐκτελέσαντο, ὅτε Σόλων εἰσέειν τὴν ἀρχήν, κ.τ.λ.*). In Sparta it is older than Herodotus (about a.c. 480), who cites the regulation that adoptions must take place before the

of adoption as being founded upon Solon's law of testament; but this is to invert the order of development. The institution is, in fact, much older than we have records to show, and was one of the most primitive factors in ancient life. Our knowledge of its regulations being derived mainly from the extant orations, especially those of Isæus and those ascribed to Demosthenes, in cases of disputed inheritance, is chiefly limited to Athenian law; but the Code of Gortyna shows considerable differences, and makes it probable that there were wide divergences in details in the various Greek States.

2. Adoption a form of will.—The primitive idea of the institution—that of an authorized fiction of direct descent, 'demanding of religion and law

\* The date of Philolaos was about a.c. 725.

† Fabricius in *Mithteil.* Ath. 1885, p. 562f. The regulations concerning adoption are given in full, with tr. and comments, in Roberts, *Introduct. to Greek Epigraphy*, Part I, p. 326f.



that which Nature had denied' (Cic. *pro Dom.* xiii. 14)—is frequently expressed by the orators (cf. Is. ii. 10: *ὅς τις ζῶντα τε γρηγοροφῆσαι καὶ τελευτῆσαντα θάψαι αὐτὸν καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον τὰ νομισόμενα αὐτῷ ποιῆσαι*. Id. ii. 46: *ἄπαιδα δὲ τὸν τελευτήσαντα καὶ ἀνώνυμον βούλεται καταστῆσαι, ἵνα μήτε τὰ λεγὰ τὰ πατρῶα ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου μηδεὶς τιμᾷ μὴτ' ἐναγίζῃ αὐτῷ καθ' ἑκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν,\* ἀλλ' ἀφαιρῆται τὰς τιμὰς τὰς ἐκείνου*). Nevertheless, this idea became overlaid with others as rationalism prevailed. The Athenian of the days of Isæus adopted a son, in very many cases at least, primarily in order to leave him property, or for other reasons. In other words, adoption, gradually losing to a large extent its early significance as a means of supplementing nature (Demos. xlv. 43: *ὅπως ἂν ὁ οἶκος μὴ ἐξερημωθῇ*), was used as a means of testamentary bequest, thereby overcoming a legal disability. For it must be remembered that 'Intestate Inheritance is a more ancient institution than Testamentary Succession' (Maine, *op. cit.* p. 207), and that normally (i.e. if he had a legitimate son) an Athenian could not make a will†—so the law is usually stated, but it may be doubted whether it was strictly enforced, at least in the 4th cent. B.C. (cf. Meier u. Schömann, *Der attische Process*\*, p. 591 f.; Wyse on Is. iii. 42 and vi. 28). If he died without legitimate male issue, and without a will, the relatives of the deceased, in an order fixed by law, were his heirs. The Athenian will, therefore, though only an 'inchoate testament' (Maine, *op. cit.* p. 203), together with adoption, which was the form in which testamentary disposition of property was as a rule made, interrupted the ordinary course of descent of family and property. In other words, an Athenian, availing himself of the right of adoption *inter vivos* or by testament, very often was actuated by the desire of *disinheriting* some one of his possible heirs-at-law (Demos. xlv. 63: *ὁρᾷτε γὰρ ὅτι ταῖς κολακείαις οἱ κλείστοι φυγαγωγούμενοι καὶ ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς οἰκελούς διαφοράις πολλάκις φιλονεικούντες ποιητοὺς υἱεὶς ποιοῦνται*). This fact explains not only the frequency of disputes over wills and inheritances at Athens, but also the method of handling such followed by the pleaders, e.g. Isæus. The impression gathered from the speeches is that it was perhaps impossible for an Athenian to safeguard the heir of his choice against the assaults of disappointed relatives. And, herein a great contrast to the Roman courts, the tendency of Athenian juries was to 'vote for the relatives rather than for the will' (Arist. *Prob.* xxix. 3).

3. Methods of adoption.—In Athens there were three methods of adoption: (1) adoption *inter vivos*, i.e. during lifetime (cf. Is. ii. 14: *διδόντων οὖν τῶν νόμων αὐτῷ ποιεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄπαιδα, ἐμὲ ποιεῖται, οὐκ ἐν διαθήκαις γράψας, μέλλων ἀποθνήσκειν, ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινές*); (2) adoption by will, taking effect only on death of the testator (see quotation above); (3) 'posthumous adoption,' by which if a man died without legitimate male issue, and without having adopted a son, the next-of-kin succeeding to the estate, or his issue, was adopted into the family of the deceased as his son. (The rules of this mode of adoption are not known, and our evidence is meagre. Instances are the following—Is. xi. 49, vii. 31; Demos. xliii. 11, this last an example of such adoption deferred for many years, and performed in the end simply as a *manœuvre* in view of a lawsuit. See Wyse, note on Is. x. 8). In Gortyna the procedure of adoption is of archaic simplicity, the act being public and oral, as its

\* For these annual offerings to the dead, see Wyse, *The Speeches of Isæus*, note in loc.

† So in Gortyna testaments are unknown, even in the rudimentary form introduced at Athens by Solon. The code seems, in fact, concerned to combat the tendencies which produced the testament.

name there (*ἀνφάνει*, 'announcement') denotes—'Announcement of adoption shall be made in the Agora, when the citizens are assembled, from the stone from which speeches are made. And the adopter shall give to his *εἰσπρία* a victim and a pitcher of wine.' The Spartan mode (Herod. vi. 57) must have been similar.

4. Conditions regulating adoption.—The conditions under which adoption in Athens was possible were as follows. Since adoption was in reality a sort of willing, it could be performed only by him who was competent to make a will, that is, by a man only, not by a woman, nor by a minor\* (i.e. one under the age of eighteen—Ar. *Ath. Pol.* 42). The adopter must be in full possession of his faculties, and not acting under undue influence (the vagueness of this last condition afforded a loophole for litigation, cf. Ar. *Ath. Pol.* 35). The proviso that the adopting citizen should have no legitimate son living, or, if he had, that he might then effect only a provisional adoption by will, followed directly from the underlying idea of the institution (Demos. xlv. 24: *ὅτι ἂν γνησίων ὄντων υἱῶν ὁ πατὴρ διαθῆται, ἂν ἀποθάνῃσιν οἱ υἱεῖς πρὶν ἐπὶ διετείς ἤβαν, τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς διαθήκην κυρὼν εἶναι*. Cf. Plato, *Laus*, xi. 923 E). The adopted son must be a citizen of citizen parents, acting with his own consent, if of age, or that of his guardian (*κύριος*) if a minor. Neither party must stand under accountability to the State (*περὶ νόμον*) for conduct of office (Æschin. in *Ctes.* 21). Penal loss of civic rights (*ἀριμία*) on either side would practically prevent adoption, especially as certain forms of such disfranchisement (e.g. the disabilities of a debtor to the Treasury) were transmitted to children and heirs until their removal (Demos. xliii. 58. Cf. the decree against Antiphon and his associates—*καὶ ἄτιμον εἶναι Ἀρχεπτόλεμον καὶ Ἀντιφῶντα, καὶ γένος τὸ ἐκ τούτων, καὶ υἱοὺς καὶ γνησίους*—*καὶ ἂν ποιήσονται τινα τῶν ἐξ Ἀρχεπτολέμου καὶ Ἀντιφῶντος, ἄτιμοι ἔστω ὁ ποιητῆς*). Hence men who had reason to fear condemnation involving such *ἀριμία* were fain to secure previous adoption of their sons (Æschin. in *Ctes.* 21; Is. x. 17: *ἕτεροι μὲν, ὅταν περὶ χρήματα δυστυχῶσι, τοὺς σφετέρους αὐτῶν παῖδας εἰς ἑτέρους οἴκους εἰσποιοῦσιν, ἵνα μὴ μετασχῶσι τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀριμίας*). The field of choice was legally unrestricted, at any rate after the time of Solon, though probably most men naturally looked for an adoptive son within the circle of their relatives.

5. The formalities of adoption.—As regards the ceremonies of adoption, the following procedure is spoken of by the orators, but it was perhaps neither universal nor legally enjoined (Is. vii. 15). The adoptive son was introduced to the members of his adoptive father's *phratry*—probably on the third and last day of the *Apaturia* (=October, roughly), as was the case with children of the body. The father offered the customary sacrifice (*μεῖον*), and took oath that his adoptive son was a genuine Athenian citizen; thereafter, with the consent of the assembled *phratry*†, the son's name was enrolled on the register of the *phratry* (*κοινὸν* or *φρατρικὸν γραμματεῖον*; cf. Demos. xlv. 41). Subsequently (and if the adopted son was a minor, not until he came of age), and purely as a civic, not religious, act, the name was entered by the head of the father's *deme* on the *deme* roll (*ἀρχιάρχικὸν γραμματεῖον*) with the consent of the members of the *deme* (Demos. xlv. 39). These two enrolments, the one *quasi*-religious, the other purely political, gave the necessary opportunities for interference on the part of those who on public or private grounds had reason to oppose the adoption. The

\* These two conditions of sex and age are insisted upon in the Gortynian Code.

† At Gortyna there is no hint that the citizens are anything but witnesses, or that the *εἰσπρία* has any right of refusal of entry of the adopted son.

adopted son usually retained his old name, altering only the name of his father in writing his full signature, and if necessary that of his *deme* (see Keil in *Rhein. Mus.* xx. [1865] p. 539 f.).

6. Rights and duties of an adopted son.—The adopted son stepped at once from the family of his natural father into that of his adoptive father; he lost his relationship to his natural father, and all rights inherent therein (Is. ix. 33: οὐδεὶς γὰρ πρότερον ἔκποιος γερόμενος ἐκληρονόμησε τοῦ οἴκου ὅθεν ἐξεποιήθη, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπανελάβη κατὰ τὸν νόμον); but he did not lose his relationship to his mother (if we may trust the statement of Is. vii. 25: μητρὸς δ' οὐδεὶς ἐστιν ἐκποιος, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει τῇ αὐτῇ εἶναι μητέρα, κὰν ἐν τῷ πατρὶτι μὲν τις οἶκῳ κὰν ἐκποιήθῃ)—which would seem to mean that an adopted son still retained his rights of next-of-kin so far as they belonged to him through his mother). He became the legal and necessary heir of his adoptive father, taking up and continuing the *saera* of his new family, and possessing the right of burial in its sepulchre. Like a legitimate son of the body, he was entitled to enter without legal formalities into possession of his estate upon his adoptive father's death (Demos. xlv. 19: ἐπὶβάτευσεν οὕτως εἰς τὴν οἴκῳ ὡς ἱπ' ἐκεῖνον ζώντος ἐπὶ εἰσποιήσεως). Collaterals (ἀγχιστεῖς) and testamentary heirs, on the other hand, were forbidden to enter on occupation before their claim had been established in a court of law (ἐπιδικασία. Cf. Is. frg. iii. 6: οὐ δεῖ τὸν ἐπιδίκον κρατεῖσθαι κλῆρον πρὸ δίκης. *Id.* vi. 3: λαχόντος δὲ τοῦ Χαιρεστράτου κατὰ τὸν νόμον τοῦ κλήρου, ἐξδὸν ἀμφισβητῆσαι Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλευμένῳ, and cf. *ib.* iii. 60). Like a son of the body, an adopted son had no option of refusal of the inheritance, as had heirs-at-law (Demos. xxxv. 4. *Att. Proc.* 573, n. 252).<sup>\*</sup> Even if legitimate male children were born to his adoptive father subsequently to the adoption, the adopted son ranked with them for equal share of the property according to the law of inheritance (Is. vi. 63: καὶ διαρρήδην ἐν τῷ νόμῳ γέγραπται, ἐὰν ποιησάμενος παῖδες ἐκτελέσονται, τὸ μέρος ἐκάτερον ἔχειν τῆς οἰσίας καὶ κληρονομεῖν ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρων. *Id.* vi. 25: τοῦ νόμου κελαιόντος ἀπαύτας τοὺς γνησίους ἰσομοίρους εἶναι τῶν πατρύων).†

The inheritance of a son adopted *inter vivos* could not be diminished, for after the act of adoption the father's limited power of testamentary disposition was, theoretically at least, *ipso facto* abrogated; only in the case of a testamentary adoption could any control over the disposition of the property be exercised, and that only in a general way (Is. v. 6: καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ τρίτῳ μέρει τοῦ κλήρου Δικαιογένης δδὲ τῷ Μενέξενῳ Δικαιογένει υἱὸς ἐγγίγνεται ποιητός). If the adopted son left behind him a legitimate son of his body (γνήσιος υἱός) in the house of his adoptive father, thereby fulfilling the object of his adoption, he might return to his natural father's house, and there resume all the rights and duties of a son, relinquishing all such claims in respect of his adoptive father's estate (Harpoer. s.v. ὅτι: οἱ οἱ ποιητοὶ παῖδες ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς τὸν πατρῶον οἶκον οὐκ ἦσαν κύριοι, εἰ μὴ παῖδας γνησίους καταλείπουν ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τοῦ ποιησάμενου). He could not, however, so leave behind him an adopted son; he had, in fact, no power himself of adoption, either in his lifetime or by will, so long as his own status was that of an adopted son; he transmitted the estate only to an heir of his body (Demos. xlv. 63: οὐ δίκαιον δῆνον τὸν ποιητὴν υἱὸν ποιητοῦς ἑτέρους εἰσάγειν, ἀλλ' ἐγκαταλείπει μὲν γιγνόμενῳ,

<sup>\*</sup> The Gortynian Code allows the adopted son to repudiate his inheritance.

† The Gortynian Code treats the adopted son less generously, giving him only the rights of a daughter when the adoptive father leaves legitimate children; that is to say, if there are other sons, he is to receive half a son's portion; if there are daughters only, he is to share equally with his adoptive sisters. The Code is concerned to depose the artificial son from a position of equality with natural heirs.

ὅταν δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπιλείπῃ, τοῖς γένεσιν ἀποδιδοῖναι τὰς κληρονομίας. *Id.* 68: τοῖς δὲ ποιηθεῖν οὐκ ἐξδὸν διαθέσθαι, ἀλλὰ ζῶντας ἐγκαταλείποντας υἱὸν γνήσιον ἐπανέειναι, ἢ τελευτήσαντας ἀποδιδοῖναι τὴν κληρονομίαν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς οἰκείοις οὖσι τοῦ ποιησάμενου). Nor, on the other hand, could he restore the line of his natural father by putting back one of his own sons; he must return himself if he wished to keep alive his father's house (Is. x. 11). In this way the law protected the rights of the next-of-kin (ἀγχιστεῖς). If the adopted son died without male issue, or by consent of his adoptive father returned to his natural family, the *oikos* of his adoptive father fell at the death of the latter to the heirs *ab intestato* (ἀγχιστεῖς), as before the adoption—provided that no new adoption had been made either *inter vivos* or by testament (Demos. xlv. 68, and xlv. 47: ὁ δ' ἐγκαταλείφεις ὑπὸ τοῦτον τελευταῖος ἀπάντων τῶν εἰσποιηθέντων τετελεστικὸν ἔσται, ὥστε γίγνεται ἔρμος ὁ οἶκος καὶ ἐπανεληλθὲν ἡ κληρονομία πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐγγύτατα γένους ὄντας).<sup>\*</sup> Apparently mutual consent was necessary for the repudiation of an adoption once made; it is doubtful how far an adoptive father could act alone herein, e.g. in case of unfilial conduct (in fact, a father's right of repudiation—ἀποκήρυξις—of a son, either adoptive or child of his body, may be a pure fiction; in any case, it is certain that he could not disinherit him by testament).† It seems that the Gortynian Code allowed one-sided repudiation of the bond; this is in accord with its whole treatment of the institution.

The law protected the rights not only of the next-of-kin, as above, but also of the female children of a father who adopted a son. The estate could not be willed away from a daughter, either by testament or by adoption; it must go 'with her' (Is. iii. 68: ὁ γὰρ νόμος διαρρήδην λέγει ἐξείναι διαθέσθαι ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ τις τὰ αὐτοῦ, ἐὰν μὴ παῖδας γνησίους καταλείπῃ ἄρρενας· ἂν δὲ θηλείας καταλείπῃ, σὺν ταῖταις, οὐκοῦν μετὰ θυγατέρων ἔστι δοῦναι καὶ διαθέσθαι τὰ αὐτοῦ).<sup>\*</sup> Hence δὲ τῶν γνησίων θυγατέρων οὐχ οὐδὲν τε οὐτε ποιήσασθαι οὐτε δοῦναι οὐδὲν οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτοῦ. Cf. Is. x. 13; Demos. xliii. 51). On the other hand, a daughter was incapable of performing the worship which was a condition of tenure of the estate. From the conflict of these two principles sprang the strange regulations concerning heiresses (ἐπικληροῖ, lit. 'those on the estate'). He who took the estate (κλῆρος) took also the daughter who was 'on the estate' (ἐπικληρος). A son, therefore, adopted during lifetime, generally espoused a daughter of his adoptive father, if there was one of marriageable age, even if it were not legally required of him to do so (Demos. xli. 3); a son adopted by will was legally bound to marry the testator's legitimate daughter, otherwise the will and the adoption became invalid, and a door was opened to the claim of the next-of-kin both to the daughter and the estate (Is. iii. 42, x. 13). We do not know what a father could lawfully do if, his daughters being already married, he wished to adopt a man who was not his son-in-law. The son, not the husband, of an heiress became heir to the estate of her father, but the husband enjoyed the usufruct until the son came of age (Demos. xlv. 20: καὶ ἐὰν ἐξ ἐπικλήρου τις γένηται, καὶ ἄμα ἡβήσῃ ἐπὶ διετεί, κρατεῖν τῶν χρημάτων, τὸν δὲ σὺν μετρῶν τῇ μητρὶ. Cf. Is. iii. 50). Posthumous adoption of the heir into the house of his maternal grandfather as his son was probably usual, but cannot be proved to have been a legal obligation.

<sup>\*</sup> So in the Gortynian law.

† Consult Mitteis, *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht*, p. 336; also Ramsay, *Hist. Com. on Galatians*, pp. 337 f. and 349 f. But the latter makes several sweeping assertions which are hardly capable of proof, or at best based upon the Roman-Syrian Law-Book of the 5th cent. A.D. Even the quotation from Lucian, *Abdic.* 12, can hardly prove anything for Athens of the 4th cent. A.C.

It is obvious that by adopting a daughter's son a man could guard against contentions for the hand of his daughter, and defeat the designs of rapacious relatives; nevertheless, instances of adoption of a grandson (son of a daughter) on the part of a grandfather are rare (Wyse on *Is.* viii. 36).

7. Decay of the institution of adoption.—Was it possible under Athenian law to adopt a daughter? A woman could not perpetuate in her own person the house and its cult, which was one of the main objects of adoption. Nevertheless, examples of the adoption of a daughter are found. *Isæus* furnishes two examples of the adoption of a niece by will (xi. 8 and 41); but in the first case the niece was perhaps also heiress *ab intestato*, apart from the adoption, and it is also doubtful whether the adoption was not *inter vivos*. A third example puzzles the lawyers (*Is.* vii. 9: *διδότω τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ ἔδωκε τῇ ἐκείνου μὲν θυγατρὶ, ἐμῇ δὲ μητρὶ, αὐτοῦ δὲ ἀδελφῇ, δίδωσι αὐτῇ Λακκαρέλῳ*). It is generally taken to mean that in his will *Apollodoros* adopted his half-sister, who was also his heiress *ab intestato*, thus acquiring the right of a father to dispose of his daughter in marriage (*Att. Proc.* 503, n. 75). But *Apollodoros* had not become the adoptive father of the girl when he made his will and settled the marriage, since the adoption was only to take effect in the event of his death on foreign service (an event which did not occur).

The adoption of a daughter (*θυγατροποιία*), certainly not contemplated in earlier times, but never expressly forbidden, probably grew to be practised (though to what extent we know not) largely as a family manoeuvre, as public sentiment became less strict, and the definitely religious aspect of the institution tended to fade from view. There are other traces of this change. Thus in the fragmentary speech of *Isæus* in defence of *Euphiletos* there is a reference to the adoption of non-Athenians irregularly for personal reasons (*Is.* xii. 2: *διὰ πέναν ἀναγκαζομένους ἔλινους ἀνθρώπων ἐλαττοῖσθαι, ὅπως ὠφεληθῶνται τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν δι' αὐτοῦς Ἀθηναίων γεγονότων*). Similarly, the necessity of providing a male descendant came to be felt less strongly. It is clear that many Athenians in the 4th cent. B.C. died unmarried and without troubling to adopt a son (*Is.* xi. 49; *Demos.* xiv. 18). The Code of *Gortyna* exhibits the same change. It is by no means certain that by it adoption was not permissible even when a man already had both sons and daughters. Its less stringent regulations concerning heiresses (*πατρῴων κοίαι = ἐκκληρίαι*); the fact that the next-of-kin might, as at Athens, shirk his spiritual duties to the deceased if he cared to waive his claim to the estate; the ease with which the bond created by adoption could be broken (by simple announcement from the stone in the Agora before the assembled citizens); and, above all, the fact that the adopted son might eventually decline his inheritance (which was his only on the express condition that he took over all the spiritual and temporal obligations of the deceased)—all testify to the gradual transformation and decay of the old institution.

W. J. WOODHOUSE.

**ADOPTION (Hindu).**—The adoption of a son (*putrasaṅgraha*) amongst the Aryan Hindus, as observed by Sir R. West, is essentially a religious act. The ceremonies in an adoption, as described in the Sanskrit lawbooks, resemble the formalities at a wedding; adoption consisting, like marriage, in the transfer of paternal dominion over a child, which passes to the adopter in the one case and to the husband in the other. One desirous of adopting a son has to procure two garments, two earrings and a finger-ring, a learned priest, sacred grass, and fuel of sacred wood. He has next to give notice to the king (or to the king's representative in the village),

and convene the kindred, no doubt for the purpose of giving publicity to the transaction, and of having the son acknowledged as their relative by the kindred. The adopter has to say to the natural father, 'Give me thy son.' The father replies, 'I give him'; whereupon the adopter declares, 'I accept thee for the fulfilment of religion, I take thee for the continuation of lineage.' After that, the adopter adorns the boy with the two garments, the two earrings, and the finger-ring, and performs the *Vyāhrti-Homa* or *Datta-Homa*, i.e. a burnt-sacrifice coupled with certain invocations, apparently from the idea that the conversion of one man's child into the son of another cannot be effected without the intervention of the gods. The learned priest obtains the two garments, the earrings, and the finger-ring as his sacrificial fee. Where the ceremony of tonsure [see **TONSURE** (Hindu)] has already been performed for the boy in his natural family, a special ceremony called *putreṣṭi*, or sacrifice for male issue, has to be performed in addition to the burnt-sacrifice, in order to undo the effects of the tonsure rite. The motive for adoption assigned in the Sanskrit commentaries is a purely religious one, viz. the conferring of spiritual benefits upon the adopter and his ancestors by means of the ceremony of ancestor-worship. The Code of Manu (ix. 139) has a fanciful derivation of the word *putra*, 'a son,' as denoting 'the deliverer from the infernal region called *put*.' In the same way, it is declared by *Vasiṣṭha* (xvii. 1) that 'if a father sees the face of a son born and living, he throws his debts on him and obtains immortality.' Another ancient text says, 'Heaven awaits not one who has no male issue.' These and other texts, laudatory of the celestial bliss derived from the male issue, are cited by eminent commentators in support of the obligation to adopt on failure of male posterity. The importance of this practice was enhanced by writers on adoption, who declared as obsolete in the present age (*Kaliyuga*) the other ancient devices for obtaining a substitute for a legitimate son of the body, such as appointing a widow to raise issue to her deceased husband, or a daughter to her sonless father, or legitimizing the illegitimate son of one's wife, etc. These writers are unanimous in declaring that none but the legitimate son of the body (*aurasa*) and the adopted son (*dattaka*) are sons in the proper sense of the term and entitled to inherit. Adoption, no doubt, has continued, down to the present day, one of the most important institutions of the Indian Family Law, and its leading principles, as developed in the writings of Indian commentators, are fully recognized by the British courts, and form the basis of the modern case-law on the subject. On the other hand, it must not be supposed that the religious motive for adoption in India has ever in reality excluded or prevailed over the secular motive. The existence of adoption among the Jains and other Hindu dissenters, who do not offer the oblations to the dead that form the foundation of the spiritual benefit conferred by sons, proves that the custom of adoption did not arise from the religious belief that a son is necessary for the salvation of man. In the Panjāb, adoption is common to the Jats, Sikhs, and even to the Muhammadans; but with them the object is simply to make an heir.

**LITERATURE.**—Stokes, *Hindu Law Books*, Madras, 1853; G. Bühler, 'The Sacred Laws of the Aryans,' part ii. in *SBE*, vol. xiv.; West and Bühler, *A Digest of the Hindu Law*, 2 vols., Bombay, 1884; Mayne, *Hindu Law and Usage*, Madras, 1900; G. Sarkar, *The Hindu Law of Adoption*, Tagore Law Lectures, Calcutta, 1891; Jolly, *Recht und Sitte*, Strassburg, 1890. See **Hindu** section of art. **SLAVERY, LAW AND LAW-BOOKS, INSTITUTIONS**.

J. JOLLY.

**ADOPTION (Japanese).**—Adoption, now widely prevalent in Japan, is not a native institution. It

was first introduced from China for a political purpose during the rule of the Hōjō Regents (1205-1333). Its importance is chiefly social and legal. The legal unit in Japan is the family and not the individual; hence, when there is no natural-born heir, adoption becomes necessary in order to provide a representative in whose person it shall be continued. But the religious point of view is by no means overlooked. The adopted son, on the death of his foster-father, takes charge of the family tombs and attends to the domestic religious observances, whether Shinto, Buddhist, or ancestral, just as if he were the real son. Their neglect, for want of an heir, would be considered a great calamity. There is no ceremony of adoption, but registration at the public office of the district is essential.

LITERATURE.—Gubbins, *Civil Code of Japan*, pt. ii.; Lloyd, 'A Japanese Problem-play' in the *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, 1905.

W. G. ASTON.

ADOPTION (Muhammadan).—In Arabia, in the days of Muhammad, a man could adopt another

person as his son (Arab. *tabanna*, تبنى). The Prophet himself adopted Zaid ibn Hāritha. The latter was carried away in his youth as a slave and came into Muhammad's possession in Mecca. Some of his own tribesmen recognized Zaid and told his father Hāritha, who went to Mecca to offer a ransom for his son. Zaid, however, chose to remain with the Prophet, upon which the latter gave him his freedom and adopted him as his son, saying, 'He shall be my heir and I his.' Since that time he was called Zaid ibn Muhammad.

Many other instances of adoption are known in Arabic literature. But as a rule it does not appear that in Arabia adoption was practised exclusively for the purpose of saving the family from extinction. Often the idea apparently was merely to incorporate a certain person into a family, for one reason or another; as, e.g., when a man, on marrying a woman who already had children from a former marriage, adopted her children as his own. Children of slave girls, begotten by the owner, were regarded as slaves, but it sometimes occurred that the father adopted them as his own children (as was the case with the famous poet 'Antara when he had given proof of ability). He who, having shed blood, fled from his tribe and found a protector in another tribe, was sometimes adopted by his protector as a son. Miqdād ibn al-Aswad, for example, who belonged to those who had accepted Islām in the very beginning of Muhammad's preaching, had fled originally from his tribe Bahra, and later on was adopted in Mecca by al-Aswad, his protector. His real name was Miqdād ibn 'Amr. (Cf. Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*<sup>2</sup>, 1903, pp. 52-55, 135 ff.).

It is to be understood that at that time an adopted son was regarded as in all respects the equal of a real son. The following event, however, caused Muhammad to abolish the old rule, and to declare that adoption was only a fiction and did not entail any consequences as regards rights. Zainab, the wife of the above-named Zaid, Muhammad's adopted son, had aroused the Prophet's passion to such a degree, that he persuaded Zaid to repudiate her, upon which he married her himself. This caused great scandal. It was objected that by the law laid down in the Qur'ān (*Sura*, iv. 27) it was incest for a father to marry a woman who had been his son's wife. Then the verses of Qur'ān xxxiii. 1-5 and 37 were revealed, in which it was expressly announced to the faithful, that

an adopted son (Arab. *da'i* داعي) was not a real

son, so that to call an adopted son a real son was wrong, inasmuch as the process of adoption could never create any bonds of blood-relationship. Marriage with the repudiated wife of an adopted son was therefore not contrary to the will of Allah.

This passage in the Qur'ān has been the accidental cause of adoption not being regarded in the canonical orthodoxy of Islām as a valid institution with binding legal consequences.

TH. W. JUYNBOLL.

ADOPTION (Roman).—The remarks made above concerning the importance attached by the Greeks to the perpetuation of the family and the family worship must be understood to apply with equal force to Rome, at least in her earlier history. The general idea of adoption, and the general effects of the act, were the same in Rome as in Athens,\* but some modification in details was introduced by the peculiarly Roman conception of paternal authority (*patria potestas*), and also by the Roman distinction between agnatic, or legal, and cognatic, or natural, relationships and rights. Their more sharply defined conception of legal status also led the Romans to a multitude of corollaries or regulations concerning adoption which find, so far as we know, no parallel in Greece, and opened up several questions which taxed the ingenuity of lawyers.

I. TWO DISTINCT METHODS OF ADOPTION IN ROME.—There were two entirely distinct methods of adoption among the Romans during the Republican period, according as the person adopted was, or was not, *sui iuris*, i.e. independent of his father's legal control (*patria potestas*). Although Cicero, for example, uses the word *adoptio* (*adoptatio*) to cover both methods, the proper term for the adoption of one who is *sui iuris* is that used by Gaius and A. Gellius—*adrogatio* (*arrogatio*), the term *adoptio* being properly restricted to the adoption of one who is under *patria potestas* (Gell. v. 19: 'quod per prætorum fit, adoptatio dicitur; quod per populum, adrogatio').

1. Adrogatio.—Adrogation, therefore, was the method by which the head of a family voluntarily submitted himself to the *potestas* of another. It involved a preliminary investigation on the part of the priestly college touching the purity of the reasons for the adoption, its suitability to the dignity of the families interested, and, above all, the security for the maintenance of the family and clan worship (*sacra domestica* and *gentilicia*) of the house which was about to lose its representative (Cic. *de Dom.* 34: 'quæ deinde causa cuique sit adoptionis, quæ ratio generum ac dignitatis, quæ sacrorum, quæi a pontificum collegio solet').

The adoption, by this method, of P. Clodius by M. Fonteius, a much younger man, is evidence of the way in which the decay of the Republic the old institution could be misused, in the interest of the object of Clodius, a patrician Fonteius, a plebeian, was to become of the Commons.

If the priestly college approved the adoption, there followed the *delestatio sacrorum*, a public renunciation of the cultus of the family (and *gens*) of his birth on the part of him who was about to pass into a new family, and perhaps a new *gens* (Serv. on Verg. *Aen.* ii. 156: 'consuetudo apud antiquos fuit, ut qui in familiam vel gentem transiret, prius se abdicaret ab ea in qua fuerat et sic ab alia acciperetur'). Next, a bill (*rogatio*) authorizing the transition was introduced to the Assembly of the Curiae (*Comitia Curiata*) by the Pontifex Maximus and voted upon in the usual manner.

Such was the procedure followed under the Republic, even when the Curiate assembly was a mere form, being represented

\* Cf. Cic. *de Legibus*, ii. 19, 'ritus familie patrumque servato.'

only by thirty lictors (Cic. *Leg. Agr.* II. 31). For the words of Tacitus (*Hist.* i. 15: 'si te privatus lege curiata apud pontifices, ut moris est, adoptarem'—used by Galba) cannot be made to justify the view that the formalities of *adrogatio* at that date took place before the pontifice.

5), the last example is that of Hadrian's adoption of Commodus (*vōu*, says Dio Cass. lxx. 20).

An easier mode of *adrogatio* was gradually adopted. The first example of this was given by Galba, who adopted Piso by simple declaration (*nuncupatio pro contione*), before the army (Suet. *Galb.* 17: 'filiumque appellans perduxit in castra ac pro contione adoptavit'; Tac. *Hist.* i. 15 f.; and Dio Cass. lxxviii. 3, Trajan's adoption by Nerva). This innovation, partly due to the Emperor's autocratic power, was assisted by the fact that the Emperor was also Pontifex Maximus (see Greenidge, *Roman Public Life*, p. 350). The method was extended to other cases, and the older formalities were largely abandoned in favour of a mode of *adrogatio* effected by Imperial rescript (*per rescriptum principis*) and issued after preliminary investigation before a Prætor (or before the Governor in the Provinces, where adoption by Roman forms now first becomes possible). The older method indeed long survived, for Gaius mentions a rescript addressed by the Emperor Antoninus Pius to the pontifices, permitting the *adrogatio* of a minor under certain regulations which need not here be specified. It was not until A.D. 286 that a Constitution of Diocletian entirely abolished the old method and substituted for it the Imperial rescript.

(a) *Some effects of adrogatio.*—The effect of *adrogatio* was the loss of his own *patria potestas* on the part of the adopted, and immediate subjection to that of his adoptive father, whose legal son (*iustus filius*) he became. It conferred upon the adopter immediate universal succession to the property\* and rights of the adopted. Seeing that, technically, *adrogatio* involved a certain loss of legal personality (*minima capitis deminutio*),† some rights vested in the adopted perished at once, e.g. any usufruct vested in him, or sworn obligation of service on the part of freedmen. In the same way, from the strictly legal point of view, all personal debts of the adopted were extinguished by his adoption (but here the prætorian equity gave his creditors the right to sell his property to the amount of their claims); if the debt was owing as a burden upon an estate to which the adopted had succeeded as heir, it was transferred with it to his adoptive father. Personal dignities of the adopted (e.g. magisterial powers) remained entirely unaffected in all their consequences. It is obvious that *adrogatio* would annul any will previously made by the adopted. If the person *adrogatus* had himself children under his *potestas*, these also fell into subjection to the adopter, and became legally his grandchildren. Hence Tiberius was compelled to adopt Germanicus before he himself was adopted by *adrogatio* by Augustus (Suet. *Tib.* 15: 'coactus prius ipse Germanicum fratris sui filium adoptare. Nec quicquam postea pro patre familias egit aut ius, quod amiserat, ex ulla parte retinuit. Nam neque donavit neque manumisit, ne hereditatem quidem aut legata percepit ulla aliter quam ut peculio referret accepta').

(b) *Adrogatio originally and always confined to patricians.*—It must be remarked that the above mode of adoption was essentially a religious mode, and applicable only to patricians, who alone were organized in true *gentes* (cf. Greenidge, *op. cit.*

\* Justinian allowed the adoptive father only the usufruct, unless the adopted son died not having been emancipated from his adoptive father's control.

† Gaius, i. 122: 'minima capitis deminutio est, cum et civitas et libertas retinetur, sed status hominis commutatur; quod accidit in his qui adoptantur.'

p. 9), as is evident from the fact that the assembled *Curie* and the priestly college were the chief actors in the ceremony. On the other hand, the restriction of this mode of adoption to those who were *sui iuris* cannot be regarded as a primitive characteristic, for the reason that the prime end of adoption, the continuation of the family cultus which was in danger of extinction through failure of natural heirs, could just as well be effected through the adoption of a *filius familias*, i.e. one who was still under *patria potestas*, provided that he had reached the age of puberty, for on the death of his adoptive father he would himself become the *pater familias*. And again, it is impossible to believe that the Rome of the regal period actually possessed no means of adoption save of those who were *sui iuris*—rather would it be probably of somewhat rare occurrence that one already *sui iuris* should put himself by *adrogatio* in the *potestas* of another. If, then, the ceremonies of *adrogatio* were originally also not applicable to sons still subject to their father's *potestas*, we shall be driven to confess that the mode of adoption of such, sanctioned by patrician law, is totally unknown to us; for the earliest method that we hear of as applicable to persons *alieni iuris*, is the purely civil and probably originally plebeian form by threefold sale hereafter described. Originally, then, *adrogatio* was probably applicable both to those who were *sui iuris* and to those who were under *patria potestas*. In historical times, however, it had come to be restricted to the former and relatively much less frequent case, while for the other the fictitious sale offered a more ready means of adoption.

2. *Adoptio properly so called.*—Adoption in its more proper sense, that is to say, the transference of a *filius familias* from the *potestas* of his natural father to that of an adoptive father, was accomplished by the aid of legal fictions in two distinct acts—(1) the dissolution of the link with the natural father, by means of fictitious sale, *mancipatio*; (2) the transference of the son to the *potestas* of the adoptive father by the procedure called *cessio in iure*.

According to the law of the Twelve Tables, a son thrice transferred by his father to another, under the solemn forms of the *mancipatio*, or sale *per æs et libram*, 'by the copper and the scales,' was freed from paternal control ('*pater si filium ter venum duit, filius a patre liber esto*'). The father, therefore, so sold his son to the person adopting, or to another; the son being forthwith emancipated by his purchaser, fell back under his father's *potestas*. The ceremony was immediately repeated with the same result. By a third sale the father finally destroyed his paternal rights over his son, who now remained in the lawful possession (*in mancipio*) of the purchaser. The usual custom was for the purchaser then to remancipate (*remancipare*) the son to his natural father, who thus for a moment held him in his turn in *mancipio*\* (no longer as *filius familias*, subject to his *potestas*). Then followed the second act, completing the adoption. This took the form of a fictitious process of law (*legis actio*) before a magistrate—the Prætor at Rome, the Governor in the Provinces. The adoptive father instituted a *vindicatio filii in potestatem*, claiming him as his son. He who was holding him for the moment in *mancipio* (the natural father, therefore, if *remancipatio* had taken place) making no demur to the claim,

\* If this were not done, the father would, of course, take no further part in the ceremony, his place being taken for the second act of the proceedings by the third person, to whom the *mancipatio* had been made. It was a deduction of the lawyers, from the words of the Twelve Tables, that a single sale sufficed to break the bond of *patria potestas* in the case of a daughter or grandson. See Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, iii. 372.

the magistrate adjudged (*addixit*) the adopted to the claimant as his *filius*, subject to his *patria potestas*. Hence this form of adoption is spoken of as *adoptio apud prætorem*, as contrasted with *adrogatio*, which is *per* (or *apud*) *populum*. It is this form of adoption that is alluded to by Cicero (*de Fin.* 24: 'in eo filio . . . quem in adoptionem D. Silano emancipaverat'), and by which Augustus adopted Gaius and Lucius, his grandsons, in B.C. 17 (Suet. *Aug.* 64: 'Gaium et Lucium adoptavit, domi per assem et libram emptos a patre Agrippa').

These complicated forms were gradually simplified, and finally Justinian made simple declaration on the part of the two principals before a magistrate sufficient, the son to be adopted also being present and consenting.

*Some effects of adoptio.*—Like *adrogatio*, true adoption involved a *capitis deminutio*, destroying the agnatic rights of the adopted in his natural family; but he still retained his rights as a cognate therein, and as such was entitled to succeed in the third degree to the estate of an intestate natural father. In his adoptive family he gained the rights both of an agnate and of a cognate; but if he were emancipated by his adoptive father, he reverted to the position and rights of an emancipated son of his natural father. Justinian altered this to the effect that (except in cases where the adopter was grandfather of the adopted) the adopted son remained in his natural family and under the control of his natural father, the adoption conferring on him simply the right of intestate succession to his adoptive father (*adoptio minus plena*).

The children, if any, of a son adopted before the prætor did not, as in *adrogatio*, pass with him into the *potestas* of his adoptive father. Emancipation of an adopted child broke all connexion between him and his adoptive family, save that marriage between the adopter and an adopted daughter or granddaughter, even after emancipation, remained illegal. Readoption by the same person was impossible.

II. REGULATIONS CONCERNING ADOPTION.—A person might be adopted, not into the place of a son, but into that of a grandson; the same applies to the adoption of a female. If he was adopted as grandson, the natural sons, if any, of the adopter became legally uncles of the adopted; but one of them might consent to stand as father to him, in which case that son's children became legally the brothers and sisters of the adopted. It was also open to the adopter to give his adopted son in adoption to a third person.

1. Age.—A debated question was as to the proper relative ages of the father and the adopted son. In the notorious case of the adoption of P. Clodius by M. Fonteius the adopted son was older than the adopter, and Cicero makes a point of this (*Cic. de Dom.* 35 f.: 'Factus es eius filius contra fas, cuius per ætatem pater esse potuisti'). The original idea was that adoption should imitate nature (cf. *Cic. ib.* 36: 'ut hæc simulata adoptio filii quam maxime veritatem illam suscipiendorum liberorum imitata esse videatur'), and this was the view of the later juriconsults, who decided that the adopter should be older than the adopted by at least eighteen years (*plena pubertas*). In the case of *adrogatio* it was held that the *adrogator* should be sixty years of age, except in special cases of health or intimacy. Until the time of Antoninus Pius, a person under the age of puberty (*impubes* or *pupillus*) could not be adopted by *adrogatio*; but if under *patria potestas*, true *adoptio* was, of course, applicable to him.

\* Gell. v. 19: 'Adoptantur autem cum a parente in culus potestate sunt, tertia emancipatione in iure ceduntur, atque ab eo qui adoptat, apud eum apud quem legis actio est vindicantur.'

2. Adoption of females.—Women properly could not adopt, either by *adrogatio* or by *mancipatio*, as they could not possess *patria potestas*. But in A.D. 291 Diocletian allowed a woman to adopt her stepson (*privignus*) to replace deceased children. The adopted in this case acquired rights of inheritance. Females of any age could be adopted, originally not properly by *adrogatio*, though not for the reason assigned by Aulus Gellius ('cum feminis nulla comitorum communio'), but because the marriage ceremony of *confarreatio* provided for them a mode of entrance into another family. Finally, however, *adrogatio* by Imperial rescript became applicable to women also.

The permission to adopt a female marked, it is clear, a decaying sense of the sanctity of the family. The institution was, p. married by cer

and become a member of his family and *gens* (see Greenidge, *op. cit.* p. 17). The same evidence of decay is seen in the abuse of the institution for political purposes by Clodius, which assuredly could not have happened had the feeling of the community been seriously concerned. Under the early Empire, adoption was practised to enable persons to escape the penalties of childlessness and to qualify under the provisions of the *Lex Julia* and *Papia Poppæa*, which prescribed that a candidate for office who had children, or who had more children, was to be preferred to one who had none or fewer (see Tac. *Ann.* ed. Furner, vol. i. p. 439 f.). In A.D. 62 it became necessary for the Senate to decree that pretended adoption for this purpose (manumission having at once followed the adoption) should be null and void (Tac. *Ann.* xv. 19: 'percrebuerat ea tempestate pravissimus mos, cum propinquis comitis aut sorte provinciarum plerique orbis factis adoptionibus adsciscerent filios, preturasque et provincias inter patres sortiti statim emitterent manu, quos adoptaverant').

The general impression given is that, at Rome, as compared with Greece, the institution of adoption more rapidly and completely lost its connexion with religious thought and practice.

3. Name.—Among the Romans, adoption introduced a peculiar modification of the name. The person adopted laid aside his original names and assumed those of his adoptive father, adding, however, an epithet to mark the *gens* out of which he had passed; that is to say, he retained his gentile name in an adjectival form. Thus C. Octavius, when adopted by the will of his maternal grand-uncle Caesar, became 'C. Julius Caesar Octavianus.' But the system was not uniformly observed, and in a few cases the epithet is derived from the name of the *Familia*, not from that of the *Gens*. The case of M. Junius Brutus is an example of another anomaly.

4. Imperial adoption.—The power of continuing the family by adoption gained a peculiar significance in connexion with the early Empire. For theoretically the *princeps* could not name his successor, though he might do much to guide the choice of the Senate and army. Neither designation nor heredity was recognized. Constitutionally, however, it was open to the *princeps* to appoint a consort in the Imperial power, who, on the death of the reigning Emperor, would have a practical, though not a legal, claim to be elected his successor. The natural course was to appoint a son to that position; but if the Emperor had no son, he could adopt whomsoever he chose as his virtual successor, the danger of such a course being minimized by the paternal control he possessed over his adopted son. The act of adoption by the *princeps* is figuratively called, therefore, by Tacitus, *comitia imperii* (*Hist.* i. 14): but the custom hardly attains its full significance until the adoption of Trajan. The accident of the childlessness of Augustus gave the institution its prominence in early Imperial history (cf. Suet. *Aug.* 64, 65; Tac. *Ann.* xii. 26; Suet. *Galb.* 17; Dio Cass. lxxviii. 3).

5. Adoptio testamentaria.—There remains to be noticed a species of adoption spoken of by Pliny as *adoptio testamentaria*. The most conspicuous



example is the will of Julius Cæsar adopting Octavius (Suet. *Cæs.* 83: 'in ima cæra C. Octavius etiam in familiam nomenque adoptavit'). The adopted in such a case could not fall under the *patria potestas* of the adopter, who was dead; hence the adopted could not become heir or acquire agnatic rights, and had, in fact, no claim to the deceased's estate, except in so far as the will specifically granted such. The only legal effect, then, was to permit the adopted to bear the name and call himself son of the testator (*adsumere in nomen*). Octavius, it is true, availed himself of his testamentary adoption by Cæsar to secure a *privilegium* from the *Curia* adrogating him to the testator (Appian, *Bell. Civ.* iii. 94: ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν θυσίων, εὐαὐτὸν εἰσεποιεῖτο τῷ πατρὶ αὐθις κατὰ νόμον Κουρίδιον. . . . Γαῖον δ' ἦν τὰ τε ἄλλα λαμπρὰ, καὶ ἐξελεύθεροι πολλοί τε καὶ πλοῦστοι, καὶ διὰ τὸδ' ἴσως μάλιστα ὁ Καῖσαρ, ἐπὶ τῇ προτέρᾳ θέσει, κατὰ διαθήκας ὁ γενομένην, καὶ ῥῆσδι ἐδέχθη. Cf. Dio Cass. xlv. 35, xlv. 5, xlv. 47); but his is an exceptional case. By his will Augustus so adopted Livia (Tac. *Ann.* i. 8: 'Livia in familiam Juliam nomenque Augustae adsumebatur'), and at the same time constituted her and Tiberius his heirs. In later times this species of adoption took the form of devising an inheritance under condition of bearing the testator's name. This mode was, in fact, in use as early as Cicero's time and before it (cf. Cic. *Brutus*, 212: 'Crassum istius Liciniae filium, Crassi testamento qui fuit adoptatus'). Atticus, the friend of Cicero, was adopted by the will of his uncle, and so became Q. Cæcilius Pomponianus Atticus, his uncle's name having been Q. Cæcilius; he also got 10,000,000 sesterces (Cic. *ad Att.* iii. 20). Dolabella was so adopted by a woman, but Cicero had his doubts as to the propriety of this—though, as he humorously remarks, he will be better able to decide when he knows the amount of the bequest (Cic. *ad Att.* vii. 8: 'Dolabellani vides Liviae testamentum cum duobus coheredibus esse in triente, sed inberi mutare nomen. Est πολιτικὸν σκῆμμα, rectumne sit nobili adolescenti mutare nomen mulieris testamentum; sed id φιλοσοφώτερον διεκρινήσμεν, cum sciemus, quantum quasi sit in trientis triente'). Whether Dolabella accepted the bequest we do not know; at any rate he did not change his name. Later, Tiberius found no difficulty in accepting an inheritance without observing the condition (Suet. *Tib.* 6: 'Post reditum in urbem a M. Gallio senatore testamento adoptatus, hereditate adita mox nomine abstinuit, quod Gallius adversarum Augusto partium fuerat'). For other examples of this method of adoption, see Suet. *Galb.* 4; Dio Cass. xl. 51; Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* xxxv. ii. 2.

LITERATURE.—Meier-Lipsius, *Der Attische Proceß*, 539 f.; *Speeches of Iseus*, ed. Wyse, Camb. 1904, pass.: L. Beauchet, *Hist. du droit privé de la répub. Athén.*; E. Hruza, *Beiträge zur Gesch. des griech. und röm. Familienrechtes*; Caillemer, *Droit de succession légitime*; Ihering, *Geist des röm. Rechts*; Scheurl, *de modis liberis in adoptionem dandi*, Erlangen, 1850; artt. 'Adoptio' and 'Adrogatio' in various Dictionaries of Classical Antiquities. W. J. WOODHOUSE.

#### ADOPTION (Semitic).—

1. Adoption in Babylonia.—In the great Babylonian Law Code (Code of Hammurabi), adoption of various kinds is referred to and regulated.

(1) *Reasons for the custom.*—An obvious reason for the custom might seem to exist in its meeting the needs of childless persons, who desired to provide themselves with an heir, that the family patrimony might not be alienated. But in Babylonia, as in old Israel, a man whose wife was childless could take a concubine, or might, with his wife's acquiescence, enter into relations with a maid-servant for this purpose. And these alternatives sufficed in Israel to meet such cases

so well that adoption was entirely unknown. Besides, adopted children in Babylonia were sometimes taken into a family where sons and daughters were living. Johns\* suggests that 'the real cause most often was that the adopting parents had lost by marriage all their own children and were left with no child to look after them. They then adopted a child whose parents would be glad to see him provided for, to look after them until they died, leaving him the property they had left after portioning their own children.' But this was by no means the only operative cause. Sometimes children were adopted where an heir was desired, sometimes as a matter of convenience;† in some cases a child was apparently adopted as an apprentice; slaves could be taken for the purposes of adoption, and in the process gained their freedom; and not only sons, but daughters, could be thus secured.

(2) *Method.*—Adoption was effected and legally safeguarded by a deed in the usual form of a 'tablet of adoption' or 'sonship' (*duppu aplutišu, marutišu*). This was sealed by the adoptive parents, duly sworn to, and witnessed. The rights and obligations of the contracting parties were fully set forth, and so long as the tablet remained unbroken, and the seal intact, the position of the adopted child was secure. In cases of informal adoption, where no deed had been properly drawn up, the relationship was not legally binding, and the child could return to its own father's house. An exception was, however, made in the case of an artisan who took a child to bring up, and taught him a handicraft. Under these circumstances the child could not be reclaimed.

The term *aplütu* is interesting. It is the abstract of *aplu*, 'son,' and therefore lit. = 'sonship.' It was, however, used to denote the filial relation generally (being applied to that of a daughter to a parent), and thus came to have the general meaning 'share' (that which belonged to a son or daughter by inheritance). *Aplütu* might be granted by a father to a son during the lifetime of the former, the father handing over his property to the son, only stipulating for maintenance during his life.

(3) *Conditions and kinds of adoption.*—The conditions were fully set forth in the 'tablet of adoption' or defined by the Code. The obligation resting on the child might be to support the adoptive parent (details of the 'sustenance' to be supplied in such cases are given in many tablets); or one of service (as when a lady adopts a maid to serve her for life and inherit a certain house‡). The adoption of a child (e.g. a daughter) by a lady of fortune was evidently regarded as a good settlement for the child. Certain classes of people appear to have had no legal claim to their own children. These were the palace-favourite (or warder?) and the courtesan.§ If the children of such, after being adopted, attempted to repudiate their adoptive parents, the action was punished with the greatest severity (*C.H.* §§ 192, 193). In other cases, however, the possibility of repudiation of the relationship on one side or the other was contemplated. It appears that a clause implying repudiation (on the part of parents of a son, or *vice versa*) was regularly inserted in the contract, though it could be enforced only by direct appeal to a law-court. Thus parents, according to the contracts, could repudiate adopted sons if they so

\* *Babylonian and Assyrian Laws*, p. 164.

† The complicated issues that might arise may be well illustrated by a case cited by Mr. S. A. Cook (*Laws of Moses and Code of Hammurabi*, p. 131 f.): 'Bel-käsir, son of Nädin, who had been adopted by his uncle, married a widow with one son: he has no children, and proposes to adopt the stepson. The uncle, however, objects, since under this arrangement his property would pass through Bel-käsir into the hand of strangers, and it is accordingly agreed that if the marriage continues to be without children, Bel-käsir must adopt his own brother as heir.'

‡ Cited by Johns, *op. cit.* p. 159.

§ *C.H.* (=Code of Hammurabi) § 187, cf. Cook, *op. cit.* p. 34, note.



wished, the son taking a son's share and departing. This looks like an attempt to contract outside the law. Failure on the part of the adopted child to carry out his obligations was good ground for disinheritance; but the penalty could be inflicted only with the consent of the judges, who felt bound, in the first place, to do all in their power to reconcile the parties. With this object in view, judgment was sometimes reserved.

The votary and the courtesan formed a class by themselves, and were the subject of special legislation. 'They were not supposed to have children of their own, but possessed the right to nominate their heir within limits. In return for exercising this right in favour of a certain person, they usually stipulated that such person shall maintain them as long as they live and otherwise care for them' (Johns, *op. cit.* p. 153\*).

2. Adoption not practised by the Hebrews.—As has already been pointed out, no mention of the practice of adoption occurs in any of the Hebrew Law Codes. No term corresponding to *viobelea* exists in Hebrew,† nor does the Greek term (*viobelea*) occur in the LXX, while in the Greek Testament it occurs only in the Pauline Epistles. In fact, the practice of adoption would have endangered the principle of maintaining property in the possession of the original tribe, which was the object of such painful solicitude in the Mosaic Code (cf. Nu 27<sup>11</sup>). It is obvious that the reasons which operated in Babylonia were not active in Hebrew life. Babylonian civilization was much more complex and highly developed. Among the Israelites the risk of childlessness was met in the earlier period by polygamy, in the later by facility of divorce. [See, further, MARRIAGE].

In the Biblical history of the patriarchs the practice of polygamy is explicitly attested. Sarah, being barren, requests Abraham to contract a second (inferior) marriage with Hagar (Gn 16<sup>7</sup>); cf. also the case of Rachel and her maid Bilhah, and Leah and Zilpah (Gn 30<sup>9</sup>).

Isolated cases of possible adoption, or something analogous, are, however, met with in the OT literature. Thus, (1) three cases of informal adoption can plausibly be said to occur in the OT—those of Moses, adopted (Vulg. *adoptavit*) by the Egyptian princess (Ex 2<sup>10</sup>); of Genubath, possibly (1 K 11<sup>20</sup>); and of Esther, who was adopted (Vulg. *adoptavit*) by her father's nephew Mordecai (Est 2<sup>7-13</sup>). It is noticeable that in all three cases the *locus* is outside Palestine, and the influence of foreign ideas is apparent. Further, (2) something analogous to adoption seems to be implied in the case of Ephraim and Manasseh, sons of Joseph, to whom Jacob is represented as giving the status of his own sons (Gn 48<sup>5</sup> 'And now thy two sons . . . are mine; Ephraim and Manasseh, even as Reuben and Simeon, shall be mine'). As a full son of Jacob each receives a share in the division of the land under Joshua, Joseph thus (in the person of his two sons) receiving a double portion. This, however, is not really a case of adoption, but one where the rights of the firstborn were transferred (for sufficiently grave reasons) to a younger son (cf. Gn 49<sup>4</sup> for the sin of Reuben, vv. 22-24 for Joseph's elevation). To Joseph in effect are transferred the privileges of the eldest son; cf. further 1 Ch 5<sup>1-2</sup>. (3) The levirate law has also some points of contact with adoption. The brother of a man dying without children entered into a union with the widow, in order to provide the dead man with an heir. The firstborn in this case received the name and the heritage of the deceased. Some of the Church Fathers (*e.g.* Augustine) have actually given the name of 'adoption' to this Mosaic ordinance. But the two things are obviously distinguished by fundamental differences. In real adoption the adopting parent exercises an

act of deliberate choice. Thus the levirate law is not a case of adoption in any real sense, but 'the legal substitution, made for sufficient reasons, of a fictitious for a natural father' (Many).

3. Legal adoption unknown among the Arabs.—Of adoption as a recognized institution among the Arabs no clear and certain traces exist. The practice of polygamy was sufficient to meet cases where the need of adoption might have been felt. See, further, art. ADOPTION (Muhammadian), above.

4. Theological application of the idea of adoption.—Adoption as an institution was evidently unfamiliar in Palestine during the NT period. None of the NT writers uses the technical Greek term *viobelea* except St. Paul. He doubtless employed the term because, having been born in Cilicia, he had received a partially Greek education, and was acquainted with the institutions and terminology of the Greeks, among whom adoption was commonly practised.

Among Gr. profane authors, from Pindar and Herodotus downwards, *θετός υἱός* or *θετός παῖς*, 'adopted son,' is regularly found.

Theologically the conception of adoption is applied by St. Paul to the special relation existing between God and His people, or between God and redeemed individuals. For the former sense, cf. Ro 9<sup>4</sup> ('Israelites . . . whose is the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises'). Here the people of Israel as a whole is thought of. The redemption from Egyptian bondage was specially associated with the thought of Israel's becoming a nation and Jahweh's son. In this sense the people is sometimes called Jahweh's son (cf. Hos 11<sup>1</sup>, Ex 4<sup>22</sup> 'Israel is my son, my first-born,' etc.). The same thought is also prominently expressed in the Synagogue Liturgy (*esp.* in the Thanksgiving for redemption from Egypt which immediately follows the recitation of the *Shema*: cf. Singer, *Heb.-Eng. Prayer-Book*, pp. 42-44, 98-99). In the four other passages in St. Paul's Epp. where the word *viobelea* occurs, it has an individual application, and an ethical sense, denoting 'the nature and condition of the true disciples of Christ, who by receiving the spirit of God into their souls become the sons of God' (Thayer), cf. Ro 8<sup>15</sup>, Gal 4<sup>5</sup>, Eph 1<sup>5</sup>; in Ro 8<sup>29</sup> the phrase 'to wait for the adoption' (*ἀπεκδέχεσθαι viobeleian*) includes the future, when the full ethical effects of having become God's adopted sons will be made manifest in their completeness.\*

Adoption in this sense implies the distinction that exists between the redeemed and Christ. 'We are sons by grace; He

baptism (cf. Suicer, *s.v.*). According to Suicer, Hesychius thus defines the term: *ὅταν τις θεῶν υἱὸν λαμβάνῃ, καὶ τὸ αἶμα βαπτίσμα*.

LITERATURE.—C. H. W. Johns, *Bab. and Assyri. Laws* (1904), ch. xv. ('*Adoption*'), *ibid.* *la Bible*, vol. I (1895) art. 'The Laws of the Levites of Moses and . . .', 131 f., 134 f., 140; *EBI*, art. 'Gr. Lexx. *s.v.* *viobelea* (*esp.* Grimm-Thayer and Cremer); the Comm. (*esp.* Ramsay, *Historical Com. on Galatians*). Reference should also be made here to the great Syrian-Roman Law Code, edited by Bruns and Sachau (*Syr.-Röm. Rechtsbuch aus dem fünften Jahrhundert*, Leipzig, 1880). G. H. BOX.

ADORATION.—As this word is used, both in literature and in common practice, it seems to imply, on the one hand, admiration of qualities that are good and beautiful, and, on the other, a recognition of power in what possesses them. Further, it usually carries with it the idea that the object of adoration is immensely greater than the being who adores.

\* In Galatians, adoption of the Greek type may be in the Apostle's mind; in Romans, of the Roman type. † Lightfoot on Gal 4<sup>5</sup>.

\* Cf. S. A. Cook, *op. cit.* pp. 134, 147 f.

† In Delitzsch's *Heb. NT* it is rendered אָנוּן הַבְּנוּיִם (*e.g.* Ro 9<sup>4</sup>).

‡ See further on this point *EBI*, *s.v.* 'Family'; § 7 (vol. II. col. 1502).

It is natural to speak of adoring God or a god, and of adoring Nature: somewhat less natural to speak of adoring another human being: hardly natural at all to speak of adoring a mere ideal, unless—and this is important—the ideal is conceived of as in some way possessing an intrinsic force of its own. Kant, for instance, might possibly have adored his Categorical Imperative, 'the Moral Law within,' which he compares in majesty to 'the starry heavens without,' for he seems to conceive it as something more than that which apprehends it.

The etymology, —*ad oro*, 'I pray to,'—is, in short, still felt in the word. Prayer, however, commonly implies the belief in some gain to him who prays, and this need not be felt in adoration. Indeed, it may be said that the pre-eminent characteristic of the adoring mood is the merging of self in the rapt contemplation of other goodness. The whole temper of the word is admirably illustrated in Browning's lines about the

'Love that spends itself  
In silent mad idolatry of some  
Pre-eminent mortal, some great soul of souls,  
That ne'er will know how well it is adored.'  
*Paracelsus*, part iii. *ad fin.*

It is well to note expressly that admiration must reach a certain pitch before the term 'adoration' is felt to be appropriate. The bare recognition of power is, of course, never enough. Admiration of some kind must always be an element, even if it is only the admiration of such power, as in devil-worship. It is, indeed, this element of admiration that appears to give the principle of division between magic and religion. But in the lower forms of worship, as in the one just mentioned, the admiration being incomplete, the adoration is felt to be incomplete also. For its completion we seem to require, on the one hand, an embodiment of all that would satisfy our own ideal, and, on the other, the presence of a force that is more than ourselves.

The types of adoration, therefore, complete and incomplete, are as diverse as the diverse types of those religions that definitely worship a power beyond the worshipper. Strictly speaking, it would appear that religions such as Buddhism, which do not recognize such a power, should be excluded from this class, and that adoration, as we have defined it, has no place in them. But for the Semites and the Europeans at least, history plainly shows how vital an element it has been in their religious development. The whole growth of Hebrew monotheism out of the surrounding idolatry, until its final sharp separation, is one struggle to get away from weak and unworthy objects into the presence of what was truly to be adored.

Lack of power on the one hand, lack of righteousness on the other, are sure signs that the true God has not been found. Anything that suggests either deficiency must be cut away. The gods of the heathen are but the work of men's hands (Is 37<sup>19</sup>); and Israel must not turn His glory into 'the similitude of an ox that eateth grass' (Ps 106<sup>20</sup>). The god that makes a man's son pass through the fire is Molech, not Jahweh (Jer 7<sup>31</sup>). No such god may stand beside Him.

It is this belief in a completely satisfactory object of worship, and this passion to show it to other men, that have been among the great moving forces in Muhammadanism, as in every missionary enterprise since missions began. But the Hebrews, above all nations, have felt the rapture of this mood, and have given it the most complete expression in poetry.

The break-up of Greek religion was directly due to the fact that the old mythology provided images too imperfect to satisfy the heart's longing to adore. Plato and Euripides show the bitter dissatisfaction with their forefathers' imaginings, and the search, never fully satisfied, for something better (see, e.g., Plato, *Euthyphro*; Euripides, *Bacchæ*, *Troades*).

The same dissatisfaction and the same search are manifest during the early days of the Roman Empire, only in a far more prosaic form, inasmuch as the age was far less imaginative. The eager acceptance of strange worship at Rome, and the attempt of Augustus to set up the worship of the

Emperor above them all, are proofs of this, as pitiful as they are ludicrous.

Christianity, it might be thought, would have solved all these difficulties for those who accepted it. And it is noteworthy that perhaps the only expression of pure adoration in literature worthy to be set beside the Hebrew, is to be found in the vision of the Christian Paradise at the end of Dante's poem. It may be added that the liturgies of the Church have always been particularly successful in the place they have given to praise as distinguished from prayer. But not to speak of the profound and complicated controversies on the Trinitarian and Unitarian conceptions, it is clear that the fierce quarrels over the use of images and the honour due to the Saints exhibit the essential features of former struggles. The Iconoclasts and Reformers fear any devotion to what is not absolutely the highest, as tending to weaken the powers of real adoration. The Roman Catholics, on the other hand, deny that the reverence paid to the Saints is the same as, or in any way conflicts with, the worship of the one God.

Thus art. 'Saints,' by Mattès, in *Dict. Encyc. de la Théol. Cathol.* (Paris, 1870): 'The Saints are not honoured like God, and are not adored, but they are more honoured, more revered, than any men alive on earth. . . . Gradually the term *ἀσκήσια*, *veneratio*, was fixed upon to denote the cult of the Saints, as distinct from *λατρεία*, *adoratio*, the word used to denote the worship offered to God, as distinct from the varying forms of expression that may indicate the respect, the deference, the homage paid to men on earth.'

A word should perhaps be said in conclusion about the attitude of those outside the Churches in the present day. For the vast majority of these there is no object of complete adoration, and this because of the divorce that is feared to exist between Power and Goodness. The cosmos, as known to Science, shows power, immense and overwhelming, but is the power good? The ideals of man—justice and mercy and love—are good, but have they a force in themselves? Only those can adore in the full sense who, like Wordsworth, definitely make the leap and unite Nature with God.

LITERATURE.—F. B. Jevons, *An Introduction to the History of Religion*, London, 1896; C. P. Tiele, *Elements of the Science of Rel.*, Edin. 1899, ii. 198 ff.; E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (1891), esp. vol. ii.; W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites* (1894); G. Lowes Dickinson, *The Greek View of Life*, London, 1896; T. H. Green, *The Witness of God and Faith* (1889).

F. MELIAN STAWELL.

ADORATION (Biblical).—1. One of the simpler and lower forms of a sentiment approaching to adoration is that which is felt in presence of a fellow-man mightier and more majestic than oneself. Kings and conquerors, in the days when might was right, were always anxious to inspire their subjects with a profound dread of their person, and insisted on a cringing, self-debasing attitude in their presence. Ages of tyranny and submission made servile fear and abjectness almost universal in Oriental lands. Dread in the presence of conscious superiority produced homage indicative of lowly self-abasement. We see this in the case of Ruth before Boaz (Ru 2<sup>10</sup>); the Shunammite before Elisha (2 K 4<sup>37</sup>); Abigail (1 S 25<sup>23</sup>), Mephibosheth (2 S 9<sup>9</sup>), and Joab (2 S 14<sup>22</sup>) before David; and in the 'reverence' paid to Haman by all the king's servants save Mordecai (Est 3<sup>2</sup>).

2. These instances do not seem to furnish us with any sentiment higher and worthier than mere dread of power: and in presence of the indications of power in nature men have ever been wont to pay homage akin to that rendered to rulers and lords. The sun is certainly the most wonderful object in nature, and has called forth adoration in every age. Though this was discouraged and forbidden by the monotheistic leaders of Israel (Dt 4<sup>19</sup> 17<sup>3</sup>), it could not be entirely suppressed. Even in the times of the Exile, in the

Temple at Jerusalem, there were those who turned their faces to the east and worshipped the sun (Ezk 8<sup>16</sup>); and in 'the Oath of Clearing' Job protests that when he beheld the sun and moon, his heart had not been secretly enticed, and he had not kissed his hand to them (31<sup>24</sup>). The stars also, which move through the heavens in silent majesty, and evoke incessant wonder and awe, have for millenniums received devout adoration, and have been believed to rule the destinies of men. Even in Israel 'the host of heaven' received worship in the time of the kings (2 K 17<sup>16</sup> 21<sup>5</sup>). Similarly, when anything mysterious suddenly occurred, it was regarded with dread and reverence, especially when it was conceived of as the manifestation of a terrible Power behind all things. At the dedication of the Tabernacle, when fire came forth and consumed the burnt-offerings upon the altar, all the people fell on their faces (Lv 9<sup>24</sup>). And in Elijah's time, when fire fell and consumed the prophet's burnt-offering and the wood and the stones, the people fell on their faces and cried, 'Jahweh, he is God' (1 K 18<sup>24</sup>). Similarly, Ezekiel fell on his face when he beheld the cherubim (1<sup>2</sup>); and when he saw the glory of the Lord returning from the east to inhabit again the visionary Temple (43<sup>3</sup>); and especially when 'the glory of the Lord filled the house of the Lord' (44<sup>4</sup>).

3. The appearance of angels is stated on several occasions to have caused great dread and the outward manifestations of adoration: as when Abraham (Gn 18<sup>2</sup>), and also Lot (19<sup>1</sup>), bowed themselves with their faces to the earth. So when Manoah and his wife saw the angel 'ascend in the flame of the altar,' they fell on their faces to the ground (Jg 13<sup>20</sup>). The same is narrated of Balaam after his eyes were opened and he saw the angel of the Lord standing in the way (Nu 22<sup>11</sup>), and of the women at the tomb of our Lord when they saw the 'two men in dazzling apparel' (Lk 24<sup>4</sup>). It was a sentiment more of abject terror, with less of reverence, that caused Saul to 'fall straightway his full length upon the earth' when he saw what he considered to be the ghost of Samuel (1 S 28<sup>20</sup>).

4. Idolatry evoked in Israel the same outward signs of servile adoration as in other nations. The image was believed to be indwelt by the genius or divinity, and was usually treated with deep reverence; as when the vast multitudes on the plains of Dura prostrated themselves before the image which Nebuchadnezzar set up (Dn 3), and when Naaman spoke of bowing himself in the house of Rimmon (2 K 5<sup>14</sup>). If not a deterioration from reverence, it must be a survival of a very early stage of idolatry, when we read of men kissing the image (Hos 13<sup>2</sup>, 1 K 19<sup>18</sup>; cf. the *stroking* (?) the face referred to in 1 S 13<sup>17</sup>).

5. The loftier our conception of God becomes, the more profound is our sentiment of adoration. So long as men conceive of God as such an one as themselves, their adoration of Him is closely akin to that of a ruler or monarch; but as God recedes beyond our comprehension, the more sincere and profoundly reverent does our homage become. And when at length the term 'boundless,' or 'infinite,' employed either in a spatial, temporal, or ethical sense, is applied to God, then adoration reaches its ideal. There is an excellent drastic influence in the conception of Infinity. 'Mystery,' as Dr. Martineau says, 'is the great redeeming power that purifies the intellect of its egotism and the heart of its pride' (*Essays* (1891), iii. 217). But the contemplation of the abstraction, 'the Infinite' or 'the Absolute,' can scarcely evoke adoration. It is when we realize that Infinity is not a void, but is permeated with the energy of an Eternal Mind, that we prostrate our souls in

holy adoration. When the OT saints could rise to the attitude of conceiving of God as 'the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy' (Is 57<sup>15</sup>); and when in the prayer of Solomon we read 'heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee; how much less this house that I have builded' (1 K 8<sup>27</sup>), we have as sublime instances of adoration as the OT furnishes.

6. Mystery is the mother of adoration. It is true that in a sense adoration is based on knowledge: 'we worship what we know': but it is an essential of sincere adoration that we should *not fully* know. Even on the lower human plane, what we revere is higher than we. If there is any one before whom we are inclined to bow the knee, and yield the veneration of hero-worship, it is the man of overpowering intellect, transcendent wisdom, or superlative goodness. Similarly, the very mysteries of the Divine foster adoration and evoke worship. The writer of Ps 8 was in a genuine state of adoration when he considered the heavens the work of God's fingers, the moon and the stars which He had ordained, and then exclaimed, 'What is man!' Self-abasement in the presence of majesty is an essential element in adoration, and the magnificence of God's work suggested to the Psalmist the incomparable magnificence of the Workman. This finds sublime expression in that most beautiful of the Nature-Psalms, Ps 29. The subject is a thunder-storm which gathers over Lebanon, and passes southward until it dies away in the wilderness of Paran. The storm-cloud is Jahweh's chariot, and as the advancing cloud tips one after another the mountain-tops of Palestine, the Psalmist sees therein Jahweh treading on His high-places, and causing the mountains to quake before Him. As the storm dies away, the setting sun gilds the gathering clouds with tints of preternatural splendour, and to the Psalmist it seems the very entrance to the temple and palace of God. The beauty of the scene entrances him. He sees a door opened in heaven. In imagination he is with the angels, who, like himself, have been enraptured with the marvellous spectacle, and he exclaims, 'In his temple everything saith, Glory.' It is to these celestial beings, who, like himself, are filled with adoration at the majesty of God, that the Psalmist addresses the words, 'Give unto Jahweh, O ye sons of the mighty, give unto Jahweh glory and strength.'

Equally sublime is the adoration of the Divine omniscience in Ps 139. The consideration of the intimacy of God's knowledge of him, wherever he is and whatever he does, produces in the mind of the Psalmist the self-abasement which prompts him to hide himself from God's presence (v. 7); the fascinating sense of mystery: 'Such knowledge is too wonderful for me' (v. 5); and also of adoring love: 'How precious also are thy thoughts unto me, O God' (v. 17).

The most worship-filled of the Psalms is a group of seven, containing 93 and 95-100. They have a common theme: the recent enthronization of the Divine King on Zion; and one might say that the keynote of the entire group is to be found in the words: 'O come, let us worship and bow down; let us kneel before the Lord our Maker' (95<sup>6</sup>). This group contains the passage which most readily comes to our lips when we desire to express the *mystery* of God's dealings and yet wish to 'comfort ourselves against sorrow': 'Clouds and darkness are round about him: righteousness and judgment are the foundation of his throne' (97<sup>2</sup>), and it gives to us the ideal of adoration: 'O worship the Lord in the beauty of holiness' (96<sup>9</sup>). The attributes of God which evoke the adoration

of the author, or authors, of these Psalms are these: (1) *The majesty of God*: 93<sup>1</sup> 95<sup>3</sup> 96<sup>3</sup> 99<sup>1-3</sup>; (2) *His providential care*: 95<sup>7a</sup> 99<sup>6-9</sup> 100<sup>3</sup>; (3) *His creative power*: 95<sup>5</sup> 98<sup>10</sup> 100<sup>3b</sup>; (4) *His righteousness and holiness*: 97<sup>6</sup> 98<sup>2a</sup> 99<sup>3</sup>.

7. The effect of the contemplation of the Divine holiness is best seen in the vision of the youthful prophet Isaiah (ch. 6). The sight of the holiest beings in heaven, veiling their faces with their wings in view of the eternal Light of the excellent Glory, filled Isaiah with profound awe; and the sound of the antiphonal song of these holy ones, celebrating the infinitely superior holiness of God, filled him with such abasement that the only words he could utter were, 'Woe is me, for I am undone.' It was at his lips that the consciousness of his own impurity caught him. 'I am a man of unclean lips,' he cried; and it was there that the cauterizing stone from off the altar was applied—after which he felt able to join in the worship of the holy ones, and to become a messenger of the Lord of Hosts.

8. In the NT there is no very marked advance in the adoration rendered to God, because the attributes of God which usually evoke our adoration were almost as fully revealed in the OT as in the NT. We note, however, that the disparity between God and man is more completely realized, so that the prostration of adoration is considered to be fittingly rendered to God only, and is refused by others on that ground. When Cornelius was so much overawed by the mysterious circumstances in which Peter was sent for and came to Caesarea, that he fell down at Peter's feet in lowliest reverence, Peter refused such obeisance as being excessive to a fellow-man. 'Peter raised him, saying, Stand up; I myself also am a man' (Ac 10<sup>25</sup>); and in the Apocalypse of John, an angel rejects the same obeisance, on the ground that he is a fellow-servant with John and with all who obey God's words, significantly adding, 'Worship God' (Rev 22<sup>9</sup>). And yet we find that the Lord Jesus never refused lowly homage, which implies the consciousness that adoration was fittingly paid to Him. The recorded instances of reverence paid to Christ are deeply interesting, especially the consideration of the motives which prompted it. There was probably a conflict of feelings in Peter's mind when he fell down at Jesus' knees, saying, 'Depart from me; for I am a sinful man, O Lord' (Lk 5<sup>8</sup>), but it is clear that he was impressed by Christ's superior holiness. When Mary 'fell down at his feet, saying, Lord, if thou hadst been here, my brother had not died' (Jn 11<sup>32</sup>), the sentiment was one of adoring love, which invests its beloved one with undefined power. The sense of need clinging vehemently to One who, they believe, has love and power enough to reach to the depth of their misery and need, was the sentiment most apparent in those who came to Jesus for His miraculous help, e.g. the leper (Mt 8<sup>3</sup>), Jairus (9<sup>18</sup>), the Syro-Phœnician woman (15<sup>21</sup>), and the Gadarene demoniac (Mk 5<sup>4</sup>), respecting all of whom we read that they 'came and worshipped him': while of the father of the demoniac boy we read that 'he came kneeling down to him' (Mt 17<sup>14</sup>). Adoration of superhuman power was the feeling uppermost in the minds of the disciples, when, after Christ had come to the ship, walking on the sea, they 'worshipped him, saying, Of a truth thou art the Son of God' (14<sup>33</sup>). Not only power but love also was present to the thoughts of the blind beggar who had been excommunicated from the synagogue when he paid adoration to the Lord Jesus (Jn 9<sup>35</sup>). Jesus heard that they had cast him out, and sought the poor outcast; and when Jesus revealed Himself to him as the Son of God, he said, 'Lord, I believe,' and worshipped

Him (*ib.*). And there was a deep adoring love in the minds of the disciples when they were met by the risen Lord, and they 'held him by the feet and worshipped him' (Mt 28<sup>9</sup>).

9. Adoration of the Lord Jesus became more profound in the Christian community as their knowledge and faith increased. It was with devout adoration that the dying Stephen beheld Jesus standing at the right hand of God, and said, 'Lord Jesus, receive my spirit' (Ac 7<sup>55-59</sup>). There was incipient adoration in the words of St. Paul, who, when he saw the ascended Christ, 'fell to the earth, and trembling and astonished said, Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?' (9<sup>4-6</sup>). There was a deeper adoration when in the Temple he prayed so long and so fervently that in ecstasy he saw his Lord again, and received from Him the definite commission to devote his life to the Gentiles (22<sup>17-21</sup>). But how much richer was the knowledge, and more intense the love, and more profound the adoration, when he could say to the Ephesians: 'For this cause I bow my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, that ye, being rooted and grounded in love, may . . . know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge' (Eph 3<sup>14-17</sup>).

The Revelation of St. John is filled with adoration to 'him who sitteth on the throne, and to the Lamb.' The vision of the exalted Lord as walking among the candlesticks caused the seer to fall at His feet as dead (Rev 1<sup>17</sup>). In ch. 4 we read of the living creatures and the elders before the throne of God, who habitually adore and worship God. The four living creatures adore the holiness of God, and the elders habitually adore the creative power and wisdom of God, and cast their crowns before the throne in lowly reverence; but when the Lamb appears in the midst of the throne, bearing the marks of His suffering and death, they both break off from their accustomed song, and join in a 'new song,' celebrating the greater wonders of redemption (5<sup>9</sup>). This is followed by the song of adoration of the angels, who are equally impressed by the wonders of Christ's death, and join in the song, 'Worthy is the Lamb that was slain,' etc. (5<sup>11-12</sup>). In ch. 7 we have two other songs of adoration: first, that of the redeemed, the 'multitude which no man could number' (7<sup>9-10</sup>), and then that of the angels, who fall before the throne on their faces and worship God (7<sup>11</sup>). In 11<sup>16</sup>, we again read of the lowly adoration of the 24 elders, and in 14<sup>3</sup> we read of the song of the 144,000 'who had been redeemed from the earth.' All through this book partial knowledge, eagerness for more knowledge, and withal a profound mystery, combine to produce the loftiest type of adoration which the creatures of God, terrestrial or celestial, can experience and render.

10. It remains now that we should tabulate the various attitudes of adoration which are mentioned in the OT and NT. They are the same as are found in other Oriental countries. (1) *Prostration* (Heb. *הִשְׁתַּחֲוֹת*, Gr. *προσκύβειν*), in which the one who was paying homage lay down abjectly with his face on the ground, as if to permit his lord to place his foot on his neck (Jos 10<sup>24</sup>, Ps 110<sup>1</sup>). This attitude is mentioned in 1 S 25<sup>44</sup>, 2 K 4<sup>41</sup>, Est 8<sup>3</sup>, Mk 5<sup>2</sup>, Lk 8<sup>4</sup>. (2) *Standing*, as slaves stand in presence of their master. The Pharisee 'stood and prayed' (Lk 18<sup>11</sup>), and many of the Pharisees prayed standing in the corners of the streets (Mt 6<sup>6</sup>). (3) *Sitting*, i.e. kneeling with the body resting on the heels or the sides of the feet. It was thus that 'David sat before the Lord' when he was filled with amazement at the message of Nathan, announcing the eternal establishment of his kingdom (2 S 7<sup>18</sup> || 1 Ch 17<sup>16</sup>). (4) *Kneeling* (Heb. *קָרָא* [2 Ch 6<sup>13</sup>, Ps 95<sup>6</sup>], *קָרָא* [1 K 8<sup>54</sup>, Jos 7<sup>6</sup>, Ezr 9<sup>5</sup>], Gr. *γονυπετείν*),

with the body erect, or bent forward so that the head touched the ground. Solomon, at the dedication of the Temple, 'knelt on his knees, with his hands spread forth towards heaven.' The prediction of Messianic days is that 'every knee shall bow' to the Lord (Is 45<sup>2</sup>, Ro 14<sup>11</sup>, Ph 2<sup>10</sup>). The Lord Jesus in Gethsemane 'kneeled down' (Lk 22<sup>41</sup>), and also 'fell on the ground' (Mk 14<sup>2</sup>). St. Paul kneeled in the building used as a church at Miletus (Ac 20<sup>20</sup>), and also on the beach at Tyre (21<sup>5</sup>). (5) *Bowing the head*, so as to rest the chin on the chest (Heb. 773, Gr. *κλίνειν*): used of Eliezer when he found that God had directed his way (Gn 24<sup>26, 48</sup>); of the elders of Israel when Moses told the story of the burning bush (Ex 4<sup>31</sup>), and when they received injunction as to the celebration of the Passover (12<sup>7</sup>); of Moses when Jahweh proclaimed His Name before him (34<sup>5</sup>); of Balaam (Nu 22<sup>21</sup>) and of Jehoshaphat (2 Ch 20<sup>18</sup>). (6) *Uplifting the hands*: used of Solomon at the dedication of the Temple (1 K 8<sup>22-24</sup>; cf. also Is 1<sup>15</sup>, La 3<sup>41</sup>, 1 Ti 2<sup>8</sup>). Then, as we have said, there is one reference to 'kissing the hand' to the sun or moon as a sign of adoration (Job 31<sup>37</sup>).

LITERATURE.—Art. 'Adoration' in Hastings' *DB* and *Single-rol. DB*, *Jewish Encyc.*, Smith, and Kittel; art. 'Anbetung' in Herzog, and Schenkel; also Marti, *Jr. Rel.* § 10; Benzinger, *Heb. Arch.* (1894) § 63; Macfadyen, *Messages of the Psalms* (1904), p. 53.

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**ADORATION** (Jewish and Christian, post-Biblical).—I. Jewish.—(1) The outward posture of adoration did not differ from what had gone before (see above), only in post-Biblical literature its various forms were more strictly prescribed. This was a natural consequence of the predominance of the Pharisaic party, with its love of the details of ritualistic observance. It was ordered that on entering the Sanctuary the worshipper should make thirteen prostrations (*shammaites*), a form of adoration which consisted in the spreading out of hands and feet while the face had to touch the ground. Another outward act of adoration was kneeling with the head bent forward so that the forehead touched the ground; a like posture, accompanied by kissing the ground, was an intensifying of the act. The most exaggerated form of adoration, however, was when, on the Day of Atonement, the high priest uttered the Holy Name of God (Jahweh); at the mention of this name every one present threw himself prostrate upon the ground, face downwards (Jerus. *Yoma* iii. 40d).<sup>\*</sup> The importance attached to the outward expression of adoration is also exemplified by the dispute that took place at the beginning of the Christian era between the Hillelites and the Shammaites as to the posture which ought to be assumed while reciting the *Shema*. The Shammaites, who regarded standing as the most fitting attitude, won the day, and at the present time the Jews recite it standing. The same position is assumed during the saying of the *Shemonē Esrē* (the 'Eighteen Benedictions'), which is one of the central parts of the Jewish liturgy; † indeed, its technical name is 'Amidah' ('Standing'), because, as it is one of the chief acts of adoration, the most appropriate attitude is that of standing while it is being recited (cf. for the position assumed during prayer, Mt 6<sup>9</sup>, Lk 18<sup>11</sup>). Throughout the Middle Ages, down to the present day, the Talmudic prescriptions regarding attitudes of adoration have been observed. Thus, the throwing of oneself at full length upon the ground took place only on the Day of Atonement; ‡ while at other times it consisted in bowing the head or standing.

<sup>\*</sup> JE 1. 210; Weber, *Jüd. Theol.* . . . 2 pp. 41, 42. The whole of the first five sections of the tractate *Berakhoth* deal with prayer and its accompanying posture, mental preparation, etc.

† Singer, *Authorized Daily Prayer-Book*, pp. 44-54.

‡ This is, however, now done on New Year's Day as well.

or, less frequently, kneeling.\* A notable exception to this is, however, afforded by the Karaites; these professed in all things to reject Rabbinical traditions and to revert to Biblical usage only; they regarded eight external attitudes in adoration as indispensable, viz. 'bending the head, bending the upper part of the body until it touched the knees, kneeling, violent bowing of the head, complete prostration, raising the hands, standing, and raising the eyes to heaven.'† It will be noticed that kissing the ground or any object is not included among these, no doubt because in the OT this act of adoration was usually connected with non-Jahwistic worship (see preced. art. § 4).

(2) God alone is adored by the Jews, though the veneration paid to the *Torah* ('Law') both as an abstract thing of perfection;‡ and also in its material form ('the scroll of the Law'), reaches sometimes an extravagant pitch. One can see not infrequently in the Synagogue, worshippers stretching out their hands to touch the roll of the Law when carried in solemn procession to and from the 'Ark.' The hand that has touched the sacred roll is then kissed; moreover, during the ceremony of the *Hagbaa*, i.e. the 'elevation' of the scroll of the Law, the whole congregation stands up in its honour; this act is regarded as a special privilege or *mitzvah*.§ There are certain intermediate beings between God and men to whom great veneration, bordering on adoration, is paid; indeed, in some passages these intermediate beings are identified with God, and in so far can truly be said to be worshipped; but the later Jewish teaching on these beings is so contradictory—sometimes they are spoken of as personalities, at other times as abstract forces, at other times as Divine attributes—that it would be precarious to regard them definitely as objects of adoration. They are: *Metatron*, the *Memra* ('Word') of Jahweh, the *Shekhinah*, and the *Ruah ha-kodesh* ('Holy Spirit');¶ to these must be added the Messiah, in so far as He is represented as the incarnation of the Divine Wisdom, which existed before the world was created.‡

2. Christian.—(1) The attitudes of adoration among the early Christians were borrowed, as one would expect, from the Jews; an instance of how minutely the Jewish custom was followed is seen in Tertullian's description of Christian worship, given in *de Corona Militis* iii. He says that on Sunday and the whole week of the festival of Pentecost, prayer was not to be said kneeling. This is thoroughly in accordance with Jewish precedent, for 'the synagogal custom (*minhag*), as old as the first Christian century, omits the prostration on all festivals and semi-festivals.'\*\*

(2) Adoration among Christians, almost from the commencement, has not been confined to the adoration of the Deity. It is true that in the Roman Catholic Church degrees of adoration are officially recognized (see above, p. 116<sup>b</sup>), but in actual practice this differentiation has not always been observed. Apart from worship offered to God, adoration is offered in the following instances:—

(a) *Adoration of the Eucharistic elements*.—The doctrine of Transubstantiation was held centuries before it was officially declared to be a dogma of

\* This refers to European Jews; those who live in the East follow, like the Muhammadans, the practice of prostration as in earlier ages.

† JE 1. 211.

‡ A very small acquaintance with the Jewish religion will show that this is no exaggeration.

§ In the Synagogue this word is used in the technical sense of 'privilege,' not in the Biblical sense of 'command' (cf. *lar Mivrah*). See, further, Oesterley, *Church and Synagogue*, viii. (1900) p. 1 ff.

¶ *ib. id.* p. 153 ff. viii. pp. 70 ff. 112 ff.

\*\* Cf. Hamburger, *REJ* 739 ff.

\*\* JE 1. 211.

the Roman Catholic Church; from it followed of necessity the adoration of the 'Eucharistic Christ.'\* Roman Catholics, of course, maintain that inasmuch as the elements of bread and wine in the Mass become the actual body and blood of Christ, they worship Christ, and Him alone, in the Mass. The adoration of the elements takes place at their elevation, i.e. after the consecration;† and the adoration is of the highest kind, viz. *cultus latriæ*. Communities, many in number, exist for the purpose of offering perpetual adoration to the consecrated elements; day and night, at least one person has to be present before these in prayer and silent adoration. In these communities‡ each member has a particular hour assigned to him or her at which regular attendance is required for this purpose in the church or private chapel. The *raison d'être* of this perpetual adoration is that it should be in imitation of the holy angels and glorified saints who serve the Lamb 'day and night in his temple' (Rev 7<sup>11-15</sup>).

(b) *Adoration of the Cross*.—As early as the time of Tertullian the Christians were accused of worshipping the Cross;§ and the evidence of Cassian (d. 435) points to a tendency which, as the witness of later writers shows, soon became a settled practice. He says: 'Quod quidam districtissimi monachorum, habentes quidem zelum Dei sed non secundum scientiam, simpliciter intelligentes, fecerunt sibi cruces ligneas, easque jugiter humeris circumferentes, non adificationem, sed risum cunctis videntibus intulerunt.'|| St. Aldhelm (7th cent.) speaks of certain Christians as *Crucicolæ*, and, indeed, not without reason, if it be true that Alcuin, who lived at the same period, was in the habit of saying before the Cross: 'Tuam crucem adoramus, Domine, tuam gloriosam recolimus passionem; miserere nostri.'¶ Moreover, stone crosses have been found at Mainz, belonging to the second half of the 8th cent., bearing the inscription: 'Sca Crux nos salva.'\*\* It was, therefore, not without reason that *latria* to the Cross was forbidden by the second Council of Nicea (787).†† Two festivals in honour of the Cross were observed in very early days, and are kept up to the present day. The one is the 'Invention of the Cross,' which is observed on May 3 in memory of the alleged finding of the true cross by Queen Helena; the fact of the 'Invention' is testified to by Rufinus, Socrates, Sozomen, and Theodoret.‡‡ According to the story, Helena sent the nails, the inscription, and part of the Cross to Constantine; the rest was kept at Jerusalem in a silver case, which was carried in procession and worshipped by the faithful on certain days in the year. This custom had died out by the time of the patriarch Sophronius (d. 640); it was, however, continued in St. Sophia's at Constantinople till the 8th century. The other festival is that of the 'Exaltation of the Cross,'§§ kept on Sept. 14, in memory of the Emperor Constantine's vision of the Cross.¶¶ At the present day supposed pieces of the true Cross are possessed

\* Cf. the words of St. Ambrose: 'It is the flesh of Christ . . . which we adore to-day in these mysteries,' quoted in Wetzzer-Welte's *Dict. Encycl. de la Theol. Cath.* (1878) i. 78.

† Cf. the ancient Jewish custom, according to which the priest prostrates himself after he has offered a sacrifice.

‡ The most celebrated of these was that founded at Marseilles in the 18th cent. by the Dominican monk Antoine Le Quien.

§ Apol. 16. The word 'adore' with respect to the Cross occurs in Lactantius, as quoted by Benedict xiv. in *de Fest.* i. § 329, referred to in Addis-Arnold's *Catholic Dictionary*, s.v.

¶ Quoted by Bingham, *Antiq. of Christian Church*, II. 362 (Oxford, 1855).

\*\* Cf. Lingard, *Antiq. of Anglo-Saxon Church*, p. 174.

†† Kraus, *Die Christl. Inschriften*, II. 107.

‡‡ Landon, *Manual of Councils*, Nic. 2.

§§ See Fleury, *Hist. Eccles.* xi. 32 (Paris, 1722-1738).

¶¶ Called 'Holy Cross Day' in the Calendar of the English Prayer-Book.

|| Eusebius, *de Vita Const.* i. 27-32.

by some churches; the piece of wood (sometimes very minute) is placed in a glass case, resembling a 'monstrance,' which is sealed up by the Pope or the Bishop; the glass case is kissed and adored by the faithful, and is also used for blessing the congregation. What must have materially contributed to the adoration of crosses and crucifixes was the custom of putting relics inside them, for veneration.

In spite of Conciliar prohibition, St. Thomas Aquinas taught that the Cross was to be adored with *latria*, i.e. supreme worship, and argued that one might regard a cross or an image in two ways: (1) in itself, as a piece of wood or the like, and so no reverence is given to a cross or to an image of Christ; (2) as representing something else, and in this way we may give to the Cross *relatively*—i.e. to the Cross as carrying on our mind to Christ—the same honour as we give to Christ *absolutely*, i.e. in Himself.\*

(c) *Adoration of the Sacred Heart*.—This cult originated with the mystic, Margaret Mary Alacoque (d. 1690). In the year 1675 she announced that she had had a vision, and that our Lord had Himself appeared to her, and showed her 'His most holy heart upon a throne of flames, encircled with thorns, and over it a Cross'; that it had been revealed to her that Christ desired that His heart should be specially honoured, as satisfaction for the many offences that had been committed against Him in the Holy Sacrament; and that special adoration should be offered to it on the Friday after the octave of the festival of Corpus Christi.

The idea of the adoration of the heart of Christ had, however, already been expressed, for in the 16th cent. the Carthusian monk Lansperg had recommended pious Christians to assist their devotion by using a figure of the Sacred Heart.† The cult was at first vehemently attacked,—the term *cardiolatræ* was applied to those who practised it; but in spite of this it grew in popularity, and in 1765 a special office and Mass were accorded it,‡ with the condition that the 'Heart of Jesus' was to be regarded only as the symbol of His goodness and love, ' . . . intelligens hujus missæ et officii celebratione non aliud agi, quam ampliari cultum jam institutum et symbolice renovari memoriam illius divini amoris, quo Unigenitus Dei Filius humanam suscepit naturam, et factus obediens usque ad mortem, præbere se dixit exemplum hominibus, quod esset mitis et humilis corde.'§ A little later, an explanation of the principle underlying the cult was put forth in the bull 'Auctorem fidei' (1794), in which it is said that the faithful worship with supreme adoration the physical heart of Christ, considered 'not as mere flesh, but as united to the Divinity'; they adore it as 'the heart of the Person of the Word, to which it is inseparably united.' Stress is laid on the distinction between 'objectum formale et materiale.'|| The cult became more and more popular under the influence and through the activity of the Jesuits; through their instrumentality the whole month of June was dedicated to the Sacred Heart. In 1856, at the desire of the French bishops, Pius IX. raised the festival of the 'Heart of Jesus' to a *Festum duplex majus*, and ordered it to be observed by the whole Church. In August 1864, Margaret Mary Alacoque was canonized, an act which still further popularized the cult.

\* Quoted from his *Works* (III. xxv. a. 3 et 4) by Addis-Arnold, *op. cit.* art. 'Adoration of the Cross.'

† Addis-Arnold, *op. cit.* p. 426.

‡ By Pope Clement xiii.

§ N. Nilles, *De rationibus Festorum sacratissimi Cordis Jesu et Purissimi Cordis Mariæ, e fontibus juris canonici erutis*, libri iv. . . Innsbruck, 1885, quoted by T. Kolde in *PRE* i. vii. p. 778.

|| Cf. Addis-Arnold, *op. cit.*, s.v.; Wetzzer-Welte, *op. cit.* s.v.

In spite of the fact that officially a distinction is made between

among very many devotion, though devotion to Christ's for the heart which pierced by the spear upon the Cross; and, in urging the excellence of this devotion, the late Bp. Martin of Paderborn (d. 1878) wrote thus: 'The real object of meditation concerning the most holy heart of Jesus, as the name itself implies, is the actual heart of Jesus,—the actual heart of Jesus, and not merely His love symbolized by this heart. . . . It is the real, bodily heart of Jesus which is placed before my eyes as an object of adoration (*Verehrung*) by means of the ordinary bodily representation of the same.'

(d) *The adoration of the Heart of Mary Immaculate.*—It was inevitable that this should follow the adoration of the Sacred Heart. This devotion was first propagated by John Eudes, who founded a congregation of priests called, after him, Eudists; it was accorded official recognition in 1799. As with the Sacred Heart, so in this case it is explained that 'the physical heart is taken as a natural symbol of charity and of the inner life.'† The heart of St. Mary is adored with *Hyperdulia*, and what was said under the foregoing section as to materialistic conceptions applies here also.

(e) *The adoration of Saints and Images.*—According to the second Council of Nicaea (787), *δovλετα* (*veneratio*) is offered to the Saints, as distinct from *λατρεία* (*adoratio*); and in the Greek Orthodox Church it is said (*Conf. Orthodox*, iii. 52): *ἐπικαλούμεθα αὐτοὺς* (i.e. τοὺς ἁγίους) οὐχὶ ὡς θεοὺς τινας, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁλοῦν αὐτοῦ (i.e. θεοῦ). In the same way, according to the Council of Trent, 'veneration' is offered to the Saints in their images and relics. It is insisted that Saints are not honoured like God, or adored, though they are more honoured and more venerated than any living man on earth. The Council of Nicaea, furthermore, ordered that respect and honour were to be accorded to the *images* of Saints, only in so far as they brought to mind their prototypes; in the same way the Greek Orthodox Church orders that worship is not to be offered them: οὐ μὲν τὴν κατὰ πλάσιν ἡμῶν ἀληθινὴν λατρείαν, ἣ πρέπει μόνῃ τῇ θεῷ φύσει.

But here again, whether it be to the Virgin Mary, or to St. Joseph (a more modern cult), or to any lesser Saint, however carefully official documents may differentiate between what is due to God alone and what is due to Saints or their images, it is no exaggeration to say that among the ignorant the Virgin Mary and the Saints take the place of God Almighty in the popular worship; and the images and relics of Saints are believed to possess miraculous powers in not a few cases, and receive adoration accordingly. In numbers of agricultural districts of European countries, the system of Saint-worship does not differ materially from that which obtained in pre-Reformation days, and that was in many cases an adaptation of heathen cults.‡ English documents of the Reformation period prove conclusively that among the things protested against were the rendering to the Virgin Mary and the Saints the honour that was due to God alone; the belief that these were able to give gifts which are in reality Divine; the belief that the ears of the Saints were more readily opened to the requests of men; and, finally, the practice of regarding Saints as tutelary deities.¶

One other point must be briefly referred to: the word 'adoration' is used in reference to a newly elected Pope. Immediately after election the Pope is placed upon the altar; the Cardinals, who then come and render him homage, are said to go 'to the Adoration.' Again, when a Pope is elected spontaneously and unanimously, without the 'scrutiny' having been made beforehand, he is said to be elected 'by adoration.'¶

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**ADULTERATION.**—Adulteration may be defined as the use of cheaper materials in the pro-

\* Quoted in *PRE* 3 vii. 780.

† Addis-Arnold, *op. cit.* p. 427.

‡ The reference is to Roman and Greek Catholics.

§ For a popular presentation of the facts, see the earlier volumes of Freytag's *Die Atheni*, a work which may be regarded as a classic.

¶ See the article on the subject in the *Church Times*, Aug. 31, 1906.

¶ Migne's *Troisième Encyc. théol.* ('Dict. des Savants et des Ignorants') xlv. 87, Paris, 1859.

duction of an article so as to transform it into an inferior article which is not by the purchaser or consumer readily distinguishable as inferior. There is not necessarily in the production the intention to deceive; and the substitute is not necessarily deleterious. Indeed, in some cases the technically inferior article may be more wholesome than the poorer qualities of the counterfeited article, as in the case of margarine and other substitutes for butter. The essential point is that the consumer does not get what he is paying for and intends to buy. We must, however, carefully distinguish between what by improved processes of production is really cheaper and what merely seems so; for it is the craze for cheapness that is largely responsible for the extent to which adulteration is practised. Owing to imperfect education and an often consequent misguided social ambition which lead people to ape the habits of those better off than themselves, without either the taste or the means to indulge in those habits, there is a very great demand for substitutes or imitations of articles of luxury, which gives the opportunity to the dishonest dealer, already disposed by self-interest and by pressure of competition and by the difficulty of detection, to adulterate.

The evil is not entirely modern. Even in the Middle Ages, under the guild system, regulations were required to secure that for a fair price an honest article was given. Night work, for instance, was forbidden, and a workman was required to show evidence of skill before he was permitted to practise his trade. Publicity was in the main the remedy against dishonest dealing, and owing to the simplicity of wants and to the simple character of the processes of manufacture, and to the close relation of producer and consumer, the remedy was tolerably effectual. In modern times these conditions are absent, and the practice is so prevalent, that, in defiance of the doctrine *caveat emptor*, legislation has been required to protect the consumer. The ignorance of the consumer, the impossibility of educating a taste that is continually being debased by the consumption of adulterated articles, and the frequent danger to life and health, have necessitated this departure from the doctrine of *laissez faire*, particularly with regard to articles of food. The consumer is still at the mercy of the vendor of shoddy clothes, etc., but in food and drugs at least he is protected, although it must be admitted that the penalties inflicted are often inadequate and the laws ineffective, owing to the absence of a standard quality (cf. the recent prosecutions for adulteration of brandy). Mr. Devns (*Political Economy*, p. 70) quotes a public analyst's report to the effect that of samples of milk 43 per cent., of mustard 16, of coffee 14, of spirits 11, of butter 11, and of disinfectants 75, were adulterated.

Legislation against adulteration takes various forms, of which the activity of the public analyst, through official inspectors who take samples, is perhaps the best known and most effective. It is unfortunate that the use of preservatives for milk and meat especially is not subject to precise regulation, for the repeated addition by successive dealers of preservatives to milk, for instance, converts what might be a laudable and economic practice into a deleterious adulteration. Fiscal legislation is often used for the purpose of excluding, or at least restricting, the use of poorer qualities and adulterated goods. Thus Canada increases the taxation on molasses as the quality deteriorates, for the avowed purpose of excluding 'black jack,' as it is called, which a paternal finance Minister declared 'no man should put into his mouth and think he is taking molasses.' In other ways, e.g. by prescribing that all goods and packages should be marked with the country of origin, the Government inter-



to prevent fraud and adulteration. This plan (made in Germany, etc.) has in the United Kingdom not been very successful, for the alleged poorer quality of goods imported has not been established, and the result has in some cases been an advertisement for the foreign producer.

It is necessary, in considering the demand for legislation to suppress adulteration, that we should be on our guard against class interests which may demand the prohibition or regulation of the sale of

some cheaper but not less useful article than that which they produce. Thus in some agricultural countries the importation or manufacture of margarine is prohibited in the interests of the farmers, and the importation of live cattle from Canada into Great Britain is [1907] forbidden on the alleged ground that disease exists among Canadian herds. See Ashley's *Economic History* for mediæval regulations and ideas, and Marshall's address to the Co-operative Congress, 1889. J. DAVIDSON.

## ADULTERY.

### ADULTERY (Primitive and Savage Peoples).

—1. Woman in primitive society.—A survey of the notions entertained by savage peoples regarding adultery tends to show that, in the earliest times, it could not have been regarded in any other light than as the interference of another with the woman over whom a man had, or conceived himself to have, certain rights. It was not considered as an act of impurity, for the idea of purity had not yet been evolved. Nor was it a breach of contract, for it is improbable that anything corresponding to marriage rites was yet in use. Nor was it a breach of social law, for men were not yet organized in social groups. Woman being conceived as belonging to man, any interference with her would immediately outrage man's instinctive sense of property, and would at once arouse his jealousy. He would, therefore, try to recover his property from the thief; and this could be done only by assaulting or killing him, in other words, by punishing him for his theft. Recognizing, too, that the woman, differing from other possessions of his, was a sentient being, and therefore to some extent a consenting party to the theft, he would also vent his anger upon her, even putting her to death in cases of extreme rage. Among animals precisely similar ideas with respect to the females may be found. Where an animal collects a number of females round him, as in the case of certain apes, he acts as a despot over them; young males born to him are, after a time, expelled, and the approach of a possible rival is at once resented (Darwin, *Descent of Man*, 591). Thus it must be admitted that, at the earliest stage of human history, adultery could have been nothing but a breach of proprietary rights, to be followed, when discovered, by a more or less savage act of private revenge upon both the culprits. Among most existing savages hardly any other idea of it exists, as we shall presently see. Woman before and after marriage is the property, first of her father or guardian, next of her husband. Among peoples who allow licence before marriage, none is permitted after it, when the husband assumes proprietary rights over the woman. And where such licence is not allowed, any unchastity is punished by inflicting a fine or death on the man who has depreciated the value of the woman in her guardian's or prospective husband's eyes. This idea of a husband's proprietary rights in the woman would be increased where she was the captive of his bow and spear, or where he had to undergo a period of servitude for her, or, much more usually, had to acquire her by purchase. Here it may be remarked that adultery is not confined to cases where a ceremony of marriage exists: wherever a man and a woman enter into a union more or less lasting, and the man treats her as his property, it may occur. But it need not be inferred that it is a common occurrence among all savage races. It is abhorrent to some peoples, e.g. the Andamanese, with whom conjugal fidelity is the rule (Man, *JAI* xii. 125), the people of Uca in the Loyalty Islands (Eskine, *Western Pacific*,

341), the Abipones (Dobrizhoffer, *Account of the Abipones*, ii. 153), and others.

Certain facts are often alleged against the idea that woman is not a free agent in primitive or savage society. Thus, a woman's consent is often required before marriage; yet even here the consent of her guardian is also necessary, and this right of choice on her part need not argue anything as to her future freedom of action, while it is counterbalanced by the overwhelming weight of evidence regarding the woman's position as a being owned by her husband. Again, in cases where the husband's power is unlimited, the influence of the husband's consent on the woman's action affects the fact that her legal status is not that of the man, nor does it give her equal rights with him. This influence may frequently arise from the fact that women have their own sphere of action, that they have been the earliest civilizers, that they possess much of the tribal lore, and that they are feared as dangerous (magically) at certain crises of their lives. All this limits the husband's power in many ways; but so far as concerns interference with her sexually, his power is unlimited. Here, any attempt at independence on her part arouses at once that jealousy, that underlying fact of man's proprietary rights in the woman, which her innate superiority or her occasional influence does not abate. Even where the matriarchate exists, and where the man goes to live with the woman's people, this seldom takes away his power of life and death over her, especially where adultery is concerned (Haddon, *Head-Hunters*, 161), says that though in the Torres Straits Islands a woman asks the man to marry her, and he goes to live with her parents, he can kill her if she causes trouble; cf. Powers, *Tribes of California*, 382). In effect all such exceptional cases are overruled by the fact that universally the woman's power of licence ceases at marriage, that universally unchastity on her part is regarded by the husband as a breach of his proprietary rights, that frequently the husband has the power to kill his wife for any such breach, that well-nigh universally he can lend his wife to another man, and that generally adultery on the husband's part cannot be punished in any way by the wife.

2. Adultery under different conditions of marriage.—It is now generally admitted that *promiscuity* was not the earliest form of human sexual relations. But even had it been so, the idea of adultery based upon jealousy and the sense of property would still have been conceivable. Men and women being collected into groups for the sake of defence or of facilitating the supply of food, the men would resent the approach of members of other similar groups, while any interference with the women of the group would be jealously guarded against by all the males of the group, to whom *ex hypothesi* all the females of the group belonged in common. Promiscuity, however, as a theory of marriage, is baseless, and has frequently been confused with what is known as *group marriage*, an entirely different thing. In this case, found in actual practice among certain Australian tribes, the men of one definite group are potential husbands of the women of another definite group; the husband of any one woman has only a preferential right in her, and the men of his group may have access to her on certain occasions. But here the husband's consent must first be given; and though it is practically never withheld, and a man is looked upon as churlish who does withhold it, this points to the existence of individual marriage underlying this mixed polyandrous and polygamous system, rather than to its being a systematized form of earlier promiscuity. The consent of the husband being necessary implies a certain proprietary right in the woman on his part; he sanctions her union with other men only on certain ceremonial occasions. If the woman dared to consort with a man

not of the group, this would be resented by her actual and potential husbands; it would be incest rather than adultery (see § 5; Spencer-Gillen\*, 62, 63, 110, do. b 73, 140; Howitt, *JAI* xx. 53). Again, where polyandry exists, adultery is still possible, since the husbands of the woman are usually well defined, and their rights over her are arranged according to strict rule. Where, as in the Tibetan type of polyandry, a woman is the wife of several brothers, it is obvious that they will resent the approach of any other man to their wife, while contrariwise the woman is extremely jealous of her own conjugal rights (*Hist. Univ. des Voyages*, xxxi. 434). The story told by Strabo (xvi. 4. 25) of the custom of fraternal polyandry among the ancient Arabs, shows that adultery with another man was punishable, and similar cases might be cited (see § 4, Tibet). Among the Nairs, with whom polyandry assumes another form, the woman is not allowed to have any later sexual relations with the man who first consummates the marriage, while any relations with a man not of her caste is *ipso facto* adultery, and was formerly punished by death (Reclus, *Primitive Folk*, 162, 164).

A modified form of polyandry exists where the custom of providing a 'secondary husband' (the *cicisbeate*) exists. In this case, the secondary husband must contribute to the support of the household, and takes the place of the husband with the wife only in his absence. This is found among some Eskimo tribes (M'Lennan, *Studies in Ancient History*, 2nd ser. 376; Reclus, 66), where frequently the secondary husband is a younger brother. With them, therefore, the system is akin to that of the Todas, where the eldest of a group of brothers is the husband, but the younger brothers have rights over the wife also (*TES* vii. 240). It occurs among some Polynesian peoples (*ZVK*, 1900, 334) and others, as it did in ancient Sparta (Xenophon, *Rep. Lac.* i. 9). Sometimes, where adultery takes place, a man is forced to become a secondary husband, to do the work of the house and obey the husband, while he may now associate freely with the wife, as among the Konyagas (Reclus, 67).

3. Adultery under polygamy and monogamy.—But it is especially among peoples with whom polygamy or monogamy is the rule that we see the working of jealousy and the idea of property in the woman existing most emphatically. Jealousy of their wives exists among the lowest savages, and with them and among higher savage and barbaric tribes the utmost precautions are taken to prevent the approach of another man. Dire punishments are frequently meted out to the wife even on the slightest suspicion, or, as among the Negroes of Calabar, the wives are at intervals put through a trying ordeal to test their faithfulness (Miss Kingsley, *Travels in W. Africa*, 497). The universality of the feeling of jealousy among the lower races, the rigour of its action, and its extreme vigilance, go far to show, as Westermarck (*Human Marriage*, 117 ff.) points out, that there never was a time when man was devoid of it, and that it is a strong argument against the existence of a primitive promiscuity. When adultery has actually taken place and has been discovered, the husband, with few exceptions, can himself punish the offending woman and her paramour, without necessarily invoking the local tribunal. Indeed, that tribunal or the tribal custom expects him to do so, or fully approves his act, though in some instances he may be retaliated upon by the relatives of the woman or the man, where he has killed either or both. Punishment varies, but very frequently death is meted out in cases of detected adultery; in other places the woman is disfigured or mutilated by shaving off her hair, cutting off her nose, ears, etc., or she is chastised more or less seriously, or she is repudiated or divorced, or treated as a prostitute. In such cases the husband's jealousy or anger turns against his offending property, even though his act of revenge deprives him of his wife, or of her attractive qualities. Towards the offending man who has invaded his rights of property his attitude varies: he may kill him, emasculate, mutilate,

wound, or flog him, or make him his slave, or force him to pay a fine, or to have his wife outraged in turn. Especially noticeable is the idea of theft in adultery, where, as in Africa, the man's hands are cut off, as if he were a thief (Waltz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, ii. 472); in the fact that in the Torres Straits there is no word for adultery apart from theft (*puri*), and all irregular connexion was called 'stealing a woman' (*Camb. Exped. to Torres Straits*, 275); and that among the Arunta a man who commits adultery with a woman of the class from which he might choose a wife is called *atna mylkura*, 'vulva-thief,' because he has stolen property (Spencer-Gillen\*, 99). The same idea also emerges where, as among some Negro tribes, it is held to be adultery for a man to lay his hand on or brush accidentally against a chief's wife (Miss Kingsley, *Travels*, 497). The conception of the wife as property is also seen, not only in the common custom of slaying her at her husband's death, but, where she is allowed to survive him, in the belief entertained by savage and barbaric peoples that second marriage is wrong, or, if permitted, that any unchastity during a certain period after the husband's death is equivalent to adultery, or should be punished as such (Amer. Indians, Kukis, Patagonians, Ainus, etc.). Among some Amer. Indian tribes, the widow cannot even appear in public without being regarded as an adulteress (Adair, *Amer. Indians*, 186). For a certain time at least, sometimes for the rest of her life, the woman is still her husband's property; and as ghosts have power over the living, it may be presumed that the dead husband might still retaliate in case of any transgression.

4. Punishments for adultery.—The following examples will show the nature of the punishments for adultery meted out among different races by the outraged husband, or permitted to him by common consent or actual law:—

Among the Wotjobaluk of Victoria both the woman and her lover are killed; among the Yerkla-mining of S. Australia the woman was branded with a firestick for the first offence, speared in the leg for the second, and killed for the third; among some tribes the punishment consisted in handing her over to all comers (Howitt, *Nat. Tribes of S.E. Aust.* 245, 257, 267). A childless wife who misconducted herself could be repudiated in W. Victoria (Dawson, *Aust. Aborigines*, 33). In Tasmania the most cruel punishments were meted out to the woman (Bonwick, *Daily Life of the Tasmanians*, 72). In the Andaman Islands adultery is rare, but when it occurs it is punished by the husband, on whom, however, the friends of the injured party may retaliate (*JAI* xii. 125). In New Guinea adultery is capitally punished (Waltz-Gerland, *Anthrop. der Naturvölker*, vi. 661); elsewhere throughout the Indian archipelago it is a crime, and frequently the only cause of repudiation (*Camb. Exped. to Torres Straits*, 216; Westermarck, *Marriage*, 437, 525). With the Melanesian tribes the woman was brutally treated, and the paramour was killed by the husband or executed, though he was sometimes freed for what was regarded as a robbery, or had his wife violated by all the men of the village (De Bock, *Nieuw-Guinea*, 202; *RSAP*, ser. iii. vol. viii. 263). Death was the usual punishment in New Zealand (*Voyage of the Astride*, 269). In other Polynesian Islands the woman was variously punished. With the Hottentots the woman was killed or flogged (Alexander, *Exped. into Interior of Africa*, i. 9; *ZVK*, 1892, 341); and killing the guilty wife, and frequently her paramour also, is usual among both Bantu and Negro tribes (Kafirs [M'Lennan, *Kafir Laws*, 111; Wakamba [Hoefer, *Three Years in Savage Africa*, 471; Kikuyu [Wilson and Felkin, *Cyanda*, i. 211]). Lesser punishments were here also administered—whipping, disfigurement, or repudiation of the woman, marrying her to a slave, and flogging the guilty man (Pohl, *Afr. Jour.* i. 401, ii. 50; Howitt, *Nat. Tribes of S.E. Aust.* 170; Du Châtelet, *Afrique Equat.* 67, 435; Johnston, *Cyanda Proleg.* 599, 600, 740, 872; Waltz, ii. 140, 115). Death, mutilation and disfigurement, abandonment, and delivery of the woman to the men of the tribe, were common among the N. Amer. tribes, with whom also the aggressor was killed, mutilated, or fined (Harrick, *Native Races*, i. 220, 412, 514; Ann. Rep. B.E., ii. 774; Schwob, ii. 152, v. 613, 614). Tortures and death were meted out to both parties in Yucatan (Harrick, ii. 674); in Mexico the woman had her nose and ears cut off, and was stoned to death (Harrick, ii. 674; F. India, iv. 225; Prescott, *Peru*, 211); in Guatemala the woman was repudiated and her paramour flogged (Harrick, ii. 672); in Nicaragua she could be divorced for rubbing her adultery (Waltz, ii. 373). Among the Fuegians the husband could kill his wife, but was liable to be killed in turn by her family (Harrick and Deniker,

and (Hobhouse, l. 62). Woman and paramour might be killed by the husband among many of the native tribes of India (Guthrie, *Eth. of Bengal*, 45; M'Pherson, *Memor. of Service in India*, 52). Among the nomad Tatars the woman is frequently killed and the man forced to pay the husband a number of cattle; elsewhere in Tibet the woman is punished and the man sent to live with the husband or group of husbands (*Hist. Univ. des Végètes*, xxvi. 437, xxviii. 241). In Japan, woman and paramour are killed by the husband, the law supporting his act (Letourneau, 217). In China the law permits this punishment if it is meted out on the spot, otherwise the husband would be punished for the crime; but where adultery is proved he can repudiate or otherwise punish his wife (Alabaster, *Chinese Criminal Law*, 157, 251; Pauthier, *Chine Moderne*, 125).

Frequently, too, the gravity of the offence is proportionate to the rank of the husband with whose wife it is committed; in other words, the value of the woman belonging to him is greater. In New Caledonia, death was meted out to a man who merely looked at the wife of a chief. Among the Banyoro (Bantu), with whom the male delinquent was usually fined, in the case of adultery with a chief's or king's wife, he was put to death (Johnston, *op. cit.* 599); while in Uganda, where whipping was the usual punishment, the king's wife and her paramour were chopped to pieces (*ib.* 603); in Ashanti, intrigue with the king's slaves is punished by emasculation (Ellis, *Tshi-speaking Peoples*, 257). So in Peru, where death was the ordinary punishment, adultery with the Inca's wife resulted in the burning of the guilty man, the death of his parents, and the destruction of his property (Letourneau, *Eth. of Marriage*, 215). Similarly, adultery with the wife of a prince among the Tatars involved the punishment of the man's relatives as well as himself: generally speaking, this distinction holds good among most savage peoples, while a further distinction may be made between adultery with the principal wife and with a subordinate wife—the value of the former being, of course, greater.

The punishment of adultery among savage and barbaric peoples is thus largely in the hands of the aggrieved husband, and evidently originated out of the desire for personal revenge. But what was at first a mere arbitrary personal vengeance has now generally become an act which is supported by tribal custom. The husband slays the aggressor, but he knows that in so doing he will be backed by public opinion, and may even call in others to assist him. He is allowed or expected to administer punishment. Frequently, too, adultery is taken cognizance of as an offence by the laws of a tribe or people, whether administered by the old men, a council, a chief, or by the State. In such cases the husband might appeal to any of these to decide what the punishment should be or to administer it. Thus in Australia, among the Kamilaroi, the husband's complaint is carried before the headman, who gives sentence; and among the tribes of N. S. Wales a similar process is found (Howitt, *op. cit.* 207; Fraser, *Abor. of N. S. Wales*, 39). Other instances of adultery being punishable judicially rather than by private revenge among peoples who also punish it in the latter way, are found among the Kanakas of New Caledonia, where the aggressor is led before the chief and his council, and executed by their sentence (De Rochas, *Nouv. Cult.* 262); among the Caribs, Samoans, Mishmis, in New Guinea, and in parts of Negro Africa (Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse*, 727 ff.; Turner, *Samoas*, 178; Chalmers, *Pioneering in N. G.* 179; Letourneau, 211). In such cases, however, the law may simply order the husband to execute the punishment, as in parts of ancient Mexico and in Central America (Bancroft, ii. 465; Biart, *Les Aztèques*, 168). And even where the offence is strictly a legal one, should the husband take the matter into his own hands, and, e.g., slay both offenders at once, he would still be considered to be acting within his own rights, or would be subject only to a slight penalty, as in China, Japan, ancient Peru (where it was held that Manco Capac had decreed death to adulterers, Garcilaso, *Royal Comm.* i. 81). Or if the husband does not act according to the judicial sentence, he himself may suffer. Thus among the Tatars, if he does not punish his wife, the chief takes the cattle which her accomplice has paid the husband (Letourneau, 216); and in China, if he does not repudiate his wife he is whipped (Pauthier, *op. cit.*

239). But we also find that, where the offence is a legal one, there is a tendency to stay the husband's desire for the worst acts of vengeance. This has probably originated the frequent system of compensation by fine; it also accounts for cases, as among the Kafirs or the Bakwiri, where the husband must not kill the offending wife, and if he does so is punished as a murderer (M'Lean, *op. cit.* 117; Post, *Afri. Jurisp.* i. 401); and, as among the Wakamba and other peoples, where the husband is allowed to slay the parties only when taken *flagrant delicto*.

The birth of twins is with many savage peoples regarded as uncanny, and one or both are put to death. The reason for this belief is not always certain, but in some cases it is thought, probably as a result of the further belief that a man can be the father of no more than one child, that a god has had intercourse with the woman. Such a belief is found among the Negroes (some of whom, however, regard the birth as lucky for this reason), South American tribes, and Melanesians (Ellis, *Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, 67; Codrington, *Melanesians*, 235). In such cases we have the idea that the wife has committed adultery with a divinity or spirit, as in the Greek myths of Alcmena and Leda. But it is sometimes held as a proof of adultery with another man (S. American tribes [Waltz, iii. 394, 450], *Teutons* [Westermarck, *Moral Ideas*, l. 405]). See Rendel Harris, *Cult. of Heavenly Twins*.

5. Adultery within the prohibited degrees.—Among all races, marriage or sexual union is absolutely forbidden between certain persons, whether blood-relations or members of the same group, clan, totem, or tribe, as the case may be. Any offence against such a law is, to the savage mind, one of the worst forms of adultery; indeed, it should rather be called incest. It is not a trespass upon another's property, but a breach of tabu, and thus approaches our idea of impurity; while it is believed to bring ill-luck or disaster upon the family, clan, or tribe. As any breach of such a law is thus believed to affect the whole group, it is therefore punished by the group or by those to whom the administration of justice is delegated. There is no question of private revenge. Any such offence is regarded as so horrible, so disgraceful, and even so obnoxious to the gods (Turner, *Samoas*, 92), that it is usually unheard of, and no one thinks of committing it. But where it is committed, the punishment is usually death to both offenders, as in Australia, New Britain, New Hebrides, and among the Amer. Indians (Spencer-Gillen\*, 15, do. b 140; Westermarck, *Marriage*, 300; JAI xviii. 282; Macdonald, *Oceania*, 181; Frazer, *Totemism*, 59). In Yucatan the man was looked upon as an outcast (Bancroft, ii. 665); and a fine was levied among the Dyaks, Chukmas, and others (St. John, *Forests of the Far East*, ii. 198; Lewin, *Wild Races of S.E. India*, 186).

6. Adultery of the husband.—That, at the lower stages of civilization, adultery is regarded as an offence against the proprietary rights of the husband, is borne witness to by the fact that it is an offence only from the husband's point of view. With the rarest exceptions has the wife any redress when the husband himself offends, and it is only at higher levels of civilization that she has any general right to complain. Of course, where the husband commits adultery, he is always in danger of death or fine at the hands of the guardian or husband of his paramour, but this does not affect his wife's position in the matter. Where the wife has the power of complaining to a tribunal or of causing the husband to be punished (and probably wherever the woman has any influence at all, she will complain freely to her husband), the cases are probably to be classed with those where she can obtain redress for other offences, e.g. ill-usage. But the cases are so exceptional that no law can be framed from them, though they may foreshadow the dawning of the idea of the equal rights of wife and husband, and of the ethical belief that adultery is wrong.

Among the people of W. Victoria the wife can get an adulterous husband punished by complaining to the elders of the tribe, who send him away for a short period (Howard, *Matrim. Inst.* i. 229; Nieboer, *Slavery*, 18). In Africa, the husband in Great Bassam pays a fine to the wife for unfaithfulness (Post, *Afrik. Juris.* ii. 72), and among the Marianna he is severely punished (Waitz, ii. 106). With the Khonds of Orissa, where polyandry exists, and the woman can set a higher price upon herself, the husband cannot strike her for infidelity, whereas he is punished or is held to have dishonoured himself (Westermarck in *Sociol. Papers* (1904), 152). The Omaha wife could revenge herself on the husband and his paramour; and among the Sioux and Dakotas she could leave her husband for unfaithfulness (Dorsey, *BE*, 1885, 364; Howard, i. 239). Divorce for unfaithfulness on the husband's part might be obtained by the wife occasionally, as among some of the peoples of the Indian archipelago, the Shans, and others (Westermarck, *Marriage*, 527). But with these few exceptions savage mankind has scarcely recognized the fact that the adultery of the husband is a wrong done to his wife. Though it might be thought that the matriarchate would give the wife some power over her husband's infidelities, this is not supported by evidence, save in a few particular cases. These are where the royal succession was through a woman, who usually married a man of lower rank than herself, and remained his superior. His adultery was punishable, but she claimed greater licence. Thus among the Tensas of North America, where the chief was looked on as a demi-god, his sister's son succeeded him. She, being thus also divine, treated her husband as a slave, killed him if he were unfaithful, but allowed herself great licence (M'Lennan, 420). Similarly in Loango a princess might be licentious, but would have her husband's head chopped off if he even looked at another woman (Pinkerton, xvi. 569). This did not apply to any other classes, and is on a level with the severity of the punishment meted out to a man committing adultery with the wife of a chief. It should be noted, however, that with a few peoples, the wife may have a ground for divorcing her husband if he takes a second wife or a concubine (Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, i. 136); while, even where polygamy is practised, the feeling of jealousy on a wife's part, though it may not affect her husband directly or stay his desire of introducing another wife to his household, is frequently directed against the new-comer to her hurt, and in some cases the wife will commit suicide (Westermarck, *Marriage*, 497 ff.).

7. Permissible adultery.—Adultery among the lower races is considered wrong, viz. an offence against the rights of the husband, when it is committed apart from his will. There are occasions on which he commands or sanctions it, or when it is, so to say, legalized by social or religious custom. The custom of lending wives either to friends or strangers emphasizes once more the view that the wife is the husband's property. Here she acts at his will, as in the other case she infringes his rights. Here for the time the feeling of jealousy is in abeyance, even where it exists most strongly, and the husband decides that the wife may commit adultery. We thus see that adultery has not the precise meaning to the savage which it has to the civilized man.

The custom of lending wives is well-nigh universal among savages (Westermarck, *Marriage*, 74, 130), but various reasons exist for it, nor is it always to be explained as the outcome of hospitality. (a) In cases where a wife is lent to a friend, it may be done out of sheer friendliness or as an act of gratitude, but generally the lender will expect a similar favour to be shown to him. In other words, there will be reciprocity, as among the Columbian Indians, who barter wives as a sign

of friendship (*Hist. Univ. des Voy.* xiii. 375), the Eskimos, Polynesians, and others (M'Lennan, *Studies*, 2nd Ser., 376; Letourneau, 212). The practice of lending wives is sometimes reduced to a system, as in those Australian tribes with whom limits to the  
Thus, where  
s wife only to  
men belonging to his own group, i.e. to those alone to whom his wife would have been marriageable (Spencer-Gillenb., 141).  
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of polyandry, as where a brother permits relations with his wife to younger brothers, as well as the system of secondary husbands, might rather be classed as instances of lending.

(b) Sometimes it is done by way of sealing a covenant of friendship between two men, who then exchange their wives, as in Timor (*Deutsche Geog. Blätt.* x. 530), or after a quarrel between tribesmen, as in N. S. Wales (*JAL* xiv. 353). In all such cases the friends would belong to the same tribe or clan, and the act would have a more or less sacred significance.

(c) Where the custom of lending a wife to a stranger is concerned, it is usually assumed that hospitality alone is the cause (Westermarck, *Marriage*, 74); and though this may frequently be true, it is doubtful whether it covers all such cases, or if the husband would for this reason alone relinquish his rights over his wife. The reason is perhaps to be sought in the common idea that the stranger is, *ipso facto*, a dangerous person. Magical and other ceremonies are often used on his arrival to neutralize the danger (*GEZ* i. 299 ff.), and respectful treatment throughout his stay is necessary for the same end. Thus the extremely common custom of lending a wife or other woman to a stranger may justly be assumed to be but one of many acts which are intended to ward off his evil powers. It tends to placate him, while, by bringing him into direct relation with the man who offers his wife, it makes him one with him. This view seems to be confirmed by the fact that among the Mercededs, an Arab tribe, the stranger who would not accept the woman offered him was driven away by the women with hoots and contumely (*Hist. Univ. des Voy.* xxxii. 380). It was desirable to get rid of a guest who was not only dangerous, but evidently disposed to act dangerously. This custom of lending wives to strangers is found practically among all savage tribes (Letourneau, *op. cit. passim*).

(d) Occasionally the idea that the woman was ennobled by the embraces of a stranger may have prevailed, especially where he was a white man. This was believed by the Tasmanians (Wake, *Ecol. of Morality*, i. 77), and probably underlies the fact that many peoples—Australians, Negroes, Sandwich Islanders, and some Eskimos—who are jealous of their own tribesmen, show no jealousy of white men, and freely allow them to have intercourse with their wives (Westermarck, *Marriage*, 131). On the whole, there is no correspondence to the custom of allowing the medicine man or priest to cohabit with the wife to ensure offspring, or to confer magical or religious virtues. This is found among the Eskimos, who believe that it is an honour for wife and husband that the *angkok* should have intercourse with the former (Egede, *Descr. of Greenland*, 140), among the Kalmuks (Moore, *Mar. Customs*, 182), in the Philippines, India, and Egypt (Reclus, *Prim. Folk*, 172-173). It is perhaps an extension of the custom of deforation by another than the husband, frequently a priest or chief, or of allowing several persons to have access to the newly-married virgin, in order to lessen the danger of sexual tabu for the husband (Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 347 ff.; Spencer-Gillenb., 93 ff.; Teulon, *Orig. de la Famille*, 69; Westermarck, 76 ff.)—a custom not to be confounded with the claim made by a chief for feudal lord over all marriageable women, the *jus primæ noctis*.

(e) Another cause which will override the feeling of jealousy is the love of gain—the husband trading with his wife to strangers or others. The Yumas of New Mexico and other Amer. Indians, the tribes of tropical S. America, the Eskimos, the Tahitians, and other Polynesian tribes, Negroes, Australians, and others (Bancroft, i. 218, 514; Powers, *Tribes of California*, 413; ZIVAR, 1898, 297; Lisiansky, *Voyage Round World*, 82, 123; Bosman in Pinkerton, xvi. 525) freely offer their wives for money or its equivalent. But it is to be observed that this revolting practice, though not unknown as between savages themselves, has frequently been introduced or largely increased through contact with men of a higher civilization (Nansen, *Eskimo Life*, 166; Westermarck, 131).

(f) Adultery is further sanctioned by social and religious custom, especially at festivals or at other times, when a wife is lent or a general exchange of wives takes place. This apparent promiscuity has usually a distinct end in view, very frequently of a magical character—to ensure the smooth working of the ceremonies about to be observed, or by way of beginning a new life by, so to say, exchanging identity for the time being, or to procure fertility for the soil, or to avert trouble or sickness, or to insure the unified relationship of those practising this promiscuity. Such general exchange is found in Australia (Spencer-Gillenb., 83, do. 157, 141), in Fiji (*JAL* xiv. 28), among the Eskimos (*Ann. Rep. BE*, vi. 633), and among other peoples (Crawley, *op. cit.* 258). It has probably been of universal occurrence at such times, and in Europe relics of it are found in the folk-festivals, at which considerable licence still prevails.

(g) Religious prostitution usually occurred before marriage, and was associated with the worship of divinities of fertility; but in some cases a wife had to devote herself occasionally for this purpose and in order (as in a province of China) to secure

magically the fertility of the land (Eusebius, *Vita Const.* III. 55; Macrobius, *Saturnalia* ed. I. 212).

See also for lending of wives, Starcke, *Primitive Family*, 122; Waite, *ibid.* III. 111; Post, *Afrikan. Jurispr.* I. 471-472.

8. Adultery as an offence against purity and religion.—It has been seen that, to the savage, adultery is mainly a breach of the husband's proprietary rights. Whether any further ethical idea was imported into it, making it an act of impurity, is a question which it is difficult to answer. But it is not improbable that savages, who are quite aware that it is wrong, may attach some idea of impurity to its committal. If so, this conception may have arisen out of the idea of sexual tabu, the danger existing in intimate relations between man and woman—a danger existing even in marriage. This danger, implying a material contagion, would naturally be increased where a man had no right of access to a woman; it is most dangerous of all where adultery occurs within the forbidden degrees (§ 5). Out of this danger and material contagion the idea of sin and of impurity might easily arise; and we can hardly doubt that, in the evolution of moral ideas, it has so arisen (Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 214). On this ground, therefore, it might be claimed that adultery is known by savages to be an act of impurity. They certainly believe that there are occasions when it is magically dangerous; that certain penalties will befall the transgressor, either automatically or, possibly, by the act of higher powers.

Ethical teaching among savages has hardly been made the subject of inquiry by actual observers, yet it is curious to note that among some of the lowest races—Australians and Andamanians—adultery is held to be a grave moral offence, and, with the former, is taught to be so to the youths at initiation, while with both it is obnoxious to their high god, and will be punished by him (Stan, *JAL* xiii. 450, 452; Howitt, *JAL* xii. 150-157, *Native Tribes*, 50). Elsewhere, as among the Indians of Guiana, the fear of spirits prevents them from offending against the rights of others, and this would probably include adultery (*JAL* xl. 382). With the Fungians, also, adultery and lewdness are condemned as evil (Westermarck, 58). We cannot say, however, that it is with these peoples an offence against purity. Perhaps only at a higher stage is this conception really reached: thus it is said to have been a maxim in ancient Mexico that 'he who looks too curiously on a woman commits adultery with his eyes' (Sahagun, *Hist. gen. de las cosas de Nueva España*, II. 147), and both in Mexico and Peru a more ethical view of sin obtained. Among the rare cases where savages believe that in the future life retributive justice will follow their evil actions, it is also likely that adultery would be included in such actions. In those cases where the sins of the living are annually transferred to an animal or a human victim, or where this is done on behalf of a dead person as part of the funeral rites, adultery is frequently one of those sins, as among the Niger tribes, the Todas, and Badagas, and others (Crawley and Taylor, *Gospel on Banks of Niger*, 344; Reclus, 208). At the Bask festival of the Creek Indians, men who had violated the marriage law were not allowed to take part in the fast, and the new fire was believed to atone for all crimes except murder (Frazer, *GB* II. 230). In such cases, however, sin is rather a material than a spiritual contagion, though the particular sin may involve the idea of incipient ethical impurity, and, as such, be obnoxious to higher powers. Again, the magical view of the danger of adultery at certain times is generally mixed up with the danger of lawful connexion at such times, but occasionally a distinction is made. During hunting, fishing, and especially in time of war, men are in a state of tabu, and must have no intercourse with women—a rule found among most savages, and one which must not be broken, lest ill-luck follow. The danger is here magical; but it is interesting to find it becoming more or less religious, as with the Aleuts, who fear that their own or their wives' unfaithfulness during whale-fishing would be punished by the whale, which is an object of reverence to them (Reclus, 22); and with some Amer. Indian tribes, e.g. the Dakotas, who think that the violation of captives would be revenged by the spirits of the dead; and the Winnebagos, who observe continence because it was commanded by the 'Great Spirit' (Schoolcraft, *Ind. Tribes*, IV. 63; Drake, *Ind. Tribes*, I. 14). A saying of the Eskimos at Anghalik may also be cited, that 'the whale, the musk-ox, and the reindeer left the country because men had too much to do with other men's wives' (Nansen, *Eskimo Life*, 173). Occasionally, too, the vengeance of a mysterious god worshipped by males in their private mysteries is invoked, to deter women from adultery among certain Negro tribes, with whom a man representing the god enters the assembled croud by night, seizes a suspected woman, and scourges her (Letourneau, 129).

It should be noted that the frequent appreciation of the chastity of unmarried women entertained by many savages, while connected with the idea that they are the property of their guardians or prospective husbands, may also be due to

respect for sexual tabu. With some peoples, unchastity is considered absolutely disgraceful, and both parties are punished; while in Loango it is held to bring ruin on the country, and with some of the Sea Dyaks it is believed to be offensive to the higher powers (Pinkerton, xvi. 563; St. John, *Forests of Far East*, I. 52).

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ADULTERY (Buddhist).—The last of the five Precepts binding on a Buddhist layman is not to act wrongly in respect of fleshly lusts (*Anguttara*, 3. 212). In a very ancient paraphrase of these Precepts in verse (*Sutta Nipāta*, 393-398), this one is expressed as follows: 'Let the wise man avoid unchastity as if it were a pit of live coals. Should he be unable to be celibate, let him not offend with regard to the wife of another.' This is evidence not so much of Buddhist ethics as of the general standard of ethics in the 6th cent. B.C., in Kosala and Magadha. In the Buddhist Canon Law we find a regulation to be followed by members of the Order, when on their rounds for alms, in order to prevent the possibility of suspicion or slander in this respect (*Pācittiya*, 43, translated in *Vinaya Texts*, I. 41). An adulterer taken in the act might be wounded or slain on the spot. This explains the implication of the words used in *Samyutta*, 2. 188. But adultery was also an offence against the State, and an offender could be arrested by the police, and brought up for trial and judgment (Commentary on Dhammapada, 300). In such texts of the law administered in Buddhist countries as have so far been made accessible to us, the view taken of adultery is based on these ancient customs. So, for instance, of the Sinhalese, Panabokke says (*Niti Nighandura*, p. xxix) that adultery, unless committed in the king's palace, was seldom punished by the Kandian judges; (1) because the husband was loath, by complaint, to publish his disgrace; and (2) because he was allowed to take vengeance himself if the offender were caught under such circumstances that adultery was presumable. (See also Richardson, *The Dhammathat*, Burmese text and English translation, Rangoon, 1906). Nothing is said in the Buddhist law-books of any punishment to be inflicted, either by the husband or by the State, on the adulteress. Buddhist influence in this matter, except in so far as it mitigated severity against the woman, was therefore confined to the maintenance of pre-Buddhist ideas and customs.

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ADULTERY (Egyptian).—That adultery with a married woman was looked upon as a sin in Egypt is shown by the Negative Confession (part of ch. 125 of the Book of the Dead, a chapter that has not yet been found earlier than the 18th Dyn.). Here, in the 19th clause, we read, 'I have not defiled the wife of a husband' (v.l. 'the wife of another man'). That it was also against the law is implied by a text of the reign of Ramses V. (c. 1150 B.C.) containing a long list of crimes charged against a ship-master at Elephantine, amongst them being that of adultery with two women, each of whom is described as 'mother of M. and wife of N.' (Pleyte, *Pap. de Turin*, pl. li ff.; Spiegelberg, *ZA*, 1891, 82). The didactic papyri warn against adultery as well as fornication. Ptahhotep says, 'If thou desirest to prolong friendship in a house which thou enterest as master, as colleague, or as friend, or where-so-ever thou enterest, avoid approaching the women: no place prospereth where that is done. . . . A thousand men have been destroyed to enjoy a short moment like a dream: one attaineth death in knowing it' (*Priest Pap.* ix. 7-12; Gunn, *Instruc.*

tion of Ptahhotep, p. 49). This text is not later than the Middle Kingdom. Another, of the period of the Deltaic dynasties, charges the youth to remember that 'the woman whose husband is afar off (or possibly 'the woman whose husband has freed himself from her,' i.e. 'divorced her'), behold she adorneth herself for thee daily. If there is no witness with her, she standeth and spreadeth her net. O crime worthy of death if one listens!' (*Pap. de Boulaq.* i. 16; Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, 155). The story of Ubaaner turns on the infidelity of his wife with a peasant, who is eventually handed over to a magic crocodile to devour, the woman being taken to the north side of the palace (evidently a place of public assembly) and burned, and her ashes cast into the river (Erman, *Pap. Westcar*, p. 1 ff.; Petrie, *Tales*, i. p. 97; Maspero, *Contes Pop.* p. 24). One of Herodotus' Egyptian tales is of king Pheron, who gathered his unfaithful wives into one town and destroyed all together by fire (*Hdt.* ii. 111). But it would not be safe to conclude that burning was ever the established penalty for adultery. In the New-Kingdom Story of the Two Brothers (Petrie, *Tales*, ii. p. 36; Maspero, p. 1), Bito, the younger brother, is solicited by the wife of the elder brother Anûp, like Joseph by the wife of Potiphar, and reproves her with the words, 'thou art as a mother unto me, and thy husband as a father.' Anûp, when convinced of her guilt—which was doubly, since in her fear she had accused Bito to him, and endeavoured to persuade him to kill Bito—slew her and cast her to the dogs. What the legal penalty for adultery was in real life, or by whom it was exacted, is not known. In two contracts of the time of the 26th Dyn., the earliest marriage contracts yet discovered in Egypt, the husband declares, 'If I leave the woman N., whether desiring to leave her from dislike (?) or desiring another woman than her, apart from the great crime that is found in woman, I will restore to her' the dowry, etc. The implication is that the husband had at least no obligation to the wife if he had divorced her for adultery. These contracts were written at Thebes in 539 and 549 B.C. respectively. Later marriage contracts, those of the reign of Darius and the numerous Egyptian contracts of Ptolemaic date, contain no definite reference to adultery (for all these see Griffith, *Catalogue of the John Rylands Papyri*, pp. 114 ff., 134 ff.); on the other hand, in the rarer Ptolemaic contracts written in Greek (Grenfell and Hunt, *Tebtunis Papyri*, i. 449) adultery and all forms of conjugal infidelity are forbidden to both husband and wife. The penalty for the husband is the forfeiture of the dowry, but that for the wife is not specified; perhaps one may gather that she was left absolutely at her husband's mercy. The contracts of Roman date, all of which are written in Greek, prescribe a blameless life on both sides, but in less detail.

A chapter of the very ancient Pyramid texts, as found in the pyramid of Unas (Onnos), after describing the divinity of the dead king and the continued activity of his bodily functions, ends strangely: 'Unas is a generator who carrieth off women from their husbands to any place that he wisheth, when his heart moveth him.' This idea is hardly to be reconciled with a highly developed moral sense in the nation, unless the divinity of kings invested them with special privileges that would be contrary to all good manners for their subjects. F. LL. GRIFFITH.

**ADULTERY (Greek).**—In Athens, adultery (*μορχεια*) on the part of the wife implied criminal intercourse with any man other than her husband. On the part of the husband it was, strictly speaking,

criminal intercourse with the wife, sister, or mother of a fellow-citizen, or with his concubine, if she were a native Athenian (*Dem. Aristocr.* p. 637, § 53).

This strict interpretation was in the classical period widened so as to include offences committed against maidens and widows. On neither side is the offence regarded as a violation of the sanctity of a binding obligation, but as an offence against the family. Hence the special severity with which the wife was treated as compared with the husband. Any act of misconduct on her side might introduce alien blood into the family and pollute the worship of its ancestors. Marital infidelity involved no such dangers to a man's own family, and was condoned by law, except in so far as it infringed the rights of other families. There are traces, however, which show that the best opinion condemned it (*Isocrates, Nicocles*, § 42; *Aristot. Pol.* 1336a. 1; *Plaut. Merc.* 817f., where the reference is to Greek and not Roman life).

1. Punishment of the man.—If the husband caught the offender *flagrante delicto* (*ἀρρεπ' ἐν ἔσθρῳ*, *Lucian, Eun.* 10), he might kill him at once (*Dem. Aristocr.* § 53). That this law was no mere antiquated survival can be seen from *Lysias, de caede Eratosth.* § 23 ff., where an account will be found of the killing of the adulterer Eratosthenes by the injured husband Euphiletus, who, it should be noticed, is careful to secure the presence of witnesses to his act. The husband, however, might content himself with punishment short of death, e.g. *παράμυθς* and *παρὰιδωσις* (*Suid. s.v. παρὰμυθς* and *Λακιδάμς*; *Schol. Aristoph. Nub.* 1083, *Plut.* 168, *Eccl.* 722); or he might agree to accept a sum of money in compensation for the wrong done to him. He was allowed to keep the offender prisoner until satisfactory guarantees were given that the sum promised would be paid (*Dem.* in *Near.* § 65; *Lys. de caede Eratosth.* § 25: *ἵκεν μὴ ἀποκτείναι ἀλλ' ἀργύριον παράσσειν*). If the alleged adulterer denied the offence, he could bring an action for unjust detention (*ἀδικίης ἐπιχθῆναι ὡς μοιχῶς*) before the *Thesmothetæ*. Should he fail to prove his case, the Court directed his sureties to hand him over to the offended husband, who might inflict whatever chastisement he chose within the precincts of the Court, provided that sword or dagger was not used (*ἀνευ ἔχρησίδιον*, in *Near.* § 66). If the offender escaped, or had not been taken in the act, the husband or, in the case of maidens and widows, the guardian (*κύριος*) could bring an action for adultery (*γραφὴ μοιχέας*) before the *Thesmothetæ*. It is doubtful if any one unconnected with the family could bring such an action. It is not known exactly what penalty was inflicted, but in all probability it was disfranchisement (*ἀτιμία*), either total or partial.

2. Punishment of the woman.—If misconduct was proved, the husband was required to repudiate his wife, under the penalty of himself suffering *ἀτιμία*. She was excluded from public temples, and, if she refused compliance, could be expelled with impunity by any citizen. Such assailant might tear off her clothes and ornaments, but might not maim or kill her (in *Near.* § 87; *Æschin. in Timarch.* § 183). *Heliodorus* (*Æthiop.* i. 11) is mistaken in stating that an adulteress was punished by death.

Little is known of the practice of other Greek communities in dealing with adultery. That it was everywhere regarded as a grave crime is clear from *Xen. Hiero.* iii. 3, where it is stated that many cities allowed the adulterer to be killed with impunity. *Zaleucus*, the Locrian legislator, ordained the punishment of blinding (*Æl. Var. Hist.* xiii. 24. 5); at *Cyme* and in *Pisidia* the adulteress was paraded on an ass (*Plut. Quest. Gr.* 2; *Stob. Anth.* xlv. 41); and at various other cities, e.g.



Lepreon, Gortyn, and Tenedos, the offenders were either fined, pilloried, or disfranchised.

LITERATURE.—Meier and Schömann, *Der Attische Process*, ed. J. H. Lipsius, pp. 404-409; W. A. Becker, *Charikles*, ed. Goll. iii. p. 334 ff.; L. Beauchet, *Hist. du droit privé de la République*, i. p. 232 f. The chief passages from Greek authors are collected in I. B. Telfy, *Corpus Juris Attici*, No. 1169-1184.

F. W. HALL.

**ADULTERY (Hindu).**—The view which Hindus take of adultery is founded upon their conception of the nature of woman and marriage. The whole of Hindu literature is pervaded by the pessimistic idea of the inconstancy of the female character, by complaints of woman's unbridled indulgence of passion, and by demands for the maintenance of a strict oversight upon her. The practice of polygamy, which has existed from ancient times in India by the side of monogamy, and the consequently slight esteem in which the Hindu woman has been held up to the present day, must necessarily have led to the occurrence of adultery, and to a lenient judgment being passed upon the fault. On the other hand, it should be noted that we do find, even if not so frequently, an especially high value set upon the wife who proves true to her husband (*pativrata*), and that the law threatens adultery with severe punishment.

As early as the oldest historical period, the Indian people, on the testimony of the Rigveda, are by no means found, as is sometimes represented, in a condition of patriarchal simplicity and of austere moral habit. The word 'adultery' is unknown to the Veda. But numerous indications point to the fact that the highly developed culture did not fail to produce its ordinary consequences in corruption of character and moral laxity. Women who betray their husbands (*patirapah*) are mentioned by way of comparison in Rigv. iv. 5. 5: 'Evil-doers . . . who walk in evil ways, like women who betray their husbands, shall be consumed by Agni.' In verse 4 of the didactic poem Rigv. x. 34, it is said that 'others lay hands on the wife of the man who abandons himself to the dice.' If from these passages we may infer on the one hand a censure upon the transgression of the marriage vow, on the other hand matrimonial infidelity is spoken of as something in itself intelligible and of daily occurrence. To this effect are the numerous stories which relate the intrigues of the gods with married women, e.g. of Indra with the wife of Vṛṣanaśva (Rigv. i. 51. 13, combined with Sātyāyana-Brāhmaṇa by Sāyana in l.c.; Śaṅkha-Br. i. 1. 16; Maitrayanisamhitā ii. 5. 5), with Apālā Atreyi (Rigv. viii. 91, and Sāty. Br. in l.c.), and with Ahalyā, the wife of Gautama (Śaṅkha-Br. i. 1. 19-20); of the Aśvin with Sukanyā, the wife of Chyavana (Satap. Br. iv. 1. 5), etc. The conduct of the gods is not here made a matter of reproach; and as little in other passages is adultery regarded from the ethical standpoint. It is because the Brāhman is in possession of the secret whereby he can by his curse inflict harm, that therefore men must refrain from illicit intercourse with the wife of a Brāhman (Satap. Br. xiv. 9. 4, 11; Brhadār. vi. 4. 12; Pārask. Grh. Sū. i. 11. 6). Adultery is mentioned in a similar connexion in the Atharvaveda, viz. in the magical spells and imprecations by which, for example, wives soothe the jealousy of their husbands, or keep their rivals at a distance, or by which the husband seeks to win back his unfaithful wife (Atharv. vi. 18; iii. 18; vi. 77).

The following passages throw a light that is altogether unfavorable on the ethical conditions of the Vedic period:—

In the *raṇunapraghāsa* the wife of the sacrificer is required by the priest to name her paramour.\* 'Who cares whether the

\* *Kena charasi, 'with whom do you go?' Śat. ii. 5. 2, 20; cf. Kāty. v. 5. 6-10.*

wife is unchaste (*parahpumsā*) or no?'\* In Ts. v. 6. 8, 3 a special penance is appointed for the man who for the first time has performed the sacred *agnichayana*; he is not again to have intercourse with a *rāmā* (the wife of a Śūdra). And he who has performed it for the second time must abstain henceforth from intercourse with the wife of another man.† Such conditions, comparable with hetairism, must have exercised an unfavourable influence on the purity of the race, and have rendered illusory the detailed pedigrees which were essential for ancestor-worship and other ritual purposes. That men were conscious of the actual unreliability of the lists of ancestors is shown by Nidāna-sūtra, iii. 8: 'Inconstant are the ways of women. Of whosoever (as father) I shall call myself the son before both gods and men as witnesses, his son I shall be; and those whom I shall name as (my) sons, they will be my sons.' The attempt, however, was of course made in ancient times to provide against this ignorance by strict oversight of the woman; for the begetting of a son of the body (*vijāvan*) is regarded even in the Rigveda as necessary for the preservation of the race.‡ A proof of this is afforded by an ancient *pāṭha* quoted in Apastamba, ii. 13. 7, and Baudhāyana, ii. 3. 34, which is taken from a dialogue between Aupajandhani, a teacher of the white Yajurveda, and the mythical king Janaka: 'Now am I jealous for my wife, O Janaka, though (I was) not before; for in Yama's house the son is awarded to him who begat him. The begetter leads the son after his death into the dwelling-place of Yama. Therefore they protect their wives carefully, who dread the seed of strangers. Watch jealously this propagation of (your) race, let no strange seed fall on your field. When he passes into the other world, the son belongs to him who begat him; it is in vain that the husband (the nominal father) accomplishes this perpetuation of his race.'

A contrast between an earlier period of laxity and a later of austere morals can hardly be derived from the passages quoted. Even when in later times a strict marriage law was developed, and in the *Smṛtis* legal regulations were formulated with regard to adultery (*strisāngrahaṇa*), polygamy and prostitution continued to exist, and the frequent mention of the son 'born secretly,'§ who may be heir to his mother's husband, though he is her illegitimate son by some other man, does not testify to a high regard for the marriage vow. A change of view was effected in course of time only so far as under the increasing influence of priestly theories adultery was seen to involve a danger to the caste system established by the Brāhmins, and an attempt was made to obviate this by the threat of severe punishments. It is essentially from the standpoint of caste distinctions that adultery is condemned in the *Smṛtis*. 'Whatever woman betrays her husband, proud of her beauty and her descent, the king shall cause to be torn in pieces by dogs in an open place. The paramour shall be roasted on an iron bed; brushwood shall men throw (upon the fire); there shall the evil-doer be consumed.¶ If these words implied merely the condemnation of adultery in general, they would be in contradiction to the comparatively lenient punishments prescribed later on.\*\* The crime which demands an expiation so terrible is certainly the intercourse of a Brāhman woman with a man belonging to one of the three lower castes. This is proved by the similar regulations of other law-givers,†† and the parallel passages of the Mahābhārata and Agnipurāṇa:

'Whatever woman abandons the nobler husband (i.e. a Brāhman, according to the commentator Nilakāṇṭha) and seeks another inferior marriage couch (*svaṇarāṇaṁ nichavarnam*, 'inferior as regards caste', Nilakāṇṭha), the king shall cause to be torn in pieces by dogs in an open place.'‡ 'Whoever being lower (in caste) has sexual intercourse with a woman higher (in caste) deserves death. But the woman, who betrays her husband, shall he (the king) cause to be torn in pieces by dogs.'§§

\* Yājñavalkya in Sat. i. 3. 1, 21.

† Na *duṣṭiyan chitvā 'nyasya striyam upyāt*.

‡ Rigv. iii. 1. 23, vii. 4.

§ *Langhayet*, properly the commentators, *anyap taropagamanena* (Kullūk. another man).

¶ Manu, viii. 371 f.

†† Apastamba, ii. 10. 27, 8, 9; Gautama, xxiii. 14, 15; Yājñavalkya, ii. 286.

‡§ *Sreyāṇśan śayanān hitvā yānyam pāpam nigacchati*, *śabhis tām ardayet rāja saṁsthāne bahuvistare*, Mahābh. xii. 165. 64.

§§ *Uttamāṇ sevamānāḥ striṣṭ jaghanyo vadham arhati*, *bhar-tārāṇaṁ langhayet yā tāṁ śabhiḥ saṅghālayet striyam*, Agni-Pur. 227 42.



By the side of these savage penalties the punishments assigned in the following verses of the *Āgni-P.* in expiation of adultery seem altogether ludicrous: 'The woman misused by a man belonging to an equal caste shall be allowed to eat only sufficient to sustain life; the woman misused by a man of a higher caste shall have her head shaved. A Brāhman for intercourse with a Vaisya woman, a Kṣatriya for intercourse with a woman of lower caste, a Kṣatriya or a Vaisya for the first offence of intercourse with a Sūdra woman, shall be fined.'

The punishments in Manu are similarly graded according to the caste to which the offenders belong. For adultery with the wife of a man of one of the three higher castes, a Sūdra is to be punished with confiscation of property and the cutting off of his organ of generation; if she were guarded,—a condition to which great importance is attached,—the penalty may even be death. In this latter case a similar punishment overtakes the Vaisya or Kṣatriya who is guilty with a Brāhman woman; otherwise they escape with heavy fines, imprisonment, shaving of the head, and watering of the head with urine. A Brāhman, on the contrary, who is guilty of a similar offence, is only condemned to fines, which are lower than in the case of a Kṣatriya.\*

The wife guilty of adultery may justly be repudiated, and expulsion from caste also usually follows. Since, however, divorce is opposed to the principle of Hindu law, which regards it as a sin for husband and wife to be separated on the ground of mutual aversion,† and according to the testimony of al-Bīrūnī did not occur,‡ we must assume that, as a rule, the adultery was not allowed to come to light, and that the rule of Vignu was observed, according to which the tribunals were to interfere only when the husband was unable without assistance to manage his wife.§ In the view of certain *Smṛtis* also, absolute repudiation of the wife was not always the consequence of adultery. Pāraskara ordains that repudiation is to be resorted to only where the adulterous connexion has not been without result, or the woman has separated herself permanently from her family.¶ Hārta even declares himself expressly against the repudiation of the adulteress.‡ Other passages make mention of merely temporary and insignificant penances, such as the use of inferior food and clothing, sleeping on the ground, and performance of the servile tasks of scouring and sweeping.\*\*

Statements which appear strange, but which are based upon the inferior position of the Hindu woman and the restraint to which she is subjected, regard as adultery conversations in an improper place or at an improper time, personal contact, playing and jesting, even the rendering of attentions and gifts of clothing, ornaments, flowers, etc.††

Undoubtedly more of theory than reality underlies these legal prescriptions. How little they corresponded to generally accepted ideas of morality is shown, for example, by the paragraph of the *Kāmasūtra* which treats of intercourse with married women. Among the reasons which deter a woman from adultery, regard for morals is mentioned only in the last place. Even the stern penalties which the law ordains for adultery between those belonging to different castes are to be ascribed, in the first instance, to the endeavour of the Brāhmins to give support to the social order which they had themselves evolved, and to assert the precedence to which they laid claim. Actual examples, nevertheless, of the infliction of savage punishments upon adulteresses are found in the popular literature. Instances are on record where the king is enjoined to have the nose and ears of the adulterous wife cut off.‡‡ In a narrative of the *Pañchatantra* §§ the aggrieved husband himself administers correction by cutting off his wife's nose and repudiating her. This kind of penalty seems to have been quite usual in the Middle Ages, even

as it is to-day. It meets us again, at least as a threat, in the legendary literature of the Buddhists.

And of this evil woman cut off the ears and nose from her living body.\* As here the threatened punishment is not carried out, so elsewhere throughout the *Jātakas* a very mild conception of adultery is presented. In the *Pabbatūpāthara Jātaka*† the king begs his wife, whom he loves, and the minister with whom she has had guilty intercourse, not to sin again, and forgives them. Another king, who has been betrayed by his wife with all the sixty-four messengers whom he has sent to her during the campaign, gives orders for the guilty parties to be beheaded. The future Buddha, however, obtains their pardon by pointing out to the king that the men were led astray by the queen, and that she has only followed her nature, since women are insatiable in the indulgence of their passions.‡ Elsewhere a minister who has transgressed in the royal harem, and is caught *flagrante delicto*, is banished from the realm.§

This lenient judgment of adultery as it is found in the *Jātakas* is, nevertheless, not to be traced to an intentional relaxation on the part of the Buddhists of the Brāhman law of marriage, but rather to the fact that the narratives, which arose in popular circles and were transmitted orally, reflect the Hindu view better than the Brāhman theory as formulated in the *Smṛtis*. Among the peoples, moreover, who adopted Buddhism, marriage law and custom, like prescriptive rights and usages in general, underwent no essential change. Abstinence from adultery was one of the rules the observance of which was enjoined by the Congregation on the youths of the laity.¶ 'The taking of life,' it is said in the *Sigālovādasutta*, which minutely describes the duties of the laity, 'the appropriation of another's possessions, and falsehood are named (as offences); the wise do not commend intercourse with the wife of another man (*paradāragamanam*).'

According to the traditional accounts of the indigenous customary law of Ceylon, open punishment for adultery was usual only when the wives of the king were involved. In other cases the husband was at liberty, if he had caught the seducer in the act, to beat, wound, or even kill him. If the husband laid a complaint on the ground of adultery, the accused, in the absence of proof, was to be dismissed with reproof and warnings; but if convicted, to be condemned to light bodily punishment, with imprisonment and fine.‡

The legal principles, also, which are in force in Burma, and which are traceable to Hindu law but little modified by Buddhism, do not in general recognize the severe penalties threatened in the Brāhman law-books. Members of the lower castes guilty of adultery with a Brāhman woman are to be punished with 100 blows of a stick, but with 1000 blows in case of intercourse with a Kṣatriya. More stern punishments, however, such as burning alive, may be inflicted.\*\* In other cases fines suffice for expiation, the amount varying with the caste of the parties concerned. Should the offender, however, be unable to pay, he is reduced to slavery. The seducer must further apologize, and give his promise not to repeat the offence. Should he break his promise, he is excluded, if a Kṣatriya, from intercourse with his relatives; if a Brāhman, he is excommunicated from his caste, and reduced to the condition of a *Chandāla*.†† According to another passage of the

\* Manu, viii. 374-378.

† Nārada, xii. 90.

‡ India, ii. 154.

§ Vignu, v. 18.

¶ Pār. x. 15.

‡ Hār. iii. 13.

\*\* Gautama, xxii. 35; Vasistha, xxi. 8, 35; Yājñavalkya, i. 70; Nārada, xii. 91.

†† Nārada, xii. 62-63.

‡‡ e.g. Kathāsaritgāra, 61.

§§ Pañch. iii. 16.

\* CullapadumaJāt. 193.

† Pabb. 195.

‡ Akālarāṭṭh. 119.

§ GhataJāt. 335, and similarly SeyyajaJāt. 282.

¶ Micchaddhāra-vādin; cf. Dharmikasutta, Sutta Nipāta, 66f.

\*\* Nitti-Nighandura, Introd. p. xlix f.

†† Menu Kṛay, vi. 30.

†† Id. vi. 8.

same law-book,\* which exhibits in general a remarkable contrast to Hindu law, the Brāhman who is guilty of adultery with a woman of his own caste shall have his head shaved and be banished, or excommunicated from his caste.

The husband may separate himself from his adulterous wife, and may retain all her possessions.† The right to leave the unfaithful husband belongs also to the wife,‡ but she has no claim to the whole property.

In modern India adultery is regarded in the same light as in ancient times, since the regulations of the Brāhman law-books are still valid, and the social position of woman has undergone little change. It is true that even by the Hindu of today the chaste wife who remains loyal to her husband is looked upon as the incarnation of Laksmī, the goddess of wealth and good fortune;§ but how little confidence the Hindus place in the faithfulness of their wives is shown by the close watch to which now, as formerly, they are subjected. The fear of punishment is regarded at the present time also as the best security for the observance of the marriage vow. 'No punishment is thought too brutal for unfaithfulness, and of this fact the women are well aware. I have myself seen instances, especially in the North-West Provinces, where a husband has cut off the nose of his wife, not even upon actual proof, but upon mere suspicion. Hands are sometimes cut off, and other horrible forms of mutilation are resorted to. . . . The woman, robbed of her fair looks, is ruthlessly cast out.'|| Even if this picture is overdrawn, yet other travellers confirm the fact that stern jurisdiction is sometimes exercised by the husband. In Nepāl the aggrieved husband has the right openly to cut down the seducer when found guilty; and here, as well as among certain Chittagong Hill Tribes, a wife whom infidelity has betrayed into guilt is deprived of nose and ears.

Divorce on the ground of adultery is allowed, according to the Madras Census Report for 1891. The Census Report, also, of the North-West Provinces and Oudh for 1901 mentions that the lower as well as the higher castes permit the divorce of the wife for unchastity. If, nevertheless, instances of divorce are rare, the cause is to be found less in a lofty morality than in the endeavour of the Hindus to withdraw their family life as much as possible from publicity.

LITERATURE.—J. Jolly, 'Recht u. Sitte,' in *GIAP* ii. 8, Strassburg, 1896, pp. 66, 121, 123; H. Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, 1870, pp. 306 ff., 331 f.; A. Weber, *Indische Studien*, x. 1893, p. 831; Pischel and Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, i. 1899, p. xxv; E. Hopkins, 'Social and Military Position of the Ruling Caste in Ancient India,' in *JAOI*, vol. xiii. 1899, pp. 107, 367; *Niti-Nighandava, or Vocabulary of the Law in the Kandyan Kingdom*, tr. by Le Mesurier and Panabokke, 1880, p. xix f.; Jardine and Forschhammer, *Notes on Buddhist Law*, Rangoon, 1882; Rich. Schmidt, *Liebe u. Ehe im alten u. mod. Indien*, 1904, p. 433; J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*, tr. by H. R. Beauchamp, 1899, p. 318; S. C. Bose, *Hindoo as they are?*, 1883, p. 289; M. F. Billington, *Woman in India*, London, 1895, p. 123; K. Boeck, *Durch Indien ins verschlossene Land Nepal*, 1903, p. 280; E. Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, 1891, p. 122. R. FICK.

**ADULTERY (Jewish).**—The substitution of monogamy for polygamy made no change in the Jewish law on adultery. From the time of the Babylonian Exile, monogamy became the prevalent custom in Jewish life. But the law continued to regard as adultery only the intercourse of a married woman with any man other than her husband. Thus a married man was not regarded as guilty of adultery unless he had intercourse with a married woman other than his wife. For in theory he might have several wives, and an unmarried woman with whom he had intercourse

might become his wife. In fact, according to the Rabbinic law, such intercourse might be construed into a legal marriage. But concubinage was severely condemned (*Leviticus Rabba*, ch. xxv.). Yet the difference between the legal position of the male and the female adulterer (using the term in its now current sense) was considerably affected by the abolition of the Jewish power to pronounce or inflict capital punishment. This occurred, according to the Jewish sources (*Jerus. Sanh.* 18a, 24b; *Bab. Sanh.* 41a), forty years before the destruction of the Temple (i.e. in the year A.D. 30); but whatever be thought of this exact date, there is no doubt that the death penalty was neither pronounced nor inflicted for adultery in the time of Christ. Hence it is generally conceded that the case of the woman taken in adultery (*Jn* 8<sup>11</sup>) does not imply that the woman would actually have been stoned. In the first place, the law of Moses does not prescribe stoning except where a betrothed virgin had intercourse with a man other than her affianced husband (*Dt* 22<sup>24</sup>). In other cases (*Lv* 20<sup>10</sup>, *Dt* 22<sup>22</sup>) the method of execution is not defined, and in all such cases, according to Jewish tradition, the criminal was executed not by stoning, but by strangulation (*Mishna Sanh.* xi. 1). Secondly, it will be observed that the woman had not yet been tried by the court. Finally, as indicated above, the death penalty had long ceased to be inflicted for adultery. The point of the incident in the Gospel of St. John was just the attempt to put Jesus into a dilemma, as the commentators point out. It may well be that the irregularities indicated above were an intentional aggravation of the record.

The punishment for adultery was modified into the divorce of the woman, who lost all her rights under the marriage settlement; the man was scourged. The husband of the adulteress was not permitted to cohabit with her; he was compelled to divorce her (*Mishna, Sota* vi. 1; *Maimonides, Hilch. Ishuth*, xxiv. 6). The adulteress was not allowed to marry her paramour (*Sota* v. 1). In case of the man's adultery, he was compelled to grant a divorce on his wife's application; the woman, of course, could not initiate divorce proceedings, but in the view of some of the mediæval authorities the Court would compel the husband to divorce her in case of his habitual licentiousness (*Eben ha-'Ezer*, § 154, 1 gloss). The 'ordeal of the bitter waters' (*Nu* 5<sup>11-31</sup>) was abolished by Jochanan ben Zakkai during the Roman invasion (*Mishna, Sota* ix. 9), though Queen Helena of Adiabene—a proselyte to Judaism in the 1st cent. A.D.—sought to restore it (*Mishna, Yoma* iii. 10; *Tosefta, Yoma* ii. 3). Of the ordeal itself, R. Akiba (2nd cent. A.D.) remarks: 'Only when the (suspicious) husband is himself free from guilt will the waters be an effective test of his wife's guilt or innocence; but if he has himself been guilty of illicit intercourse, the waters will have no effect' (*Sifre, Naso*, 21; *Sota*, 47b). Mr. Amram (*Jewish Encyc.* vol. i. p. 217) comments on this passage as follows: 'In the light of this rabbinical dictum, the saying of Jesus in the case of the woman taken in adultery acquires a new meaning. To those asking for her punishment, he replied: "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her" (*Jn* 8<sup>7</sup>). The abolition of the ordeal is attributed in the Mishna to the great prevalence of adultery; and it may be that in the disturbed conditions due to the Roman régime laxity of morals intruded itself.

But if so, it was but a temporary lapse. The records of Jewish life give evidence of remarkable purity in marital relations (cf. Abrahams, *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, 1896, 90 f.). The sanctity of marriage was upheld as the essential condition for social happiness and virtue. The moral abhorrence felt against the crime of adultery is shown in many

\* Menu Kray, vi. 31.

† Manoo Woonnana Dhammathat, 170.

‡ Billington, *Woman in India*, p. 123.

§ *Id.* xii. 43.

§ Bose, p. 288.

Rabbinical utterances. Not all a man's other virtues would save him from Gehenna if he committed adultery (*Sofa*, 4b). Even lustful desire was condemned as a moral offence (*Eben ha-Ezer*, § 21; cf. Mt 5<sup>27-28</sup>). Perhaps the most remarkable testimony to the Jewish detestation of the crime is to be found in the Talmud (*Sanh.* 74a). In the year A.D. 135, at the crisis of the disastrous revolt against Hadrian, a meeting was held at Lydda. The assembly was attended by several famous Rabbis (including Akiba), and the question was discussed as to the extent of conformity with Roman demands which might justifiably be made rather than face the alternative of death. It was decided that every Jew must surrender his life rather than commit any of the three offences, idolatry, murder, or *gillui arayoth* (מגילת אריות). This latter phrase includes both adultery and incest (*Graetz, Hist. of the Jews*, English tr., ii. ch. xvi.).

LITERATURE.—Z. Frankel, *Grundlinien des Jüdisch-Talmudischen Eherechts* (Breslau, 1860); D. W. Amram, *Jewish Law of Divorce* (1896); and the same author's art. 'Adultery' in *Jewish Encyc.* vol. I.  
I. ABRAHAM.

**ADULTERY (Muslim).**—In the year 4 of the Hijra, the Prophet was accompanied on one of his military expeditions by his wife, 'A'isha. One day, at the removal from the camp towards night, she remained behind and reached Muhammad's caravan only on the following morning, in the company of a man. This circumstance caused great scandal. Even the Prophet at first suspected his wife of adultery. Afterwards, however, it was revealed to him that she had been falsely accused, and he was again reconciled to her. The verses of the Qur'an that have reference to this occurrence, namely, *Sür.* xxiv. 1-5, contain, amongst other statements, the following words: 'As for the whore and the whoremonger, scourge each of them with a hundred stripes, and do not let pity for them take hold of you in Allah's religion. . . . But as for those who cast (imputations) on chaste women and do not bring four witnesses, scourge them with eighty stripes, and do not receive any testimony of theirs for ever' (cf. Th. Nöldeke, *Gesch. des Qur'ans*, p. 156; A. Sprenger, *Das Leben und die Lehre des Mohammed*, iii. 63 ff.; D. S. Margoliouth, *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam*, p. 341; *The Koran*, Sale's Eng. tr., ed. 1825, ii. 180).

In Islām, therefore, according to these verses of the Qur'an, incontinence should be punished with one hundred stripes. Originally, however, Muhammad had commanded that those who had been found guilty of this misdemeanour should be put to death by stoning—a punishment which he had probably derived from Judaism. In the Muslim tradition, various instances are mentioned in which this punishment is said to have been inflicted at Muhammad's command (cf. A. N. Matthews, *Mishkāt-ul-Maṣābiḥ*, ii. 182-186, Calcutta, 1810; L. Goldziher, 'Mohammedanisches Recht in Theorie und Wirklichkeit' (*Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswissenschaft*, viii. 466 ff.). It may thus be understood that the Prophet had designedly mitigated the punishment attached to adultery out of affection for 'A'isha.

After Muhammad's death, a difference of opinion arose amongst the faithful with respect to this point. Many thought that the punishment of stoning to death was abrogated by the verses of Qur'an xxiv. 1-5. But the second Khalif, 'Umar, set his face very strongly against this view. According to him, adultery in Islām should be punished with stoning. 'Thus hath the Prophet ordained it,' said he, 'and thus have we acted on his command. Some people say that they find no injunction to this effect in Allah's book; but in the days of Muhammad we were accustomed in the recitation of the Qur'an to recite also a verse in which the punishment of

stoning was undoubtedly denounced against the violator of the marriage bond.' Indeed, according to Muslim tradition, such a verse is said to have formed originally a part of the thirty-third *Sūra* (cf. Nöldeke, *op. cit.* p. 185).

In the Muslim law-books, both punishments, stoning as well as scourging, are found threatened against the offence of fornication (*Arab. zinā*). By this offence, the Muslim jurists understand not only adultery, but any sexual intercourse between two persons who do not stand to one another in the relation of husband and wife or master and slave. For those who are not yet married, if they render themselves guilty of this offence, scourging is thought sufficient; all others must in that case be put to death by stoning. An individual belonging to the latter group of persons is in Arabic called *muhṣan*. The original signification of this word is 'well-guarded,' but in Arabic it came to be employed metaphorically to signify a married woman, and later a married person in general (cf. J. Wellhausen, 'Die Ehe bei den Arabern,' *Nachrichten der königl. Gesellsch. der Wissensch. in Göttingen*, 1893, No. 11, p. 447). According to the jurists, however, a person remains *muhṣan*, even though his marriage may have been dissolved at a later period. If he thereafter renders himself guilty of *zinā*, he must be stoned. In Islām, stoning is thus not a punishment exclusively of adultery, as was often incorrectly supposed (cf. Snouck Hurgronje, review of E. Sachau's *Mohammedanisches Recht* in *ZDMG* liii. 161 ff.).

On various matters of detail, as, for example, the question whether those who are to be stoned must also be scourged, etc., many go into different scholastic minutiae. The evidence of *zinā*, however, according to Qur'an xxiv. 1-5, cannot be presented except by the testimony of four male witnesses, who are able to confirm the truth of the accusation by details. In fact, a condemnation for *zinā* is thereby rendered impossible, unless the guilty person makes a confession, and thus becomes willingly subjected to the punishment.

When a man takes his wife in the act of adultery, he may put her to death at once, along with her paramour. If he suspects her of adultery, he is not required to bring forward any witnesses. The law permits him to take an oath that his wife has been unfaithful to him. When, however, the wife on her part swears under oath that she is innocent, she is not punished. Nevertheless, the marriage is then dissolved; and if the wife brings a child into the world, the legitimacy can be disowned by the husband. The swearing of this oath is in Arabic called *ḥān*. Cf. Qur'an xxiv. 6-9: 'They who accuse their wives (of adultery) and shall have no witnesses (thereof) besides themselves, the testimony (which shall be required) of one of them (shall be) that he swear four times by God that he speaketh the truth and the fifth time (that he imprecate) the curse of God on him if he be a liar. And it shall avert the punishment (from the wife) if she swear four times by God that he is a liar and if the fifth time (she imprecate) the wrath of God on her if he speaketh the truth.'

Slaves are not stoned for *zinā*, but only punished with fifty stripes.

LITERATURE.—E. Sachau, *Mohammedanisches Recht nach Schafitischer Lehre*, pp. 14, 73 ff., 809, 815 ff., and other translations of Muslim Law Books; J. Krcsmárk, 'Beiträge zur Beleuchtung des islamitischen Strafrechts mit Rücksicht auf Theorie und Praxis in der Türkei,' *ZDMG* lviii. 101 ff.  
TH. W. JUYNBOLL.

**ADULTERY (Christian).**—1. Teaching of Jesus and the Apostles.—It is sometimes said that the Law of Moses deals only with outward actions, while the Sermon on the Mount teaches us to think of the inward disposition, and the motives that prompt to action. The Decalogue, it is said, like other ancient codes of laws, forbids

the sinful act by which the marriage bond is violated, but takes no account of the character or disposition. Jesus, on the other hand, shows us that the inward disposition which renders the sinful act impossible is the one thing of importance in the sight of God. A moment's consideration will convince us that, whatever element of truth there may be in this statement, it cannot be taken as a complete and satisfactory account of our Lord's comment on the Seventh Commandment (Mt 5<sup>27-30</sup>), inasmuch as it is simply untrue to say that the Decalogue takes no account of inward disposition or motives. The command, 'Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife,' goes behind the outward act, and condemns the sinful desire which leads to adultery. It is true, nevertheless, that in this passage in the Sermon on the Mount our Lord goes beyond the teaching of the Decalogue, and gives a new and deeper meaning to the command, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery'; that He does not merely recall to men's minds the teaching of the Tenth Commandment, which had been overlooked or forgotten in the Jewish schools, but that He lays down a great principle of the righteousness required in the Kingdom of heaven, from which obedience to the letter of the command will follow as a matter of course. The Tenth Commandment forbids the sinful desire, mainly because it tends to conduct which will injure one's neighbour; it is a safeguard against injury, and the thought of the injury done to one's neighbour is the prominent thought. In the passage in the Sermon on the Mount, on the other hand, our thoughts are centred on the moral injury to the man himself. 'If thy right eye causeth thee to stumble, pluck it out, and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body be cast into hell.' The indulgence in sinful thoughts and desires is not a minor offence tending to the injury of others, but is already the soul-destroying sin of adultery committed in the man's own heart.

It is now easy to understand why it is that, while throughout the NT sins of the flesh are unsparingly denounced, we have no detailed classification of such sins; and very little account is taken of the various distinctions—as between adultery, fornication, *stuprum*, etc. etc.—which are so often treated of at unedifying length in writings on these subjects. The word used most frequently in the NT for such sins is *πορνεία*, 'fornication.\*' This serves to include all those 'lusts of the flesh which war against the soul' (1 P 2<sup>11</sup>); and but little account is taken of the distinction between fornication and what we naturally regard as the graver offence of *μοιχεία*, or adultery proper, which involves the violation of the marriage bond. Some writers in modern times have found a difficulty in our Lord's words which forbid the dissolution of the marriage bond—*παρεκτός λόγου πορνείας* (Mt 5<sup>32</sup>), *μή ἐν τῇ πορνείᾳ* (19<sup>9</sup>); and Dollinger (*Christentum und Kirche*) made a not very successful attempt to show that the word *πορνεία* in these passages must refer to some offence committed before marriage, rendering the marriage itself null and void *ab initio*. It is a sufficient refutation of this view that such an interpretation was not thought of by the writers of the first four centuries, and that no difficulty was found in recognizing *πορνεία* as a general term, including in itself all sins of the flesh, and in this particular instance applying to adultery.

The passage in 1 Th 4<sup>6</sup>, in which St. Paul deals directly with the sin of adultery, may be placed side by side with these passages from Mt., as

\* St. Paul uses *πορνεία* and derivatives about eighteen times: *μοιχεία* does not occur, while *μοιχέω* (and derivatives) occurs only five times in his Epistles, and two of these instances are quotations from the Decalogue, viz. Ro 2<sup>22</sup> 13<sup>9</sup>.

affording an interesting illustration of the same principle. The Apostle does not ignore our duty towards our neighbour. Adultery is sinful because it is a kind of theft (*τὸ μὴ ὑπερβαίνειν καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν ἐν τῷ πράγματι τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ*). But he seems to dwell on this aspect of the matter only in passing, while his exhortation is occupied mainly with the need for purity and sanctification, and the danger of that fornication (*τῆς πορνείας*—note the use of the article) which was so common a feature in the life of the Græco-Roman world. St. Paul, no doubt, would have been quite ready to acknowledge that adultery, as inflicting a more grievous or irreparable wrong, was a graver offence than simple fornication, just as he recognized fully the gravity of the case of incest in Corinth (1 Co 5<sup>1</sup>); but, in general, the object of the gospel was not primarily to develop a system of casuistry, but to call men to newness of life, and to produce a character which should make sin in all shapes and forms impossible. For the Christian, therefore, the Seventh Commandment is, before everything else, a law of chastity, and the sin of adultery includes every kind of unlawful sensual indulgence, whether in thought or deed. Marriage is, first of all, a spiritual union between those who are 'heirs together of the grace of life' (1 P 3<sup>7</sup>); and all other objects must be considered as subordinate to the promotion of that social life which is absolutely necessary to man's well-being.

2. Ecclesiastical discipline.—The case of the incestuous Corinthian (1 Co 5) gives us our first example of the exercise of ecclesiastical discipline by a Christian community; and the Epistles to the Corinthians make it plain that, while the Christian Church from the very beginning was accustomed to exercise a stern discipline over the lives and conduct of its members, the idea that the offence of adultery necessarily involved final and irrevocable exclusion from the Church was unknown in the days of the Apostles.

Tertullian's statement, therefore, that from the beginning gross sins of the flesh were visited with final exclusion from the Church, must be regarded as an exaggeration, so far as the Apostolic age is concerned. Indeed, all the evidence goes to show that we have here rather the ideal picture of the glories of the primitive age, as conceived by the enthusiastic Montanist, than a sober statement of fact.\*

Towards the close of the 2nd cent. there seems to be no doubt that the discipline in the Churches of Africa and Italy, with which Tertullian was most familiar, was exceedingly strict; but the evidence available appears to show that there was no uniform or clearly defined system of discipline established throughout the whole of Christendom.

Irenæus (c. *Hæc*. i. l. 13) tells us of certain women in the Church of Lyons who had been found guilty of adultery, and subjected to penance. As he speaks of only one of these as not being finally restored to communion, it may be inferred that the others had been received back; hence we may conclude that the system of discipline in the Gallic Church was somewhat less strict than that which prevailed in Italy or Africa. During the whole of the sub-Apostolic age, and down, at all events, to the close of the 2nd cent., the high standard of morality which we find in the Apostolic age was well maintained throughout the Christian communities. If any Christian fell away to vicious or immoral courses, he would in all probability forsake the Church and relapse to heathenism. Hence cases of grave offences calling for ecclesiastical censure would be of rare occurrence, and the conditions required for the establishment of a well-defined system of penitential discipline would not arise.

With the expansion of the Church and also, perhaps, as a consequence of the fading away of the early enthusiasm, it became necessary, if the Church was to maintain her position and carry on her work in the world, to relax somewhat the extreme severity of discipline, to make provision for the restoration of penitent sinners, and, at the same time, to make the Church's rules on such matters clear and distinct.

\* *adv. Marc.* iv. 9. Tertullian here enumerates 'seven deadly sins which exclude from communion,' viz. *idololatria, blasphemia, homicidium, adulterium, stuprum, falsum testimonium, fraus*

Pope Calixtus I. (c. 220) was probably neither the monster of iniquity depicted by his enemies, nor yet an enthusiastic exponent of evangelical principles, but simply a ruler of practical wisdom and foresight, who saw clearly what was required by the circumstances of the time. His famous edict: 'Ego et moechie et fornicationis delicta iunctis penitentia dimitto,' however, provoked a stormy controversy, and was assailed with much vigour and bitterness by Tertullian in his treatise *de Pudicitia*. In this contest, and in the Novatian dispute which followed, the victory remained with those who maintained the laxer policy, and experience showed that the high but impracticable ideals of what seemed to be the more strictly religious party were unsuited to the new conditions and circumstances of the Church.

From the beginning of the 4th cent. down to the very close of the Middle Ages, a long series of Conciliar decrees and other authoritative enactments bears witness to the fact that throughout this period the Church was called upon to deal practically and effectively with a widely prevalent immorality, and to solve the problem of combining due severity against sinners with the mercy enjoined by the gospel.

The Canons of the Council of Illiberis (Elvira in Spain), which met A.D. 305, seem to have furnished a type and regulating principle for the ecclesiastical legislation of succeeding ages, and may well serve to indicate the conditions with which the Church had to deal and the principles adopted in dealing with them.

Canon 9 declares that a woman who has divorced her husband for adultery ought not to marry again during the husband's lifetime. Should she do so, she is to be excluded from communion until after the first husband's death, at all events unless she should be seized with a dangerous illness.

Canon 13 decrees perpetual exclusion from communion in the case of consecrated virgins who have fallen, and who show no true sense of the seriousness of their loss (*non intelligentes quid amiserint*). Such virgins, if repentant, may be restored to communion in the hour of death.

Canon 14. *Virgines seculares*, guilty of fornication, to undergo a year's penance and to marry their seducers.

Canon 16 condemns marriage with Jews, pagans, or heretics as akin to adultery.

Canon 18 condemns adultery committed by a clergyman. Bishops, priests, or deacons found guilty of adultery are never, even to the end of their lives, to be restored to communion, both because of the enormity of the offence and because of the scandal to the Church [*et propter scandalum et propter nefandum crimen*].\*

Canon 69 imposes five years' penance for a single act of adultery.

Canon 64 imposes ten years for adultery persisted in for any length of time, and enacts that there must be no restoration to communion so long as the sinner persists in the sinful life.

Canon 72. A *widow* who commits adultery (*sic*) must undergo a penance of five years, and, if practicable, must marry her seducer.

It is worth noting that in these decrees the words *mœchia* and *adulterium* are used in the broad NT sense to include sins of the flesh of every description.

3. Christianity and the civil law.—It may or may not have been a mistaken zeal for Christian religion and morality that induced Constantine and Constans to revive the old capital penalties for adultery which had been obsolete since the days of Augustus Cæsar.† In any case, it seems certain that the attempt to return to barbarous methods was a failure, since we find that in the time of Theodosius I. a milder, if scarcely less degrading, method of dealing with adulteresses was prevalent, at all events in the city of Rome. We learn from the Church historian Socrates (*HE* v. 18) that in the time of the Emperor Theodosius the Great these unhappy sinners were punished by confinement in the public brothels under circumstances of shameful and disgusting ignominy. The Emperor is praised for putting a stop to this barbarous practice on the occasion of

\* The refusal of absolution implies that the offence committed is one with respect to which the Church has no authority to promise the Divine pardon, but does not imply a claim to limit God's power to grant forgiveness, and must not be taken as a declaration that the guilty person will certainly be finally lost.

† The law of Constantine condemned the adulteress to death, but the penalty might be mitigated to banishment. The paramour was to be beheaded if a freeman, and if a slave, burned to death (*Cod. Justin. i. ix. tit. 11*). Constans decreed against both guilty parties the penalty inflicted on parricides, viz. to be burned alive, or else drowned in a sack (*ib. i. vii. tit. 65*).

his visit to the capital. Under Justinian the death penalty was finally abolished, and the Lex Julia restored with certain modifications. By this legislation the guilty wife, if not received back by her husband within two years, was condemned to be shut up for life in a convent.

Whatever we may think of the influence of Christianity upon the civil law of the older Empire, we can have no doubt that its influence upon the laws of the new nations that overran the Provinces of the Empire in the 5th and following centuries was wholly beneficent. The barbarous severities of the old national laws against adultery were mitigated. Divorce, pecuniary fines and—for guilty women—confinement in convents gradually took the place of the death sentence or the infliction of cruel mutilations.

The code of Theodoric decreed death for adultery. A married man who seduced a virgin was mulcted in a third part of his property as damages. The unmarried seducer was bound to marry his victim and endow her with a fifth of his estate. In the Burgundian code the adulterer was punished with death, and the adulteress, if not put to death, was treated as an infamous person. By the Visigothic code the adulteress and her paramour were given up to the injured husband to be punished with death or otherwise—according to his free pleasure. Flogging, mutilation, and other barbarous punishments were in force amongst the Danes and Saxons. In England the death penalty was not formally abolished until the reign of Canute. (See Milman, *Hist. of Latin Christianity*, Bk. III. ch. v.)

There was, indeed, one custom of the Northern nations which yielded very slowly, and only after many conflicts, to the influence of Christian teaching. In general the tone of morality—especially in all that relates to married life—amongst those nations was very high, much higher than in the Roman world which they conquered. Monogamy was the rule, and conjugal fidelity was strictly enforced. An exception, however, was made in the case of princes, who, as a mark of dignity, were allowed to maintain a plurality of wives or concubines. It is perhaps not wonderful that after their conversion these rude chiefs found it hard to accept the Christian view, and to regard this practice as sinful adultery, or that zealous Christian teachers should have often found the task of contending against this practice beset with much difficulty and danger.

4. Divorce.—The adultery of the wife has at all times been regarded as a sufficient ground for divorce; but differences of opinion have prevailed as to whether the same rule applies to the case of adultery committed by the husband. By the civil law of England, a wife cannot obtain a decree for divorce on the sole ground of the husband's adultery: there must be other circumstances, as, e.g., cruelty or neglect. In Scotland, on the other hand, the adultery of either partner is itself a sufficient ground for divorce. The subject of divorce will be more fully treated in a separate article. For the present it may be sufficient to note that in the Roman Catholic Church, and by the canons of the English Church, divorced persons, whether innocent or guilty, are not allowed to marry again during the lifetime of the other partner. Remarriage is permitted in the Greek Church and in most Reformed Churches.

LITERATURE.—Von Dobschütz, *Christian Life in the Primitive Church* (Williams & Norgate, 1904); Lecky, *History of European Morals*; Harnack, *Gesch. der altchristl. Literatur* (Leipzig, 1893); Funk, *Altkristl. Bussdisciplin* (Paderborn, 1897); see also Letourneau, *L'évolution du mariage et de la famille*, Paris, 1888 (Eng. tr. in *Contemporary Science series*); Westermarck, *Hist. of Human Marriage* (Macmillan, 1891); art. 'Adultery' in Cabrol's *Dict. d'Archéol. Chrét. etc.*, and in Vacant's *Dict. de Théol. Catholique*. W. M. FOLEY.

ADULTERY (Parsi).—The ancient Iranians attached much importance to marriage, and hence they looked upon adultery with horror. In the Gāthā Ushtavaiti (*Yasna*, liii. 7) there is a carefully worded warning against what Mills calls

'solicitations to vice,'\* etc. The female Yazata Ashi (*Yasht*, xvii. 57-60) inveighs bitterly against this vice. She says that it 'is the worst deed that men and tyrants do,'† when they seduce maidens from the path of virtue. In some parts of the Avesta and in the Pahlavi books adultery is personified as 'Jahi.' The Yazata Haoma is entreated to withstand the evil influence of vicious women, whose lustful, wavering mind is like a cloud, which changes the direction of its motion according to the direction of the wind (*Yasna*, ix. 32). The Amesha Spenta *Asha Vahishtā* ('Best Righteousness') is similarly appealed to (*Yasht*, iii. 9). An adulterer or adulteress is, as it were, an opponent of Gao, the good spirit of the earth or the animal creation, the idea being that such a person comes in the way of the progress of the world (*Vendidad*, xxi. 1). The progress of the world in the different spheres of activity, physical and mental, acts against these evil-doers (*ib.* xxi. 17). Eredat-Fedri is the name of a good, pious maiden who is considered as a prototype of maidenly virtue, and whose guardian spirit is invoked to withstand the evil machinations of Jahi, the personification of adultery (*Yasht*, xiii. 142).

In the Pahlavi *Bundahish* (ch. iii.) this Jahi (Pahlavi *Jēh*) is said to be an accomplice of Ahriman himself. Her work is 'to cause that conflict in the world, the distress and injury from which will become those of Auhurmazd and the archangels.'‡ In the Pahlavi *Daṭistān-i-Dēnīg* (71st question) § adultery is spoken of as one of the most heinous sins. The mother of Zohāk is said to be the first woman in the world who committed this offence. It is described as a sin which disturbs all lineage, which puts an end to all self-control and to the legitimate authority of a husband. It is more heinous than theft or spoliation (77th question).|| It is a crime which leads at times to murder, because the woman sometimes brings about abortion.¶ There is another way in which adultery leads to murder. It is noted in the account of pregnancy\*\* that sexual intercourse during pregnancy is prohibited, because it is understood that it leads to injury to the life of the child in the womb. Now, a woman who yields to lust and gives herself up to an adulterous life is likely to commit adultery even in pregnancy. Such intercourse may cause the loss of the life of the child in the womb.††

Adultery is a canker in society in another way. When a man commits adultery with a woman, according to the injunction of the *Vendidad* he is bound to support the woman whom he has seduced and the children that may be born of the illicit intercourse. It is his duty to bring up his illegitimate children along with his legitimate children. But then the company of the illegitimate children is likely to spoil the good manners and morals of the legitimate children. And, on the other hand, if he does not bring up the illegitimate children properly, if he does not give them proper training, he is responsible for, and guilty of, all the wrongful acts and sins that the children may commit in their childhood or when they are grown up.

The sin of adultery was too heinous to be fully atoned for. But what little atonement could be made for it was directed to be done by the following good acts (*Daṭistān-i-Dēnīg*, lxxviii. 17-19):

(a) The guilty person, especially the adulterer, must help, i.e. by money or otherwise, in bringing about the marriage of four poor couples. (b) He must assist with money poor children who are not cared for by others, and bring them up decently

and educate them. (c) If he sees others in society leading a vicious life, he must do his best to retrieve them. (d) He must perform certain religious rites, like those of the *Dvāzhdah-Hōmāst*.

In the *Virāf-Nāmak* the adulterer is represented as punished by being thrown into a steaming brazen caldron (ch. lx.), the adulteress as gashing her own bosom and breasts (ch. lxii.).\* The adulteress who brings about abortion meets with worse punishment (ch. lxiv.). In all cases of adultery the *Vendidad* (xv. 18) requires that the person seducing a woman, whether married or unmarried, shall maintain her and the children that may be born of her until they come of age. Any attempt at abortion was considered a great sin (*Vend.* xv. 11-14).

JIVANJI JAMSHEDJI MODI.

**ADULTERY (Roman).—1.** Under the Republic.—The word *adulterium* is a noun-derivative of *adulterare*, which is probably *ad alterum* (*se convertere*). The offence on the part of the wife is sexual intercourse with any man other than her lawful husband. On the part of the husband it has a narrow meaning, and is confined to misconduct with married women, misconduct with other than married women being designated by the general term *stuprum*. The unequal treatment of husband and wife is bluntly expressed by Cato in *Aul. Gell.* x. 23: 'In adulterio uxorem tuam si prehensisses, sine iudicio impune necares: illa te, si adulterares . . . digito non auderet contingere, neque ius est.' From this passage it is clear that the old right of self-help survived into the times of the Republic. There is no evidence, however, that the adulterer could be killed as well as the woman, if taken in the act. Originally the offence was dealt with not by the State (except in cases where it passed all bounds, and became, like open immorality, a matter for the police jurisdiction of the censors and aediles), but by the *iudicium domesticum*, or family council, in which near relatives took part, with the head of the family as president in virtue of his *patria potestas*. This council could inflict what punishment it chose (*Dionys.* ii. 25; *Suet. Tib.* § 35. *Cf. Plin. HN* xiv. 13 ff.: 'matronam a suis inedia mori coactam,' where the charge brought is intemperance). If a wife was divorced on the ground of adultery, it was left to a civil court to decide what part of her dowry she should retain. Such a trial was termed a *iudicium de moribus*. The procedure followed is not accurately known, and cannot be recovered with any certainty from the evidence of the later lawyers, who are our only authorities.

**2. Under the Empire: The Lex Julia.**—By the end of the Republic, owing, among other causes, to the absence of effective legislation, immorality became so rife at Rome that the Government became alarmed at the prospect of a shrinkage in the population of Italy. In consequence of this, Augustus in 736/18 carried through the measure known (though the title is doubtful) as the *Lex Julia de adulteriis coercendis* (*Hor. Car.* iv. 5. 21-24; *Suet. Aug.* § 34). This, as its opening clause shows ('*ne quis posthac stuprum adulteriumve facito sciens dolo malo*'), was directed against immorality in general as well as against adultery. But now for the first time Roman law recognized adultery as an act done in contravention of the law of the State, and allowed others than the father or husband of the adulteress to prosecute. For this purpose a new court (*quæstio perpetua*) was established (*Dio, liv.* 30). The fragments of the law that survive will be found in *Bruns, Fontes Juris Antiqui*\*, p. 114. Adultery on the part of wife or concubine was declared punishable by the law, while marital misconduct was taken to include offences knowingly (*dolo malo*) committed against

\* *SBE* xxxi. 189.

† *ib.* xxiii. 281.

‡ *ib.* vol. xviii. ch. lxxii. § 5.

§ *ib.* ch. lxxviii. § 3.

¶ See *BIRTH*.

†† *SBE*, vol. xviii. ch. lxxviii. § 9

† *ib.* v. p. 15.

¶ *ib.* § 5.

\* Hoshangji and Haug, *Virāf-Nāmak*, pp. 186, 187.



any *matrona honesta*, as well as against a married woman (*materfamilias*). It should be noticed that the *concubinatus*, or inferior marriage, though of great antiquity, was now for the first time recognized as a permanent legal relationship, doubtless in order to prevent such connexions from being penalized under the clauses against *stuprum*. The law fined the adulteress in one half of her dowry and one third of her property. The adulterer lost the half of his property. Both were interdicted fire and water, a punishment soon replaced by exile or deportation to an island. There is no ground for supposing that the death-penalty was sanctioned by the original terms of the *Lex Julia* (Paul. Sent. ii. 26. 14). Conviction entailed *infamia* (Dig. iii. 2. 2, 3), and the condemned became incapable of giving evidence (*intestabiles*, Dig. xxii. 5. 14, 18). The adulteress could not marry again (Dig. xxiii. 2. 26), but she was not debarred from entering the condition of *concubinatus* (Mart. vi. 22). The dissolution of the marriage was a necessary preliminary to any action taken against the wife or her paramour, and if her husband did not divorce his wife, he rendered himself liable to the charge of procreation (*lenocinium*). For sixty days after the dissolution of the marriage the right to prosecute was reserved to the husband or father of the woman (Dig. xlviii. 5. 2, § 8). If these took no action within this period of time, any one unconnected with the family (*extraneus*) could prosecute (Tac. Ann. ii. 85). Both offenders could not be prosecuted at once, and the trial of the one had to be completed before that of the other was begun. If the man was acquitted, the woman could not be charged. A period of limitation was prescribed within which an action must be brought,—six months in the case of the woman, five years in the case of the man. The ancient right of self-help was never entirely abolished, but the exercise of it was severely restricted. A father who surprised his daughter in *ipsa turpitudine* might kill her and her paramour, if he did so in *continenti*, which was held to mean 'almost by one and the same blow.' The husband's right to kill his wife when taken in the act was withdrawn. Here we seem to see an attempt to abolish the right of self-help by restricting it to the person least likely to act on the impulse of the moment. The only fragment which the husband retained of his former power was the right to kill the adulterer if a freedman of the family or a *persona vilis* (e.g. an actor), and if found in the house. The husband could detain the adulterer for twenty hours in order to secure evidence of the offence (*rei testandæ causa*).

The *Lex Julia* formed the basis of all subsequent legislation against adultery. It was not seriously modified till Constantine, under the influence of Christian ideas, introduced the penalty of death for the adulterer, and, by a curious reaction, once more confined the right of prosecution to the near relatives of the adulteress. The death penalty was maintained during the reigns of succeeding emperors. It was confirmed by Justinian (*Inst.* iv. 18. 4), who imposed on the adulteress the penalty of lifelong imprisonment in a nunnery, unless the offended husband cared to reclaim her within two years.

LITERATURE.—W. Rein, *Das Criminalrecht der Römer*, 1844, p. 835 ff.; Th. Mommsen, *Röm. Strafrecht*, 1899, p. 628 ff.; A. du Boys, *Hist. du droit criminel des peuples anciens*, 1845, pp. 400 ff., 617 ff.

F. W. HALL

ADULTERY (Semitic).—The treatment of infidelity among the Semites can be illustrated by a great variety of evidence, extending from the codified legislation of Hammurabi, king of Babylonia (c. 2250), to the unwritten, though no less authoritative, tribal laws of the present day. So far as women are concerned—and, as elsewhere,

the infidelity of the man was only tardily recognized as blameworthy—it must be understood that the offence implies a particular type of marriage, since it is obvious that where the woman has liberty of choice, does not leave her own kin, and may receive her suitors when or as long as she will, adultery is out of the question. Such a union is entirely one of a personal character, and gives the man no legitimate offspring.\* But the prevailing type in the Semitic world is that wherein the woman follows the husband, who has paid a 'bride-price' (Arab. *mahr*, Heb. *môhar*) to her kin, whereby he has compensated them for the loss of her services, and has acquired the right of possessing sons who shall belong to his tribe. By this act the man has practically acquired the exclusive property-rights, and deprives the woman of the right of disposing of her own person. Further, it must be recognized that this does not imply that paternity always meant what it does to us. The evidence goes to show that the man is at first only the father of all the children of the woman he has taken; and he might transfer or dispose of her temporarily in a way that is quite repugnant to all ideas of chastity. At this stage, therefore, a distinction could be, and was, drawn between authorized and unauthorized laxity, and in the circumstances the term 'adultery' could be applied only to those acts of infidelity which were done without the husband's consent or knowledge. It required a great advance before any breaking of the union between husband and wife could be regarded as a desecration.† See MARRIAGE.

In tracing the growing strictness of ideas of chastity in the Semitic world, it is to be observed that there was a gradual development of institutions of law and justice. Primarily, all offences against a man are matters for him and for his kin or tribe to settle; adultery may thus be privately avenged, and it is not until society has taken many steps forward in government that the matter is taken out of private hands and referred to a judicial inquiry. There is a great social gap, therefore, between the parental authority of Judah in Gn 38, and the recognition that immorality is an offence to be punished by judges, in Job 31<sup>14</sup>.

It is undeniable that there was much in early Semitic life that cannot be judged in the light of modern ideas, and that primitive usages which were hardly thought to be dishonourable (Gn 19<sup>7</sup>, cf. Jg 19<sup>21</sup>)—for which parallels could easily be found—bespeak a lack of refinement which leads to the inference that adultery, if recognized at all, could only have been the unauthorized infidelity referred to above. But a general advance in custom can be traced, and is peculiarly illustrated by three stories of the patriarchs: there is a distinct growth in morals in the account of Isaac's adventure at Gerar (Gn 26) as compared with the duplicate narrative of Abraham in Egypt (ch. 12), and these stories from the Jahwist or Judæan source are overshadowed by the Elohist or Ephraimite account of Abraham at Gerar (ch. 20), where the iniquity of adultery is forcibly realized.

Under the ordinary type of marriage, known as the *baal* or marriage of subjection, the Semitic woman, if unmarried, is entirely under the authority of her father; if betrothed or married, of her husband. It is necessary, therefore, to observe that, if adultery is primarily an infringement of the husband's rights, seduction is no less a matter for the father of the unbetrothed virgin. According to the old Hebrew law (Ex 22<sup>16-17</sup>), the man who was

\* See Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, pp. 79-99.

† Robertson Smith's researches are supplemented by Wellhausen (*GGN*, 1893), who has observed that among the Arabs mistrust and jealousy spring less from love or ethical considerations than from ideas of property.



guilty of seduction was obliged to pay the *môhar* or bride-price and marry his victim;\* the later code (Dt 22<sup>24</sup>) fixes the amount at fifty shekels, and characteristically prevents the man from turning his newly-made wife adrift, by removing from him the right of divorce. How the law worked in ancient Israel can be gathered from the account in Gn 34, where, although little of the oldest narrative has been retained, it seems clear that compensation was required, and dispute or high-handed action would lead to furious intertribal conflicts.† The usual penalty for adultery was compensation, but frequently the offender was put to death. Modern custom permits the guilty pair, if caught, to be killed at once, or, at the sentence of the sheikhs, all the men take an equal share in the execution. The last point is important, since bloodshed according to primitive thought is a responsibility which all members of the community must share. The old form of exacting the death-penalty is parallel, as Robertson Smith has observed, to the ancient ritual of sacrifice. In both, every member of the kin should as far as possible participate in the act.‡ The particular form of death-penalty may vary between stoning, strangling, impaling, burning, and—at the present day—even shooting.

More suspicion of adultery is not enough, and terrible consequences may result from unsupported denunciation. Hebrew law required two witnesses, and (by an extension of the *talio*) the false accuser would bring upon himself the punishment his charge would have entailed upon another. It is noteworthy that the law in Dt 22<sup>2</sup> specifically provides that the guilty ones are 'found' in the act. The law in question belongs to a group which reflects that stage where moral ideas have become so advanced that the husband attaches importance to the chastity of his newly-married wife (the restrictions of Lv 21<sup>14</sup> apply only to the priests). The procedure (Dt 22<sup>2-21</sup>) is detailed, and states that if the accusation of impurity brought against the bride is true, she is stoned to death by 'the men of the city'; if false, the man must pay a hundred shekels to the father, and is not permitted to divorce his wife.§ It is intelligible that, in the former event the girl is treated as an adulteress, since from the time that she was betrothed she is regarded *de facto* as a married woman. The same code in its treatment of betrothed women makes a noteworthy distinction in the *scene* of the offence. Should it be committed in the city, both are stoned; whereas, if it be in the open country, the woman goes free, since it is assumed that she cried for help and found no protector (vv. 25-27).||

The Babylonian code of Hammurabi implies a more advanced state of culture than the oldest Hebrew. The position of the married woman was secured by a contract which could specify the penalty for her infidelity and possibly vouched for her purity at the time of marriage.¶ The following laws require notice:—The man who is caught ravishing a betrothed virgin who is living in her father's house is put to death, whilst she herself goes free. If she was betrothed to his own son, a distinction is drawn dependent upon whether the marriage had or had not been consummated. In the latter event, the man must pay half a mina of silver and give her her personal property, and she

\* The payment, 'according to the bride-price of virgins,' which the man must make in the event of the father's refusal, is apparently an additional compensation.

† Cf. Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*, II. 114 (see Bennett, *The Century Bible*, 'Genesis', p. 318 f.).

‡ *Religion of the Semites*, pp. 285, 485 ff.

§ See, further, Driver, *JCC*, 'Deut.', p. 255.

|| Cf. with this Boaz and Ruth (Ru 2<sup>8</sup> 9, 27).

¶ See the contract, Pinches, *The Old Testament* (1903), p. 178. It will be noticed that in Dt 22<sup>15</sup> the accusation of impurity is regarded as a distinct reflexion upon the parents.

is free to marry whom she will. In the former event, the man is strangled; the treatment of the girl is uncertain in the text.\* Drowning was the ordinary legal penalty, although, according to a somewhat obscure law, the man might pardon his wife and the king the adulterer at their will. The Babylonian procedure in cases where absolute proof was not at hand is characteristic. In all ordinary cases the wife could take an oath and swear her innocence, and was allowed to return (or was sent?) to her (father's) house; but 'if the finger had been pointed at her on account of another,' and she is obviously the subject of scandal, she must undergo ordeal by water. Robertson Smith has cited the Arabian story of Hind bint 'Utba, whose husband sent her back to her father on suspicion of unchastity, and it appears that the case could not rest there, her treatment being clearly regarded as an insult; and from another incident it would seem that suspected wives could be conducted under ignominious circumstances to the Ka'ba and there swear seventy oaths.† The ordeal and oath reappear in the antique ordeal preserved in a late source, Nu 5<sup>11-31</sup>, where the suspected wife is conducted to the priest, who brings her in humiliating attire before Jahweh. There the priest charges her by an oath which she accepts with the formula 'Amen,' and prepares a potion of holy water and the dust of the floor of the sanctuary,‡ in which have been washed the words of the oath. The procedure, which does not prescribe any punishment for unjust accusation, is treated at greater length in the Mishna (*Sota*; cf. also Jos. *Ant.* III. xi. 6), and is said to have been abolished towards the close of the 1st cent. A.D. (cf., further, OATH, ORDEAL).

The old Babylonian code handles acts of adultery in the case where the husband is a captive away from home. If he had left means of livelihood (lit. maintenance), and the wife enters the house of another, she is condemned to be drowned,—his family perhaps bring the charge,—whilst, failing these means, her desertion is not blameworthy; only, should the man regain his city she must leave the second husband (and children, if any) and return. Not unconnected with the subject is the further law that the woman who brought about her husband's death in order to marry another is to be killed. In Talmudic law, moreover, the adulteress who is divorced may not marry her accomplice. The charge against the widow in Gn 38, as the narrative shows, comes under the case of betrothed women, but the penalty (burning) is exceptional.§ When the woman was of low standing, e.g. a slave, the death-sentence was not demanded (Lv 19<sup>20</sup>).

Naturally, the extreme sentence was not always carried out. Usage varied according to the tone of public opinion and private interests. A man might not care to parade his wife's disgrace (Mt 1<sup>9</sup>), and the woman in Jn 8 who was taken in adultery ultimately departs unpunished. Cosmopolitan life in Palestine in the last centuries of the pre-Christian era was scarcely conducive to purity, and the writer in Pr 6<sup>32</sup> emphasizes not so much the immorality as the folly of the man who provokes the jealousy and wrath of the husband in a way which is likely to have unpleasant consequences for himself (cf. also Sir 23<sup>28-29</sup>). No doubt the teaching of the Hebrew prophets always outstripped contemporary morals.

\* For 'one shall cast her into the water' we should probably read 'him' (Schell, Winckler, Harper, etc.); see S. A. Cook, *Laws of Moses*, etc. (1903) 100 f. In that case 'strangled' should preferably be 'bound'.

† *Kinship*, p. 123; *Rel. Sem.* p. 180.

‡ For Semitic parallels cf. the Syriac *henānā* and *sheydgā*, and see JQR, 1902, p. 431; JRS, 1903, p. 605.

§ For daughters of priests (Lv 21<sup>9</sup>), for all cases of immorality (Jub 204 41<sup>25</sup>) and for incest (Code of Hammurabi).

The great advance upon primitive thought was the insistence upon the fact that adultery is as immoral in the husband as in the wife; previous to this the adulterer suffered only in so far as he had been the object of the injured husband's revenge. Accordingly the Decalogue and related teaching mark a great step in ethics in denouncing adultery, and in their warning against the covetousness from which lust springs (cf. the development of the truth in Mt 5<sup>22</sup>).

The peculiar character of Nature-worship and the native cults of Baal and Ashtoreth were direct incentives to impurity, and whatever may have influenced growth of refinement in this scattered field, it is evident that the purer conception of Jahweh among the Hebrew prophets went hand in hand with the refinement of moral ideas in Israel. The relation between worshipper and God was typified by the marriage-relation, and Jahweh was His people's *baal* even as the husband was the *baal* of his wife. It was impossible not to perceive that intercourse with aliens tended inevitably to participation in foreign rites, and the symbolical use of such terms as 'jealousy,' 'fornication,' or 'adultery' becomes characteristic of the religious life of Israel, bound as it was to its God as surely as the wife was bound to her husband. Hosea's doctrine was thus in accordance with well-established belief, and lays stress upon the fact that, whatever may have been the customary attitude towards adultery in everyday life, Jahweh had neither destroyed nor utterly forsaken His adulterous people, but was willing to receive them again and pay the betrothal price of 'faithfulness.'

LITERATURE.—A. B. Davidson, art. 'Hosea' in Hastings' *DB*; *PEFS*, 1897, p. 126 ff., 1901, p. 176 ff., 1905, p. 350; and the works referred to in the course of the above article. For the OT laws consult C. F. Kent, *Messages of Israel's Lawgivers* (1902), p. 92.

STANLEY A. COOK.

**ADVAITA.**—*Advaita*, derived from a privative and *dvaita*, 'duality' or 'dualism' (from Skr. *dvī* = 'two'), in its philosophic applications means *non-dualism*, and is used to designate the fundamental principle of the Vedānta (see art. *VEDĀNTA*), which asserts that the only reality is *brahman*; that the dualism set up between self and the world, between spirit and matter, is the result of illusion (*māyā*), or of ignorance (*avidyā*). The manifold world with its changing phenomena is unreal; the only reality is *brahman*, which is identified with *ātman* or self. The view which accepts as real both the Ego and the non-Ego in their distinction and opposition is *dvaita* or dualism; that which denies this dualism is *advaita*.

It is important to note the negative form of this philosophic term. It would have been easy to find a positive term if the intention had been to assert dogmatically the oneness of all reality as a positive conclusion. The *advaita* does not positively assert this oneness; it simply denies the dualism which presents itself in our ordinary thinking. This distinction is not only of importance in defining the precise meaning of the *advaita*, but it also throws light on the process of development by which Indian philosophy arrived at this result.

Just as the ideal philosophy of Greece was preceded by attempts to reach the basis of things along quite other lines, so the *advaita* solution of the Indian problem was the culmination of a long series of philosophic systems. These are generally described as the six *darsanas*, the six recognized systems.

The predominant interest in all of these was religious, not philosophic. The Nyāya taught its logic in order that man by finding out truth might attain to the bliss of emancipation through the favour of *īśvara* (God), whose existence can be demonstrated by inference. The Vaiśeṣika school sought to enlarge our means of knowledge by an elaborate classification of existence. The Sāṅkhya called in question these classifications, and reduced all existences to one, which it called *prakṛti*,

dead matter, out of which all other substances were formed by the spontaneous action of its three qualities (see art. *SĀṆKHYA*). The explanation of life it sought in a *puruṣa* (soul), always in, but not of, *prakṛti*. Unwilling to admit the presence of a Creator, it thinks to secure the same result by the joint action of this *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. *Puruṣa* cannot create; *prakṛti* cannot move; the one is lame, the other is blind. But the cripple and the blind work together for the benefit of the cripple. *Puruṣa* believes himself to be miserable as being bound in *prakṛti*; but when, by the destruction of *karma* (action), he is set free from the influence of *prakṛti* and attains to a correct understanding of the course of nature, he is set free from misery. The Yoga restored to this atheistic system the idea of a self-existent *īśvara*, through whose guidance alone *puruṣa* could find his way to salvation. This result, however, could be achieved only through a long process of physical

of the occult processes of . . . a *Mīmāṃsā* was a return to the authority of Vedic ritual and ceremony, while the *Litāra* *Mīmāṃsā* devoted itself to an exposition of the rationalism of the Upaniṣads, in which are found the germs of those conceptions which are peculiar to the *advaita* teaching (see art. *VEDĀNTA*).

This latest of the six schools, basing itself on revelation (*śruti*), asserts that revelation not justified by reason and not corroborated by common sense experience will not lead to any real knowledge. It addresses itself to a criticism of the creation theory, and the evolution theory of the Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya systems above mentioned. It calls in question the very nature of our perceptions of *prakṛti*, and asserts that we are never conscious of anything beyond our own consciousness of phenomena, whether objective or subjective. Thought and being are, in fact, so inseparably united, that the attempt to separate the one from the other is like trying to mount on one's own shoulders. Thought can never transcend thought, and all we are cognizant of is *thought*. Real existence (*sat*) is the same as thought (*chit*). We are cognizant of phenomena under various forms, and we ascribe to them various names, but that of which they are the names and forms we do not know. The *substratum* of phenomena is *per se* incapable of definition, it is indescribable (*anirvachaniya*). Nor can it be maintained that these phenomena are evolved from thought, for to assert that thought changes itself into phenomena would be to contradict our experience of the essential nature of thought as one and the same in all states and under all conditions.

Abandoning, therefore, the theories of creation and evolution, the *advaita* has recourse to what it calls *vivarta*, the mere unaccountable assumption of the phenomenal in thought. Thought and Being having been shown to be inseparable, the supreme genus is a compound of both, which is named *brahman*. Thus the *advaita* proclaims itself a philosophy of non-dualism. It recognizes *phenomena* as *phenomena*; but it refuses to penetrate into the ultimate nature of their *substratum*, which it declares to be a profound mystery. Matter without mind and mind without matter are alike unthinkable. *Dvaita*, duality, is an entire misconception. The philosophical accuracy, therefore, of the term *advaita*, which was selected to designate this philosophic position, is apparent. It does not assert that all is *one*; it denies duality without asserting the convertibility of mind and matter. According to the *advaita* doctrine, the test of supreme or ultimate reality is unchangeableness. The eye does not change with the phenomena which it perceives; but it can be cognized as phenomenal by the mind, which can discern the changing conditions of the eye, the mind itself remaining unchanged throughout the process. But the mind, with its various phenomena of reason, volition, feeling, etc., is cognized as phenomenal by something which cannot be cognized by anything else, for it is unchanging and unique. This something is the ultimate self-cognizant and constant fact in all our perceptions. In and through it everything is. It is unconditioned, and therefore indescribable. It is neither *he* nor *she*; it is *it*.

Of it is all real being (*sat*), all thought (*chit*), all joy (*ānanda*). Hence the formula which defines *brahman*—*sach-chid-ānanda*=being, thought, joy.

It is to be noted that the *advaita* does not deny the existence of matter, it simply regards it as *per se* unknowable, and therefore indescribable. We can know it only in the forms in which it is phenomenally present in thought. All our knowledge contains two elements, one constant and eternal, which is the true, the real; the other changing and transitory, which is the untrue, the unreal.

The precise meaning of *māyā* becomes clearer when regarded from this point of view. *Māyā* is illusion, but not illusion without a basis. This basis is not thought which is changing, but the indescribable, the unknowable substratum of phenomena. That this unknowable must exist is a necessity of thought. Some metaphysicians speak of it as if it were an illusion out and out, sent forth from within the bosom of thought itself; but this is a view which is not necessitated by the teaching of the *advaita* as expounded above. *Māyā* cannot mean illusion out and out, but only so far as the phenomenal presentation is concerned. The *Advaitin* is concerned only in maintaining that thought and being are inseparable; it is quite in harmony with this position to maintain that a substratum of phenomena, regarding which nothing is or can be known, exists.

The name given to the complex whole, thought and being as reality, *brahman*, has been variously explained. (See art. *BRĀHMAN*.) The most satisfactory explanation is that which traces it to the rise of the term in the *Rigveda* to describe the elevating and inspiring power of prayer, resulting in an elevation of spirit which seems to lift the soul out of the consciousness of its individual separate existence. It is also designated *ātman* (self), not as implying individuality, for the consciousness of individuality must vanish in the contemplation of *brahman*, but because the sphere within which these higher processes of thought, which rise above the phenomenal self, have their being is that of the thinking subject. *Brahman* is the Supreme, the unconditioned Self, transcending all individuality. The relation of this *brahman* to the illusions that present themselves in our consciousness is illustrated by familiar examples—the mirage assumed to be water, the rope assumed to be a snake, etc. As in some of these instances want of proper light is the source of the illusion, so want of right knowledge is the cause of our mistaking phenomena for realities.

The *Advaitins* were fully conscious of the gravity of the problem which still remained unsolved, viz. the real origin of these illusions. In many of their attempts at explanation they contradict the fundamental principle of their system. We are told that *māyā* is only a creation of the mind; the mind is led away to these false notions. But this explanation, which seems to give definite objective existence to these false notions, is subversive of *advaitism*. The attempt is made to evade this difficulty by asserting that the mind has within itself from eternity ideas which it only reflects or dreams out. It thus only perceives itself. But eternal ideas seem also to constitute a separate reality. Others find the origin of *māyā* in the limitations imposed upon the unlimited. These limits, which give rise to the phenomena of perception, are the creation of the individual as an individual; in *brahman*, the unlimited, there is no individualization. To be emancipated from all sense of separate individuality is real knowledge, real bliss. This is the emancipation which finds expression in the formula *tat-tvam-asi*, 'thou art it.'

Others, again, have recourse to the theory of reflexion, viz. that the varying phenomena of perception emerge through the reflexion of *brahman* in nature. But what is it that reflects? Here again we have duality. The most generally accepted solution is that which despairs of the solution, which contents itself with saying that separate existence in every form is false, all is as it is, all is *brahman*. It illustrates its position by

the story of Yājñavalkya, the ancient sage, who, when asked by one of his pupils in a question, thrice repeated, to describe the *advaita*, gave no answer; and, when pressed, replied that the *advaita* is best described by silence, for all describing means *dvaita* or dualism.\*

Religion having furnished the chief stimulus to Indian philosophic thought, we naturally expect to find the root and germ of its leading conceptions in the Indian sacred writings. A line of thought leading up to the Vedāntic or *advaita* conception can be distinctly traced in the *Brāhmaṇas* based upon the *Vedas*, and in subsequent writings reckoned as inspired scripture.

Starting from a worship of personified nature-powers, the religious mind of the ancient Indians pressed on to seek that on which the gods and the worlds depended for their creation and their support. It found it in that elevation of soul experienced in prayer, which enabled it to transcend its individual existence, to which it gave the name *brahman*.

In the *Taittiriya-Brāhmaṇa*, 2, 8, 9, 6, the question of the *Rigveda*, 'Who is the supporter of the bearers of the world?' is answered. *Brahman* is declared to be 'that out of which earth and heaven have been formed, and that which upholds the bearers of the world.'

In the *Kāthaka-Upaniṣad*, v. 1-3, which represents a later stage in this process of thought, the *brahman* is described as the most inward and the noblest element in all the manifestations of nature, 'the sun in the firmament, God in the heavens,' as dwelling everywhere, as born everywhere, and he only is free from suffering and sure of salvation who reveres 'the unborn, the unchangeably spiritual' that dwells within him.

In the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* is set forth in the clearest terms this exaltation of the *ātman*, or self, in its identification with *brahman*. 'This Universe is *brahman*. Its material is spirit, life is its body, light its form . . . all-embracing, silent, undisturbed—this is my soul (*ātman*) in the inmost heart, smaller than a seed of grain—this is my soul in the inmost heart, greater than the earth, greater than the heavens, greater than all these worlds . . . this is *brahman*; to it shall I, when I go hence, be united.'† The self in this sense is 'the real,' 'the one without a second (*advitiya*). It is that out of which the whole world has been formed, of which the world is a mere transformation. He who knows the one knows all.'

The parallel movements of thought in the ancient and modern philosophies of the West have been frequently pointed out. The early Greek philosophy was inspired by the longing to discover a principle of unity in the manifoldness of the phenomenal world. The earlier attempts resulted in the assumption of some one common physical principle, out of which this variety was developed; the later attempts sought it in a spiritual cause. Xenophanes proclaimed the unity of the Divine, and his disciple Parmenides, denying to this Divine principle personality and change, reduced it to *Being*. To the unity thus reached by the path of pure abstraction he opposed the world of phenomena as *non-being* (*τὸ μὴ ὄν*). The correspondence between these successive stages in Greek thought and the course of Indian thought outlined above is interesting and suggestive. The other parallel is that presented by the Kantian philosophy. By a different path from that of mere abstraction, Kant pursued the same metaphysical quest. Having subjected to a minute critical analysis the faculties of human knowledge, he arrived at the result that 'the thing in itself' (*das Ding an sich*) is not accessible to human knowledge, as all knowledge of the external objective world is realized through the application of certain categories of thought, the categories of space, time, and causality, which inhere in the mind of the thinking subject. Reality in itself, therefore, so far as these faculties are our means of knowledge, is unknowable.

One cannot fail to recognize here also a remarkable similarity between Kant's critical position and the real *advaita* doctrine. But there is this important difference to be noted in regard to

\* Śaṅkara on *Brahmasūtra*, III. 2. 17; Deussen, *Upaṇishads*, Eng. tr. (1906) p. 166 f.

† Chānd.-Up. III. 14, cf. Satap.-Br. x. 6. 3.

method. The *advaita* presents us with no critical analysis of the process of knowledge, for we can scarcely dignify with such a name the arbitrary and fanciful methods above indicated, by which the *Advaitin* sought to explain the fact of *māyā* in our perception of phenomena. So far as the *advaita* is to be regarded as a philosophy, it is a philosophy of a purely abstract and speculative nature. By one supreme effort of mind it advances to a position which other philosophies have sought to establish by a patient and laborious examination of the facts of experience. In its religious aspect it exhibits similar characteristics, and its religious aspect is more important than its speculative interest. It is a doctrine of salvation through the attainment of the true *knowledge*, and this knowledge is to be realized in the *advaita* conclusion. By a purely intellectual effort the emancipation of the soul from evil is to be achieved. In this solution of a deep moral problem we see the same impatience of facts, the same summary method of reaching the desired goal, as marks the speculative side of this philosophy. How far this philosophy has sounded the depths of the problem may be gathered from the illustration which it employs to describe it. One who wears a jewel round his neck is distressed when, forgetting that he has it, he searches here and there to find it. His peace is restored when he discovers that it has never been lost. So, we are told, the distressed soul finds salvation in the knowledge that there is no diversity, no evil, no separateness. Pleasure and pain are merely the results of this false sense of individuality and separateness. The mind of the individual may be conscious of evil and of suffering; but the great mind *brahman* knows nothing of these. Identification with *brahman* is the source of all bliss, the sense of separateness is the root of all evil.

LITERATURE.—See ART. VEDĀNTA. The view of Advaitism given above will be found fully expounded in M. N. Divedi's *Monism or Advaitism* (Bombay, 1899). D. M. MACKICHAN.

ADVOCATE.—The etymological meaning of 'advocate' (Lat. *advocatus*) is one called to, i.e. one called to another's aid. It may be used of one called in to assist another in any business, as, e.g., when an official appointed to defend the rights and revenues of the church was called *advocatus ecclesiae*. In legal phraseology an advocate is one called in to assist another's cause in a court of justice. The Lat. *advocatus* had a wider significance than 'advocate' connotes in modern English; in Cicero's time it denoted a backer, hence any legal assistant: not an advocate as in later authors (cf. *Phil.* i. § 16, *pro Cæc.* §§ 24, 43). Like *παράκλητος* in classical Greek, *advocatus* might refer to any 'friend of the accused person, called to speak to his character, or otherwise enlist the sympathy of the judges (or, as we should call them, the jury) in his favour.'

Field (Notes on Translation of NT, 1899, 102) supports the above statement by the following apposite quotation from Asconius, ad Cic. in Q. Cæcil.: 'Qui defendit alterum in iudicio, aut patronus dicitur si orator est; aut advocatus, si aut ius suggerit, aut presentiam suam commodat amico.' For a similar use of *παράκλητος* he refers to Dem. de F. L. init. p. 341, 10; Diog. Laert. Vit. Dionis, iv. 68. In Philo, de Opif. M. § 6 'the office intended is that of a monitor or adviser... but still preserving the leading idea of amicus advocatus in consilium.'

'Advocate,' as a judicial term, now generally signifies *pleader*. This is a natural development of meaning, for assistance in courts of law usually takes the form of speaking on behalf of one who is accused. As thus employed the word practically corresponds to the English 'barrister,' whose office it is to plead the cause of his client.

Five uses of advocate fall within the limits of this article, viz:—

1. In the New Testament :
  - (a) Jesus Christ 'an Advocate.'
  - (b) The Holy Spirit 'another Advocate.'
2. In Church History :
  - (a) *Advocatus ecclesiae*.
  - (b) *Advocatus diaboli*.
  - (c) *Advocatus Dei*.

1. 'ADVOCATE' IN NT.—(a) Jesus Christ 'an Advocate.'—There is general agreement that in 1 Jn 2<sup>1</sup> ('If any man sin, we have an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous'), 'Advocate' is a better rendering of *παράκλητος* than either 'Comforter' or 'Helper,' the alternatives suggested in RVm. Wyclif, following the Vulgate, has 'We han an aduocat anentis the fadir.' In considering the NT use of this word, Jewish as well as classical authors should be consulted. In Rabbinical literature *paraglitā*—the Aramaic transliteration of *παράκλητος* (cf. 'paraclete')—is not infrequently found. Buxtorf quotes 'An advocate is a good intercessor before a magistrate or king' (cf. *JE* vol. ix. p. 514 f.). Doubtless the word sometimes occurs in Jewish writers with a wider meaning, as in the Targum on Job 16<sup>20</sup> and 33<sup>7</sup>, where it represents the Hebrew word for 'interpreter' (*mēlitz*); but its use to designate 'pleader' is well established. The antithesis between advocate and accuser is, for example, clearly marked in *Pirqe Aboth*, iv. 11: 'He who performs one good deed has gotten to himself one advocate [paraclete], and he who commits one transgression has gotten to himself one accuser.' Field (*op. cit.*) has good grounds for saying that Rabbinical writers use *paraclete* 'precisely in the same way as St. John in his Epistle, and as the Latin *patronus* which they also adopt.' This judgment accords with the conclusion already drawn from the history of the word. Though there is no evidence that the *patronus* was ever called *advocatus*, 'advocate' was, in its later usage, extended in meaning so as to include the function of the Roman *patron*, who was liable to be called to the side of his client 'to represent him before the tribunals when he became involved in litigation' (Muirhead, *Roman Law*, p. 9). Clement of Rome (1 *Ep. ad Cor.* i. 36) applies to our Lord the title *παροδότης* = *patronus*.

In 1 Jn 2<sup>1</sup> the thoughts suggested by the comparison of Christ to the Advocate must be interpreted in harmony with the context. When the believer is charged with having sinned, and Satan presses the charge in the presence of the 'Father... who judgeth' (1 P 1<sup>17</sup>), Christ pleads for the accused; because He is 'righteous' His advocacy is well-pleasing to the Father; and His plea that God would show forth His righteousness in the sinner's forgiveness is based upon the fact that He Himself is more than the sinner's Advocate, even the 'propitiation' for his sins (1 Jn 2<sup>2</sup>, cf. Ro 3<sup>25</sup>). 'Faith in the forgiveness of sins cannot be religiously and ethically innocuous unless it is associated with faith in the propitiation' (Rothe, *ExpT*, i. [1890] p. 209).

(b) The Holy Spirit 'another Advocate.'—There has been much controversy in regard to the rendering of *παράκλητος* in Jn 14<sup>16</sup>, 15<sup>26</sup>, 16<sup>7</sup>. In all four places Wyclif and the chief English versions translate it 'Comforter'; the Rheims has 'Paraclete.' In RVm 'Advocate' is the first alternative. Beza, however, has *advocatus* both in the Epistle and in the Gospel; he rightly explains its application to the Holy Spirit 'by a reference to St. Paul's words (Ro 8<sup>34</sup>) about the Spirit as making intercession for us. The same explanation is given by Pearson on the eighth article of the Creed' (Hare, *The Mission of the Comforter*, 1846, note k. Hare's own preference is for 'Comforter,' not in its secondary sense as Consoler, but in its primary sense as Strengthened). Amongst modern scholars there

is a growing consensus of opinion in favour of 'Advocate' as a title of the Holy Spirit as well as of Jesus Christ.

'Christ is our Advocate on high,  
Thou art our Advocate within.'

The arguments in support of this view are succinctly stated by Field (*op. cit.* p. 103): '(1) "Another Advocate," i.e. besides Myself. (2) The word is only known from St. John's writings, here and in 1 Jn 21, where "advocate" is, by general consent, the right word in the right place. (3) Etymologically, advocate and *παράκλητος* are identical. (4) This is the only rendering which accounts for the passive form.'

The question is, 'Does the work of the Holy Spirit as described in the above four passages correspond to the functions of an advocate?' In three of them (1 Jn 14<sup>16</sup>, 26 15<sup>26</sup>) the Holy Spirit is the 'Advocate within' the hearts of Christ's disciples; as an Advocate he 'pleads the truth and makes reply to every argument of sin' (14<sup>16</sup>); His pleading is with power because He brings to remembrance the Saviour's words, unfolds their teaching (14<sup>26</sup>), and bears witness to His glory (15<sup>26</sup>). No strain is put upon the context of these passages by this interpretation; the disciples themselves will be 'judges against their own unbelieving hearts, and Christ will be triumphantly acquitted and declared to be the Son of God with power' (Hastings, *ExpT*, x. [1899] p. 170). The remaining passage (16<sup>7</sup>) describes the Holy Spirit's work in convicting the world. He is Christ's Advocate, and 'for the Apostles themselves the pleading of the Advocate was a sovereign vindication of their cause. In the great trial they were shown to have the right, whether their testimony was received or rejected' (Westcott, *Com. in loc.*).

Zahn (*Einleit.* vol. i. p. 45) finds a difficulty in accepting the rendering 'another Advocate' in 1 Jn 14<sup>16</sup>. 'Another,' he argues, implies that Christ Himself had already been His disciples' Advocate, whereas He had rather been their Teacher or their Interpreter. But there is no need to give precisely the same meaning to 'Advocate' when it is applied to Christ's earthly intercourse with His disciples and to His heavenly intercession on their behalf. The difficulty seems to be sufficiently met by saying that on earth Christ was ever pleading God's cause with the men who had been given Him out of the world, whilst in heaven He is ever pleading their cause with God (*cf.* Cremer, *Bibl.-Theol. Lex. of NT Gr.* p. 337).

All admit that 'Advocate' does not adequately represent the varied work of the Holy Spirit. As a descriptive general title rather than as a precise tr. of the word in the passages discussed above, the felicitous suggestion of Dr. E. A. Abbott may be gladly accepted: 'Perhaps the best periphrasis of Paraclete for modern readers would be "The Friend in need"' (*Paradosis*, 1413a).

2. 'ADVOCATE' IN CHURCH HISTORY.—(a) *Advocatus ecclesiae*.—The 'Church's advocate' was a civilian officially charged with the duty of defending ecclesiastical rights and revenues. At the sixth Council of Carthage (A.D. 401) it was resolved (Canon 10) that 'the Emperors shall be prayed to appoint, in union with the bishops, protectors (*defensores*) for the Church.' At the eleventh Council of Carthage (A.D. 407) it was decreed (Canon 2c) that 'for the necessities of the Church five *executores* or *exatores* shall be demanded of the Emperor to collect the revenues of the Church' (Hefele, *Hist. of Church Councils*, vol. ii. pp. 425, 442). At different periods the duties of the *advocati ecclesiae*—sometimes designated as *agentes*, *defensores*, or *exatores*—included not only the defence and maintenance of the secular and legal rights of the Church, but also the protection of the poor and of orphans, the exercise of jurisdiction, including police functions and the power to levy soldiers from among the vassals of ecclesiastics who claimed immunity from the service of the State.

At first the office of *advocatus ecclesiae* was not hereditary, but Hinschius states (*PRE<sup>s</sup>* i. 199) that before the end of the 9th cent. founders of monasteries, etc., sometimes stipulated that it

should be retained for themselves and for their heirs. In Charlemagne's time the right of nomination belonged to the king; but to some ecclesiastical corporations the power of free choice was given, with the proviso that the secular authority of the district—the duke or count—had the right to reject the nominee of the Church.

When the office of advocate was held by unscrupulous men, it became an instrument of oppression and extortion. Historians record many charges brought against these officials of plundering the property of the Church and misappropriating its revenues. Kurtz does not overstate the facts when he says: 'Many advocates assumed arbitrary powers, and dealt with the property of the Church and its proceeds just as they chose' (*Church History*, § 86). Hinschius (*op. cit.*) says that it was Pope Innocent III. who, in his negotiations with Otto IV. and Frederick II., first secured a promise that the State should protect the Church against the oppression of the *advocati ecclesiae*.

(b) *Advocatus diaboli*.—In the Roman Catholic Church, when it is proposed to honour a departed saint by Beatification or Canonization,\* it is the duty of the 'Devil's advocate' to plead against the proposal and to bring forward every possible objection to it. These objections may lie either against the saint's reputation for 'heroic' virtue, the orthodoxy of his writings, or the genuineness of the miracles with which he is credited. They may also have reference to technical errors of procedure, or to flaws in the evidence.

Von Moy, in an article which has the approval of the Roman Catholic authorities, says that papal canonizations are not certainly known to have taken place before the time of Pope John xv. (A.D. 993). At first bishops sanctioned beatifications without consulting the Pope, but in consequence of abuses Pope Alexander iii. decreed (1170) that henceforth papal consent should in all cases be obtained. This decree, known as *Audivimus* (the word with which it begins), is the basis of the present regulations in regard to Beatification and Canonization. The edict of Pope Urban viii. (1634) made it beyond dispute that it is the Pope's exclusive prerogative to beatify as well as to canonize, these acts being forbidden not only to bishops, archbishops, etc., but even to a papal legate, a council unless it has the Pope's consent, and the college of cardinals assembled when the papal throne is empty (Wetzer-Welte, *Kirchenlexikon*<sup>2</sup>, vol. ii. p. 140 ff.).

In the process of Beatification a preliminary inquiry is instituted by the bishop of the diocese concerned. If the result is favourable to the *postulatores* who desire the Beatification, the proposal is forwarded to the *congregatio rituum* in Rome. At the various meetings of this congregation the *advocatus diaboli* or *promotor fidei* is required to bring forward all the objections that can be urged against the proposition of the *postulatores*. The decision is taken after both sides have been fully heard. Between the first and second meetings of the *congregatio rituum* ten years must elapse. The Beatification of a saint cannot take place less than fifty years after his death. Canonization may follow after an interval, if it can be shown that 'since beatification at least two miracles have been wrought by God in answer to the intercessions of the saint' (Von Moy, *op. cit.*). In the processes preliminary to Canonization the 'Devil's advocate' discharges the duties of his office in the manner already described.

The official regulations under which the *advocatus diaboli* acts provide for the strict application of the most stringent tests to the claims of the saint whom it is proposed to beatify or to canonize; moreover, the final decision, as in all *causae majores*, rests with the Pope. It is claimed that 'in modern times the court of Rome has shown itself extremely averse to promiscuous canonization; and since the days of Benedict XIV., the promoter of the faith,

\* Beatification differs from Canonization in that it permits but does not enjoin the honouring (*cultus*) of a saint, and that it applies to a particular diocese, province, or order, but not to the whole Roman Catholic world.

popularly known as the devil's advocate, has exercised extreme severity in sifting the claims of aspirants' (Foye, *Romish Rites*, p. 406 f.). This statement, however true of the procedure under some Popes, needs qualification. Alzog, an orthodox writer of 'correct' opinions, testifies that Pius IX. 'performed more beatifications and canonizations than any of his predecessors'; and Nippold, who quotes this testimony, adds that the Beatifications of this Pope show him to have been 'entirely in the hands of the Jesuits,' and that the biographies of the worthies beatified by him are 'full of unnatural asceticism and unnatural miracles.' The same historian states that the virgin Clara of Montefalco was canonized by Leo XIII. on the ground that 'not only was the body of the saint well preserved since her death in 1308, but that more especially her heart showed traces of the instruments of the passion.' At the public celebration of Dec. 8, 1881 there were exhibited in the gallery connected with the Vatican 'twelve pictures, of which six treated of the miracles performed by Clara' (*The Papacy in the Nineteenth Century*, Schwab's tr., pp. 128, 147, 198).

(c) *Advocatus Dei*.—In the Roman Catholic Church this title is given to the *procurator* whose duty it is to refute the objections raised by the *advocatus diaboli* against the Beatification or Canonization of a saint. Von Moy (*op. cit.*) states that 'God's advocate' is always a man of high rank, and that he is chosen from the province or from the order to which the saint belonged. Just before the solemn moment of canonization, the *advocatus Dei* approaches the papal throne, accompanied by an advocate of the consistory, who, from the lowest step of the throne, presents to the Pope, in the name of 'God's advocate,' an earnest request that it may please His Holiness to canonize the saint.

LITERATURE.—For 'Advocate' in NT see bibliography given in art. HOLY SPIRIT. Of special value is Westcott's Additional Note on Jn 14<sup>th</sup> in his Com. on this Gospel. For *advocatus ecclesiae* the best sources are mentioned by Hinschius (*PRE<sup>3</sup> f.*).

source mentioned by Von Moy in his art. 'Beatification and Canonization' in *Wetzer-Welte's Kirchenlexikon oder Enckyl. der kathol. Theol. und ihrer Hülfswissenschaften*. See also Du Cange, *Glossarium*, s.v. 'Canonizare'; Milman, *Hist. of Lat. Christianity*, vol. ix, p. 711; Alban Butler, *Lives of the Saints*; F. W. Faber, *Essay on Beatification, Canonization, etc.* J. G. TASKER.

ÆGEAN RELIGION.—By this is meant the religion of the coasts and isles of the Ægean Sea in the Bronze and earlier Ages. 'Ægean' civilization was commonly known till recently as 'Mycenean.' Now, however, that Mycenæ has been shown to have been probably neither the centre of it nor the scene of its earlier developments, the wider and non-committal name 'Ægean' has come into use, to include the 'Mycenean' of Schliemann, the 'pre-Mycenean' of his earlier critics, the 'Cycladic' of Blinkenberg and others, and the 'Minoan' of Evans. The first revelation of this forgotten civilization occupied the last quarter of the 19th cent., and begot, as was inevitable, more wonder and curiosity than science. Scholars were not able all at once to comprehend and co-ordinate the mass of novel raw material accumulating on their hands; and it took time to make the necessary comparisons between the Ægean civilization and other civilizations, contemporary and posterior. Among its institutions none remained so long obscure as the religious. Up to almost the end of the century no sacred building had been recognized among Ægean remains, and no undoubted idol of a

divinity. Of the small number of unquestioned cult objects discovered, almost all were still ascribed by many scholars to foreign importation. The few ritual scenes represented on intaglios were, some of them, not observed to be religious at all, while others were ill understood for want of known parallels and of a sound general conception of Ægean cult. Perrot and Chipiez in their volume on the Art of Primitive Greece, issued in 1895, found hardly anything to say on religious representations; and Evans, when about to show in 1900 how much light could be thrown on the religion by certain classes of small objects, not till then adequately remarked, had to confess that 'among the more important monuments of the Mycenean world' very little was to be found 'having a clear and obvious relation to religious belief.' Since that date, however, the inquiry has been revolutionized by the exploration of Crete; and we now have a mass of monumental evidence upon Ægean religious belief, cult, and ritual from which knowledge of the broad principles and much ritual detail have been obtained. Upon this class of evidence any general account of the religion of a prehistoric civilization must of necessity be based; and only in the second instance should contemporary and posterior cults be introduced into the inquiry. For the present purpose no account will be taken of possible racial changes during the Ægean period, since the civilization evidently remained of one type throughout, and the popular religion shows development only, not essential change.

i. GENERAL NATURE OF ÆGEAN RELIGION.—We have ample evidence that Ægean religion and ritual had originally both a *natural aniconic* and an *artificial aniconic* character. In the first state, man, conscious of a dominant unseen Spirit, and impelled by his instinct to locate it in some visible object in permanent relation to his own daily life, finds its dwelling in imposing features of Nature, e.g. the sun, a mountain, a wood, a stream, and even a single tree or rock. In the second, he attempts to take the Spirit under his own control, and to bring it into particular and exclusive relation to himself by placing its dwelling in smaller and even portable objects: in stones of singular natural appearance, or fashioned by himself into pillars; in trees or bushes of his own planting, weapons, animal forms, and all kinds of object known to us as fetiches. The transition from these to idols is easy. Having become familiar with the Spirit, and conceiving it more and more in his own image, he passes to the *iconic* state, and in that will remain till the advanced point of mental development at which he ceases to demand a visible home for his god.

These states, however, are not to be regarded as always successive. With primitive man they are often contemporaneous, the usages and ritual proper to one coexisting with those proper to another, and making his religious life more full and various. The facts of an early state can therefore be learned from a later; and this is fortunate for the student of an extinct religion, since man seldom reaches the point of making monumental records of his cult before he has passed almost out of the primitive states. Nor can the peculiar character of his religion become certainly intelligible to us till he has expressed his conception in some theanthropic presentation. In the case of the Ægean religion, our monumental evidence hardly begins until the full *iconic* state is well in sight. But from that point it is sufficiently full and intelligible to

\* Mycen. Tree and Pillar Cult' in *JHS*, 1901, p. 99 (herein after referred to as *TPC*).



inform us not only how the deity was conceived and how worshipped from the beginning of theanthropism, but how worshipped previously, before being endowed with human attributes on the monuments, or perhaps with any very precise attributes whatever in the minds of worshippers. Moreover, more than most religions, the Ægean remained to the end full of aniconic cult-practices.

Ægean religion, then, was from the first a Nature cult, in which the heavenly bodies and imposing terrestrial features were objects of worship, while at the same time a Divine Spirit was understood to have its dwelling therein. From this state there survived in the Ægean religious art of a later stage such cult objects as the solar disc, the lunar crescent, the star symbol passing into various forms of cross,\* the rocky mountain, and the grove; while from the other state, the artificial aniconic, persisted the single tree or group of trees, generally three in number, the pillar, single, triple, or many, sacred animals, weapons, conspicuously the *bipennis*, or double war-axe (chosen as a fetish very probably from its obvious likeness to the star dwelling), the large body shield, and other objects, notably a pair of horns, perhaps a trophy, symbolic of a sacrificial bull. All these accidents of the primitive religion will be dealt with more fully below in the section on the Cult; but in order to discern its essential idea, dependent as we are for all first-hand information on artistic monuments, we must pass at once to the iconic stage and inquire how Ægean man, so soon as he had clearly conceived the Divine Spirit, represented it in terms of his own nature.

ii. THE DEITY.—It has been said that, previous to the exploration of Crete, no idol or icon of a deity had been certainly recognized among Ægean remains. It must be borne in mind that in dealing with novel monuments of a prehistoric civilization, it is not legitimate to presume that a representation of the human figure is intended to be Divine until and unless it be found with clear concomitant indications of the supernatural—unless, for



FIG. 1.—GOLD RING FROM MYCENÆ.

example, it be represented as emitting light, or accompanied by wild beasts, such as lions or large serpents, fatal to ordinary humanity, or, again, of superhuman relative stature, or, lastly, receiving adoration. In the cult-scenes found first, e.g. those on the bezel of a gold ring found in the Acropolis treasure at Mycenæ (fig. 1), on impressed glass plaques, on a painted stela from the same site, and on other monuments, a manifest deity was not generally recognized, although there were undoubted religious votaries, even monstrous demonic

forms,\* and at least one figure accompanied by doves. Acute observers, however, familiar with the monuments of other Near Eastern religions, had already noted the prominence of female figures in these cult-scenes, and begun to guess that the Ægean peoples embodied their principal conception of the deity in feminine form. In particular, Evans had been observing a class of gem and ring subjects which showed a female between lions, goats, etc.† As the excavation of Knossos proceeded, this female form, represented under circumstances implying divinity, appeared with increasing frequency on a class of objects first found there, and of great value in this connexion, viz. well-preserved clay impressions of intaglio gems. On several such impressions the female figure is seen seated (fig. 1), while other figures stand in attitudes of adoration or pour libations before it; on one found in 1901 the figure is standing on a mountain peak, while lions mount guard on either hand and an adorer stands below; on another the figure in flounced dress lays her hands on the backs of two lions;‡ on another the figure, holding a spear, is accompanied by a lion regardant;§ on another the figure bears on her shoulder the sacred *bipennis*|| This female figure with the axe appears also on a schist mould found in East Crete. And, lastly, on one found by Halbherr at Haghia Triadha, in the south of Crete, a female of relatively gigantic stature stands between two smaller females before a shrine.¶ In the third year of the Cretan excavations the discovery of actual shrines began. In the first found, a miniature shrine of early date, there were no idols, but among other obviously sacred objects was a triad of terra-cotta 'bætylic' pillars with doves perched atop; and presently, in the same season, an actual chapel, very small, but sufficient for its purpose, which was no doubt domestic, was opened and found to contain, in company with sacred axes on pedestals and 'horns of consecration' (see below), three feminine idols in painted terra cotta and semi-anthropomorphic, of which the largest had a dove perched on her head. In the same year other and ruder idols of the same sex and type, but with snakes coiled about them, were brought to light at Gournia, an Ægean site in eastern Crete, dug by Miss H. A. Boyd, and also at Priniás in the Cretan Messará. This snake-goddess was not found at Knossos till 1903, and then she appeared as a faience idol, which is among Mr. Evans' greatest prizes. Three serpents coil about her and form her girdle, while a fourth rears its head above her tiara (fig. 2). That this figure, whether shown on intaglios or as an idol, is a goddess there is no manner of doubt; and that she is one and the same, whether accompanied by doves or serpents, has been conclusively proved by excavations in East Crete carried out in 1904. At Palaikastro the remains of a shrine were discovered wherein a goddess held a triple snake in her arms, while votaries danced round her, and doves perched on pillars hard by.\*\*

This goddess, however, is not alone. In a much smaller number of intaglio impressions a youthful male figure has been observed, accompanied by

\* The latter, often observed on gems, were not credited with much significance owing to doubts, not only of the indigenous nature of the objects on which they appeared, but also of their being other than human votaries engaged in a theriomorphic ritual. Cf. A. B. Cook in *JHS* xiv. p. 81.

† *TPC* § 22, figs. 44, 45. Cf. Annual Brit. School at Athens (*BSA*), vi. p. 43 n.

‡ *BSA* vii. pp. 18, 19, 29, 101.

§ *Ib.* ix. fig. 37.

|| *Ib.* viii. fig. 59.

¶ *Mon. Antichi*, xlii., *Resti*, etc. fig. 37. Cf. the gigantic seated female on a Zakro seal, *JHS* xxii. p. 77, fig. 2.

\*\* *BSA* x. p. 223. This ritual dance seems also to be figured on an impression from Haghia Triadha (*Resti*, etc., *cf. supra*, fig. 83).

\* The 'Swastika' (*crux gammata*), the cross *patée*, and the plain Greek cross.



lions, and sometimes armed (fig. 3).<sup>\*</sup> On a gold signet of Knossos such a figure with hair flying loose behind is seen in the upper field, and is supposed by Evans to be the deity descending on his shrine.<sup>†</sup> But no actual idol of a god has come to light, unless the male of short stature offering a dove to the goddess in the little chapel at Knossos<sup>‡</sup> is to be interpreted as a Divine figure.

This list is not exhaustive. The goddess is probably to be recognized in many other intaglio scenes, e.g. those wherein a female holds up goats by the legs,<sup>§</sup> as elsewhere she holds lions; and perhaps in certain other feminine idols. But it includes all undoubted representations of a deity so far found, and is more than enough to prove how the Ægean peoples, when they arrived at the iconic stage of religion, conceived divinity. They personified the Supreme Principle as a woman, to whom was subordinated a young male, less in honour and probably later in time. There is no evidence for more deities than these. The religion was what may be called a Dual Monotheism.

iii. CULT.—There is evidence for several classes of cult-objects, considered to be dwelling-places of the Divine Spirit, and surviving through the theanthropic age as fetishes; for inanimate



FIG. 2.—SNAKE-CROWNED GODDESS FROM KNOSSOS.

accessories of various kinds, of which the origin and later significance are often obscure; and for animate accessories of cult, perhaps also at first dwelling-places of the Spirit, but tending more and more to be regarded as symbolic. These all played a part in a customary ritual, of whose practices, strikingly uniform over the Ægean area, we have many illustrations.

1. Dwelling-places of the Spirit (fetishes).—(a) *Betyls* (sacred stones or



FIG. 3.—SEAL IMPRESSION FROM HAGHIA TRIADHA.

pillars, Gr. *βαῖτυλος* or *βαῖτυλον*=esp. the stone swallowed by Kronos, which was really Zeus in his betylic form, but also others, e.g. the black Cone of the Sun at Baalbek=Sem. *Bethel*?). The

<sup>\*</sup> TPC fig. 43; BSA ix. fig. 33, vii. p. 101. Cf. Haghia Triadha seal (Resti, etc. fig. 40).

<sup>†</sup> TPC fig. 43.

<sup>‡</sup> BSA viii. p. 100, fig. 56.

<sup>§</sup> e.g. Zakro (JHS xxii. p. 77, fig. 3). Vaphio (Furtwängler, Ant. Gem. pl. ii. 23), Haghia Triadha (Resti, etc. fig. 42).

character and use of Ægean sacred stones have been very fully treated by Evans in TPC, and subsequent Cretan discoveries have added little but confirmation. There can be small doubt that, as cult-objects, they represented in a convenient fetish form the original Divine mountain, still seen in intaglio cult-scenes of a late period. They themselves became in time the origin both of altars and of iconic statues, passing through gradations of rude shaping. A remarkable example of this transition has come to light latterly at Knossos in the large building to the west of the palace, where lay several natural stone freaks, roughly resembling human forms, and evidently carefully preserved in a shrine. Whether pillars or wooden posts, descended from sacred trees, eventually acquired a symbolic significance as *phalli*, is less certain. An upright object impaling a triangle occurs in any case in gem-scenes, and is strongly suggestive of a *phallus* in connexion with a *vulva*. Further, there is reason to think that betyls originated upright tombstones, which from being Divine or ghostly dwelling-places became merely commemorative in a late age.

Betyls passed in Ægean cult through various modifications, retaining their significance as dwelling-places of the Spirit. At first unshaped single rocks or cairns, we find them developed in the majority of earlier Ægean cult-scenes into pillars, monolithic or built up. The Divine pillar stands alone, sometimes, as over the Mycenæ Gate, between sacred animals, a position wherein it precedes the iconic figures of a later period; often also in front of a shrine, while a votary adores before it; and it is very often associated with trees. Almost equally often it does not appear singly, but in groups of three, and less commonly of more.<sup>\*</sup> Occasionally the dove is seen either descending towards it or perched upon it; more rarely rays issue from it. Thereafter the pillar, from standing free, becomes a support,—a 'pillar of the house,'—but is still betylic, and its double function is sometimes shown by the free pillar bearing a fragment of superstructure. It is seen rising from behind 'horns of consecration' in fresco pictures of the façades of shrines, and in one case bearing sacred axe-heads affixed to its capital;<sup>†</sup> and it props up 'tables of offering,' with accessory supports round it.<sup>‡</sup> It is possible that such sacred 'pillars of the house' have actually been found in certain chambers at Knossos and elsewhere, which seem too small to have needed a central prop for purely architectural reasons, and the probability is heightened by the fact that the blocks of which two such pillars in the Knossian palace are made, are marked with the sacred sign of the double axe.<sup>§</sup> There is reason to think that the original Ægean sanctity of pillar supports has something to do with the later Greek fashion of using a redundancy of columns in sacred architecture.

(b) *Triliths* (dolmens).—These are much less frequently represented than betyls, but sufficiently often to leave no doubt that the triad of stones forming a free standing portal had a sacred character in Ægean as in so many other lands.<sup>||</sup> They are seen framing a betyl or standing before a sacred tree. On a remarkable gem impression from Zakro<sup>¶</sup> in East Crete, such a trilith is well shown with lions couchant on either hand.

(c) *Trees* (Sem. *ashera*).—These, being perishable, are now to be looked for only in cult representations, and especially on intaglio impressions. There they are as frequent as betyls, and they

<sup>\*</sup> BSA viii. 23, fig. 14.

<sup>†</sup> BSA x. fig. 14 and pl. 2.

<sup>‡</sup> TPC figs. 7, 9. These objects are supposed to be the origin of the sacred tripods of Greek cult.

<sup>§</sup> TPC fig. 5.

<sup>||</sup> See TPC § 22.

<sup>¶</sup> JHS xxii. 87, fig. 23.

occur singly or in triads (very common) or in groves. They are often seen growing out of the shrine itself, or in close proximity to an altar. The goddess sometimes sits under the shade (fig. 1); at other times she plucks the fruit. Many botanical varieties can be distinguished, the palm, the fig, the cypress, the pine, the plane, the vine; but the first three are most frequent. As has been said already, the tree occurs very often in the same scene with the pillar, a coincidence frequently observed in the case of megalithic monuments elsewhere.

(d) *Weapons*.—The great *body-shield*, curved inwards at the waist, which is so often used as a decorative motive in Ægean relief work, occurs in cult-representations as an independent object, lying before a shrine, or suspended in mid-air. Compare two gem-impressions from Zakro, which show shields lying, in the one case, before a group of five pillars (probably not towers, as stated in the text); in the other, before the façade of a shrine.\* The most decisive monument is a small painted *stela* found at Mycenæ, whereon is depicted a great shield between two adoring votaries.† Miniature shields in clay and ivory, found at Knossos, were evidently cult-objects or amulets.

Figures of both the goddess and the god bear *spears*, but we have no evidence yet for the use of either that weapon or the *sword* as a cult-object.

With the *bipennis* or double-axe the case is very different. The evidence for its cult-use is overwhelming. It is seen in the field of a gem-impression with a votary adoring;‡ it forms the central object of a cult-scene painted on a clay coffin found at Palaikastro; and is being adored in both the chief scenes on the great Haghia Triadha sarcophagus,§ where it is seen in conjunction with sacred palm-trees and doves, and stands upright on a stepped pyramidal base, similar to the basis with socket for a staff, found in the palace at Knossos. In the small chapel on the latter site, it evidently stood between the sacred 'horns of consecration,'|| a position in which it is often shown on intaglios (cf. fig. 4). Sometimes it appears in a reduplicated form, as in a steatite example from the small shrine at Knossos; on the gold signet from Mycenæ (fig. 1); and on the schist mould from East Crete, mentioned already: and, *a propos*, Evans recalls the fact that, since it appears in the hand of the goddess on a Knossian gem, and in company with her idols in the small shrine, it was at least as much her weapon as the god's. The dual axe is, he thinks, the fetish of a bi-sexual god. Miniature axes in bronze have often been found on Cretan sites, e.g. in the lower part of the holy cave on Mt. Dicte, and were evidently very common fetishes or cult-offerings. The sign of the axe is found more often than any other on Knossian blocks, whether as a symbol of consecration or as a mason's mark. It is not impossible that its name *labrys* is to be detected in that of the Cretan *labyrinth*.¶

2. *Other inanimate accessories of cult*.—Certain other objects are represented in cult-scenes, or have actually been found in connexion with shrines, about which it is less safe to say that they were dwelling-places of the Spirit. Even if originally so, and long in use as fetishes, they seem in the iconic stage to have become rather articles of ritualistic furniture.

(a) '*Horns of consecration*.'—These long misunderstood objects, of commonest occurrence in gem and fresco cult-scenes, and found modelled in stucco, clay, terra-cotta, and stone, were almost certainly fetishes at the first. They consist simply of a base with two erect horns, which, in the more elaborate examples represented, bend outwards at the tips, like the horns of oxen (fig. 4).\* They are seen either on the top of a shrine or altar,† or beside sacred pillars or trees, which in some cases seem to rise out of them (cf. figs. 5, 6). Also they support in the same way the sacred *bipennis*, actual examples having been found in the small shrine at Knossos with sockets for axe-shafts. Upon a vase from Enkomi (Old Salamis) in Cyprus the picture shows not only one *bipennis* so rising from these horns, but two other axes fixed between the horns of actual *bucrania*, depicted in full (fig. 5).‡ This seems to confirm the inference, which in any case suggests itself, that the conventional sacred horns are a convenient reduction of an original *bucranium*, itself a reduction of the entire bull, known from abundant evidence to have been a sacred animal, and probably a Divine




FIG. 4.—FRESCO FROM KNOSSOS.

dwelling. The horns-object serves to stamp any scene as religious, and its very frequent appearance is of great importance as a clue to the sacred character of other objects.

(b) *The knotted tie or zone*.—A representation of a knotted scarf or tassel seems also to have sacred significance. Found modelled in alabaster by Schliemann in the Mycenaean Acropolis graves, and supposed to be merely a fragment of wall decoration, it turned up again in the small shrine at Knossos as an independent object. It is possible that this 'tie' is a votive model of a zone, dedicated with a sexual significance, as in later Hellas. On a ring found at Mycenæ these knots are seen suspended from the capital of a lion-guarded pillar; and on a gem from the Argive Heraeum they perhaps appear on either side of a *bucranium*.§

(c) *The cross*.—A cross in marble was found in a Knossian shrine; and the cross sign is common on gems and seal impressions.

\* See, e.g., the coloured plate appended to *TPC*, showing a fresco painting of a Knossian shrine.

† Paribeni, *l.c.* p. 6. Model altars with horns attached were found in the sacred Temenos near the royal villa of Haghia Triadha.

‡ *TPC* fig. 3.

§ Halbherr doubts this (*Resti*, etc. p. 42), preferring to interpret the objects as corselets.

\* *JHS* xxii. figs. 29, 30.

† Perrot-Chipiez, *Hist. de l'Art*, 'La Grèce Prim.' fig. 440.

‡ From Zakro, *JHS*, *l.c.* fig. 5.

§ Paribeni, *Rendiconti R. Acc. Lincei*, xii. fasc. 70, p. 30.

¶ *BSA* viii. 100.

¶ So Kretschmer and Max Mayer quoted by Evans, *TPC* p. 109, n. 6.

3. **Animate accessories of cult.**—What are known in late stages of religion as animals sacred to such and such a divinity, in art appearing as mere attributes, and in real life devoted to the Divine pleasure, whether by being preserved as 'tabu' in the sacred precincts, or by being sacrificed that they may pass to the world invisible, have probably all a common origin as Divine dwelling-places or fetishes. In Ægean cult there were many such sacred animals:

(a) *Serpents*, seen twined about the person of the goddess (fig. 2), or held in the hands of her votaries. These were probably her original dwelling-place as an earth (chthonian) spirit.

(b) *Doves*, settled on her person or offered by votaries; also settled on, or seen approaching, bœtyls, shrines (fig. 6), trees, and axes. They represent probably her original dwelling-place as a spirit of the sky.

(c) *Lions and lionesses*, which, in the iconic stage, are represented as the companions, guardians, or supporters of the deity.

(d) *Bulls, cows, and calves.*—The bull is most frequent. He is seen crowned with the sacred axe (fig. 5). In a magnificent relief, he guarded the main portal of the Knossian palace, and both there and at Tiryns appears again and again in fresco or on intaglios charging and tossing maidens and youths. Evans interprets these as circus scenes (the later *ραυροκαταγία*); but it is possible that what was represented was not so much a comparatively harmless sport as a scene of the devotion of maidens and youths to the Divine beast. It is inevitable in this connexion to recall the tradition of the Knossian Minotaur, the semi-Divine and monstrous bull to which an annual tribute of maidens was devoted. Monstrous figures

and kids seem to have the same significance as the cow and calf.

(f) *Deer and eagles* are frequent intaglio subjects; but beyond the fact that all Ægean engraved gems were probably in some degree amulets, we cannot adduce evidence of the sacred character of these animals.

(g) *Fishes* appear in fresco paintings at Knossos and Phylakopi in Melos, in two cases at least in possible connexion with shrines, recalling their




FIG. 5.—VASE PAINTING FROM SALAMIS, CYPRUS.

well-known connexion with the Semitic goddess.

(h) *Monstrous animals.*—Not only the *Minotaur*, but the *Griffin*, the *Sphinx* (two sphinxes draw a chariot on the Haghia Triadha sarcophagus), and various *composite monsters* appear in intaglios and on frescoes. Lion-headed demons are seen performing ritual acts, as, e.g., pouring libations. Human figures with heads of *asses, lions, goats, birds, and bulls* occur, e.g. on a carved shell found at Phaistos.\* A procession of ass-headed figures bearing a pole on their shoulders, in a Mycenaean fresco painting, has been interpreted as a scene of votaries wearing skins and engaged in *theriomorphic* rites; but this is an unsupported guess. An extraordinary variety of wildly monstrous combinations was found on intaglio impressions at Zakro; but it is possible that these were the product of heraldic fancy, and owed their variety to the necessity of differentiating signet types.

4. **Temples and ritual.**—There is no good Ægean evidence as yet for the existence of such large free-standing structures, having no relation to domestic buildings and devoted to Divine worship, as were the temples of the Hellenic period, although intaglio scenes show *small shrines*, either isodomic or of the dolmen type, standing apparently within enclosures or *femenoi*, and containing bœtyls, sacred trees, and 'horns of consecration.' Such constructed shrines as have actually been found are *small plain chambers* enclosed in palace blocks, as at Knossos, and, possibly, at Palaikastro and Phylakopi in Melos. These, if they do not contain a sacred pillar, show only a ledge or platform at one end, upon which fetishes, idols, and other sacred objects stood. Such domestic 'shrines,' even if beautifully decorated with frescoes like the Melian chamber, can be regarded as little more than mere repositories for *sacra*. As for the representation of shrines, characterized by bœtyls and horns, seen through openings in the façade, and in almost all cases tripartite, it is very doubtful if they are intended to show distinct temples,




FIG. 6.—GOLD SHRINE FROM MYCENÆ.

of minotaur type actually appear on Ægean intaglios,\* proving that the legend is of prehistoric Ægean origin.

The cow and calf, very frequent on intaglios, seem to have typified the goddess's maternity.

(e) *Goats, nannies, and kids.*—The goat is very frequently held by the leg in the hand of the goddess, or accompanies her. A clay goat was found in the west shrine at Knossos. The nanny

\* Knossos, *BSA* vii. figs. 7 b, c; Zakro, *ib.* fig. 45.

\* *JHS* xxii. p. 92.

and not rather parts, or the whole, of a palace or other domestic structure. We have such representations in the Knossian frescoes, on intaglios, and in beaten metal (the gold miniature dove shrine of Mycenæ, fig. 6). It seems clear that certain parts of the Knossian Palace had a peculiarly sacred character; \* and if it be admitted that the whole block of this 'Labyrinth' was the sacred house of the 'Labrys,' and that Minoan rulers were priest-kings (which is very probable), *the whole palace is perhaps to be regarded as a temple*, and we may assume that palaces and temples had not yet been differentiated. *Cave-sanctuaries* there certainly were, wherein Nature often provided bœtyls ready made in the form of stalactites and stalagmites, as in the lower grotto of the Dictæan Cavern. Crete has supplied the most notable instances of caves so far; but parallels to the Idæan and Dictæan grottoes, and those near Sybrita and Kamares (southern face of Ida) and the mouth of the Knossos river, will probably be found ere long on the Greek mainland and in other islands. Such discoveries as the Temenos near Haghia Triadha and the deposits of votive objects found by Myres at Petsofa on the hills near Palaikastro, seem, however, to show that there were sacred places, distinct from domestic buildings, where cult was practised and votive objects were dedicated: but whether these were marked by constructed shrines or were mere enclosures (*temenoi*), or, again, open spots, possibly sanctified by a sacred tree or natural bœtyl, we do not yet know. The evidence now available is rather in favour of the last alternative.

Free-standing altars, probably evolved from the bœtyl, and retaining, perhaps, its self-contained sanctity and its significance, were, however, in ritual use. One, hewn out of rock, stands before the Idæan Cave; the foundations of three were found within the Knossian Palace on three sides of a quarter apparently indicated by its contents as peculiarly sacred; and they are often shown on intaglios and reliefs,† sometimes crowned with 'horns of consecration,' like the actual models found in the Temenos of Haghia Triadha (see above). Altars appear in pictures as rectangular structures of moderate height (fig. 7). The cupped 'table of offerings,' found, as has been already said, in some cases superimposed on a bœtyl, is a convenient reduction of the altar.‡

We have no good evidence yet for a class of *priests* or *priestesses*; but it is quite possible that certain figures shown in such cult-scenes as those on the Haghia Triadha sarcophagus are intended to be sacerdotal.

As to *ritual*, various acts are represented. Votaries pour libations, raise hands in postures of adoration, call down the Divinity to his fetish dwelling by blowing through a triton shell, dance round the goddess (the 'Chorus of Ariadne'), brandish *sacra* (as does the faience votary of the snake-goddess of Knossos), play on stringed and wind instruments (Haghia Triadha sarcophagus), offer flowers and perhaps fruit (fig. 1), doves, etc., and slay animals in sacrifice (an ox on the Haghia Triadha sarcophagus, and perhaps goats, as in many intaglio scenes). There is no good evidence for *burnt* sacrifice; and the question of *human* victims cannot be determined at present. It depends on the interpretation of the *ταυροκαθάρσια* scenes and of the Minotaur legend.

Dedication both of real articles of personal property and of *simulacra* was extensively practised. The Dictæan Cavern yielded hundreds of spear-

heads, arrow-points, knives, sword-blades, razors, tweezers, hairpins, rings, and other bronze objects, taken off the persons of worshippers and offered to the Deity. It also yielded *simulacra* of weapons, e.g. especially the double-axe, a miniature chariot, miniature oxen, sheep, and goats, and figures of men and women. The latter figures belong to a large and widespread class of Ægean remains, found in silver, bronze, lead, terra-cotta, ivory, and faience, and of every grade of art. They are conventional representations of worshippers, dedicated to the Deity and placed in the Divine precinct to ensure Divine protection and a share in the Divine life for the dedicator. Even when placed in tombs, as at Kampos in Laconia, such statuettes were probably not *ushabti* (servants to answer the dead man's call in another world), but *simulacra* of surviving relatives who wished to be under the protection of the deceased and the Deity to whom he had gone. Less common objects of *ex voto* dedication are models of garments, e.g. skirts and girdles (found in the faience deposit at Knossos), and of human limbs, birds, and vermin (found in




FIG. 7.—PYXIS FROM KNOSSOS.

terra-cotta at Petsofa near Palaikastro). The Temenos of Haghia Triadha yielded a great variety of *simulacra* of all kinds.

Perished *vegetable* substances have often been observed in little clay cups, in one locality (a 'pillar room' in a private Knossian house) lying under up-turned cups, disposed in orderly rows round the pillar. Certain long-stemmed vases with a spreading bowl, often richly painted, and always perforated to allow liquid to run away, which have been found on many Ægean sites (e.g. Knossos, Phylakopi), and were of frequent occurrence in the Dictæan Cave deposit, are supposed to have served for offerings of fruit. Corn was found in the cists containing the faience objects at Knossos. *Animal* remains lay thick in all strata of the Dictæan Cave, being chiefly the horns and bones of oxen, sheep, goats, and birds, which must be assumed to have been dedicated, cooked or raw; and stags' horns occurred with the sacred faience objects at Knossos.

It remains to be added that on the sarcophagus of Haghia Triadha, a scene is represented which has been interpreted as an act of worship to the mummified corpse of a dead man. The particular interpretation is not certain; but we have long had evidence of a practice of *ancestor worship* in the shape of the altar found above the Acropolis grave<sup>4</sup>

\* Evans in *BSA* ix. pp. 9, 25.

† E.g. on the steatite pyxis from Knossos, *TPC* fig. 2, fig. 7 above.

‡ See the specimens from the Dictæan Cave (*BSA* vi. pl. xi.) and Knossos (*BSA* ix. fig. 20).

at Mycenæ. Such a cult is quite compatible with that of the Divine Spirit, however personified, and indeed is almost always found as a subordinate practice in primitive religions. The dead, who are gone to the Great Mother or the Great Father, acquire a derivative sanctity, and are considered as able to exert powerful influence with the Deity for their surviving kin, and upon the lives of that kin. It would appear that the dead, who were not burned in the Ægean Age, and not certainly mummified, were supposed to continue to live as spirits in their tomb-houses on earth. Hence magnificent sepulchres were constructed, such as the great 'bee-hive' tombs of Mycenæ.

iv. SIGNIFICANCE OF ÆGEAN RELIGION.—The religious character and use of a great body of Ægean cult-objects having now been established, without reference to alien evidence, we may safely inquire whether a comparison of neighbouring and succeeding cults will explain the significance of the religion to which they pertained—a religion, be it remembered, which has no literary history of its own, and no literary records that can yet be deciphered. In this place the comparisons must be very briefly made. First, in regard to the Ægean *Divine Spirit* itself, personified in the iconic stage as a goddess and a young god, the student of comparative religion finds himself on very familiar ground. A goddess with a young subordinate god is known in early times on every coast of the Mediterranean which looked towards Crete. In Punic Africa she is Tanit with her son; in Egypt, Isis with Horus; in Phœnicia, Ashtaroth with Tammuz (Adonis); in Asia Minor, Cybele with Attis; in Greece (and especially in Greek Crete itself), Rhea with the young Zeus. Everywhere she is *παρθένος*, i.e. unwed, but made the mother first of her companion by immaculate conception, and then of the gods and all life by the embrace of her own son. In memory of these original facts, her cult (especially the more esoteric mysteries of it) is marked by various practices and observances symbolic of the negation of true marriage and obliteration of sex. A part of her male votaries are castrated; and her female votaries must ignore their married state when in her personal service, and often practise ceremonial promiscuity. As there is no ordinary human birth, so there is no ordinary human death. The Divine son Tammuz, Attis Melicertes, or Zeus himself in Crete (where his tomb was shown), dies, but comes again to life, as does Nature from summer to winter and winter to summer. The goddess is therefore the Spirit of Nature, constantly renewing herself in her own offspring. Of this universal Deity of all the Near East the Ægean goddess with her son was, beyond all question, a manifestation. If we are to give a name to her, it must be *Rhea*;\* and if to her son and companion, it must be Zeus, remembering that, by Hellenic tradition, the coming into being of Zeus was laid peculiarly in Crete. In the primitive story he embraces his own mother.† Knossos, as Diodorus Siculus indicates,‡ was associated from dim antiquity with Rhea; and a curious piece of direct evidence connecting the Ægean goddess with the cult of Rhea has lately been adduced. A clay vessel of very peculiar form, the *kernos*, is stated by an ancient commentator§ to have been for the use of worshippers of Rhea. The only vessels answering his description have come to light on Ægean sites, and one in particular was found at Palaikastro, in Crete, among

the hoard of sacred objects accompanying a snake-goddess described above.

The spiritual community between Ægean and other Near Eastern religions being so close, it is not surprising that almost every recognizable cult-feature in the former can be paralleled in the latter. The indwelling of the Deity in stones, whether natural *baetyls*, cairns, pillars, or triliths, and in trees, is a most familiar Semitic belief, and one which left numerous traces on Hellenic worship. A cult of weapons appears to have existed in early Asia Minor among the Hittites of Pteria and the Carians of Labranda, not to go so far afield as the Alani on the Eastern Euxine, who in a late age adored a standing blade.\* The 'horns of consecration' are seen in Semitic sacred representations, and appear in Hebrew ritual as 'horns of the altar'. The 'sacred animals' are all widely related. The serpent as an embodiment of chthonian Divinity is not only Greek but Egyptian (snake-form of Nekhebst); the dove as the vehicle of the Divine spirit from on high has survived from Semitic literal belief into the symbolism of Christianity. The great *felidæ* were guardians and supporters of Anatolian Cybele. The bull, as a dwelling of Divinity in Egypt, has his counterpart in the Greek legends of Zeus; and the cow of Hathor is known to all. The infant Zeus is wrapped in the goat-skin, and the goat continued to a late time peculiarly sacred in the cult of western Asia Minor. The monsters of Ægean cult-scenes have so many affinities with the Egyptian (those on the Phœstian shell actually carry the Nilotic life-sign, the *ankh*) that they have all been referred to an Egyptian original, the maternity personification, Thueris, the hippo, reared on her hind-quarters. The parallelism in ritual observance is too extensive and obvious to need detailed mention.

It is not to be understood, however, that such parallelism implies the derivative character of Ægean religion, least of all derivation from any single civilization, such as the Semitic or the Egyptian. If there be parentage between Semitic and Ægean civilization, it is the former that is the offspring, given the comparative youth of its art and its system of writing;† while, as for Egyptian religion, though there is good reason to think that it came to exercise a considerable influence on Ægean iconic representation, and even a little on the ideas which that in turn produced, no one, comparing the complexity of early Egyptian cult with the simplicity of the early Ægean, could suppose the one derived bodily from the other. It is needless, indeed, to look for the derivation of the essential features of Ægean cult at any later epoch than that of the primeval expansion of mankind. Its fundamental religious ideas were those of a vast proportion of the common human stock, and they continue to be so to the present day. The Ægean race sought Divinity in the life principle of Nature, spontaneously originated and reproducing itself to eternity. It placed that Divinity in great features of Nature visibly related to human life. When it came to define its idea in terms of man, being yet in that social stage in which man in relation to reproduction held his naturally subordinate place, it represented the principle of life as an unwedded woman, its property of reproduction as a son unbegotten, and its relation to the humanity resultant from this woman and man as an unseen Spirit, descending on wings and indwelling in certain material objects, the choice of which was to some degree determined by their inherent suggestion either of great natural features or human organs of life. From these fundamental

\* But she unites many attributes afterwards distributed between different impersonations of the mother-goddess, e.g. Demeter-Erinyes; Eleithyia, known in East Crete as Dictynna-Britomartis; and Aphrodite-Ariadne.

† Cf. Clem. Alex. *Protrep.* ii. p. 76.

‡ v. 68.

§ Gloss on Nikander, *Alexipharmaka*, v. 217. See Dawkins in *BSA* x. p. 221.

\* Amm. Marc. xxii. 2, 21; cf. *TPC* p. 9.

† Some influence actually passed from Crete to Philistine Gaza, commemorated by a cult of Zeus Kretagenes.

ideas all the features of Ægean cult representation and ritual practice known to us can very well have proceeded naturally and independently.

D. G. HOGARTH.

**ÆGIS.**—In Greek mythology, the ægis is an attribute of magic power, which seems to belong originally to Zeus, the supreme god, who is therefore called *αἰγίοχος*. It seems to have the power both of protecting its wearer and of inspiring terror in his enemies; and for this purpose, according to Homer, it is borrowed both by Athene and by Apollo. Its form is not easy to realize in the earlier descriptions, of which we find the fullest in *Il.* v. 738, where Athene puts it on.

'About her shoulders cast she the tasselled ægis terrible, whereon is panic as a crown all about, and strife is therein, and valour and horrible onslaught withal, and therein is the dreadful monster's Gorgon head, dreadful and grim, portent of ægis-bearing Zeus.'

Here it appears to be some sort of defensive mantle, like what is worn by Athene in later art; it is provided with 'a hundred tassels of pure gold' (*Il.* ii. 448), and is also described as *ἀμφιδόχεια*, fringed all round or hairy on both sides, as if it were a skin of some sort, but it was made by the smith-god Hephaestus (xv. 309); when it is shaken, it scatters terror on all around. It is used by Apollo (xxiv. 20) to wrap round the dead body of Hector, and so protect it from injury.

The views both of the Greeks themselves and of modern mythologists as to the form and meaning of the ægis have been greatly influenced by opinions as to the etymology of the word. The Greeks often associated it with *αἰγία* or *αἰγίς*, 'a goat-skin'; and Herodotus (iv. 189) suggests that the ægis of Athene was derived from the tasselled goat-skins worn by the Libyan women near Lake Tritonis. It was interpreted by later Greek mythologists as either the skin of the goat Amalthea, which had suckled Zeus in his infancy, or that of a monster slain by Athene. Modern mythologists have usually preferred the connexion with *ἀσσεύω*, 'to rush,' *αἰγίς* or *καρκαῖς*, 'a squall'; but their interpretation of it as symbolical of the thundercloud, though found in many modern books, is not supported by any satisfactory evidence of early date; though Zeus thunders while he shakes the ægis (*Il.* xvii. 593), the two actions are not necessarily related as cause and effect; for a clear example of the ægis as causing a thunderstorm no earlier authority can be quoted than Silius Italicus (xii. 720); Virgil (*Æn.* viii. 352) connects it with clouds. Such instances are, of course, of no mythological value, but represent later theorizing.

In artistic representations the ægis regularly appears as the attribute of Athene; there is no certain example of its being associated with Zeus, and the restoration of the Apollo Belvedere as holding it is more than doubtful. In early representations of Athene it is a kind of scaly cloak, fringed with serpents, and with the Gorgon's head fixed in it; it extends over the left arm, and so can be held up as a shield. In other cases it takes the form of a short breast-plate with similar adjuncts, and this is the usual form in later art; sometimes it is abridged to a mere band across the breast of the goddess.

ERNEST A. GARDNER.

**ÆONS** (Gr. *αἰῶνες* = 'ages,' 'periods,' 'dispensations,' probably related to *αἰεῖν* = 'always,' 'for ever').—This term was employed by the opponents of Gnosticism, and by some of the Gnostics themselves, to designate the successive emanations from the Absolute Being. The problem of accounting for the existence of the actual world-order, when it is regarded as unreal and illusory, without ascribing it directly to the Absolute One, is common to all Oriental theosophical systems; and the philosophers of most of them attempted

its solution by an evolutionary (devolutionary) series of æons or emanations. Close parallels to the Gnostic æons may be found in Japanese Shintoism, Mahāyānist Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, the Platonic *Ideas*, Philo's *Powers*, the Stoic *Logoi*, etc. The Shinto system (as set forth in the *Kojiki*) seems to rest upon pure pantheism. To gain a starting-point for the devolutionary process, the infinite becomes differentiated into the male and female principles Izanagi and Izanami, personified and conceived of as grossly lustful. These procreative æons are thought to be derived from certain abstract deities that are merged in the infinite. These produce, first, three other deities (æons), representing the great powers of nature; and these still others, some working for the good and some for the evil of man. In the Buddhism of the Northern School the Adibuddha (*q.v.*) produces the five 'Buddhas of Contemplation,' Vairocana, Akṣobhya, Ratnasambhava, Amitābha, and Amoghasiddhi; from whom, in their turn, emanate five 'Future Buddhas of Contemplation,' the sources of the five worlds which successively make up the universe. This number five may perhaps be compared with the five elements, earth, water, fire, air, and ether, of orthodox Brahmanism. Zoroastrianism has a similar, but twofold, system of æons in the Kingdom of Light and the Kingdom of Darkness, the head of the former being Ahura-mazda and that of the latter being Ahriman. From each of these is evolved a graduated host of personified powers of nature, those proceeding from the former working for good, and those proceeding from the latter working evil, the two hosts being in perpetual conflict the one with the other. Philo, who regarded the Supreme Being as exalted above all possibility of contact with matter, which he characterized as 'lifeless, erroneous, divisible, unequal,' and hence as fundamentally evil, sought to bridge over the gulf between God and the world by the hypothesis of certain 'creative and regulative Powers.' These Powers are represented as God's thoughts, as the heavenly archetypes of earthly things, as that which gives life, reality, and durability to matter, as the breath of God's mouth. He sometimes seems to regard them as personalities. His Logos doctrine is particularly significant in relation to Gnostic æons. The Logos is designated 'Eternal Wisdom' (cf. the Gnostic æon *Sophia*), and 'the Sum of the Thoughts of God' (Gnostic æon *Ennoia*, or *Synesis*).

Plato (*Timæus*, 37 D) applies the name *αἰών* to the eternal Being which has Time as its counterpart in the world of sense. Aristotle in like manner describes the ultimate principle which sums up in itself all existence, as *αἰών* (*ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος*, *de Mundo*, i. 9. 11). These and similar speculations of Greek metaphysics exercised a profound influence on later Gnostic theory; but it may now be regarded as almost certain that the Gnostic doctrine of the Æons was immediately derived from Mithraism. At the head of the Mithraic hierarchy, as in the earlier Zarvanite heresy of Zoroastrianism, from which this trait in it is derived, stood Infinite Time. This supreme god, inconceivable and ineffable, was worshipped under the name of *Aion*, and was represented in sculpture as a figure whose body was inscribed with the signs of the Zodiac and encircled by a serpent, which typified the course of the sun in the ecliptic.

The earlier Gnosticism, like the cult of Mithra, appears to have known of only a single Æon, which was conceived impersonally—sometimes as the Absolute itself, sometimes as the sphere of the Absolute. Thus in the account of the 'Gnostics' (specifically so called) which is given by Irenæus (*adv. Hær.* i. 30) we read of an ascent εἰς τὸν ἀφθάρτον αἰῶνα, and similar language is employed

by Epiphanius (*Hær.* xxxviii. 1) in his description of the Cainites. Traces of this original doctrine continue to reappear in the more highly developed Gnostic systems. Valentinus himself (*Frag.* 5) speaks of the 'living Æon' as of a unity, although he discovers a principle of distinction within this primordial unity. It belongs, indeed, to the essence of Gnostic speculation that the Æons remain ideally one, while they manifest themselves as a plurality.

In later Gnosticism the Æons are represented as a system or confederacy of Divine existences, which proceed in pairs of male and female (syzygies) from the supreme Father. Each pair originates another, and each descends in dignity as it stands more remote from the source of being. The doctrine of syzygies has its analogies in Mithraism as in the other Eastern religions mentioned above; but it was no doubt borrowed by the Gnostics from that Babylonian tradition to which they were indebted for so many details in their cosmology. In Gnosticism, however, the Babylonian idea of a physical generation is softened and rationalized. The successive pairs are not begotten, but are projected or emanated. They are the self-unfolding of the Divine nature; and in their totality they form its perfect manifestation. Hence they constitute the Pleroma,—the 'fulness' in which the Godhead exhausts its hidden potentialities. The Pleroma, composed of the several Æons, is the world of Light or higher reality; and is divided by a great gulf from the 'darkness' of phenomenal being.

The different Gnostic systems are widely at variance in their accounts of the number and arrangement of the Æons. Basilides (if we accept Irenæus and Hippolytus I. as our authorities for his teaching) would seem to acknowledge only six (*Πατήρ, Νόος, Αβυσς, Φερβήρις, Δίναυς, Σοφία*). The *Pistis Sophia* assumes thirteen, and conceives of the Æons as the spheres inhabited by the Divine powers, rather than as the powers themselves. Valentinus enumerates thirty Æons, which are grouped in three divisions—the Ogdoad, the Decad, the Dodecad. Ideas of a geometrical nature are probably involved in this grouping; while the number 30 is apparently suggested by the thirty *yazatas* (angels) of Zoroastrianism. In the various systems which branch off from the main stem of Valentinianism, the Pleroma of 30 Æons is normative, but this number is subject to continual modifications.

A brief account of the system of Valentinus will suffice to illustrate the general character of the Gnostic Æonology. He starts with *Bythos* (depth) the Absolute One, and *Sige* (silence) as his female companion. These generate *Nous* (mind) and *Aletheia* (truth). These in turn project *Logos* (word) and *Zoe* (life), and these *Anthropos* (man) and *Ecclesia* (church). *Nous* and *Aletheia* afterwards produce ten Æons (a perfect number) as an offering to the Father. *Logos* and *Zoe* follow in the production of Æons, but produce twelve (not a perfect number), including Faith, Hope, Love, and the Lower Wisdom (*Achamoth*). This last, being unduly ambitious, and aspiring to produce Æons without conjunction with a male æon, brought forth a 'formless and undigested substance' (the Demiurge), which evolved into the present order of things, with its mixture of good and evil, and with man in whom spirit is enslaved by matter. This disturbance of the Pleroma alarmed the other Æons and deeply distressed Achamoth. In response to the tears of Achamoth and the supplications of the other Æons, the Father permitted *Nous* and *Aletheia* to project Christ and the Holy Spirit for the restoration of form, the destruction of the Demiurge, and the comfort of Achamoth. These have for their task the separation of the life and light

that have become imprisoned in humanity, from dead, evil matter, through a long series of magical rites (mysteries), and through the promotion of ascetical living.

In Gnosticism generally, as in the teaching of Valentinus, the creation of the lower world is explained by the hypothesis of a disturbance within the Pleroma. The error, or the undue ambition, of one of the Æons results in the origin of an inferior power, who in his turn originates others, until a whole world of darkness and illusion comes into being. Nevertheless, since the process has its beginning within the Pleroma itself, some portion of the higher essence becomes intermingled with the baser elements, from which it yearns to be delivered. The Redemption, according to the Gnostic thinkers, consists in the sifting out of this higher essence and its restoration to the Pleroma. In order that this may be accomplished, an Æon of supreme dignity descends into the phenomenal world and becomes identified, really or in seeming, with the man Jesus.

The Æonic theory, as we have seen, was in the first instance derived from the Zarvanite idea of Infinite Time as the ultimate fact in nature. Thus it was allied from the beginning with speculations of a purely physical character, and from these it never succeeded in entirely freeing itself. The greater Gnostics, and Valentinus more especially, sought to resolve the Æons into spiritual facts or processes. They were construed as modes of the Divine Being, activities in which the Absolute One unfolds and manifests His inward life. It proved impossible, however, to effect a complete transformation of a theory which was, in its essence, physical. Valentinus himself wavers in his conception of the Æons,—regarding them now as ideas, now as heavenly Persons, now as creative forces. His philosophical construction loses itself at every turn in primitive astrology and cosmical speculation. To this may be attributed the eventual failure of Gnosticism, alike as a philosophy and as a religion. While it professed to open a way out of the bondage of the natural world, it was itself grounded in ideas derived from nature-worship. See, further, GNOSTICISM.

LITERATURE.—Cunmont, *The Mysteries of Mithra* (Eng. tr. 1903); Hilgenfeld, *Ketzergesch. des Urchristentums* (1884); Mead, *Fragments of Faith Forgotten* (new ed. 1906); Schmidt, *Die Gnosis* (1903); Liechtenhan, *Die Offenbarung im Gnosticismus* (1901), pp. 105-141; E. Buckley, *Universal Religion* (Chicago, 1897).

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ÆSCHYLUS.—Æschylus, son of Euphion, an eupatrid of Eleusis, was born B.C. 525, commenced as a dramatist c. 499, gained his first victory in 484 and his last (with the *Oresteia*) in 458, and died at Gela in 456. He fought at the battles of Marathon, Artemisium, Salamis, and Plataea. From about 476, when he composed for Hiero of Syracuse *The Women of Ætna* at the foundation of that town, he was frequently in Sicily. There is no satisfactory explanation of the statement of Heraclides Ponticus that he was tried on a charge of revealing the Mysteries in a play, and acquitted on the ground of ignorance (cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* iii. 2); the further details are probably unauthentic. Partizanship in politics can hardly be imputed to him on the strength of the supposed reference to Aristides in the description of Amphiaras (*Sept.* 592-594),\* still less on the theory that Prometheus, son of Themis, stands for Themistocles. His eulogy of the Areopagus, however, in the *Eumenides* (esp. 681-706) testifies to conservative sentiments. In the same play (754-777), as well

\* All references are to the text of Sidgwick (*Script. Class. Bibl. Ozon.*), whose numbering hardly differs from that of Dindorf, Wecklein, and most modern editors. Hermann, Paley, and a few others use their own special notation.



as in the *Supplices*, he approves of the democratic friendship between Athens and Argos. He expresses the strongest detestation of tyranny in all forms (*Pers.*, *Prom.*, *Ag.* 953-955, *Eum.* 185-190); but has no objection to constitutional monarchy (*Supp.* 398, 517, 600), or to moderate democracy (*Pers.* 242, *Supp.* 485-489). His general ideal is a balance of order and liberty (*Eum.* 526-528).

Æschylus may be called the Father of Tragedy (Philostr. *Vita Apoll.* p. 220), in the sense that he first perceived the possibilities of the drama as a branch of literature, rather than as ritual or ceremonial, for the expression of views as to life and character. His plays are *τεμάχη τῶν Ὁμήρου μεγάλων δέλτων*, because the personages are derived mainly from the Epic cycle; but he drew upon other 'sagas' as well, and upon contemporary history; and he dealt very freely with the plots. He was evidently acquainted with Hesiod and other cosmological writers. In a few cases he cites the gnomic moralists (*Prom.* 890); more often (*Sept.* 439, *Ag.* 1331, *Cho.* 60, *Eum.* 529) he expresses similar sentiments about wealth, fortune, pride, moderation, etc. He has much in common with his contemporary Pindar; and his general attitude towards the popular mythology was almost certainly influenced by the poems of Solon and Theognis. The common statements that he was indebted to Orphic or to Pythagorean doctrines cannot be seriously supported from the extant plays or fragments.

Of the 80 to 90 plays attributed to Æschylus, many of which can be grouped in trilogies or tetralogies, the majority are cited only by the lexicographers; little is known of their plots or the views contained in them, except in the case of the *Prometheus Solutus*. The *Danaids*, *Myrmidons*, and *Niobe* seem to have dealt with various aspects of the passion of love. Certain gnomic fragments (Nos. 70, 156, 159, 161, 177, 255, 266, 301, 353, 395, 401, 475, Sidgwick), which are striking aphorisms about the nature of the gods, good and evil, life and death, do not necessarily express the mind of the poet himself. His own moral and religious doctrines must be sought in (1) the general tendencies, (2) the choric odes, (3) the emphasized speeches of the favoured characters, in the seven extant plays. The selection of these, made apparently not later than the 5th cent. A.D., if not entirely accidental, may be due partly to celebrity and partly to special reasons. The *Oresteia* (*Agam.*, *Choëph.*, and *Eum.*) constitutes his masterpiece in all respects. The *Persæ* and the *Septem contra Thebas* are cited by Aristophanes for their literary and patriotic qualities. The structure and style postulate an early date for the *Supplices*, though the theology is already remarkably mature; either of these features may have saved it. The *Prometheus Vincetus*, which might easily have aroused popular suspicions of impiety, appealed to the popular fancy for the marvellous in spectacle and narration. From these plays, after all allowances for the exigencies of dramatic form and popular taste, there emerges a body of gradually developed views attributable to Æschylus himself. His philosophy, in which the ethical cannot be sharply demarcated from the theological, may be discussed in the order of its development, as it deals with (1) the Divine nature, (2) the Divine agencies, (3) the moral nature and action of man, (4) the special questions of responsibility and heredity, the family curse, and the blood-feud, while (5) the nature of the problem dramatized in the *Prometheus* requires separate consideration.

1. In the earlier plays the Olympian gods are invoked jointly as a *πανήγυρις* (*Sept.* 220), or a *κοινοβωμία* (*Supp.* 222); they are *θεοὶ ἐγχώριοι, γενέθλιοι, ποταμοῦχοι, ἀστικοί, ἀγῶνιοι*, with temples,

altars, and images (*Βρότην*). The Theban maidens pray to Pallas, Poseidon, Ares, Cyprus, Lyceius, Artemis, Hera, Apollo, and the local Pallas Onca (*Sept.* 126-180), as *παραρκείς, τέλειοι, λυτήριοι*, but also *Διογενεῖς*, under Zeus as the *πατὴρ παντὸς* (116); Eteocles adds Earth and the *Ἀρὰ Ἐρινύς* of Œdipus (70). Popular language is used of augury, oracles, sacrifice, river-gods, and Hades (26, 379, 618, 269, 272, 854-860). But the same play finely describes Justice as the virgin daughter of Zeus (662); both the piety of Amphiaras and the impiety of Polyneices have moral elements; no *δαίμων* could involve Eteocles in *ἔρη* but for the *ὑβρις* of his determination to defend the gate attacked by his brother (677-703, 949-956). Similarly, in the *Supplices* the fugitives appeal to Artemis, Ares, Poseidon, Apollo, Hermes, and especially (*Supp.* 1034-1042) to Aphrodite, by whom Hypermnestra was perhaps dephended (*Fr.* 44); also to Zeus as *ξένιος, σωτήρ, αἰδοῖος, ἱκέσιος, κλάριος, κτήσιος*, etc.; and to local deities, as the hero Apis (117, 263). With the *ἑκατοὶ θεοὶ* are coupled the *βαρύντες χθόνιοι θήκας κατέχοντες* (24-25); if Artemis is deaf, the suppliants will turn 'to the Zeus of the earth below, the host of all those whose work is done, if we fail to reach the Olympian gods' (154-161). But the coarser side of the myth of Io seems to be treated sarcastically (291-315); it is tentatively moralized by the insistence on Zeus as the eventual deliverer and founder of a royal race (574-593). The chthonian Zeus, who 'judges the sins of men by final judgments among the dead' (230), is deliberately identified with the Zeus who is *τέλειος, γαῖδοχος*, and *παγκρατής* (816), who is also the son of Earth (892) and allied with Themis (360). The slightest association of injustice with the gods is impiety (921; cf. 395); and everywhere the lyrics extol the power and righteousness of Zeus, with the fervour of Hebrew prophecy. He is 'king of kings, most perfect in strength of the powers that make perfect' (524-526); 'hospitable in the highest, he directs destiny by venerable enactment' (673); 'he beholds violent deeds not gladly, but with eyes of justice' (812); 'the beam of his balance is over all' (822); 'what is fated, that will be; there is no transgressing the mighty, the limitless will of Zeus' (1047-1049). This is not merely poetical optimism:

'The desire of Zeus is not made to be easily grasped. Everywhere it glows, even in the gloom, with fortune that is sombre to mortal races. . . . For dark and dusky went the ways of his mind, unobservable by human gaze. He hurleth men to utter destruction from their towering hopes, though he array no force against them; deity does nothing with labour. What his spirit has once designed, he works out withal, from above, from his holy seat' (87-103).

Such theology is in essentials that of the *Oresteia*, though the more ethical conceptions are tentative and far from correlated.

The theology of the *Persæ* (?472 B.C.) is dramatically Oriental. Zeus and Phoebus and the Sun are invoked; Pallas has favoured Athens. The ritual of the dead (*οἱ φθιτοί*, *Pers.* 219, 523, 607-622) is supplemented by appeals to Earth, Hermes, and Hades-Aidoneus, who *λαβεῖν ἀμείβους εἶσιν ἢ μεθίεναι* (690), though Darius as a *δαίμων* or even *θεός* has a *δυναστεία* below. The repeated *ex parte* allegations of a Divine Nemesis or *φθόνος*, arbitrarily afflicting excessive wealth or happiness (163, 354, 373, 842), are akin to the fatalism of Herodotus's famous legends; and all the characters arraign a deity who deludes men to their ruin (*ἀπάτη θεοῦ*, 93, cf. *Fr.* 301; *νόστος φρενῶν*, 750; *ἔψευσας φρενῶν*, 472), or at least abets their folly (*ἀλλ' ὅταν σπείδῃ τις αὐτὸς, χῶ θεὸς συνάπτεται*, 742). But both Darius and the Persian elders charge Xerxes with provocative *ὑβρις* in binding the sacred Hellespont (745, 72), and in destroying images and temples (807-815, 830), and blame him rather than the alleged

δαμῶν (924 v. 910, 933). It is insolence (ὕβρις) which 'flowers and is full in the ear with ruin' (ἀργ), from which it reaps a harvest of lamentation' (821). Cyrus was right-minded and so was not afflicted (θεὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἤχθησεν, εὖ ἐσφρων ἔβν, 722). Athens survives as the higher civilization.

So far the moralization of Homeric or popular theology has not been violent. In the *Oresteia* there is a marked advance in boldness of expression: 'le polythéisme subsiste, mais épuré, moralisé, presque purgé d'anthropomorphisme' (E. de Faye, p. 34). The allusions to Uranus and Kronos (*Ag.* 167-172, 640) possibly indicate development in the Universe; the chthonian cults of Earth, Night, the Dead and their agents (*Cho.* 399; *Eum.* 115, 321) are subordinated to the conception of deity as moral and rational. Sacrifices and ceremonies of purification are little in comparison with the observance of justice and self-restraint. Venerable legends of conflicting divinities are even re-written (*Eum.* 1-19). Of the Olympians, Apollo as the giver of oracles and ἐξηγητής of rites, and Athens as the inspirer of political wisdom, retain some genuine personality with impaired divinity; perhaps Hermes also and Artemis, for whose interference with the winds at Aulis Æschylus attempts to provide a decent motive (*Ag.* 134-155). Zeus is too great for the stage, even in the Prometheus plays. Theology is to be sought not in mythology, but in history (πάρεστι τοῦτό γ' ἐξηγεῖσθαι, *Ag.* 368), and in conscience (μνησιγίμων πόνος, *Ag.* 180; cf. 975-983). The supreme deity is not only all-powerful but all-just; thus Electra craves for Orestes the support of 'Strength and Justice with him who is the third (i.e. Zeus σωτήρ), Zeus the greatest of all' (*Cho.* 244). To Zeus are applied not the old departmental names, but such epithets as πανόπτης, παγκρατής, πάντα κραίων, παναίριος, and δικαφόρος. There is surely more than an 'illusion du monothéisme' in the first theological passage of the *Agamemnon* (160-178):

'Zeus, whoever he be, if by this name 'tis his pleasure to be called, this name I address to him. Weighing all things well, I can conjecture nought but Zeus, if the burden of this vanity is in truth to be cast off from my mind. . . . But whoso heartily giveth titles of victory to Zeus shall hit the mark of wisdom full; even to Zeus, who hath guided mortals in the ways of wisdom, who hath established "learning by suffering" as an ordinance for ever.'

To those only who have learnt on these lines to know and do justice, 'Zeus the all-seeing and Fate (Μοῖρα) have condescended' (*Eum.* 1046).

Thus, in harmony with the conception of deity as normally personal, there emerges the conception, increasingly impersonal, of universal order. As physical law this is Μοῖρα, τὸ μέτρον, τὸ πεπρωμένον, ἡ πεπωμένη, αἶσα, ἀνάγκη; as moral law it is θέμις, δίκη, νόμος θεῶν; but these terms admit of many degrees of personification, and not only overlap, but not uncommonly involve the *circulus in definiendo* to which idealistic systems are liable. The statement that Zeus is weaker than the Μοῖραι and Ἐρινύες (*Prom.* 515-518) is isolated and controversial; generally the established order is the expression not so much of the will of God as of His being. God is subject only to the law of His own nature as consistent and just. He cannot be on the side of evil (κρατεῖται δὲ πῶς τὸ θεῖον τὸ μὴ ὑποργεῖν κακοῖς, *Cho.* 957); He must be partial (ἐτερορρεπής) morally either way (λέμων εἰκότως ἀδικα μὲν κακοῖς, δῶτα δ' ἐννόμοις, *Supp.* 403). The working of this supreme authority is described in many combinations of terms, personally and impersonally. When in defiance of Right (θέμις) men trample on the majesty of Zeus (Διὸς σέβας), then 'Justice sets up her anvil and Destiny forges the sword' (προχαλκεῖ δ' Αἶσα φασγανουργός, *Cho.* 641-647). 'For each fresh deed of injury, justice is whetted by Fate (Μοῖρα) upon a fresh whetstone' (*Ag.* 1535, 1536). The μεγδάαι Μοῖραι are

besought (*Cho.* 306-314) 'to grant success from Zeus to that cause to which Justice (τὸ δίκαιον) has gone over. For words of hate let words of hate be rendered; so Justice proclaims aloud as she exacts her due. For a bloody stroke let him repay a bloody stroke. That "the doers must suffer," there speaks a saying thrice ancient.' Even Clytemnestra's 'thoughtfulness not overcome by sleep shall order justly everything that has been fore-ordained with Divine sanction' (δικαίως οὖν θεοῖς ἐμαρμένα, *Ag.* 912). Themis the Titaness and the παλαργεῖς Μοῖραι administer the νόμος θεῶν (*Eum.* 171) no less than Justice, the daughter of Zeus.

2. The determinations of this supreme authority are intimated to man not only in history and in conscience, but by direct agencies. Positively, Æschylus attaches importance to dreams; the visions of Atossa, Io, and Clytemnestra reflect popular beliefs. 'For the mind in sleep is bright in its vision, though in daytime Fate is undiscernible by mortals' (*Eum.* 104). His attitude towards oracles is ambiguous. There seems to be some *arrière-pensée* in its treatment of the relations between Apollo and Orestes; Athens and not Delphi has the final word in the termination of the blood-guilt of the house of Atreus.\* Negatively, the Erinyes are all-important. The meaning of the word fluctuates considerably in the extant plays, and evidently has a long history behind it. It is hardly likely that Æschylus himself first identified the Avengers of the underworld with the Benign or Venerable earth-goddesses of Athens and Sicily (Ἐμμερίδες or Σεμναί); but he certainly accentuated both factors of this conflation,† and, while first investing the Furies with the archaic horrors of Gorgons, etc. (Paus. i. 23, 6), was also conscious of a development from objective to subjective associations, from punishment as retributive to punishment as remedial. The Ἐρινύς is the activity of Divine justice in the presence of lawlessness. Zeus is a constant θεωρὸς (*Cho.* 246); even for birds robbed of their young, 'a god on high, some Apollo or Pan or Zeus, hears the shrill complaint of his denizens; and sooner or later sends on the transgressors a Fury of requital' (*Ag.* 55-59). Much less for Paris's breach of the laws of hospitality will Zeus shoot an arrow in vain, either short of the mark or too high in heaven (*Ag.* 365). 'One said that the gods do not deign to trouble about men by whom the honour of sacred things (χρόσι ἀδίκητων) is trampled on; but he was not pious' (*Ag.* 372). Helen herself becomes for the house of Priam 'by the sending of Zeus, the lord of hospitality, a Fury of weeping to other brides' (*Ag.* 749). The Erinyes apply the laws of retributive and educational suffering. 'We deem ourselves,' sings their chorus (*Eum.* 312-320), 'to be direct in the course of justice. On the man who holds out pure hands, there comes no wrath from us; unscathed he traverses the way of life. But if one in guilt, like this man, hides his gory hands, we appear as honest witnesses for the dead, and visibly to the uttermost exact from him the price of blood.' Again, 'Great power have the awful Erinyes both with the gods immortal and with those below the earth; and in their dealings with men they fully and visibly bring things to pass, to some giving songs of joy, but to others a life blurred by tears' (950-955). As the play draws to a close, they serve to link Μοῖρα and Δίκη; and in their final metamorphosis there is as much conscious symbolism as the dramatic form permits.

3. If, then, innocence is rewarded and guilt punished, at any rate, in the long run (*Ag.* 750-771; *Eum.* 526-565), human morality must be based on

\* See U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf's Introduction to the *Choephori*, 1896.

† See Harrison and Verrall, *Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens*, pp. 558-564, and Haigh, pp. 120, 121.

universal law as applied to the life of the family and the city. By Æschylus, as by Dante, types of good and bad character are exhibited rather than analyzed. The dignity of individuality is drawn on a grand scale even in the case of Clytemnestra, without casuistry or sophistry. There is the same note of distinction about the characters which are presented for admiration, the king of Argos, Eteocles as patriot, Orestes, Electra, and, above all, Prometheus. The whole range of Greek piety is displayed in the choruses of the Oceanids, Danaids, captive women, Persian and Argive elders. The fine series of contrasts in the *Septem* shows the poet's concurrence in the normal Greek ideas of αἰδώς, αἰσχύνη, σωφροσύνη, and εὐσέβεια; also in the connexion of morality with religion. He does not absolutely avoid the popular language which makes ἀμαρτία a disease of the intellect (νόσος φρενῶν, *Pers.* 751; σὺν πότῳ φρενῶν, *Sept.* 661; παραφορά φρενοδαλῆς, *Eum.* 330; ἀποσφάλλει φρενῶν, *Prom.* 473); but in his own view passion at least is bestial in character and originates where there is no law. The lustful 'have the tempers of random and unholy brutes' (*Supp.* 762); and 'the inordinate love which masters the female mind both in brutes and in men wins a perverse victory over the fellowship of wedlock,' and involves calamities (*Cho.* 598-601). Generally sin is ὑβρις, immorality plus impiety, as the wilful transgression (παραβασία) of the fixed limits of human action. It is ἀνομιον and μάταιον, and its fruit is ἄτη, the criminal infatuation which is its own punishment. Ἀτη is δόλιος, μηχανόβυς, ὑστερόποιος; the moment of its supervention may be inevitable, but it is neither less nor more voluntary than happiness as the reward of virtue (*Eum.* 532-537). Moral pathology has never been more convincingly expounded than in the *locus classicus* on ὑβρις (*Ag.* 750-771):—

'An ancient saying has been fashioned in the generations of old, that a man's prosperity, when it has waxed great, brings forth and does not die without issue, but that out of good fortune springs up for the family an insatiate misery. But I hold my own mind apart from the rest on this. 'Tis the impious deed that gives birth to more after it, more, and like to their own breed; but the fate of righteous houses has ever a fair progeny. But old insolence is wont to beget an insolence with the vigour of youth in mortal ills, this day or that, when the time of birth has come due, yea and a fiend, against whom there is no battle, no war, unholy boldness; and these are the black banes (ἄρας) unto mansions, and like are they to their progenitors.' Nor has the moral ever been drawn more relentlessly than by him:—

'Reverence the altar of Justice, nor trample it down at the sight of gain with godless foot; for retribution will ensue. The right issue abides in force. Wherefore let a man put in the place of honour, piety towards parents, and pay reverence to the claims of strangers to hospitality. He who is just of his own will without constraint' . . . 'utterly ruined he will never be . . . gressor who dares to offend, and without justice, shall perforce be when trouble seizes him and his calls on those who hear him not and struggles in the midst of the swirl; but the god mocks at the hot-headed man, seeing him who boasted he should never be powerless now in helpless woes nor able to weather the point. And so, for ever wrecking his former prosperity on the reef of justice, he perishes unwept, unseen' (*Eum.* 639-666).

A religious moralist is sure to emphasize the inevitableness of ἄτη (e.g. *Ag.* 1566; *Cho.* 1076), but there are careful caveats against fatalism:—

'Instruct my son plausibly,' says Darius, 'warned from heaven as he has been to be wise in time, that he leave off from offending against God in overboastful boldness' (*Pers.* 831). The murderers of the house of Atreus are even freer agents than the avengers. But if there has been no repentance and no purification, vengeance pursues the sinner even to the world below:—

'For this office has piercing Fate allotted to us to hold for ever, that all mortals to whom befall wanton deeds of blood, we should attend, until the guilty pass beneath the earth; but even in death he is not over free' (*Eum.* 334-340).

Æschylus's allusions to life after death are marked by a reserve unusual in poetical descriptions of Hades; as to continued consciousness he is perhaps

consistent (*Cho.* 517); but he recognizes the possibilities of prolonged retribution and of remorseful memory, such as that indicated in Clytemnestra's terrible sarcasm about Iphigenia's reception of her father (*Ag.* 1555-1559). Apart from the functions of an Alastor (*Supp.* 416) or an Erinyes (*Eum.* 267), there may be a judgment in Hades by a presiding deity (*Supp.* 228-231). The ghost of Orestes will punish or reward his countrymen according as they deal with Athens (*Eum.* 767-777). The curses of the slain subsist by the survival of their personalities (ἴδετε πολυκρατεῖς ἀπαι τεθυμέναν, *Cho.* 406); the Erinyes themselves are called 'Apoi in the underworld' (*Eum.* 417).\*

4. But the more vividly sin is pictured as prolific and its effects as incalculable, the more difficulty there is in escaping from fatalistic theories, such as those implied in the popular ideas of the ancestral curse and the *jus talionis* developing into a blood feud. These subjects specially fascinated the mind of Æschylus. In the *Suppliants* there is a simple warning of the danger of starting a curse: 'For your children and your house, in whichever way you determine, it remains to pay in full a corresponding penalty' (433-436); and in the sequel there was some purification from blood-guilt. In the *Septem* the children of (Edipus are involved in a curse not clearly defined as invoked or inherited by him (832-833), nor always alluded to in the same way (for the various phrases see *Sept.* 70, 654, 695, 709, 720-726, 887, 977-979). The curses (ἀραι, κατεύγματα) produce in the γένος a criminal propensity (ἄτη), sometimes personified as an evil spirit (δαίμων, ἐρινύς, δάδσωρ, even μοῖρα or κτήρ) hounding it to destruction and infectious by its ὁμίλια κακή: 'the field of criminal folly produces a harvest of death' (*Sept.* 601). The chorus, indeed, makes Eteocles a responsible agent on account of his savage desire to shed unlawful blood (αἵματος οὐ θεμιστοῦ, 689-694), but to the question τίς ἂν καθαρμὸς πόροι, the poet has not yet found his solution: οὐκ ἔστι γῆρας τοῦδε τοῦ μάσματος (682), unless one is indicated in the self-sacrifice of Antigone. But ten years later the double problem of hereditary criminality and blood-guiltiness is treated in the *Oresteia* with a breadth of design which is not only poetic but 'prophetic.' There is little reason to suppose that early tragedy was necessarily written in trilogies, but the scheme is admirably suited to Æschylus's exposition of the origin, transmission, and extinction of a πρόταρχος ἄτη (*Ag.* 1192). The principal terms, ἀρά, ἐρινύς, ἄτη, are developing specific meanings; beside them are vaguer phrases (μήνις, *Ag.* 155; μύθος, *Eum.* 378; ἄγος, *Cho.* 155; παρακοπή, *Ag.* 218; πῆμα, *Ag.* 346; ποιμή, *Cho.* 947, etc.). The phenomena are best stated in *Cho.* 400-405: 'Law it is that drops of gore spilt upon the ground demand the shedding of other blood. For Havoc cries on the avenging Fury, who brings up from those slain before calamity (ἄτην) to attend upon calamity'; and then 'who will expel from the house the breed of the curse?' κεκόλληται γένος πρὸς ἄτα (*Ag.* 1566). The story of the house of Pelops is not laboured; but a sufficient number of points—the adultery of Thyestes, Atreus's horrid revenge, the sacrifice of Iphigenia—lead up to the murder of Agamemnon. At each point the chain might have been broken, but each link is fresh riveted: 'Where will the force of this "Ἀτη" make an end? where will it cease and be lulled to rest?' (*Cho.* 1075). Has the curse acquired a personality as the τριπάχωντος δαίμων γέννης (*Ag.* 1476), demanding new blood before the old is dry, or as the παλαιὸς ὀμιλὸς δάδσωρ (*Ag.* 1501), masquerading as the murderous adulteress, and yet all

\* Hill not of Ares but of the Erinyes as well as the in its chasmus.

along the instrument of justice? (*Cho.* 641). Yet among the consequences may come a deed which, though terrible, is really innocent, an ἀνελπομενος ἄτη (*Cho.* 830); and the chorus of elders, even while declaring that the house is 'fast-bound,' grasps the truth that saves the morality of the situation. All retribution is and must be deserved; 'The robber is robbed, the murderer makes payment in full. There abides, while Zeus abides on his throne, the rule that the doer must suffer; this is the eternal law' (*Ag.* 1562-1564). The curse, then, is not an overwhelming fatality, but a hereditary predisposition which may be worked out in the race and even in the individual. The original transgressor was free to sin, and his descendant is free to adopt the prescribed means of purification. The actual development of this theme in connexion with the traditional obligation of the blood-feud is perhaps confused by a political motive; and the special pleading in the *Eumenides* about the nature of kinship is certainly frigid, as also the insistence on legal forms (ἀράξεις, μαρτυρία, σίνδικοι). The idea of blood for blood was so deeply rooted in popular sentiment and religious institutions, that Æschylus, no less than the legislators of his time, may have been puzzled to discriminate degrees of guilt, except by instinct. If the law is simply τοὺς κτανόντας ἀντίκαταβαίνει (*Cho.* 144), Clytemnestra may be allowed to swear that she sacrificed her husband to the Δίκη, Ἄτη, and Ἐπὶ τοῖς of their daughter (*Ag.* 1433). If not, how can Orestes ever say that his mother's blood 'sleeps and is fading away from his hand, and the pollution is being washed out'? (*Eum.* 280). No libations are of any use (*Cho.* 521), especially if the blood is κοινόν (*Cho.* 1038); the spirit of the dead is not tamed by the funeral fires, φάσκει δ' ὅτε ποτὶ ὄρνυς (*Cho.* 326); and the feud would go on for ever, or till the family became extinct. In Æschylus's solution of the problem there are really two stages, of which the latter is the more important. Orestes can plead innocence because he acts under the 'interpretation' (ὁ μάρτυς ἐγγυεῖρό σοι ματροκτονεῖν, *Eum.* 595) and even threats (*Cho.* 283-293) of Apollo-Loxias, and is ready to perform the ritual purifications (*Cho.* 1059); and the Delphic oracle had since the 8th century really exercised an ethical and educational influence in Greece. On the other hand, Æschylus felt that neither the payment of blood-money nor the performance of ritual can quiet the conscience or carry civilization very far. It is perhaps too much to say that Apollo is 'kein guter Gott'; but the ultimate and really moral solution is to be found in the judicial decision of Athens on the divided vote of the Areopagus, which she herself represents as the victory of the vox populi regarded as the vox Dei; δὴν ἐκέρησε Ζεὺς ἄγορας (*Eum.* 978). The *Oresteia*, then, is certainly a 'tendency' poem to this extent, that it expresses a view in the moral and religious speculations of the age as to heredity and responsibility, though it is not merely didactic on any particular question of justice or equity.\*

5. In the *Oresteia* the final reconciliation is provided by the gods; in the *Prometheus* they sustain the whole drama. Except in a few details attributable to a re-reading of his *Suppliants*, the surviving play of the set (probably two tragedies with a satyric play) is totally opposed to Æschylus's theology in all its stages. Prometheus, son of Themis or Earth (212), secured Zeus's triumph over the older dynasty (221), but is now tortured for having saved the human race by the gift of fire, the chief instrument of civilization, of augury and medicine, and of other means of providing for the

\* This view of the *Eumenides* seems less liable to objections than that which makes the Furies represent law, Apollo and Zeus equity, and Athens mercy, in a special question of moral casuistry. For that view see Haigh, p. 119.

future, and of Hope as the mainspring of effort (249-256, 442-506). All who visit the victim, whether as Zeus's agents—Strength, Hephaestus, and Hermes—or as sympathizers—the Oceanids, Oceanus, and Io—have suffered more or less in person or in character from Zeus, who is a νέος τίταρος, governing gods and men arbitrarily (παρ' αὐτοῦ, 189; ἰδίοις νόμοις, 404), unjustly (ἀδίκως, 150; τέρα δικῆς, 30), and odiously (975). But Prometheus, by virtue of his parentage, knows a secret; if Zeus contracts a certain marriage,\* his son will be greater than the sire (768, 907-927); in this respect Zeus is weaker than the Fates and Erinyes (515-520). The fragments of the *Solutus* indicate close parallelism in form and episodes to the *Vinctus*; in the solution Zeus and Prometheus meet one another half-way in a reconciliation, of which the agents are Heracles and Chiron the Centaur (cf. *Prom. Vinct.* 188-194, 1026-1029). Now this conception of a Zeus, inferior both in righteousness and in power, is out of all relation to the *Suppliants* and the *Oresteia* alike, and no theory of the poet's meaning can be accepted which minimizes this fact. Apart from purely fanciful explanations of the plays as political or scientific allegory, two views have been very commonly held.

(a) A tragedian was at liberty to develop his dramatic situations freely, provided he kept to the main lines of some recognized myth. Æschylus found Hesiod's story of Prometheus suitable for the exhibition of character as affected by injustice, and susceptible of brilliant episodes about geography, anthropology, etc. This view, as developed by (e.g.) Patin and Paley, may be called the literary explanation. Wecklein's theory, that Zeus is in the right and Prometheus violent and shortsighted, but a tragic hero by virtue of a certain dignity of character, like Milton's Satan, comes under the same head. But no such theory really explains the boldness of the idea, the conflation of myths, or the intensity of the passion with which the hero is supported.

Accordingly, (b) most modern scholars, including E. de Faye, regard Æschylus as deliberately inculcating the position that even the supreme personal authority in the Universe is itself subject to the eternal laws (Μοῖραι) which constitute the ultimate necessity (Ἀνάγκη). Prometheus, the mythical representative of these forces, is, then, really in the right, and Zeus is in the wrong with him and with Io; but Zeus's submission is effected by the educational value of time (δὴν ἐκδιδόσκει πᾶν ὁ γηρόσκου χρόνος, 981); and Prometheus, too, can yield without loss of dignity to an improved Zeus. This view gives an adequate meaning to the play as a whole, but it seems to lay undue stress on lines occurring in mere dialogue and not specially emphasized, and also to ignore the human personality of the protagonist. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine the author of the *Oresteia* and its epithets for Zeus acquiescing even temporarily in the idea of such development in the godhead.

Those, therefore (c), who hold the view first enunciated by a brother poet, Shelley, that Prometheus stands for Man, anxious to be moral and religious as well as rational, but convinced that he is the victim of forces incompletely understood, of the *de facto* supremacy of 'Nature,' prefer to trace in this drama the Greek parallel to the Book of Job. Æschylus was too great a poet to be a mere allegorist; but when his mind was occupied with the problem of undeserved evil, he found in the arch-allegorizer Hesiod that the origin of evil was the gift of fire and the creation of woman by Prometheus. He selected with a free hand from

\* This is a marked instance of Æschylus's syncretism; the story of Peléus and Thetis has even less connexion than Io with the myth of Prometheus, which was apparently an ætiological explanation of certain fire ceremonies.

this and other myths the more dramatic parts of the symbolism. The mention of Heracles may have suggested the insertion of his ancestress Io, the passive as a foil to the actively-resisting victim. The anthropology and geography are not episodic if they bring out the dignity of human reason and the universality of human suffering. The heroic sympathy of the Oceanids illustrates the value of simple and instinctive morality. The philosophical answer seems to be indicated in the words *αἰθαῖα*, repeated at every point of the play (see 64, 79, 436, 907, 964, 1012, 1034–1038), and *εὐθουῖα*, the special quality of Themis, set in antithesis to it in the last lines of the dialogue. In the two recitative passages assigned to the hero in the *Exodos*, the boast *πάντως ἐπὶ γ' οὐ θανάτωσιν* (1053) must have special significance as balancing the protest *ἐσθρᾶς μ' ὡς ἔκδικα πτόχω*. But it is likely enough that the solution of the problem, like the conclusion of the Book of Job, was too formal a compromise to be altogether satisfactory; and that may be the reason why it has perished. The whole tendency of Æschylus's mind is so strongly optimistic in theology, that it would right itself naturally after a reactionary period of what is *pessimism* rather than *scepticism*, however dramatically intensified.

Æschylus's originality as a thinker consists, then, in his attempts to moralize the traditional beliefs, embodied in myths and institutions, by the light of certain religious presuppositions and certain moral convictions which have been illustrated above. In his main ideas there is little variation, except in their poetical expression; in the detailed application of them his language fluctuates too much to admit of exact and consistent analysis. His doctrines left hardly any mark, though his dramas continued to be popular for their antique simplicity and dignity; even Aristophanes's vindication of his literary merit against the criticism of the next generation takes lower ground than it might. Neither the piety of Sophocles nor the impiety of Euripides felt the force of his protest against a fatalistic theory of morals. In philosophy, intellect and state-law took the place of conscience and Divine law so completely, that Plato could employ the myth of Prometheus without reference to a treatment of the subject which the modern world has long considered one of the most sublime efforts of poetic genius.

LITERATURE.—Besides the introductions to editions of Æschylus, sections on him are to be found in all the general works on Greek literature or theology. The most useful summary in English is A. E. Haigh's *Tragic Drama of the Greeks*, ch. ii. (1896). Of the innumerable essays on Æschylus those by J. A. Symonds (*The Greek Poets*, 2nd series) and E. Myers (*Hellenica*) are best known. Of older books the most frequently referred to are K. O. Müller's *Dissertations on the Eumenides* (Eng. tr. revised, 1853), F. Welcker's *Griech. Götterlehre* (1857), and K. F. Nagelsbach's *Nauck-hypomnest.*, etc. (1857). The principal monographs are: Æschylus (1829); G. Dronke's *Religion des Æschylos (und Sophocles)* (1861); E. Buchholz's *Sittliche Weltanschauung des (Pindaros und) Æschylos* (1869); and E. de Faye's *Étude sur les idées religieuses et morales d'Æschyle* (1884).

HERBERT E. D. BLAKISTON.

**ÆSTHETICISM** (*αἰσθητισμός*, 'sense perception').—The theory of life which fails to distinguish moral from æsthetic values, or subordinates the moral to the æsthetic. Ordinarily the term is not used as a distinctive title for specific theories, but as denoting a tendency of theories otherwise named. Three usages of the term may be conveniently distinguished:

1. Æstheticism may denote the identification of moral goodness with beauty, such as is suggested in the common Greek phrase 'beautiful and good.' Morality and art may be looked upon as the realization of a common principle, that of order or harmony. The good man, like the musician

to whom Aristotle is fond of comparing him, is the man who can introduce harmony into his subject, who can maintain that balance and symmetry of parts essential to the highest music, whether of conduct or of sound. The musician works with a different material from the good man, but their purpose and principle are the same, the good life is a work of art. And the impulse toward creation may also be the same. The artist works from love of the beautiful, from an instinctive passion for the beautiful itself. He recognizes no compulsion in his work, for he has no other desire than to create. So, too, the moral man creates from love of the good, from his instinctive desire to realize a complete and perfect life. Morality does not come to him in the form of a law constraining him to walk contrary to his nature. The good life is the life which realizes all the possibilities of man, the most completely human life. The good man is beauty realized in flesh and blood and action rather than in stone, but he is beautiful none the less.

That æstheticism in this sense characterized the Greek view of life is to a certain extent true, but not unreservedly so. It is true that the Greeks did not work out a clear distinction between the beautiful and the good. Aristotle (*Metaph.* xiii. 3) notes that the term 'good' is limited to certain actions, whereas beauty pertains also to that which is unmoved, but he gives no more exact *differentia*. Yet it is far from true that the Greeks altogether ignored the more severe, dualistic aspect of the moral life. To Plato, certainly, moral development is not a mere unfolding of the life of instinct, but the acquiring of a rational control over desires. The good is a reality recognized by reason, and independent of the individual's appreciation of it. As such an independent reality it stands over against the individual as the law of his action, demanding realization in his life. The moral life shows struggle and discord rather than the calm unity of a work of art. But this difference fails to find adequate expression in Greek theory, and as a consequence the fields of ethics and æsthetics remain confused. Were one to characterize this condition, it would perhaps be truer to say, not that their moral theory is æsthetic, but that their æsthetics is moralistic.

This confusion of the two fields is continued in the English Moral Sense School, which inherits the Platonic tradition, but in these later writers the Utilitarian principle is beginning to supplement the more æsthetic aspect. This is partially true of Shaftesbury, but more completely so of Hutcheson and Hume.

2. Æstheticism may also be used to denote the theory that all ultimate values are æsthetic, moral good being a means towards an ultimate æsthetic good. Under this conception the moral life is not itself beautiful, but it exists for the sake of æsthetic enjoyment. Morality, with its sense of obligation, is a result of mal-adjustment, in consequence of which we are compelled to do much which we do not value for its own sake, but as the necessary means towards an enjoyment which itself has no further use.

This conception finds literary expression in the writings of Mr. Walter Pater, in which the end of life is stated as richness of experience. This richness of experience is best realized in the life of æsthetic enjoyment.

3. Æstheticism also denotes the divorce of art and morals, usually implied in the popular use of the phrase 'art for art's sake.' Beauty is held to be independent of goodness, the technical aspect of a work of art being emphasized at the expense of its human significance. Art thus becomes a kind of higher morality, free from the objective laws which hold in the lower. The immoral may thus enter into the beautiful on the ground of its immediate value for perception.

LITERATURE.—Zeller, *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics* (1897), ii. ch. xv.; Muirhead, *Chapters from Aristotle's Ethics* (1900), ch. v. § 5; Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory* (1855), i. bk. i. branch 1; Santayana, *Sense of Beauty* (1896), pt. 1; Pater, *The Renaissance* (1873), conclusion, also *Marius the Epicurean* (1885); Shaftesbury, *Characteristics* (1711); Bosanquet, *History of Æsthetic* (new ed. 1900), ch. iv.

NORMAN WILDE.

**ÆSTHETICS**.—Æsthetics is the philosophical study of beauty regarded in itself and in its application to art and nature. (1) *Meaning of the word*.—Considered solely from the etymological point of view (*αἰσθησις*, *αἰσθητόν*, to perceive by the senses), the word means the study of sense-per-

ceptions. Kant remains faithful to this etymological acceptance when he applies the name of 'Transcendental Aesthetics' to the chapter of his *Critique* in which he discusses the sense-perceptions Time and Space. Baumgarten was the first to use the word 'Aesthetics' for the science of the beautiful; and the change that has taken place in the history of the term may be understood when it is recollected that, according to Baumgarten, the beautiful exists in the obscure regions of the lower consciousness, that it belongs to the rank of sensations, and is opposed to the 'clear thinking' of the intellect. To-day the term 'Aesthetics' has lost this connexion with *sensation*, and denotes in general the philosophy of the beautiful.

(2) *Place of Aesthetics in philosophy.*—The philosophy of the beautiful is bound up with and forms an integral part of a general system of philosophy. But Aesthetics is one thing in Plotinus or Thomas Aquinas, and quite another in Kant or Taine, because the philosophical systems of these scholars are so widely divergent. In the opinion of the present writer, Aesthetics is a mixed science, borrowing its principles from both metaphysics and psychology; so that (see art. BEAUTY) it includes two classes of questions, the one class bearing on the *subjective* feeling that beauty produces in the person affected by its charm, and the other relating to the *qualities of the things* to which we ascribe beauty.

(3) *History.*—Ancient writers devoted special attention to the objective side of beauty. Plato and Aristotle consider the beautiful as identical with order and proportion; Plotinus and the Neo-Platonic school make it an attribute of everything that exists *as such*. The Middle Ages changed the aspect of the doctrine of Aesthetics. While sharing largely in the *objective* theories of the beautiful, they supplemented them by a study of impression or *aesthetic pleasure*. Modern philosophy, on the contrary, takes its stand almost exclusively on the psychological side of beauty, and regards it as a purely *subjective* phenomenon. With Kant, for instance, beauty does not belong to the object itself, but only to our perception of it. Contemporary Aesthetics perpetuates and emphasizes these ultra-subjective tendencies.

LITERATURE.—See under BEAUTY.

MAURICE DE WULF.

**ÆTHER.**—Derived from a root signifying to burn, Æther is a term appropriated in Greek literature to the blue vault of the upper firmament, as contrasted with *aër*, which is applied to mist and vapour. In Homer æther is the abode of Zeus (*Il.* ii. 412, etc.). In Hesiod (*Theog.* 124) Æther and Day are the offspring of Night, and in at least one of the Orphic cosmologies, Æther, as representing light or fire, is contrasted with Chaos, and proceeds from Kronos (see Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, Eng. tr. 1901, i. 92f.). Pherecydes, who occupies the borderland between the mythical and the scientific, traces the origin of all things to Zeus, Earth, and Kronos, and identifies the first of these with æther (Diels, *Vorsokratiker*, p. 508, No. 71, A 9).

The current conception of æther passed into the keeping of the philosophers, by whom it was variously defined and modified. In the Fragments of Parmenides æther is found as the region of the fixed stars (*Fr.* 10. 1, Diels), and as the fiery element of which their substance is composed (*Fr.* 11. 2, Diels); and although Aëtius indicates a distinction between æther as the outermost covering of the universe and the subjacent fiery heaven, we cannot attach much weight to his authority (*ii.* 7. 1; cf. *ii.* 15. 7, and see Krüger, *Forschungen*, pp. 114, 115). Empedocles treats æther as a synonym of *aër*, except in one doubtful passage (*Fr.* 33. 4, Diels). On the other hand, Anaxagoras regarded *aër* and

æther as the two primary differentiations of being—the cold and dark contrasted with the bright and warm (*Fr.* 1. 2, Diels). Indeed, we are informed that he employed æther as synonymous with fire (*A 73*, Diels). In the formation of the world, the dense, wet, cold, and dark sank into the centre, while the rare, hot, and dry went to join the enveloping æther (*Fr.* 15, Diels). From Anaxagoras it is convenient to pass to Euripides, who is said to have been largely influenced by his teaching (Diod. i. 7. 7.). There are various references to æther in Euripides, which may be the reflexion either of popular fancies or of current science, or of both. Thus the identification of Zeus with æther carries us back to Pherecydes, and anticipates the pantheism of the Stoa (*Fr.* 935; cf. *Æsch.* *Fr.* 65a). The conception of Æther as the husband of Earth, quickening all things into life by his fertilizing showers, is the common property of many poets and philosophers (Eur. *Fr.* 488, 836; and see Munro on *Lucr.* i. 250). Similar to this is the notion that the vital breath is derived from æther, and that the soul, retaining its consciousness after death, is absorbed in the source from which it sprang (*Hel.* 1014; *Suppl.* 531; cf. *Lucr.* v. 318). Though it has often been supposed that Euripides was here borrowing from Anaxagoras, it is noteworthy that the same thought is found in the inscription over those who fell at Potidæa (*CIA* i. 442), and may well be due, as has been recently suggested (*CIR* xv. 431), to a popular belief which arose in connexion with the practice of cremation. The soul of the dead man was thought to ascend with the smoke which rose from the burning corpse.

By the side of the four elements generally recognized in philosophy, from the time of Empedocles onwards,—fire, air, water, and earth,—æther ultimately came to be admitted as a fifth; but it is still open to question whether this view was derived by the Platonic school from the Pythagoreans (Zeller, *Pre-Socratics*, vol. i. p. 313, n.). Plato, in the *Timæus*, does not adopt this position (58D); and though there is strong evidence that it formed part of his oral doctrine (Xenocrates, *ap. Simplic. Physic.* 268a), and it is accepted by the author of the *Epinomis* (981C), its definite establishment is generally connected with the name of Aristotle, from whose statement of the theory through the scholastic *quinta essentia* is derived our word *quintessence*. Eternal and immutable, providing the substance of the heavenly spheres and stars, ceaselessly rotating round the world, but transcending the strife of the terrestrial elements (*de Caelo*, 1. 2. 269a 30. 1. 3. 270a 13, b 1), æther was at once material and divine. The Stoics took a further step by identifying the substance of æther with God. It is described as fiery breath or creative fire, the rarest and most subtle of all bodies (Chrysipp. *ap. Ar. Did. Fr.* 31, Diels), which produces out of itself the phenomenal world, passing through the medium of the elements. The universe, subject to a law of ceaseless flux and reflux, moves either in creative progress or towards periodic conflagration. When everything is consumed by fire, the world-soul and the world are united in the single essence of æther (Chrysipp. *ap. Plut. Comm. Not.* 36). But when, by the equipoise of its constituent forces, the created world is in existence, the ruling power resides in the outermost periphery of æther (Diog. Laert. vii. 139; Ar. *Did. Fr.* 29, Diels). Then, as the world-soul, it permeates every part of the universe, and is the immanent cause of all individual existence (Diog. Laert. vii. 138). Thus may be justified the summary assertion of Chrysippus, that æther is everything, being at once father and son (Philodem. *de Piet.* c. 13, p. 80. 26G). A. C. PEARSON.



**ÆTIOLOGY** (αἰτιολογία).—The doctrine of causes. The latter part of the *Categories* of Aristotle (chs. 10–15), early suspected, but possibly compiled from Aristotelian fragments (Zeller's *Aristotle*, Eng. tr. vol. i. p. 66), contains the *Post-prædicamenta* which give the clue to the subsequent position and treatment of ætiology. In the treatises on *Metaphysics* which are based on the scholastic philosophy, 'General Metaphysics' is distinguished from 'Special Metaphysics,' notwithstanding the difference of standpoint, precisely as 'General Philosophy' is distinguished from 'Special Philosophy' by H. Spencer (*First Principles*, § 38). General metaphysics treats of—(1) Being and its properties; (2) the highest kinds of beings, i.e. the categories; (3) the relations of beings to each other. The third head embraces the same subject as the *Post-prædicamenta*, the whole division being foreshadowed by the *Ante-prædicamenta* (due to Abelard), *Prædicamenta* and *Post-prædicamenta* of the mediæval logic. Of the five relations treated of in the *Post-prædicamenta*—*oppositio*, *prioritas*, *simultas*, *motus*, and *habere*—two, *prioritas* and *simultas*, are especially concerned with causality. The first two divisions of general metaphysics, dealing with universals, the six transcendents, the nature of being, the supreme classes of finite beings, are sometimes regarded as constituting Ontology. The third division, which deals with the relations of finite beings to each other and to the Infinite, will thus contain as its most important part the doctrine of causes—Ætiology.

If we turn to modern philosophy, the position of ætiology is not different. In the contents of Burgersdyk's *Institutiones Metaphysicæ* (Mansel, *Metaph.* p. 288), the doctrine of causes occupies a similar position. It holds a like place in Wolf's *Ontologia*. K. Rosenkranz (*Wissenschaft d. log. Idee*) divides metaphysics into Ontology, Ætiology, Teleology (Erdmann's *Hist. of Philosophy*, tr. vol. iii. § 346. 11). E. von Hartmann (*Kategorienlehre*), under the categories of speculative thought, puts Causality (Ætiology), Finality (Teleology), Substantiality (Ontology).

We do not propose to enter into an examination of the various forms and shades of meaning which ætiology assumes in these several systems. Nor does it belong to this article to view the subject of causation from the point of view of the theory of knowledge and of the criticism of the causal concept. We shall confine ourselves to considering simply the leading forms of the theory of the nature and classification of causes in the successive periods of the history of philosophy. For this purpose the history of philosophy may be considered as divided into three periods—the ancient, the mediæval, and the modern. The leading characteristic of each of these periods is as follows: in ancient philosophy (Greek) the antithesis of subject and object, of mind and matter, as two substances over against each other, is absent. Thought and being, the one and the many, are equally objective. In the second period, owing to the development of Greek philosophy itself, and the spread of the Roman conceptions of authoritative law and duty, but above all, owing to the influence of Christianity, the spiritual and material are conceived as antithetically opposed existences, and the attempt is made under this altered point of view to retain the Greek solution of the problem. The substance of this solution is dogmatically affirmed in Scholasticism. What is not shown is that it is possible under the changed point of view. Modern philosophy consists in the constant effort to prove the possibility of the solution, to explain the manner in which spiritual and material being interpenetrate, affect, and condition each other. In modern philosophy, not the dogmatic result

itself, but the way in which it is obtained, is the leading interest. The ætiological problem becomes an essentially different one in each of these periods.

In Greek philosophy the antithesis of subject and object is absent. Nature is instinct with motion, life, reason. The notion of personality is undeveloped, but at the same time the tendency to personification is omnipresent (see Jowett's *Plato*, vol. i. p. xiv). Thought is not a modification of a conscious mind, but consciousness is the accident, a ripple on the surface of nature (see Martineau's *Types of Ethical Theory*, vol. i. p. 23). From this point of view the antitheses with which Greek philosophy dealt—the one and the many, the real and the apparent, thought and being—are all reconcilable by one concept—that of mixture. 'There is only a mingling, and then a separation of the mingled' (Empedocles, v. 38). This mingling, or, as Plato termed it, 'participation' (μέθεξις), when conceived as the union of the one and the many, of form and matter, εἶδος and ὄλη, gives the well-known fourfold classification of causes of Aristotle—the formal, material, efficient, and final (ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι· ἡ ὄλη καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον· ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως· τὸ οὐ ἐνεκεν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν (*Metaph.* i. 3)). The principles intermingled are form and matter; the agency by which the composition is effected, and the end to be realized by the process, are the efficient and final causes. The latter causes, however, are never considered as distinct from the principles intermingled. The individual Greek thinkers illustrate this position. Aristotle has pointed out that the early ætiologists recognized only the material cause (*ib.*). The water of Thales, the air of Anaximenes, were material principles; but the active forces, the causal energies, are either the living matter itself, or its rarefaction and condensation. The same is true of the fire of Heraclitus (Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, Eng. tr. vol. i. pp. 222, 223, vol. ii. pp. 27, 28). In like manner, even when the efficient cause begins to receive distinct recognition, as in the love and hate of Empedocles, or the *voûs* of Anaxagoras, it still is not separate from the material cause. The *voûs* of Anaxagoras must not be conceived as a mere prime mover, a distinct agency detached from the universe to which it communicates motion. It passes into things. It is in all essences entirely homogeneous. It is not mixed with them in the coarse sense, but it permeates them (cf. Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, vol. ii. pp. 343 ff.). When Socrates, in the *Phædo*, complains that Anaxagoras did not make full use of his principle (Aristotle makes the same complaint), this is not an *ignoratio elenchi*, as Lewes (*Hist. of Philosophy*, vol. i. p. 84) represents it. Socrates does not desiderate a physico-teleological theory of the universe in the modern sense. It is only to be expected that *voûs*, in moving the universe, should impart something of its own sublime rational nature to things, should more or less pass over into them. The Platonic idea does no less. Socrates and Plato thus bring to light the formal cause.

As is well known, the causal activity of the ideas is the crux of the Platonic philosophy. In one of its forms, at any rate, the formal cause is naturally regarded as the moving principle. The efficient cause is identified with the form, the Idea. The demiurge in Plato is most probably to be viewed, not as the exclusive activity of the highest idea, the idea of the Good, the One (as by Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, vol. i. pp. 45 ff.), but as the personification of the principle of activity or efficiency flowing from the Good, and pervading the whole world of ideas. We thus see that efficiency, action, may be identified with either the matter or the form.



When Aristotle brought down form from the far-off *τόπος νοητός*, or intelligible world of Plato, and incorporated it in matter, the problem still remained, to which side action, efficiency, was to be attributed, and Aristotle is generally interpreted as assigning it exclusively to form. In favour of this view is his celebrated definition of the Absolute as *νόησις νοήσεως*, the thought of thought; but the interpretation is probably one-sided. There is much in Aristotle to lead us to regard the Absolute as dwelling in a sort of supersensuous sensuous world, as related to the real world—which in all its various grades is a *σύνολον*, a compositum of matter and form—not merely through the element of form, but also through that of matter. In *Metaph.* viii. (ix.) 8, end, the argument against the ideal theory contends that the ideas, as such, are mere potentialities (*δυνάμεις*). This view would help to solve the ancient controversy as to the pantheism or monotheism of Aristotle, the immanence or transcendence of the *νοῦς*.

In the Neo-Platonic philosophy the ideal world of Plato and the Divine *νοῦς* of Aristotle are hypostasized into a series of personal beings. This philosophy represents the innate tendency of Greek philosophy itself to pass over into that antithesis which dominates Christian philosophy—the antithesis of subject and object, spirit and nature. St. Augustine views the Platonic ideas no longer as independent substances, but as ideas in the mind of God. The hierarchy of ideas and emanations yields to the heavenly hierarchy. With this change of view the combination or composition of form and matter, of idea and reality, becomes a most difficult problem. The community of idea and reality, the intercourse of mind and matter, can no longer be conceived as a mere mingling or composition of the two, if the idea as universal dwells in a separate substance—mind. The great controversy of the Middle Ages, of Realism and Nominalism regarding universals, is the struggle with this problem. Yet in regard to aetiology, the real interest does not lie in this problem, but in a greater one connected with it. Granting that reality is the union of matter and form, which factor in this union is the active one? Thomas Aquinas answers, 'form': 'Forma est agendi principium' (Stöckl, *Gesch. der Philos. des Mittelalters*, vol. ii. p. 451). It is diverse views of the relation of the causal power in the universe to those principles of matter and form, the union of which to the Scholastic as much as to Aristotle constitutes the nature of things, that underlie the great rival systems of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, and from which their other differences proceed. In Scotus the union proceeds from the side of the matter, not the form. The latter is the efficient, the causal factor (de Gérando, *Systèmes de Philosophie*, vol. iv. p. 577; Rousselot, *Études sur la Philosophie dans le Moyen Age*, iii. p. 56). Duns Scotus's philosophy here encounters the same difficulties as have been urged against H. Spencer. In both Aquinas and Scotus, however, the source of the efficiency is transcendent, whether it be the Divine intellect or will which determines it.

Modern philosophy, from Descartes and Spinoza to Hegel and Hartmann, Spencer and Lewes, is engaged on the problem of explaining how the intercommunication of mind and matter, spirit and nature, takes place. It has been remarked by Bayle and Rousselot that Spinoza's philosophy is contained in that of Scotus. This is true in a sense. But the ultimate causal principle is in Scotus transcendent, in Spinoza immanent. This difference is characteristic of modern philosophy. The solution is no longer taken from the transcendent sphere. If the Absolute is called in, it is, as in

Spinoza, Leibniz, Schelling, Hegel, an immanent, not transcendent Absolute.

Of the problem thus handed down it cannot be said that the solution has yet been reached. In the Monadology of Leibniz and the Absolute Idea of Hegel it is form, the ideal side, that contains the principle of all causal agency throughout the universe. These principles differ from the Platonic idea in this, that they are subjects, have the objective world over against them, even if that world have no being apart and be a nullity or contradiction at the core. In Schopenhauer and Hartmann only the Will, the material side, actualizes the representation or idea. The 'willing to will' of Hartmann answers to the *materia prima* of Duns Scotus. It is the same in our English philosophy. Out of the unknowable Absolute of Spencer, and the known Absolute of Lewes, the material, organic, and mental worlds proceed. Yet the relation of these higher forms to the primordial matter and motion is unsolved. Psychophysical parallelism is but the statement of the enigma. The question remains, Which is the efficient—form, matter, or both? In what ways do they co-operate, and how? The aetiological and teleological problems are still unsolved.

LITERATURE.—Aristotle, *Organon* and *Metaphysics*; H. Ritter et L. Preller, *Hist. philos. Gr. et Rom.*; Fairbanks, *First Philosophers of Greece*; Ferrier, *Lectures on Gr. Philosophy*; Zeller, *Philos. der Griechen*; Stöckl, *Gesch. der Philos. des Mittelalters*; Fichte, *Wissenschaftslehre*; Schelling, *Syst. des transcend. Idealismus*; Hegel, *Logik (Werke, iii., iv., v.)*; Karl Rosenkranz, *Syst. der Wissenschaft, Wissenschaft der logischen Idee*; von Hartmann, *Philos. des Unbewussten, Religion des Geistes, Kategorienlehre*.

GEORGE J. STOKES.

**AFFECTION.**—That aspect of psychic life which comes to consciousness as concrete states of Feeling (which see); the abstract *quale* of feeling consciousness. In the newer divisions of the fundamental or rudimentary aspects of conscious process it has been found necessary to distinguish the concrete given states of mind, characterized as Knowledge, Feeling or Emotion, and Will, from those abstract and largely hypothetical *quales* which, although never found alone, nevertheless serve to define the concrete states. For example, a state of feeling is always or usually one both of knowledge of an object and of active tendency or will. Since never realized in its purity, it becomes necessary, therefore, to define such a state by what it would be if so realized. The characteristic aspect of consciousness whereby it is not knowledge or will, but feeling, is what is called 'affection.' It is the differentia of a state of feeling or emotion. Similarly, a state of knowledge is never feelingless nor will-less; its differentia as knowledge is its reference to an object; it is called 'cognition.' With active process, or in a large sense Will, the same sort of distinction leads us to the determination of its *differentia* as a certain active quality called 'conation.' Affection, cognition, and conation are therefore the three fundamental aspects of conscious process, considered as irreducible phases of what in a case of concrete happening is, usually at least, all three. Cf. Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, art. 'Affection,' 'Cognition,' 'Conation,' and 'Classification of the Mental Functions' (by Stout). J. MARK BALDWIN.

**AFFIRMATION.**—1. In legal parlance an affirmation is distinguished from an oath in that no penalty is invoked upon himself for false witness by the person affirming. It seems to have arisen in the scruples of those who felt the danger of invoking the name of the Deity in case a mistake of memory or statement led to unforeseen consequences. Courts, seeing that testimony from persons of this character might be quite as reliable as any supported by an oath, finally accepted

affirmation in lieu of more strongly attested allegations. The tendency to substitute affirmation for an oath will be proportioned to the decline of the belief that oaths have any more sacredness than a simple asseveration, and to the decline of the belief that the invocation of the Deity affects the efficacy of an oath. Where an appeal to the Deity and His punitive disposition or habits is supposed to influence human veracity, the oath will prevail; but it is not necessary where veracity is respected for itself. No doubt the efficacy of the oath in one period of human history was much influenced by a belief in future punishment, but that has ceased to exercise the influence it once possessed, and the community must rely upon one of two motives to assure veracity. The first is natural human penalties, and the second is respect for the truth. In either of these there will be no necessity for the oath where any scruple exists about invoking the Deity.

2. Affirmation, in *logical and philosophical diction*, is distinguished from negation or denial. It thus means the statement of a fact. It may represent nothing more than a belief that a given thing is a fact, but, so long as it takes the form of a positive statement, it is called an affirmation. To assert, to posit, to asseverate, to declare are the equivalents of affirmation, and, of course, mean at least the formal assurance that the thing affirmed is a fact. In formal logic, affirmation is a name for a certain type of judgment which is distinguished by the grammatical form or mode of statement, and not by the meaning or content of the sentence, or by the particular state of mind out of which the statement issues. Psychologically speaking, however, affirmation denotes a degree of tenacity in conviction which looks towards assurance, and it expresses that state of mind. Negation or denial expresses the same kind of mental state, while doubt is the opposite of both affirmation and negation. Hence psychologically there is no difference between affirmation and negation, in so far as assurance is concerned, but only a difference in reference to the relation between the ideas involved in the mental process of comparison and judgment. That is, the difference between affirmation and negation concerns the content of the judgment, and not its mental state of conviction. Affirmation implies a certain kind of connexion between subject and predicate, and negation excludes it.

JAMES H. HYSLOP.

**AFGHANISTAN.**—Afghanistan (lit. 'land of the Afghans') is a country of south-central Asia, whose location and political importance have led to its playing a part in the religious history of the Orient from the time of Zoroaster to the appearance of Muhammad. The present boundaries of this mountainous land are political rather than geographical, as they are largely defined by the fact that Afghanistan is a buffer-country between the English empire of India on the south and south-east and the Russian provinces of Bokhara and Turkistan on the north, while Persia and Baluchistan limit its western and southern frontiers.

In the first chapter of the Avesta (Vd. i. 7) the ancient northern capital Balkh (Bākhdi) is referred to as a beautiful city with banners floating from its high walls, and there is a persistent tradition that the city was a strong religious centre, the abode of Lohrasp, the father of Vishtasp, patron of Zoroaster, and that Zoroaster himself was slain there when the Turanians stormed Balkh during the Holy War which Iran had started against Turan. The modern capital Kābul (Kāvul in the Pahlavi treatise *Shatroihā-i Airān*, 34) appears in the Avesta (Vd. i. 9) as Vākereta, and the region of the Helmand, the chief river of

Afghanistan, the Etymandros of the Greeks, is called Hæstumant (Phl. Hētūmand) in the same Zoroastrian law-book (Vd. i. 13). The modern lowland district of Seistan in south-western Afghanistan was the home of the Zoroastrian dynasty of the Kaianians and the place of the holy lake Kansaoya (mod. Hāmūn) of the Avesta, from whose waters the Saviour (Av. Saoshyant) was to arise at the Millennium. Zoroastrianism appears also to have prevailed in the land during the Parthian and Sasanian eras, from B.C. 250 to A.D. 650, although some Greek religious influences may have followed in the wake of Alexander's invasion. Buddhism made some progress in Afghanistan, being traceable chiefly to Indians who emigrated from the Indus to the Helmand region after the Scythian invasion, and who carried with them, among their sacred treasures, the water-pot of the blessed Buddha himself. This relic was preserved in a shrine near the ancient site of Kandahar, and is described by Bellew, who saw it, as 'a huge bowl carved out of a solid block of dark green serpentine' (see *Races of Afghanistan*, p. 22).

The conquest of the country by the Arabs in the 7th cent. destroyed all previous religious foundations, and cleared the ground anew for the building up of Islām. Muhammadanism became the national faith of the Afghans, and has remained, mainly in its Sunnite form, their creed and chief bond of union, although they acknowledge the political headship of an Amir over their loosely connected tribes.

The Afghan nation consists of a number of tribes considerably divergent in their character, with a population variously estimated at between 3,000,000 and 6,000,000. Most important are the Afghans and Pathāns, who constitute the chief element of the population, together with the clans known as Ghilzais in the east, Yusufzais and Afridis on the Indian border, the Duranis to the west, and the Tajiks, Hazarāhs, Usbegs, and Aimaks, mostly showing traces of Mongolian blood, to the north and north-west. The great majority of the Afghans belong ethnologically to the Iranian stock; and although there is an intermixture of blood, especially on the borders, there is no good reason for accepting the view that they were of Semitic origin, while they may preserve some such tradition from a later date and show certain slight Semitic traces.

The language of the country is generally called Afghan, but often Pukhtun or Pushtun, the former (Pukhtun) being North Afghan, the latter (Pushtun) South Afghan. The literature of the people is but scanty, and no monuments have been traced farther back than the 16th century. Most interesting among the remains are the Afghan folk-songs, a collection of which has been made by the French scholar Darmesteter, and among these ballads are a number that deal with religion.

**LITERATURE.**—A comprehensive bibliography of works relating to Afghanistan, its language, history, and religion, will be found in the German work by Geiger and Kuhn, *Grundriss der Iranischen Philologie*, i. pt. 2, 201-230 (Geiger), ii. 612-16 (Jackson). Of general interest are: Elphinstone, *Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, London, 1815; Spiegel, *Eranische Alterthumskunde*, i. 307-25, Leipzig, 1871; Bellew, *The Races of Afghanistan*, 1890; Roskoff, *Iranians*, Leipzig, 1885-6; Darmesteter, *Iranians*, Paris, 1888-90; Forbes, *The Afghans*, 1892; Roberts, *Forty-Nine Years in Afghanistan*, 1892; Northern Afghanistan, London, 1888, *Khurasan and Sistan*, London, 1900; Sultan Mahomed Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2 vols., London, 1900; Hamilton, *Afghanistan*, London, 1906.

A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON.

The name 'Afghan,' first appearing in literature in al-Birūnī's *India* (tr. Sachau, i. 208), is of uncertain signification; and the Afghans themselves prefer the designation Pushtūn or Pukhtūn, older form Pashtūn, Pakhtūn (whence their Indian name

Paṭhān)—a term which Lassen (*Ind. Altertums-kunde*<sup>2</sup>, Leipzig, 1867, i. 513) connected with the Πάτνες of Herodotus (iii. 93, 102, iv. 44, vii. 68); while Darmesteter (*Chants populaires des Afghans*, Paris, 1888, i. Introd. 182) has suggested that the Afghans may also be implied by the Παρσύναι of Ptolemy (vi. 18. 3, 20. 3). At all events, the native appellation Pushtūn signifies 'mountaineers,' and may be implied by the passage in Arrian's *Anabasis*, iii. 8. 4: Βασάντης δὲ Ἀραχῶτων σατράπης Ἀραχῶτους τε ἦγε καὶ τοὺς ὀρεοὺς ἱρδοὺς καλονέμενους. Several other names are given by Dorn (ii. 62-64), the most interesting being Sulaimāni (doubtless from their residence in the Koh-i-Sulaiman), Bani Aṣif (Aṣif being the cousin of Afghāna), Bani Isrā'īl, and, of course, Rohillas ('mountaineers').

Though pre-Islāmic Afghanistan has no real history, it is rich in legends of its origin. The best known of these traditions, to which allusion has already been made in the preceding article, is preserved in a Persian history of the Afghans by Nī'amat Allah, an author of the 16th cent. (tr. Dorn, *History of the Afghans*, 2 vols., London, 1829-36). According to his account, the eponymous hero of the Afghans was Afghāna ibn Irmia ibn Tālūt (Saul). Afghāna himself was the commander-in-chief of Solomon's army, and through his executive ability he was enabled to complete the Temple at Jerusalem. When, however, the Israelites were scattered abroad by Nebuchad-rezzar, Afghāna and his children (numbering forty) were also dispersed; and some settled around Ghor and others near Mecca, where they remained for fifteen hundred years, obeying the Torah in all things. With the advent of Muhammad, the contemporary head of the Afghans or 'Israelites,' Khalid ibn Valid, embraced Islām, and after a long and victorious career, which included exploits in Persia, sent letters to the Afghans at Ghor concerning the coming of Muhammad, whereupon several of their chiefs, headed by Kais, went to Medina and there accepted the new faith, spreading it in Afghanistan on their return. The historic worthlessness of this legend is beyond question; and equally absurd is the tradition recounted by Firishta, tracing the Afghans to descendants of Pharaoh's nobles, who, after his fall, emigrated to India and settled in the Sulaiman Mountains. Many joined Abrahā in his attack on Mecca, and were converted, and later returned to the neighbourhood of their early home.

Turn from legends to facts. Afghanistan was traversed by Alexander the Great in his march to India, and it is alluded to by Strabo (p. 699) as Γαρδαπίς. This latter term is of particular interest, in that it represents the Sanskrit *Gandhāra*, which 'lay on both sides of the Kabul river, immediately above its junction with the Indus' (McCrindle, *Ancient India as described in Classical Literature*, Westminster, 1901, p. 31, n. 4). After Alexander, this region came under the sway of his successors, and thus formed part of the dominions of the Græco-Bactrian and Indo-Scythian dynasties. With the latter line of kings a new religious influence was introduced into Afghanistan, particularly by Kanishka (1st cent. A.D.)—the faith of the Buddha. By this time nearly all trace of Zoroastrianism had probably disappeared, though even in the middle of the 19th cent. local tradition at Herat told of the destruction of a fire temple there by Muhammadans in the reign of the Tāhirid Abdallah (d. 844) (Ferrier, *Caravan Journeyings and Wanderings*, London, 1857, p. 181); while Zoroastrians seem to have flourished in the Pamirs as late as the 13th cent., ruins of three forts ascribed to them still existing in Wakhan (Gordon, *Roof of*

*the World*, Edinburgh, 1876, p. 141), where the natives even now treat fire with reverence, being reluctant to blow out a light (Wood, *Journey to the Sources of the River Oxus*, new ed., London, 1872, p. 333). Buddhism, however, has left not only many small figures at Hidda and Kabul (Vigne, *Personal Narrative of a Visit to Ghuzni, Kabul, and Afghanistan*, London, 1840, p. 207), but also some sixty topes, dating mostly from the 4th and 5th cent. A.D., and found chiefly at Darunta, Chahar Bagh, Hidda, Kabul, Koh Daman, and Kohwat; as well as ruins of elaborate monasteries at Jamalgiri, Takht-i-Babi, and Sahri Bhalol, which show distinct influence of Greek art. Sculptures of the Buddha have also been found at Bamian (Wilson, in Vigne, *op. cit.* pp. 187-192); and the Chinese travellers Fa Hsien (tr. Legge, Oxford, 1886, pp. 33-40) and Hsien Tsiang (tr. Beal, London, 1884, i. 98-103) both describe Kanishka's magnificent dagoba at Peshawar.

Modern Afghanistan, as noted in the preceding article, is wholly Muhammadan. Besides official Sunnite orthodoxy, however, there exists a mixture of Semitic and Indian folk-belief. To this category belongs the vast number of saint-shrines (*ziārat*), which consist either of the domed tomb of some saint or of a heap of stones, enclosed by a wall and usually surrounded by trees or bushes (Bellew, *Journal of a Political Mission to Afghanistan*, London, 1862, pp. 70-71, 107-109, 386)—a religious phenomenon common amongst both the modern Semites and Hindus (Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, New York, 1902, *passim*; Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folk-Lore of Northern India*, Westminster, 1896, i. 183-185, 189-229). Again, levirate marriage is practised, and it is a grievous affront not to ask the brother's consent if the widow be again married, though, if she have children, it is considered more honourable for her to remain unwedded (Elphinstone, *Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, London, 1815, i. 236). Amongst some tribes, moreover, it is customary for the suitor to serve the father of his would-be bride for many years, as Jacob served Laban for Rachel's sake (*ib.* p. 249; Bellew, *Journal*, p. 27). The blood-fend, as amongst the Semites, is a sacred duty (Elphinstone, *op. cit.* i. 220-221; Conolly, *Journey to the North of India*<sup>2</sup>, London, 1838, ii. 163-165); and blasphemers, as amongst the Hebrews, are stoned to death (Bellew, *Journal*, p. 68). In time of pestilence a buffalo or cow is led through or around the village or camp. The sins of the community are then ceremonially transferred to the victim's head, after which it is either slaughtered and its flesh divided between the priests and the poor, or it is driven into the wilderness (Bellew, *loc. cit.*). This practice, familiar from the Hebrew scapegoat, is also found extensively in Northern India (Crooke, *op. cit.* i. 142, 166-167, 169-170).

Dreams, the evil eye, exorcism, ordeals, and omens are, of course, attentively regarded by the Afghans; so that a high wind for three days is a sign that a murder has been committed, since, when Cain slew Abel, there was a similar commotion of the elements (Conolly, *op. cit.* ii. 137-146). The popular demons of Afghan folk-belief are *jinn*s, *peris*, *āls*, and *parraīs*. The *jinn*s and *peris* are common to all popular Muhammadan mythology, but the *āls* and *parraīs* (the latter word a semasiologic variation of *pari*, 'peri') are plainly Indian in origin. The *āl*, described as a woman about twenty years of age, with long teeth and nails, eyes curving down the side of the nose, feet turned heel foremost, and feeding on corpses (Vigne, *op. cit.* pp. 211-212), is manifestly the *churl* of Northern India (Crooke, *op. cit.* i. 269-271; *Calcutta Review*, No. cxiil. p. 180 ff.), who, though

she may assume a beautiful form, is in reality 'very ugly and black, breastless, protruding in stomach and navel, and feet turned back' (Steel and Temple, *Wide-Awake Stories*, Bombay, 1884, p. 318). In Armenian folk-lore the *al* is also found, though differing materially from the Indo-Afghan concept (cf. Abeghian, *Armen. Volks Glaube*, Leipzig, 1899, pp. 118-120). The *parrai*, a huge monster, with flabby breasts thrown back over her shoulders, stretching out her hairy arms to any length, and devouring those who answer her plaintive cry for help (Darmesteter, *op. cit.* i. 254-255), is clearly the Indian *rakshasi* (Crooke, *op. cit.* i. 246-253), who plays an important part in Hindu folk-tales. Though the Afghans are essentially an Iranian people (Deniker, *Races of Man*, London, 1901, p. 420), they thus exhibit a total loss of Iranian concepts, for which they have substituted an amalgam of Semitic and Indian beliefs.

**LITERATURE.**—In addition to the works cited in the previous article, mention may be made of Lassen, *Ind. Altertumskunde*?, i. 503-515, ii. 239-360 (Leipzig, 1867-74); Masson, 'Topes and Sepulchral Monuments of Afghanistan', in Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, pp. 55-118 (London, 1841); Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, pp. 72-78, 169-184 (London, 1870); Bellew, *Journal of a Political Mission to Afghanistan*, pp. 40-77 (London, 1862); Conolly, *Journey to the North of India*?, ii. 136-160 (London, 1838); Ni'amat Allah, *Hist. of the Afghans* (tr. Dorn, 2 vols., London, 1820-30); Modi, 'The Afghanistan of the Amir and the Ancient Mazdayasnans in East and West, 1907; Raverty, *Poetry of the Afghans* (1862), and *Notes on Afghanistan* (1881); Malletson, *Hist. of Afghanistan* (1879); and Laws of Census Report on its border).

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**AFRICA.**—[The purpose of this article is to give a general account of the ethnology, religions, and ethics of Africa. A detailed description of the various religions will be found in the following articles: BANTU AND S. AFRICA, BERBERS AND N. AFRICA, HAMITES AND E. AFRICA, NEGROES AND W. AFRICA].

A line drawn from the mouth of the Senegal river, through Timbuktu, eastwards to Khartum, then southwards to the equator, and along the equator again eastwards to the Indian Ocean, will roughly divide Africa into two main ethnical sections of nearly equal areas—*Caucasic* in the north and *Ethiopic* or *Negro* in the south (for the sense in which these and other general ethnical terms are here taken see art. ETHNOLOGY [Conspectus]). Of the northern section, which comprises the Mediterranean seaboard from Morocco to Egypt, the Saharan and Libyan deserts from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, Abyssinia and the Galla, Massai and Somali lands, there are two great divisions—the *Hamitic Caucasians*, who are here indigenous, and the *Semitic Caucasians*, who are later immigrants from Asia, but have long been almost everywhere in the closest contact with the Hamitic aborigines. Most probably the two races originally constituted a single Hamito-Semitic group, whose primeval home was North Africa, whence some moved in remote times across the Red Sea to South-West Asia, and here became specialized as Semites; while others—Iberians, Ligurians, Pelasgians—ranged northwards into Europe by the land-connexions still persisting in the Old and New Stone Ages at various points across the Mediterranean. In those days the Saharan wastes were not a marine bed since upraised, as is popularly supposed, but, on the contrary, a plateau which was higher than at present, enjoyed a genial climate, was traversed by great rivers (now reduced to dry wadys), and clothed with a rich subtropical vegetation; in a word, a region in every way suited for the evolution of the highest (Caucasic) division of the human family. In North Africa this evolution has from prehistoric times been represented by the ancestry of the present Hamitic populations, who are still

found in possession of all the inhabitable parts, either exclusively or in association with their Semitic kindred who have returned at different times to the common cradle-land.

The Hamites, who are called *Libyans* (Africans) by Herodotus, and recognized by him as the one autochthonous people in the north (iv. 197), have throughout all recorded time formed not merely the substratum but the great majority of the inhabitants between the Atlantic and the Red Sea, and from the Mediterranean to the Sudan. They are the *Tamahu* of the Egyptian temple-inscriptions (n.c. 1500-1300), and the *Mazyes* of Herodotus (iv. 191, 193), this term and its later forms as given by Ptolemy, *Masices*, *Mazices*, being identical with *Amzigh* (plur. *Imazighen*), 'free' or 'noble,' which is still the collective name of all the Mauritanian Hamites. There are three well-defined divisions, which, with their chief sub-groups, may here be tabulated:

#### I. EASTERN HAMITES:

*Ancient Egyptians and Copts*; Nile valley from the Delta to Khabla.  
*Bejas* (Ababdeh, Bishkri, Hadendawa, Homran, Beni-Amer); from Upper Egypt to Abyssinia, between the Nile and the Red Sea.

*Ajars* (Dankali, pl. Danakil); the steppe between Abyssinia and the Red Sea.

*Agas, Khamanis, Falashas* (?), *Funji*; Abyssinia, Senaar, Galla (Him'orra), Somali; Galla and Somali lands.

*Turkanas, Masai, Wa-huma*; Lake Rudolf, Mau plateau, Uganda.

#### II. WESTERN HAMITES:

*Imazighen* (Atlas or Mauritanian Berbers), *Kabyles*, *Rife*, *Shluhs*, *Shawias*, *Zenagas*, *Mzabs*, *Khumirs*, *Haratins*, *Wajila*; Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli, Siwa oasis.

*Tuaregs* (Saharan Berbers); *Askar* (Azjar) group, *Ahoggar* (Hoggar) group, *Kel-Owi* group, *Kel-Geres* group, *Avelimiden* group, *Trarzas* and *Braknas*; Western Sahara.

#### III. CENTRAL HAMITES:

*Tibus* (Tedas, Dazas, Baales, Zoghawas); Tibesti uplands, Ennedi, Wanyanga, Borku, Kanem.

During the historic period the Semites have been represented in North Africa by the Phœnicians from Syria, the Jews from Palestine, the Himyaritic Arabs from Yemen, and the Muslim Arabs from Central and North Arabia. The *Phœnicians*, founders of Carthage, Leptis, Utica, and numerous other settlements on the north coast, have long been extinct. The *Jews*, who began to arrive some time after the Babylonian captivity, are still found in small communities along the seaboard, from Egypt to Morocco. In Tripolitana some have become troglodytes, dwelling in the limestone caves of the Ghurian uplands, south of Tripoli. These subterranean habitations appear 'to have originated principally with the Jews, who from time immemorial had become intimately connected with the Berbers, many of the Berber tribes having adopted the Jewish creed' (Barth, *Travels*, i. p. 48). The Jews also penetrated at an unknown date into the heart of Abyssinia, where they are supposed to be still represented by the Judaizing *Falashas* of the Simen district, who claim to be of the 'House of Israel,' and are often called the 'Jews of Abyssinia.' But these *Falashas*—that is, 'Emigrants'—can no longer be called Jews, since they are now completely assimilated in speech and appearance to the surrounding Agao Hamites. They have no knowledge of Hebrew, and even their Bible is the Gêez (Himyaritic) version common to all the Abyssinian Christians.

This term *Gêez*, properly *Ag'azi*, has reference to Aksum, capital of the Aksumite empire, founded probably about the beginning of the Christian era by the *Himyaritic Semites*, who had already crossed over from South Arabia, and have since then been politically dominant in Abyssinia. Aksum soon became a great centre of Himyaritic culture, which was further developed under Hellenic influences about 450, when Christianity was introduced by

the apostle Frumentius from Alexandria. Then the Bible was translated into Gêez (*v. supra*), which was at that time the current, as it is still the liturgical, language of the country; and this tongue has preserved some early Christian documents, the Greek or Syriac originals of which have been lost.

Having received its teachings from Alexandria, the Abyssinian Church is a branch of the Coptic, and consequently professes the Monophysite doctrine of Eutyches accepted by the Alexandrian patriarchs in the 6th cent. The *Abuna*, or spiritual head of the Abyssinian Christians, is always consecrated by the patriarch of Alexandria, and for the last 700 years has even been of Coptic nationality. But his possibly dangerous political influence is neutralized by the *Elshege*, a kind of national high priest at the head of the regular clergy, and of the *debtura*, or men of letters. These literati, although laymen, enjoy special ecclesiastical privileges, and thus serve to check the action both of the *Abuna* and of the religious orders, which are very numerous, and own a large part of the land. Like the mosques in Muhammadan lands, the churches and monasteries are the schools of the country, and over these the *debtura* have complete control. But education is in a rudimentary state, and the only art still cultivated is painting, which was introduced in Byzantine times, and is employed exclusively for the decoration of the churches. A traditional canon of the art requires all orthodox Christians, saints, and good people to be represented in full face; all others in profile. Among the latter are included all their enemies, the Jews, the devils, and especially the Falashas, who are popularly believed to be magicians, capable, like the European wer-wolves, of assuming the guise of dangerous animals, such as lions, panthers, or hyænas. These and many other old pagan notions are still rife beneath the thin lacquer of Abyssinian Christianity.

After the 6th cent. the Aksumite empire disappeared from history, and was successively followed by those of *Tigrê* in the north, *Amhara* in the centre, and *Shoa* in the south. Menilek, present king of Shoa, rules the whole land in absolute sovereignty, and all his Himyaritic subjects are being slowly merged in a single Abyssinian nationality, differing little in their physical and mental characters, and speaking two distinct modern forms of the old Gêez language—*Tigrîna* in the north and *Amharic* in the south, the parting line being the Takkazê river. But all these historical Himyarites of the plateau are to be distinguished from the *Zabalat Himyarites*, who probably preceded them in this region, and have been settled from time immemorial in the district between the Blue Nile and its Dender affluent east of Senaar. These Zabalats never came under Hellenic or later Muslim influences like their Funji neighbours, and hence are neither Christians nor Muhammadans, but appear still to practise the same Semitic rites as their Minæan and Sabæan forefathers. They are called 'fire-worshippers,' but do not worship the fire itself, which they regard only as a great purifier and as an emblem of a Supreme Being, who reveals himself in this element as well as in the heavenly bodies. Hence they turn in prayer to the stars or towards the rising and the setting sun, and kindle great fires over the graves of the dead. But there is also a supreme demon, whose wrath has to be averted by offerings and sacrifices. The two principles of good and evil would thus appear to be recognized, as in so many other religions which can have had no direct contact with the old Zoroastrian system. The Zabalats differ from the Muslim Arabs in

many other respects, being strict monogamists, keeping no slaves, and recognizing no hereditary sheikhs.

Even before the great Muslim irruptions of the 7th and later centuries, the northern *Arabs*, mostly, no doubt, Bedawin from the Nejd plateau, had ranged into North Africa, and mention is made of the *Ruadites*, who had already penetrated westwards to Mauritania before the rise of Islâm. But the great movements which have made the Arab race, language, and religion dominant throughout North Africa, began with the conquest of Egypt in the 7th century. Later came the peaceful but ethnically more important immigration of North Arabian tribes, instigated by Ahmed ibn-Âli, who died in 1045. Then took place that tremendous dislocation of the indigenous populations during which a large section of the Berbers withdrew from the plains to the Mauritanian uplands, while others retired to the Saharan oases. Here they were followed later by the Arabs themselves; so that at present the pure Arab and mixed Arabo-Berber tribes form the great majority of the inhabitants of Tripoli, Mauritania, and the Sahara; while the Arab language and the Muslim religion prevail almost exclusively amongst the native populations in all the large towns along the Mediterranean seaboard, from Marakesh and Fez to Cairo and Alexandria. The old Hamitic languages, however, still persist amongst the Muhammadans of the Sahara (Tuaregs, Tibus), the tribes of the Siwa and Aujila oases (Cyrenaica), and many of the Berber groups in the Atlas uplands.

Islâm, long the exclusive religion of Arabs, Berbers, and Tibus, presents few special features, except where it assumes a political aspect, as among the *Senûsiya* brotherhood, or else becomes affected by the primitive beliefs and superstitions of the aborigines, as in Tibesti and Senaar. There are numerous small groups which enjoy great repute either as *shurfa* (pl. of *sharif*, 'noble,' 'high-born,' a title assumed by those claiming descent from the Prophet), or *marabouts* (saints, recluses, charlatans, claiming supernatural powers like shamans or medicine-men), or *Khucân*, the literati, who now constitute the *Senûsiya* confraternity, a politico-religious body which has acquired immense influence throughout the Muhammadan world. It is so named from the Algerian sheikh Senûsi, who set up as a zealous preacher or reformer, first in Mecca, then at Bengazi in 1843, and in 1855 removed to the Faredgha oasis, where he died 'in the odour of sanctity.' Since then the brotherhood has continued to flourish under his successors, the Mahdi ('guided'), who are destined to restore the power of Islâm to its former splendour. Numerous *zawiya*s (convents), each a little centre of religious fervour, industry, and even culture, have sprung up in Tripoli and the Saharan oases, and the Faredgha 'mother-house'—convent, mosque, school, hospital, and stronghold combined—has thus become the headquarters of a powerful organization, which numbers millions of devoted adherents, and makes its influence felt from Mauritania to Mesopotamia. The society continues to expand throughout North Africa; and although it looked askance at the late Nubian Mahdi and his Khalifian successor at Omdurman, that was only through jealousy, and because its time had not yet come.

Of the strange interminglings of Muhammadanism with primitive religions, some instances are given in art. ABORIGINES. The same tendencies may be observed amongst the Saharan *Tibus*, who represent the ancient Garamantes, and were nearly all pagans till they became at least nominal Musalmâns in the 18th century. Some still practise heathen rites openly, and amongst the Baelés of the

Ennedi district Allah has not yet been dethroned by Yido, the native name of the Supreme Being. In the same district a kind of *mana* or supernatural virtue is ascribed to the *küntok*, a species of mottled stone of somewhat rare occurrence in the country. During the prayers addressed to Yido this stone is sprinkled with flour and with the blood of a sacrificed sheep, and it then secures for its fortunate owner the success of all his projects and confusion to all his enemies (Nachtigal, *Sahāra u. Sudan*, ii. p. 176). Polygamy is not controlled by the Qur'anic law, the number of wives being merely a question of ways and means, while the son is obliged to marry all his father's wives except his own mother. Matriarchal custom persists, as is shown by the fact that the wife continues to reside in her parents' home till the birth of the first child, and permanently if there is no issue; in which case the husband receives back the camels paid to his father-in-law for his bride.

Although passing for good Muhammadans, the *Tedas* (Northern Tibus) do not abstain from *lakbi* (palm wine), and now and then sacrifice a goat for rain or other favours. All wear amulets attached to various parts of the body, and think that ailments may be cured by drinking the water used for washing out Qur'anic texts written on the inside of a cup. Similar texts contained in little leather bags make their spears and other weapons more deadly, and also protect horses and camels from the evil eye. Their half-Arabized Fezzanese cousins put great faith in the marabouts, who are more numerous and influential in Fezzan than elsewhere. They are much employed as sorcerers in thwarting the machinations of the great demon Iblis or Shaitān and the innumerable other wicked jinns, common enemies of mankind, against whom Allah appears to be powerless. In the Timbuktu district the marabouts are, or were formerly, replaced by the *santons*, a sort of African shamans, who employed music to work themselves into a state of ecstasy, in which they pretended to hold communion with the souls of departed Muslim saints. From these they received instructions as to the proper animals—a white or red cock, a hen, a gazelle, a goat, or an ostrich—to be sacrificed for the recovery of the sick. In such cases incense was burned, and the cooked meat was served to the patient and those present, the blood, the bones, and feathers being buried as a sacrificial offering to the dead saint.

Amongst the Muslim *Tuaregs* the belief is universal that below the surface the Sahara is everywhere peopled by a class of supernatural beings called *Ahl at-Trab*, who delight in playing mischievous pranks on wayfarers in the desert. They seize and pull down the camels' feet, causing them to sink in the soft sands; they gnaw off the roots of the desert plants, thus killing the scanty vegetation; on the approach of the thirsty traveller, they drink up the water of springs and wells; they even come to the surface and assume bodily forms to deceive and torment the living. All unexplained natural phenomena, such as the pillars of sand raised by the whirlwind, are referred to invisible agencies, and the mysterious droning heard on a still night in many parts of the wilderness is the voice of the jinns conversing among themselves (Harding King, *A Search for the Masked Tawareks*, pp. 39, 42).

Although little influenced by the teachings of Islam, the moral character of the Tuaregs and Mauritanian Berbers is greatly superior to that of their Arab neighbours. Apart from the blood-feuds, vendettas, and predatory expeditions permitted by tribal usage, 'the vices so common amongst the Moors are unknown in the homes of the Berbers. They seem to possess none of that uncontrollable passion that is so large a feature in the Arab character, and its place is taken by affection and sin-

cerity. No doubt, to a great extent the moral character of the Berbers is due to the fact that their women are allowed entire liberty, do not veil their faces, and mix on almost all occasions with the men' (W. B. Harris, *Taflet*, p. 160). The Arab, still a nomad herdsman, who holds that the ploughshare and shame enter hand in hand into the family, remains a fanatic ever to be feared, because he blindly obeys the will of Allah proclaimed by his prophets, marabouts, and mahdis. He is ruled by a despotic and theocratic sheikh, in accordance with the precepts of the Qur'an; whereas the agricultural Berber, with his *jam'a* (public assembly) and unwritten code, feels himself a freeman, is a born sceptic, cares little for theological dogmas, and is far less of a fatalist than his Semitic neighbour. Although many of the Mauritanian tribes have adopted the Arabic language, the process of assimilation appears to be arrested, and the Berber is now everywhere gaining on the Arab. 'He is the race of the future, as of the past' (Dr. Malbot).

In a remarkable ethnological generalization, Herodotus tells us (iv. 197) that the Africa known to him was occupied by four distinct peoples,—two indigenous, the Libyans (our Hamites) and the Ethiopians (our Negroes); and two intruders, the Phoenicians and the Hellenes. Since then other intruders (*ἐπιλύοις*), such as the Romans, Vandals, Bulgarians, and Cherkesses, have come and gone, while other later arrivals—Arabs, Jews, Turks, Italians, Iberians, French, Britons, Dutch, Belgians, Germans—have settled round the seaboard, and, by occupying their respective 'Hinterlands,' have made nearly the whole continent a political dependency of Europe. But these movements have scarcely affected the ethnical relations, and the statement of Herodotus regarding two indigenous races (*αὐτόχθονες*)—Libyans in the north and Ethiopians in the south—still holds good. Thus the Libyan (Hamitic) domain, as above described, is everywhere continuous with the Ethiopic (Negro), which comprises the section of the mainland south of the parting line indicated at the beginning of this article, together with the adjacent island of Madagascar. Amid the great mass of black humanity there are extensive and long-standing interminglings,—Arabo-Berbers and Fulahs in the north, Malaysians in Madagascar,—and also some aberrant elements, such as the Negroites in the forest zone of the Congo, the Bushman-Hottentots in the southern steppe lands, and the utterly degraded Vaalpens of the Limpopo basin. But, taken as a whole, these Negro and Negroid populations present sufficient uniformity in their physical, and still more in their mental, characters to be grouped together as one main division of mankind. More, perhaps, on linguistic than on ethnical grounds, they are usually divided into two great sections: *Sudanese Negroes*, of diverse speech, north of the equator; and *Bantu Negroes*, of one speech, thence southwards.

Sudan—that is, the region which stretches south of the Sahara between the Atlantic Ocean and Abyssinia—is commonly regarded as the original home of the Negro stock; hence its Arabic name, *Biḥād as-Sūdān*, 'Land of the Blacks,' the Nigritia or Negroland of our early writers. Although it has been largely encroached upon by Hamites and Semites from the north and east, here are still found many of the most typical Negro populations, such as the Serers, Felups, Timni, and Krumen of the West Coast; the Tshi, Ewe, and Yorubas of the Gold and Slave Coasts; the Bauchi, Mosogus, Michi, and Yedinas of Central Sudan; the Igarras, Ibos, and Benins of Southern Nigeria; the Mabas, Nubas, Denkas, Golos, Shilluks, Bari, Bongos, and Nuers of East Sudan and the White Nile; and the Zandelos (Niam-niam), Mangbattus, Monfus, A-Barambos, and A-Babuas of the Welle basin. These are all



uncivilized pagans, who speak a great number of radically distinct Negro languages, and exhibit Negro physical traits, often to an exaggerated degree. These traits, which prevail with marked uniformity over wide areas, were already specialized in remote times, as we see from the portraits depicted on the early Egyptian monuments, and as we find them graphically summed up in the description of a negress attributed to Vergil (*Moretum*, 32-35):

'Afra genus, tota patriam testante figura,  
Torta comam labroque tumens et fusca colore,  
Pectore lata, lacens mammis, compressor alvo,  
Cruribus exilis, spatiosa prodiga planta.'

Standing out in marked contrast to all these primitive peoples are the relatively civilized Hamito-Negro or Semito-Negro nations, such as the Mandingos, Songhais, and Fulahs in the west; the Hausas, Kanuri, Baghirimi, and Mabas of Wadai in the centre; and the Furs and Nubians in the east, who are all Muhammadans, and of diversely modified Negroid type, but still speak independent languages of Negro stock. From these striking contrasts between the pure Negro and the mixed Negroid peoples the inference has been drawn that the Negro left to himself remains a Negro in every sense of the term, and without miscegenation is incapable of making any advance beyond a low social and intellectual level. For this arrest of progress seen everywhere in Africa and the New World (West Indies, Southern United States), a physiological explanation has been sought in the early closing of the cranial sutures, preventing any further expansion of the brain after puberty. 'À cet arrêt intellectuel doit correspondre la soudure de la boîte cervicale; le développement du crâne s'arrête et empêche le cerveau de se dilater davantage' (Binger, *Du Niger au Golfe de Guinée*, ii. p. 246). Hence it is that the Negroes often display in early life a degree of intelligence even superior to that of European children. 'They acquire knowledge with facility till they arrive at the age of puberty, when the physical nature masters the intellect, and frequently completely deadens it. This peculiarity has been attributed by some physiologists to the early closing of the sutures of the cranium, and it is worthy of note that throughout West Africa it is by no means rare to find skulls without any apparent transverse or longitudinal sutures' (Ellis, *The Ewe-Speaking Peoples*, p. 9).

The chief subdivisions of both the Sudanese and the Bantu sections will be found in art. ETHNOLOGY (Conspectus). Between the two sections the most conspicuous difference is the linguistic confusion which prevails in Sudan and the linguistic unity which is the dominant feature in Bantuland. Except in the south-western Bushman-Hottentot territory, in Madagascar, where a Malayo-Polynesian tongue is exclusively spoken, and perhaps amongst the Negritoes of the forest zone, all the current idioms are closely related members of a common stock language. And as the tribes themselves are not so closely related, but, on the contrary, often present considerable physical differences, it follows that Bantu is far more intelligible as a linguistic than as an ethnical expression. In fact, a Bantu is, strictly speaking, nothing more than a full-blood or more often a half-blood Negro of Bantu speech. In general, all are mestizos, showing every shade of transition between the Negro and the Caucasian (Hamitic and Semitic) elements. The Negro has apparently everywhere formed the substratum, which has, so to say, been leavened in diverse proportions by very old and later Caucasian infiltrations from the north. These interminglings have resulted in endless modifications of the physical characters, but have left the original Bantu form

of speech untouched, as is always the case where two or more races are merged in one. The ethnical groups form new combinations by miscegenation, while the languages, being incapable of miscegenation, all perish except one. Hence it is that in the Bantu domain we have many physical blends with only one unblended form of speech. 'There are many mixed races; indeed, all races are mixed; but there are no mixed languages, but only mixed vocabularies' (A. H. Keane, *Ethnology*, 1896, p. 199; also M. L. Lapique: 'Les langues se tuent; les peuples se mêlent,' MS note). For details see art. BANTU AND S. AFRICA.

From the religious and ethical standpoints there is not much to choose between the pagan Sudanese and the Bantu peoples. Everywhere amongst both sections are met the same crude animistic notions, gross superstitions, cruel practices associated with ancestor-worship, ordeals, omens, witchcraft, fetishism, human sacrifices, and other observances which are specially characteristic of all primitive African cults. Everywhere also is noticed the clear line of demarcation which is drawn by all the natives between their religious practices and their rules of conduct. Here is plainly seen how religion and morals belonged originally to two different orders of thought, and how the one is made subservient to the other, as when the invisible powers are asked to aid and co-operate in deeds of violence, murder, vendetta, rape, theft, plunder, and other acts regarded as immoralities in higher social systems. Thus on the Gold Coast 'religion is not in any way allied with moral ideas, whose source is indeed essentially distinct, although the two become associated when man attains a higher degree of civilization. Murder, theft, and all offences against the person or against property are matters in which the gods have no immediate concern, and in which they take no interest, except in the case when, bribed by a valuable offering, they take up the quarrel in the interests of some faithful worshipper. The most atrocious crimes, committed as between man and man, the gods can view with equanimity. These are man's concerns, and must be rectified or punished by man' (Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples*, p. 11). In fact, all these gods are themselves originally malignant superhuman beings, born of fear, and authors of all evil, as is even indicated by some of their names, such as that of the Ashanti god *Bolsum*, said to mean 'Producer of Calamities.' Hence sickness, death, and all other miseries are attributed to them, either directly, or indirectly through witchcraft, since 'it is from them that wizards and witches obtain assistance and mysterious knowledge' (*ib.* p. 13). From such venal deities no correct views of right and wrong could ever have been acquired, and it must be obvious that 'moral ideas flow from an essentially different source than religion,' that both 'cannot have sprung from a common root' (Th. Waitz, *Introd. to Anthropology*, Eng. ed. i. 279).

Ancestor-worship appears to be the most outstanding feature of all African primitive religious systems. That the spirits of the dead are the gods of the living is a formula that applies equally to the Sudanese natives of Upper Guinea, and to the Bantu populations of Uganda, the eastern coastlands, and Damaraland. Amongst the Gold and Slave Coast peoples there are many local and general personifications of the powers of nature; but these were held in slight esteem compared with the ancestral gods to whom hecatombs of human victims were immolated at the periodical 'Customs' during the flourishing days of the kingdoms of Ashanti, Dahomi, and Benin. It was the same in Uganda, where the former kings of the national dynasty were revered as demi-gods. Their souls were supposed to dwell in and inspire the witch-



doctors; shrines were raised over their graves, the maintenance of which was a religious duty, and here were offered the human sacrifices, as many as two thousand by the late King Mtesa. The demon Ndanla, whose abode is on the Gambaragara heights, whence he plagues the people with small-pox and other evils, is also a departed spirit, identified with one of the early members of the Uganda dynasty. The trees planted round the ancestral graves were sedulously tended by wise women, whose oracles, like those of the Pythian priestess, were taken as decisive in certain political crises. The course of events was thus still controlled by the deceased rulers of the land, while the very trees overshadowing their tombs gradually acquired that sacred character which led eventually to general tree-worship.

Along the eastern seaboard the dominant spirit was Munkulunkulu, who ruled, under endless variants, from the Tanā river round the Cape to the Cunene. He is often spoken of as the 'Supreme Being'; but such a concept was not grasped by the African aborigines, and the fundamental idea is revealed in the root *inkulu* = 'old', 'great' (cf. Lat. *alt-us*, cognate with Teutonic *alt*, 'old'); so that the word really connotes a deification of the great departed, and is thus a direct outcome of the universal ancestor-worship. This is also fully in accordance with the view of Bleek, who holds that the term originally meant 'great ancestor.' Thus, as in Celebes, where *empung* (= 'grandfather') is the generic name of the gods, *Unkulunkulu* becomes the Divine progenitor of the Zulu-Xosa Bantus; while of *Mulungu*, the form current in Nyasaland, the Rev. Duff Macdonald writes: 'In all our translations of Scripture where we found the word "God" we used *Mulungu*; but this word is chiefly used by the natives as a general name for spirit. The spirit of a deceased man is called *Mulungu*, and all the prayers and offerings of the living are presented to such spirits of the dead. It is here that we find the great centre of the native religion. The spirits of the dead are the gods of the living' (*Africana*, i. p. 59). And again: 'Their god is not the body in the grave, but the spirit [*Mulungu*], and they seek the spirit at the place where their departed kinsman last lived among them. It is the great tree at the verandah (*kwi-penu*) of the dead man's house that is their temple; and if no tree grow here they erect a little shrine, and there perform their simple rites' (*ib.* p. 60). Here we have the very incipient stage itself of ancestor-worship again closely interwoven with the tree element. Then comes a further development, in which the departed spirit reveals himself first in dreams, and later through the *juakuncweta*, the priestess or prophetess, as in Uganda and Hellas. 'The god comes to her with his commands at night. She delivers the message in a kind of ecstasy. She speaks (as her name implies) with the utterance of a person raving with excitement. During the night of the communication her ravings are heard sounding all over the village in a high key' (*ib.* p. 61). We seem to be reading an extract from Pausanias on the Delphic Oracle. And the broad statement is made that 'the spirit of every deceased man and woman, with the solitary exception of wizards and witches [who become hyænas], becomes an object of religious homage. The gods of the natives, then, are nearly as numerous as their dead' (p. 68).

In some parts of Nyasaland, as in Uganda and elsewhere, ancestor-worship eventually became associated with human sacrifice. 'If the deceased owned several slaves, an enormous hole is dug for a grave. The slaves that were caught immediately on his death are now brought forward. They may be either cast into the pit alive [being made fast to slave-sticks], or the undertakers may cut all their

throats. The body of their master or their mistress is then laid down to rest above theirs, and the grave is covered in' (*ib.* p. 107). We know from Commander Cameron and most other early travellers that similar and even worse atrocities were of constant occurrence all over the Bantu lands, before their suppression by the European Powers in 1884. It is thus again seen that in these respects the Bantus stand on the same low social level as the Sudanese negroes.

On the West Coast nature-worship was, as a rule, perhaps more prevalent than on the east side. Here Munkulunkulu was generally replaced by *Nzambi*, who also has many variants, and is similarly described by some observers as a 'Supreme Being.' But this is denied by the Rev. W. H. Bentley, our best authority on the subject, who rejects the far-fetched explanations of Kolbe and others, adding that 'the knowledge of God is most vague, scarcely more than nominal. There is no worship paid to God' [in Kongoland] (*Dict. and Gram. of the Kongo Language*, p. 96). Farther south, *Mulungu* reappears, under the form *Mukuru*, amongst the Bantu Hereros of Damaraland, and it is noteworthy that here also ancestor-worship prevails almost exclusively. 'The best missionaries who have worked among the Hereros could find nothing going beyond the simplest ancestor-worship. Their chief deity, *Mukuru*, that is, the "Ancient," is a spirit whose dwelling is placed in the Far North. His grave is regarded as a sacred spot in many places. Every tribe has its own *Mukuru* [exactly as in Nyasaland], to whom all superstitious usages and customs are referred. Above all, he sends rain and sunshine. *Mukuru's* "grave" certainly points to the weight assigned to ancestor-worship among these people, and many other facts confirm this' (Ratzel, *Hist. of Mankind*, ii. 358). Here also the worship is connected with trees, since 'the Hereros in their sacrifices use sacred sticks from trees or bushes consecrated to the ancestors. Many keep these sticks, which are perhaps the last relics of ancestor-worship, in bundles, hung with amulets, upon the branches of the bush *makera*, which stands at the place of sacrifice, and represents the altar' (*ib.* p. 361). Farther on, the highly-developed tree-cult of the Hereros is shown to be 'a direct offshoot of ancestor-worship, for it ultimately leads to the tale that a sacred tree gave their origin to the Ovaherero, the Bushmen, oxen, and zebras' (*ib.* p. 481). One particular species is specially revered, and, when seen from afar, is hailed with the words, 'Holy art thou, our ancestor.' The evolution is thus obvious. A given tree is first respected for the sake of the man who was attached to it when alive, or else buried beneath its shade in death. Then the tribe during its wanderings meets the same tree elsewhere, and by association of ideas transfers to it the reverence or worship formerly paid to the now perhaps forgotten ancestor. But a tree is always something visible and tangible. Hence, under changed conditions, tree-cult may well outlive the ancestor-worship in which it originated. Here it may be noted that the selection of the bush *makera* for special homage was probably due to a popular etymology confusing this term with *Mukuru*, the Herero form of *Mulungu*, the 'Ancient.'

Other more or less characteristic features of the African religious systems and superstitions—fetichism, human sacrifices, omens, ordeals, talismans, cannibalism, ver-animals, witchcraft—are dealt with in separate articles.

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**ĀGAMA.**—In the oldest Buddhist writings this is the standing word for 'tradition' (*Vinaya*, ii. 249; *Aṅguttara*, ii. 147). This usage is maintained in the *Milinda* (215, 414) and in the *Mahāvastu* (ii. 21). But from the 5th cent. A.D. onwards the word means usually a division of the Sutta Pitaka—the same portion as was, in the older phraseology (*Vinaya*, ii. 287), called a *nikāya*. The reason for this change was that the latter word (*nikāya*) had come to be used also in the sense of a division of disciples, a school or sect, and had therefore become ambiguous. In Buddhist Sanskrit books this later use of *āgama* seems to have supplanted entirely the use of *nikāya*; but our edited texts are not sufficient in extent to enable us, as yet, to state this with certainty.

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**AGAOS.**—1. The Agnos or Agows, a name applied to various groups of Hamites who do not possess any collective name, form part of the primitive Hamitic population of Abyssinia. Formerly they occupied a large extent of the plateau, but were gradually driven, in prehistoric times, towards the south and west by incoming peoples—the Himyaritic Semites speaking the Gēez tongue. The latter are now divided into the Tigre and Amhara branches, but the Amhara, who crossed the Takkazē, are much mixed with the Hamitic element, while their Gēez speech has been greatly modified by the primitive language, if indeed it is not that primitive speech itself modified by the Semitic language of the conquerors. At present the Agnos, whose name means 'the free', are composed of several groups scattered throughout the region between the Takkazē and the Abai, mainly in subjection to the rule of the Negus Negust, but retaining their own customs and speech. They are found chiefly in the province of Lasta, on the upper Takkazē (where they were completely reduced only in the 17th cent. by the Emperor of Abyssinia), and in the districts to the south-west of Lake Tānā or Tzana (where they give their name to one province, Agaomidir or Agao-land, which is almost entirely peopled by them). They are characterized by broad faces and high cheek-bones, yellow complexion, and strong, coarse, straight hair, and are of the Caucasian type, like their Semitic conquerors, from whom they do not differ much in appearance. The name Agnos is probably to be found in the *Āthagaō* of the inscription at Adulis, dating from the beginning of the 2nd cent. A.D., discovered and preserved by Cosmas. This may be the district of Addago on the Takkazē, with a population of Agao blood. Cosmas (A.D. 523) refers to the 'Āgāō, and says they acknowledged the authority of the kings of Aksum. About 400 years later, the Agnos of Semen, under their queen, Judith, were strong enough to expel the Menilek dynasty from the throne of Aksum (JA, 1863). The Agao speech is said by Beke to be the language of the people of Abyssinia, as Amharic is that of the court, the army, and commerce. It is spoken from the Sanhail district in the N.E. to Gojam and Shoa in the south, under different names and in a variety of dialects, and in some provinces is almost exclusively in use. By the people themselves in Lasta it is known as *Khamtinja*; this group also call themselves *Hamra*, now found in the name Amhara borne by the district between the Takkazē and the Abai, and suggesting that the present Himyaritic Amhara

people may have borrowed their name from that of some of the Hamitic aborigines. D'Abbadie calls the Lasta Hamites *Khamta*—a word connected with *Khamtinja* (*Athenæum*, 1845, 359); while Beke (*JRGS* xiv. 56) calls their language *Hamera*. *Khamta*, still borne by the Khamants of Lake Tānā, and *Hamera* were probably names of earlier dominant Agao tribes.

2. The principal divisions of the peoples who may be classed as Agnos are the Agnos of Lasta (Bruce's 'Teheratz Agnos'), including the Khamants; those of Agaomidir and the surrounding districts enclosed in the sweep of the Abai as it issues from Lake Tānā; and the Falashas. Both the first groups are divided into seven tribes, probably from some sacredness in this number. The second group call themselves Aghaghā, according to Beke (*JRGS* xiv. 10). The Falashas, whose language closely resembles the Agao, are found scattered through the province of Semen and neighbouring districts, as well as in Agaomidir. They claim to be descended from Jews who came from Judæa with the Queen of Sheba, and follow the rites of Judaism. Hence they are frequently called the Jews of Abyssinia. But they are certainly not Jews by descent, nor are their features Semitic, since in physiognomy they closely resemble the Agnos. Possibly their Jewish faith is the survival of some earlier diffusion of Judaism through Abyssinia before the introduction of Christianity, as there is no record of their conversion. They are divided into three sects, each with its high priest; they hold themselves aloof from the other peoples of the land, do not practise polygamy, and never marry out of their own tribe. Entering a Christian house is strictly forbidden; when this has been done, ritual purification is necessary. Their places of worship or *masjids* are distinguished by a red earthenware pot placed on a pinnacle. They are divided into three compartments, each of different sanctity, as in the Jewish tabernacle, and admission to each is strictly regulated by the Levitical law. Behind is a small enclosure with a stone on which sacrificial victims are slaughtered. Though they have incorporated with their customs several ceremonies drawn from Christian sources, they carefully observe the Law, especially in the ritual of purification and of feasts and keeping the Sabbath. Some of their sacrifices, however, differ from those of the Jewish law. They observe great ritual scrupulosity. The dying and the unclean are taken to a hut set apart for this purpose. They fast twice a week, as well as for forty days before Easter. Their ideas about the Messiah are vague, but they believe that Jerusalem will again be rebuilt. The priests must observe several tabus from which the people are free; some of them are great ascetics, passing years in dismal swamps, and sometimes in a frenzy throwing themselves into the waters. As a people the Falashas are inoffensive. They are devoted to agriculture, are metal-workers, and furnish skilful artisans in various towns of the province (see D'Abbadie in *Nouvelles Annales des Voyages*, iii. 84 ff.; Stern, *Wanderings among the Falashas*, 1862; Beke, *JRGS* xiv. 8).

3. The other branches of the Agnos were pagans, or possibly pagans with a veneer of Judaism, as the name of their queen, Judith, would suggest, until the advent of the Portuguese missionaries in the 16th and 17th centuries. By them they were in part converted to Christianity of a nominal type, and the process was probably completed by their final subjugation to the Abyssinian emperors. Like the rest of the Abyssinians, they are of the Monophysite sect, and assert their orthodoxy as strongly as any; but it is probable that, beneath their nominal adhesion to the faith, there are many

survivals of their earlier paganism with its cult of sun and moon, trees, rivers, and animals, of which the cow was the chief. No complete account of that primitive paganism is now available, but it was evidently nature-worship of no high order, and in its observances the fertility of the land was aimed at. Hence the worship of rivers, and especially of the Takkazē and Abai, was prominent. Survivals of these rites are described by Lobo and Bruce. The springs from which the Nile rises were the scene of an annual gathering of the tribes for this cult. A small mound formed the altar upon which the sacrifices were placed. To this place once a year, on the appearance of the star Sirius, the *shum* or priest called the heads of the Agao clans. A black heifer which had never borne a calf was slain, its head cut off and plunged into one of the springs, and then wrapped up in the hide, which was sprinkled with the sacred water. The carcass was laid on the mound, washed with water, and divided into as many pieces as there were heads of clans. Each head received a piece, and the flesh was eaten raw, with draughts of the Nile water. Lobo says that each then sacrificed one or more cows. The bones were collected into a heap, and the priest, having anointed himself with the fat, sat down on the heap, which was then set on fire. As the flames increased, he harangued them, the fire doing him no injury. When all was consumed, each person present made him an offering. The head of the animal was carried to a cave, where other ceremonies were performed, apparently for the purpose of ensuring rain and good seasons. The spirit of the river was called by the highest Divine names—Eye of the World, the Everlasting God, etc., and the priest told Bruce that it had appeared to him in bodily shape like a venerable man (Lobo, *Voyage to Abyssinia*, Eng. tr. 1735, 99; Bruce, *Travels*, iii. 730). This cult is obviously based upon the importance of the river to the whole region through which it passes, and is not unlike the rites performed by the ancient Egyptians at the rising of the Nile and the appearance of Sirius, the star of Isis (Frazer, *Adonis*, *Attis*, *Osiris*, 228). Similar rites were practised by other tribes (*La grande Encyc.* i. 177), and human sacrifices to river-divinities are also spoken of; these also occurred in Egypt (Johnston, *Travels in S. Abyssinia*, 119). A modified form of these rites still prevailed in Beke's time (1804), and sick persons are still brought to the sources of the Abai, and left there for seven days in hope of their recovery (Beke, *JRGS* xiv. 13). Serpent-worship was prevalent in Abyssinia in earlier times, and a great serpent called *Arwā* figures in the early history of the people. Some remains of this cult are found among the Agaos. The preservation of serpents was prayed for; they were believed to give oracles, and in some cases they were kept in the houses of the people and fed. If the animal did not eat, ill-luck was at hand (Bruce, iii. 732-4). Miraculous stories of serpents are found in the legendary lives of Abyssinian saints (Parkyns, *Life in Abyssinia*, 298). Other relics of earlier animal-worship may be seen in the claim of the Agaos of Lasta to understand the language of birds, by the interpretation of which they regulate their affairs (Plowden, *Travels in Abyssinia*, 124). The Falashas, on account of their skill in metal working, and some of the Agaos, are regarded as sorcerers and *bandas* or wer-wolves. They are believed to take possession of their victims, who exhibit curious symptoms of hysteria, and try to get into the forest, where their persecutor, in hyæna shape, devours them (see *LYCANTHROPY*).

4. The Khamants, scattered through Amhara and Shoa, claim descent from Moses, but are regarded as pagans by both the Falashas and the

Abyssinians. They are said to believe in God and in a future state, but are called worshippers of forests from the rites performed by them under trees. Other 'secret acts of devotion' at certain rocks are also spoken of. A scheme of King Theodore's for their compulsory conversion was overruled by his advisers (Stern, 43; *La grande Encyc.* i. 177; Reclus, *Univ. Geog.* x. 147). It is uncertain whether the Waito, dwelling on the eastern shore of Lake Tānā, belong to the Agao race. They speak the Agao language, but are an extremely primitive people, supporting themselves by hunting and fishing, and eating animals regarded by the other tribes as unclean. By them, therefore, they are called 'idolaters,' a vague term, but they call themselves Christians (Keane, *Africa*, 494; St. Martin, *Géog. Univ.* i. 36).

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## AGAPE.—

- i. Summary of theories.
- ii. Evidence for Christian common meals and for their connexion with the Eucharist:
  1. New Testament.
  2. Ecclesiastical writings to the end of the 3rd cent.: *Didache*; Ignatius; Pliny; Justin Martyr; Celsus; Minucius Felix; Lucian; *Epistle to Diognetus*; *Acts of Paul and Thecla*; *Acts of Perpetua and Felicitas*; Irenæus; Clement of Alexandria; Tertullian; *Canons of Hippolytus*; *Acts of James and Maritanus*; Origen; Cyprian; *Acts of Pionius*; the older *Didascalia*.
  3. Writings of 4th cent. and later: 'Church Orders'; Councils of Laodicea, Carthage No. 3, Gangra; pseudo-Pionius; Chrysostom; pseudo-Jerome; Theodoret; Augustine; Socrates; Sozomen; Trullan Council.
  4. Funeral and commemorative Agape.
  5. Archaeological and epigraphic evidence.
- iii. Review of the evidence.
  - (a) General deductions.
  - (b) Relative order of Agape and Eucharist when united.
  - (c) The name 'Agape.'
  - (d) Materials for the Agape.
- iv. Origin of the Agape.
  - Literature.

i. SUMMARY OF THEORIES.—The Christian Agape or Love-Feast is one of those subjects which are apparently easy, but which are shown by careful study to be exceedingly difficult. At one time there was little doubt about its origin and history; but in the last few years it has attracted much attention, not only in Great Britain and in Germany, but also more especially in France; and views which were formerly held almost as a matter of course have been emphatically called in question, with the result that there is at present nothing like unanimity among scholars as to the origin and history of this curious custom of Christian antiquity. It may be well, by way of preface, to state briefly, and as far as possible in general terms, the views that have been put forward, classing together those which differ only in minor details. (a) The view which was almost universal, and which is still by far the most common, is that from the first the Christians celebrated the Eucharist and also a common meal to which some liturgical importance was attached, and which was called, from at least the latter part of the 1st cent., the 'Agape'; that the Eucharist and the Agape were at first united, but that, by reason either of abuses or of external persecution, they were disjoined at some time in the latter half of the 1st or the first quarter of the 2nd cent., though the time of the separation was not the same in all countries. (b) An entirely different view has lately (1902) been published by Mgr. Batiffol, who thinks that the Agape itself did not exist till the 3rd cent.,

beginning as a private charity supper, and becoming a more public organization in the 4th cent.; that though in the earliest ages the Christians sometimes had meals in common, these did not, except as an abuse, have any connexion with the Eucharist, and that the name 'Agape' in writings of the first two centuries was another designation of the Eucharist itself. (c) A view which has found much favour in Germany is that the Agape was the original institution, and that the Eucharist itself grew out of it, or that there was no real distinction between them (Spitta, Jülicher). (d) Ladeuze and Ermoni consider that both the Agape and the Eucharist are Apostolic, but that they were in reality perfectly distinct rites, though sometimes joined as in 1 Co 11. (e) Dean Armitage Robinson and a writer in the *Church Quarterly Review* (July 1902) hold a somewhat undefined but perhaps intermediate position, being dissatisfied with the first of the views enumerated above. Dr. Robinson (*Encyc. Bibl. s.v. 'Eucharist'*) suggests that every meal was probably hallowed by Eucharistic acts, especially the daily meal for the poor (Ac 6'), but that these should be distinguished from formal Eucharists like that in Ac 20'. The Christians had stated charity suppers, he thinks, parallel to those of Greek guilds; these cannot always be distinguished from Eucharists. The Eucharist was gradually separated from a common meal; the original institution developed in two ways, liturgically into the Eucharist, and socially into the Supper; and the more these two sides developed, the more decided became the separation. Such are the various theories that have been maintained; we shall return to them when we have cited the evidence.

ii. EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIAN COMMON MEALS AND FOR THEIR CONNEXION WITH OR SEPARATION FROM THE EUCHARIST.—It is proposed to gather together here all the evidence; for it seems unreasonable to put out of view, as is suggested by the *Church Quarterly Reviewer*, all evidence of suppers where the word 'Agape' is not found. We shall discuss later the name 'Agape' itself; here it may be remarked that the most important matter to be considered is the thing implied. The name need not necessarily have been universal; or, if it was universal, there is no special reason why it should have been mentioned in all the authorities, many of whom allude only incidentally to the custom now under discussion.

i. The New Testament.—(a) We may first take Acts, as indicating the earliest Christian customs, though the book itself was written later than 1 Corinthians, which we will next consider. In neither of these books is the name 'Agape' mentioned, but in Acts probably, and in 1 Corinthians certainly, there are allusions to a common meal having some connexion with the Eucharist. In Ac 2<sup>42</sup> we read that the Christians continued steadfastly in the Apostles' teaching and fellowship (*κοινωνία*)—or perhaps 'in fellowship'—in the breaking of bread and the prayers (*τῇ κλάσει τοῦ ἄρτου καὶ ταῖς προσευχαῖς*), and in v. 43, that they 'day by day continuing . . . in the temple, and breaking bread at home (*κλῶντες τε καὶ οἶκον ἄρτον*), did take their food (*τροφῆς*) with gladness and singleness of heart, praising God,' etc. The expression 'to break bread' is found also in Ac 20<sup>7-11</sup>, where St. Paul, at Troas, after preaching till midnight on the 'first day of the week,' and after the Eutychus incident, broke bread and ate (*κλάσας τὸν ἄρτον καὶ γευσάμενος*), and 'talked with them . . . till break of day'—apparently an Eucharist with or without a meal, though Alford (*Gr. Test. in loc.*) and Bp. J. Wordsworth (*Ministry of Grace*, p. 316) think that *γευσάμενος* certainly means a meal (cf. Ac 10<sup>10</sup>),—and in Ac 27<sup>35</sup>, where an

ordinary meal is almost certainly spoken of. The phrase was used by the Jews (Jer 16<sup>7</sup>, La 4<sup>4</sup>), and we find it, or the corresponding substantive, in NT in connexion with the Feedings (Mt 14<sup>19</sup> 15<sup>36</sup> and || Mk.), the meal at Emmaus (Lk 24<sup>35</sup>), and the Eucharist (Mt 26<sup>26</sup> and || Mk. Lk. and 1 Co 10<sup>16</sup> 11<sup>24</sup>, in the last of which verses, however, *κλῶμενον* agreeing with *σῶμα* must doubtless be omitted, with ABCN). In view of these facts, we must conclude that 'to break bread' (*κλάσαι ἄρτον* or *τὸν ἄ.*) was used in the Apostolic age sometimes of an ordinary meal and sometimes as a technical name of the Eucharist, or perhaps of the Eucharist and a meal combined. In Ac 2<sup>42</sup> the article ('the breaking of bread') shows that an ordinary meal is not meant, and we have to take the reference to be to the Eucharist, with or without a religious meal eaten in common, and the word 'food' (*τροφῆς*) in v. 43 will probably lead us to think that the Eucharist *with* a meal is meant. The Peshitta reading in v. 42 ('the breaking of the Eucharist') goes the other way, but seems to be a mere gloss due to later ideas. The phrase *κατ' οἶκον* in v. 43 (i.e. 'at home' or 'in a private house') has probably no bearing on the matter, as being merely opposed to 'the Temple'; it is not likely that there is any reference to a supposed custom of going from house to house to partake of a common meal.

(b) In 1 Co 11<sup>27-34</sup> we have an undoubted reference to a meal taken in common (*δείπνον*, probably, though not necessarily, an evening meal) and combined with the Eucharist, when the Corinthians were in meeting assembled (*ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ*, v. 18); abuses of greed and drunkenness are censured, and St. Paul promises to 'set the rest in order' whenever he comes. From this passage most writers have concluded that the earliest custom was for the Christians to combine the Eucharist with a meal taken in common. Lightfoot (*Apost. Fath.* 2 pt. 2, ii. 313) and Duchesne (*Origines*, p. 48, in Eng. ed. p. 49 n.) further deduce that the meal came first and the Eucharist 'at a late stage in the entertainment'; this (apparently) being suggested by the emphasis laid by St. Paul on our Lord's having taken the Eucharistic cup 'after supper' (*μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνῆσαι*, v. 23). Batiffol (*Études*, 1st ser. p. 281) thinks that the union of meal and Eucharist was an innovation of the Corinthians, and that it is the union itself that St. Paul censures. If so, we cannot argue any common custom from this passage. Against this view, Ermoni (*L'Agapé*, p. 9 ff.) truly remarks that St. Paul does not attack the thing itself, but only the abuse of greed and drunkenness, seeing that each one ate what he had brought, not partaking with others. St. Paul would not, Ermoni says, have bidden them wait for one another if the meal itself, in union with the Eucharist, were the thing condemned. All knew that the Eucharist began when the community were assembled. And, further, the Fathers who comment on the passage all see in it the Agape and Eucharist combined,—Chrysostom, Theodoret, Augustine, Jerome,—though Chrysostom, imbued as he is with the discipline of his own time (of fasting communion), puts the Eucharist first; Augustine says that it was St. Paul that gave the rule of fasting communion in consequence of the abuse at Corinth (*Ep. cxviii. [liv., Bened.] ad Januarium*, § 8).

(c) In Jude, and probably in 2 Peter, we have the first trace of the name 'Agape.' In Jude<sup>12</sup> we read of 'hidden rocks in your love-feasts when they feast with you, shepherds that without fear feed themselves' (*οἱ ἐν ταῖς ἀγάπαις ὑμῶν σιτῶντες, συνευχόμενοι*, κ.τ.λ.). The reading *ἀγάπαις* (BKLN, etc.) is no doubt correct, and is supported by the

Vulgate (*epulis*) and the Syriac (ܥܡܬܐܝܬܐ), but AC have ἀράται, influenced by the *v.l.* in 2 P 2<sup>13</sup>. Here, then, we have a common feast called Agape, but nothing is said of the Eucharist. There is no necessary connexion of the feast with the Eucharist in Jude, nor yet any necessary separation. Batiffol endeavours to get over this witness to the Agape by translating ἀγάπαι by 'love,' saying that Jude elsewhere has ἀγάπη in this sense (v. 21; cf. ἀγαπήτοι, vv. 2, 17), and that he uses plurals for singulars elsewhere,—in v. 8 δόξας (Vulg. *majestatem*, Syr. also has singular), and in v. 13 ἀσχύνας (Vulg. *confusiones*, but Syr. has singular). There is, however, no reason for taking these plurals as singular in meaning; in the former case 'dignities' makes the only good sense, and in the latter the plural, as meaning 'each his own shame,' is very suitable. Thus Batiffol's translation in v. 13 can hardly be accepted. But in any case the common feast itself (if not the name 'Agape') is borne witness to by Jude. In the parallel passage 2 P 2<sup>13</sup> we have at least one variation: 'Spots (σπίλοι) and blemishes, revelling in their love-feasts (ἀγάπαι) while they feast with you' (συνευωχούμενοι ὑμῖν). Here we note the variation of σπιδάδες and σπιδόι; and the reading ἀγάπαι, which is supported by B and by the A corrector, the Vulgate, Pocock's Syriac (the Peshitta does not contain Jude or 2 Peter), Sahidic, and Ethiopic, is disputed by A\*C, which have ἀράται both here and in Jude. Deissmann (*Bibl. Stud.* p. 365) and Batiffol (*op. cit.* p. 283) assume the latter to be the true reading without even mentioning the former; and Batiffol builds an argument on ἀράται—that the writer of 2 Peter did not see any reference to the Agape in the Jude passage that was before him. On the other hand, Lightfoot (*op. cit.* ii. 313) and Bigg (*Internat. Crit. Com. in loc.*) treat ἀράται as an obvious error; and this is probably true, ΑΓΑΠΑΙΣ passing very easily into ΑΙΡΑΤΑΙΣ.

2. Ecclesiastical writings up to A.D. 300.—(a) We may pass over Clement of Rome (though his mention in § 44 of the presbyters 'offering the gifts of the episcopate' is thought by Lightfoot to include contributions to the Agape) and come to the *Didache*, which, in common with almost all writers, we may date very early in the 2nd century. In this work (§ 9) we find, after instructions on baptism, fasting, and prayer, directions for the 'Eucharist' (περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐχαριστίας οὕτω εὐχαριστήσατε), with thanksgivings first over the cup and then over the 'broken bread' (κλάσμα); to the latter is attached a prayer that the Church may be gathered together. In these formulas we have no reference to our Lord's words at the Last Supper, or to the sacrament of His body and blood; nor is there anything in common between them and the Eucharistic passages of Ignatius and Justin Martyr. After them follows a prohibition against any of the unbaptized eating and drinking of the 'Eucharist,' and we then read (§ 10): 'After ye are satisfied (μετὰ τὸ ἐμπλησθῆναι), thus give ye thanks,' and the thanksgiving is for God's holy name, for the 'knowledge, faith, and immortality made known,' for God's power, and because the Creator had given food and drink for enjoyment (εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν), and had bestowed spiritual food and drink and eternal life. A prayer is added for the protection and gathering in of the Church, ending with 'Hosanna.' Then comes a 'fencing of the tables' and 'Maranatha.' But prophets may 'give thanks' as much as they desire (εὐχαριστεῖν ὅσα θέλουσιν). Of all this there are many interpretations. Batiffol (*op. cit.* p. 284) thinks that the Eucharist alone is here referred to; he takes the words 'after ye are satisfied' metaphorically, as a souvenir of Jn 6<sup>12</sup> (though that tells against his

view). He considers that as only the cup and the bread are mentioned, we cannot have here an Agape; while in the thanksgiving after 'being satisfied' spiritual nourishment is spoken of, which would be inapplicable to an Agape. Dom Leclercq also (*Dict. d'Archéol. Chrét., s.v. 'Agape,'* col. 792) thinks that the *Didache* does not mention the Agape, but that it does not contradict the supposition of its existence; he does not, however, consider that the first formulas are the words used to consecrate the bread and wine. Mr. Box likewise (*JThSt.* iii. 363 ff.) holds that the *Didache* formulas are for the Eucharist, but he believes that the Agape followed the Eucharist and must be inserted before the words 'after ye are satisfied.' Prof. Ermoni, on the other hand, holds (*op. cit.* p. 17 ff.) that, as the *Didache* in § 14 speaks of the Sunday Eucharist ('gather yourselves together and break bread and give thanks,—or celebrate the Eucharist, εὐχαριστήσατε,—first confessing your transgressions, that your sacrifice may be pure'), the earlier sections must speak only of the Agape; and he concludes that the two ordinances were then separate, all the baptized being allowed to attend the Agape, but only the pure and holy (§ 15) the Eucharist. He takes εὐχαριστία in §§ 9, 10 as meaning no more than 'thanksgiving.' None of these theories appears to be so probable as that of Bp. Lightfoot (*op. cit.* ii. 313) and Dr. Keating (*The Agape*, p. 53), that the *Didache* writer means that the Agape was joined on to and preceded the Eucharist. The reference in §§ 9, 10 would then be to the two combined; the mention of the Sunday *synaxis* in § 14 does not really militate against this. The Agape probably, in the *Didache* as in 1 Co 11, came first, with the formulas given there as graces before and after meat (so Bp. J. Wordsworth, *Holy Communion*, p. 46); and after the people were satisfied came the fencing of the tables (§ 10 *s.f.*), which, as Zahn (*Forsch. zur Gesch. des NT Kanons*, 3rd pt. p. 293 f.) suggests, would be the connecting link between Agape and Eucharist. The prayers for the Eucharist, on this view, are not given; but prophets might use any words which they thought suitable. It is not improbable that the earliest Eucharistic worship was, in the main, extemporaneous. This theory makes εὐχαριστία in the *Didache* include the Agape. As the common meal was holy and so closely joined to the Eucharist, there was not in the thought of the writer such a sharp distinction between the two that one name might not be applied to both (cf. Ignatius below), or that the meal itself should not be conceived of as giving a spiritual blessing, as in the thanksgiving 'after being satisfied.' It is remarkable that the writer of the *Apostolic Constitutions* (vii. 25 f.), owing to the changed conditions of his day, in adapting the *Didache* turns this thanksgiving into a thanksgiving 'after partaking' (μετὰ τὴν εὐχαριστίαν) of the Eucharist.—There is another passage in the *Didache* (§ 11) which should be noticed. A prophet who 'orders a table (ὁρίων τραπέζαν) in the Spirit' must not eat of it. The Eucharist therefore cannot be referred to. The phrase may be applied to an Agape, but Batiffol is probably right in thinking that merely gifts to the poor are meant, and that there is nothing liturgical about this passage.

(b) Ignatius (c. 110 A.D.) speaks (*Ephes.* 20) of 'breaking one bread, which is the medicine of immortality and the antidote that we should not die but live for ever in Jesus Christ'; and in *Rom.* 7 says: 'I desire the bread of God, which is the flesh of Christ . . . and for a draught I desire His blood, which is love (ἀγάπη) incorruptible' (see below, iii. c). In *Smyrn.* 8 he says: 'Let that be a valid Eucharist which is under the bishop . . . it is not lawful apart from the bishop either to baptize or

to hold a love-feast (ὅτε ἀγάπην ποιεῖν). In the first two passages Ignatius clearly speaks of the Eucharist, and it is remarkable that he uses ἀγάπη in connexion with it; while the most obvious interpretation of the last passage is that ἀγάπη includes both the love-feast and the Eucharist, which would therefore be held together in Ignatius' time. This is Lightfoot's conclusion (*op. cit.* i. 400 f., ii. 312 f.). But Batiffol takes ἀγάπη here of the Eucharist, 'par une abstraction,' and thinks that the metaphorical use of the word in *Rom.* 7 bears out his view. He denies that 'Agape' was at this early time used of a feast. He also says that the 4th cent. interpolator of Ignatius took the words in question to mean the Eucharist [the interpolator being probably the writer of the *Apostolic Constitutions*, see Brightman, *Lit. E. and W.* p. xxxiv ff., though Lightfoot gives an argument to the contrary, *op. cit.* i. 265 n.]. The interpolator has, 'not to baptize, nor to make an oblation (προσφέρειν), nor to offer (προσκομίζειν) sacrifice, nor to celebrate a feast (δοχεῖν).' Here the Eucharist and the love-feast are spoken of as quite separate. This was obviously the case in the 4th cent., and the interpolator is only introducing the customs of his own day; but this has no bearing on the sense of the true Ignatius [δοχεῖν = ἀγάπη frequently in the 4th cent., see, e.g., Lightfoot, ii. 312, and below (r)]. Robinson (*Encyc. Bibl.* s.v. 'Eucharist') does not think that Eucharist and Agape are in Ignatius convertible terms; if, he says, the Agape required the presence or sanction of the bishop, *a fortiori* so would the Eucharist. This does not really explain why Ignatius should join baptism and the Agape without mentioning the Eucharist, as would be the case if his ἀγάπη does not include the Eucharist. Lightfoot's opinion, then, seems to be by far the most probable. The phrase 'to baptize and hold the Agape' would be nearly equivalent to Tertullian's 'to dip and offer.' A woman may not, that Father says, 'tinguere nec offerre,' i.e. baptize or celebrate the Eucharist (*de Virg. Vel.* 9; cf. *de Exh. Cast.* 7: 'et offers et tinguis et sacerdos es tibi solus').

(c) Pliny's letter (*Ep.* xvi.) to Trajan (A.D. 112) may next be considered, so far as it bears on the Agape. He says that certain Christian renegades had stated to him that the Christians were wont on a fixed day (*stato die*) to assemble before dawn and to repeat antiphonally a hymn to Christ as to a god, and to bind themselves by an oath (*sacramento*) not to commit any wrong . . . ; which done, they had been accustomed to separate and to come together again to take food, but that ordinary and innocent (*promiscuum tamen et innoxium*); and even this they had ceased to do after [Pliny's] edict, in which he had forbidden guilds (*heterias*) according to [Trajan's] command. Thus there was a morning religious service and a meal later in the day (which, however, was innocent, and gave no countenance to the charge of indiscriminate immorality made against the Christians), and the second meeting was given up. Various views of the meaning of this passage have been held. With Lightfoot (*op. cit.* i. 13 ff., 50 ff.,—a long and careful account,—ii. 313) and Probst (*Lehre und Gebet*, p. 350 f.), we may consider the morning service to have been the Eucharist, and that there is some confusion between the double meaning of the word *sacramentum* ('oath' and 'sacrament'), or that the two sacraments of baptism and the Eucharist are confused; while the later meeting was for the Agape, which, in consequence of Trajan's action, was given up in Bithynia. The separation between Agape and Eucharist would either have taken place some time before Pliny,—perhaps, as Probst thinks (following Augustine), in St. Paul's time,—or else have been recent, and due to Trajan's well-

known hostility to clubs. It is inconceivable that the Christians should have given up the Eucharist, and this consideration is against Batiffol's idea (*op. cit.* p. 288), that the first meeting was only for praise and prayer, and the second only for the Eucharist,—that being the meaning, he says, of 'ordinary and innocent food,'—the Agape not yet existing. He thinks that the Eucharist no less than the Agape would be contrary to Trajan's edict; and that, had the Eucharist been celebrated at the morning meeting, the apostates would have said so, for they had no reason for hiding anything. Dr. Armitage Robinson thinks (*op. cit.* § 17) that we cannot deduce from Pliny's letter that the Eucharist and the Agape had once been united, and that they were at that time, or had been at some previous time, separated; he considers that the renegades had given up the common meal, but that the Christians, as far as we know, had given up nothing. The renegades, however, had given up Christianity altogether, and they spoke of what had been given up before the persecution broke out,—they can hardly refer to any but the whole body of Christians in Bithynia. Dom Leclercq (*op. cit.* col. 795) thinks that the early meeting was the one which was given up; but the Latin will hardly bear this construction. None of these criticisms seems to the present writer to have shaken Lightfoot's position.

(d) Justin Martyr (*Apol.* 65–67) openly describes the Eucharist; for, as Batiffol shows (*Etudes*, 1st ser. p. 18), the *disciplina arcani* hardly existed in his day; but he does not mention the Agape. Leclercq (*op. cit.* col. 796) thinks that his silence does not exclude it, for he had only to defend what was attacked. But surely the Agape was a ground of attack? Keating (*op. cit.* p. 59) thinks that it had been given up generally, because of Trajan's edict; and with this opinion we may agree. The unessential nature and partial existence of the Agape are the conclusions to which the early evidence points.

(e) The date of Celsus is disputed. Keim, Funk, Aubé, Renan, and Mozley place it c. 177 A.D. For a careful discussion see Lightfoot, *Ap. Fath.* pt. 2, i. 530 f.; he gives reasons for thinking that the date should be put before A.D. 161. Origen (*c. Cels.* i. 1) says that Celsus' first accusation against the Christians was 'that they were accustomed to hold secret meetings among themselves, forbidden by the laws (ὡς συνθήκας κρύβδην πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιούμενων, κ.τ.λ.). . . . And he would calumniate the so-called Agape of the Christians among themselves (καὶ βολύτῃ διαβαλεῖν τὴν καλουμένην ἀγάπην Χριστιάνων πρὸς ἀλλήλους) as taking its rise from the common danger,' etc. Batiffol (Letter in the *Guardian*, Jan. 7, 1903) argues that ἀγάπη must mean 'love' here, since πρὸς ἀλλήλους follows. No doubt the phrase 'Agape among themselves' is not an elegant one, but Batiffol's interpretation makes καλουμένην meaningless; 'so-called love' has no sense. The expression is parallel to the phrase above (συνθήκας κρύβδην πρ. ἀλλ.). May there not be a *double entendre* in the second phrase, the word ἀγάπη being used in its technical sense, with an ironical reference to the primary one? Celsus would mean 'the so-called Agape of the Christians, the feast of mutual love.' He could not intend to condemn Christian love as 'arising from the common danger and having a power that transcends oaths.' Origen clearly understands him to refer to the Agape, and this seems to be the only possible meaning of his words.

(f) Minucius Felix (for the date see Lightfoot, *op. cit.* i. 534, who puts it at c. 160 A.D.; and Salmon in Smith-Wace, *Dict. Chr. Biog.*, who puts it at 234; Keim gives 177) combats accusations of the heathen with regard to Christian assemblies. He



says (*Octavius*, xxxi. 5): 'The feasts (*convivia*) which we hold (*colimus*) are chaste and temperate; we neither indulge ourselves in luxurious repasts (*epulis*) nor protract our feast (*convivium*) with strong drink, but we blend cheerfulness with gravity.' This can only refer to a meal, not to the Eucharist, to which the accusations of drunkenness and greed could not refer, though Batiffol thinks that Minucius is here alluding to it alone.

(g) Lucian in his satire *de Morte Peregrini*, § 12 (written probably not long after A.D. 165, Lightfoot, *op. cit.* i. 141, 345), says that when Peregrinus was in prison, 'old women—widows they are called—and orphan children might be seen waiting about the doors of the prison. . . . Then various meals were brought in and sacred formularies (*ἁγία ἑρμηνεία*) of theirs were repeated.' Whether Lucian was primarily satirizing the Christians or the Cynics, we have probably here, as elsewhere, allusions to Christian history and customs, and in this case to the Agape (see below, i).

(h) The *Epistle to Diognetus* (date uncertain; probably c. 170 A.D., though some argue for a later date) says of the Christians that 'they partake of the same table, not of the same bed' (*τῆς αὐτῆς κοινῆς παρατίθενται, ἀλλ' οὐ κοίτης*), evidently alluding to the accusation of Edipodean incests made against the Christians. As Leclercq (*op. cit.* col. 798) observes, this accusation seems to refer to the Agape, while that of Thyestean banquets refers to the Eucharist, the feeding on the body and blood of Christ being misunderstood; and the *τῆς αὐτῆς κοινῆς* would apply less to an Eucharist than to a repast where the guests lay at meat, there being a paronomasia between *κοινή* and *κοίτη*.

(i) In some texts of the *Acts of Paul and Thecla* (§ 25), in connexion with a meal of bread with vegetables, salt, and water, we read: 'There was within the tomb a great Agape' (or 'much love,' *ἀγάπη πολλή*, Lat. *gaudium magnum*). But in the uncertainty as to the date of the writing, which has probably a very early substratum, though in its present form it is a late work, we can lay no stress on this quotation, especially for the name 'Agape' (see Ramsay, *Ch. in Rom. Emp.* ch. xvi.; also Conybeare, *Mon. of Early Christianity*, p. 75, who strangely takes this meal for a primitive Eucharist).—In the *Acts of Perpetua and Felicitas* (§ 17, Ruinart, *Act. Mart. Sinc.* p. 100), which must be dated probably at the very end of the 2nd cent., we have a reference to the custom of publicly entertaining at a free meal those condemned to wild beasts (cf. Tertullian, *Apol.* 42 [*Patr. Lat.* i. 556]). Perpetua and her companions turned the entertainment into an Agape ('non cœnam liberam sed agapen cœnarent').

(j) Irenæus does not mention the Agape. Dom Leclercq (*op. cit.* col. 796) thinks that this does not exclude its existence in Gaul; this Father's treatise being an exposition of Christian doctrine, no mention of the Agape is to be expected. And Dr. Keating comes to the same conclusion, believing that no connexion between Agape and Eucharist had survived in Gaul. But Batiffol takes Irenæus' silence as disproving the existence of the Agape anywhere.

(k) Clement of Alexandria undoubtedly refers to meals taken in common, and to their being called 'Agapæ.' He denounces the drunkenness and greed which disgraced some such repasts (*Pæd.* ii. 1): 'They . . . dare to apply the name Agape to pitiful suppers redolent of savour and sauces, dishonouring the good and saving work of the Word, the consecrated Agape, with pots and pourings of sauce. . . . Gatherings for the sake of mirth . . . we name rightly suppers . . . but such entertainments (*ἐορταίς*) the Lord has not called Agapæ.' So in *Strom.* iii. 2 he denounces the licentiousness

of the feasts of some heretics (perhaps the cause of the heathen slanders), and says that he will not call them 'Agapæ.' According to the *Church Quarterly Review* (July 1902, p. 500), Clement protests against the use of the word 'Agape' at all for common meals, and not only against its application to these feasts of drunkenness and revelling; but this hardly appears from Clement's own words. A more probable interpretation is that meals taken in common were ordinarily called 'Agapæ' in his time, and that he would not allow the name where abuses were rife. In any case, he is a witness for the ordinary use of the name, whether he approved of it or not. For Clement and the Agape see Bigg's *Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, p. 102 f. He inclines to the idea that the Eucharist and the Agape were celebrated together in Clement's time at Alexandria, in the evening. In connexion with the passages from Jude and 2 Peter, Dr. Bigg points out (*Internat. Crit. Com. in loc.*) that Clement uses *ἐσθλα* of the Agape (*Pæd.* ii. 1), which he also calls *ἡ ἐν λόγῳ τροφή* (*ib.* 12, aliter 1), using *τρ.* in a good sense as opposed to *ἡδονή*, the pleasure of eating and drinking; though it is also just possible, as Dr. Keating suggests (*The Agape*, p. 86), that Clement is referring by this latter phrase to the Eucharist as preceding the Agape ('public banquets after the rich fare which is in the Word,' *μετὰ τὴν ἐν λόγῳ τροφήν*). But see below, iii. (b).

(l) Tertullian refers more than once to the Agape, or as he also, translating, calls it, 'dilectio.' He gives a full account of it in *Apol.* 39 (*Patr. Lat.* i. 531 ff.), and says: 'Among the Greeks our supper is called *dilectio*.' In § 9 he had dealt with Thyestean banquets; in § 39 he returns to the heathen accusations, dealing with the charge of incest, and the words used (e.g. 'triclinium,' 'discumbere,' 'cœnula') show that a meal in common is referred to, though Batiffol understands him to be speaking symbolically of the Eucharist throughout. In the treatise *ad Martyres* (§ 2, *Patr. Lat.* i. 696), Tertullian speaks of the consolations of Christians in prison 'through the care of the Church, the brethren's Agape' (cf. *Acts of Perpetua*, above); but here the meaning probably is 'love' merely, though the Greek word is used. In his Montanist days he brings against the Catholics the very accusations which he had refuted in his *Apologeticus*. In *de Jeuniis*, 17 (*Patr. Lat.* ii. 1029, c. 217 A.D.?), he accuses them of licentiousness in the Agape: 'Apud te agape in cacabis fervet: fides in culinæ calet, spes in ferculis iacet. Sed maior his est agape, qui per hanc adolescentis tui cum sororibus dormiunt,' etc. This cannot possibly refer to the Eucharist.—Tertullian's style is so difficult that it is not surprising if scholars do not agree in interpreting his words; but it is hard to escape the conclusion, especially from the *Apologeticus* passage, that the Agape, as we generally understand the term, was in common use in his time. We read here of preliminary prayers, sitting at meat, handwashing, the lighting of the lamps, psalms and hymns, prayer and dismissal; a collection was taken for the poor. This description shows that the Agape was held in the evening. On the other hand, the Eucharist in Tertullian's time was in the morning (*de Cor. Mil.* 3 [*Patr. Lat.* ii. 99], *etiam antelucanis coetibus*, where *etiam* perhaps means that the usual custom was to celebrate the Eucharist after dawn, save in time of persecution; cf. *de Fuga in Persec.* 14 [*Patr. Lat.* ii. 141], where the same is implied; see J. Wordsworth, *Min. of Grace*, p. 317). For a full discussion of Tertullian and the Agape, see Keating, p. 62 ff., Batiffol, p. 291 ff., Leclercq, col. 802 ff.; Ermoni, p. 28 ff.

(m) There is not much that need detain us after



this till the end of the 3rd cent., but the *Canons of Hippolytus* are important as introducing a whole series of 4th cent. 'Church Orders,' which are, as some think, derived from these *Canons*, or more probably are their collateral descendants. For the date, etc., see Achelis, *Die Canones Hippolyti* (TU vi. 4), p. 212 ff., and Funk, *Didasc. et Const. Ap.*, 1906. The latter thinks that the *Canons* are of the 6th cent. or later, and derived from *Apost. Const.* bk. viii.; but most writers take them to be a somewhat interpolated work either of the Roman or of the Alexandrian Church early in the 3rd cent. (so Achelis, Duchesne, J. Wordsworth, Brightman, Morin). We know the work only in an Arabic translation. In these *Canons* (§§ 164-177, ed. Achelis), the Agape, 'if there is one,' is to be on Sunday at lamplighting, the bishop being present and praying, and psalms being sung; the people are to be dismissed before dark. The feast is described as 'prepared for the poor.' The catechumens receive the 'bread of exorcism' but are forbidden to eat at the 'meal of the Lord.' Christians are to eat and drink to satiety, not to drunkenness or scandal. The exhortations of the bishop at the meal (he speaks sitting) are referred to. It is not, however, correct to say that the *Canons* use the name 'Agape' ('in agapis κυριακαίς,' Achelis, Haneberg); for, as Riedel (*Die Kirchenrechtsquellen des Patr. Alex.*, 1900, p. 221 ff.) points out, the Arabic *walimah* does not mean anything more than a meal or feast; it is not equivalent to the technical 'Agape.'

(n) In the *Acts of James and Marianus* († 259 A.D.), James, speaking of the heavenly banquet and a martyr Agapius, says: 'Ad Agapium ceterorumque martyrum beatorum pergo convivium. . . Quo cum . . . quasi ad agapen spiritu dilectionis et caritatis raperemur,' etc. (Ruinart<sup>2</sup>, p. 228). Here the heavenly feast is the antitype of the earthly Agape.

(o) Origen, except in the quotation from Celsus given above, hardly refers to the Agape, but deals at length with the Eucharist. Probably the Agape was, at least for the time, less common in his day. We find, however, in a work ascribed to Origen, references to the funeral agapæ, for which see below, § 4.

(p) Cyprian (*Ep.* lxii. [lxiii.] 16, c. 253 A.D.) explains why the Eucharist (*dominicum*) is celebrated in the morning and not after supper. While it was right, he says, for Christ to 'offer [the mingled cup] about the evening of the day, that the very hour of sacrifice might symbolize the setting and the evening of the world,' yet 'we celebrate the resurrection of the Lord in the morning.' Elsewhere (*ad Donatum*, 16) Cyprian describes the supper in common, the 'temperate meal' (*convivium sobrium*) resounding with psalms. Thus the Agape and the Eucharist were quite distinct in his day. For other allusions to the Agape in Cyprian, see Keating, *op. cit.* p. 102 f.

(q) In the *Acts of Pionius*, § 3 († 250 A.D.; see Ruinart<sup>2</sup>, p. 140), we read of what appears to be a Saturday Agape with solemn prayer ('facta ergo oratione solenni cum die sabbato sanctum panem et aquam degustavissent'). The 'bread and water' could not be the Eucharist.

(r) The older form of the *Didascalia* (as given by Dr. Hauler in the *Verona Fragments*, xxvi. p. 38), which perhaps belongs to the 3rd cent. or the beginning of the 4th, speaks of the Agape by name. It is a feast given to old women (*amiculis*); a portion is to be given to the bishop (*sacerdoti*), even if he be not present at the Agapæ and distributions (*in agapis et erogationibus*), and so also to the other clergy. Similarly the Syriac *Didascalia*, edited by Mrs. Gibson (Eng. tr. p. 48), which has 'widows' for 'old women'; and also the

parallel passage of the *Apostolic Constitutions* (ii. 28, c. 375 A.D.), which has 'agape or entertainment' (ἀγάπη ἢ τροφή, cf. the Ignatian interpolation above, 2 (b)), and expands the *Didascalia* without adding to the sense.

3. Evidence of the 4th cent. and later.—It is not disputed that in the 4th cent. there was a custom of having meals in common and of calling them 'Agapæ'; and also that the Eucharist was absolutely distinct from them.

(a) The 'Church Orders' make this plain. [For a description of them and for their dates, see Cooper-Maclean, *The Testament of our Lord*, pp. 7 ff., 25 ff.; Funk believes that the dates of most of them are later than those there given]. The *Egyptian Church Order* (c. 310 A.D.), found in the *Sahidic Ecclesiastical Canons* or *Egyptian Heptateuch*, the *Ethiopic Church Order* (c. 335 A.D.), found in the *Ethiopic Statutes* (lately published by Mr. Horner), and the Latin *Verona Fragments* (c. 340 A.D.), edited by Dr. Hauler, and the *Testament of our Lord* (c. 350 A.D.; some think that it was edited in its present form c. 400 A.D., though this seems less likely), all speak of the common meal, which the *Egyptian Church Order* and the *Verona Fragments* call 'the Lord's Supper.' They all forbid the catechumens to partake of it, though they allow them to receive the 'bread of exorcism' [Ethiopic: 'of blessing'] and a cup (the bread and cup are omitted in the *Testament*). The bishop presides and exhorts; all eat abundantly, but soberly and in silence; drunkenness is strongly forbidden, and scandal is not to be brought on the host. We must also notice that the Egyptian and Ethiopic books say that the people are each to receive a portion of bread, and 'this is a blessing, and not an Eucharist like the body of the Lord' (the *Testament* has a similar phrase). This partaking of *eulogie* ('blessings'), or loaves given by the people at the offertory in the Eucharist, but not consecrated, afterwards became and still is very common in the East, and it is just possible that it may be a relic of the Agape. Perhaps the 'bread of exorcism' is something of this sort. In these Church Orders the Agape is a feast provided by the rich for the whole community; but it is not represented as being merely a 'charity supper' or a form of alms to the poor.

(b) The Agape is mentioned in three 4th cent. Councils. That of Laodicea in Phrygia (c. 370?) forbade the 'so-called Agape' to be held in the Lord's houses (*κυριακαίς*) or in churches (*can.* 28), probably because of the prevalent abuses. The Third Council of Carthage (A.D. 397) made the same rule (*can.* 30, aliter 29; following one which orders that the 'sacrament of the altar shall always be celebrated fasting' except on Maundy Thursday). The Council of Gangra in Paphlagonia (date uncertain) endeavoured to restore the Agape to its former dignity, and forbade any to despise those who in the faith solemnized it (*can.* 11). This shows that the abuses of the Agape were leading to its discontinuance in Asia Minor.

(c) Pseudo-Pionius' *Life of Polycarp* can be used as evidence only for the 4th cent. (see Lightfoot, *Ap. Fath.* pt. 2, iii. 429 f.). The writer relates how Polycarp visited a certain bishop named Daphnus, who made an offering in his presence to a number of brethren, and set a little cask full of wine in the midst of them, which miraculously remained full though they drank from it. Here an Agape seems to be meant.

(d) The comment of Chrysostom on 1 Co 11 (*Hom.* 27) does not appear to give us any sure indication about the ordinary Agape in his own day. He uses the past tense, and from his language here, if taken alone, we might have supposed that the Agape had ceased in his time. In

*Hom.* 22 he describes how, after instruction, prayer, and 'communion of the mysteries,' the rich had been accustomed to bring materials for a feast from their houses to the church, and to entertain the poor there. Pseudo-Jerome and Theodoret in their comments on 1 Co 11 follow Chrysostom. Their evidence is good for what was the tradition of former custom, though not necessarily for that of Apostolic times (see above, § 1). In the same *Hom.* 27 and in *Hom.* 31 Chrysostom refers to the funeral-Agape of his own day (see below, § 4).

(c) Augustine speaks of the Agape in his own time as a charity supper (c. *Faust.* xx. 20). Faustus the Manichean had represented the Christians as converting the heathen sacrifices into their Agapæ. Augustine denies this, and says that the Agape is a feeding of the poor ('agapes enim nostræ pauperes pascunt') with fruits or flesh meat. But whether the Agape was in his day celebrated regularly, or only as a funeral feast (see below § 4), we cannot say.

(f) The Agape in Egypt in the 5th cent., united with the Eucharist, is apparently attested by Socrates and Sozomen. The former says (*HE* v. 22): 'The Egyptians near Alexandria and the inhabitants of the Thebaid hold their religious assembly on the sabbath, but do not participate in the mysteries in the manner usual among Christians in general; for, having eaten and satisfied themselves with food of all kinds, making their offering (προσφοράς, i.e. celebrating the Eucharist, as often) in the evening they partake of the mysteries.' Sozomen (*HE* vii. 19) says: 'There are several cities and villages in Egypt where, contrary to the usage established elsewhere, the people meet together on sabbath evenings, and, although they have dined previously, partake of the mysteries.' [For the Saturday Agape cf. the *Acts of Pionius*, above, 2 (q)]. Dom Leclercq (*op. cit.* col. 822) thinks that in Socrates and Sozomen there is no trace of an Agape, only of an Eucharist. But the words 'eating and satisfying themselves' certainly point to one, and the whole object of this exceptional custom would appear to be to keep up the example of the Last Supper.

(g) We notice, lastly, that as late as the Trullan Council (A.D. 692) the 'African practice of receiving the Eucharist on Maundy Thursday after a meal' is disapproved (*can.* 29), and Agapæ within the churches are forbidden (*can.* 74).

4. **Funeral and Commemorative Agapæ.**—These should probably be treated separately from the ordinary Agapæ, as being quite distinct in origin, and as having arisen later (Duchesne, *Origines*, p. 49 n., Eng. tr.). It will be a question whether some of the references already given should not have been placed under this head. The commemorative Agape was a Christianized form of the heathen *parentalia* or festival in honour of dead relatives (cf. Augustine, *Ep.* xxix. 9 *ad Alypium*); and the custom probably was, first to celebrate the Eucharist with prayer for the departed, and later in the day to hold an Agape. In the references to this custom in Tertullian and Cyprian, the Eucharist alone is explicitly mentioned; but probably an Agape is intended as well, as the Hippolytean *Canons* show. The custom seems to have spread as the veneration for the martyrs grew.

In the *Martyrdom of Polycarp* (§ 18) the Smyrneans look forward to 'celebrating the birthday of his martyrdom, for the commemoration of those that have already fought in the contest,' etc. But we are not told how the commemoration was to be celebrated. The Leucian *Acts of John* (Gnostic; c. 170 A.D. ? or perhaps earlier) speak of going 'to the tomb to break bread' (ed. Zahn, p. 231). This may be an Agape or the Eucharist. Tertullian

(*de Cor. Mil.* 3 [*Patr. Lat.* ii. 99]), immediately before describing baptism and the Eucharist, says: 'We make oblations for the departed annually for their birthdays'; and in *de Monogam.* 10 (*Patr. Lat.* ii. 992) the widow 'prays for his [her husband's] soul . . . and offers (i.e. the Eucharist) on the anniversary of his falling asleep.' So in *de Exhort. Cast.* 11 [*Patr. Lat.* ii. 975], addressed to a widower about his departed wife, we read: 'For whose spirit thou prayest, and for whom thou offerest annual oblations.' The *Canons of Hippolytus* (above, 2 (m)) have this direction (§§ 169, 170): 'If there is a memorial of the dead, before they sit (at meat) let them partake of the mysteries, though not on the first day of the week ('neque tamen die prima'). After the oblation, let the bread of exorcism be distributed to them before they sit down.' This comes after the directions for the Sunday Agape, and before general rules for meals taken in common. We may notice here that the parallel passage in the *Apostolic Constitutions* (c. 375 A.D.), which follows an office for the departed, refers to the commemorative feasts only, not to the Sunday Agape (viii. 44; Lagarde, p. 276), and rebukes faults of drunkenness. In Cyprian (*Ep.* xxxiii. [xxxix.] 3, *ad clerum* [*Patr. Lat.* iv. 323]) we read of sacrifices being offered ('sacrificia offerimus') for martyrs and their anniversaries kept, and the last words probably refer to an Agape (so elsewhere in the Epistles). For many years after Cyprian's death they danced and sang round his grave, till this was stopped by Aurelius, bishop of Carthage (Augustine, *Serm.* cccxi. 5 [*Patr. Lat.* iv. 328 f.]); a feast is probably implied. The *Commentary on Job*, ascribed to Origen (Bk. iii. p. 238, ed. Lommatsch), speaks of these commemorations of the departed as being an opportunity for feeding the poor. In the 4th cent. we have an obscure canon of Elvira in Spain (c. 305 A.D.), forbidding lights in cemeteries 'per diem,' as disturbing the souls of the dead (*can.* 34). This may refer to a funeral Agape; the lamp-lighting rather points to this. Later, Gregory of Nazianzus (*Orat.* vi. 4 ff.) and Chrysostom (*Hom.* 47, *On Julian the Martyr*) bewail the drunkenness that was rife at these entertainments (cf. also Chrys. *Hom.* 27 in 1 *Cor.* 11, *Hom.* 31 in *Mt.* 9). Augustine tells us of the pious custom of his mother Monica at Milan, of bringing food 'ad memorias sanctorum,' as was usual in Africa; but that Ambrose had forbidden it (*Confess.* vi. 2), no doubt because of the 'revelries and lavish repasts in cemeteries,' which Augustine himself deplors (*Ep.* xxii. 6, *ad Aurelium*). He forbade these commemorative feasts himself in A.D. 392, and says that they were not universal in Italy, and that where they were customary they were abolished by the bishops (*ib.* 4, 5). Theodoret, however, in the 5th cent., tells us of yearly feasts in honour of martyrs; and the sermons ascribed to Eusebius of Alexandria (5th or 6th cent. ? see Smith-Wace, *Dict. Chr. Biog.* iii. 305 f.) describe banquets given to the poor on Saints' days, 'the hosts considering that they are entertaining the martyrs themselves. These sermons speak of the disorders and drunken revels going on till daybreak; 'while aside the priest prays for them and consecrates the body of Christ, they separate' (Migne, *Patr. Gr.* lxxxvi. 357 f., 364 f., quoted by Leclercq). At the funeral itself feasts were common. Paulinus (*Ep.* xiii. 11, A.D. 397) tells us of a funeral banquet at Rome called an Agape, given for the poor in the basilica of St. Peter, by Pammachius.

In Syriac writers Agapæ are called *nyāhāthā*, lit. 'rests' or 'refreshments'; so in Jude and 2 Peter. This word, however, has no special reference to the dead, nor can it be argued from it that the Syriac translator of Jude and 2 Peter took the

meaning of ἀγάπαι to be 'commemorations of the dead.' On the other hand (see Payne-Smith, *Thesaurus Syriacus*, s.v.), the word is often in Syriac writings coupled with *dūkhṛānē*, the ordinary word for 'Saints' days,' and then the reference is without doubt to commemorative Agapæ.

5. Archaeological and epigraphic evidence.—This seems to the present writer not to carry us far. It is too vague, and the dates are too uncertain to lead us to any sure conclusion about the Agape. Reference may, however, be made to Dom Leclercq's art. in the *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie Chrétienne*, where this side of the subject is treated very fully with excellent illustrations. It will suffice here to mention one or two examples of evidence adduced by the author. There is a fresco in the Capella Greca of the Cemetery of St. Priscilla near Rome, discovered in 1893. The multiplication of the loaves and fishes is represented as a banquet, with seven persons lying at meat. Dom Leclercq thinks that this shows that at the time of the fresco the Agape and the Eucharist were united. But this is very precarious. Of inscriptions alluding to the heavenly Agape may be mentioned *πικρὸν ἐν Θεῷ* (Leclercq, *op. cit.* col. 832) and 'Anima dulcis pie zeszes in Deo: dulcis anima pie zeszes vivas,' where probably 'pie' = *πικρὸν*, 'zeszes' = *ζῆσθαι*, and perhaps 'vivas' = 'bibas' (*ib.* col. 833).

iii. REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. — (a) General deductions.—Looking back at the quotations and references detailed above, we may obtain some idea of the history of the Agape. To the present writer it appears, after a careful consideration of what has been written in the last few years, that Bp. Lightfoot's view of the matter has not, in the main, been shaken. The evidence seems to point to the Apostles, probably because of the precedent of the Last Supper, having combined the Eucharist with a common meal, which before long was called the Agape. Yet the Agape was not universal. It was dropped, in some places earlier than in others, and then resumed under somewhat different forms. At first, as the evidence seems to show, the Agape was a meal for the whole community. To call it always a 'charity supper,' as it undoubtedly became in some or in most places later on, is a little misleading. It was a supper for all, rich and poor alike, though no doubt provided almost entirely by the rich, a sign of Christian unity and marked by liturgical forms. Later, the thought of the rich providing for the poor and of the Agape being a charity became prominent; and this was perhaps largely due to the rise of funeral or commemorative feasts, in which the relatives of the deceased gave in his honour, or rich people generally gave in honour of a martyr, a banquet to the poor. These commemorative feasts and the ordinary Agapæ seem to have been confused, at least in many places, during the 4th century. It is important to bear in mind that the custom of the Agape, being a non-essential, varied in different countries. Perhaps it was never quite universal; certainly it was of only partial adoption for the greater part of the first four centuries.

To summarize the evidence, we may say that in Acts and 1 Corinthians the Eucharist and the Agape seem to have been combined; in Jude and 2 Peter perhaps dissociated. In the *Didache* and Ignatius they were probably combined, and perhaps also in Bithynia quite up to the time of Pliny, when they were separated and the Agape dropped. In Justin the Agape does not seem to have been actually existent, perhaps on account of Trajan's Edict. In Celsus, Minucius Felix, and the *Epistle to Diognetus* it is found existing. In Gaul, at the end of the 2nd cent. it had probably been dropped, as it is not mentioned by Irenæus. Lucian's satire and the *Acts of Perpetua* probably testify to the custom

of a 'prison Agape.' Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Cyprian, the *Canons of Hippolytus*, and some *Acts of Martyrs* in the 3rd cent., attest the Agape as existing and separate from the Eucharist; the old *Didascalia* describes it as a feast to old women. In the 4th cent. 'Church Orders' the Agape is a common meal, not only a charity supper; it is entirely separate from the Eucharist. From the canons of the Councils of Laodicea, Gangra, and Carthage (No. 3), we gather that it was held in churches; perhaps the evidence shows a tendency for it to disappear at this time. Augustine treats it as a charity supper, 'a feeding of the poor.' In the 5th cent. there is the remarkable testimony of Socrates and Sozomen to the exceptional case of Agape and Eucharist combined in Egypt; but there is nothing to show that this custom had always existed there. It may, on the one hand, be a relic of old custom; or, on the other, it may be a revival, a piece of out-of-date antiquarianism. In the 7th cent. the Trullan Council shows that the Agape still existed.—Funeral or commemorative Agapæ are probably referred to by Tertullian, the *Acts of John*, and Cyprian, certainly in the *Canons of Hippolytus*, in the *Commentary on Job* (by Origen?), by Gregory of Nazianzus, Augustine, Chrysostom, and others.

(b) Relative order of Agape and Eucharist when united.—Did the Agape or the Eucharist come first? On the one hand, we have the precedent of the Last Supper, where the Eucharist followed the meal, and the suggestion in 1 Co 11 that the Corinthian Agape came first (see above, ii. 1). In the *Didache*, if the view taken above (ii. 2) be right, the Agape precedes, and the 'fencing of the tables' is followed by the Eucharist. In the exceptional case in the Thebaid in the 5th cent., the Agape (if there was one) clearly came first. On the other hand, in Ac 20<sup>11</sup> we have the order, 'breaking bread' and 'eating.' If the former means the Eucharist and the latter the Agape, the order is reversed. It is quite possible, however, that 'breaking bread' and 'eating' are here one and the same thing, and refer to the Eucharist and the meal combined; in which case we can make no deduction from the words. As has been seen, Chrysostom, in his homily on 1 Corinthians, makes the Eucharist precede, i.e. not in his own day merely, but in the primitive ages. We need perhaps lay no great stress on the late evidence of the Thebaid on the one hand, or of Chrysostom on the other. The Fathers of the 4th or 5th cent. probably had no more knowledge of Christian antiquities in this department than we have. Chrysostom was no doubt influenced in his view of the Apostolic age by the customs of his own day, and the Christians of the Thebaid may have been merely trying to follow what appeared to them to have been the custom at the Last Supper. Confining ourselves, then, to the early evidence of NT and the *Didache*, it certainly seems more probable than not that the Agape came first, and that the Eucharist immediately followed. This is Bp. Lightfoot's view. Dr. Lock (in Hastings' *DB*, s.v. 'Love-feasts') inclines the other way; and so, more decidedly, does Mr. Box (*op. cit.*).

(c) The name 'Agape.'—It is important to consider why this word was applied to a meal. The Greek ἀγάπη is apparently first found in the LXX. Before NT it is exclusively found in Jewish documents. It is not, however, only biblical. Deissmann (*Bibl. Stud.* p. 199, Eng. tr.) quotes a passage in Philo (*Quod Deus immut.* § 14), who probably took the word from the LXX; the meaning is 'love to God.' ἀγάπη is also found in a scholium on Thucydides, but we do not know if the glossator was a Christian or not (see Deissmann, *op. cit.* p. 200). In OT and NT, except in

the two passages Jude 12, 2 P 2<sup>13</sup>, the word always means 'love.'

How, then, did it acquire its technical sense? Dr. Keating (paper in the *Guardian*, Dec. 24, 1902) suggests that it was because of the new commandment given at the Last Supper (Jn 13<sup>34</sup> *ἡ ἀγάπη ἀλλήλων*); and this may very probably be the case. At any rate, the feast would be called 'love,' because it was the bond which united Christians together; and when (as in Ignatius) the name was applied to the Eucharist and the meal jointly, it would be especially suitable, because Christians are thus united to their Saviour. That this was the main idea of the name is confirmed by the phrase 'kiss of love,' *φίλημα ἀγάπης* (1 P 5<sup>14</sup>; cf. *φίλημα ἀγίου*, Ro 16<sup>16</sup>, 1 Co 16<sup>20</sup>, 2 Co 13<sup>12</sup>, 1 Th 5<sup>26</sup>), which was no doubt in early times as in later ages, and as it is still in the East, one of the most significant features of Christian assemblies; by it the worshippers reminded themselves of their brotherhood. As the idea of a charity supper became prominent, after the separation of Eucharist and Agape, the name came to imply 'benevolence' rather than 'brotherly love.' Sometimes in Latin, and perhaps in Greek, *agape* came to mean no more than 'alms.' Thus Jerome speaks of widows being fond of display at Rome—'cum ad agapen vocaverint, præco conductur' (*Ep.* xxii. 32, A.D. 384), and in the *Apostolic Constitutions* *ἀγάπη* is used of a charitable gift to a widow, apart from a supper. But this is not certain. The degeneration of the word is exactly parallel to that of our English 'charity.'

It is noteworthy that the name 'Agape' is very seldom given to commemorative feasts. In the passage of Paulinus given above (ii. § 4), however, the feast is so called.

As will be seen from the evidence produced above, the name 'Agape' is applied to a meal taken in common, if the deductions made in this article are correct, in the following: Jude, 2 Peter (probably), Ignatius, Celsus (probably), *Acts of Paul and Thecla* (perhaps), *Acts of Perpetua and Felicitas*, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen (quoting Celsus), *Acts of James and Marianus*, the older *Didascalia*, and in the 4th cent. writers *passim*.

As in the case of other technical terms, it is probable that a double reference was not uncommon. Just as 'Agape' was used of a meal with an implied reference to Christian love, so it and its corresponding verb were sometimes used of Christian love with an implied reference to the love-feast. Thus in the Celsus passage (above, ii. 2 (c)) the reference is probably double. So in Ignatius, *Rom.* 7 (above, ii. 2 (b)), an Eucharistic passage ('I desire His blood, which is love incorruptible'), the primary reference is to love, but there is probably a secondary one to the Agape. And similarly in *Smyrn.* 7, the passage which immediately precedes that already quoted (ii. 2 (b)), though the words *συνεσθῆεν δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀγαπᾶν* must probably be rendered: 'It were expedient for them to have love,' and not, as Zahn and others suggest, 'to celebrate the Agape' (as if *ἀγαπᾶν* were equivalent to *ἀγάπην ποιῆν*), yet the passage would seem to have an indirect allusion to the combined Eucharist and love-feast (see Lightfoot's note, *op. cit.* ii. 307).

(d) Materials for the Agape.—As to these we have very little evidence. In the *Didache* only a cup [of wine] and bread are explicitly mentioned. In the *Acts of Paul and Thecla*, § 25, 'five loaves of bread, with vegetables and salt besides, and water' are spoken of (Conybeare, *Monuments of Early Christianity*, p. 75); in the *Acts of Pionius*, only bread and water. Later on, Augustine mentions meat, poultry, cheese, milk, honey (c. *Faust.* xx. 20). Dean Plumptre (Smith-Cheetham, *Dict.*

*Chr. Ant. s.v.* 'Agapae') suggests, from archaeological evidence, that fish was commonly used. He adds that 'bread and wine were of course indispensable'; but this, as far as the wine is concerned, is not obvious, except when the Eucharist was combined with the Agape.

iv. ORIGIN OF THE AGAPE.—Many suggestions have been made on this subject. Most writers have seen in the custom an endeavour to follow the precedent of the Last Supper, when the Eucharist was combined with a meal. It is also thought that the early Christians were copying the Jews, who had social meals, or the Greeks and Romans, who had clubs, of which banquets were a prominent feature. The origin of the Agape has also been looked for in the funeral feasts which were common among both Jews and Gentiles. Or it has been thought to have arisen simply from the early communism of the Apostolic Church (Ac 4<sup>32</sup>).

These suggestions are not all mutually exclusive, and probably all of them have a solid foundation. It would be difficult to deny all association with the Last Supper. In that action of our Lord the Christians would find ample justification for joining their Agape to the Eucharist, or for making the Eucharist a part of the Agape. But then it is necessary to ask, What was the exact significance of the Supper celebrated by Jesus? This question is made difficult by the apparent discrepancy between the Gospel accounts, St. John suggesting that the Supper was celebrated some twenty-four hours before the Paschal lambs were killed, while the Synoptists would lead us to think that the Supper was the Passover itself. This difficulty cannot be fully considered here (see the discussion in Dr. Sanday's article 'Jesus Christ' in *Hastings' DB* ii. 633 ff.—the article has been republished in book form, 1904—and the literature enumerated there, *ib.* p. 638), but whatever view be taken of the Last Supper, that observance cannot fully account for the rise of the Agape. For, first, suppose that our Lord ate the real Paschal Supper on Maundy Thursday; if the Apostles had instituted the Agape in imitation of the Last Supper, it seems almost certain that the love-feast would have been held only once a year, at Easter. [We cannot use this as an argument for the Johannine account of the disputed chronology, for the connexion between the Agape and the Last Supper is assumed. But it is probable for other reasons (see Sanday, *loc. cit.*) that the Last Supper did not synchronize with the regular Paschal meal]. Next, suppose that the Last Supper was an anticipated Passover; then, if the Agape depends entirely on it, the difficulty just mentioned as to its being frequent instead of annual would not be taken away. Thirdly, let us take Mr. Box's suggestion (*JThSt.* iii. 360 ff.), that the Last Supper had its origin in the Jewish *Qiddush* or weekly sanctification of the Sabbath, an ancient Rabbinical observance, and still a feature of the home life of the Jews. The family sit at table after the synagogue service at the beginning of the Sabbath (*i.e.* our Friday evening), and on the table are placed two loaves and wine. The father blesses the cup, and all the family drink of it; handwashing follows, and the bread is blessed and distributed. Then follows the Sabbath meal. This ceremony is not confined to the Sabbath, but also precedes other festivals, such as the Passover. This is certainly an attractive suggestion, and one which, if the Agape depended solely on the Last Supper, would account for its frequent, instead of annual, occurrence in the Christian Church. But there are several objections to it. Dr. Lambert (*JThSt.* iv. 184 ff.) has brought forward some of them. Two considerations seem fatal to it. It assumes

that the Eucharist followed by the Agape (for Mr. Box believes the Eucharist to have come first) represented the Jewish *Qiddush* followed by a festive meal. But at the Last Supper the Eucharist certainly *followed* the meal (1 Co 11<sup>25</sup>); and the balance of the argument appears to be against the order required by this theory for the Christian Agape (see above, iii. (b)). And, further, the Paschal character of the Last Supper seems too prominent for us to be convinced that it was not in some sense a Paschal meal. If so, our difficulty as to the origin of the Agape remains, and we must look elsewhere for it, without indeed denying the influence of the Last Supper on the custom under discussion.

The environment of the Apostolic Church must certainly be considered in judging of the origin of the Agape. To the Jews common meals were quite familiar. The Essenes made a practice of them, living a sort of community life (Philo, *Quod omnis probus liber*; Jos. *B.J.* ii. 8; Hippolytus, *Ref. Her.* ix. 18 ff.). For other Jewish illustrations see Keating, *op. cit.* p. 20 ff. We may also cite the allusion to the heavenly banquet in 2 Es 2<sup>33</sup>, 'Behold the number of those that be sealed in the feast of the Lord.' The guilds and associations in the heathen world at the beginning of our era were also very common; of these, banquets were usually a prominent feature (Lightfoot, *op. cit.* i. 18 ff.; Keating, p. 1 ff.). Funeral feasts were common in the heathen world (Tacitus, *Ann.* vi. 5, *Hist.* ii. 95; cf. Tertullian, *de Res. Carn.* 1 [*Patr. Lat.* ii. 841]); they were part of the obsequies, and were offerings to the dead. They were common in Egypt, Asia Minor, and indeed throughout the countries touched by Christianity. The Jews were familiar with them (2 S 3<sup>33</sup> was a delayed funeral banquet; cf. Jer 16<sup>7</sup>, Ezk 24<sup>17</sup>, Hos 9<sup>4</sup>, To 4<sup>17</sup>, Bar 6<sup>36</sup>). For a full account of them see Dom Leclercq's article, which, however, appears to make them too exclusively the origin of the Christian Agape. He seems to look on the Last Supper as a funeral banquet, celebrated before our Lord's death, and on the Agape as having that aspect throughout. The evidence does not show this. We do not read of Christian funeral or commemorative feasts till the time of Tertullian, at least; and there is nothing to connect them with the Eucharist or with the Last Supper. They would seem rather to have arisen after the almost total separation of Agape and Eucharist.

The most probable account of the origin of the Agape would seem to be that the Christians of the Apostolic age, desirous of showing their unity and brotherly love, imitated the Jewish and heathen custom of having common meals; they could not join the heathen guilds because of the idolatry that would be involved in doing so, and therefore they had what corresponded to these guilds among themselves, namely, the Agapæ. The connexion with the Eucharist—which in itself was quite a distinct act—would be a further step. They remembered that our Lord had associated the first Eucharist with a meal, and this was their justification in joining the Agape with it, so that the name 'Eucharist' could be said to include the Agape, as in the *Didache*, or the name 'Agape' the Eucharist, as in Ignatius. Indeed, in this way they would seem to be carrying out our Lord's injunction most fully. That the meal partaken of by our Lord was a Paschal meal—probably one specially instituted by Him in anticipation, but that is immaterial—would not affect the matter. There was nothing Paschal about the Agape, but the point of similarity between it and the Last Supper would be the connexion with the Eucharist. These two points, then, seem to stand out—(1) the frequent Agape was at first due to the early com-

munion of the Church at Jerusalem, and carried on by the Gentile Churches in imitation of those without; (2) its connexion with the Eucharist was based on the fact that our Lord instituted that sacrament after a common meal. That the origin and history of the Agape are plain cannot for a moment be maintained; but that the explanation here given fits the known facts, appears to be at least probable.

LITERATURE.—Lightfoot, *Apostolic Fathers*<sup>2</sup>, pt. 2 ('Ignatius and Polycarp'), 1859, i. 52 n., 400 f., ii. 312 f., iii. 457; Keating, *The Agape and the Eucharist*, 1901, and art. and letter in the *Guardian*, Dec. 24, 1902, Jan. 7, 1903; Batiffol, *Études d'Histoire et de Théologie positive*, 1st ser., Paris, 1902 (reply to Dr. Lightfoot's letter in the *Guardian*);

the *Church Quarterly Review* for July 1902, notice of Dr. Keating's book; Lock, art. 'Love-feasts' in *Hastings' DB* vol. iii. 1900; Armitage-Robinson, art. 'Eucharist' in *Encyc. Bibl.* vol. ii. 1900; Zahn, art. 'Agapen' in *PRE<sup>3</sup>*, 1896, and *Brot und Wein*, Leipzig, 1892 (reply to Dr. Ad. Harnack); Ramsay, *Church in the Roman Empire*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 219, 353; Cooper and Maclean, *The Testament of our Lord*, 1902, p. 228 f. (for the Communion, 1891), pp.

901, ch. vi.; Bingham, *heaurus*, s.v. 'Agape'; Plumptre, art. 'Agapæ' in Smith and Cheetham's *Dictionary of Christian Antiquities*; Leclercq, art. 'Agape' in Cabrol's *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie* (esp. for epigraphy and pictorial representations); Ermont, *L'Agape dans l'Eglise primitive*, Paris, 1904 (a reply to Batiffol); Funk, 'L'Agape' in *Revue d'Histoire ecclésiastique*, Jan. 15, 1903 (Louvain); Adolf Harnack, 'Brot und Wasser', *TU*, vii. 2 (Leipzig, 1892); Kraus, art. 'Agapen' and 'Mahle' in *RE der Christl. Altertümer*; Ladeuze, 'L'Eucharistie et les repas communs des fidèles dans le Didaché' (*Revue de l'Orient Chrétien*, 1902, No. 3); Spitta, *Zur Geschichte und Literatur*

'Zur Percy Recent xviii. 110-131); Box, 'The Jewish antecedents of the Eucharist' (*JTAS*, iii. 357); Lambert, 'The Passover and the Lord's Supper' (*JThSt*, iv. 184); Th. Harnack, *Der Christliche Gemeinde Gottesdienst*, p. 213 f.; Wright, *NT Problems*, p. 134 ff. A. J. MACLEAN.

AGAPEMONE ('Abode of Love').—Henry James Prince, the founder of Agapemonism, was born January 13, 1811. After being articled to a medical man in Wells, Somerset, he resolved to take Holy Orders in the Church of England. In his 26th year he entered St. David's College, Lampeter (March, 1836). The connexion with the Welsh college led to the new sect being called the 'Lampeter Brethren.'

This, however, was misleading, for the Lampeter Brethren, eleven alumni of that institution, were a devout and earnest band of Episcopalian ministers who met for mutual edification, but who afterwards felt 'compelled to come to the calm, deliberate, and final, though most distressing, conclusion that Prince is awfully in error.'

During his college course Prince was an exemplary student. His brother-in-law and fellow-student, Rev. A. A. Rees, wrote that, till 1843, he never saw or heard of an individual more thoroughly devoted to God.

Prince was ordained in 1840 to the curacy of the agricultural parish of Charlynch, near Bridgwater, Somerset. The rector's name was Starky.\* The careers of these two men now became identified. Starky, like Prince, was a man of extraordinary gifts of speech, but the rector soon acknowledged his curate as the very voice of God. His zeal on behalf of Agapemonism led to its adherents in Weymouth and other parts of the south country being called 'Starkyites.' A wonderful revival of religion began in Charlynch and the district in October 1841. Prince published a record of it in 1842. It is a diary of most earnest work on behalf of souls. In six months the whole parish had professed conversion. Yet we find that, as early as May 4, 1841, the Bishop of Bath and Wells had revoked Prince's licence to preach, on the ground of his labouring in neighbouring parishes, admitting

\* His Christian name appears to have been lost. In the B.M. Cat. the name stands 'Starky (—)', and on the title-page of his book in the Museum it is given as Br. Starky.

to the Lord's Table before Confirmation, and refusing the Sacrament to persons of evil lives. The diary is an instructive and edifying book, but it reveals the subtle and almost hypnotic power of Prince over his rector and the parishioners. While so absorbed in seeking the salvation of his people that he can think of nothing else, the emotion he expresses strikes the reader as unpleasant and unnatural. *The Charlynch Revival* was published because Prince thought it 'calculated, under the Divine blessing, to stir up the hearts of the Lord's people, and especially of His ministers, to expect great things from God.' With a few emendations it might be reissued as a model of pastoral labours. Before its publication in August 1842, Prince had already sent out two small works, *Letters to his Christian Brethren in St. David's College, Lampeter*, and *Strength in Jesus*, both of which ran to more than one edition.

The date of the beginning of his delusions seems to have been early in 1843. In May of that year he wrote to Mr. Rees a long letter in which he expounded the steps by which the Holy Ghost came to be settled and fixed in the personality of H. J. Prince. In the same year he desired his Lampeter brethren to believe (1) that he was the Holy Ghost personified; (2) that the Holy Ghost suffered and died in him; (3) that this suffering and death obtained for them what he called 'my spirit,' or, as he also phrased it, 'a modification of the Holy Ghost.' About the same time he also published *Testimony Hymns*, religious parodies on certain popular ballads, to back up his own pretensions,—wretched doggerel, like almost all his hymns,—in which he seemed to be losing all consciousness of other things and persons than himself. This was the beginning of his own self-proclaimed apotheosis.

Prince had been inhibited by the Bishop of Bath and Wells, and presently the same lot befell him at the hands of the Bishop of Salisbury. When he attempted to officiate as curate at Stoke-by-Clare, in Suffolk, he suffered once more at the hands of the Bishop of Ely. He appealed to the Archbishop, but could get no redress. Then, to use his own words, 'prevented from preaching within the pale of the Established Church, Bro. Prince, after some months' waiting on God for guidance in faith and prayer, proceeded to preach without it.' He became most energetic in denouncing priestcraft, but apparently without having observed that there were fellow-Christians who felt as strongly as himself upon this subject. Starky and Prince began to preach in barns at Charlynch. What was practically a Free Church was formed at Spaxton, a mile away. Crowds came to hear them. The twin asserted that they were the Two Witnesses of Rev 11, and Prince published several brochures in regard to the 'Two Anointed Ones.' He declared that community of goods was still binding on believers. Thereupon they sold their lands, and brought the money, 'laying it at Bro. Prince's feet.' About this period also he asserted that he was the prophet Elijah, that this had been made known to him by direct revelation, and that 'people were not to consider what they heard from him as an ordinary sermon, nor to think of him as an ordinary preacher; on the contrary, he was come from the courts of heaven, from the bosom of eternity.'

A crop of opposing pamphlets immediately sprang from the press, written for the most part by men who had been his personal friends. It is clear from some of his actions at this time, and particularly from the ballads which he penned and made his congregation sing, that his phenomenal self-love had passed beyond eccentricity into unsoundness of mind.

Prince and Starky now set up the Agapémone, which they opened in 1849 at the entrance to the village of Spaxton. Money was poured into the treasury by their credulous followers. Freehold land was bought, and a beautiful and spacious residence erected upon it (for a description of it see Hepworth Dixon, *op. cit. infra*). The whole of the Princeite propaganda centred in the Agapémone. It was the residence of Prince until his death on January 5, 1899, when he had almost completed his 88th year.

It was very noticeable that Prince renounced the money which he had put in the Bank of England in the name of Brother Prince, and took up their abode at the Agapémone. A wave of fanaticism seemed to sweep across the district about Bridgwater. Many intelligent persons believed him when Prince announced himself as the Final Revelation of the will of God to mankind. Christ had come again in the person of His messenger, first to judgment, and then to convince the world of righteousness. In him the Holy Ghost was to destroy the works of the flesh, and to cast out the devil. Whether he took the title of 'Lord,' or only accepted it, without deprecating its application to himself, seems uncertain. Some who retired from the Agapémone blame his followers as much as they do Prince. Said one of them, 'They were simply mad about him, and were ready to fall down and worship him as if he were God.' Letters passed through the post addressed to 'Our Holy Lord God at Spaxton.' There is no evidence that Prince objected to this profane and wicked adulation. He stood at his throne in the auditorium, defying all the powers of evil—sin, death, hell, the devil,—speaking as if he were master of all, until the doubters among the assembly quailed and trembled lest sudden judgment should fall upon him and upon them. He announced that neither he nor any that attached themselves to him could die, or suffer grief or sickness, because the Lord had come in his person to redeem the flesh. He began to set up royal state. Having purchased the Queen-Dowager's

ghibourhood, accustomed to the element of fear to the spectacle. In 1851, when he brought a party of believers to see the Great Exhibition, he drove about the parks and streets in an open carriage, preceded and attended by outriders, all of them bareheaded because they were in the presence of 'The Lord.' After the catastrophe which we have now to relate, he fixed upon the title of 'The Beloved' as his own, because we are 'accepted in the Beloved.' His books and tracts were signed with a 'B,' as the initial letter of his pontifical title. Presentation copies bore the words 'From Beloved,' and the inscription, 'I have chosen you out of the world.'

It was inevitable that a movement begun in pride and profanity should develop into ungodliness. The habit of ostentation, luxury, boisterous hilarity, drinking to excess, gaiety, amusements, and the pursuit of wealth had become the order of the day. Disturbances arose out of lawsuits brought by some who seceded from the Agapémone, horror-stricken at what they had witnessed and suffered there. One of these cases, *Nottidge v. Prince* (British Museum, Vol. Law Reports, 29 L.J.Ch. 857) brought about a complete exposure of the methods by which Prince and his henchmen 'crept into houses, leading captive silly women,' and 'turning the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ into licentiousness.' The suit was heard before Vice-Chancellor Stuart in the Court of Chancery, and occupied in hearing June 4-8, and July 25, 1860, when judgment was given. The bill was filed to recover from Prince £5,723, the property of Louisa Jane Nottidge, and the like amounts on behalf of two of her sisters. The report of the trial is the most trustworthy and complete history of the shameful condition of the Agapémone from 1848 to 1860, when Prince was at the summit of his power and arrogance.

Whether Prince proclaimed or allowed 'free-love' at the Agapémone cannot be proved. But the cross-examination in Court revealed the fact that, up to 1856, at any rate, grave disorders occurred, and the Vice-Chancellor referred in the strongest terms to the disgraceful revelations.

We have said that there is much in Prince's writings that is commendable and edifying. In the *Journal* of three years' spiritual experience he bows low before God under the sense of sin, or enjoys ecstatic communion with his Saviour. The



*Man Christ Jesus* is an enthusiastic review of the life of the Lord, though verbose, dreamy, obscure, and exclamatory,—exhausting all the Orientalism of Holy Scripture that can be used in a luscious and erotic sense to express devotion to Christ. *Leaves from the Tree of Life*, and *The Shutters taken down from the Windows of Heaven* contain much that needs to be said in regard to spiritual, as opposed to sacerdotal, religion. But the books, like the man himself, are stealthily and deceptive. While devout Christians can approve large portions of his writings, the latter are completely marred by the sudden introduction of his own theories, and by the application to himself personally of the words used by our Lord about His own nature and work. Next to the *Journal* the most important book is *The Counsel of God in Judgment*, or *Br. Prince's Testimony to the Closing of the Gospel Dispensation*, published when he was 77 years old. It declares the doom of Christendom, the fulfilment of all grace in Prince, his rejection by the Church, and the consequent withdrawal of the Holy Ghost from the Church and the world to Prince and the Agapēmone. But he will have to be judged by *The Little Book Open*. The note to the copy in the British Museum, 4th October 1856, is that an order went forth from the Agapēmone that all copies should be destroyed,—so strong was the public sentiment about it. It consists of a collection of the 'Voices.' In one of them Prince profanely manipulates Holy Scripture to cover and justify his own adulteries. All this loathsome uncleanness stands dressed in fervid and glowing language which vainly endeavours to conceal its crime.

After the trial in the Chancery Court, comparative silence fell upon the Agapēmone. Prince lived a very retired life. The funds of the brotherhood also seemed to be failing them, until in the late eighties a windfall came in the person of a wealthy London merchant, who presented to Prince all his property, and served the brotherhood in the humble capacity of butler. For the last ten years of his life Prince was very feeble. He outlived all his principal followers. He was buried on the 11th of January 1899, in the grounds behind the Agapēmone.

In 1890 and for a few years later there was a remarkable recrudescence of this fanaticism. Several prominent members of the Salvation Army cast in their lot with Prince. A mission to Norway was reported to be very successful. But, above all, Clapton, in the N.E. of London, became the scene of this renewed activity. The 'Children of the Resurrection,' as they named themselves, built, in 1892, 'The Ark of the Covenant,' an elaborate structure, seating about 400 persons, at a cost of £16,000. The preacher, at its opening in 1896, was the Rev. J. H. Smyth-Pigott, the official successor of Prince. Smyth-Pigott, who is of good family, was formerly a curate of St. Jude's, Mildmay Park. He has also served in the Salvation Army. In his opening sermon he declared he expected Christ to come that very day to judgment, but did not explain why, in that case, this expensive church was being dedicated. In September 1902, Smyth-Pigott proclaimed himself to be Jesus Christ; with the result that most riotous scenes took place for several weeks.

Since the tumultuous scenes which accompanied the making of this announcement, Smyth-Pigott has lived in retirement at his house in Upper Clapton, or at the Agapēmone at Spaxton, worshipped as Divine by the little company who accept his pretensions. 'The Ark of the Covenant' remained closed to the public during 1903 and 1904, private services being held at rare intervals. It needs only to be added that the present tenants of the Agapē-

mone are a quiet, blameless, and elderly company, numbering about 35 persons, whose praise is sung throughout the whole neighbourhood for their unquestioned piety and fervent charity [1907].

LITERATURE.—Prince's own *Journal*: or, *An Account of the Destruction of the Works of the Devil in the Human Soul*, by the Lord Jesus Christ, through the Gospel, published in 1859, but relating to the period between 1835 and 1839, also *The Charlynych Retiral*: or, *An Account of the Remarkable Work of Grace at Charlynych*, 1842; J. G. Dick, *A Word of Warning: The Heresy of Mr. Prince*, London, 1845; Rees, *The Rise and Progress of the Heresy of Rev. F. Prince*, 1845; Piers, *The Door not Shut*: or, *Mr. Prince to be a True F. Prince*, 1845; *Spiritual Wires*, chapter on Visit to the Agapēmone, 1865; Prince, *A Hook in the Nose of Leviathan*, 1877, also, *A Sword in the Heart of Leviathan*, 1877, and *The Man Christ Jesus*, London, 1886; *The Counsel of God in Judgment*: or, *Br. Prince's Testimony to the Closing of the Gospel Dispensation, and the Revelation of Jesus Christ as the Son of Man*, 1887; also a variety of pamphlets of a painful nature, printed for private circulation only.

EDWIN J. LUKES.

AGAPETÆ.—A name applied to female Christian ascetics who lived together with men, although both parties had taken the vow of continency, and were animated with the earnest desire to keep it. They were also known by the nickname of *Virgines Subintroductæ* or *Syneisaktōi*, which arose at a comparatively late date, after the custom had fallen into disfavour, and has tended not a little to confuse the judgment regarding this form of sexual asceticism. In reality, this spiritual marriage was one of the most remarkable phenomena which asceticism called forth on Christian soil—a fruit of overwhelming enthusiasm for the ascetic ideal. Our sources justify us in saying that the custom was widespread during the whole of Christian antiquity. In Antioch the bishop Paul of Samosata had several young maidens in his immediate neighbourhood (Eusebius, *HE* vii. 30. 12 ff.). At the time of Cyprian, virgins who were dedicated to God lived in the most intimate relationship with confessors, priests, and laymen (*Epist.* 4. 13. 14); and the rigorous Tertullian advises well-to-do Christians to take into their houses one or more widows 'as spiritual spouses,' who were 'beautiful by their faith, endowed with their poverty, sealed by their age.' . . . 'It is well pleasing to God to have several such wives' (*de Exhort. Castit.* 12; *de Monog.* 16). We hear the same regarding heretics: several heads of the Valentinian sect lived together with 'sisters' (Irenæus, *Hær.* i. 6. 3), the Montanist martyr Alexander was united in spiritual marriage with a prophetess (Euseb. *HE* v. 18. 6 ff.), and the Marcionite Apelles had in the same way two spiritual wives, one of whom was the prophetess Philumene (Tertullian, *de Præscr.* 30).

As spiritual marriage arose from ascetic motives, it had its proper place in monasticism, and has there preserved its original form. From the first initiators or forerunners of the monastic life onwards—among the Encratites of Tatian, the Origenists and Hieracites—to the anchorites whom Jerome and Gregory knew, we hear again and again that many monks lived together with women, and we need not wonder if we meet with traces of *Syneisaktism* proper on monastic soil till late in the Middle Ages. In the desert, where the ascetic was alone with his companion, the relation often took the form of the woman becoming his servant, and assisting him in the many varied ways in which the man of antiquity allowed himself to be waited on by his servants. We must not, however, on this account allow ourselves to be misled as to the main point, viz. that the reason why the monk and the nun had retired into the desert is to be sought in their ascetic ideal, which they had in common, and which they aimed at realizing in separation from the world. In the struggle for life and in the conflict against their own flesh they



sought power in a union of souls, which was supposed to bring them nearer to God.

The old Irish Church had made this kind of asceticism a foundation-pillar of its organization. According to the primitive Christian custom, no difference was then made between man and woman (cf. Gal 3<sup>28</sup>), and both were allowed to take part in Church functions. In the monastic houses, moreover, the priestly monks lived together with the priestly nuns, according to an old anonymous reporter, up to the year 543: '*Mulierum administrationem et consortia non respuebant, quia super petram Christi fundati ventum tentationis non timebant*' (Haddan-Stubbs, *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents*, ii. 2, p. 292). At the time, too, when the Irish, with their mission, undertook a forward movement towards Brittany, the Gallican bishops found it especially blameworthy in the incomers that they were accompanied by women, who, like the men, assumed to themselves sacramental functions (cf. the letter of the three bishops in the *Revue de Bretagne et de Vendée*, 1885, i. p. 5 ff.); they did not know that the Irish-Breton Church had preserved customs and principles of the most ancient Christian Church.

After the well-to-do circles in the large cities had become Christian, there was developed a new form of spiritual marriage. It happened frequently that rich widows and young women, in accordance with the tendency of the time, refused marriage, and in order to provide a master for their large houses, caused clergymen or monks to bind themselves to them in spiritual marriage. This is a variety of Syneisaktism, but an unfortunate one. The rôles seem to be reversed. The woman had the upper hand, because she remained the mistress of her large possessions, and in addition she enjoyed the repute of virginity. On the other hand, the position of the priest was difficult, and often precarious. However seriously asceticism and the union of souls might be taken, still the fact could not be lost sight of that the priest was a subordinate, and his position may have varied between house steward, domestic chaplain, and spiritual lover. This is the rôle which the *abbé* in France had in the 17th and 18th centuries. At the time of Chrysostom this evil custom was widespread in Constantinople (Migne, *xviii. col. 495 ff.*); likewise at the same time in Gaul, as Jerome (*Ep. 117*) discloses. It is therefore to be regarded as a peculiar product of Christianity.

The spiritual marriage of the clergy is most frequently mentioned, and therefore best known; so much so that it has been widely believed that only the clergy of the ancient Church lived with Syneisaktoi. And it cannot be denied that the custom, just as in the case of Monasticism, found its especial home here. It stands parallel with celibacy, which, in like manner, in Christianity was not created for the clergy, but none the less became a ruling custom among them, and at a later date was elevated to a law, because people judged marriage to be inferior, and imposed the highest and most ideal demands on the clergy. Now, as the clergy who withdrew from marriage became more numerous, their choice of a companion for spiritual wedlock, in order professedly to live a life of asceticism, was of much more frequent occurrence. And as time went on, the ideal nature of the relationship seems to have disappeared in face of practical motives. Out of the ascetic and the bride of the soul there arose imperceptibly the housekeeper, who was suspected to be also the mistress. No doubt the common judgment on this form of asceticism had changed in course of time. Men's minds had become more alert and sane, and the priest who lived together with a woman was looked on with other eyes than at an earlier date. It

seems, however, as if Syneisaktism itself had degenerated. The housekeepers of the clergy were called *mulieres extraneæ*, and placed on the same footing as servant maids. Spanish synods, about the year 600, even ordered that the *extraneæ* should be sold as slaves, and the proceeds given to the poor (*can. 5 Toledo, 589; can. 3 Hispalis, 590; can. 42, 43 Toledo, 633*). In the Decretals of Gregory IX., iii. 2, *de cohabitatione clericorum et mulierum*, the concubinage of the clergy is forbidden. In the East the same development can be proved. Even in the later synods the Syneisaktoi are alluded to; but it is evident that it was really a question of female servants of the clergy; and to the Greek canonists of the 12th cent. the name Syneisaktos means no more than the housekeeper of a clergyman. Syneisaktism must, therefore, have undergone a transition. Even in the later centuries clergy lived together with women without being married to them, just as in earlier times; but people regarded this living together differently. In the early times man and woman had taken the vow of virginity, and had struggled in a union of souls to attain the common ideal; in later times the practical requirements of life came to the front. The clergyman needed a woman to look after his household, who was faithful and devoted to him. The natural way of marriage was barred to him by the ordinance of celibacy; but if he took a young woman into his house without marrying her, he was exposed to evil report. Without doubt, even in later times the ideal motives of the community of life may in many cases have been alive, as formerly. On the whole, the development which has been sketched is thoroughly natural. An ascetic enthusiasm which proposes to itself such high aims must, in the course of time, evaporate and make room for the sober realities of the day. Such an heroic ideal may perhaps be suitable as a way to heaven for a few specially favoured natures; but it becomes questionable, and even pernicious, as soon as it is made a rule to be followed by a large class of men.

The different forms of Syneisaktism arose under the influence of social conditions. In the loneliness of the desert, the nun became the maid-servant of the hermit; in the cities and villages, the soul-friend of the well-to-do priest degenerated into his housekeeper, just as, on the other hand, rich widows assigned to their spiritual friends the rôle of steward; and if in Ireland monks and nuns lived together in large companies, that was caused by the peculiar conditions of the Irish missionary church, which was a monastic church. The difference of the forms, however, allows us to see plainly the original form. The original motive was in all cases a religious one—more precisely, an ascetic one; brotherly love was supposed to take the place of the love of marriage. Syneisaktism was the natural product of two opposing tendencies in ancient Christianity. On the one hand, brotherly love, in all its forms of expression, was most highly prized, so that it was declared to be the proper palladium of religion (cf. 1 Co 13), and the exclusiveness of the small and intimate congregations favoured the rise of a narrow social life and close friendly relationship between Christians who were widely separated in age and social position. We can see, from the example of the Irish religious houses, how great an influence the idea of community must have had. On the other hand, there was a strong aversion, based on religious feelings, to sexual intercourse. Marriage was regarded as a not very honourable concession to the sensual nature of mankind, and people revered the ascetics without inquiring what sacrifices they paid for their ideals. Owing to the conflict of social ideals, which bound men most closely with each

other and yet threatened to estrange man and woman, there arose the unnatural combination of asceticism and brotherly love, which meets us in Syneisaktism. A form of intimate social life of the sexes was created, which was not marriage either in reality or in intention, and was blind to its own dangers, because those who adopted it trusted everything, even the quite impossible, to the power of the Spirit animating the Christian.

Thus it is only natural that it was just the spiritually elevated Christians, the leaders of the communities—the prophets, confessors, bishops, and clergy—who lived in spiritual marriage. In the same way the *uzores spirituales* of the earlier times were always such women as enjoyed a special position of honour in the community as ‘brides of Christ,’—the virgins, widows, or even prophetesses. What they undertook was not hidden in a corner, but was generally admired as a glorious example of Christian love and continency. But in course of time the judgment of the ancient Church regarding the Syneisaktioi changed.

Hermas seems to regard spiritual marriage, in all its forms, as a precious characteristic of the life of the Christian community (*Simil.* x. 3). Irenæus does not disapprove of it (*Hæres.* l. ii. 3. 1). Tertullian regards it as the most desirable form of cohabitation of man and woman (see above). Paul of Samosata values it highly, and practices it himself. His opponents at the Synod of Antioch (Eusebius, *HE* vii. 20. 12 ff.), and, shortly before that, Cyprian (*Ep.* 4. 13. 10), are the first to express themselves against it. The Synods of the 4th cent.—Elvira *can.* 27, Ancyra *can.* 19, and Nicea *can.* 8—prohibit the clergy to have women in their houses, and after that date prohibitions of Syneisaktism are never absent from the Church ordinances. In cases of disobedience the clergy are punished or even deposed. In the case of laymen or monks, strict admonitions are, as a rule, regarded as sufficient.

The different attitudes taken up by the Church on the question are explained by the development which she had undergone. In the first three centuries she had spread very widely, and the communities had in places become very numerous. There were many elements in her that did not take the moral precepts of Christianity seriously. The strict prohibitions regarding sins of the flesh were, owing to the necessity of the case, weakened and modified in the 3rd century. The Roman bishop Callistus likened the Church to Noah's ark, in which there were clean and unclean beasts (Hippolyt. *Philos.* ix. 12). Then such a custom as spiritual marriage had to be abolished,—a custom which, if feasible at all, was so only in small intimate communities, where each one knew the other and all were under supervision and discipline. It proved, however, excessively difficult to root out Syneisaktism, as we may learn from the ever repeated prohibitions, which become more and more strict as time goes on. How very deep the opposition to it went can be gathered from the fact that the later bishop of Antioch, Leontius, castrated himself in order to be permitted to retain his house companion. Yet people were in many places convinced of the innocence and the justice of such a relationship, and even produced proofs from writers who justified the Syneisaktioi by quoting Biblical examples from the Old and New Testaments (Achelid, *Virg. Subintroduct.* p. 42 f.).

That spiritual marriage was in course of time regarded in a different light, is proved further by the changes of designation.

Tertullian calls the female ascetic, who lives with a man, his *uzor spiritualis*—which is the appropriate name in the sense of early days. Then there occurs the term *conhospita*. The spiritual marriage . . . . . On the other hand, the in . . . . . friends of Paul of . . . . . name afterwards . . . . . with like-minded male friends. The term was carried over into the Latin Church in the translation *subintroducta* (Roman Synod a. 743 in Mansi, xii. 331). More frequently still the general designation, *mulieris extraneæ*, is used.

In regard to the question of the age of spiritual marriage, the *Shepherd* of Hermas comes especially

under consideration. Hermas knows the custom of Christian men and women being united to each other by a bond of special affinity, even when they are separated from each other by all kinds of relationships in life (*Vis.* i. 1. 1); he presupposes that virgins find shelter in the houses of Christian brothers (*Sim.* x. 3); and, finally, knows the intimate forms of intercourse which were usual between the spiritually betrothed (*Sim.* ix. 11. 3, 7). He reports, of course, not facts but visions, but he would not have been able to introduce the situations he describes in such a matter-of-fact way, if he had not regarded them as characteristics of Christian brotherly love, of which he was proud.

The passage 1 Co 7 has also to be considered, since it has been brought by Ed. Grafe into connexion with the question of the Syneisaktioi. According to the interpretation suggested by Grafe, 1 Co 7<sup>23</sup> refers to the awakening love between a Christian householder and a young girl residing in his house, who are bound by a common vow; the Apostle recommends that an end be put to the precarious situation by marriage. But, on the other hand, in v. 27 he praises the Christian who, in the like situation, understands how to control himself; while v. 28 unites both decisions. The matter, then, does not concern father and daughter, as has generally been held by exegetes, but is a case of spiritual marriage—the same situation as we found above in the case of the bishop and clergy of Antioch, as we must presuppose in Hermas, and as we saw in the letters of Cyprian. What was so inevitable took place at Corinth (although it was avoided in other places), viz. that the peculiar relation between the guardian and his spiritual bride became too intimate to be endurable for any length of time. According to Grafe, St. Paul advised both to marry, while the present writer finds it more in accordance with the wording of the text (cf. the repeated *γυναικα*) and also with the supposed situation, to think that he advised the young woman to leave the house and be married to some other Christian. If the words of St. Paul have a concrete case of Syneisaktism in view, such as prevailed at the episcopal court of Antioch, that is almost the only conceivable solution. In ancient times young girls were married without much ceremony, and for a female ascetic, who had had a disappointing experience, a marriage was certainly the best way. It must, however, be granted that this interpretation of the passage in Corinthians is not beyond question, especially as the text is not quite certain.

Lastly, the *de Vita Contemplativa* must be mentioned. This may be regarded as a genuine work of Philo. The Therapeutæ in Egypt, who are there described, and who tabued marriage and sexual enjoyment, lived in union with female companions, just as the Christian monks did at a later date. It is the same combination of sexual asceticism and brotherly communion as in Syneisaktism, only that the personal intimacy between the individual pairs is wanting; the brotherly love is just the specifically Christian factor in the spiritual marriage. This makes it possible to place the beginnings of Syneisaktism in the Apostolic Age. The ascetic cohabitation of man and woman had already had its prototype in Hellenistic Judaism. It can, however, on more general grounds, hardly be doubted that spiritual marriage with its extravagances belongs to the earliest Christian times, when ‘the Spirit’ ruled the community, and the ‘first love’ still burned. At that time the communities were small and intimate, and had had no disappointing experiences with regard to themselves; asceticism made its way into the Church; and so all the conditions for the rise of Syneisaktism were present. This must be so if Syneisaktism is conceived of, as it has been by us above, as

an attempt to substitute for marriage Christian brotherly love. If we seek to derive it, in the way formerly adopted, from the celibacy of the clergy or from Monasticism, then we are driven to a much later date for its origin. But in face of the testimony of the most ancient Christian authors, that can hardly be maintained.

LITERATURE.—The question was first raised by Henry Dodwell, *Dissertationes Cyprianicae*, iii. (Oxford, 1682). Thereupon a small literature on the subject grew up. The titles of the contributions are given by J. E. Volbeding, *Index dissertationum* (Lipsia, 1849), p. 167. So far as is known to the present writer, all the authors held Syncretism to be an error of the corrupt Church of the 3rd century. The above mentioned discussion of 1 Co 7<sup>36-39</sup> by Ed. Gräfe, 'Geistliche Verhältnisse bei Paulus,' followed a notice of Weizsäcker, and

aktism given above is proved in  
Subintroduction; Ein Beitrag zu

AGARĪA, AGAR, AGARĪ.—An Indian tribe which, at the Census of 1901, numbered 270,370, of whom the vast majority are found in Bombay, the Central Provinces, and Bengal, with a few in other parts of N. India. The ethnography of this tribe is very obscure, and, as collected under one heading in the Census returns, it includes at least three different communities, who may, however, agree in being of common Dravidian or Mundā origin. In Chota Nāgpur and the adjoining district of Mirzapur the AgarĪa practise the old rude Dravidian method of smelting iron. In the Tributary Mahāls of Bengal and in the Sambalpur district of the Central Provinces they are a fair, good-looking race, who claim to have once been Rājputs in the neighbourhood of Agra, whence they say they derive their name. The legend runs that they refused to bow the head before the Muhammadan emperor of Delhi, and were compelled to leave their original settlements and migrate southwards. These the Census returns describe under the name of *Aghariā*, in order to distinguish them from the *AgarĪa*, who are pure Dravidians. In the Mandla district of the same province they are described as a subdivision of the Gonds (wh. see), and among the laziest and most drunken of that race. In Bombay another branch practise in some places the business of salt-making, and derive their name from the pit (Hind. Mahr. *agar*, Skr. *ākara*, 'a mine') in which the brine is evaporated.

It is only the tribe in Chota Nāgpur and the immediate neighbourhood that preserves its original beliefs. Generally they have a well-marked totemistic division into sub-castes; a vague form of ancestor-worship, which is confined to propitiating the dead of the preceding generation; and a respect for the Sāl tree (*Shorea robusta*), which is used at their marriages. In Mirzapur they neglect the ordinary Hindu gods, and have a special worship of Lohāsūr Devī, the Mother-goddess who presides over the smelting furnace. To her the *baigā*, or village officiant, sacrifices a goat which has never borne a kid, and burns a few scraps of cake, the meat and the remainder of the bread being consumed by the worshippers. In Palamāu, according to Forbes, their worship is of a still lower type. 'They appear,' he writes, 'to have no deities, and to have no knowledge of the Supreme Being, though some of them appear to have heard of the universal Devī; but I do not think they worshipped her in any way. On certain days of the year they offer up sacrifices to propitiate the spirits of the departed members of the family.' This ceremony is called *Mūā*, i.e. 'the Dead.' They generally also worship the Dih or local gods of the village in which they happen to settle. In Bengal their women have the reputation of being notorious witches. Dalton was told that 'in Gangpur there are old women, professors of witchcraft, who stealthily instruct the

young girls. The latter are all eager to be taught, and are not considered proficient till a fine forest tree, selected to be experimented upon, is destroyed by the potency of their "mantras" or charms, so that the wife a man takes to his bosom has probably done her tree, and is confident in the belief that she can, if she pleases, dispose of her husband in the same manner if he makes himself obnoxious.'

A closely allied tribe of the E. Mundās in Lohārdaga—the Asurs, who speak the same language as the AgarĪa—worship Andhariyā Devatā, the Earth-god. The sacrificer places a fowl with its head on the anvil, and, holding it in position with the forge pincers, strikes its head with a hammer, praying that the goddess will protect the worshipper from injury by the sparks which fly from red-hot iron. These people also worship Bōr Pahārī Bōṅā, the great Hill-god, with the sacrifice of a brown goat, and Pandrā Devatā, the Sun, with a mottled fowl.

The AgarĪa of the Central Provinces and the allied tribe in Bombay are practically Hindus, worshipping in particular Hanumānta, the monkey-god, and all the village gods and goddesses. But they still preserve traces of the original pre-Aryan beliefs in representing these deities by stones and white ant hills, and by performing their worship through their own headman, and not by a Brāhman officiant.

LITERATURE.—For Bengal and the United Provinces: Dalton, *Ethnology of Bengal* (1872), 196, 322 ff.; Forbes, *Settlement Report on Palamāu*, quoted in *North Indian Notes and Queries*, iv. 43; Crooke, *Tribes and Castes* (1896) i. 1 ff. For Central Provinces: *Census Report*, 1901, i. 196, 322 ff.; *Gazetteer*, i. 273 f. 457. For Bombay: *Gazetteer*, xv. pt. i. 360. For the Asurs: *JASB* lvii. pt. i. 8; *Census Report*, 1901, i. 283.

W. CROOKE.

AGASTYA (or Agasti).—The reputed author of some Vedic hymns (*Rigveda*, i. 165-191). In the *Rigveda* he is sometimes mentioned, and some particulars are alluded to, notably his miraculous origin and his relation to Lopāmudrā, his wife (see E. Sieg, *Sagenstoffe des Rigveda*, i. 105-129). In Hindu mythology\* he is regarded as the patron saint of Southern India, where places sacred to him abound; still, his hermitage was shown on the Yamunā near Prayāga.† He originated from the seed of Mitra and Varuṇa, which they had dropped into a water-jar on seeing the heavenly nymph Ūrvaśī.‡ From his double parentage he is called Maitrāvaruṇi, and from his being born from a jar he got the names Kumbha-sambhava, Kalasayoni, and similar ones denoting 'jar-born.' A Vedic name of Agastya is Mānya.

Agastya, growing old as an ascetic, was admonished by his ancestors to beget a son in order to save himself and them from perdition. He therefore produced, by magic power, a beautiful maiden, Lopāmudrā, from the best part of all creatures, and gave her to the king of Vidarbha to be his daughter. Nobody daring, on account of her supernatural beauty, to pretend to her hand, Agastya at last demanded her in marriage. The king, fearing his wrath, acceded to his wish, and Lopāmudrā became the wife of the ascetic. When, however, after a course of penances in Gangādvāra, Agastya desired to embrace his wife, she refused to do his will unless she was decked out in such splendid robes and costly ornaments as she had been accustomed to in her father's house. In order to satisfy her demand, Agastya applied to different kings for treasures; but he ascertained that their budgets were just balanced, so that they might not bestow wealth on him. On their advice and in their company he went to the king of Manimatī, the Dānava Ilvala, who was famous for his riches.

\* See Holtzmann's paper on Agastya in the *Mahābhārata* in *ZDMG* xxiv. p. 589 ff.

† *Mahābhārata*, iii. 87.

‡ *Bṛhaddevatā*, v. 30; *Rāmāyaṇa*, vii. 57.

Now Ilvala, an enemy of the Brāhman, had a brother, Vātāpi, whom, on the arrival of a Brāhman, he used to kill and then to prepare as a meal. When the unsuspecting guest had finished his dinner, Ilvala, by his magical power, called Vātāpi to life again, and in this way killed his victim. The Dānava tried this trick on Agastya, but his incantation failed to revive Vātāpi, whom Agastya had already completely digested. So Ilvala was fain to give Agastya such treasures as satisfied the desires of Lopāmudrā. According to the *Rāmāyana* (iii. 11. 66), however, Agastya, on this occasion, reduced the Dānava to ashes by fire issuing from his eye. The Rīṣi had by Lopāmudrā a son called Drdhasyu or Idhmavāha.\*

Another famous deed of Agastya was his having caused the fall of Nahuṣa.

When, after vanquishing Vṛtra, Indra, polluted with the sin of *brahmaṇatya*, or killing of a Brāhman, fled and hid himself, the gods made Nahuṣa ruler of the skies. But Nahuṣa soon became overbearing and desired to make Sachi, Indra's wife, his own. She, however, would not consent unless he came to her on a car drawn by the seven Rīṣis. Nahuṣa therefore yoked them to his car, and made them draw it. During his ride, he, for some cause, differently stated in different places, kicked Agastya on the head, whereupon the Rīṣi turned him, by his curse, into a serpent, until Yudhiṣṭhira should release him from the curse.†

Most frequently Agastya is mentioned in Sanskrit works as having stayed the abnormal growth of the Vindhya range, and as having drunk up the ocean.

The Vindhya was jealous of Mount Meru, round which sun and moon and stars were always revolving. In order to force the heavenly bodies to go round him too, Vindhya began to grow, and rose to such a height that the gods became alarmed. They therefore asked Agastya to prevent the mountain from obstructing the path of the sun. Accordingly the Rīṣi went with his family to the Vindhya, and, pretending to have something to do in the South, he asked the mountain to cease growing till he should return; and when the Vindhya had agreed, he passed on and took up his abode in the South for ever.† His hermitage was near the Godavari and Pampa, where Rāma and Sītā were his guests.‡ The *Rāmāyana*, however, takes apparently no heed of Agastya's resolve never to leave the South, for in Bk. vii. it is related that he visited Rāma in Ayodhyā, and there told him the early history of Rāvana and Hanuman.

The drinking up of the ocean is thus related in the *Mahābhārata* (iii. 103 ff.):

The Kālākeyas or Kālejas, a class of Asuras, had fought under Vṛtra against the gods. After the death of their leader they hid themselves in the ocean where the gods could not reach them; and determined to extirpate the Brāhman and holy men; for thus, they thought, they would bring about the end of the world. The gods, alarmed by their raids, were advised by Viṣṇu to implore Agastya for help. The Rīṣi, accordingly, drank up the water of the ocean and thus laid bare the Kālākeyas, who were then slain by the gods. The ocean continued a void till Bhagiratha led the Gaṅgā to it and thus filled it again with water.

A curious trait of our saint is that he was a famous hunter and archer. For this reason, probably, Manu (v. 22) adduces Agastya as an authority for killing deer and birds for sacrificial purposes and for servants' food.

After his death Agastya was placed among the stars|| as Canopus, the most brilliant star in the southern heavens except Sirius. The heliacal rising of this star, while the sun is in the asterism Hastā, marks the setting in of autumn after the close of the rains.¶

Agastya seems, in popular belief, to represent that force of nature which makes an end of the monsoon,—in mythological language, drinks up the waters of the ocean,—and which brings back the sun, temporarily hidden by the clouds of the rainy season, or, turned mythologically, stays the growth of Vindhya obstructing the path of the sun. As a rain-godling, 'who is supposed to have power

to stop the rain,' he is still invoked in Muzaffarnagar.\*

In Southern India, Agastya 'is venerated as the earliest teacher of science and literature'; he is the reputed author of many Tamil works; 'he is believed to be still alive, though invisible to ordinary eyes, and to reside somewhere on the fine conical mountain in Travancore commonly called Agastya's hill, from which the Porunei, or Tāmraparni, the sacred river of Tinneveli, takes its rise.'† See also VEDIC RELIGION (4 Bb).

H. JACOBI.

AGE.—In most animals there is a normal specific size to which the great majority of the adult members of the species closely approximate. In a large collection representing a species there may be a few giants and a few dwarfs, but most of the members show a close approximation to the same limit of growth, and there are good reasons for believing that the normal specific size is *adaptive*, i.e. that it has been slowly established in the course of selection as the fittest size for the given organization and the given conditions of life. In some cases, e.g. many fishes, there is no such definite limit of growth; thus haddocks are often found as large as cods.

Similarly, in many animals that have been carefully studied, we find that there is a normal potential duration of life,—an age which is rarely exceeded, though it may be seldom attained. This normal 'lease of life' is in most cases known only in a general way, though in many cases we are able to say that the living creature in question never lives *longer* than a few months, or a year, or a few years. Statistics from forms kept in captivity are obviously vitiated by the artificial conditions, and the life of animals in their natural conditions is so often ended by a 'violent death'—coming sooner or later according to the varying intensity of the struggle for existence—that it is difficult to say what the normal potential duration of life really is. But a critical survey of a large body of facts led Weismann in his essay on 'The Duration of Life' (1889) to the conclusion that this, like size, is an adaptive character, gradually defined by selection in relation to the external conditions of life.

Attempts have often been made to correlate the duration of life with certain structural and functional characteristics of the type discussed, e.g. with size, with the duration of the growing period, with rapidity or sluggishness of life, but none of these correlations can be generalized, and there is much to be said for Weismann's more cautious thesis, that the length of life is determined in relation to the needs of the species. Given a certain rate of reproduction and a certain average mortality, the duration of life that survives is that which is fittest to the conditions. (See ADAPTATION.) In the same essay Weismann pointed out that unicellular organisms, which have no 'body' to keep up, which can continually make good their waste by repair, and which have very simple inexpensive modes of reproduction, are practically 'immortal,' i.e. they are not subject to *natural* death as higher organisms are. Epigrammatically expressed, natural death is the price paid for a 'body.'

In the case of man, we must clearly distinguish between the *average specific longevity*, about 34 years in Europe—but happily raisable with decreasing infantile mortality, improved sanitation, decreasing warfare, increasing temperance and carefulness,—and the *potential specific longevity*, which for the present race is normally between.

\* *Mahābhārata*, iii. 95-99.

† *Mahābhārata*, v. 17 ff., xii. 342 ff.; and, with some variations, xiii. 69 ff.

‡ *Mahābhārata*, iii. 103.

§ *Rāmāyana*, iii. 11; *Kādambarī*, ed. Peterson, p. 21 ff.

¶ *Taittirīya Aranyaka*, i. 11. 2.

¶ *Varāha Mihira, Bhāt Saṁhitā*, xii. 7 ff.

\* Crooke, *The Popular Religion and Folklore of Northern India*, i. 76.

† Caldwell, *Compar. Gram. of Dravidian Languages* 2, 1191.

seventy and one hundred years. There is no warrant for fixing any precise limit, either for the past or the future. All that we can scientifically say is that there are few well-established instances of a greater human longevity than 104 years. Sir George Cornewall Lewis did good service (1862) in destructively criticising numerous alleged cases of centenarianism, the occurrence of which he at first regarded as quite unproved, but even he finally admitted that men do sometimes reach a hundred years, and that some have reached one hundred and three or four. The famous cases of Thomas Parr, Henry Jenkins, and the Countess of Desmond, said to be 152, 169, and 140 respectively, were ruled out of court by Mr. Thoms, who edited *Notes and Queries* at the time when Sir G. C. Lewis's wholesome scepticism created much stir. As man is a slowly varying organism, as regards physical characters at least, it is extremely unlikely that his longevity was ever much greater than it is now. Monsters in age and monsters in size are alike incredible.

Prof. E. Metchnikoff is one of the few modern biologists who would deal generously with Biblical and other old records of great human longevity. He apparently thinks there has been some misunderstanding in regard to Methuselah's 969 years and Noah's 950, but he accepts the great ages of 175, 180, and 147 years ascribed to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Similarly, he accepts the 185 years with which St. Mungo of Glasgow has been credited. And as he is generous in regard to the past, he is hopeful in regard to the future, believing that a more careful and temperate life, as well as an enlightened recognition of the disharmonies of our bodily frame, may bring about a time when man will no longer, as Buffon says, 'die of disappointment,' but attain everywhere 'a hundred years.' 'Humanity,' Metchnikoff says, 'would make a great stride towards longevity could it put an end to syphilis, which is the cause of one-fifth of the cases of arterial sclerosis. The suppression of alcoholism, the second great factor in the production of senile degeneration of the arteries, will produce a still more marked extension of the term of life. Scientific study of old age and of the means of modifying its pathological character will make life longer and happier.' He also quotes the theoretically simple conclusion of Pflüger's essay on 'The Art of prolonging Human Life':—'Avoid the things that are harmful, and be moderate in all things.'

A fact of much interest is the statistical evidence that such a subtle character as 'longevity,' that is to say, a tendency to a certain lease of life, be it long or short, is heritable like other inborn characters, though it rests, of course, to some extent with the individual or his environment to determine whether the inherited tendency is realized or not. Just as stature is a heritable quality, so is potential longevity, but the degree of expression is in part determined by 'nurture'—taking the word in the widest sense.

There is, as we have hinted, reason to believe that natural death is not to be regarded simply as an intrinsic necessity—the fate of all life; we can carry the analysis further, and say that it is incident on the complexity of the bodily machinery, which makes complete recuperation well-nigh impossible, and almost forces the organism to accumulate arrears, to go into debt to itself; that it is incident on the limits which are set to the multiplication and renewal of cells within the body, thus nerve-cells in higher animals cannot be added to after an early stage in development; and it is

incident on the occurrence of organically expensive modes of reproduction, for reproduction is often the beginning of death. At the same time, it seems difficult to rest satisfied with these and other physiological reasons, and we fall back on the selectionist view that the duration of life has been, in part at least, punctuated from without and in reference to large issues; it has been gradually regulated in adaptation to the welfare of the species.

It seems to us suggestive to recognize four categories of phenomena in connexion with age. The first is that of the immortal unicellular animals which never grow old, which seem exempt from natural death. The second is that of many wild animals, which reach the length of their life's tether without any hint of ageing, and pass off the scene—or are shoved off—victims of violent death. In many fishes and reptiles, for instance, which are old in years, there is not in their organs or tissues the least hint of age-degeneration. The third is that of the majority of civilized human beings, some domesticated, and some wild animals, in which the decline of life is marked by normal *senescence*. The fourth is that of many human beings, not a few domesticated animals, e.g. horse, dog, cat, and some semi-domesticated animals, notably bees, in which the close of life is marked by distinctively pathological *senility*. It seems certain that wild animals rarely exhibit more than a slight senescence, while man often exhibits a bathos of senility. What is the explanation of this?

The majority of wild animals seem to die a violent death, before there is time for senescence, much less senility. The character of old age depends upon the nature of the physiological bad debts, some of which are more unnatural than others, much more unnatural in tamed than in wild animals, much more unnatural in man than in animals. Furthermore, civilized man, sheltered from the extreme physical forms of the struggle for existence, can live for a long time with a very defective hereditary constitution, which may end in a period of very undesirable senility. Man is also very deficient in the resting instinct, and seldom takes much thought about resting habits. In many cases, too, there has come about in human societies a system of protective agencies which allow the weak to survive through a period of prolonged senility. We cannot, perhaps, do otherwise in regard to those we love; but it is plain that our better ambition would be to heighten the standard of vitality rather than merely to prolong existence, so that if we have an old age it may be without senility. Those whom the gods love die young.

LITERATURE.—Ebstein, *Die Kunst das menschliche Leben zu verlängern*, Wiesbaden, 1891; Flourens, *De la Longévité humaine*, Paris, 1835; G. M. Humphry, *Old Age, and Changes incidental to it*, Cambridge, 1835; E. Ray Lankester, 'Centenarianism,' in *The Advancement of Science*, London, 1899, also *Comparative Longevity in Man and Animals*, London, 1870; Lejoncourt, *Galerie des vieillards célèbres et modernes*, Paris, 1842; E. Metchnikoff, 'a Vieillesse,' in *Annales Inst. Pasteur*, p. 912, also *The Nature of Man* (tr. 1903), esp. ch. x., 'The Scientific Study of Old Age'; Karl Pearson, *The Chances of Death*, vol. 1., London, 1897; Pflüger, *Ueber die Kunst der Verlängerung des menschlichen Lebens*, Bonn, 1890; W. J. Thoms, *Human Longevity*, 1873; J. Arthur Thomson, 'On Growing Old,' in *London Quart. Rev.*, April 1903; H. de Varigny, art 'Croissance' in *Richet's Dict. de Physiologie*, iv., 1900; August Weismann, 'The Duration of Life,' in *Essays upon Heredity*, Oxford, 1889.

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AGED.—See ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE, OLD AGE.

## ✓ AGES OF THE WORLD.

Primitive (L. H. GRAY), p. 183.  
 Babylonian (A. JEREMIAS), p. 183.  
 Buddhist (L. DE LA V. POUSSIN), p. 187.  
 Christian (G. BONET-MAURY), p. 190.  
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Greek and Roman (K. F. SMITH), p. 192.  
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**AGES OF THE WORLD** (Primitive and American).—1. The conception of a series of cosmic eras, mutually related, yet separated from each other by cataclysms destroying the entire known world and forming the basis for an essentially new creation, is peculiar to a high degree of religious development. The idea of creation is common to practically all religious systems (see art. COSMOGONY), and at a later, though still relatively primitive, period is evolved the notion of a cosmic cataclysm which is to annihilate the world. Still later, it would seem, comes the doctrine that after this cosmic annihilation there is to be a new world, a belief which is found, for instance, in systems so divergent as the Iranian and the Norse. Closely connected with the belief in the regeneration of the world is the well-nigh universal doctrine that the entire earth has already been destroyed by a flood (see DELUGE). The theory of Ages of the World has been carried still further by the phase which holds that the present cosmic era has been preceded by others, and the Greek, Hindu, and Buddhist systems have even evolved a series of cycles each of which contains four Ages, and which have been and are to be repeated in infinite succession.

2. The most familiar example of the belief in Ages of the World is, of course, the philosophized Greek view presented by Hesiod (*Works and Days*, 109-201), according to whom there have been four Ages—golden, silver, brass, and iron—each worse than the one preceding. Equally pessimistic is the Hindu system of Ages, where the four *yugas*, or Ages of a 'day of Brahma' (12,000 years), are successively shorter in duration and increasingly degenerate. Among primitive peoples such a series of Ages of the World seems to be unknown, yet it is noteworthy that among the South American Indians it is generally held that the world has already been destroyed twice, once by fire and again by flood, as among the eastern Tupis and the Arawaks of Guiana. In like manner, the ancient Peruvians fancied not only that two cosmic cataclysms had occurred, but that the world was again to be destroyed, so that they stood in terror of every lunar and solar eclipse.

3. Outside the great culture nations of Asia, Northern Africa, and Europe, however, only the Aztecs of ancient Mexico, perhaps under the influence of the still more highly developed Mayas of Yucatan, evolved a doctrine of Ages of the World. This marvellous people held that the present era, which bore no special name, was preceded by four Ages or 'Suns': the Sun of Earth, the Sun of Fire, the Sun of Air, and the Sun of Water. Each of these cycles had been terminated by a fearful and universal cataclysm, and the Aztecs looked forward with dread to the end of the present era. At the close of each cycle of fifty-two years they were filled with special fear; every fire was extinguished, and all the priests, followed by the people, marched in solemn procession to a mountain two leagues from the capital. There they watched with bated breath for the rising of the Pleiades, and when this constellation was seen, the priests rekindled fires by the friction of two

pieces of wood, one of which was placed on the breast of a human sacrifice, while the multitude rejoiced in the assurance that the world would surely survive for another cycle of fifty-two years. It is noteworthy that Aztec sources vary widely with regard to both the length and the sequence of the cosmic eras, the latter being given not only as stated above, but also as Water, Air, Fire, Earth; Earth, Air, Fire, Water; Water, Earth, Air, Fire; and Water, Air, Earth, Fire. In like manner, the order of the cataclysms which terminated the several eras varies according to the different sources, but it is certain at least that the Sun of Earth was terminated by famine, the Sun of Fire by conflagration, the Sun of Air by a hurricane, and the Sun of Water by a flood.

4. The basis of this Aztec belief in Ages of the World is not altogether certain. It has been suggested that it was due, at least in part, to the tremendous natural phenomena of a tropical country, and also to the political and social revolutions which took place in ancient Mexico. The former explanation is doubtless the one to be preferred, implying a reminiscence of some remote catastrophe, mythopoetically magnified by successive generations, especially as this hypothesis also explains the characteristic South American belief in a twofold destruction of the world by fire and flood.

LITERATURE.—Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, iv, 161-163 (Leipzig, 1864); Brinton, *Myths of the New World*, pp. 229-233 (New York, 1876); Réville, *Native Religions of Mexico and Peru*, pp. 113-118 (London, 1884); Ehrenreich, *Mythen und Legenden der südamer. Urvölker*, pp. 30-31 (Berlin, 1905).

LOUIS H. GRAY.

**AGES OF THE WORLD** (Babylonian).—Even before the discovery of the cuneiform inscriptions, it was known that the Babylonians had reflected on the course of the world's history, and that they regulated the Ages of the World according to the movements of the planets. Seneca\* reports a statement of Berossus, who under the rule of the Seleucids was priest in the Marduk temple of Babylon, and whose lost historical work *Chaldaica* was intended to prove the commencement of a new world period under the Seleucids or under Alexander.

\*Berossus says that everything takes place according to the course of the planets, and he maintains this so confidently that he determines the times for the conflagration of the world and for the flood. He asserts that the world will burn when all the planets which now move in different courses come together in the Crab,† so that they all stand in a straight line in the same sign, and that the future flood will take place when the same conjunction occurs in Capricorn. For the former is the constellation of the summer solstice, the latter of the winter solstice; they are the decisive signs of the zodiac, because the turning-points of the year lie in them.

These accounts of Berossus have here, as well as in the narratives of the Creation and the Flood, been proved thoroughly reliable. The teaching which underlies them regarding the course of the world corresponds to the accounts which we can read from the cuneiform inscriptions.

\* *Fragm. Hist. Græc.* ii. 60.

† The sign of the Crab in the zodiac is the turning-point of the summer sun, if the vernal equinox lies in the Ram; the corresponding turning-point of the winter sun is Capricorn. Our calendar has retained the designations, although the vernal equinox has long ago moved into the Fish.

The Babylonian doctrine, which we find popularized in myths, dramatic and festive customs, and games, inquires into the origin of things and the development of the world from its beginnings in chaos to its renewal in future æons. The doctrine has spread over the whole world. We find it again in Egypt, in the religion of the Avesta, and in India; traces of it are discovered in China, as well as in Mexico and among the savage nations of South America. To refer these phenomena back to 'elementary ideas' (Bastian, *Völkeridees*), such as may arise independently among different peoples, will not hold good in view of the circumstance that we have to do with ideas connected with definite facts which rest on continued astronomical observations. Babylonia was, moreover, according to a constant tradition, the home of astronomy ('Chaldean wisdom'), and there the science of the stars formed the basis of all intellectual culture.

In the Babylonian conception of the universe, which regards everything earthly as a copy of a heavenly prototype, the zodiac is considered the most important part of the whole universe. The zodiac (*šupuk samē*) is the broad 'Way' on the heavens, c. 20 degrees, upon which the sun, the moon, Venus and the four other moving stars (planets) known to antiquity, trace out their course; while the other stars, the fixed stars, seem to stand still on the ball of the revolving heavens. The moving stars were regarded as interpreters of the Divine will. The heaven of fixed stars was related to them like a commentary written on the margin of a book of revelation.

The rulers of the zodiac are the sun, the moon, and Venus. In a mythological text (*WAI* iv. pl. 5) we are told that Bel placed them to rule the *šupuk samē*. The four remaining planets, Marduk-Jupiter, Nebo-Mercury, Ninib-Mars, and Nergal-Saturn, correspond to the quarter appearances of the three, and have their special place of revelation at the four quarter points of the cycle, or, speaking in terms of space, at the four corners of the world. Every one of the astral divinities represents the whole Divine power. Polytheism rests on myth, which popularizes the teaching, and on worship, which again is a product of the mythology. The temple-teaching at every place of worship serves to prove that the divinity reveals itself at a particular place in a definite form and shape, such as result from the relation of that place to the corresponding sacred region of the heavens (*τόπος*, *templum*). The local god is *summus deus* for the region; the other gods are like wonder-working saints.

Seeing, however, that the Divine power reveals itself in the zodiac, the theory involves a triadic conception of the godhead. The triad—sun, moon, and Venus—in their relation to each other, as well as each of these three bodies individually, comprehends the whole being of the godhead. In the case of every mythological phenomenon, the question must be raised whether the divinity in the particular place or in the expression of its worship stands for the sun, the moon, or the Venus-(Ištar-) character. In each case, however, the deity represents at the same time the whole cycle, which repeats its phenomena in every microcosm of the natural world. The same is true of Marduk, Nebo, Ninib, and Nergal. In the teaching of Babylon, which is best known to us, the chief points in the sun's track belong to them in a special sense as well as the quarter appearances of the sun's course. They can thus be designated sun-gods, but they can equally well be represented as forms of the moon or of Venus as they appear in their course. In like manner, they are representatives of the course of the cycle of nature (Tammuz in the upper and under world), which

runs parallel with the astral phenomena in the changes of the year. Marduk and Nebo as the embodiments of the spring and harvest phenomena, or Ninib and Nergal as the embodiments of the phenomena of summer and winter, could occupy the place of Tammuz in both halves of his cycle.

The Babylonian sages reached the profound conception that time and space are identical.\* Both are revelations of the Divine power, and have therefore the same principles of division.

The course of the world cycle is consummated in the struggle of the two powers of the world system, light and darkness, the upper and the under world, the summer of the world and the winter of the world. In the myths the sun and the moon are the combatants. The moon is, according to the Babylonian teaching, the star of the upper world (the reverse holds in Egypt). She dies and rises again from the dead (*inbu ša ina rammanisa ibband*, 'fruit, which produces itself out of itself'); she symbolizes the power of life from the dead. The sun, which, in opposition to the moon, stands at the low point, and in which the stars disappear, is the power of the under world. 'Ištar desires to become the queen of heaven.' In the myth she is the heavenly virgin (in the zodiac she is represented by the figure of the Virgin with the ear of corn or with the child) who gives birth to the sun-child or the moon-child, which then overcomes the dragon of darkness and thereby brings in the new era,—but then at the highest point of the course dies and sinks down into the under world; or she is the Venus, who descends into the under world and brings up the fallen ones. The four planets of the four points of the world, which indicate in the gyration the turning-points of the sun (Ninib and Nergal) and the equinoctial points (Marduk and Nebo), are made use of in the mythology in the following manner: Marduk is the bringer in of the new time (the spring sun), Nebo (Hermes with the balance of the dead) is the guide to the dark half of the lower world, Ninib (Mars) brings the doom of the change of the summer sun (death of Tammuz by the boar, the sacred animal of Ninib), Nergal is lord of the dark half of the under world. Thus Marduk and Nebo exchange places under the precedence of Babylon, whose local god is Marduk. The rôle of bringing in the new time belongs in reality to Nebo. His name indicates that he is the 'prophet' of the new time (Nebo-Mercury is the morning-star; in the word lies the root of the official name *nebbi*, 'prophet,' i.e. one who announces the new age).†

The change of the arc of day and the arc of night, the summer and winter courses of the stars, and the related change of life and death in nature, result in the doctrine of the *change of the Ages*. The change of the seasons corresponds to the succession of day and night. According to the principle that the microcosm everywhere reflects the macrocosm, the year is a copy of the greater period of time, in which the evolution of the world is consummated, and the seasons correspond to Ages of the World.

The acceptance of Ages of the World must go back to the observation of the stages of the sun's course. Before we speak of these Sun Ages of the World, we shall give a survey of traces of Ages of the World in which the connexion with these stages is not at first apparent.

The cuneiform texts mention 'kings before the Flood' in opposition to 'kings after the Flood.' They are thought of as in past time:—

\* The Assyrian-Bab. *alam*, 'world,' is the Heb. *olām*, 'primeval time,' 'eternity.'

† Jupiter, as a planet, has in itself no claim to special emphasis. In our order of the days of the week it occupies the fifth place. The fact that the classical peoples have designated it *Jovis deus* is an indication of the connexion of the Babylonian conception of the world.



1. *Lam abūbi*, 'the time before the Flood.' In the time before the Flood there lived the heroes, who (according to the Gilgames Epic, which on the 11th tablet tells the story of the Flood) dwell in the under world, or, like the Babylonian Noah, are removed into the heavenly world. At that time there lived, too, the (seven) sages. Ašurbanipal speaks of inscriptions of the time before the Flood. A magical text mentions a saying of an old sage before the Flood. *WAI* v. 44, 20a, speaks of 'kings after the Flood.' Berosus indicates along with the sages the early kings, who together lived 120 years.

1. Aloros (= Bab. *Arāru*).
2. Alaporos (Adaporos) = *adapa*, i.e. Marduk, the son of Ea in the Babylonian myth. In of the new age (cf. with the dragon, will . . . . .).
3. Amēlon = *amēlu*, 'man.' As *Adapa* corresponds to the Biblical patriarch Seth, Amēlon in like manner corresponds to Enosh (i.e. man).
4. Ammenon = *ummdnu* ('workmaster') = Cain (Cainan), 'smith' (cf. Aram. *gaindya* = 'smith').
5. Megalaros = ?.
6. Daonos = ?.
7. Evedorachos = *Enmeduranki*, 'favourite of the great gods,' who taught his son the secret of heaven and earth; i.e. Enoch, who walked with God, and after a life of 365 years (the number of the sun) was taken away. The Jewish feast of the turning of the winter sun (*Hanukkah*, 'feast,' later applied to the dedication of the Temple) was connected with Enoch. Jubilees (47) says of him: 'Enoch was among the angels of God six jubilees; and they showed him all that the rule of the sun is in heaven and on the earth, and he wrote it all down.'
8. Amempinos = *amēl-Sin*, 'man of the god Sin' = Methuselah. There is a Babylonian text which communicates 'the secrets' of Amēl-Sin.
9. Otiartes (Oartes?) = *Ubara-Tutu*, father of the Babylonian Noah (Utnapishtim, *Ilasistra*, in Berosus *Xisuthros*).

Berosus relates that Kronos before the Flood had ordered Xisuthros to engrave with letter-signs all things according to their beginning, middle, and end (engraving on tablets with cuneiform letters is meant), and to deposit them in Sippar. After the Flood his children and relatives had gone to Babylon, taken the writings from Sippar, and circulated them among the people.

2. The historic period, which again unfolds itself in Ages. The division of the Ages into periods before and after the Flood is also connected with the course of the stars. The Golden Age of early times corresponds to the time in which the vernal equinox in the zodiac goes through the dominion of Anu (four figures). The Flood brought the course of the world through the dominion of Ea (four figures, water-region); the historical period corresponds with Bel's realm of the zodiac. For the track of the zodiac is portioned out to Anu, Bel, and Ea, the triad of Divine power in the whole universe of space, corresponding on the zodiac to Sin, Šamaš, and Ištar. The restoration of the world after the Flood corresponds to the fashioning of the world after the original chaos, which also appears as the power of the waters (in the myth the water-dragon had been subdued); the world after the Flood corresponds to the primeval world after the Creation.†

The application of Ages of the World to the periods of the evolution of the æon of mankind is connected in a special way with the teaching about

\* Marduk and Adapa are both *abkalū*, i.e. 'sages' in the Divine sense. Sennacherib, who, by the destruction of Babylon and the raising of Nineveh into prominence by violent means, sought to inaugurate a new era, allows himself to be glorified as Adapa. He says (*K.* 270, 1a): 'Assur spoke in a dream to the grandfather of the king, my lord "abkalū": "the king, the king of . . . . . the abkalū and Adapa."'

Age with Ašurbanipal. . . . . ill shows traces of the notion found in the Babylonian narrative of the flooding of the whole world. The mountain where the ark landed is originally the mountain of the world. The report of the Priests' Code (*Gn* 8:12) gives the precise height of the mountain. On its top stands the tree of life (olive tree) from which the dove brings the leaf. The ark of the Indian Flood also lands on the mountain of the world.

the calendar, which is based on observation of the precession of the equinoxes.

By the precession of the equinoxes is meant the gradual displacement of the same point of day in the ecliptic, the middle line of the zodiac, of the axis of . . . . . In accordance with plane of the sun . . . . . For the observation of the . . . . . this resulted in the following phenomenon: The position of the sun in the same spring days recedes from year to year farther towards the east. In 72 years the displacement amounts to a day, in every 2200 years therefore, about a figure in the zodiac. The vernal equinox traverses once in 12 x 2200 years the water-region (Flood) and the fire-region. On this fact rests the teaching of Berosus given above (p. 183b).

In the region of further Asia, the earliest historical time of which we can find traces in the original sources had placed the cult of the god of the moon in the forefront. Sargon says, in his State inscription of the king of Meluhha, that his fathers had, from distant times, since the æon of the moon-god (*Adi Nannar*), sent no more messengers to his predecessors. In the scheme of the partition of the world between the moon and the sun (moon = star of the upper world, sun = the star of the under world; see above, p. 184b), Nebo would, in the pre-Babylonian order, correspond to the moon, Marduk to the sun. Nebo, too, in accordance with his character, is the 'prophet'; and, according to the nature of the doctrine regarding him, also the victor over the power of darkness, the bearer of the tablets of fate. Under the influence of the supremacy of Babylon he has exchanged his rôle with Marduk; and this, by the way, agrees with the principle of the Babylonian doctrine, according to which opposites pass over into one another (east and west, south and north, summer and winter, day and night, exchange their rôles). We could thus speak of an *Age of the moon* or an *Age of Nebo*, to which in the epoch of the supremacy of Babylon an *Age of the sun* or an *Age of Marduk* would correspond. But if there was a theory which reckoned in this way, still the latter is at least subsequently regarded as the Age of the moon; i.e. the Nebo Age, which preceded the rule of Marduk of Babylon, has been transposed in the teaching of the calendar, which was reckoned according to the precession.

(a) *Age of the Twins*.—In the Age before the rise of Babylon (about B.C. 5000-2800) the sun stood in the zodiacal sign called the Twins. If we were to make additional use of this circumstance in the theory of the Ages of the World, as we are inclined to do, the two phases of the waxing and waning moon would in harmony with it correspond to these twins. The moon also is called repeatedly *ellamônê*, i.e. 'twins'; and the hieroglyphics of the zodiac, which even to-day indicate the Twins in the calendar, consist of the picture of the waxing and waning moon, just as the Romans represented Janus, who bears the character of the moon, as the two half-moons with human faces.

This Age of the Twins was for Babylon the age of the settlement of the Semitic Babylonians.

The Twins (*Dioscuri*) thus supply the ruling motive for all the myths which indicate the beginning of a new epoch (Cyrus, Cambyzes, Romulus, Remus, etc.). And if any one in the time of the Assyrian predominance wished to dispose of the claims of Babylon, he went back to the archaic form of calculation. Either Nebo was deliberately raised to a more prominent place than Marduk, or (e.g., under Sargon) Sivan, the month of the moon-god, was regarded as the first month of the year. In the same way the Roman calendar was made archaic by beginning the year with Janus (January), although the last month was called December (i.e. the tenth month).

One would expect an Age of the sun to follow an Age of the moon (the sun and the moon are also twins). As a matter of fact, the reckoning of the calendar, which was changed about B.C. 2800, on the basis of the precession into the next figure of the zodiac, was so adjusted that in the zodiac the figure of the Bull followed the Twins.

(b) *Age of the Bull.*—This reform of the calendar was assisted by the actual state of affairs. The time of its introduction corresponds with the period in which Babylon became the metropolis of the world. Marduk, the god of the city of Babylon, the 'farmer of Babylon' (Nebuchadrezzar calls himself *Ikkaru ša Babilī*, as representative of the god on earth), is symbolized by the bull, which corresponds to the figure of the Bull in the heavens.\* In this way the Age of the sun came at the same time to its rights, for Marduk as the representative of the Divine power is in an especial sense the sun-god. Hammurabi took advantage of the reform of the calendar to glorify his rule as a new epoch of the world. He says that he has succeeded in 'exalting Marduk.' The priests of Babylon celebrate Marduk as the fighter with the dragon and as the demiurge, and found the claim of Babylon to world empire on the rôle of Marduk as creator of the world. The honour which belonged to Nebo as the lord of the destinies is transferred to Marduk. He determines on New Year's day the fate of the world. Nebo, who in the older teaching carried the tablets of fate, is now recorder of the destinies.

The calendar which corresponded to the Age of the Bull must have reckoned the beginning of the year a month earlier, so that the year began with Iyyar and closed with Nisan; for the world-epoch embracing a sign of the zodiac corresponds to the course of the sun through a sign of the zodiac, i.e. one month. That it was so reckoned can, of course, be proved only indirectly. The king of Assyria allowed himself to be invested in office in the month Iyyar. The investiture is a ceremony which took place also in Babylon, and therefore according to Babylonian law. The king seized the hands of Bel-Marduk, and by this act his rule obtained its ratification and consecration. This inauguration was still observed in Iyyar after Nisan must have long been regarded as the first month. Under Sargon and Nebuchadrezzar the inauguration took place in Nisan. The new calendar had thus in the meantime secured recognition for its claims.

The mythological motives of the Age of the Bull had to be taken from the myths of Marduk. Seeing that Marduk is regarded as the child of the sun (the ideogram signifies 'son of the sun'), the motive of the mysterious birth is connected with his appearance as well as the motive of the persecution by the dragon (exposure and rescue). The myths of Marduk which are as yet known have not supplied evidence for his birth from the virgin queen of heaven (see above, p. 184<sup>b</sup>). But the myths tell of the marriage of Marduk. The child of the sun in the course of the cycle becomes the lover and the husband of the queen of heaven (Ištar). Every historical celebrity who, in the Bull age, was distinguished as a ruler of the world, a founder of dynasties, etc., was furnished with the Marduk motive, if some antiquated method corresponding to the age of the Twins did not prefer the motive of the Dioscuri (see above, p. 185<sup>b</sup>). In this way we can explain the mythical setting of the history of Sargon I., who founded Babylon, and in all probability was the first to introduce the Marduk method of reckoning.

\* In the Babylonian ideogram of the planets, Jupiter signifies 'bull of the sun,' and is explained as the 'furrow of the heavens' which the bull of the sun ploughs.

'Sargon the mighty king of Agada am I. My mother was a vestal,\* my father of the lower class. . . . My vestal mother conceived me, in secret did she bear me. She laid me in an ark of bulrushes, closed my doors with pitch, laid me in the river. . . . The river bore me downwards to Akki, the water-carrier. Akki, the water-carrier, received me in the friendliness of his heart, brought me up as his child, made me his gardener. During my activity Ištar fell in love with me. . . . For years I enjoyed sovereign power.'

It is related of the hero of the Babylonian Gilgames Epic how Ištar seeks to win his love. Elīan, however (*Hist. Anim.* xii. 21), says his mother had been a king's daughter, who conceived the hero by means of an insignificant man.

Gudea, the South Babylonian priestly prince, says to the goddess, who stands by his side, 'I have no mother, thou art my mother; I have no father, thou art my father; in a secret place hast thou borne me.'

Ninib appears in an epic poem as the hero, who will allow his royal power to extend to the bounds of heaven and earth. He is a child of Ištar, he is called 'My father know I not.'

Ašurnāširpal allows the following story to be told of himself:

'I was born in the midst of mountains, which no man knoweth; thou hast, O Ištar, with the glance of thine eyes chosen me, hast longed for my supremacy, hast brought me forth from the mountains, and called me as ruler of men.'

Ašurbanipal wishes to be regarded as a child of Ištar, who had once nourished him. The writers of his tablets represent his Age as the Golden Age of the world (cf. p. 187<sup>b</sup>).

(c) *Age of the Ram.*—The recognition of the fact that the calendar must now be arranged according to the Ram as the vernal equinox, and the fixing of it so, give to the otherwise unimportant king Nabonassar (Nabū-nasir, 797-734) a special significance. The framers of the calendar in his time have dated a new age from Nabonassar. Syncellus relates (*Chronographia*, 207) that Nabonassar, according to the testimony of Alexander Polyhistor and Berosus, destroyed all historical documents relating to his predecessors, in order that dates might be reckoned only according to his time (συνταγὰς τὰς πράξεις τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ βασιλέων ἡφάνισεν, ὅπως ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἡ καθαρὴ μετρίσις γένηται τῶν Χαλδαίων βασιλέων).

The breaking of the tablets is not to be taken literally. It is the same as the burning of the books in reforms of other ages, in Persia under Alexander, in China, a.c. 213, under Chin-shi-hoang. In the case of the burning of the libraries of Alexandria, too, this motive must be taken into consideration. It signifies the beginning of a new era of Islām in Egypt under Omar.

This is the reason why the Babylonian chronology contained in the extant inscriptions begins with Nabonassar. The Ptolemaic canon, too, which, as is well known, did not follow historical ends, but represented a calendar with astronomical limits,† had begun with Nabonassar. The misunderstanding of Syncellus can also be explained in this way; the *Chronographia* (267) says the Babylonians had from the time of Nabonassar written down the periods of the courses of the stars (ἀπὸ Ναβονασάρου τὸν χρόνον τῆς τῶν ἀστέρων κινήσεως Χαλδαῖοι ἠκρίβωσαν).

In Babylon itself the reform of the Age of the Ram never obtained full recognition, because the Age of Nabonassar coincided with the fall of Babylon. The old Babylonian reckoning kept its hold here. Still Berosus, under the rule of the Seleucids, reckons, as we saw (p. 183<sup>b</sup>), with the Age of the Ram. The new reckoning seems to have found its chief support in Egypt. Just as the Bull Age received recognition by emphasizing Marduk of Babylon, in the same way the Age of the Ram served the purpose of glorifying Jupiter Amon, who is represented with the head of a

\* *Entlu*, the 'sister of god,' in the Code of Hammurabi, the priestly representative of the sister-wife of Marduk, Ištar.

† It was carried further for several centuries after Christ. Claudius Ptolemaeus is by no means the author; he had collected the traditions and preserved them in their true form.



The fanciful theories of the *Kalpas* or *Ages of the World* do not appear to be essential to Buddhism, whether looked upon as a religion or as a philosophy. Nor are they of mythological moment, being rather matter of 'secular knowledge,' or, as a Buddhist would say, *lokiyāñā*. Nevertheless, as they can be proved to be very old; as they are made use of when the myriads of Buddhas of the Great Vehicle are honoured, and have been duly recorded by the Buddhists of every country, Sinhalese as well as Mongolian; as, moreover, some bits of philosophical or religious reflexion are interwoven with them, we may be allowed to consider the subject in all its aspects.

There is no beginning of transmigration (or *samsāra*); there will be no end to it: on these two points all Buddhist schools agree. But, without mentioning that speculations on the beginning or the end of the cosmos are forbidden by the Buddha in some texts (see *Adhvamāra* [Buddhist]), it must be observed that there is an end to transmigration for the Arhats, who rightly say at the time of dying, 'This existence is for me the last one.' Moreover, in the Buddhism of the Great Vehicle, Avalokita, for instance (see *Avatamsaka*), resolved to postpone his entering into Nirvāṇa till every creature should, by his own really divine exertion, have been carried into the peace of salvation. The problem, where the texts are silent, or rather, contradictory, will probably have to be solved as it has been by the *Sāikhya*: the number of the souls being infinite, there will never come a time when all will have attained Nirvāṇa. Hence there need be no dependency, for we can be among the elect, if only we care for it.

Theories on the revolutions of the world are said, in the *Brahmajāla*, to be extraneous to Buddhism, and even alien to its spirit. But they soon became naturalized; and, while originally very like the Brahmanical theories, they were worked after a new plan.

There is mention in the fourth edict of Aśoka of the next destruction of the Universe. 'The pious king hopes that his sons and grandsons, and so on, will maintain good practices till the age of comical destruction (*saṃvartakappa*).<sup>1</sup> This text does not, however, prove that the belief in the very speedy disappearance of Buddhism was still unknown.

The canonical Pāli texts do not furnish us with the complete theory now to be stated. These afford only hints or allusions, from which it is difficult to draw any conclusion as to the conditions of the elaboration of the doctrine. These hints, however, will be carefully pointed out. So far as the Buddhism of the South is concerned, we derive our knowledge from the Commentaries, of which the materials are much older than Buddhaghosa, their official compiler; and for the Buddhism of the North from Mongolian, Tibetan, and Chinese sources, confirmed by the *Abhidharma* literature.

The general lines are as follows:

A 'Period' (*kappa*), or 'Great Period' (*mahā-kappa*, *kappa*) of cosmical evolution, is to be divided into four 'Incalculables' (*asaṅkheyya*) or 'Incalculable Periods' (*asaṅkheyyakappa*, *asaṅkheyyakappa*). These last are always mentioned in the following order: (1) Period of destruction (*saṃvartakappa*, *saṃvartakappa*); (2) of duration of the destruction (*saṃvattatthāyin*, *saṃvartasthāyin*, when the world remains destroyed); (3) of renovation, or rather revolution (*viratṭa*, *viratṭa*); (4) of duration of the world renovated (*Āṅguttara*, ii. 142, iv. 100; *Majjh.* i. 35).

How long is an 'Incalculable' period? The answer given by Buddha himself is a very good one: It is difficult, i.e. impossible, to exhaust an 'Incalculable' by numbering hundreds of thousands of years. In *Sāmyutta*, ii. 181-2, there is a simile which has found its way into the Chinese and Sinhalese records: 'Suppose a mountain of iron to be touched every hundred years by a muslin veil; the mountain will be destroyed before the Incalculable is at an end—and the *samsāra* has no common measure with the Incalculables, nay, with hundreds of thousands of Incalculables'; the *samsāra* being 'infinite,' as we should say, and the 'Incalculables' indefinite.

The same problem occurs in the *Mahāvastu* (i. 77). It is said that the future Buddha must, be-

fore becoming a Buddha, pass through 'stages' or 'terraces' of immeasurable duration (*apamāṇa, aprameya*). 'If it be so,' asks Kātyāyana, 'How will the future Buddha ever attain the higher stage?' Answer: 'It is the same with the Ages of the World: each of them is immeasurable, and nevertheless there are many Ages.'

Notwithstanding these very clear statements, Buddhists and moderns have tried to calculate the 'Incalculable.' *Asaṅkheyya*, like many other words of the same meaning (and there are plenty of words in Sanskrit to express 'incalculable'), has been used to indicate an exact number. But the lists of 'numbers,' the so-called *pañcāṅk*, are constructed on different principles: the progression being sometimes by multiples (1, 100, 1000; or 10, 10,000, 1,000,000 . . .), sometimes by squares, and the *asaṅkheyya* does not always hold the same place in the lists. A Rémusat said that an 'Incalculable' = 1 followed by 17 ciphers (100,000,000,000,000,000) years. But these figures give a *parārdha*, not an *asaṅkheyya*. From the *Dharmapadīpikā*, Burnout and Hardy admit 1 followed by 87 ciphers; and there is, according to the first named, a very ingenious combination of the first 'numbers' premises' in the formation of this number. Joinville (Sinhalese unnamed source) has 1 followed by 63 ciphers. From Burmese sources, Pāṇi has 1 followed by 163 ciphers, and Burnout, 1+16 ciphers. According to the Northern *Abhidharma* list, *asaṅkheyya* being the 53rd of a geometric progression (1, 10, 100 . . .), we have 1 followed by 52 ciphers. Lastly, the *Buddhābhaya* list gives a much larger number of ciphers. Given a progression, 10, 10<sup>2</sup>, 10<sup>4</sup>, . . . *asaṅkheyya* is the 104th term; to write the number thus described we should require 252 septillions of kilometres of ciphers, allowing that one cipher occupies a length of 0.001 m. That suggests in some degree the vastness of an 'Incalculable.'

Theoretically, each 'Incalculable' is divided into twenty *Antarakalpas* (*kappa*) or 'Intermediate Periods.' But the advantage of this division is not very clear, except in the third Incalculable.

When the Great Period begins, of which the Destruction Age is the first part, the average duration of human life is 80,000 years. Gradually there is moral deterioration, with a corresponding decrease in the age of man (see *infra*, p. 189). The destruction is near at hand. A hundred thousand years before it is to begin, a *Dera* or Angel (a 'Buddhist Noah,' as he has been called) gives to the world of conscious creatures a warning about the forthcoming calamity.\* In course of time all the creatures, with the exception just to be noted, attain reincarnation in higher worlds, i.e. in spheres which will not be overtaken by the destruction. The time for a higher reward may be said to have come for the great majority of creatures, after numerous migrations amongst ordinary good and bad births. They alone 'in whom the root of merit is destroyed' by adhesion to wrong views, and for whom 'the word of deliverance has utterly perished,' cannot by any means ascend into the higher realms; and as the hell in which they are tormented is going to be annihilated, they will take rebirth in the hell of some universe whose destruction is not imminent. Elsewhere it is said that there are self-made hells for them. In the old sources it would seem that only Devadatta, the cousin and rival of Śākyamuni, will endure 'for an age,' or 'for ages' (*kappa*) in a state of pain.

This gradual disappearing of the animate world (*sattaloka*) fulfils the first Intermediate Period of the Age of Destruction. Now begins the Destruction of the 'receptacle-world' (*bhājanaloka*) itself, by fire (*tejahsambartani*), by water (*ap*), or by wind (*vāyu*).† There is a complete set of 64 Great Periods, in regular succession; seven destructions by fire, then one by water, then seven by fire, then one by water, and so on, the last, i.e. the 64th, being by wind. We are told that the destruction by fire does not reach so high in the various spheres of the cosmos as does the destruction by water; and the

\* All the gods called Lokatyūhas hold this office of Noah, according to the *Vīrūdhīnagga* (Warren, p. 222).

† *Vīrūdhīnagga*, xiii.; *Apocryphal*, *tejo*, *vāyu* (*stāva*, 1891, p. 115). For the Brahmanical speculations, see *Śākhya purāṇa*, ap. Aufrecht, *Cat. Oronensis*, p. 216; *U. cat.* p. 216; *Śākhya*, *Sākhya*.

destruction by wind is greater than the destruction by water (*samvāṭṭasimā*, limit of destruction).\*

But there are discrepancies between the European authorities, and probably also between the sources. Köppen has a very ingenious theory, stating that there are great, mean, and little destructions by fire, and so on. He goes so far as to ascertain the order in which they will succeed, though he confessedly fails to find any authority to support his views. Does the destruction by fire annihilate only the worlds up to the abode of the Mahābrahmins, including the sphere of the first meditation? Or does it annihilate the two abodes immediately superior belonging to the second Dhyāna (*Parittasubhas* and *Aparamāpāhas*)? Does the Water-Destruction, which in any case destroys the three second Dhyāna abodes, destroy also the two first third Dhyāna abodes?† Hardy, misunderstood by Köppen, gives a third opinion: the water destroys the first third Dhyāna abode. Lastly, there seems to be a general agreement as regards the Wind which overthrows the worlds up to the second fourth Dhyāna abode. The matter would be a little too fanciful to detain our attention if we did not find in the *Brahmajāla*, the first Sutta of the *Dighanikāya*, the origin of the contest. Buddha, explaining the origination of the universe, states that, during the period of destruction, beings have mostly been re-born in the World of Radiance (i.e. in the third second Dhyāna abode)—hence the opinion that the fire (the fire must be meant, as it is the more frequent) reaches up to the second second Dhyāna abode; but Buddha adds that, at the origin of time, the Palace of Brahmā with Mahābrahmā appears, this being fallen from the World of Radiance. There is no mention here of the two first second Dhyāna abodes, which would have been necessary steps of decadence; hence the opinion that the destruction does not go higher than Brahma Palace—i.e. the apex of the second meditation.

We may conclude that the theory of the celestial abodes was not perfectly elaborated when the *Brahmajāla* was compiled.

Details ‡ are given of the destruction by Fire, wrought by seven suns, well known in the Brāhmanical literature. All water is dried up, beginning with the small rivers; and the appearance of the seventh sun gives rise to the general conflagration. As regards Water, the *Sikṣāsamuchchaya* is the only text to give us the names of the four Dragon-Kings who pour drops always increasing in size, each for five Intermediate Periods: Iṣādhāra, Gajaprameha, Acchinnadhāra, Sthūlabinduka.§ It treats the matter from a philosophical point of view: 'Whence comes the water?' it is asked. 'From nowhere.' 'And where does it go when the deluge is at an end?' 'To nowhere.' The destruction is also said to reach the Brahma-heaven, but it is not said to go higher. The destruction by winds is parallel. The Pāli commentator gives the name of one of them, *prach-chanda*.

Nothing is known of the Second Period. The world remains chaotic, or, if we prefer it, a pure nothing: 'The upper regions of space become one with those below, and wholly dark.' There are no ashes left by the fire; no dust by the wind. One would assume that the water (which, being very acid, disintegrates the Iron or Crystal Mountains) does not annihilate itself. On the contrary, 'the water does not settle so long as anything remains,

\* To understand the following, the reader is referred to the Cosmology. We give below the necessary ideas:

Above the world of desire (i.e. the four continents, Mount Meru with its divine inhabitants) begins the world of form, consisting of three (or two) heavens of the first meditation, three of the second, three of the third, eight of the fourth. Above are the four heavens of non-form. The worlds are organized in such a way that the second meditation realms are established above a thousand first meditation realms (Little Chilicoosm); that the third meditation realms cover a thousand second meditation realms (Middle Chilicoosm); that the fourth meditation realms cover a thousand third meditation realms (Great Chilicoosm). For one universe, in the proper sense of the word, there are 1,000,000,000 first meditation abodes (Brahma-heavens), 1,000,000,000 Mount Merus. One universe is the 'field of a Buddha.' The authorities are not very consistent. For instance, we learn that the destructions by fire, etc., destroy the same number of worlds (1,000,000,000). 'In lateral expansion the world-cycle always perishes to the extent of a Buddha's domain' (*Vissuddhim*, xiii., in Warren, p. 321).

† The latter opinion is better supported by the texts at our command (*JPTS* 1591, p. 115).

‡ For particulars see Spence Hardy, *Manual*; Köppen and Warren, *loc. cit.*

§ In the 'Matsyapurāṇa,' *Cat. Oxon.* 347b, 33, there are seven clouds 'to give the destruction-water'; the first is named 'destruction' (*narmarta*).

but everything becomes impregnated with water and then suddenly settles and disappears.'

When the time of renovation is come again, i.e. when the former merit of the beings born in higher abodes is exhausted, and they have to be reborn in inferior regions, first (in the case of destruction by fire) appears the abode of Brahmā (Brahmavimāna), with its threefold division of inhabitants, coming from the Ābhāsvara abode; then in order the three Deva abodes of the Parinimitavaśavartins, the Nirmānaratis and the Yāmyavimāna (gods, Yāmas, the Tuṣitas, etc., are not named); then the Circle of the Wind (*vāyu-maṇḍala*) on which is established the Circle of Water, etc., with Mount Meru and its heavenly inhabitants, with the sun and the moon, etc.: all this is called the *bhājanaloka* or the 'receptacle-world.' And that is the end of the first Intermediate Period of the 'Incalculable of Renovation.'

During the nineteen following periods the inferior parts of the *bhājanaloka* are successively peopled by men, and so on. First the men are said to be *aparimitāyu*, i.e. 'of immeasurable life.' Such they remain to the end of the Period of Renovation, according to the *Abhidharmakośa*. The sources known to Hardy and Köppen agree in stating a decrease to 80,000 or 84,000 years. When the infernal beings have appeared, the Incalculable Period of Renovation (*viratamānavasthā*) is finished.

The following Period of Duration (*virṭtāvasthā prārabdhā*) is divided into twenty well-characterized Intermediate Periods. During the first, the whole of which is of decrease, the average duration of human life falls from 'immeasurable length' (or from 80,000 years) to ten years. The eighteen following are divided into two parts: the first of increase (*utkarṣakalpa*, *īrdhāmukha*), during which life increases from ten years to 80,000 years; the second of decrease (*apakarṣakalpa*, *adhomukha*) inversely to the first. The twentieth and last is only of increase. We do not know if the first and the last are shorter than the remaining ones, but that seems probable.

Here the Brāhmanic theory of the Four *yugas* finds a place: the increasing will be divided into the Iron, Bronze, Silver, and Golden Ages; and the decreasing will be parallel (Kali, Dvāpara, Trētā, Rta). We are now (A.D. 1907) in the Iron Age of the first Intermediate Period of the Period of Stability (this Intermediate is only decreasing). From a hundred years, the highest attained in the Iron Age, life is declining to ten.

When the decreasing Kali Age begins, the five calamities (*kaṣāya*) begin to prevail; but when life is reduced to ten years (*akāraṣāyuk kalpa*) the destiny of men is worse. At the end of every Intermediate Period (except the last, or the 20th, which is only of increase) the greater number of living beings pass away by hunger, epidemics, and sword. Some say that

and Chinese sources. Spence Hardy establishes a connexion between pre-Love, Epidemic, and Wind. many Inter-

'Incalculable' ing to the final modes of passing away.\* The majority of the creatures being dead, the remaining ones are 'converted,' and the age of man increases again. A new Intermediate Age has begun.

If we except the speculations on the 'creation' by the united merit of all sentient existence, and on the 'repopulation' of the worlds, which are perfectly free from pantheistic views, and, being built on the doctrine of *karma*, are perfectly Buddhist, there is not much Buddhism in the cosmogony we have studied. We must add some details which are part of the Buddhist's own mythology.

Periods (i.e. great Periods) are said to be 'void' (*śūnyakalpa*) if no Buddha appears in them. They are 'non-void' or 'Buddha-periods' in the opposite

\* See Köppen, 252, n. 1. He adds that, according to 'some,' these plagues appear only in the Intermediate Period immediately preceding the Destruction.

case. Sometimes a great Period elapses between two appearances of a Buddha; sometimes an incalculable number of great Periods; sometimes, on the contrary, there are in the same period many Buddhas. We have 'substantial' periods (*sāra*), with one Buddha; 'curd' periods (*mandā*), with two; 'excellent' (*vara*), with three; 'substantial-curd' periods (*sāramandā*), with four; 'auspicious' (*bhadra*) or 'greatly auspicious,' with five. Such is the present Period. There have been twenty-nine 'void' Periods before it. So far the old tradition. The redactors, moreover, of the *Mahāvastu* (iii. 330), the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims, etc., are already aware that in the Bhadrakalpa a thousand Buddhas are wanted.

At the beginning of the Universe, when the primordial water (see above, 189<sup>a</sup>) is about to give way for the appearance of the solid world, a lotus appears at the place where the sacred tree of Buddha has been and will be.\* There is no flower if the period is to be void; there are as many flowers as forthcoming Buddhas.† Compare the Brāhmanical flower.

Another point of interest is the description of the first men, or, as it has been called, the Buddhist Genesis.‡ Originally, falling as they did from the Ābhāsvara-abode, human beings retained the attributes of their former existence. Born by 'apparitional-birth,' self-radiant, with joy as their only food, and with spiritual bodies, such beings are evidently meant by the 'men of immeasurable life' referred to above (see p. 189<sup>a</sup>). There is neither sun nor moon. As time goes on, earth appears on the surface of the primeval ocean. It is a savoury earth, and, as it were, a foam. Men eat it, and their radiance is lost for ever. Sun and stars furnish some light. Then follows the eating of some honey-moss, of creepers, of a marvellous rice. It is a long decadence. When this last has become a regular food, organs of sex appear; and with the institution of marriage, of private property, and of caste, begins the organization of human society. Interesting for general folklore (especially the details on marriage), the story is certainly very old, and was adapted before the classification of the celestial abodes. That in falling from the Ābhāsvara-abode the beings do not go through the heavens of Brahmā and the Devas, and that these are utterly ignored, are significant facts. But it is more astonishing that the 'self-appearing' men do possess the attributes of the Ābhāsvāras. We might assume that there was originally no connexion between these first men and any sort of degenerated gods. The first men were regarded as ābhāsvāras, i.e. 'resplendent,' and the Ābhāsvāras gods themselves may be derived from this old conception.

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2. Indian Sources.—*Viuddhimagga*, xiii., trans. by Warren, *Buddhism in Translations* (1900), p. 321 f.; the Sarvāstivādin treatise entitled *Lokaprajñapti*, known in the Tibetan version (*higrtlen-gdags-pa*, Tāndjur, Mdo. xlii. 1-107), regarded by the

\* On the intervention of the vajrasana see Beal, *Buddhist Records*, ii. 116.

† In the late records a thousand lotuses appear at the beginning of the Bhadrakalpa.

‡ By Prof. Rhys Davids, *Dial. of the Buddha*, p. 105, and by A. J. Edmunds, 'A Buddhist Genesis,' *Monist*, xiv. 207-214. The text is the *Aggaññasutta* (Digha xvii.); it is translated from the Chinese by S. Beal, *Four Lectures*, pp. 151-155, and it is found in the *Mahāvastu* (Sacred Book of the Mahāśāṅghikas), i. 339-348. See E. Hardy, *Buddha*, p. 81.

Vaiśvāsikas as forming part of the Sarvāstivāda.

7n., 143; neither have been directly of *Abhidharma*, however, that is found in the *Antanārmakośayakhyā*, fol. 262 of the MS. of the French Asiatic Society, which has been consulted for the present article.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

AGES OF THE WORLD (Christian\*).—The poets and the philosophers of pagan antiquity have, as a rule, represented the evolution of man as a gradual but inexorable decay, putting the happy era at the beginning, and asserting that the world would end in complete destruction. The Christian idea is exactly the opposite; and this is quite natural, for Jesus Christ caused a great hope to shine on humanity, groaning in the darkness of paganism. The prophets of Israel had already flung out some rays of this hope, in foretelling the coming of the Messiah, who would establish on earth an era of true religion, of peace and happiness. In short, while pagans placed the Golden Age in the past, Christians put it in the future; they have described the history of the world as an ascent, if not continuous, at least intermittently progressive, and finally triumphant, towards good and happiness. The writer of the Apocalypse (ch. 20) describes in an imaginative style the last phases of this historical drama.

St. Augustine is the first Father of the Church who explicitly mentions Seven Ages in the history of man, and all the theologians who followed him were more or less inspired by his idea. His plan is derived from the 'Days of the Creation' in Genesis. The passage is *de Civitate Dei*, xxii. 30 *ad fin.*

Paulus Orosius, a Spanish priest (d. 418), the friend and admirer of St. Augustine, to whom he dedicated his *Historia*, besides trying to prove incidentally the Bishop of Hippo's theory of the government of God in history, divided his work into seven books, which, however, correspond to different epochs. He had clearly come under the influence of Roman history. The founding of Rome, the taking of the city by the Gauls, the death of Alexander, the taking of Carthage, the Servile War, the reign of Cæsar Augustus, with which he makes coincident the birth of Jesus Christ,—these are the memorable events which form the boundaries of his periods.†

The Venerable Bede (d. 735), who in his *Chronicles* owes much to Paulus Orosius, also adopts seven Ages, and surmises that the last one, ending with the year 1000, will mark the end of the world.

Adson, abbot of Montier-en-Der, in his treatise,

\* [As the Jews were accustomed to distinguish the age before, from the age after, the advent of the Messiah, so the majority of NT writers distinguish *οἱ αἰῶνες* from *αἰὼν ὁ μέλλων*. In both cases an ethical is always superimposed upon the temporal meaning. The former age is the period which shall elapse before the appointed Parousia of Christ, 'the period of instability, weakness, impiety, wickedness, calamity, misery' (Thayer); the latter is the age after Christ has come again in power to establish the Kingdom of God definitively, with all its blessings. It is inaugurated by the resurrection of the dead, and it answers, in scope and nature, to the completed work of Christ. The present world, as being material and transient, is under subjection to angels, who mediate the Law; the world to come (*ἡ οἰκουμένη ἡ μέλλουσα*, He 2<sup>a</sup>), on the other hand, is viewed as already existent, in a sphere transcending this earth, out of which it will come down as a new and divine order of things. The term 'world' (*οἰκουμένη*) expresses the constitution of that state of things which as 'age' (*αἰὼν*) is viewed more in relation to its development in time. The tone of the NT in speaking of the present age is almost invariably one of censure. The gulf between the two ages is being quite absolute, project themselves in ing harmony and order and preparing ultimately to supersede the laws of the present dispensation. H. R. MACINTOSH.]

† See the Anglo-Saxon version of the *Historia* of Orosius by Alfred the Great, ed. Bosworth, London, 1859.



*de Antichristo*, dedicated to queen Gerberge (954), sketches the preliminaries of the final judgment, which will follow the apostasy predicted by St. Paul, and the struggle against Antichrist; and he puts off the end of the world until this epoch.

Bernard, a hermit of Thuringia (d. 960), announces, on the contrary, that the end of the world is near. He and a great number of preachers in the 10th cent., through their allegorical interpretation of the Apocalypse, spread the belief in the immediate coming of Antichrist and the end of the world. Nevertheless their position was combated as an error by Abbo, abbot of Fleury-sur-Loire, the most learned monk of his time.

Scotus Erigena (d. circa 890) groups the first six Ages into three epochs, each marked by a different priesthood. The first epoch, comprising the first five Ages of St. Augustine, was contemporary with the patriarchs and priests of the OT. The second, beginning with Jesus Christ, was marked by the priesthood of the NT. Erigena foretells a third in the everlasting life, when all the faithful will serve as priests, and will see God face to face.

Joachim of Floris (d. 1202), the famous visionary hermit of Calabria, in his book, *de Concordia*, adopts Erigena's division into three Ages or religious conditions, and places each under the control of one person of the Trinity; but, differing from his predecessors, he holds that these periods overlap each other. The Age of the Father extends, according to him as well as to Scotus Erigena, from Adam to Christ. The Age of the Son starts from Elisha, and reaches as far as 1260. The last Age, that of the Holy Spirit, takes its origin from St. Benedict and the establishing of the monks in the West, and will last until the end of the world.

'The first era,' says Joachim, 'was that of knowledge, the second that of wisdom, the third will be that of complete intelligence. The first was servile obedience, the second was filial servitude, the third will be liberty. The first was the trial, the second action, the third will be contemplation. The first was fear, the second faith, the third will be love. The first was the age of slaves, the second that of sons, the third will be that of friends. The first was the Age of old men, the second that of young people, the third will be that of children. The first passed under the light of the stars, the second was the dawn, the third will be broad daylight. The first was winter, the second the beginning of spring, the third will be summer. The first bore nettles, the second thorns, the third will yield wheat. The first gave water, the second wine, the third will give oil. The first is connected with Septuagesima, the second with Quadragesima, the third will be Easter. The first Age refers, then, to the Father, who is the originator of all things; the second to the Son, who condescended to put on our clay; the third will be the Age of the Holy Spirit, of whom the Apostle has said, *Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty*' (*de Concordia*, lib. v. c. 84).

Dante does not number the Ages of the World, but, borrowing the form of his prophecy from the figures of the Apocalypse, foretells the vengeance of God against the Dragon, which has broken the wheel of the Chariot of the Church, and announces that the one sent by God, whose number is 510 (=DVX), will kill the foul thief and the giant who sins with her (*Divina Commedia*, Purg. xxxiii. 43 ff.).

Bossuet, in his *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* (1681), returns to the seven Ages of the City of God, but considerably modifies the divisions of St. Augustine. According to him, the first Age, from Adam to Noah, comprises the creation and the beginnings of man. The second, from Noah to Abraham, was marked by the Flood and the first punishment of man, and opens the era of the bloody conquests. The third Age, from Abraham to Moses, was contemporaneous with the beginning of the OT. The fourth stretches from Moses to the building of the Temple at Jerusalem by Solomon. The fifth goes to the end of the captivity of Babylon; the sixth runs from Cyrus to Jesus; the seventh, and last, reaches from the Nativity up to our time. It is evident that Bossuet looked only at the past;

he did not borrow the Bishop of Hippo's beautiful prophecy of a seventh Age,—the Age of rest and of face to face contemplation of God, when Christ has triumphed over His enemies, and God is all in all.

The Neapolitan Vico (d. 1744), in his *Scienza Nuova*, distinguishes three Ages in the history of the different nations. The Divine Age, or, so to speak, the infancy of man, where all is divinity and authority, belongs to the priests; the Heroic Age, where the conquerors rule by brute force; and the Human Age, the period of civilization, after which men will return to their primitive state. Mankind, according to him, will turn round perpetually in this circle—a theory similar to that of the Stoics.

It was the privilege of a Frenchman, more famous as an economist than as a theologian, to return to the Christian idea of a progressive development. Turgot, a prior in the Sorbonne, at the age of twenty-three (1750), in his *Discours sur le progrès successif de l'esprit humain*, established the contrast between the pagan notion of a Golden Age at the beginning of the world, and the idea of the perfecting of mankind. In the same way as sons and heirs profit by the knowledge and advantages acquired by their fathers and grandfathers, so, according to Turgot, there is a heritage of truth, of intellectual, moral, and economic progress, which, in each new generation, enriches the patrimony of humanity. Hence comes progress.

In the 18th and 19th cents. the idea of the development of the Ages of the World, i.e. of mankind, by analogy with the ages of human life, was renewed by some Christian philosophers. J. G. Herder, in *Ideen zur Philos. d. Gesch. der Menschheit* (1784), admits that there are in the evolution of races and nations, as in the life of plants, periods of growth and blossoming, of fruit-bearing, and, lastly, of withering. Mankind tends, by the reciprocal influence of the nations, to the realization of that blessed Age announced by Christ under the name of the 'Kingdom of Heaven.'

The founder of positivism, Auguste Comte (d. 1857), thinks that religion is contemporary with the infancy of humanity.

'Following the very nature of the human mind,' he says, 'each branch of knowledge must pass through different stages: the theological stage, which is the age of fiction; the metaphysical stage, which is that of abstraction; and the scientific stage, which is the positive age' (*Cours de philosophie positive*, lib. I, Appendix, p. 77).

Henrik Ibsen maintains that man evolves in turn through three phases:

'the kingdom founded on the tree of knowledge; the kingdom founded on the tree of the Cross; and, lastly, the kingdom founded on these two trees at once, for the sources of its life are in the paradise of Adam and at Golgotha' (*Emperor and Galilean*, 1st Part, Act III.).

Drummond, in his *Ascent of Man* (1894), distinguishes three ages in the evolution of the world: the first, in which the Vegetable Kingdom was led to produce the flowering plants; the second, the evolution of the Animal Kingdom, where the possibilities of organization were exhausted in the Mammalia; lastly, the third, which comprises the ascent of man and of society, and is bound up with the struggle for the life of others. 'This is the Further Evolution, the page of history that lies before us, the closing act of the drama of Man' (p. 443).

This is a short sketch of the Christian theories of the Ages of the World. In opposition to the pagan conception of a fateful decay of man, ending in annihilation, the Christian conception, derived from the Messianic idea of the Hebrews, shows the ascent, the progress of man, though not without falls, towards more truth, more justice, and more happiness. The socialists of the present day have unwittingly adopted the Christian idea of the 'Millennium.'



Pascal summed up the Christian conception of the Ages of the World very well when he said: 'The whole race of men, during the course of so many centuries, ought to be considered as being the same man always living and continually learning' (*Fragment d'un traité du Vide*, Paris, 1897, p. 436).

LITERATURE.—Rev 20; Augustine, *de Civitate Dei*, xxii. 30 ad fin.; Paul Orosius, *Historiarum mundi*, libri vii. *adversus paganos, sive Ormesta*; Bede, *Chronicles, sive de sex ætatis mundi*; Scotus Erigena, *Homilia in prologum Johannis evangelii*; Joachim de Floris, *Liber de Concordia*, v. 84; Vico, *Principi di una Scienza Nuova d'intorno alla comune natura della nazione* (1725); Turgot, *Discours sur le progrès de l'humanité* (1760); J. G. Herder, *Ideen zur Philosophie der Gesch. der Menschheit* (1784); Auguste Comte, *Cours de philosophie positive* (1830-42), iv., App. 77; H. Ibsen, *Emperor and Galilean* (1873); Jules Roy, *L'an mille*, Paris (1885); Drummond, *The Ascent of Man* (1894).

GASTON BONET-MAURY.

**AGES OF THE WORLD (Egyptian).**—In their literature the Egyptians have not left any formal description of the world and its ways as they imagined it to have been in past ages. Manetho (c. B.C. 300), enumerating the rulers of Egypt, records in the period before Menes two dynasties of gods, followed by four others the character of which is not defined, and finally a dynasty of *rékves*, demi-gods. The fragments of the Turin Papyrus of kings prove that such a view was already established in the 14th cent. B.C., although the details cannot yet be recovered. Hephæstus, the creator-god, heads the list in Manetho, and he is immediately succeeded by the sun-god. These two correspond in Egyptian to Ptah and Rê, the latter being the organizer of the world. An inscription of the Tenth Dynasty says of the temple of Siut that it was 'built by the fingers of Ptah and founded by Thoth for Ophois,' the local god; and a Ptolemaic text ascribes to the sun-god, during his reign on earth, the building of most of the Egyptian cities and their shrines. Stories of the time of the rule of the gods on earth are seen in the mythology (e.g. the myth of Osiris, and the legend of Hathor's massacre, and the Heavenly Cow) and in the popular tales (vaguely in the story of the Two Brothers). 'Since the time of the god' and 'since the time of Rê' are old formulas for expressing immemorial antiquity; so also is 'since the time of the worshippers of Horus.' These last correspond to Manetho's *rékves*, and have been shown by Sethe to be historical personages, representing the kings of Upper and Lower Egypt before Menes united the two lands. Their records, when they had not perished altogether, were written in so primitive a style as to be undecipherable to the Egyptians of the third millennium B.C., and these 'worshippers of Horus' entered early into the realm of the legendary. The Turin Papyrus appears to give 23,200 + x years to the god-kings, and 2100 + x years to a dynasty of 19 'worshippers of Horus.' The wise Ptahhotep, in his rather cryptic proverbs dating from the Old Kingdom, seems to refer to 'the counsels of them of old, of them who listened to gods'; and the 'worshippers of Horus' are the type of virtue rewarded in the same collection of proverbs: 'An obedient son is like a worshipper of Horus, he hath happiness in consequence of his obedience; he groweth old, and attaineth to the honour of great age.' Thus there was some idea of a more perfect condition having prevailed in primeval times. None the less, the myths show rebellion, deceit, and wickedness of all kinds appearing amongst both gods (e.g. Seth) and men in the age of Divine rule.

LITERATURE.—Meyer, *Egypt. Chronol.* p. 115; Sethe, *Beitr. z. älteste Gesch. Äg.* i. p. 3; Maspero, *Dawn of Civilization* (1901) p. 160.

F. LL. GRIFFITH.

**AGES OF THE WORLD (Greek and Roman).**\* —The Greeks, and after them the Romans, were

\* There is no extended treatment of this subject as a whole. Among the three or four briefer accounts, the only one of any

especially interested in this subject, and it is largely to their speculations that we owe those familiar references to the Ages which we find in the literary tradition of our Western civilization. In the Græco-Roman world this theme was actively discussed for nearly a millennium. During that long period the theory of the Ages was worked over again and again by the various schools of philosophy, by manifold attempts to harmonize conflicting authorities or to incorporate new ideas, by the lore of the people, by the fictions of the poets, even by the embellishments of mere rhetoric. The result is that a complete and detailed examination of the question is not to be expected in the space at our command.

Every theory upon this subject belongs to one of two types. The first assumes that man has risen from his former estate; the second, that he has fallen. Both of these occupy an important position in the history of ancient thought, but, so far as the present inquiry is concerned, the theory of descent, that belief in the progressive degeneration of mankind which is cherished by the folk of many races, was at all times the dominating type. The well-known lines of Horace (*Odes*, III. vi. 46-48),

'Ætas parentum, peior avis, tulit  
Nos nequiores, mox daturos  
Progeniem vitiosiorum,'

are the expression of a view which recurs again and again in the Græco-Roman world, from the Homeric poems (*Il.* i. 272, v. 304; *Od.* ii. 276, etc.) to the last words of Classical Literature.

A strictly chronological development of our subject is impracticable. The blanks in our surviving tradition are so large, especially in the departments most important to us, that no definite date for the inception of any one article of doctrine may be assumed with safety. Indeed, practically every idea by which the later tradition is distinguished will be found upon examination to possess a high antiquity. We may assert, however, that three periods of formative influence are especially prominent. The first is represented by Hesiod, the second by the Stoics and their predecessors, the third by the revival of Mysticism in the 2nd cent. B.C.

1. Hesiod.—The position of Hesiod was always paramount. The influence of Hesiod upon our theme is very much the same as was the influence of Homer upon the form and content of Greek Literature. The account of the Ages which we find in his *Works and Days* (109-201) is our earliest classical authority upon the subject. It is, also, to a remarkable extent, the centre and ultimate source of the later development. There were several other accounts of the early history of man, and some of them were evidently folk-legends of a high antiquity. None of them, however, is of any great importance to us. A few have contributed a detail here and there to the development of the Hesiodic norm, but most of them languish in comparative obscurity. Such being the case, it will be advisable to make Hesiod our basis, and to begin with a summary of his famous account.

First of all, the Olympian gods made the 'Golden Race of men.' These men lived when Kronos was king in heaven. They fared like the gods themselves, always making merry, and untroubled by toil or care, for the teeming earth bore of its own accord an abundance of all good things, and there was no old age. Even death itself, when at last it came, stole upon these men like a pleasant slumber. When this race passed away, Zeus made them the good spirits that live above the earth and are the invisible guardians and helpers of mortal man.

Then the Olympians made a second race, the men of the Silver Age. These were far inferior to the Golden Race, for they remained little children a hundred years, and when they finally reached maturity they straightway perished by their own folly, for they slew each other and refused to worship the immortals as men ought to do. Therefore Zeus was wroth, and put them

real value is by O. Gruppe, in his *Gr. Mythol. und Religionsgesch.*, Munich, 1902, pp. 447-450 (*Müller's Hdb. der Klass. Altertumswissensch.* vol. v.).

away. But even these men were honoured, for they were made the good spirits that live below the earth.

Then Zeus made another and a third race, the men of the Brazen Age. They were sprung from the ash-trees, and were strong and terrible, eating no corn, lovers of war and violence, and knowing nought of pity. Their weapons and their houses were of bronze, and they wrought in bronze. There was no iron. These men, too, fell by the work of their own hands and fared to Hades, nameless and unhonoured. Mighty they were, but dark death laid hold of them, and they left the bright light of the sun.

Then Zeus made a fourth race, better and more just. These were the Heroes of the elder days, such as fought at Troy and at Thebes. We call them the Demigods. And when they perished, Zeus gave them a life and an abiding-place at the ends of the earth. There they dwell in careless ease in the Isles of the Blessed, hard by the deep-eddying stream of Ocean, and thrice a year the earth bears them fair fruit.

Would that I had not been allotted to the fifth period, but might have died earlier, or else have been born later! For this is the Age of Iron. There shall be no success from labour and sorrow by day or by night, and the gods will lay bitter burdens upon us. But, even yet, not all will be bad. This race shall Zeus destroy, when men are born with hoary hair, when fathers strive with sons and sons with fathers, guest with host and friend with friend; when brothers cease to be dear, when goodness, justice, and piety are no longer regarded. . . .

Then Aidos and Nemesis, whose fair bodies are clothed in pure white raiment, shall depart to heaven, and men shall find no succour in their grievous calamity.

The inconsistencies in this account were perceived by the ancients themselves, and in modern times an extensive literature has gathered about the subject.\* For our present purpose, however, it is enough to say that these inconsistencies are due to the fact that Hesiod's version is a composite structure, the main support of which is an ancient division of the history of mankind into four Ages. No reference to this version is found in the Homeric poems, but, even at that early period, some form of it was probably current among the Greeks.

The designation of these four Ages by the four metals—gold, silver, bronze, iron, in the order named—is, in itself, an indication that the theory of descent is the fundamental idea of the legend. True, the causes and symptoms of descent, the coefficients of degradation, so to speak, are by no means clear at first sight. This, however, is, in itself, a striking proof of the high antiquity of the theory. Our long familiarity with the later phases of the legend naturally suggests the ethical motif as the standard of measurement here. But in the primitive stages of a myth like this, neither morality nor moral responsibility is of much account. The Golden Age is a replica of heaven, a mortal reflexion of the glory of the immortals. The men of those days were superior to us simply because they were made so. They were nearer the gods than we. Their position was a matter of powers and privileges, not of character. The long descent from those happier days has been measured by the gradual loss of those powers and privileges. The causes of it are in the will of the gods themselves. The idea of moral responsibility as a factor in the problem belongs to a period of more mature reflexion, and we see the first beginnings of it in Hesiod's own account. Peace and plenty in the first Age are followed by brutish anarchy and violence in the second. The third sees organized violence and deliberate cruelty; the fourth, crime of every sort and description. The steps, however, are none too clear, and the old description of the Ages was not yet in harmony with the new standard.

During the subsequent history of our discussion, more and more emphasis was given to the ethical motif. The basis of it continued to be the assumption of a descent from innocence and happiness to guilt and misery, the adumbration of which has

already been observed in Hesiod. More specific details of the process frequently reflect the philosophical tenets of the writer, and may, also, be freely manipulated in the interests of rhetoric or for other purposes.

The principal difficulty with Hesiod's account arises from the fact that there was no place in the old four-fold scheme for the Heroic Age. As a matter of fact, the Heroic Age belongs to another and a different account of the development of mankind. Neither of these accounts, however, could be neglected, and in Hesiod we see the first known attempt to combine and harmonize the two. The deduction upon which it was based seems tolerably clear. According to the old four-fold system, the Brazen Age immediately preceded our own. On the other hand, it was also generally accepted that the Heroic Age immediately preceded our own. Consequently, the Heroic Age of the one scheme ought to coincide with the Brazen Age of the other. This, however, is impossible, as any one may see by comparing the two. Hesiod, therefore, inserted the Heroic Age between the Brazen and the Iron Ages of the old scheme, and re-numbered accordingly. The result was a system of five Ages, the inconsistency of which was usually clear enough to the ancient critics themselves.\* For example, the famous accounts given by Aratus and Ovid indicate a full realization of the fact that the only way of harmonizing the two systems was either to revise Hesiod's conception of the Four Ages in such a way that the Heroes could find a place in the last of them, or, better still, to shift all four Ages to the past. In that event, our own race, of which the Heroes are, in any case, the earlier and better exemplars, may be assigned to the period between the close of the Iron Age and the present day.

As we have already seen, the presence of the Heroic Age in Hesiod's account upsets the principle of progressive degeneration, a fundamental idea of the old four-fold scheme. It also runs counter to the belief that each one of the Ages is represented by its own separate and distinct race of men. It was not until the rise of the Cyclic Theory that this idea was in any way disturbed, and, even then, the process was one of revision rather than destruction. Much less was the doctrine of successive races affected by the later intrusion of the Flood Legend. At first thought, we might esteem ourselves the descendants of Deucalion and Pyrrha, who were themselves survivors from the previous Age. But the story itself reminds us that we are really *terrigena*, a new race sprung from the earth.

We now come to one of the most notable and, doubtless, one of the most ancient features of our legend. This is the significant association of it with the great dynastic change of Olympus. The Golden Age was under the sway of Kronos. Since then, his son Zeus has ruled the world in his stead. On this basis, the Four Ages are sometimes reduced to two, the Age of Kronos and the Age of Zeus, the old régime and the new, the happy past and the unhappy present. This may well be an older and a simpler version. But it occurs only in the later writers,† and, so far as they are concerned, is probably for brevity, or to score a rhetorical point.

Real variations from this feature of the old account are especially characteristic of the philosophers, and may best be taken up in connexion

\* Rohde, *l.c.*, contends that the principle followed by Hesiod in his classification and discussion of the Five Races was not their condition in this world, but their status in the world to come. This view has not met with approval, and in any case it has no direct bearing upon the points which are of real importance to us.

† e.g. Vergil, *Georg.* i. 121 l.; Tibullus, i. 3. 35; Dio Cassius, lxxi. 56; Maximus Tyr. xxxvi. 2; Ausonius, xvi. 2. 27 (p. 175, ed. Schenkl).

\* Preller, *Gr. Mythol.* p. 87; E. Rohde, *Psyche*, i. 91-110; Bergk, *Gesch. der Gr. Lit.* i. 947 ff.; Alfred Nutt, *Foyage of Bran*, i. 238 ff.; Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. ii. Among the older authorities the most important are: K. F. Hermann, *Verhandl. d. Philologenversammlung*, etc., zu Göttingen, iii. 62 ff.; Bamberg, *Rhein. Mus.*, new ser., i. 524-534; Schömann, *Opuscula*, ii. 305-319; Buttmann, *Mythologus*, i. 1-27.

with the Cyclic Theory. But the Hesiodic version of this *motif*, above all, the primitive association of Kronos with the Golden Age, persisted until a late date, not only in the genuine folk-tradition to which it really belongs, but also, to a large extent, in the literature. In fact, the Golden Age is often designated simply as 'the Age of Kronos,' 'the Days when Saturn was King,' etc.\*

**THE GOLDEN AGE.**—No part of our subject has been so thoroughly investigated by modern scholarship as the Golden Age.† It is, perhaps, the most important element in Hesiod's own account, and, for obvious reasons, the theme was extremely popular in the literary tradition of later times.‡ And, with the exception of certain details to be taken up in another connexion, these descriptions all bear a strong family resemblance to each other. Not less striking is their resemblance to what we hear about Elysium, the Garden of the Gods, the Hyperboreans, and similar conceptions.§ Indeed, as Dieterich has shown in his interesting monograph, *Nekyia*, the traditional *motifs* common to all these themes passed over to the early Christian writers, and were applied by them to their descriptions of heaven.

The main reason for such a similarity is, of course, not far to seek. In all cases, the theme is ideal happiness, and whether we locate it in the past or somewhere in the present, in this world or in the next, the details which make up the vision of unfulfilled desire are, for the average man, very much the same. Nor should we fail to remind ourselves that in the speculations of the folk there is no impassable barrier between our life and the life of those beyond the grave. Nothing was more certain than that the Golden Age and the race who had lived in those happier days had both passed beyond our ken; but that they still existed somewhere, and that, even now, a mere mortal man might be able to find them again, was not felt to be utterly beyond the bounds of possibility. Odysseus had returned alive from Hades, and it is a well-known historical fact that the gallant Sertorius|| was, at one time, actually on the eve of setting sail for the Fortunate Isles in the Western Ocean, just as, many centuries later, Ponce de Leon took the same direction in his search for the Fountain of Youth. The same association of ideas is clearly seen in Hesiod's account. In fact, this is one of the most ancient and primitive aspects of the legend. Hesiod's Golden Age, when Kronos ruled a race of men who have since departed, is in all essential particulars a mere replica of Hesiod's Isles of the Blest, where dwell those sons of the gods who have passed alive beyond the grave. Moreover, the foundation of both is material which had long been traditional, even at the time when

\* e.g. Plato, *Polit.* 269 A, 271 C, 276 A, *Hipp.* 269 B; Philodemus, *de Pietate*, p. 61; Vergil, *Ecl.* iv. 6; Tibullus, i. 3. 35; Propert. ii. (iii.), 32. 52; Ovid, *Amor.* iii. 8. 35, *Heroid.* iv. 132, etc.

† See esp. Eichhoff, *Jahrbuch. f. Philol.* cxx. 581 ff.; E. Graf, 'ad Aurea Etatis Fabulam Symbola,' *Leipz. Stud. z. Class. Philol.* viii. (1885) 1-35; A. Dieterich, *Nekyia*, Leipzig, 1893; E. Rohde, *Psyche*, Leipzig, 1903, i. p. 106 ff.; A. Nutt, *Voyage of Bran*, London, 1895.

‡ The earliest known reference after Hesiod is a line quoted by Philodemus from the old epic, *Alcmaon* (see Kinkel, *Epic. Græc. Fragm.*, Leipzig, 1877, p. 313). Theognis, 1135 ff., is the source of Ovid, *F. i.* 6. 29. The author of the *Ætina*, writing in the 1st cent. A.D., says that descriptions of the Golden Age may be found in many places.

§ common that—  
tempora nosse.  
hundred references to it

|| Sallust, *Hist.* frag. 192, 193, ed. Maurenbrecher; Horace, *Epod.* xvi. 42, and schol.; Plutarch, *Sertorius*, 8.

the Homeric poems were composed.\* Indeed, even as Hesiod tells the story, it still reflects with remarkable fidelity the old folk-tale of a Lost Paradise before the simple beauty of the legend had been marred by the intrusion of moral lessons and specific philosophical doctrines. Men lived long, never grew old, and died a painless, i.e. a natural death. Meanwhile, they passed their days like the gods, in innocence, peace, and fabulous plenty, making merry continually, and knowing nothing of labour, disease, or sorrow.

Such are the principal *motifs* of the old legend of the Golden Age, and they usually form the basis of all versions. The variations or additional details which we find in later accounts are, for the most part, due either to philosophical speculation, the incorporation of allied myths, or manipulation for literary purposes.

By far the most important of these is the first. In fact, the growing prominence of the ethical element, the most notable feature in the later development of the Golden Age, is very largely due to the philosophers. The earliest of them were the Orphics of the 6th cent. B.C. The body of doctrine developed by these nameless mystics was probably long the possession of a few, and, when we consider the strange figures of speech in which its real meaning was often concealed, we can hardly wonder that it was long misunderstood or derided by the many. The kernel of it, however, the great idea for which they were slowly preparing, was destined to grow in strength, and, in the far future, to bear abundant fruit. This was the belief that not alone the sons of the gods, but, by a lifetime of merit, the sons of men, might find their reward, even in the dark house of Hades. Naturally, therefore, not only among the Orphics and their disciples, but also among their opponents, the ideal of the Lost Paradise became more and more prominent. Discussion or description of the Golden Age, more especially of its analogue beyond the grave,—the Golden Age, so to speak, of the future—continued to grow in importance and interest. We hear many echoes of it in Plato. But, especially, to the writers of the Old Comedy the Orphics and their doctrines were a never-failing subject for parody and satiric comment.

One of the plainest signs of Orphic influence upon this discussion was the marked improvement in the present position of Kronos. According to the popular belief, old 'King' Kronos had been in the Golden Age a sort of divine *Roi d'Yvetot*, afterwards consigned to nethermost Tartarus, and, ever since then, a synonym of extreme old age and harmless senility.† This view, however, was deliberately opposed by the Orphics. Their teaching was that Kronos had long since been freed from his shameful captivity. Moreover, he is not old and weak. On the contrary, he is for ever young and vigorous, and now rules in Elysium, the land of those who have gone hence. There, in a world of eternal youth and joy, he is surrounded not only by the heroes of old, but also by the spirits of just men made perfect—after the Orphic pattern—and, indeed, as some say, by a remnant of men from those golden days when he was king in heaven.‡

Piety and justice as *motifs* in the ideal of happiness had been ascribed, long before Hesiod's time, to peoples living beyond the limits of the known world. Such were Homer's *Abioi* (*Il.* xiii. 6), 'the most righteous of men,' and, to give one more

\* e.g. Homer, *Il.* xiii. 5, *Od.* iv. 85, vii. 201 and 88, iv. 563, vi. 41, ix. 108. See Graf, *l.c.* p. 4 ff.

† See M. Mayer in Roscher, ii. 1456 ff.

‡ Pindar, *Olymp.* ii. 124, *Pyth.* iv. 291; Æschyl. frag. 190, ed. Nauck; Teleclides, frag. 1, ed. Kock; Varro, *de Re Rust.* iii. 1, 5; Horace, *Epod.* xvi. 63; Orphica, frag. 245, ed. Abel.

example, the Hyperboreans,\* so long famous in the literature and legend of the Graeco-Roman world. This idea was now emphasized in the analogous legend of the Golden Age—the ideal world of the past—and on the basis of it not only the Orphics but other schools of philosophy exploited their specific views regarding the nature of righteousness and the indispensable conditions of happiness. In other words, as the Golden Age ceased to be an article of faith, it became, more and more, the field in which these thinkers aired their theories of what the world ought to be. From this sort of thing it was only a step to that long line of Utopian romances which were quite as characteristic of late antiquity as they are of the present day.†

Among the various bits of specific theory imported into the Golden Age by the philosophers, one of the oldest and most important was the doctrine of vegetarianism.‡ This doctrine doubtless goes back to the elder Orphics, but the most prominent representatives of it in antiquity were the Pythagoreans. The earliest reference to it now surviving is a fragment of Empedocles (127 D), and the most complete discussion of it in connexion with the Golden Age is Ovid, *Met.* xv. 961 f. In this famous passage Ovid introduces Pythagoras himself as the expounder of his own doctrine. The essence of it is that, in the Golden Age, men lived upon the fruits of the earth, and that the degeneration of later Ages is marked by the departure from this rule.

That the Golden Age was distinctively the era of perfect love and peace is easily inferred from Hesiod's account, but the later development is marked by a much stronger emphasis upon this feature. This was partly due to the influence of the Cyclic Theory, in which, as we shall see later, it was the necessary result of the Platonic conception of harmony. The first to lay stress upon it—and probably in this connexion—was Plato's predecessor Empedocles.¶ This, no doubt, is the reason why he made Aphrodite instead of Kronos ruler of the Golden Age.

Among those not interested in any cyclic theory—poets, for the most part—the favourite method of bringing out the peace and harmony of the Golden Age was to emphasize the contrast with later times by dilating upon war, violence, and bloodshed as both causes and symptoms of degeneration in the succeeding ages of mankind. This diatribe on war first comes to the front during the Alexandrian age. It is characteristic of Roman poetry, especially of the Elegy, and, in the end, became a mere rhetorical commonplace.‡

Another important line of development in later times was inspired by the varying use and interpretation of one of the most persistent and characteristic peculiarities of the genuine folk-legend. We refer to the belief that in the Golden Age all the imaginable blessings of life come of their own accord. In this way we have an ideal combination of fabulous plenty with luxurious idleness.

\* See esp. O. Crusius in Roscher, I. p. 2395 ff., and the references.

† Henkel, *Philologus*, ix. 402, gives a long list, beginning with the Republic of Protagoras. See E. Rohde, *Der Gr. Roman*, Leipzig, 1900, p. 210 ff., with references.

‡ See Graf, *l.c.* p. 20 ff., for an extended discussion, and cf. Porphyry, *de Abstinentia*, ii. 21 ff.; Plato, *Ley.* vi. 782 E; Seneca, *Epist.* cviii. (Sotion); Clemens Alex. *Strom.* vii. 32, etc. For similar ideas in the East, Gruppe (*Gr. Mythol.* p. 448, note 2) refers to Gn 1<sup>st</sup> 216; cf. Windischmann, *Zoroaster. Stud.* p. 212. Connected with this discussion is the old tradition that men talked with the animals in the Golden Age. The references to it are, Crates, 14, ed. Hock; Plato, *Polit.* 272 B; Xen. *Mem.* ii. 7, 13; Babrius, *proem*.

§ See esp. Schmekel, *de Ovid. Pythag. Adumbratione*, Diss., Greifswald, 1885.

¶ So, too, Aratus, 103, and freq. in the Roman poets, e.g. Vergil, *Ecl.* iv. 18, Georg. i. 125 and ii. 539; Tibullus, i. 10. 7; Ovid, *Met.* i. 97; Seneca, 14, ed. 1056; Juvenal, xv. 163; Claudian, *de Raptu Proserp.* ii. 25, *proem*, *Laud. Seren.* 70; Sidon. *Apoll. Pan.* 105, etc.

‡ E.g. Aratus, 151; Vergil, *Ecl.* iv. 32, Georg. ii. 540, and Servius; Tibullus, i. 3. 36 and 47; Juvenal, vi. 163; Ovid, *Met.* i. 92, etc.

When treated seriously, either for literary or for didactic purposes, this motif led directly and inevitably to the conclusion that the ideal condition of human society was communism.\* Several commonplaces which the Roman poets inherited from the Alexandrian age might be included here.† We know, too, for example, that this theme was developed at some length by the historian Ephoros in his account of the idealized nations of the North.‡

When treated by the satirists and by other people of a less serious turn of mind, the same motif led quite as directly to one of the most important and interesting developments in the literary history of this legend. This is the treatment of the Golden Age or its analogues in this world and the next as a comic theme. It makes its first appearance in the writers of the Old Comedy, and was primarily intended by them to satirize the peculiar tenets of the Orphics. But the story of Topsy-Turvy Land (*das Märchen des Schlafwandlers*, as the Germans call it) was certainly not invented by the Comic Dramatists. It is rather a folk-variation of the old story of the Golden Age, and references to it turn up now and then from the old Comedy of Greece to the present day.§ The comedy in these descriptions is usually produced by pushing the automatus element, occasionally too, the theory of communism, to its perfectly logical, and yet, at the same time, its utterly absurd conclusion. The result is a Lost Paradise of the bon-vivant, the votary of ease, and the irresponsible bachelor. The nearest congener of this type is the conception of the Golden Age especially affected by the idyllic-erotic poets of the Alexandrian age and by their Roman imitators. The same automatus and communistic features are prominent, and the examples by which they are illustrated are sometimes so nearly the same that the difference between the two departments is hardly more than a matter of mood.¶ At first sight this is surprising. It ceases to be so, however, as soon as we remind ourselves that the pathetic exaggeration so characteristic of the idyllic-erotic sphere is largely due to the fact that the author himself is rarely more than half convinced of the truth, or even of the possibility, of his own statements. It is an easy step from this state of mind to that ironical extravagance of humorous unbelief—and this, too, has its pathetic side—to which we are indebted for the old tale of Topsy-Turvy Land.

On the philosophical side, the growing distrust of everything in Hesiod's account that savoured of the supernatural served to bring out still another aspect of the Golden Age more and more clearly. Before taking up this point, however, we should remind ourselves that the counter-theory of ascent was, meanwhile, being supported by a party of such activity and intelligence that it could not be ignored.\*\* The theory of ascent was also backed by folk-legends of great antiquity, and for centuries all classes seem to have been interested in discussing the various inventions by which the rise of mankind from utter savagery to our present stage of civilization has been marked.

It is evident that until the account of Hesiod was revised the two parties were utterly irreconcilable. If one did not believe Hesiod, the most

\* See Graf, *l.c.* p. 60, and compare such passages, e.g., as Plato, *Critias*, 110 C, but esp. the *Republic*, 415, 417, 424, 451-465, with the notes and references in the edition of Adam, Cambridge, 1902. Plato went further in this respect than any of his predecessors. He looked upon communism as one of the indispensable conditions of an ideal State, and the reflexion of this view may be seen in what he has to say of the Golden Age.

† Vergil, *Georg.* i. 126, *Æn.* ix. 589, and Servius; Tibullus, i. 3. 43, ii. 3. 73; Ovid, *Met.* i. 132; Juvenal, vi. 18; Seneca, *Phaedra*, 539, *Epist.* xc. 41; Justinus, xliii. 1. 3, etc.

‡ Frag. 76 in Müller's *Fragm. Histor. Græc.* vol. i. p. 256.

§ Friedländer, *Sittengesch. Roms*, i. 537, Leipzig, 1853;

O. Crusius, 'Märchenreminiscenzen im antiken Griechenland', in *Verhandlungen der 10ten P.* 31-47; Rohde, *Psyche*, i. 315.

J. Pöschel, *Das Märchen von Topsy-Turvy*, best known to us, through numerous editions, given by the old Trouvère in his (text in Barbarn, *Folklore* et

1890, ii. p. 175), tr. by G. L. Way, 1890, ii. p. 51; abstract by I. Contes, etc. Paris, 1892, i. p. 392.

¶ Teleclides, 1 ed. Hock; Pherecrates, 108 K; Cratinus, 165 K; Crates, 14 K; Eupolis, 277 K; Athen. vi. 267 E; Lucilius, 978, ed. Marx; Petronius, 45; Lucian, *Sat.* 7, *Vera Hist.* i. 7, etc.

‡ Vergil, *Georg.* i. 132, *Ecl.* iv. 21; Horace, *Epod.* xvi. 49; Tibullus, i. 3. 45; Ovid, *Met.* i. 111; Dioscorides, *Anth. Pal.* vii. 31, etc.

\*\* Rohde, *Griech. Roman*, p. 216, n. 2; Eichhoff, *l.c.* p. 587;

Graf, *l.c.* p. 57; Eschylus, *Prom.* 440-455; Moschion, frag. 7, ed. Nauck; Critias, frag. 1, ed. Nauck; Athen. frag. 1, ed. Hock; Democritus, p. 237, ed. Mullach; Aristotle, *Met.* i. 2, and Zeller, *Phil. der Griechen*, i. p. 826. 8; Lucretius, v. 925; Diodorus, i. 8 and ii. 38; Horace, *Sat.* i. iii. 99; Lucian, *Amores*, 33. 24; Aristides, i. p. 82, ed. Dind.; Ovid, *Art. Amat.* ii. 473; Tibullus, ii. 1. 39; Cic. *pro Sent.* 42; Lobacz, *Aglaophant.* p. 246 (*Orphica*).

logical course was to agree with the Epicureans, who denied the account of Hesiod *in toto*, and replaced it by their own view, which is the nearest approach in antiquity to our modern theory of evolution. This denial, which lies implicit in the famous passage of Lucretius (v. 925 f.), is stated positively, for example, by Diodorus, who (i. 8 f.) describes the theory of Epicurus upon this point, and (v. 66 f.) implies that the Golden Age was a mere invention of the Cretans. But this summary disposition of the difficulty is of no value to us. We are more interested in the process of reconciliation. The most important force in this process, so far as it was accomplished at all, was a gradual realization among thoughtful men of the fact that the ideal of life traditionally associated with the Golden Age, though it seemed attractive, was, in reality, unfit to pose as the highest development in any theory of descent.

2. Cynics, Stoics, etc.—At this point, certain Stoic modifications of Cynic doctrine are of especial value to us. The great representative passage to be considered in this connexion is Aratus, *Phaenomena*, 97-140.\* The version of the Ages by this famous Alexandrian poet of the 3rd cent. B.C. was one of the best known in the ancient world, and undoubted traces of its influence are to be found in most of the later accounts. Briefly described, it is a revision of Hesiod under Stoic influence. The object of the author was not only to reconcile the discrepancies of the old version, but also to remove whatever was irrelevant to a theme which he proposed to treat not as an independent account, as Hesiod had done, but as a rhetorical episode suggested by his mention of the constellation Virgo, i.e. Astraea, whom Aratus, following an old tradition, identifies with the Nemesis of Hesiod, and calls *Dike*.

*Dike* was comparatively unimportant in Hesiod. Owing to the exigencies of rhetoric, she now becomes the central figure. Moreover, after the true Stoic fashion, she is made to assume the functions of both Zeus and Kronos in the traditional version. The five ages of Hesiod are reduced to three—an Age of Gold, of Silver, and of Bronze.

The men of the Golden Age are described as peaceful tillers of the soil, with no knowledge of civil strife or of the vexations of the law. Moreover, they were far removed from the perils of the sea. In those days there were no ships to bring the luxuries of life from abroad. The goddess mingled freely with these simple souls, and taught them how men should live with reference to each other.

The Silver Age was more sophisticated. Nevertheless, the goddess still remained upon earth, although she now retired to the mountains, and was seen but rarely.

The Brazen Age saw the first swords, and the first slaughter of the oxen for food. Then *Dike*, utterly hating that race of men, finally departed to heaven and took her place among the stars.

It will be seen that one of the most notable signs of revision here is the disappearance of the old folk-element of marvel. In its place we have a conception in which the Stoics are mainly responsible for the emphasis laid upon the ethical *motif*, especially upon the relation of man to his fellows, to the world about him, and to the State.

The underlying principle in such a theory of the Ages is the conclusion that the ascent of man in the arts of civilization is accompanied, at all events beyond a certain point, by a corresponding descent in moral and even in physical fibre. Why is this the case? The reply was that to be healthy in mind and body, and therefore, happy, we must live in harmony with nature. But civilization beyond a certain point is not in harmony with nature. Accordingly, beyond a certain stage of civilization, we can be neither healthy, virtuous, nor happy. Now, as journeying into the future should bring us finally to a state of ideal misery, so journeying into the past should take us back

\* Another representative passage is Seneca, *Epist.* xc. 5 ff., in which he quotes from Posidonius the description of an ideal past of the Stoics, in which the philosophers take the place of Kronos.

finally to a state of ideal happiness. That state of ideal happiness was, of course, the Golden Age. The Golden Age of the past was, therefore, the ideal simple life of the past.

Such in substance was the general drift of the Cynic argument as modified by the Stoics, and, as a matter of fact, the Golden Age of Aratus is really an idealization of the agricultural and pastoral stage of human society—a theme which always comes to the front in any period of over-cultivation, as soon as men begin to stagger under the burden of their own inventions. So conceived, the theory of the Ages was not only quite consistent with the evolution of civilization from the crudest beginnings, but agreed with the Epicureans in presupposing such a process. But, as regarded the various inventions and discoveries by which that process has been marked, it loved to dwell upon those very devices, and to lay great stress on the view that they had been the most conspicuous cause of the downfall of man himself. The favourite examples are those chosen by Aratus. They are the first sword and the first ship.

The first sword† is a characteristic introduction to the topic of war which we have already mentioned. The first ship is also a favourite way of connecting the discussion of the Ages with the diatribe on navigation so frequently found in the later writers, especially among the Romans. In fact, it is a commonplace of modern criticism that the Romans were afraid of the sea. As, however, the opinion is a generalization, founded, for the most part, upon these very passages, we need not take it too seriously. The sailor's impious challenge of the treacherous and relentless deep was a subject inspired not so much by national character as by literary tradition. It is fully developed in the *Works and Days* of the old Boeotian poet, a conventional theme of the Greek epigram at all periods, a regular *motif* in the poetry of the Augustan age, and by the 1st cent. of our era a mere rhetorical commonplace.‡

In order to understand better the attitude of the Epicureans towards the theory of the Ages, as presented, for example, by Aratus, we must return for a moment to the underlying principle upon which, according to Stoic reasoning, that theory was founded. We mean the conclusion stated above, that advance in the arts of civilization is at the expense of the character, health, and happiness of the individual. Now, when we consider the Stoic argument by which this conclusion was made to yield the theory that the Golden Age of

\* Horace, *Epod.* ii.; Propert. iii. 13. 25; Seneca, *Medea*, 333; Plutarch, *de Nobil.* 20, etc. etc. This interpretation of the Golden Age was especially welcome to the Romans, not only because of their temperamental Stoicism, but because it agreed more nearly with their own tradition of early times and with the character and attributes of Saturn before he was identified with the Greek Kronos.

† e.g. Vergil, *Georg.* ii. 540; Ovid, *Met.* i. 99; Juvenal, xv. 108; Tibullus, i. 3. 47. The rhetorical question of Tibullus (i. 10. 1) states a maxim of the philosophers which is often repeated. See, e.g., Seneca, *N.Q.* v. 18. 15: 'Nihil invenimus tam manifestæ utilitatis quod non in contrarium transeat culpa.' So Ovid, *Met.* xv. 106, speaking in the person of Pythagoras. Opponents of the theory of descent, especially the Epicureans, contended that the sword merely marked one period in the long chronicle of homicide. It was the successor of the club and the large rough stone (Lucretius, v. 966). Cf. also Hor. *Sat.* i. 3. 100; Valer. Flacc. v. 145, and esp. Plato, *Rep.* 358 E (war the natural condition of mankind), and the commentary of Adam.

‡ Among the most important of the numberless references are, Stobaeus, 67 (who gives a number of quotations); Hesiod, *W. and D.* 230; Sophocles, *Antig.* 332; Seneca, *Medea*, 301 and 607; Tibullus, i. 3. 37 and ii. 3. 39; Propert. i. 17. 13 and iii. 7. 23; Ovid, *Amor.* ii. 11. 1; Statius, *Thebaid.* vi. 19 and *Achilleid.* i. 62; Claudian, *de Raptu Pros.* i., *proem.* The final conclusion, after generations of discussion, was that the one great cause of the downfall of man had been his greed and his selfishness. It was clear to the poets and philosophers themselves, especially to the Romans, that all their commonplaces on the fall of man were really just so many illustrations of this one *motif*. It drove him to war, it suggested the first ship, it urged him on to explore the earth for treasures better hid, it devised the vexations of the law and brought about the injustice of wealth and poverty; through crime and self-indulgence it has made him acquainted with sorrow, disease, and all the ills that flesh is heir to. The result is that he has not only shortened his life by his own devices, but, what with anxiety, dyspepsia, and a bad conscience, with marriage a failure and children a burden, the little life he has left is no pleasure to him.

the past was the ideal simple life of the past, we perceive that it is founded on two assumptions. The first is that this conclusion, that advance in the arts is at the expense of the individual, is a truth of universal application, and not to be modified. The second is that the twin process to which it refers has operated continuously, and will go on doing so. The Stoics could make these assumptions without hesitation, since both of them followed, inevitably, from that cyclic theory of the Ages to which this school of philosophers gave its enthusiastic support. Not so the Epicureans. The Epicureans agreed that the growth of civilization had been accompanied by certain signs of degeneration in man himself, but they denied that the principle was capable of universal application. They insisted that every stage of civilization, in its own particular fashion, has been unfavourable to the individual. In other ways it has been favourable. There is no such thing, therefore, as progressive degeneration in the strict sense of the word. Such a theory would imply a period of ideal happiness at one extreme, followed by a period of ideal misery at the other extreme. Both are superhuman, and therefore impossible. In other words, there never was a Golden Age, even if we adopt the Stoic revision of the old legend.

Another method of reconciling the difficulties in Hesiod's account is illustrated by Vergil, *Georg.* i. 121 ff. The primary purpose of this version was to enhance the dignity of labour. The history of mankind is divided into two periods—the Age of Saturn, and the Age of Jove. The Golden Age, when good old Saturn was King, agrees entirely with Hesiod. The second period, however, is not an age of degeneration, but an age of reform. Jupiter, the divine father of our race and of all our higher aspirations, purposely did away with the *far niente* of the old régime, not out of a petty resentment against Prometheus—as the old folk-legend (e.g. Hesiod, *W. and D.* 42 f.) would have us believe—but rather,

\*curis accensu mortalia corda,  
Nec torpere gravi passus sua regna veterno,\*

because he was well aware that, unless men have difficulties to meet and overcome, they can never grow strong in any sense. In this characteristically noble conception, it is interesting to see to what an extent Vergil succeeded in meeting the demands of contemporary thought without sacrificing the traditional account of the Golden Age so dear to the poets.

The famous account of the Ages which Ovid gives in the first book of his *Metamorphoses*, 89–162, and the version best known to the modern world, is one of the earliest surviving attempts to incorporate the Flood Legend. Otherwise, it is chiefly remarkable as an illustration of the poet's characteristic skill in combining and harmonizing the views of preceding thinkers. The Four Ages (Gold, Silver, Bronze, and Iron) are all in the past. The Age to which we belong is a fifth. The Flood is the great catastrophe by which the wicked and godless race of the Iron Age was destroyed. The history of our own race, therefore, begins with the earth-born children of Deucalion and Pyrrha. In this way, the Flood Legend, the theory of descent, the theory of ascent, the traditional account of the Golden Age, the Heroes, and, with only a slight modification, even Hesiod's quintuple division of the Ages, were all made to dwell together in peace and unity.

**CYCLIC THEORY.**—Let us now turn our attention to the Cyclic Theory, the most important element, in the long run perhaps the one really vital and vitalizing element, in the history of our subject. The Cyclic Theory of the Ages was founded on the belief that, after the analogy of day and night,

of the waxing and waning of the moon, and of the eternal round of the seasons, the entire Universe itself is subject to an ever-recurring cycle of change. This ancient Babylonian doctrine\* of the world-year, the *magnus annus*, as it was called by the Romans, makes its earliest known appearance on Greek soil with Heraclitus,† was thoroughly discussed by the later philosophers, and finally became known to the world at large. Indeed, it may be called the prototype of some of our most recent views suggested by the nebular hypothesis.‡

The association of this idea with the old folk-legend of the Ages was inevitable, and appears at a very early period in the history of Greek speculative thought. In fact, it has often been stated, though without sufficient warrant, that belief in a cyclic theory of the Ages is the explanation of Hesiod's wish that he had died earlier or could have been born later.§ The fragments, however, of Empedocles show, in spite of their scantiness, that at that time the process had already begun.|| But the most important discussion, so far as we are concerned, the one, too, which had the strongest influence upon later times, is developed or touched upon in various dialogues of Plato,¶ more especially in the *Polit.*, *Timæus*, and *Republic*.

According to Plato's definition,—and this much, at least, appears to have remained unchanged in later times—a *magnus annus* means the period which elapses before the eight circles, each revolving about the earth in an orbit of its own, arrive simultaneously at the point from which they started at the beginning of our cycle.\*\* Further details of the Platonic theory—and these underwent considerable revision in later times—apparently rest on the assumption that each complete revolution of the Universe is followed by a counter revolution in the opposite direction. A motion forward, as it were, is followed by a motion backward. The history of mankind is directly affected by this motion, and especially by the alternation of it.

The motion forward is the Age of Kronos and the direction of harmony. During all this period the great Helmsman of the Universe is at his post, and we have the Golden Age of the poets. As the motion is the reverse of that which prevails in our time, it is naively assumed that the conditions of life are to a large extent the opposite of those with which we are familiar. The men of that age are born old, with hoary hair,†† and instead of growing older continue to grow younger, until they finally disappear. Moreover, they are born from the earth, and the earth feeds them. There is no toil, no pain, no war, there are no women!‡‡ and no children of women. Yet with all their

san retires  
o the force

of gravity, as it were, and begins its backward revolution, which is in the direction of discord. The point at which the motion is reversed is always signalized by fire, flood, or some other cosmic upheaval, involving a terrific destruction of organic life. The few men who survive cease growing young and begin to grow old, those just born from the earth with hoary hair die, and return to the earth from which they came. Men are no longer born from the earth, as before, but even as

\* Gomperz, *Griech. Denker*, Leipzig, 1896, I. p. 115, with note and references on p. 433; Lenormant-Babelon, *Hist. de l'Orient*, v. 175; *supra*, p. 183 ff.

† Gomperz, *loc. cit.* pp. 64 and 423; Diels, *Heraclitus von Ephesos*, Berlin, 1901, frag. 66 (26, Bywater).

‡ Gomperz, *loc. cit.* p. 117.

§ Hesiod, *W. and D.* 174–5. See the editions of Rzsch, Leipzig, 1902, p. 153, and of Goettling-Flach, Leipzig, 1878, p. 201, with notes and references; Grut, *loc. cit.* p. 11; Schoell-Studemund, *Anecdota Græco-Latina*, ii.

¶ Diels, *Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta*, Berlin, 1901, pp. 53 and 112 ff.

‡ Plato, *Polit.* 283 C, *Tim.* 39 D ff., *Rep.* 545 C ff.; *Cic. Timæus*, 34 ff. For a good discussion of this theory and of the Platonic Number with which it is closely associated, and also for a selected bibliography of the enormous literature which has gathered about it, see Adam's ed. of the *Republic*, ii. p. 264 ff.

\*\* *Tim.* 29 D; *Cic. Timæus*, 33; Macrobi., *Som. Scipionis*, ii. 2, 19; Stobæus, *Edog.* I. 264 (vol. I. p. 107, Hense). See esp. Usener, *Rhein. Mus.* xxviii. 325; Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Philol. Græc.*, Götting, 1858, p. 404; Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, Leipzig, 1904, p. 50, n. 2.

†† The likeness to Hesiod, *W. and D.* 180 ff., has been pointed out and discussed by Adam in the *CIR* v. 445.

‡‡ *Polit.* 291 F; *Leg.* iv. 713 C ff. It has been observed by Eichhoff (*loc. cit.* p. 559) and others that the story of Pandora as told by Hesiod (*Theog.* 570, and *W. and D.* 70) implies that there was no woman in the Golden Age, and that it was through her that this happy period came to an end. See also, Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, p. 540.



the Universe is now left to itself, so are all and several of its parts; and each race is propagated in the manner familiar to us who belong to that period. The continuance of the motion backward increases and accelerates the process of disorganization, until, by the time the Universe again reaches the point of departure, it is ready to fly off at a tangent and disappear for ever in the infinite space of discord. At this point, however, the Helmsman again resumes his post, reverses the direction of the Universe, and with the change again to harmony the Golden Age necessarily returns as before. The few who survive from the preceding period suffer change in sympathy with the whole. Again the old begin to grow young, and continue to do so until they finally disappear. Again the new generations are born with hoary hair, and not from each other, but from the earth. In fact, it is those who died in the preceding period of discord and were buried in the earth that now rise again from the dead, and in their turn are born old, grow young, and finally vanish.

It will be seen at once that, according to this remarkably suggestive theory, which, of course, owes much to earlier thinkers,\* the sum of human experience is measured by two world-years. During the first the Universe moves forward, during the second, backward, to the place of beginning. Each *magnus annus* is therefore one of the two Ages into which the history of mankind is divided; and this alternation of Ages will continue so long as the Universe endures. As with the whole, so with each and all of its parts. The Ages of man, the life of man himself, are closely connected with this eternal oscillation of the Universe. All move in a cycle. The Golden Age of the long ago will surely come again some day. Moreover, every one of us shall rise again to another life in that Golden Age. Thus, regret for the past was balanced by hope for the future. In the later history of our theme, this association of ideas was of the utmost importance, and served to identify the theory of the Ages more and more closely with its ancient analogue, the doctrine of a future life beyond the grave.

The Stoic theory† of cycles occupies an important place in their systems. Here, their acknowledged dependence upon Heraclitus is clearly seen in the prominence they give to his doctrine of *ἐκπύρωσις*, the elemental fire into which the world is periodically resolved, and from which it is periodically born anew.

After the old world has been completely consumed, the four primal elements,—fire, air, water, earth,—which are indestructible, gradually assume their previous relations to each other, and in this way a new world comes into being exactly like the old. As soon as the proper point is reached in the process of reconstruction, every sort of living thing is born from the earth, and from that time proceeds to increase after its kind.‡ Man, too, is here, 'knowing nothing of wrong and born under better auspices.' But this Golden Age of innocence is never for long. 'Villainy steals on apace. Virtue is hard to find out: it needs a leader and a guide. The vices are learned without a master.'§ So the process of degeneration goes on until the time comes for the next *ἐκπύρωσις*. Then the world is destroyed and built anew, as before.

An *ἐκπύρωσις* occurs each time that the eight circles are in conjunction at the place of beginning.¶ For the Stoics, therefore, every *magnus annus* is the measure of one complete life, as it were, of the Universe. It follows that the totality of human experience must, also, lie between those impassable barriers of flame by which every great year is divided from its fellows. The soul outlives the body, but even the soul of the ideal Stoic¶ cannot survive the *ἐκπύρωσις*. Nothing emerges from this trial by fire except the primal elements from which all things are made.\*\*

In one sense, however, we all have a personal interest in every period of the world's existence, for the reason that,

\* See the two preceding notes, and Adam, *Repub.* ii. p. 296, n. 6, p. 297, n. 1-4, and references.

† Ritter and Preller, *l.c.* pp. 23 ff. and 393-405; Zeller, *Grundriss der Gesch. der Gr. Phil.*, Leipzig, 1905, p. 214; Zeno, *frag.* 107-109, and Chrysippus, *frag.* 690-692, in van Armin's *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, Leipzig, 1905.

‡ Cleanthes, *frag.* 497, ed. van Armin.

§ Seneca, *N.Q.* iii. 30. 8.

¶ Nemes. *de Nat. Hom.* 28 (quoted by Ritter and Preller, *l.c.* p. 404).

¶ Diog. Laert. (vii. 156) says that 'the Stoics claim that the soul is the spirit which is a part of ourselves. It is, therefore, corporeal, and though it survives our death, it is not immortal. . . . Cleanthes, therefore, thinks that all souls, Chrysippus, that only souls of the "wise," last until the *ἐκπύρωσις*.' Cf. also vii. 151; *Doxographi Graeci*, 393, ed. Diels, etc.

\*\* But see Ritter and Preller, *l.c.* p. 401 B.

according to the Stoic doctrine of *ἐκπύρωσις*,\* the history of every *magnus annus* is, necessarily, the exact counterpart of the history of every other *magnus annus*. The chain of existence and of consciousness is parted by the *ἐκπύρωσις*; but all begins anew, just as it did in the previous epoch; and every thing down to the slightest detail is exactly repeated.† To quote a favourite illustration of the Stoics themselves, every *magnus annus* will see Socrates. In every *magnus annus* he will marry Xanthippe, drink the hemlock, and die.‡

In the later stages of the Cyclic Theory we have also to reckon with the manipulations of the Orphic philosophers.§ It is extremely difficult to extract a definite answer to any question connected with the history of this movement. The *floruit* of the elder Orphics was not far from the 6th cent. B.C. With the great revival of Mysticism, four or five hundred years later, the old doctrine of the Orphics again came to the front, and was more or less revised or extended in conformity with similar ideas in other systems of thought—more especially Plato, the Stoics, and the Orient. Both periods were characterized by great literary activity. Unfortunately, however, our present knowledge of it is, for the most part, confined to chance quotations in the Neo-Platonists and the still later scholiasts, and their references are generally so vague and indefinite that, in the absence of other testimony, it is often impossible to distinguish the earlier product from the later. We may be fairly certain, however, that the two following theories, both of which are ascribed to the Orphics, are not a product of the earlier school.

The first is mentioned by Servius on Vergil, *Ed. iv.* 10. In this note, Nigidius Figulus (*de Diis*, lib. iv.) is quoted for the statement: 'According to Orpheus, the ruler of the First Age is Saturn; of the Second, Jupiter; of the Third, Neptune; of the Fourth, Pluto.' An apparent reference to the same theory is found in two hexameters quoted from some Orphic poem by Lactantius, *Instit.* i. 13. 11 (Abel, *Orphica*, *frag.* 243).

As we shall see shortly, the four gods in this system are merely personifications of the four elements. The number points either to the Stoics or to the common source of both. Moreover, the formal association of the four elements with the Four Ages of man is an item of speculation which, so far as the Greeks are concerned, cannot be carried back beyond the Alexandrian period. Finally, this is certainly a cyclic theory, and it cannot be shown that the elder Orphics ever carried their doctrine of the re-birth of the soul any further. The extension of it to a periodical re-birth of the Universe itself, and the establishment of a close connexion between the two, belong to a subsequent development in the history of the Orphic movement.

The second theory is much more Orphic in character. The substance of it is given by Proclus in a note on Plato's *Republic*, 38. 5, ed. Schöll.

'The theologian Orpheus,' he says, 'taught that there were three Ages of man. The first or Golden Age was ruled by Phanes. Most mighty Kronos was ruler of the second or Silver Age. The third is the Titanic. The ruler of it is Zeus, and it is called Titanic because the men of that age were created by him from the remains of the Titans. The idea of Orpheus is that these three periods comprise every stage in the history of the human race.'

The Orphic elements in this account receive their best illustration from an Orphic theogony, the fragments of which are arranged and discussed by Gruppe in Roscher, iii. 1139 ff. The naive crudity of the imagery in this poem strongly reminds one of the teleological speculations of the savage or semi-barbarous races.¶ The underlying thought, however, seems to be clear enough. It is a belief that the creation of the Cosmos was brought about by a series of emanations from the universal essence (Phanes), and that from time to time the Cosmos returns to its primeval form. The souls of men themselves are so many sparks which trickle down, as it were, from the divine fire above. But we are much more remote from the first Phanes, the primal All-Soul, than the first men were. Since then the backward path has steadily grown longer and more indirect. At all events, this seems to be what Proclus means when he says (*Orph. frag.* 244, ed. Abel) that, according to Orpheus, the men of the Golden Age lived *κατὰ νοῦν μόνον*, the men of the Silver Age *κατὰ τὸν καθάρου λόγον*; whereas all that we can appeal to is that small portion of Dionysus-Phanes which the

\* Diog. Laert. vii. 147 ff., and Ritter and Preller, *l.c.* p. 412.

† Eudemos, ed. Spengel, Berlin, 1866, pp. 73-74; Chrysippus, *frag.* 623-627, ed. van Armin; Gomperz, *l.c.* pp. 113 and 116 ff.

‡ Nemes. *de Nat. Hom.* 38.

§ See esp. O. Gruppe in Roscher, iii. 1117-1154, who discusses the subject at length, and refers to all the important literature connected with it. A new edition of the Orphic remains is much needed. The latest edition, and the only one now generally available, is Abel, *Orphica*, Leipzig, 1885. This, however, is not entirely satisfactory, and does not supersede the monumental work of Lobeck (*Aglaophagos*).

¶ See Gomperz, *l.c.* pp. 193 and 109 ff.



Titans had eaten before they were slain by Zeus, and which, therefore, still lingered in the remains from which we of the third race were afterwards created.

The coefficient of descent in this version of the Ages is the ever-increasing distance from that to which the gods themselves owe their being. On the whole, we may characterize the account which Proclus summarizes as a theory of double emanation, the chief object of which was to lead up to the birth of Dionysus, the Orphic redeemer. In other words, we have the somewhat vague idea of a cyclic theory of the Universe attached to a much more highly developed doctrine of the re-birth of the soul and of the means whereby it may some day return to the god who gave it.

The doctrine of an *ἐκέρπσις*, irrespective of its philosophical meaning, makes a strong appeal to the imagination. It was at all times, therefore, one of the most prominent features of the Cyclic Theory. By the 2nd cent. B.C., owing to the widespread activity of its most enthusiastic exponents, the Stoic popular preachers, no item of philosophical speculation could have been more familiar to the average man. Finally, together with much else that had been identified with the Stoics, it passed over to the Christian thinkers; and, long after the period with which we are here concerned, we find the Church Fathers undertaking to derive the doctrine of the *ἐκέρπσις* from the Book of Genesis.\*

But, long before the Stoics, the *ἐκέρπσις* had begun to be associated with other great cosmic disasters of a different nature. The origin and progress of this development are better understood as soon as we observe the process of reasoning by which they were inspired and directed. In the first place, the cycle of the Universe had been called a year. This led to the natural but quite illogical assumption that, for that very reason, it must necessarily possess all the attributes of its prototype and namesake, the solar year. Second, the present condition of the world depends upon the maintenance of the elements in a certain state of equilibrium. Any disturbance of it is at once reflected in the world about us. If the disturbance is sufficiently severe, the result is cosmic disaster. The character of the disaster is determined by whichever one of the elements has gained the upper hand. Finally, great significance was attached to the fact that there were four Elements, four Seasons, four Ages of man.

The conquests of Alexander drew the East and the West closer to each other than they had ever been before, and this *rapprochement* was not disturbed by the Imperial policy of Rome. The phase of our subject now under consideration is especially marked by the more or less direct influence of Oriental speculations. Conversely, therefore, this aspect of the Cyclic Theory did not become especially prominent until the Alexandrian age. The first step was to associate the Flood Legend with the Cyclic Theory, and to set it over against the *ἐκέρπσις* as a second recurrent catastrophe of the *magnus annus*. This doctrine of the regular alternation between a destruction by fire and a destruction by water was already an old story in the time of Plato (e.g. *Tim.* 23, C). There are no signs of this doctrine in the fragments of Zeno, Cleanthes, and the earlier Stoics. We know, however, that it was familiar to their contemporaries. Moreover, as early at least as Cicero's time, the doctrine had been adopted by the Stoics themselves, and henceforward we hear much of it.† Compare, for example, the vivid description of the great cyclic *diluvium* which Seneca gives us in his *Nat. Quæst.* iii. 27 ff.

The idea that these two contrasted disasters occur at certain definite points in the *magnus annus* is also of Oriental origin, and, doubtless, of a high antiquity. On the Greek side, the first

to mention it is Aristotle. The quotation, which we owe to Censorinus, xlii. 11, was probably from Aristotle's lost *Protrept.*, the model of Cicero's famous dialogue, the *Hortensius*, which is also lost.\* No doubt it was largely through the *Hortensius* that the Romans became familiar with Aristotle's observation that the two disasters of the *magnus annus*, or, as he termed it, the *maximus annus*, occur at the solstices: the *conflagratio* at the summer solstice, the *diluvium* at the winter solstice.† In other words, the solar year has solstices; it also has summer and winter—the one, hot and dry, the other, cold and wet. Therefore the great year has the same peculiarities. This being granted, the *conflagratio* is put in the great summer, simply because the great summer is hot and dry, and the *diluvium* in the great winter, because the great winter is cold and wet.

We should not expect this sort of logic from Aristotle, and, as a matter of fact, the idea was not his own. Indeed, as the *Protrept.* was a discussion in the form of a dialogue, we do not know that he approved of the view at all. That his information went back to some Eastern source is indicated by a fragment from the voluminous history of his much younger contemporary, the Chaldean priest Berosus. The passage is quoted by Eusebius, *Preparatio Evangelica*, i. 10, § 23. Berosus, he says, "can set forth will move in different orbits, are in conjunction in the constellation of Cancer. The Flood will take place when the same stars reach conjunction in the constellation of Capricorn. 'Illic solstitium, hic bruma confluxit.' Conjunction in Cancer produces the *conflagratio*, conjunction in Capricorn the *diluvium*." This touch of astrology makes the statement very impressive, and these Chaldeans were nothing if not impressive. But, as Gomperz has already observed, the actual foundation of the statement is nothing but the fact that the summer and winter solstices of the ordinary solar year are presided over by Cancer and Capricorn respectively. When this flimsy assumption of profundity is removed, the theory of Berosus is probably identical with the one mentioned by Aristotle.

Now that fire and water had acquired a definite and important position in the cyclic scheme, it followed inevitably that the two remaining elements, air and earth, ought to be put on the same plane. The line of development followed was largely suggested by the fact that there were four Elements, four Seasons, four Ages of man. The four seasons of the ordinary year are spring, summer, autumn, and winter—a series which has always been associated with man's own descent from youth to hoary old, from strength and happiness to weakness and sorrow. So the four seasons of the great year are the four Ages of man, another series with which the idea of descent had always been associated. As the springtime of the little year of our life is the golden youth of man, so the springtime of that greater year was the golden youth of all mankind.‡ Finally, the traditional order of the four elements—fire, air, water, earth—is also one of descent from the lighter to the heavier, from pure spirit to the earth, earthy.

If, now, we associate the four elements in their regular order with the corresponding Ages of man in their regular order, the dominating element during the Golden Age will be fire, during the Silver Age, air, during the Brazen Age, water, and during the Iron Age, earth. The conclusion of this is that the descent of man himself is due to his ever-increasing distance, so to speak, from the Divine fire. We are thus brought back to the Orphics again, and, as a matter of fact, the Stoic-Orphic theory reported by Nigidius Figulus, in which, as we have already seen, the *magnus annus* was equipped with four seasons, each ruled by the appropriate element, is a complete illustration of the tendencies we have just been discussing.

A theory ascribed to the Magi by Dio Chrysostom and partially reported by him (xxvii. 43 ff.), should also be mentioned here. The Magi tell us, he says, that the Lord of the world rides in a chariot drawn by four horses which are sacred to Zeus, Hera, Poseidon, and Hestia respectively. In other words, the four horses are the four elements, fire, air, water, and earth. As a rule they are tractable. Now and then, however, the first steed becomes restive and sets fire to the other three. This is the origin of the story of Phaëton told by the Greeks. Again it is the steed of Poseidon that becomes

\* See Windischmann, *Zoroastr. Stud.* p. 259.

† Cic. *Rep.* vi. 23, cf. Macrobi. *Som. Scip.* ii. 10. 10 ff.; Lucr. v. 333; Luc. vii. 612, as interpreted by the *Commenta Lucani*, ed. Usener, p. 253 (frag. 608, vol. ii. p. 186, ed. van Armin); Seneca, *Dial.* vi. 26, ff. 606.

\* Usener, *Rhein. Mus.* xxvii. 321 ff.

† For an echo of this statement see the *Meteorologica*, i. 14.

‡ Griechische Denker, i. 115.

§ Vergil, *Georg.* ii. 336 ff.; Ovid, *Mét.* i. 107; *Periclytus Veneris*, 2 ff. etc.

restive, and the drops of his sweat are sprinkled upon the other three. This, again, is the source from which the Greeks derived their story of Deucalion's flood.

If one were to insist upon completing the analogy between the four Elements, the four Ages of man, and the four Seasons of the great year, the Ages presided over by air and by earth, as was already the case with the Ages of fire and water, should each be marked by a cosmic disaster appropriate to its nature. We know that this was actually done, but as these attempts lie outside the sphere with which this article is concerned, they do not require discussion here.\*

3. Revival of Mysticism in 2nd cent. B.C.—The last important stage in the long history of our subject is the era of the prophets. The rapid growth of Mysticism which began early in the Alexandrian age reached its culmination in the 2nd cent. B.C. One of the most striking features of the movement, and a significant comment upon the mental and spiritual condition of the entire Græco-Roman world, was the rapid production of apocryphal works. It is probably fair to assume that the production of this literature was much encouraged, if not actually suggested, by the then widespread belief that the life of mankind moves in cycles. At all events, one of the most characteristic features of all these visions and prophecies was the emphasis given to some cyclic theory of the Ages. It would be quite unnecessary here, even if they were still available to us, to examine these works in detail. Their chief importance to us would be derived not from their contents, but from the point of view which, by virtue of their very nature, they all possess in common. These visions and prophecies, like all other works of the same class, appealed more to faith and the emotions than they did to reason and the understanding. The author tells his readers that this last Age has nearly run its course, and that the great change is near at hand. He does not state it as an opinion or a theory, capable of being discussed as such. He states it as oracular utterance, as inspired prophecy, the truth of which is already foreshadowed in current events and cannot be questioned. In this way the Cyclic Theory of the Ages was transformed from a rhetorical and philosophical theme into a Divine assurance of the joy soon to come. As a class, these compositions contributed almost nothing to the development of the Cyclic Theory itself. A word or two, however, should be given to the Sibyl.

The *Oracles of the Sibyl* have been ascribed to about the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C. They were well known to the Romans for the next 200 years; but at the time when the collection now bearing that name† was composed, the earlier had apparently ceased to exist. Meanwhile, however, they had won a sort of secondary immortality through the influence they had exerted upon the fourth *Eclogue* of Vergil,‡ the most famous literary work ever inspired by any aspect of our theme. From this poem and the ancient comment upon it, it appears that the Sibyl adopted the Stoic-Orphic identification of the Four Ages of man with the four seasons of the *magnus annus*. In addition to this, she—or her authority—was inspired by the analogy of the ancient solar year to divide the great year into ten great months, each of which was the length of a *sæculum* and presided over by

a god. Ever since the time of Sulla there had been rumours afloat that the Sibyl's last *sæculum* was drawing to a close, and that the Golden Age was at hand. One cannot read the fourth *Eclogue* without feeling that Vergil was himself impressed by a prophecy so much in harmony with the aspirations of his own lofty soul. Nevertheless, we must not forget that the poem is really a poem of congratulation upon the birth of a son, into which, as Marx has clearly demonstrated,\* Vergil introduced the topic of the Ages in accordance with the specific suggestion of the rhetoricians for poems of this type, and developed it in strict conformity with the rules laid down by them. The most famous line in the poem,

'Iam nova progenies cælo demittitur alto,'

is a clear reflexion of the cyclic theories which we have just been discussing; That, in itself, it should also foreshadow quite as clearly the great central article of the Christian faith, is an excellent illustration of the fact that there has never been any break between ancient and modern culture. The foundation of the most enlightened Christian thought, quite as much as the foundation of Vergil's thought, was that gradual blending of the Orient with the speculations of the Greek philosophers, more especially Plato and the Stoics, which moulded the doctrine of the Ages in its final form, and which, ever since then, has played such an important part in the mental and spiritual consciousness of the civilized world. It is, therefore, no matter for surprise that for more than 1500 years this last great document in the long history of the Cyclic Theory of the Ages was firmly believed to be a prophecy of the coming of Christ.†

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AGES OF THE WORLD (Indian).—The Hindu doctrine of the Ages of the World (*yugas*) is combined with that of two other great periods, the *manvantaras* and *kalpas*, into a fanciful system of universal chronology, which passes for orthodox. Its basis is the *yugas*; they are, therefore, treated here in connexion with the other elements of the chronological system. Orthodox Hindus recognize four Ages of the World (*yugas*), roughly corresponding to the Gold, Silver, Brass, and Iron Ages of the ancients. They are called *kṛta*, *tretā*, *dvāpara*, and *kali* after the sides of a die; *kṛta*, the lucky one, being the side marked with four dots; *tretā* that with three; *dvāpara* with two; *kali*, the losing one, with one dot. These names occur in the period of the Brāhmaṇas as names of throws at dice, and in one verse of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (7, 14) they are already referred, by the commentator, to the *yugas*. In the epics and the Purāṇas the belief with regard to the four *yugas* has become a fully established doctrine. The general idea, the same in all Brāhmaṇical sources, is that the character, or, if the expression may be used, the proportion of virtue, and the length of each *yuga* conform to the number on the side of a die, after which it is named. In the *kṛtayuga*, virtue (*dharma*) was fully present in men, with all four feet, as it is expressed, but it diminished by one quarter or foot in every succeeding age, till in the *kaliyuga* only one foot of *dharma* remains. The same proportion holds good with regard to the duration of the several Ages. The *kṛtayuga* lasts 4000 years, to which a dawn and a twilight of 400 years each are added; the same items in *tretā* are 3000 and 300, in *dvāpara* 2000 and 200, in *kali* 1000 and 100 years. Thus the period of the four *yugas* together, technically called a *mahāyuga* or *chaturyuga*, though commonly a *yuga*, lasts 12,000 years (Mann, i. 69 ff. = \* F. Marx, *Neue Jahrbuch. f. das klass. Altertum*, I (1898), pp. 105–128.

† Comparetti, *Virgilio nel medio evo*, 1896, I. 129–133, and ii. 90–99; Mayor, etc., *Virgil's Messianic Eclogue*, 1907.

\* O. Gruppe, *Gr. Mythol.* p. 450, n. 1, also his *Gr. Kulte und Mythen in ihren Beziehungen zu den orient. Religionen*, Leipzig, 1897, p. 670, n. 8, and 695, n. 22, with references.

† The two modern editions of the *Oracula Sibyllina* are by Rzsch, Vienna, 1891, and by Geffcken, Berlin, 1902. See also Christ, *Gesch. der Gr. Lit.*, Munich, 1905, p. 822, and references.

‡ O. Gruppe, *Gr. Kulte*, etc., p. 687 ff., and references; A. Cautant, *Étude sur les Bucol. de Virg.*, Paris, 1897, p. 210 ff.; W. W. Fowler, *Harvard Studies*, xiv. 19 ff. etc.

Mahābhārata, iii. 12,826 ff.). The years in this statement are interpreted as Divine years, consisting each of 360 human years, giving thus a total of 4,320,000 years in each *mahāyuga*, and this interpretation, once adopted in the Purāṇas, became a dogma. The usual descriptions of the *kṛta*- (or *satya*-) *yuga* reveal to us a happy state of mankind, when life lasted 4000 years, when there were no quarrels nor wars, when the rules of caste and the precepts of the Vedas were strictly obeyed, when, in short, virtue reigned paramount. In the *kali*- (or *tiṣya*-) *yuga* just the reverse prevails. There is a confusion of castes and *āśramas*. The Veda and good conduct gradually fall into neglect; all kinds of vices creep in; diseases afflict mankind; the term of life grows shorter and shorter, and is quite uncertain; barbarians occupy the land, and people kill one another in continual strife, till at the end of the *yuga* some mighty king extinguishes the infidels. From these extremes the character of the intermediate *yugas* may be imagined.\* The dawns and twilights of the several Ages are periods of transition from one Age to the next, when the character of the one is not yet entirely lost, and that of the other not yet fully established.

It seems natural to presume that originally the *mahāyuga* comprised the whole existence of the world; indications, indeed, of such a belief are not wanting, as will be noticed later. Still, the common doctrine is that one *mahāyuga* followed on another, one thousand of them forming a single *kalpa*. The *kalpa*, then, is the length of time from a creation to a destruction of the world. The belief in periodical creations and destructions of the world is very old; and its existence in the Vedic period may be inferred from Atharvaveda, x. 8. 39, 40. It is combined as follows with that in the four Ages. In the first *kṛtayuga*, after the creation of the earth, Brahman created a thousand pairs of twins from his mouth, breast, thighs, and feet respectively. They lived without houses; all desires which they conceived were directly fulfilled; and the earth produced of itself delicious food for them, since animals and plants were not yet in existence. Each pair of twins brought forth at the end of their life a pair exactly like them. As everybody did his duty and nothing else, there was no distinction between good and bad acts. But this state of things changed at the end of the Age; the first rain fell and trees grew up. These produced honey and whatever the primitive people desired. In the first *tretāyuga*, mankind consisted no longer of pairs of twins, but of men and women. Being now for the first time subject to cold and heat, they began to build houses, and they quarrelled about the miraculous trees. The trees, however, disappeared, and herbs became the food of men. Now trade was introduced, and personal property, unknown before, caused the social distinctions. Then Brahman established the four castes and the four *āśramas*, and fixed the duties peculiar to each of them. Afterwards he created spiritual sons, who were the ancestors of gods, demons, serpents, inhabitants of hell, etc.† At the end of the last *kaliyuga* of a *kalpa*, the heat of the sun becomes fierce and dries up the whole earth; and by it the three worlds are set on fire and consumed. At last enormous clouds appear and rain for hundreds of years, and deluge the whole world till the waters inundate heaven.‡ As the latter signs are frequently alluded to, in the form of similes in the Epics, etc., as occurring at the end of a *yuga* (instead of at the end of a *kalpa*), it is most probable that originally the *yuga* ended with the destruction,

and consequently began with the creation of the world. A similar belief seems to have been expressed by the term '*kalpa*,' but perhaps with this difference, that the concept of a *yuga* was intimately connected with the idea of the four stages through which mankind must pass, analogous to the four ages of man, viz. childhood, youth, adult life, and old age, while this idea was not necessarily implied in the concept of the *kalpa*. The combination of both these popular beliefs, with regard to the *kalpa* and the *yuga*, in the form described above, was probably due to the systematizing efforts of the Paurāṇikas.

There is still a third kind of long period, the *manvantara*, fourteen of which go to the *kalpa*. Each *manvantara* contains 71 *mahāyugas*, and 14 *manvantaras* are therefore equivalent to 994 ( $14 \times 71$ ) *mahāyugas*. The remainder of 6 *mahāyugas* required to make up the *kalpa* (=1000 *mahāyugas*, *sup.* p. 200) is so distributed that the first *manvantara* is preceded by a dawn of the length of one *kṛtayuga* (=0.4 *mahāyuga*), and each *manvantara* is followed by a twilight of equal length ( $15 \times 0.4 = 6$  *mahāyugas*). The twilight of the *manvantara* is, according to Sūrya Siddhānta, i. 18, a deluge (*jalaplava*). This artificial system of the *manvantaras* was probably introduced in order to account for the different patronymics of Manu, such as *Vaivasvata*, *Svayambhuva*, *Saṁvarana*, which occur already in different Vedic works. These early caused a belief in the existence of several distinct Manus.\* The Paurāṇikas systematized these notions as described. Since Manu was thought to have introduced the social and moral order of things, and to have played a part in the creation of gods and men, 'the seven Ṛsis, certain (secondary) divinities, Indra, Manu, and the kings, his sons, are created and perish' in each *manvantara*;† and the details of these recurring events in each *manvantara* are given, e.g., in the same Purāṇa.‡ Artificial as these *manvantaras* appear to be, still they are given as one of the five characteristic topics of the Purāṇa in a verse found in several Purāṇas.§ And the whole system of *yugas*, etc., is regarded as orthodox to such a degree that all the astronomical works, the Siddhāntas, have adopted them, except the Romaka Siddhānta, which for that reason is stigmatized as not orthodox.||

The astronomical aspect of the *yuga* is that, in its commencement, sun, moon, and planets stood in conjunction in the initial point of the ecliptic, and returned to the same point at the end of the age. The popular belief on which this notion is based is older than Hindu astronomy.¶ The current *yuga* is the 457th of the present *varāha-kalpa*, or *kalpa* of the Boar, the 28th of the present *manvantara* (that of Manu *Vaivasvata*), which itself is the 7th of this *kalpa*. We are now in the *kaliyuga*, which began Feb. 17, B.C. 3102, the epoch of the still used era of the *kaliyuga*. At the end of the last *tretāyuga* lived Rāma, the son of Daśaratha, and at the end of the last *dvāparayuga* took place the great war of the Pāṇḍavas and Kauravas, described in the Mahābhārata.

A *kalpa* is called a day of Brahman, and his night is of equal length. At the close of the night he creates the world anew. Of such days and nights a year of Brahman is composed; and a hundred such years constitute his whole life. This longest period is called a *para*, half of which, a

\* Cf. SEE xcv. p. 124 l.

† Wilson, *Vīṣṇu Purāṇa*, l. p. 50.

‡ Wilson, *l.c.* iii. p. 1 ff.

§ Wilson, *l.c.*, Prēt. p. vii, note 1.

¶ Thibaut, *Pañcatantrasiddhāntikā*, Introd. p. xxviii.

‡ See *Actes du X. Congrès International des Orientalistes*, p. 104. For details of the astronomical use of the *yugas*, the reader is referred to the translation of the Sūrya Siddhānta, JAOS vi. p. 15 ff.

\* Cf. J. Muir, *Original Sanscrit Texts*, vol. i. p. 143 ff.

† *Vāyu Purāṇa*, l. 8.

‡ *Vīṣṇu Purāṇa*, vi. 3. 42.

*parārdha*, had elapsed at the beginning of the present kalpa.\*

The notions of the Buddhists about the Ages of the World (*yugas*) and about the larger periods (*kalpas*) are similar to those of the orthodox Hindus, but still more fanciful. The names of the four *yugas* are the same, but their arrangement is different. They begin with *kaliyuga* and go up to *kṛtayuga*,† and then, in reversed order, go down to *kaliyuga*.‡ Thus, instead of a *mahāyuga* of four Ages, the Buddhists assume a period of eight Ages, which is called an *antarakalpa*. An *antarakalpa* is 'the interval that elapses while the age of man increases from ten years to an *asaṅkheyya* (*asaṅkheyya* = 10,000,000<sup>§</sup>), and then decreases again to ten years; this period is of immense length.¶ According to some authorities, it has a length of 1,680,000 years.|| Together with the age, the moral state of mankind increases and decreases. Twenty *antarakalpas* form one *asaṅkheyya kalpa* (Pali *asaṅkheyya kappā*), and four *asaṅkheyya kalpas* constitute one *mahākalpa*. The first *asaṅkheyya kalpa* is called *saṃvartā* (P. *saṃvattā*), during which a world or sphere (*chakravāla*, P. *cakkavāla*) is completely destroyed by fire, water, or wind. In the second (*saṃvartāsthāyin*, P. *saṃvattāsthāyin*) the state of void continues. In the third (*vivartā*, P. *vivattā*) the world is being built up again; and in the fourth (*vivartāsthāyin*, P. *vivattāsthāyin*) the world continues to exist.

It is during this last period that the world becomes first inhabited, by *ābhāsvara* gods of the *Brahmaloka* being born on earth. These self-luminous beings lost their lustre when they first began to feed on a delicious juice produced by the earth. They then created the sun, the moon, and the stars. While these beings gradually degenerated, the earth ceased to yield this first kind of food, and produced a kind of cream-like fungus. This was followed by a climbing plant, and this again by an extraordinary kind of rice. When this rice was used as food, sexual intercourse began. The rice deteriorated, and at last ceased to grow of itself. At the same time other vices were introduced, and personal property, till at last the present order of mankind was established.¶ Then comes the period of the twenty *antarakalpas*, described above. A hundred thousand years before the end of the *mahākalpa*, a god appears and warns mankind of the coming event, exhorting them to amend. And after that time the destruction of the earth—nay, of a billion of worlds or *chakravālas*—sets in by fire, water, or wind.\*\* The *mahākalpas* are either empty (*śūnya*) kalpas—those in which there is no Buddha—or Buddha kalpas. The latter are of five kinds, *sāra*-, *maṇḍa*-, *vara*-, *sāramanḍa*-, and *bhadrakalpas*, according as one, two, three, four, or five Buddhas appear. The present kalpa is a *bhadrakalpa*; for four Buddhas have already appeared—*Krakucchanda* (*Kakusandha*), *Kaṇakamuni* (*Koṇāgamana*), *Kāśyapa* (*Kassapa*), and *Gotama*; and the fifth, *Maitreya* (*Metteyya*), has yet to come (see above, pp. 187-190).

The notions of the *Jainas* about the Ages of the World are not quite unlike, yet curiously different from, those described above. The *Jainas* liken time to a wheel with twelve spokes; the descending half of the wheel is called the *avasarpinī* period, the ascending half *utsarpinī*. Each half is divided into six Ages (*āra* = 'spoke'). The *āras* are, in *avasarpinī*, the following:—(1) *suśamasuśamā*, the duration of which is 400,000,000,000,000 oceans

of years (*sāgaropamā*); (2) *suśamā*, 300 billions of oceans of years; (3) *suśamadūṣamā*, 200 billions of oceans of years; (4) *dūṣamasuśamā*, 100 billions of oceans of years, less 42,000 common years; (5) *dūṣamā*, 21,000 years; (6) *dūṣamadūṣamā*, likewise 21,000 years. The same Ages recur in the *utsarpinī* period, but in reversed order. In the first Age men lived three *palyas* or *palyopamās*, a long period not to be expressed in a definite number of years (one billion of *palyas* go to one ocean of years), and men grew to a height of three *gavyūtis*, a *gavyūti* being about two miles. Men were born in pairs, and each pair gave birth to a pair of twins, who married. There were ten kinds of miraculous trees (*kalpavṛkṣa*), which furnished men with all they wanted. The earth was as sweet as sugar, and the water as delicious as wine. This state of things continued through the first three Ages, but gradually age after age the length of life declined, and was only two *palyas* at the beginning of the second, and one *palya* at the beginning of the third Age, while correspondingly the height of the body diminished to two and one *gavyūti*. Furthermore, the power of the trees and the quality of earth and water deteriorated at the same rate. In the third Age the trees more slowly satisfied the wants of men, who therefore claimed them severally as personal property. *Vimalavāhana* was appointed to keep order among men, and he became the first patriarch (*kulakara*). The seventh patriarch, *Nābhi*, was the father of *Rṣabha*, who was anointed the first king, and who introduced the principal institutions of mankind. *Rṣabha* became the first *tirthakara*, or prophet of the *Jainas*. His *nirvāṇa* occurred 3 years 8½ months before the end of the third Age. In the fourth Age the order of things was similar to the present one, except, of course, that everything gradually deteriorated with the lapse of time. The life of man lasted a *krora* of *pūrvas* (a *pūrva* = 8,400,000<sup>2</sup> years) at the beginning, and diminished to a hundred years at the end of the Age; and, similarly, the height of men decreased from 2000 cubits to 7 cubits. 23 *tirthakaras* were born in the fourth Age, the last of whom, *Mahāvira*, died 3 years 8½ months before the beginning of the fifth Age, which began in B.C. 522. In the fifth and sixth Ages length of life will diminish down to 16 years, and the height of men to 1 cubit. There will be no *tirthakaras* in the last two Ages of the *avasarpinī* period. In the succeeding *utsarpinī* period the same Ages will recur, but in reversed order. In this way an infinite number of *avasarpinīs* and *utsarpinīs* follow each other.\*

The idea on which the notion of these periods seems to be based is apparently the year. The *avasarpinī* and *utsarpinī* correspond to the two *ayanas*, the southern and northern course of the sun; and the six *āras* of each period to the six months of the *ayana*.† On the other hand, the first three *āras*, with their pairs of twins, with the miraculous trees for their subsistence, much resemble the first *kṛtayuga* of the *Purāṇas*, while the remaining three *āras* may be compared to the *tretā*, *dvāpara*, and *kali yugas*. A peculiar feature of the *Jaina* system, however, is the great disparity in length between the last two Ages and the first four, while the relative length of the four *yugas* is reproduced in the *āras*, if we consider the fourth, fifth, and sixth *āras* as one.

On the whole, there is an unmistakable family likeness between the notions of the orthodox Hindus, the Buddhists, and the *Jainas*, as described above, though they have developed on different lines.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works referred to throughout this article, consult the Literature given at the end of the article AGES OF THE WORLD (Buddhist).

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\* Wilson, *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, i. p. 63.

† *Utsarpinī yugas*; see Hardy, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 7.

‡ *Arpani*, apparently for *avasarpinī*, ib.

§ Childers, *Pali Dictionary*, s.v. 'Kappa.'

¶ Burnout, *Lotus de la bonne Loi*, p. 3241.

¶ Hardy, l.c. p. 64 ff.

\*\* Hardy, l.c. p. 28 ff.

\* Hemacandra, *Ādīśvara-charitra*, 2. 118 ff.

† Cf. *SBE* xiv. p. 18, note 1.

**AGES OF THE WORLD (Jewish).—1.** The Heb. word *yôm* (יֹם), 'day,' is frequently applied in both Biblical and post-Biblical literature in a sense closely allied to that of an Age of the World. *Levit. Rab.* 19 and *Sanh.* 19, referring to Ps 90<sup>1</sup>, say God's 'day' is a thousand years. Philo in *de Opificio Mundi*, i. 3, etc., treats 'the Days of Creation' as covering an epoch. He denies that the story of Genesis is to be taken literally as meaning an actual creation in six ordinary days. Creation was not in time: the six days described the arrangement or order of creation, much in the same sense as scientists talk of the geological orders. *Midrash Ber. Rab.* xii. deals with the time occupied in creation. 'The day of the Lord' (*Mal* 4<sup>2</sup>) 'that day' (יִּיּוֹם הַהוּא, *Zec* 14<sup>2</sup>), 'the great day' (*Mal* 4<sup>2</sup>), 'the day of judgment,' 'the day of vengeance' (*Jer* 46<sup>10</sup>), 'the day of rebuke' (*Hos* 5<sup>9</sup>), are all expressions for the Last Judgment, sometimes covering the future world (עֵלֶיךָ הָאָבֶדָה) which will succeed it. יוֹמָנוּ, 'our day,' is used as a synonym for עֵלֶיךָ, 'this world' (Targum for 'days' in Ps 34<sup>12</sup>). 'The days of the kings' (*Dn* 2<sup>4</sup>) means the everlasting kingdom of the future world. 'The days of the Messiah' (*Sanh.* 99a) is used in the Talmud and Midrash for the Messianic Age; 'the days of the life of the world to come,' for the future world which follows. 'The day which is all Sabbath,' 'the day which is altogether good,' 'the day which is altogether long,' 'the day whereon the righteous sit with crowns upon their head and enjoy the splendour of the Divine presence,' are expressions in the Jewish Liturgy (in the grace after meat for Sabbaths and Festivals, especially Passover) which also connote the future world.

2. Before this world existed there had been successive creations (*Gen. Rab.* 1, *Ab. R.N.* xxxvii.). 'Seven things were created before the world was created, and these are they: the Law, Repentance, the Garden of Eden, Gehenna, the Throne of Glory, the Temple, and the Messiah's name' (*Pes.* 54a). There were 974 generations before Adam, which with the 26 generations between Adam and Moses make up a thousand (*Shab.* 88b, *Hag.* 13b, 14a). The Mishna discourages such cosmogonic speculations. 'Two together should not study the Creation nor even one the Chariot' (*Hag.* cap. ii.). The Gemara *ad loc.* (*ib.* 11b) forbids inquiry into what was before the world was, basing this on the limitations of Dt 4<sup>2</sup>.

3. In the Bible narrative there are traces of a Golden Age in the account of the Garden of Eden, where Adam dwelt till the Fall. As to the length of his sojourn the Rabbis differ. The Bible narrative presents some striking parallels to the Assyrian story, just as the post-Biblical does to Zaratrustrian speculations. But, as Goldziher points out in his *Mythology among the Hebrews*, even if its cosmogony had been derived from Iranian sources, it is an essential part of their system, whereas the Pentateuch makes no further use of it. It is notable that the later Jewish view is that *Gan Eden* (Paradise) will be the reward for good conduct after death. This is no devolution from a Golden to an Iron Age (for traces of which in *Dn* 2, see below), and no evolution in an opposite sense, but rather a sort of endless cycle; 'the thing that hath been, it is that which shall be' (*Ec* 1<sup>8</sup>).

4. The Pentateuch is almost exclusively concerned with the history of Israel, and the first age of persecution (afterwards known as מִצְרַיִם, *gālūt*, or 'captivity') is that of Egypt. According to *Gen* 15<sup>13</sup>, Abraham's seed is to be afflicted 400 years. In *Jg* 11<sup>26</sup> a period of 300 years is given as the interval between the Exodus and Jephthah, during which the children of Israel were left in undisturbed possession of the other side of the Jordan. In

1 K 6<sup>1</sup> the period between the Exodus and the building of the Temple is fixed at 480 years.

5. The Prophets, before the Assyrian captivity, are concerned only with the immediate future. They deal with practical politics, and warn the people to repent in view of disasters that are imminent. The Day of the Lord, which in the post-captivity literature of the Bible becomes the Day of Judgment, occurs already in Amos (5<sup>18-20</sup>), the earliest of the later prophets, as well as in Isaiah (cf. W. R. Smith, *Proph.* 131 f.).

6. In the post-exilic literature of the Bible we first meet with a distinct promise of an ultimate, not immediate, Messianic Age, in which all wrongs will be righted. The return under Zerubbabel had proved a disappointment. The autonomy of the Jews had not been satisfactorily re-established. The Jews did not occupy their proper position in the world. The people were dissatisfied with their leaders, and thus the notion of an ideal Messiah rather than a political one seems to have become evolved. Zechariah (ch. 14), when he proclaims: 'One day which shall be known to the Lord, not day, nor night . . . there shall be no more the Canaanite in the house of the Lord of Hosts,' represents a Messianic Age distant but sure. Malachi is much more practical. He preaches against the sins of his day, but even he does not threaten with immediate disaster. His 'day that I [the Lord] do make' (*Mal* 4<sup>2</sup>)—the great and dreadful day of the Lord (4<sup>2</sup>)—is the Day of Judgment, and here first is Elijah the prophet promised as a precursor of that day. Daniel is written in a different spirit. Despite its mysticism, it is a political pamphlet. It is almost certainly late, and intended to encourage those who were suffering under the Syrian oppression. Ben Sira is perhaps earlier. He, too, prays for redemption (ch. 36), and, like some of the Psalms and post-exilic prophets, looks forward to the Kingdom of God. The Apocalyptic literature, of which Enoch is certainly, and the Book of Jub. is perhaps, pre-Christian, is overweighed by the gloomy events of the time. The Messianic Age is increasingly needed, and national impatience insists on fixing its date.

7. The destruction of Jerusalem gave a mighty impetus to apocalyptic literature. The era of Messiahs and Prophets produced such men as Theudas in B.C. 44, under Fadus; 'the Egyptian' was another such under Felix; under Hadrian appeared Bar Cochba 'the Son of the Star,' who persuaded even an 'Akiba to join him in insensate revolt against Rome; and so on through a long succession of pseudo-Messiahs down to Sabbatai Zebi (whose advent in the mystic year 1666 caused such excitement both in and out of Jewry), and even to Mari Shooker Kohail, an impostor who so lately as 1870 excited wild hopes among some Arabian Jews of Aden. The Diaspora seemed to lay stress on individual rather than national hopes of reward and punishment after death. But Messianic hopes are traceable even in Philo, who looks to a future re-assembly of the Diaspora in Palestine, and echoes of this view are to be met with in the 4th *Ecllogue* of Vergil. The Kingdom of God and His people (see Ps 145<sup>11</sup>, Wis 10<sup>10</sup>) is of the future (cf. Is 52<sup>1</sup>, Mic 4<sup>1</sup>, *Zec* 14<sup>2</sup>). Contrast the national view of Is 24<sup>2</sup>, 'The Lord of Hosts shall reign in Mount Zion, and in Jerusalem,' with the universalistic concept of *Orac.* iii. 767, 'His everlasting Kingdom shall be over all creatures,' and the Jewish Liturgy for the New Year and Atonement, 'all works shall fear thee . . . joy to thy land . . . shining light to the Son of Jesse thine anointed . . . when thou makest the dominion of Arrogance to pass away from the earth' (Singer's *Prayer Book*, 239). But such universalistic ideas are comparatively rare. God's

Kingdom is also that of His people (Dn 2<sup>44</sup> 7<sup>27</sup>). And this idea prevails throughout the Jewish apocalyptic writings, e.g. Assump. Mos., Enoch (Eth. and Slav.), 4 Ezra: God's enemies, whole peoples, will be previously destroyed. It is perhaps based on Ezekiel's Vision of Gog and Magog (38 and 39) as the first prophecy of this stage. After this world-war comes the Judgment (Jl 3<sup>12</sup>). Meantime the people of Israel will be hidden away in safety (Is 26<sup>20</sup>, Zec 14<sup>5</sup>, Apoc. Bar 29<sup>5</sup>, and Mk 13<sup>14-20</sup>). The precursors of the Messiah are Elijah (Mal 4<sup>5</sup>, Sir 48<sup>10-12</sup>, Orac. Sib. ii., Edujoth, viii. 7), Moses (Dt 18<sup>15</sup>), Enoch (Gn 5<sup>24</sup>, Eth. Enoch). The Messianic Kingdom is predominately particularistic. The Diaspora will be reunited, Jerusalem rebuilt, the heathen converted.

8. In the Apocalyptic literature, and first in Daniel, we get the universalist idea of 'this world' and 'the next' as parallel to the tribal idea of the Present Age and the Messianic Age. The *Æon* of מַלְאָכָא (6 מַלְאָכָא, 1 Ti 6<sup>17</sup>) is 5000 years in Assump. Mos.; 10,000 in Eth. En 16<sup>1</sup> 18<sup>16</sup> 21<sup>6</sup>, Jub 1<sup>2</sup>; 7000 in *Sanh.* 97a, where R. Katina says the world will last 6000 years and in the seventh will be destroyed; of the 6000, 2000 years are 'Tolu' (chaos), 2000 Torah, and 2000 Messianic. This theory is based on the 6 days of Creation. 'As the sabbatical year is remitted once in 7 years, so is the world remitted 1 chiliasm in 7' (cf. Bacher, *Agada der Tannaiten*, i. 139 ff. [2nd ed. 133 ff.]).

Daniel's theory of year-weeks (ch. 9) is based on the 70 of Jer 25<sup>12</sup> 29<sup>10</sup>. (The Babylonian year was divided into 72 weeks of 5 days each). Daniel's 4 metals (ch. 2) and his 4 great beasts (7<sup>2</sup>) seem based on the classical conception of this world's division into the Gold, Silver, Bronze, and Iron Ages. Eth. Enoch also divides the period of the 70 shepherds into 4 ages ('*cursus alter*') is divided into 4 *horæ*, meaning perhaps 4 Roman Emperors).

9. The division into 7 millenniums for the duration of 'this world' is made in Eth. Enoch, Test. Abr., R. Katina (*Sanh.* 97a). The preceding tribulations of the Messiah are to last 7 years, says R. Simeon ben Jochai (*Der. Eretz zut.* 10). In 3<sup>4</sup> periods (Dn 12<sup>7</sup>) 'all these things shall be finished.' 4 Ezra divides the world into 12 portions. All these figures, 4, 7, 3, 70 (72), and 12 have an astronomical basis, and correspond to the seasons, the days of the week, the weeks of the Babylonian year, and the signs of the Zodiac.

10. The mathematical determination of the end of 'this world' and the beginning of the next was eventually discarded by the Rabbis after all such calculations had proved false. 'Rab says, All the terms (מִסְפָּרִים) have ceased, and the matter resteth only upon repentance and good works' (*Sanh.* 97b, cf. Am 5<sup>18</sup>). Before God renews His world (תָּחִילָא), the Messianic Age will come. It is inter-related between this world and the next. The time of Messianic tribulations (תְּכֵלֶת שָׁנָה) is the precursor of the change of *Æon*. Men will be weaker (4 Ezr 5<sup>4-53</sup>). They will suffer terrible diseases (*Orac. Sib.* iii. 538), children will be born with white hair (Jub 23<sup>25</sup>), women will be barren (*Orac. Sib.* ii. 164). Fields will not fructify (4 Ezr 6<sup>27</sup>), poverty and famine will prevail (Eth. En 99<sup>5</sup>, Apoc. Bar 27), universal war will rage (4 Ezr 9<sup>5</sup>), the wise shall be silent and fools shall speak (Apoc. Bar 70<sup>5</sup>). Then will come the Judgment (יִדְּיָא), when God will weigh sins and virtues, but even here the Messiah, Prince of Peace, emerges (Apoc. Bar 29 and 73); and after all this travail the time of the Messiah shall be revealed, though He is here no longer the national hero but the renewer of Paradise, the restorer of the Golden Age. Next will follow the Resurrection of the Dead (Is 26<sup>19</sup>). God will destroy death (Dn 12<sup>2</sup> 'Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake'). En 51<sup>1-4</sup>,

4 Ezr 7<sup>32</sup>, and Apoc. Bar 50<sup>2</sup> point to a universal resurrection. Others limit this to the righteous (*Test. of Judah*, xxv., cf. Jos. Ant. xviii. § 14 [ed. Niese]). The Rabbis throughout their literature rebuke the scepticism of the Sadducees who deny this dogma (*Sanh.* xi. 1: 'He hath no portion in the world to come who denies that the Resurrection of the Dead is in the Torah'). The righteous obtain eternal life (עוֹלָם חַיִּים, *Baba Bathra* 11a). After the Resurrection comes the Renewal of the World. Is 65<sup>17</sup> foretells the creation of 'new heavens and a new earth'; Jub 1<sup>25</sup> speaks of the New Creation; *Mekhilta* 51b on Ex 16<sup>25</sup> describes this עוֹלָם הָרִשׁוֹן, 'the new world.'

11. The discordance of ideas between the earthly Paradise of the Messianic Kingdom and the transcendental New Jerusalem induced a belief in an interregnum (cf. Eth. En 91). The Ages of the World are 10 weeks; the 8th, that of the sword and rebuilding of Jerusalem, is the Messianic period. The 9th and 10th are those of the Last Judgment, at the end of which comes the New Creation. In the Apocalypse of John (ch. 20) this Messianic interregnum is to last 1000 years, whence the Christian doctrine of the Chiliasm (cf. *Orac. Sib.* iii., 4 Ezra, and Apoc. of Baruch). In 4 Ezr 7<sup>28</sup> the Messianic period lasts 400 years, after which Christ returns to heaven, and the general Resurrection follows.

In the Talmud the Messianic period is to last a 'fixed time' (*Zebahim* 118b, *Arakhin* 13b, *Pes.* 68a). Periods mentioned are 40, 70, 365, 400, 1000, and 2000 years. Only Ben Zoma in *Ber.* 1. 5 contrasts this world with the Days of the Messiah. But in the 2nd cent. a clear distinction is drawn between the Days of the Messiah and the Future World (cf. *Shab.* 151b, *Pes.* 68b, *Sanh.* 91b, *Ber.* 34b). The Samaritan Messiah, Ta'eh, dies 'after a long reign.' 'All the prophets,' say R. Chijja bar Abba and R. Jochanan, 'propheesied only as to the days of the Messiah, but, as for the Future World, no eye but thine, O Lord, hath seen it' (*Ber.* 34b).

Maimonides in his *Yemen Epistle* gives the following order: Resurrection, Future World, Death, and a second Resurrection. In his *Moreh* 11, 29, and 30 he endeavours to prove that the world is eternal, and in his *Mishne Torah* on 'Repentance' (8) he declares that the future world is already existent. Nachmanides (in his *Torath Adam*, 'Reward and Punishment,' שְׂעָר הַנִּסְיוֹן) and the Raabad dispute this, and declare that Gn 8<sup>22</sup> 'while the earth remaineth' suggests its destruction. The world is to return to *tohu bohu* (chaos), and the Almighty will renew it. So too Azaria de Rossi (*Aleor Enayim*, xlv. 54). When Ecclesiastes says (14) 'the world abideth for ever,' he only means the world Jubilee. Bahya ben Asher in his *Com.* on Lv 25<sup>3</sup>, 'then shall the land keep a Sabbath unto the Lord,' takes this to support the view of the Qabbālā as referring to the destruction of the world (תְּכֵלֶת שָׁנָה). The rest eternal is the future world after the Resurrection. In Lv 25<sup>3</sup>, 'seven times seven years,' the second seven 'hints' (רִמְזָא) at the Great Jubilee, which is the end of the world. The Qabbālā, though the idea predominates therein of the world-wheel (*gilgal*), implying the endless recurrence of all things, is directed less to time than to space. The notion of space is older than that of time.

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1000 years, but gave up 70 for David (alluding to Ps 214).

12. Bible chronology has always presented difficulties. The discrepancies between the chronology of the Massoretic and Samaritan texts and the Septuagint are dealt with by Dr. Jacob of Göttingen. He explains one chief variation as due to a desire to date Noah exactly 1000 years after Adam. *Pirke Aboth* (v. 2, ed. Taylor) draws attention to the fact that there were ten generations from Adam to Noah, and ten from Noah to Abraham. The chronology of Genesis would seem to have been based on years according to the solar system, but the Jews reverted to the lunar system after the Exodus, as seen from Ex 12<sup>14</sup>.

13. The conservative Jewish view is still expressed in the following passages in its Liturgy. The 12th Creed expresses belief 'in the coming of the Messiah, and, though he tarry, I will wait



daily for his coming'; the 13th, 'that there will be a resurrection of the dead at the time when it shall please the Creator' (Singer's *Prayer Book*, p. 90); in the *Qaddish* (*ib.* p. 37), 'May he establish his Kingdom in your days . . . speedily!' (cf. *Orac. Sib.* iii. 767). In the Sabbath Morning's Service (*ib.* p. 129) the following antitheses bring out Jewish belief in the four cosmic stages or Ages of the World: 'There is none to be compared unto thee, O Lord our God, in this world, neither is there any beside thee, O our King, for the life of the world to come; there is none but thee, O our Redeemer, for the days of the Messiah; neither is there any like unto thee, O our Saviour, for the resurrection of the dead.'

LITERATURE.—Bacher, *Agada der Tannaiten*, vol. i. 1884; Bousset, *Rel. d. Judentums* 2, 1906, pt. iv. pp. 233-346 (cf. the list of authorities cited by him); Schürer, *GVF* 3, ii. 498-556; R. H. Charles, *A Crit. Hist. of the Doct. of a Future Life in Israel*, London, 1899; Loewy, 'Messiaszeit und Zukünftige Welt' in *MGWJ*, 1897, 392-409; Sanh. c. 11; Maimonides, *מסד תורה*, *Yemen Epistle*; Nachmanides, *Torath Adam*, 'Sh'ar Ha Gemul'; Maimonides, *Guide to the Perplexed*, li. 29, 30, also his *Mishne Torah*, *Hilchot Teshubah*, viii.; Azaria di Rossi, *Meor Enayim*, xlv. 54; Lipschütz, *Mishna*, *מסכת תענית*; An Excursus on the Future Life (based on *Nezikin*).

E. N. ADLER.

#### AGES OF THE WORLD (Zoroastrian).—

1. By far the most detailed account of Iranian cosmology is afforded by the Pahlavi *Bundahishn*, a work which, though dating in its present form from the post-Muhammadan period, undoubtedly contains material of far greater antiquity. According to it, Aôharmazd (Ormazd) 'produced spiritually the creatures which were necessary for those means [his complete victory over evil], and they remained three thousand years in a spiritual state, so that they were unthinking [or invulnerable] and unmoving, with intangible bodies' (i. 8). . . . 'And Aôharmazd spoke to the evil spirit thus: "Appoint a period, so that the intermingling of the conflict may be for nine thousand years." For he knew that by appointing this period the evil spirit would be undone. Thus the evil spirit, unobservant and through ignorance, was content with that agreement; just like two men quarrelling together, who propose a time thus: "Let us appoint such-and-such a day for a fight." Aôharmazd also knew this, through omniscience, that within these nine thousand years, for three thousand years everything proceeds by the will of Aôharmazd, three thousand years there is an intermingling of the wills of Aôharmazd and Ahriman, and the last three thousand years the evil spirit is disabled, and the adversary is kept away from the creatures' (i. 18-20, West's tr.). Then Ahura Mazda (Pahlavi *Aôharmazd*) recited the *Ahunarar*, and exhibited to the evil spirit his own triumph in the end; the evil spirit, perceiving his own impotence and the annihilation of the demons, became confounded and remained three thousand years in confusion, that is, the second trimillennium of time. During the confusion of the evil spirit, Ahura Mazda created Good Thought (Pahlavi *Vohûman*), as well as the five other archangels. Ahriman (wh. see) produced in opposition to them six corresponding evil powers. Of the creatures of the world Ahura Mazda produced first, the sky (and the light of the world); second, water; third, earth; fourth, plants; fifth, animals; and sixth, mankind (*ib.* i. 21-28). The spirits of men, their *fravashis* and their consciousness, had already been created in the beginning. Now Ormazd deliberated with them, asking them if they would assume a bodily form in order to contend with the fiend Ahrimah, and in the end become wholly immortal and perfect for

ever, whereupon they consented (ii. 10-11). According to the third chapter, the confounding of the evil spirit and his demons was due to 'the righteous man,' a phrase which doubtless designates Gaya-maretan (Pahlavi *Gâyômart*), the primeval man, who existed undisturbed, during the same second trimillennium, with the primeval ox.

The evil spirit now rushed into creation, and the seventh millennium, or the third trimillennium, began. The elements, the primeval ox, and the primeval man were successively attacked by the Evil One. But the appointed time for Gaya-maretan had not yet arrived. He lived and ruled for thirty years more, although the destroyer had come (iii. 22f.). Attacked by Ahriman, the ox fell to the right; from his body and his limbs the plants were produced, and the animals from his seed (iv. 1, x. 1-3, xiv. 1-3).<sup>\*</sup> Gaya-maretan fell on the left side in passing away, and from one portion of his seed received by the earth the first human couple, Mâshya and Mâshyôd, grew up for forty years as a plant, and were then changed into the shape of a man and a woman (iv. 1, xv. 1-5). The history of mankind, which then began, occupies the second half of the 12,000 years.

The 34th chapter of the original *Bundahishn* sums up the first two trimillenniums of the creation as follows: 'Time was for twelve thousand years; and it says in revelation, that three thousand years was the duration of the spiritual state, where the creatures were unthinking, unmoving, and intangible; and three thousand years was the duration of *Gâyômart*, with the ox, in the world.' Those three millenniums are immediately connected with three of the constellations of the zodiac: Cancer, Leo, and Virgo.

The first millennium of the human race is distributed as follows in the same chapter:—

... during 40 years (*Bünd.* 15. 2).  
... desire for intercourse, 50

... years.  
... living as husband and wife, 93 years, until  
*Hôshyang* (Av. *Daohyangha*), great-grandson of Mâshya,  
came, 40 years (and six months, according to Windisch-  
mann).  
*Takhmôrûp* (Av. *Takhma-urupa*; Shâh-nâmâh *Tahmûras*),  
great-grandson of Hôshyang, 30 years.

... because he took pleasure in words of falsehood and error  
(*Yashî*, xix. 34), and made himself something more than a  
man.

Then he lived in concealment for 100 years.

Total, 999 years and six months (or 1000 years).

The next millennium, the second of human history, and the eighth of the creation, was under the sway of Dahâk, whose lineage on his mother's side is traced, by *Bünd.* xxxi. 6, nine degrees from the evil spirit himself. Dahâk is the Azhi Dahâka, the dragon with three heads, of the Avesta, who tried to seize the kingly power-substance, the *Khvarenah*, as it left Yima, who had become too proud owing to his happy paradise-reign; but Atar, the fire, saved it (*Yashî*, xix. 47 ff.).

According to another tradition in the same *Yashî* (xix. 35), the *Khvarenah*, in leaving Yima, went in three parts: one to Mithra; the second to Thraëtaona, who killed the dragon Azhi Dahâka; and the third to Keresâspa, the great hero, who is to be the successful adversary of the dragon at the end of the time. Those three guardians of the 'kingly glory' are regarded as succeeding each other, so that Mithra preserves it during the reign of the fiend, until Thraëtaona comes—as, in the other version, just mentioned, Atar is said to save the kingly glory, which takes refuge in the waters of the sea Vouru-Kasha.

After the millennium of Dahâk, who is assigned

<sup>\*</sup> The twenty-seventh chapter of the *Bundahishn* presupposes the existence of plants before the attack of the fiend; 'it says in revelation, that, before the coming of the destroyer, vegetation had no thorn and bark about it.'



by *Bünd.* xxxiv. 5 to Scorpio, the sovereignty devolved on Frētūn, the Thraētaona of the Avesta, the Frīdūn of the *Shāh-nāmāh*, who killed the terrible usurper and introduced the third millennium of mankind and of the third trimillennium of creation. This millennium is assigned by the *Bāndahishn* to Sagittarius, and contains the names of the heroic legends of ancient Irān. The *Bāndahishn* makes the following calculation (xxxiv. 6-7):—

*Frētūn*, contemporary of the 12 years of Airiō, 500 years.

*Mānūshcihar* (Av. *Manushcihtra*), contemporary of the Turanian adversary Frāsiyāb, the Franhraşyan of the Avesta, who made Mānūshcihar and the Iranians captive in the mountain-range Padashkhvār, south of the Caspian, 120 years.

Zōb, Aōzōbō (Av. *Uzava*; *Shāh-nāmāh* *Zav*), grandson of Mānūshcihar, expelled Frāsiyāb from Iran, and reigned 5 years; adopted

Kaī-Kabāt (Av. *Kavi Kavata*), founder of the most renowned royal race of Iran, the Kavis, who retained the *khvarenah*, the spiritual substance of the kingship of Irān, during several generations, 15 years.

Kaī-Kāns (Av. *Kavi Usadham*), grandson of Kaī-Kabāt, 150 years.

His grandson Kaī-Khūsrāv (Av. *Kavi Husravah*), who was received into heaven without death, 60 years.

Kaī-Lōrāsp (Av. *Kavi Aurvat-aspa*), 120 years; and his son Kaī-Vishtāsp (Av. *Kavi Vīshṭāspa*), the protector of Zarathustra, until the coming of the religion, 30 years.

Total, 1000 years.

So far the last chapter of the *Bāndahishn*. It accordingly gives only a short chronology of the millennium of the Zarathushtrian faith,—ruled by Capricorn,—in which period the present generation is thought to live. After the coming of religion it reckons (xxiv. 7-9):—

For the Achæmenians . . . . .	258 years.
" Alexander . . . . .	14 "
" the Ashkānians (Arsacides) . . . . .	284 "
" the Sasanians . . . . .	460 "

Total . . . . . 1016

Then the sovereignty somewhat older list of Louis H. Gray, 'The K Rabbā', in *ZA*, xix. 272 ff.)

In this chronological table the successors of Alexander and the Parthian kingdom until Ardāshir, the founder of the Sasanian dynasty, occupy only 284 years, instead of at least 547. On the other hand, the Sasanians have too many, 460 years instead of 425 or 427. This double mistake is perhaps unintentional. Although the total of the millennium is thus incorrect, the order of the reigns is correct. The millennium, which must contain the whole history since the revelation to Zarathustra, has been a puzzle to the Zarathushtrians. The *Bahman Yasht* (Pahlavi), which has, in its present form, a complicated literary history behind it, shows the difficulty caused by the old traditional statement of the sacred writings that a son of the prophet should be born in a supernatural way and appear a thousand years after the beginning of the new dispensation. The popular belief awaited rather a valiant warrior, Bahram Varjāvand, the Iranian Messiah. Indeed, we read in the Pahlavi *Bahman Yasht*, iii. 44 ('Pahlavi Texts', tr. by E. W. West, *SBE* v. p. 231): 'Regarding Hōshētar it is declared that he will be born in 1600.' This must mean 1600 years after Zarathushtra. That is 600 years too late—but it brings us only to the beginning of the 13th cent. A.D., according to the traditional Zarathushtrian chronology. E. W. West to his tr. zur Gesch. der Esc xx. 122 ff.; N. Söderblom, *Die Religionen des Altertums*, and art. ESCHATOLOGY, § 8.

It is evident, as E. W. West has pointed out in his most important introduction to vol. v. of his tr. of Pahlavi Texts (*SBE* xlvii.), that this system of chronology must have been made before the year that should finish the millennium of the actual history of mankind after Zarathushtra. The first revelation to the prophet being dated by the Pahlavi tradition 300 years before Alexander, or about 630 B.C., that means about 370 A.D.

Amongst other statements and calculations to be found in Pahlavi writings about the first thousand years of the last or fourth trimillennium, besides the short notice at the end of the *Bāndahishn*, two have an interest for our present purpose.

(1) The period of mankind being fixed at 6000 years, Zarathushtra, who was born thirty years before the end of the former 3000 years, and whose first intercourse with the celestial beings begins the second trimillennium, makes his appearance

in the middle of human history. According to the *Sad Dar*, lxxxi. 4-5, it is declared in revelation that the Creator spoke to Zarathushtra thus (*SBE* xxiv. 345):

'I have created . . . for it is three the now, and from no years that remain . . . precious and better and more valuable, . . . as the heart is in the middle of the whole body, . . . and as the land of Irān is more valuable than other lands, for the reason that it is in the middle.'

(2) The *Dinkart*, ix. 8, a compilation of the 9th cent., renders the contents of the seventh *fargard* of the now lost *Sūtgar Nask* of the Sasanian Avesta thus (*SBE* xxxvii. 181):

'The seventh *fargard* is about the exhibition to Zarātōst of the nature of the four periods in the millennium of Zarātōst. First, the golden, that in which Agharmazd displayed the religion to Zarātōst. Second, the silver, that in which Vištāsp received the religion from Zarātōst. Third, the steel, the period within which the organizer of righteousness, Atōrpāt, son of Mārāspand, was born [or Adarbād, the great champion of orthodoxy in the 4th cent., who offered to undergo the ordeal of pouring molten brass on his chest in order to prove the truth of the Mazdayasnian faith]. Fourth, the period mingled with iron is this, in which there is much propagation of the authority of the apostate and other villains, as regards the destruction of the reign of religion, the decay of every kind of goodness and virtue, and the disappearance of honour and wisdom from the countries of Irān.'

It is not possible to say how much of this account belonged to the text of the *Sūtgar Nask* and what is taken from its 'Zend' (its translation and Pahlavi paraphrase, used by the compiler). The events described need not come down later than the time after the death of the great Shāhpūr II. in 379. His grandson Yazdgard I. (399-420) was called by the priests the 'sinner' because of his tolerance in quarrels about religion. At all events, it is scarcely likely that the whole scheme of the four [Metal] Ages, known in India, Greece, Rome, etc., should have been wholly introduced by the Pahlavi paraphrase. In the Pahlavi *Bahman Yasht*, i. 6, it is expressly said that the appearance of the accursed Mazdāk [the heretic who flourished during the reign of Kōbād (488-531), and who was put to death by his son Khūsrō Nōshirsān] during 'this time' (the Iron Age), is mentioned in the lost Zend commentary on three *Yashts* of the Avesta, although the two of these three *Yashts* still extant (the Avesta *Bahman Yasht* being lost) do not contain anything about the matter.

In the same context of the Pahlavi *Bahman Yasht* the historical standpoint is a later one than in the *Dinkart's* rendering of *Sūtgar Nask*, and three of the four Ages are applied to other epochs. That of Gold means the conversation of Ahura Mazda with Vištāsp's acceptance of the religion. That of Silver is the reign of the Kayanian Artakhsht, general Longimanus (465-424)—perhaps Xerxes II., Darius II., and Artaxerxes Mnemon (404-358). That of Steel is the reign of the glorified Khūsrō, son of Kōbād (531-579), the greatest of the Sasanians, during whose reign the Pahlavi literature flourished (F. Justi in *Grundriss der iran. Philologie*, ii. 539). In ii. 21-22 there is allusion to the great merit of the Steel Age king: 'when he keeps away from this religion the accursed Mazdāk. . . . And that which was mixed with iron is the reign of the demons with dishevelled hair of the race of Wrath, when it is the end of the ten-hundredth winter of thy millennium, O Zarātōst, the Spītāmān!' The speaker is Ormazd.

In another passage of our Pahlavi commentary or paraphrase of the *Bahman Yasht* (ii. 15-22) the Metal Ages are increased to seven. Zarathushtra had seen in a dream a tree with seven branches; one golden, one of silver, one bronze, one of copper, one of tin, one of steel, and one mixed up with iron. The Lord explains the dream thus: The seven branches are the seven periods to come. The Golden one means the reign of King Vištāsp; that of Silver is the reign of Artakhsht the Kayan (= Artaxerxes Longimanus); the Bronze Age represents the first two Sasanian monarchs, Artakhsht (226-241) and his son Shāhpūr I. (241-272), and the restorer of true religion, Atōrpāt Mārāspand ('with the prepared brass'), under Shāhpūr II. (309-379). The Copper Age is evidently out of its order, as it puts us back from the Sasanian dynasty to the Parthians, to 'the reign of the Ashkānian king' [we do not know which] who removed from the world the heterodoxy which existed; while the wicked *Akandgar-i Kūtişyakh* [probably = 'Alexander the Christian', an anachronism that need not surprise us on the part of a Pahlavi writer, who identifies the two great enemies of the Mazdayasnian faith coming from the West (Alexander the Great and

the Christian Roman empire) is utterly destroyed by this religion, and passes unseen and unknown from the world. The Tin Age brings us to the powerful Sassanian monarch, Bahān V. (420-438), 'when he makes the spirit of pleasure and joy manifest, and Ahartman with the wizards [i.e. the heretics] rushes back to darkness and gloom.' The Steel Age represents the persecutor of Mazdāk, King Khōsrō, and the one mixed with Iron is characterized as in the first chapter.

As we have seen, the four original Ages are the same, but between the Silver one (= Artaxerxes I. and N.) and the Steel one (= Khōsrō Anoshirvan) three supplementary periods are intercalated. The Copper Age is out of place, and should probably be put before the Bronze Age. The number four is thus changed into seven.

At the end of Zarathushtra's millennium Ukhshyatereta (Pahlavi *Hūshētar*), 'the one who makes piety grow,' shall be born, in a marvellous way, from the prophet's seed. When thirty years old, he enters on his ministry to restore the religion (*Bundahishn*, xxxii. 8; *Bahman Yashst*, iii. 44; *Dinkart*, vii. 8, 51-60). The second millennium of the post-Zarathushtrian trilmillennium begins. In the 5th cent. of that millennium (*Dinkart*, vii. 9, 3 [SBE xlvii. 108]) the wizard Mahrkūsh, mentioned in an extant fragment (*Westergaard*, vii. 2) of the Avesta as Mahrkūsha, will appear for seven years, and produce a terrible winter, that will, 'within three winters and in the fourth,' destroy the greater part of mankind and of animals.

Those winters are mentioned in the second *fargart* of the *Vendidad* without the name of Mahrkūsha, the demon or the wizard of frost and snow. Yima, the paradise-king, is told by Ormazd to prepare an enclosure, a *vara*, and to live in it himself with a chosen host of men, animals, plants, and fires, in order to be preserved during the winters that will invade the earth.

When in Hūshētar's millennium the enclosure made by Yima is opened, mankind and animals will issue from it and arrange the world again, and there will be a time of fulness and prosperity (*Dinkart*, vii. 9, 3 f.; *Mainōg-i Kīrat*, xxvii. 27-31). New beings thus come back miraculously for the restoration of the world (*Dāstān-i Dīnīk*, xxxvii. 95 [SBE xviii. 109-110]).

A thousand years after Hūshētar, a second son of Zarathushtra will be born, Ukhshyatnemah, 'he who makes the prayer grow' (Pahlavi *Hūshētar-mah*). When thirty years old, he will confer with the archangels. That is the beginning of the last millennium of the world (*Bundahishn*, xxxii. 8; *Dinkart*, vii. 9, 18-23). After its end the third miraculous son of the prophet shall be born in the same way by a third virgin, pregnant from the water of the lake Kansava, which holds the seed of Zarathushtra (*Bundahishn*, xxxii. 8; *Dinkart*, vii. 10, 15-18).

The usual translation of his name *Astrat-ereta*, 'he who raises the [dead] bodies,' seems very unlikely. The second part of the name, *ereta*, which means in the name of the first son of the prophet 'righteousness,' being the Iranian equivalent of the Skr. *ṛta* (which appears otherwise in the Avesta as *asha*), would then be a verbal form in the third name. More probable is Bartholomae's rendering (*Altiran. Wörterbuch*, col. 215), 'he who is the personified righteousness' or 'piety.' But the analogy with the former two names: *Ukhshyat-ereta* and *Ukhshyat-nemah*, makes one think that the first half also of this third name is a verbal form, an act. participle of *star-*, 'to praise,' with a preceding *ā*. If, indeed, the initial *a* were long, the name might be translated, 'he who praises righteousness.'

More frequently the third expected restorer of religion is called *Saoshiyant* 'the saviour,' 'the helper,' originally and generally in the Avesta an appellative applied to the zealous Mazdaeasians and promoters of religion.

Now the last conflict breaks out; resurrection and purification open the way to eternal blissful existence. The time preceding the coming of the three restorers of faith will be marked by misery and impiety (*Spend Nask*, according to *Dinkart*, viii. 14, 11 ff.). We recall the four Ages that mark a successive deterioration in Zarathushtra's millennium. The Pahlavi apocalypses paint the time before Hūshētar's coming in dreadful colours borrowed from history. At the end of the last

thousand years Azhi Dahāka will break his fetters. But, on the other hand, the end of those three Ages is described as an advance towards the glorious consummation (*Dinkart*, ix. 41, 4-8). We have seen how the opening of the gate of Yima's enclosure will produce a new prosperity before Hūshētar-māh's appearance. After the 5th cent. of Hūshētar's millennium two-thirds of the population of Irān are righteous and one-third wicked (*Dinkart*, vii. 9, 13). In the last millennium 'no one passes away, other than those whom they smite with a scaffold weapon, and those who pass away from old age. When fifty-three years of that millennium of his still remain, the sweetness and oiliness of milk and vegetables are so perfect, that, on account of the freedom of mankind from desire for meat, they shall leave off the eating of meat, and their food becomes milk and vegetables. When three years remain, they shall leave off even the drinking of milk, and their food and drink become water and vegetables' (*Dinkart*, vii. 10, 7 ff.). The milk of one cow shall be sufficient for a thousand men. As hunger and thirst diminish, men shall be satisfied with one meal every third day. Old age shall not be weak any more and life shall become longer. Humility and peace shall be multiplied in the world.

The Greeks were acquainted with the optimistic Mazdaean doctrine of the spiritualizing of mankind towards the end. Men, at the end of the world, will need no food, and they will cast no shadow (Theopompus-Plutarch). The eighteenth *fargart* of the *Varštānānsar Nask* of the Sassanian Avesta told, according to *Dinkart*, ix. 41, 4, 'about the triumph of the sacred beings over the demons at the end' of the three last periods of the world.

These 12,000 years form the long period of creation, divided into four great Ages. It is bounded by eternity on both sides, by 'time without end.' The 'Great,' or 'Iranian,' *Bundahishn*, which appears to be a later development of the more commonly known *Bundahishn*, says about Time (Darmesteter, *Le Zend Avesta*, ii. 310-311): 'It was without limits up to the creation, and it was created limited to the end, that is, to the reducing of the evil spirit to impotence. After this, Time resumes its infiniteness for ever and ever.' This later theological speculation about the personified Time (*Zrvan*) is found in the Avesta itself, which distinguishes between 'Time without limits' (*Zrvan akarana*), and the 'Time long, self-determined' (*Zrvan dareghō-khvadhāta*) (*Nyāish*, i. 8). In *Vendidad*, xix. 9, Zarathushtra answers the Evil One: 'The beneficent spirit created in the time without limits.' 'Time without limits' was made later on, in order to weaken the dualism to an eternal Divine Being, from whom the two opposite spirits emanate.

The distribution of Time into the endless Time before and after the 'long, self-determined Time' has its exact local equivalent in the strictly organized Mazdaean theology. The region of light where Ormazd dwells is called 'endless light.' The region where the Evil Spirit resides is called the 'endless dark.' 'Between them was empty space, that is, what they call "air," in which is now their meeting' (*Bund*, i. 2-4) (cf. Plutarch's words, de Is. et Os. 46, about Mithra as *meion* between the two 'gods'). The air or atmosphere, *Fayū* (Pahlavi *Fāi*) is deified as well as *Zrvan* (Time), and is designated exactly as Time: *dareghō-khvadhāta* (*Nyāish*, i. 1), 'long, self-determined.' The Great *Bundahishn* (Darmesteter, loc. cit.) distinguishes between the good *Vai* and the bad *Vai*—space as well as time being divided according to the dualistic principle. Already the Avesta knew such a distinction, *Fash*, xv. invoking 'that part of thee, O *Vayu*, which belongs to the Good Spirit.'

2. Date of the Zoroastrian system of Ages of the World.—(a) As we have already seen, most of the names and legends and ideas that belong to the Pahlavi accounts of the Ages of the World are to be found in the Avesta. As to the system itself divided into four periods, the principal contents of the lost *Dāmdāt Nask*, the book 'about the production of the beneficial creatures,' of the Sassanian Avesta, from which the *Bundahishn*, 'the original

creation,' is derived, are very shortly reproduced in the following terms in the *Dinkart*, viii. 5 (*SBE* xxxvii. 13-14).

'Amid the *Dānādt* are particulars about the maintenance of action and the production of the beneficial creatures. First, as to the spiritual existence, and how much and how is the maintenance in the spiritual existence; and the production of worldly existence, therefrom, qualified and constructed for with the destroyer, and accomplished for the end and circumvention

An extant Avesta fragment, quoted in the Pahlavi *Vendidad*, ii. 20, runs: 'How long time lasted the holy spiritual creation' (*cvantem zrvānem mainyava stish ashaoni dāta as*). It shows that the complete Avesta knew the system of four times three thousand years.

Except for the events at the end of Zarathushtra's millennium, the Sasanian Avesta must have known all the principal features of the world-chronology now described, with its environment of 'the endless time.'

(b) Plutarch brings us further back, to about 300 B.C., but speaks only of two or three of the four periods (*de Is. et Os.* 47), expressly quoting Theopompus, Philip of Macedon's historian:

Θεόπομπος δὲ φησὶ κατὰ τοὺς μάγους ἀνὰ μέρος τρισχίλια ἔτη τὸν μὲν κρατῆν τὸν δὲ κρατεῖσθαι τὸν θεῶν, ἄλλα δὲ τρισχίλια μάχασθαι καὶ πολεμεῖν καὶ ἀναλίσκιν τὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸν ἑτέρον· τέλος δ' ἀπολείπεσθαι τὸν Ἀἰθρῆν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους εὐδαίμονας ἵστασθαι, μὴτε τροφῇ δεκόμενους μὴτε σκίαν ποιοῦντας. τὸν δὲ ταῦτα μηχανησάμενον θὸν ἡρεμεῖν καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι χρόνον, καλὸς μὲν οὐ πολὺν τῷ θεῷ, ὥστε δ' ἀνθρώπων κοιμωμένων μετρίον. Bernardakis, in his edition of the *Moralia*, reads after χρόνον: ἄλλος μὲν οὐ πολὺν ὥς θεῷ, etc.

The first part of this quotation\* agrees with the Mazdayasnian record of the last nine thousand years (*Būd.* i. 20).

Lagrange ('La Religion des Perses' in *RE*, 1904, p. 35) understands *ἀνὰ μέρος* as indicating two periods: one with Ahura Mazda as ruler, another with Angra Mainyu as ruler; then follows their fight in a third and last period, ended by the defeat of evil. It is possible to translate *ἀνὰ μέρος* in that way. But, as the phrase runs, it is more natural to apply the two 'turns' to the two different trimillenniums mentioned. *ἀνὰ μέρος* belongs to both the periods, after τὸν θεῷ and after τὸν ἑτέρον.

Some slight misunderstanding may easily have been perpetrated either by Theopompus or by Plutarch in quoting him. But it seems impossible not to recognize (1) the impotence of Ahriman, (2) the conflict, and (3) the victory of Ormazd—making up the well-known Mazdayasnian scheme.

The second part of the quotation from Theopompus offers some difficulty. The last words after χρόνον have been more or less ingeniously changed by various conjectures. The phrase should mean: 'The god who has brought about these things (the defeat of Hades (identified with Ἀρεμάνος also by Diog. Laërt. *Proem.* 6) and the blessed state of mankind) keeps still and reposes himself during a period not very great for the god, as [it would be] moderate for a sleeping man.' But the end of the phrase is not tolerable Greek, and must be corrupted in some way. The meaning compels us to think of a rest of Ahura Mazda after the consummation of the destiny of the world. Such an idea is not necessarily inconsistent with the opposition of later Mazdayasnian theology. The opposition to the creation of the world is the opposition of the unfettered Azhi Dahāka; the god who is to awake after the end of the world is supposed to be the god who is to awake after the end of the world.

The context excludes, as far as the present writer can see, the introduction of a third god, after the two enemies spoken of. But it might be that the Greek author has applied to Ahura Mazda some misunderstood statement regarding another figure in the final drama.

(c) The elder Pliny writes (*HN* xxx. 2. 1): 'Endoxus, qui inter sapientiarum sectas clarissimam

\* 1. 'One of those gods reigned and the other was under his dominion during three thousand years. 2. During another three thousand years they battle and fight and destroy each other's works. 3. At the end Hades (Angra Mainyu, who was indeed originally probably a god of the infernal regions and of the dead) succumbs, and men shall be happy, needing no food and throwing no shadow.'

utilissimamque eam intelligi voluit, Zoroastrem hunc sex millibus annorum ante Platonis mortem fuisse prodidit. Sic et Aristoteles.' Thus Greek authors of the 4th cent. B.C. placed Zarathushtra 6000 years before B.C. 347. Hermodorus, in the same century, and Hermippus, a century later, put him 5000 years before the Trojan war. Xanthus of Lydia, perhaps a century earlier, seems to have stated that the prophet lived 6000 years before Xerxes. These fanciful dates are the more astonishing the older they are,—that is, the nearer they approach to Zarathushtra's lifetime, which the Mazdayasnian tradition places in the 7th cent. B.C., and which can scarcely have been many centuries earlier at least.\*

A. V. Williams Jackson ingeniously suggests that the placing of Zarathushtra 6000-7000 years before Christ is due to the Greeks having misunderstood the statements of the Persians, according to which the spiritual prototype of Zarathushtra was created several thousands of years before the prophet himself. ('On the Date of Zoroaster,' in *Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran*, p. 152 ff.). This view has been supported by West, 'Pahlavi Texts,' v. (*SBE* xlvii. p. xi ff.).

*Dinkart*, vii. 2, 16 f., in rendering the contents of *Spend Nask*, tells: 'Again, too, revelation says that, when the separation of the third millennium occurred, at the end of the 3000 years of spiritual existence without a destroyer (after the creatures were in spiritual existence, and before the arrival of the destroyer), the spiritual body of Zarathushtra is framed together two trimillenniums before his birth, at the end of the ninth millennium, i.e. B.C. 6630, according to Mazdayasnian tradition. If this striking explanation of the fanciful Greek dates for Zarathushtra be right, even this special feature of the Mazdayasnian chronology—the pre-formation of Zarathushtra's body 6000 years before his birth—must have been heard of by Greek writers as early as the 5th cent. B.C., which does not seem very probable. At all events, nothing is to be found in these Greek records about 'the holy spiritual creation,' the first of the four trimillenniums.

3. Composite character of the Mazdayasnian system of Ages of the World.—This is evident. The means are lacking for the reconstruction of its formation. But certain points may be noted.

(a) The whole Yima legend must drop out. Originally it was an independent scheme of Ages of the World, like the old Norse Fimbulvetr, 'great winter,' which ends this Age and brings about a new mankind, whose ancestors, Líf and Lífthrasir, are hidden during the desolating winter in Mimir's grove. Mahrkūsha's winter and the new humanity arising from Yima's *vara* have evidently no *raison d'être* whatever in the complete historical system of the Avestan theology. It has been rather awkwardly put aside in Ukshyatereta's millennium, because it must not be omitted. The Yima legend in *Vendidad*, ii., does not know the 12,000 years' system, and excludes it, at least in its complete form, although the old mythic Yima has been duly transformed into a forerunner of Zarathushtra.

The blessed paradise-reign of Yima was a very popular legend in old Iran. Several Avesta texts mention it (*Yasna*, ix. 4 f.; *Yasht*, ix. 9 ff., xiii. 130, xv. 15 f., xvii. 29 ff., xix. 32 ff.), besides *Vendidad*, ii. Under his rule death and sickness and all adversities were unknown. The older tradition gives him a thousand years. In the *Vendidad* he enlarges the earth by one-third of its space, 'the cattle and mankind and dogs and birds and red burning fires' being after 300 years too crowded. After another 300 years he has to repeat the enlargement. When he has done this three times, that is, after 900 years, the tale passes on to the preparation of the *vara* for the coming winters. The analogy—300 years after each enlargement—should give us 1200 years. But the author might have imagined a hundred years after the third enlargement for the making of the enclosure, thus keeping the old tradition of a happy age of a thousand years in the old time. The later learned chronological system in *Bāndahishn*, xxxiv. 4, and *Matnīg-i Khrd*, xxvii. 24, 25, gives 616 years and 6 months.

The Yima legend gives three Ages of the World: the paradise-Age; the present time, which will close with a catastrophe; the frost-demons' win-

\* Pliny also mentions another Zarathushtra, who is said to have lived shortly before A.C. 500.

ters, and the restoring of the living world from Yima's *varā*—after the well-known scheme :

'Past and to come seems best; things present worst'  
(c. Henry IV. l. iii. 108).

It is impossible to say whether this system of three Ages ever existed as a theory by itself. But there are several traces of the greater importance of Yima Khshaeta, 'the radiant,' Jamshid in pre-Zarathushtrian legend (cf. Blochet, *Le messianisme dans l'hétérodoxie musulmane*, p. 126 f.). He seems to have been once considered as the first man and the first ruler. For further discussion see Söderblom, *La Vie Future*, 175-187.

(b) The heroic lore of Irān knew a list of heroes and old rulers, which is preserved in the extant parts of the Avesta, especially in the fifth *Yasht*, consecrated to the goddess Ardvī Sūra Anāhita, in the dramatic history of the *Khvarenah* (the spiritual substance-power of the Iranian kingship), as given in *Yasht*, xiv., and in the ecclesiastical lists of saints of the *Yasht*, xiii. These legends have been, *tant bien que mal*, amalgamated with and adopted into the Zarathushtrian system.

(c) The division of the present millennium into the common Metal Ages is a combination of two systems, of which the Mazdayasnian tradition evidently adopted or borrowed the second one at a later period.

(d) The real existence of mankind from Māshya-Māshyōi until the coming of the Saoshyant comprises only 6000 years,—as in Talmudic and Christian literature (Böcklen, *Die Verwandtschaft der jüd.-christl. mit der pers. Eschatologie*, 82-84), where the duration of the world is fixed on the analogy of the six days of creation, a thousand years being with God as one day. Theopompus-Plutarch also seems to reckon 6000 years, but in a different way: 3000 for Ahura Mazda's supremacy (= Gāyōmart's trimillennium), and 3000 for the conflict (= until Zarathushtra), the two periods being ended by the final victory and eternal bliss (and the rest of God, which looks like a Jewish-Christian Sabbath of the world; cf. Ep. Barn. 15).

The last trimillennium, from Zarathushtra to the Saoshyant, of the final Zarathushtrian chronology seems to have been understood by Theopompus as the time of fulfilment, rather than as a new period. It is possible that the doctrine had this aspect earlier. That would better suit the spirit of the *Gāthās*, where the final renovation of the world seems, in some texts at least, to be soon expected. In any case, Theopompus' record agrees, as to the main contents, with the last 9000 years of the *Bundahishn*. The 9000 years alone are mentioned in the *Arđ Vīrā* where the damned souls complain that all although 9000 years have gone—one day or three days in hell seeming to them as long as the whole duration of the world. The author of the *Arđ Vīrā* Nāmāh must have known the first trimillennium, as the period of 'the holy spiritual creation' is mentioned in the Avestan fragment Pahl. Vend. ii. 20. But it is not unlikely that *Arđ Vīrā*'s 9000 years, which are to be compared with Theopompus' statement, represent an older chronology containing three parts: (1) a good ruler, (2) the present intermingled state, and (3) the great restoration, corresponding to our reconstruction of the Yima legend. The first of the four great epochs will then have been added in order to get the number four, or the twelve thousand years.

We are not sufficiently acquainted with the old Babylonian divisions of the existence of the world. But probably the 12,000 years of the *Bundahishn*—as well as the same age of the world predicted by Mani (Kessler, *Mani*, i. 343; the number 12 is fundamental in Mani's doctrine, see Kessler, art. 'Mani' in *PRE3*), and by the Etrurians (according to Suidas), like the 12 parts of the existence of the world in 2 Es 14<sup>10c</sup> and Apoc. Bar 53, are derived from a Babylonian cycle. This probability comes very near demonstration when we remark that both the Etrurian belief, as reported by Suidas, and the *Bundahishn* combine the twelve millenniums with the zodiacal signs. The Mazdayasnian theologians owed their astronomical science to the Babylonians and to the Egyptians (J. Marquart, *Philologus*, Sup. x. 1. 192 ff.).

(e) The *Gāthās* represent an epoch in which this doctrine of periods did not belong to the Zarathushtrian faith. If periods were already known in Irān, this must have been outside the Zarathushtrian reform. The long waiting is incompatible with the preaching of the *Gāthās*. Time, as in both Jewish and Christian prophecy and

apocalyptics, is rather sharply divided into two Ages: the present era of struggle and difficulty, and the happy reign of theocracy and justice after the longed-for separation by fire.

4. Meaning of the periods.—The beliefs outlined in the foregoing pages represent the original and characteristic feature of the Mazdayasnian system of Ages of the World, and must be derived from the Zoroastrian idea, expressed in the *Gāthās*, of Ahura Mazda as the ruler of the future destiny of mankind. The division into Ages does not imply merely a distinction between the present and the old time—as e.g. in the *alcheringa* (wh. see) of the Australians. Nor does it signify a deterioration, as, for example, in the Ages of Hesiod and Ovid. Something resembling a pessimistic view of the course of time might be gathered from three phases of the Mazdayasnian religion: (1) the monster of the old myth will be unfettered; (2) the sharp opposition implied in the Zarathushtrian reform, and the earnest appeal to choose the way of Asha, sometimes give a dark colouring to the Gāthic view; (3) several thousand years later, when the glorious line of history was already pointed out by Avestan and Pahlavi theology, the tragic events under the last Sasanians and after the Arabian conquest taught a sombre lesson of the end of Zarathushtra's millennium before the advent of the expected helper, who never came. The four Ages of Gold, Silver, Steel, and Iron were adopted, at first probably by an orthodox compiler, during the early controversies with Manichæism and other heresies; then history filled out the Iron-mingled Age in different ways. The Great *Bundahishn* kept open its chapter 'On the calamities which have invaded Irān in different ages' (Blochet, *l.c.* 45). But the Metal Ages are only episodes in one millennium, and give no idea of the destiny of the world. In both cases the general optimistic character of the Zarathushtrian faith prevails: the victory of Ormazd is the surest thing in the world, known and predicted since the beginning. The worldly corporeal existence and human affairs are no enemies of piety, but pure elements and duties, the diligent fulfilment of which formally constitutes each Mazdayasnian a fellow-worker with Ormazd, a helper, saviour (*saoshyant*), and *frashbaretar*, 'a renewer' of humanity and of the world. These functions he discharges in company with the great heroes, from Kai-Khūsrāv—without whose destruction of the idolatrous temples behind the lake of Caecasta the renovation of the world could never have been carried out (*Mainōgt-Khrat*, ii. 95)—to the last *saoshyant*. The world is a realm of conflict, where impurity constantly threatens and demons are ever on the watch. But it is a noteworthy fact that the period of confusion and strife is not the present Age. That period ended with the appearance of Zarathushtra. We already live in the Age of the victory of Ormazd.

The Persian periods do not imply an eternal repetition, as in the developments of Aryan speculation and religion in India and Greece, and sometimes in modern thought (e.g. Nietzsche, and, in a less pedantic way, Sv. Arrhenius)—the same causes combining to produce in eternal cycles the same effect—

'When this world shall be former, underground,  
Thrown topsy-turvy, twisted, crisp'd, and curl'd,  
Baked, fried, or burnt, turn'd inside-out, or down'd,  
Like all the worlds before, which have been hurl'd  
First out of, and then back again to chaos,  
The superstratum which will overlay us.'

—(Don Juan, canto ix. stanza xxxvii.)

Nothing can be more characteristic than the placing of the Metal Ages and this Iron Age only in one, the present, Mazdayasnian millennium, while the millenniums form together a progress towards an end, whereas in the Indian conception the four

*yugas* and the present evil *kali* Age form the constant feature of periods which emerge and pass away in endless similarity. The system of periods in Iran did not unite, as in India, with the popular belief in the transmigration of souls—a belief worked out into a fundamental philosophical doctrine in Indian systems of periods.

The Mazdayasnian scheme expresses, in a somewhat scholastic way, the idea implied in the word *history*: that is to say, 'something happens in what happens' (E. G. Geijer), so that the intricate mass of events has a meaning and a goal beyond the actual combinations and situation. The real kernel of history is a 'forward,' not a 'see-saw,' and not a 'backward,' although it may seem so to human eyes. This profound conception has arisen only twice in the history of human thought—in the only two ancient prophetic religions, one Aryan, one Semitic—in Zarathushtrianism and in Mosaism. Neither seems to have borrowed it from the other. Christianity inherited it from Mosaism, and it has become prevalent in the Western civilization in the form of belief in a Divine purport in history, in progressive evolution, or in a redeeming crisis, and constitutes one of the most significant features and influential factors in the civilization of Europe and America, as distinguished from the great civilizations of India and of the Far East. It is so deeply rooted in the Western mind, that even so sincere and acute an admirer of and believer in the Indian conception as Schopenhauer unconsciously yields to it (cf. his *Sämmtliche Werke*, v. 224). To have originated faith in the significance and purpose of history may fittingly be called Zarathushtra's greatest gift to mankind.

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NATHAN SÖDERBLOM.

—AGHORI, AGHORAPANTHĪ, AUGAR, AUGHAR. —These are names applied to a sect of ascetics in India who have for a long time attracted attention on account of their habit of cannibalism and other abominable practices.

1. *Meaning of name.*—Their name indicates connexion with the cult of Śiva, being derived from Skr. *a-ghora*, 'not terrific,' one of the euphemistic titles of the god. *Aghorapanthī* means 'one who follows the path' (Skr. *pantha*) or cult of Śiva in this form. The worship of Śiva as Aghoriśvara, 'the non-terrific Lord,' is practised at a fine temple at Ikkeri, in Mysore, and in many other places.

2. *Distribution.*—The present distribution of the sect is a question of some difficulty. According to the Census of 1901, they number within the Empire 5580, of whom the vast majority (5185) are found in Bihār or W. Bengal, the remainder in Ajmir-Mhairwāra and Berār, with 2 convicts in the Andaman Islands. This differs widely from the Census figures of 1891, when 630 Aghori and 4317 Augars were recorded in the United Provinces, 3877 Aghori in Bengal, and 436 Augars in the Panjāb. The explanation of this discrepancy lies partly in the fact that, like all ascetics of the kind, they are constantly wandering from one part of the country to another to attend bathing fairs and visit places of pilgrimage. Secondly, the unpopu-

larity of the sect doubtless induces them at the time of the Census to record themselves under other and more reputable titles. The chief centres of the sect, where a monastery (*matha*) of some kind was assigned to them, used in former times to be Mount Ābū, Girnār, Bodh Gaya, Benares, and Hinglāj—the last the most western point to which Indian polytheism extends. But they have now disappeared from Mount Ābū, and they seem to have no recognized establishments at any of the other holy places, which, however, they still occasionally visit.\*

3. *History of the sect.*—The first account of ascetics following the rule of the modern Aghori is found in the *Travels* of the Buddhist pilgrim, Hiuen Tsiang. He speaks of 'naked ascetics, and others who cover themselves with ashes, and some who make chaplets of bones, which they wear as crowns on their heads' (Beal, *Si-yu-ki, Buddhist Records of the W. World*, i. 55; Watters, *Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, i. 123). In another passage he speaks of the Kāpāladhārin, or 'wearers of skulls,' some of whom have no clothes, 'but go naked (*nirgranthas*); some wear leaf or bark garments' (Beal, *op. cit.* i. 76; Watters, *op. cit.* i. 149). When we come to later times, we have more particular accounts of these Kāpālika or Kāpāladhārin (Skr. *kāpāla*, 'a skull,' *dhārin*, 'carrying'). Anandagiri, in his *Saṅkara-vijaya*, thus describes the Kāpālika: 'His body is smeared with ashes from a funeral pile, around his neck hangs a string of human skulls, his forehead is streaked with a black line, his hair is woven into the matted braid, his loins are clothed with a tiger's skin, a hollow skull is in his left hand (for a cup), and in his right hand he carries a bell, which he rings incessantly, exclaiming aloud, "Ho Sambhu, Bhairava, ho lord of Kālī!" titles of Śiva' (H. H. Wilson, *Essays*, i. 264 n.). Again, the poet Bhavabhūti, who wrote in the first half of the 8th cent. A.D., in his drama *Mālātī and Mādhava*, Act V., gives a vivid account of the rescue by Mādhava of his mistress from the clutches of the Aghora Ghanta, who is about to sacrifice her at the altar of the goddess Chāmūṇḍā, who represents Devī in one of her most terrible forms. Within the temple the human-sacrificing priest circles in his Tantric dance round his victims, while he invokes the goddess, round whose neck is a garland of human skulls (Wilson, *Theatre of the Hindus*, ii. 55; Frazer, *Lit. Hist. of India*, 289 ff.). A vivid description of this Kāpālika-vrata, or worship of the terrific forms of Śiva and his consort Durgā, is given in the *Prabodha Chandrodāya*, or 'Moon of Intellect' (Eng. tr. J. Taylor, 38 ff.). In the *Dabistān* (Eng. tr. Shea-Troyer, ii. 129), the author of which died about 1670, we have an account of the 'sect of the Yogis, who know no prohibited food. . . . They also kill and eat men. . . . There are some of this sect who, having mixed their excretions and filtered them through a piece of cloth, drink them, and say that such an act renders a man capable of great affairs, and they pretend to know strange things. They call the performance of this act *Atīla* and also *Akhori*. They have all originated from Gorakhnāth. The author of this work saw a man, who, singing the customary song, sat upon a corpse, which he kept unburied until it came into a state of dissolution, and then ate the flesh of it; this act they hold extremely meritorious.' Gorakhnāth is the great mediæval Hindu saint, of whom many

\* Havell, in 1905, found an Augar at Benares seated in a stone cell raised high above the burning-ghāt. The sect still maintains here its evil reputation, but this black-robed ascetic, who is shown in the photograph studying a sacred book, proved to be quite inoffensive. He bestowed his blessing upon the prying tourist, but contemptuously refused to accept a present (Benares, *The Sacred City*, 119\*).

marvellous tales are told, and from whom some of the *yogi* Orders trace their origin.\*

4. *The sect in modern times.*—There are numerous accounts of the disgusting practices of these ascetics in modern times. M. Thevenot, whose *Travels* were republished in London in 1687, alludes to what was apparently a community of Aghori cannibals, who during his time were established at a place which he calls 'Debca,' in the Broach district of the Bombay Presidency; but his statements must be received with caution. Ward (*View of the Hindoos* [1815], ii. 373) mentions, among oth-

war human skull containing urine and ordure, and a pan of burning coals in the right. If these marks of self-denial do not extort the alms they expect, they profess to eat the ordure out of the skull, in the presence of the persons from whom they are begging.\*

Tod (*Travels in W. India* [1839], p. 83 ff.) gives a vivid description of a colony of Aghori at Mount Ābū (wh. see). One of the most famous of them, named Fatehpuri, was finally, by his own instructions, immured in the cave which he had occupied for many years. A native gentleman informed Tod that a short time previously, when he was conveying the dead body of his brother to the burning-ground, an Aghori begged to be allowed to remove the corpse, saying that it would make excellent chutney (*chatni*), the relish used with curry. He further refers (p. 383) to the terror felt regarding such wretches, who resided near the shrine of Kālīkā Mātā, the Mother-goddess, another form of Devī, where a stranger visiting the place was met by a personage, who after a while explained that she was the dread Mother-goddess herself. But this was really the disguise of an Aghori cannibal, who captured his victims in this way. Buchanan (Martin, *E. India*, ii. 492f.) tells of an Aghori who appeared at Gorakhpur in the United Provinces early in the 19th century. He thrust himself into the house of the local Rājāh, whom he bespattered with filth. The Rājāh complained to Mr. Ahmuty, the judge of the district, who ordered the expulsion of the Aghori from the place. But soon after, when Mr. Ahmuty himself fell sick and the Rājāh's heir died, every one of the Hindu population attributed these misfortunes to the curse of the offended saint.

The same feeling of horror caused by the practices of these wretches is graphically pictured in a curious book, *The Revelations of an Orderly*, published at Benares in 1849. The author (reprint 1866, p. 66) speaks of the *ghāṭs*, or bathing-steps, on the river Ganges at Benares being frequented by—

Aghorpunth faqueers (Anglicé, ogres), practical philosophers, who affect to disbelieve that there is any difference between things, and to avow that any difference depends upon the imagination. A cuff or a kick is as immaterial to them as a blessing. They go about in *puris naturalibus* with a fresh human skull in their hands (off which they have previously eaten the putrid flesh, and from which afterwards with their fingers they scoop out the brain and eyes), into which is poured whatsoever is given them to drink. They pretend to be indifferent whether it be ardent spirits, or milk, or foul water. Their food is the first thing that offers, whether it be a putrid corpse, cooked food, or ordure. With matted hair, blood-red eyes, and body covered with filth and vermin, the Aghori is an object of terror and disgust to everybody. He looks rather like a wolf, ready to destroy and devour his prey, than a human being. I once saw a wretch of this fraternity eating the head of a putrid corpse, and as I passed by he howled and pointed to me; and then scooped out the eyes and ate them before me. I had my matchlock in my hand, and was within an ace of putting a ball into his head; for I deemed him a wolf, and, in fact, he was a brute.\*

The author, really a European in the disguise of a Hindu, ends by appealing to the Government to suppress such abominable exhibitions. Since

\* For the Kāpālīka, also, see Monier-Williams, *Hinduism and Brahmanism*, p. 69; Barth, *Religions of India*, Eng. tr., p. 69; Wilson, *Essays*, i. 21, 264; Buchanan, in Martin, *Eastern India*, ii. 484.

the time when this book was written, the custom of ascetics wandering about nude has been repressed by police regulations, and, as will be seen later on, the habit of cannibalism, as practised by the Aghori, has been prohibited by special legislation within British territories. But as late as 1887 we have an account of a gang who appeared at a fair held at the sacred city of Ujjain in the native State of Gwālior in Central India. 'On demanding some goats from the authorities, they were refused. On this, they proceeded to the burning-*ghāt*, and, taking a corpse from the pile, began to devour it. The horrified spectators summoned the police, but the naked fanatics only desisted on being promised the goats which had been before refused them' (*Panjāb Notes and Queries*, iv. 142).

5. *Life history of an Aghori.*—A full account of the life history of a modern Aghori, based on inquiries by an Indian Medical Officer, Drake Brockman, was contributed by H. Balfour (*JAI* [1897] xxvi. 340 ff.). This man was by caste a *lohār*, or blacksmith, from the Native State of Patāla, in the Panjāb. He started life as a beggar, and was adopted as a disciple by an Aghori. He wandered to the Saiva shrine of Badarīnārāyan in the lower Himalaya, and thence to Nepāl. He then made a pilgrimage to Jagannāth in Orissa, and came finally to Mathura and Bharatpur, at which last place he was found and examined. 'I now receive,' he stated, 'food from every caste and tribe, and have no caste prejudices. I can eat from every one's hand. I do not myself eat human flesh, but some of my sect have the power to eat human flesh and then make it alive again; some have success with charms, and they eat the flesh of the human body; but I have not this power, as I was not successful with the charms. This much I do, I eat and drink out of a human skull. I also eat the flesh of every dead animal, with the exception of the horse, which we are forbidden to devour; all my brotherhood eat the flesh of all dead animals but the horse.'

It has been a subject of much debate why the flesh of the horse is specially prohibited. Some have believed that the reason is that the Hindi name of the horse (*ghora*) may be connected by its members with the title of the sect. But this seems hardly probable. On the other hand, the horse has long been a sacred animal in India, and its sanctity possibly dates from a period earlier than that of the cow. In the *Āvamedha* or horse-sacrificial rite, it was regarded as an emblem of Virāj, the primeval and universally manifested Being, and even at the present day there is considerable evidence of the sanctity of the animal (Colebrooke, *Essays*, ed. 1858, 36; Crooke, *Pop. Religion*, ii. 204 ff.). As a coincidence it may be noted that Pliny (*HN* xxviii. 9) specially points out that when a horse was sacrificed at public ceremonies the *flamen* was forbidden to touch it.

6. *Relations of the Aghori to other Hindu sects.*—The Aghori are naturally so reticent about their sectarian organization that their relation to other Hindu sects is as yet imperfectly known. The sect in modern times, or at least that branch of it which has its headquarters at Benares, assigns its origin to one Kinna Rām, who was initiated by one Kālu Rām, an ascetic from Gīrnār, towards the close of the 18th cent. (Crooke, *Tribes and Castes*, i. 26). Hence they are sometimes known under the title of Kinnārāmī. In religious belief the Aghori is closely allied to the Paramahansa, who

'is solely occupied with the investigation of Brahma, or spirit, and who is equally indifferent to pleasure or pain, insensible to heat or cold, and incapable of satiety or want. Agreeably to this definition, individuals are sometimes met with who pretend to have attained such a degree of perfection; in proof of it they go naked in all weathers, never speak, and never indicate any natural want; what is brought to them as alms or food, by any person, is received by the attendants, whom their supposed sanctity or a confederation of interest attaches to them, and by these attendants they are fed and served on all occasions, as if they were as helpless as infants' (Wilson, *Essays*, i. 232).

Another sect of the same class, which displays an equal disregard of the decencies of life, is the Sarbhāngi (Crooke, *op. cit.* iv. 292). But the dis-



regard of the ordinary needs of life shown by these two sects is very different from the abominable practices of the Aghori. Their relations, again, to the Angbar yogis of the Panjāb have not been clearly ascertained. It would seem that to the general licence of the latter, the former add the occasional eating of human flesh and filth.

7. *Cannibalism and eating of filth.*—The questions of importance in connexion with the Aghori are: first, the eating of human flesh and filth; secondly, the use of the human skulls from which they eat and drink. The practice of human sacrifice and cannibalism in India has always been chiefly associated with the Tantric rites of the Śakta worshippers of Devī, the Mother-goddess, in one or other of her various forms, as Kālī, Durgā, Chāmundā, and others. This cult is supposed to have had its origin in E. Bengal or Assam about the 5th cent. A.D. The Kālika Purāna distinctly recommends the immolation of human beings, for which at the present time pigeons, goats, and, more rarely, buffaloes are substituted. It may be suspected that Hinduism, in this form, assimilated some of the rites of the non-Aryan races; but from the place of its origin it is more probable that these practices were adopted from the E. tribes rather than from the Bhils, to whom they have been attributed by Hopkins (*Rel. of India*, 490, 533), and others (Gait, *Census Rep. Bengal*, 1901, i. 181 f.). Human sacrifice in this ritual form still prevails in dark corners of the land, as in Assam, and the more remote forest tracts of the Central hill ranges (Gait, *Census Rep. Assam*, 1891, i. 80; Crooke, *Pop. Rel.* ii. 169 ff.). With this side of Hinduism the Aghori sect is closely connected. There are, again, as in the case of the Śrāddha, or annual Hindu feast of the dead, fairly obvious survivals of the primitive custom of the sacramental eating of the dead, as well as that of devouring the bodies of old or eminent persons for the sake of keeping in the family their valour or other virtues (Hartland, *Legend of Perseus*, ii. 278 ff.). But none of these motives accounts for the cannibalism of the Aghori.

It is perhaps possible to account for these practices in another way. We find among some savage races instances of wizards or medicine-men eating substances which are in themselves disgusting and revolting, or poisonous or medicinal in nature, with a view to enhancing the spiritual exaltation of the eater.

Thus, according to Haddon (*Report Cambridge Exped.* v. 321), at Mlabui in the New Guinea Highlands, the practice of eating human flesh is a religious character, and is performed by the wizards of the course of a sorcerer, who is expected to perform a special act of sorcery. For instance, they were said frequently to eat flesh of corpses, or to mix the juices of corpses with their food. One effect of this diet was to make them "wild" so that they did not care for any one, and all affection temporarily ceased for relatives, wife, and children; and on being angered by any of them they would not hesitate to commit murder. In parts of Melanesia, according to Codrington, Mana, or spiritual exaltation, is gained by eating human flesh; and in this way people obtain the power of becoming vampires, and the ghost of the corpse which was eaten entering into friendly relations with the eater (*JAI* x. 305; *Melanesians*, 222).

In Macdonald, witches and wizards one tasting a morsel of such food (*JAI* xxii. 107). Among nearly all is a lingering suspicion that the sorcerer, or person desiring to become a sorcerer, is a corpse-eater, a ghoul who digs up the bodies of dead persons to eat them, either from a morbid taste, or in the belief that this action will invest him with magical powers. In Uganda, as well as in many parts of Bantu Africa, there is believed to exist a secret society of such ghouls, who assemble at midnight for the purpose of disinterring and eating corpses. People cursed with this morbid taste are in Uganda called *basezi* (Johnston, *Uganda*, ii. 678, 692 f.). The same story is repeatedly told of witches in the power of flying in the air and performing other wonders (*Tawney, Kaba-sarit-sagara*, i. 153, ii. 450, 594). Stories of the same kind are still told in India (*Panjāb Notes and Queries*, ii. 75; Temple-Seel, *Widewake Stories*, 418). Even at the present day the Ōḍi magicians in Malabar are said to eat filth as a means

of acquiring power (Fawcett, *Bulletin of the Madras Museum*, iii. 311).

Belief of this kind may have been the real origin of the practice, and the explanation which the modern Aghori gives, that according to the Śaiva rule all things are equal and all immaterial, may be a recent development.

8. *Use of human skulls as cups and vessels.*—The same motive possibly accounts for the use of the human calvaria for purposes of eating and drinking. In many places the skull used in this way is believed to possess special magical qualities. Thus, among the Wadoe of E. Africa, at the appointment of a chief, a stranger is killed, and the skull of the victim is used as a drinking-cup at the inauguration rite (*Man*, iii. 61). The new priest of the king of the Baganda drinks out of the skull of his predecessor, whose ghost thus enters into him (*JAI* xxxii. 45). In the same way the Zulus make the skull of a noted enemy into a bowl for holding the 'charming-medicine' with which the war-doctor sprinkles the soldiers before a campaign (*ib.* xix. 285). Similarly, in the Indian Himalaya, the skulls of some women killed in a snowstorm were made into drums for summoning devils (Waddell, *Among the Himalayas*, 401). In these and in many other instances of the practice collected by Balfour (*JAI* xxvi. 347 ff.), it is clear that the skull has been carefully selected as that of some eminent or notorious person, or of one whose death has occurred under tragical circumstances. The custom of the Aghori, if it originated in this way, appears, therefore, in a debased form, for they do not seem to exercise any special care in selecting the skulls which they use. Several bowls of this kind, procured in India, Ashanti, Australia, China, Tibet, and the lower Himalayas, have been figured and described by Balfour (*JAI* xxvi. 357). Waddell gives a picture of one used in Tibetan devil-worship, as well as a drawing of a modern Tibetan hermit, an exact representation of the Aghori, drinking out of such a bowl (*Lhasa and its Mysteries*, 220, 239, 243, 370). In fact, Tibet, with its remarkable colony of immured hermits described by Waddell (*op. cit.* 237 ff.), appears to exhibit more closely than even modern India the course of austerity practised by the early Hindu ascetics. The fat, comfortable appearance of the modern yogi or sannyāsi proves that austerity is not a part of his way of life.

This habit of using skulls as drinking-cups shows itself even in Europe. It was a custom of the old Germans, and Livy (xxiii. 24) tells the same tale of the Celts. Paulus Diaconus (*Hist. Langob.* ii. 28 in Gummere, *Germ. Orig.* 120) tells how Alboin met his death when he insisted on his queen drinking out of a cup made of the skull of her father. It is still a common belief that epilepsy may be cured by drinking out of a cup made from the skull of a suicide (*Folk-lore*, vii. 276, xiv. 370; Mitchell, *The Past in the Present*, 164; Rogers, *Social Life in Scotland*, iii. 225). The powder made from human skulls, and even the moss growing on them, are valued as a styptic in cases of hæmorrhage (Black, *Folk Medicine*, 96).

9. *Punishment of Aghori.*—There are numerous cases of members of the sect convicted in modern times by Indian courts of law, on charges of outraging and eating human corpses. In 1862 the Sessions Judge of Ghāzipur in the United Provinces convicted and sentenced an Aghori to one year's rigorous imprisonment, under sections 270-297 of the Indian Penal Code, on a charge of dragging a corpse along a road. A similar case, in which cannibalism was proved, occurred at Rohtak in the Panjāb in 1882, and in Dehrā Dūn of the United Provinces in 1884. In 1884 two Europeans detected an Aghori eating human flesh on an island in the Ganges. Several skulls, one of which had been recently severed from the trunk, were found

\* In Nepāl, Buchanan Hamilton saw people of the Got or gardener caste, in the worship of Bhawāni in the Tantric form, drinking spirits out of human skulls, until they danced in a state of drunken excitement, which was supposed to proceed from inspiration (*Account of the Kingdom of Nepal*, 35).



impaled on bamboo posts round his hermitage (*PASB* iii. 209 f., 300 f.).

10. *Initiation rites of the Aghori*.—Ascetic Orders usually guard as secret the methods of initiation and the formula which is whispered in the ear of the neophyte. Hence the accounts of the initiation rites of the Aghori are, from their general unpopularity, to be received with some degree of caution. According to one, and that perhaps the most authoritative account, the *guru*, or head of the Order, blows a conch-shell accompanied by rude music performed by a hired band. He then micturates into a human skull and pours the contents over the head of the candidate, whose hair is then shaved by a barber. The neophyte next drinks some spirits and eats food which has been collected as alms from the lowest castes, and assumes the ochre-coloured, scanty waist-cloth, and the stick of the ascetic. During the rite the *guru* whispers mystic formulae (*mantra*) into the ear of his disciple. In some cases it is reported that eating human flesh is part of the rite, and two necklaces, one made of the tusks of the wild boar and the other of the vertebrae of the cobra, are placed round the neck of the disciple (*PASB* iii. 241 f.). According to another account, five glasses filled with spirits in which meat has been mixed with flowers are placed upon the altar. A piece of cloth is tied over the eyes of the neophyte; he is then led before two *gurus*, who light a lamp; the cup of initiation is served to all present; his eyes are opened, and he is told to look for the 'divine light,' while the spell (*mantra*) is whispered into his ear (*North Indian Notes and Queries*, ii. 31). According to a third account, the initiation takes place in Benares at the tomb of Kinna Rām, the founder of the Order, on which cups of hemp liquor (*bhang*) and spirits are placed. 'Those who wish to retain their caste drink only the hemp; those who solicit complete initiation drink both the hemp and spirits. A sacrifice of fruits is then made on the holy fire, which has continued lighted since the days of Kinna Rām, and an animal, usually a goat, is sacrificed. It is believed that the victim often comes to life, and that the cups on the tombstone miraculously raise themselves to the lips of the candidates for admission into the Order. The rite ends with the shaving of the head of the neophyte, the hair being previously moistened with urine, and a feast is given to the assembled brethren. Full admission to the Order is said to be granted only after a probation lasting twelve years.'

11. *Dress and appearance*.—The Aghori, of whom photographs were collected by Leith for the Anthropological Society of Bombay, is represented as covered with ashes taken from a funeral pyre. He seems to wear frontal marks denoting the unity of the deities Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva. He wears the rosary of Rudrākṣa beads made of the seeds of the tree *Elæocarpus ganitrus*, a necklace made of the bones of a snake, and the tusks of a wild boar, and carries a skull in his hand. Some members of the Order are said to wear necklaces made of human teeth (*PASB* iii. 348 f.).

LITERATURE.—The chief authorities have been quoted in the course of this article. The most complete accounts of the sect are those of H. Balfour, 'The Life History of an Aghori Fakir,' *JAL* xxvi. [1897] 340 f.; H. W. Barrow, 'Aghoris and Aghorapanthis,' from the MS collections of E. T. Leith, *PASB* iii. [1893] 187 f.; Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces* [1898], I. 28 ff. W. CROOKE.

AGITATION.—I. The methods of the agitator are usually considered to be a modern phenomenon, and although this is not an entirely accurate view of the case, it is at least so far true that the conditions of social life have recently become such as to bring his labours into startling prominence. It

is possible to trace the rudiments of this device far back into the past, since the ringer of the tocsin bell, the lighter of the beacon-fire, and the bearer of the flaming torch may fairly be regarded as forerunners of a Mazzini or a Shaftesbury. But there is a pregnant distinction. The message of the tocsin bell in mediæval Florence was an agitating one, but it was single, definite, and predetermined, announcing a bare fact, but conveying no new idea. A developed agitation, on the contrary, depends almost entirely on popularizing a new thought; it applies fresh moral judgments to facts which may have been familiar enough. The present writer has elsewhere described this instrument of collective action as 'an attempt to act mediately on social abuses by acting directly on a social conscience' (*History of Eng. Philanthropy*, p. 172). Even in this, its developed form, agitation can be discovered in so-called ancient as well as in modern history. Whether judged by its results or by the splendid vigour of its onset, no greater agitation has been witnessed than the reconstruction of Western society by the enthusiastic promulgation of the Christian faith. Nor is any more instructive description of the effect of the agitator's art to be found than 'These that have turned the world upside down are come hither also' (Ac 17).

Nevertheless, agitation is characteristically modern. There is not much opportunity for its successful use, unless a 'public opinion' exists to which its appeal can be directed. Public opinion itself has existed in some shape for many centuries, but it continually gains in power and effectiveness. In the more definite form of what Professor Dicey calls 'law-making public opinion' it is not yet evolved except in the more progressive nations. The formation of public opinion in its modern sense has been referred to the era of the first printing-presses, and its mature growth to that of the periodical press (Tarde, *L'Opinion et la Foule*, pp. 7-9). This is also the period of democracy, and it is precisely in democratic societies that agitation is found to be a potent and familiar weapon. We have to appraise its ethical value. If we are to do this with any precision, we shall be compelled to limit the range of the discussion, and to treat not all agitations, but only one leading group. The present article, then, is immediately germane to agitation as an instrument of the humanitarian spirit, and may require some modification in details before being applied to purely political movements, as for the franchise, or class struggles, as of Trade Unionism.

2. The most obstinate labour of public life is to make institutions (*e.g.* laws or customs) match with the ethical ideal. The agitator's function is to facilitate the task. Accordingly, any good agitation should possess the following characteristics. (1) It is *the antithesis of quietism*, for it is necessarily based on the conviction that objects of social concern are the proper concern of the individual also; it denies the distinction between public and private interests, and asserts the duty of each to share in the life of all. It is directed to the removal of abuses; but, so far from being caused directly by the *existence* of a wrong, it springs from the *perception* of the evil. Successful agitation is, therefore, an index of moral sensitiveness. Men treated animals with cruelty long before the Kindness to Animals campaign began (Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, A.D. 1824). (2) Agitation is a leading method of *popularizing higher moral standards*. In the instance just referred to, the matter of judgment was simple enough. Frequently, however, the full significance of the end to be pursued is discovered only in the course of the agitation itself. This was notably the case with Prison Reform and

Factory Legislation, so that what was at first a goal to be reached becomes repeatedly the starting-point for fresh effort. (3) *Agitation appeals to the unselfish impulses and strengthens the social imagination.* Most of us live largely in a world of personal aims purified and enriched only by consideration for the aims of a few neighbours. Into this mind marked by narrow (not necessarily poor) sympathies strikes the impetus of a larger claim. It may be a Dreyfus affair, the appeal for justice to one; \* or Emancipation, the appeal of the enslaved Negro race; or the ideal of Italian unity. In every instance individuals are driven into the larger realm of public sympathy. (4) *Agitation is a means of social peace.* This is in the nature of paradox, because the first result is always controversy and strife. But even in the turmoil something is gained when social imagination is stirred. Through the effort to remove particular wrong there emerges forefeeling of and admiration for the ideal human society in which remediable wrongs will be remedied. Opposition to the bad is one form of loyalty to the good, and those who enter on the conflict prepare the type of mind fit for the better life of social peace.

3. So far we have rather ignored the foibles, prejudices, and inconsistencies of actual men. No agitation proceeds with much sweet reason, and there is something in strong zeal which accentuates our native quarrelsomeness. In other words, agitation is not a perfect instrument in the hands of imperfect men. Agitators even for worthiest ends are not immune from bitter envying and strife in their hearts. Of course, there are drawbacks, but the only question which need now detain us is whether they are of such a kind as to discredit the use of a powerful instrument of ethical gain. Two serious criticisms are adduced, neither of which can be entirely rebutted. (1) Agitation is rooted in exaggeration, and appeals to an unhealthy sensationalism. Thus the higher powers of the intelligence are swamped under orgiastic emotion. This is the danger of all enthusiasm. It would be more than serious enough if Le Bon's indictment of the 'crowd' could be accepted. Agitation does appeal to half-instructed emotions with incalculable results. Yet such an appeal may very well lead to right conduct, and even to truer thought. For in respect of the disinterested response of the 'public' it must be noted that (a) it is set to ponder larger issues; (b) its thinking (or feeling) becomes more incisive; (c) the thought may not be very clear, but were its sympathies not warmly engaged, it would hardly think at all on great affairs of ethical concern. (2) Popular movements, it is objected, are liable to be vitiated by the ignorance of those to whom appeal is made. Agitation which is effective as a stimulant is inapt for instruction; it is certainly no method for producing philosophers. This fact is serious chiefly as it affects the results of agitation. Something is accomplished, but the whole thought is rarely worked out before the fervour begins to fade. Agitation can achieve more in the field of criticism than in that of construction, or, to finish with a truism, agitation cannot be the only instrument of reform. But it has its function. A final judgment as to its precise worth will depend on the value attached to 'correct thinking' and 'the good will' respectively. The difficulty of improving and perfecting this instrument is a part of the general problem of how to maximize correct thinking and good will in the same persons at the same time and for a single ideal end.

\* It is instructive to contrast this world-wide agitation with Voltaire's similar effort on behalf of Calas when popular interest was less largely evoked. The difference marks the enhanced modern facility for agitation.

LITERATURE.—A. V. Dicey, *Law and Public Opinion in England*, 1905; B. K. Gray, *History of Eng. Philanthropy*, 1905 (esp. ch. viii. 'T. ...'); *Psychologie des Foi* 1899 (esp. § 1. 'Le ...'); *of Enthusiasm*, 1842. B. KIRKMAN GRAY.

**AGNOIOLOGY.**—A term coined by Professor J. F. Ferrier in his *Institutes of Metaphysics* (1854), to denote the Theory of Ignorance in contrast to Epistemology (*q.v.*), also a term apparently coined by him (p. 48) to denote the Theory of Knowing. The conception of Agnoiology, as well as the name, was originated by Ferrier (pp. 50–51, 406, 435). Agnoiology is intended to meet the plea by which Ontology is often baffled, that Absolute Being—that which truly is—may be something of which we are ignorant (pp. 50, 406–408). This plea is met by showing that ignorance is an intellectual defect, and must, therefore, admit of a possible remedy. Consequently we cannot be ignorant of anything which cannot possibly be known. We cannot, for example, be ignorant of two straight lines enclosing a space. To be ignorant of them would imply that our ignorance might possibly be removed, and that they might thus be known. But they cannot be known, for they are contradictions, absurdities; and therefore also they cannot be things of which we are ignorant. For the same reason, matter by itself, that is, an object which is not related to any conscious intelligence, contradicts the very nature of knowledge. It is something which we cannot possibly know, and therefore cannot be ignorant of. Accordingly the conclusion of Agnoiology is that the only object of which we can be said to be ignorant is, like the real object of all knowledge, not what is commonly spoken of as an object in contradistinction from a subject, but that object in relation to an intelligent subject by whom it is known. Thus matter and mind, some object *plus* some subject, is the complete object of all ignorance as well as of all knowledge (p. 432). From this the ontological inference is that, as Absolute existence must be either that which we know or that of which we are ignorant, it can never be an object by itself or a subject by itself, but must always be a synthesis of the two (pp. 511–521).

The Agnoiology of Ferrier is thus by anticipation a critique of the system which soon afterwards came to be known as Agnosticism (*q.v.*). Ferrier's work appeared six years before Spencer's exposition of Agnosticism in his *First Principles*, and double that period before Huxley gave the system its unclassical name. Yet neither of these writers has attempted to grapple with Ferrier's critique, and in the vast literature of Agnosticism the critique has failed to receive the recognition which it certainly deserves. There is, therefore, no work to be consulted for Agnoiology besides the *Institutes of Metaphysics*. The above references are to the pages of the 3rd edition (1875).

J. CLARK MURRAY.

**AGNOSTICISM.**—1. Meaning.—The origin of the term is described by Huxley as follows:—

'When I reached intellectual maturity, and began to ask myself whether I was an atheist, a theist, or a pantheist; a materialist or an idealist; a Christian or a freethinker, I found that the more I learned and reflected, the less ready was the answer; until at last I came to the conclusion that I had neither art nor part with any of these denominations, except the last. The one thing in which most of these good people were agreed was the one thing in which I differed from them. They were quite sure they had attained a certain "gnosis"—had more or less successfully solved the problem of existence; while I was quite sure I had not, and had a pretty strong conviction that the problem was insoluble. And, with Hume and Kant on my side, I could not think myself presumptuous in holding fast by that opinion. This was my situation when I had the good fortune to find a place among the members of that remarkable confraternity of antagonists, long since deceased, but of green and pious memory, the Metaphysical Society. Every variety of philosophical and theological opinion

was represented there, and expressed itself with entire openness; most of my colleagues were -ists of one sort or another; and, however kind and friendly they might be, I, the man without a rag of a label to cover himself with, could not fail to have some of the uneasy feeling which must have beset the historical fox when, after leaving the trap in which his tail remained, he presented himself to his normally elongated companions. So I took thought, and invented what I conceived to be the appropriate title of "agnostic." It came into my head as suggestively antithetic to the "gnostic" of Church history, who professed to know the "mysteries" of which I was ignorant; and I thought of it as a term for parading it at our Society, to the amusement of the other foxes. To my great satisfaction, the term took; and when the *Spectator* had stood godfather to it, any suspicion in the minds of respectable people that a knowledge of its parentage might have awakened was, of course, completely lulled' (*Collected Essays*, vol. v. pp. 239, 240).

Mr. R. H. Hutton has given a slightly different account; he states that the word was 'suggested by Professor Huxley at a party held previous to the formation of the now defunct Metaphysical Society, at Mr. James Knowles' house on Clapham Common, on November 15, 1869, in the hearing. He took it from the Unknown God' (Mur-

'These accounts demand a few brief comments. The inscription on the altar was 'the unknown,' not 'the unknowable God' (ἀγνώστου, not ἀγνώστου θεῶ), and the term 'agnostic' is said to be linguistically incorrect. The Gnostics of Church History were so called in contempt because they opposed their extravagant speculations to the historical testimony of the Church; and in opposing Agnosticism to the knowledge of God claimed by Christian theism, Huxley suggests that it is an equally baseless fabric. There was no necessity for the introduction of the new term, as the familiar term 'scepticism' is almost synonymous with it, although Agnosticism restricts its doubt to a narrower sphere; not the possibility of all knowledge is denied, but only the possibility of any knowledge of ultimate reality. This restriction the term does not, however, indicate; nor has Huxley proved his right to impose on the term this arbitrary restriction. The flippancy also of the account must produce a painful impression.

It is as a refuge from the dread of Materialism that Huxley offers us this doubt of Agnosticism.

'For what, after all,' he asks, 'do we know of this terrible "matter," except as a name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of states of our own consciousness? And what do we know of that "spirit" over whose threatened extinction by matter a great lamentation is arising . . . except that it also is a name for an unknown and hypothetical cause, or condition, of states of consciousness? And what is the dire necessity and "iron" law under which men groan? Truly, most gratuitously invented bugbears. . . . Fact I know, and Law I know; but what is this necessity save an empty shadow of my own mind's throwing—something illegitimately thrust into the perfectly legitimate conception of law?'

Refusing to attempt any solution of the problem of ultimate reality, he very confidently declares the terms in which the immediate reality is to be interpreted.

'It is in itself of little moment whether we express the phenomena of matter in terms of spirit, or the phenomena of spirit in terms of matter—each statement has a certain relative truth. But with a view to the progress of science, the materialistic way is to be preferred. For it concerns the phenomena of the universe . . . spiritualistic terminology is utterly barren, and leads to nothing but obscurity and confusion of ideas. Thus there can be little doubt that the further science advances, the more extensively and consistently will all the phenomena of Nature be represented by materialistic formulæ and symbols' (*Collected Essays*, i. p. 159 ff.).

In the supposed interests of science he is prepared to sacrifice the real interests of morality and religion, although in determining the mode of explaining the world these supreme interests of the life of man have surely a prior right to be taken into consideration. Not only so, but he assumes that from the standpoint of 'spirit,' science will not get its due, whereas an idealist philosophy has no interest in traversing the conclusions of science in its own sphere—the explanation of phenomena. It is only when science attempts to be a philosophy of ultimate reality as well, that it comes into necessary conflict with a spiritualistic interpretation of

the Universe. If all the phenomena of the Universe are known only as they exist for thought, it is not necessary to connect thought with these phenomena by reducing it to them, for there must ever be the essential connexion between it and them of the subject which knows and the objects which are known. Thought is not an alien in the Universe to be made at home only by a proof of its kinship with the material phenomena it knows. Nay, rather it alone holds the secret of relationship among all these phenomena; for Huxley is entirely without warrant in his assumption that a complete and adequate and consistent account of the Universe, even as phenomenal, can be given in the materialistic terminology. Life and Mind alike cannot be resolved into matter and force. This line of criticism belongs to the article on MATERIALISM; but it was necessary to indicate it so far in order to show on what unproved assumptions Huxley's agnosticism rests. The materialistic explanation, even he recognizes, cannot be accepted as a solution of the problem of ultimate reality. It is because he refuses to treat as seriously as it deserves, on account of its own sufficiency as well as for the interests it protects (morality, religion, etc.), the spiritualistic explanation, which does offer the solution, that he is compelled to assume, and even to make a boast of, his attitude of nescience.

2. Hume.—To understand Agnosticism as the modern phase of scepticism, it is not necessary to go further back than Hume, to whom Huxley confidently appeals: 'The fundamental doctrines of materialism, like those of spiritualism and most other "isms," lie outside the limits of philosophical inquiry; and David Hume's great service to humanity is his irrefragable demonstration of what these limits are.' Whether the demonstration is as irrefragable as Huxley thinks, we may inquire. Hume reduces all the contents of consciousness to 'perceptions,' and divides perceptions into 'impressions' and 'ideas.' The former include 'all our sensations, passions, and emotions' which are given us with a peculiar 'force and liveliness' by which we distinguish them from the latter, which are but their faint copies. In thinking, we connect impressions and ideas with one another, by such conceptions as causality and substance and subject. These cannot be derived from our sensations, the ultimate and exclusive source of knowledge. How does Hume account for these conceptions? He derives all such conceptions from custom. 'Because we are accustomed to see that one thing follows another in time, we conceive the idea that it *must* follow, and *from* it; of a relation of succession we make a relation of causality' (Schwegler's *Hist. of Philos.* p. 183). That any such connexion necessarily exists we have no right to affirm. 'All events,' Hume says, 'seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another, but we can never observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected' (*Works*, A. & C. Black, 1854, iv. p. 84). 'Necessity,' he says elsewhere, 'is something that exists in the mind, not in objects' (i. p. 212). Without attempting to offer an ultimate reason for this custom, he recognizes it as a *universal principle of human nature*. Substance is explained in a similar way. 'The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned to them, by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that collection' (i. 31, 32). A consequence of this definition of substance is the denial of the reality of the external world. 'The opinion of external existence, if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason, and, if referred to reason, is

contrary to natural instinct, and carries no natural evidence with it to convince an impartial inquirer' (iv. 177). The subject fares no better. 'What we call a mind,' he says, 'is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with perfect simplicity and identity' (i. 260). Such radical scepticism could not offer any solid basis for a rational theism. While Hume expressed his satisfaction that 'our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on Reason,' and personally professed belief in the existence of God; yet in his *Natural History of Religion* he sought to trace back the origin of belief in God to ignorance and superstitious fears; and in his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* there can be little doubt he endeavoured to throw discredit on the theistic evidences. This apparently inconsistent position may be explained by the fact that his own scepticism, in spite of his philosophical principles and the conclusions which he so frankly and boldly drew from them, was not absolute, but mitigated; for he recognized, in practical life at least, 'the strong power of natural instinct' as lending sanction to common beliefs, for which no rational proof could be given.

3. Kant.—Although Kant set himself the task of answering Hume, yet his answer was so incomplete that Huxley claims Kant as well as Hume on his side. Opposed to Hume's scepticism in regard to the forms of sense and the categories of the understanding, Kant himself becomes sceptical as regards the ideas of reason.

He conclusively showed that knowledge could not be reduced to sensations, and that intelligence implied in all its operations necessary conditions as well as contingent impressions, and so far he substantially disposed of the scepticism of Hume by proving its dependence on an inadequate and erroneous psychology. But when he proceeded to argue that the constitutive principles involved in knowledge have to do only with phenomena or states of conscious experience, but are wholly incapable of placing us face to face with things; that they have a merely subjective and relative value, but give us no information as to external reality; that, while useful in co-ordinating and unifying our perceptions, they in no degree justify our affirming that there is anything corresponding to these perceptions,—then he virtually undid his own work, and became not the conqueror, but the lineal successor of Hume' (Flint, *Agnosticism*, p. 141).

Into the details of Kant's criticism of Hume's scepticism it is unnecessary to enter (see KANT). Suffice it to say that Kant has shown once for all that the connective principles, by which the contents of consciousness are combined in an intelligible, rational unity, belong of necessity to the mind itself. Sensation does not give them; custom cannot bring them into being; the very possibility of consciousness depends on them; they are not casual results of, but necessary conditions for, any experience. Nevertheless he distinguishes the 'thing-in-itself' from the thing as it is for our knowledge; and thus the necessary constitution of the mind makes a knowledge of the reality as it is impossible. This sceptical element appears more prominently in Kant's treatment of the ideas of the reason. 'The mind from the very nature of its intellectual constitution necessarily assumes the unity of the soul, the existence of the universe (the totality of phenomena), and the reality of a First Cause' (ib. p. 163), and nevertheless the ideas are only *regulative*, and not *constitutive*. By them we can give the rational unity to our experience which is the aim of all thinking; but we are not at liberty to regard these ideas as clues to reality, or as proofs of the existence of world, self, or God. Kant's criticism of the rational theology of the age (the cosmological, teleological, and ontological arguments) will be duly taken account of in the treatment of Theism. Here it need not further concern us. It is true that in his *Critique of the Practical Reason* he restores the

ideas of God, freedom and immortality, as postulates of the moral consciousness; yet his conception of reason as theoretical is in its final issue sceptical. German idealism laid hold on the anti-sceptical aspect of the Kantian philosophy; but in more recent Neo-Kantian movements the sceptical aspects have again come to the front. Against Kant's position it may be urged that the reason which, by its very constitution, is debarred from knowing reality as it is, and which in its final unifying exercise is necessarily illusive, is so grotesque a conception, that so great a thinker can be excused its creation only on the ground that, as a pioneer in new ways of thinking, he could not himself realize whither he was allowing himself by his tortuous reasoning to be led. The division of the mind into sense, understanding, reason, is an unreal abstraction; the separation of the pure from the practical reason is opposed to more recent developments of psychology, which recognize the control of the *cognitive* by the *conative* aspect of personality. If mind be a unity, the illusiveness of the ideas of the pure reason would attach to the postulates of the practical reason; and the categories of understanding and forms of sense must fall under the same condemnation. What the Hegelian Logic does is to develop the most concrete conceptions out of the simplest, and to identify this mental process with the evolution of the Universe—some interpreters would say even of God Himself. If here 'vaulting ambition doth o'erleap itself,' yet, with greater modesty, it may be claimed that experience itself warrants the assumption that in the process of thinking the mind does penetrate more deeply into the reality of things; for the system of nature which science builds is not contradicted, but confirmed, by the course of nature itself. That the world is one and the self is one is an assumption that is ever finding verification in experience. Not only is the self one as the subject of consciousness, but it is one as a character which is being formed, as a personality which is being developed. If this be so, then the practical as well as the theoretical need of a final unification of the world and life in the conception of God, fully justifies the assumption of God's existence. What makes reality as we know it most intelligible cannot, without an absolute scepticism, such as the positive elements of Kant's analysis forbid, be denied reality. Kant should have been more, or not at all, sceptical.

4. Comte.—The positivism of Comte is necessarily agnostic; but as it is discussed in another article (see POSITIVISM), all that need be said about it in this connexion may be put in a few sentences. Both the theological and the metaphysical explanations of the world are condemned as superseded stages in the development of human thought. The positive stage does not connect phenomena by the principles of causality and substance; it only observes sequences and resemblance. The custom, which Hume recognizes as universal, of thus connecting phenomena is in positive thought to be expressly avoided. Nevertheless, Comte assumes the uniformity and constancy of the laws of phenomena, as taught by experience, although what warrant can be given for such an assumption, if no objective connexion of phenomena may be asserted, it would be impossible to discover. With glaring inconsistency he resolves mental into material phenomena, thus applying the category of causality which he himself had relegated to the metaphysical stage. Kant's vindication of the necessity for thought of these connective principles is a convincing answer to Comte's positivism.

5. Hamilton.—Hamilton, although in his general philosophical position a follower of Reid, had read Kant without thoroughly understanding him,

and developed the sceptical elements in his system. While the Divine nature cannot be known, the Divine existence may be believed, as our moral nature and the Scriptures testify. We can believe that God is, without knowing *what* He is. He goes so far as to affirm that 'to think that God is as we can think Him to be is blasphemy. The last and highest consecration of all true religion must be an altar *ἀγῶνιστε θεῷ*, To the unknown and unknowable God.' That there is no warrant for such an application of the inscription on the altar at Athens, has already been shown. If the endeavour to think what God is is blasphemy, then not only all theology but even all religion must be convicted of it. The recognition in all humility and sincerity that God cannot be perfectly known by the imperfect mind of man is characteristic of all genuine piety; but that does not involve the admission, which is something altogether different, that God cannot be known at all. Hamilton must turn elsewhere than to religion, and theology as its interpreter, for a justification of his sweeping statement. From his own philosophy he draws the following arguments: (1) As all knowledge is relative in two senses, all objects being related to one another, and also related to the subject knowing, God as the absolute, out of all relations, cannot be known. But to think God as absolute is not to think of Him as out of all relations, but as Himself constituting all His relations; and His relation as object to the thinking mind as subject is not necessarily one in which He, as He really is, is concealed and not revealed; for, as Creator, it is more likely He would make mind capable of knowing Him. As has already been insisted on in criticising Kant, the thing-in-itself, reality as it is, has not a foreign distorting and obscuring element added to it when it is known; but even from the data of sense the thinking mind can construct the object as it is. The *phenomenal* as perceived is completed in the *noumenal* as conceived, and in the latter reality is known as it is, which is not the case in the former. (2) As the only possible object of knowledge and positive thought is the conditioned and the limited, the Infinite as *the unconditionally unlimited*, and the Absolute as *the unconditionally limited* cannot be known or positively thought. But is there any justification for so defining the Infinite and Absolute, and still more for identifying such verbal abstractions with the conception of God? God has a definite nature, distinct attributes, characteristic operations, and to think God is not to think an abstraction at all. His infinitude and absoluteness mean self-limitation and self-conditioning. Since for our knowledge and our thought all existence, save God, is conditioned and limited by other existence, the mind cannot find rest until it conceives such self-limitation and self-determination. It may be said that the mind not only can but must think the Infinite and Absolute, that is, God. (3) As has already been indicated, the Infinite and Absolute are both so defined as to be a mere 'negation of thought'; but as the necessity and legitimacy of so defining these terms have been challenged, his conclusion that God as Infinite and Absolute cannot be known or thought falls to the ground. Both are positive conceptions, and both are necessary to complete our positive thinking about the world as conditioned and limited. As correlative conceptions, finite and infinite, relative and absolute, may claim to be equally known and mutually illuminative. (4) He concedes that although by reason we may not know God, yet we believe that God is an authority, which yields us 'the original data of reason.' This faith rests on 'a mental impotency.' To state his amazing argument in his own words: 'The conditioned

is the mean between two extremes—two inconditionates exclusive of each other, neither of which can be conceived as possible, but of which, on the principle of contradiction, and excluded middle, one must be admitted as necessary. We are thus warned from recognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessarily coextensive with the horizon of our faith. And by a *wonderful revelation* we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and the finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality' (*Discussions*, p. 15). It has already been shown that the Infinite and Absolute are not *inconditionates*; but if they were, how can positive thought be the mean of notions that are 'a mere negation of thought'? How to these can there be applied any of the laws of thought? If we cannot define these notions, how can we affirm that they contradict or exclude one another? Or, in fact, how can we base any sort of argument on the unknowable and unthinkable? One cannot but feel that most of this argument is merely verbal jugglery.

6. Mansel.—Nevertheless, Hamilton found a follower in Mansel, who adopted his philosophy so far as he could use it for an avowedly apologetic Christian purpose. He believed that he could best cut the ground from under the feet of any objectors to the Christian revelation, by showing that in these matters human reason was quite incapable of offering an opinion. He set himself to answer in the negative this question: 'Whether the human mind be capable of acquiring such a knowledge as can warrant it in deciding either *for* or *against* the claims of any professed revelation, as containing a true or a false representation of the Divine Nature and Attributes?' (1) The first argument Mansel advances is that reason is not entitled to criticise the contents of revealed religion unless it can prove itself capable of conceiving the nature of God, that is, of constructing a philosophy of the Infinite and the Absolute. This is an extravagant demand. The moral insight and spiritual discernment which qualify a man to judge of a doctrine, whether it be of God or not, are very much more general and simple than the speculative capacity, not to say audacity, which can and dares undertake to find out God unto perfection. (2) Having made this demand, he seeks in his second argument to prove that neither psychologically—from a study of the mental faculties of man—nor metaphysically—from the knowledge man can get of the nature of God—can it be met. This second argument loses its validity with the disproof of the first. Both by looking within and by turning without can man get such glimpses of God as make real religion possible; and he need not, therefore, concern himself about the question whether he can or can not construct a philosophy of the Infinite and Absolute. (3) Having demanded a philosophy of the Infinite and Absolute, and demonstrated its impossibility, Mansel next concentrates attention on the conceptions of the Infinite and Absolute, and seeks to show how contradictory they are. How can human thought distinguish in the Absolute, as one and simple, a plurality of attributes? If the Infinite is free of all possible limitations, how can it coexist with the finite? The conception of God as First Cause, as involving the limitation of its effect, is irreconcilable with the conception of the Infinite. But all this playing with words fails to mislead, if we look steadily at realities and keep our eyes off abstractions. If we define, as we may and should, the Infinite and Absolute as the fullness of being, life, mind, power, which is distinguished from relative and finite existence in that it is self-conditioned and self-limited, not determined either positively

or negatively by that which is not itself, this whole scholastic structure falls to the ground. (4) Turning from these conceptions, Mansel then seeks by an analysis of the universal conditions of human consciousness to prove that the Infinite and Absolute cannot be its object. 'Consciousness is the relation of an object to a subject and to other objects, but the idea of the Absolute precludes all such relation. Further, our consciousness is subject to the laws of space and time, and cannot therefore think the thought of a Being not likewise subject to them' (Pfleiderer's *Development of Theology*<sup>2</sup>, 1893, p. 327). But to be known by a mind which He has endowed with the capacity of knowing Him is no limitation of God's Infinitude. As the Absolute, God is not without relations, but only as related to Him do all things exist, consist, persist. Man's consciousness of time and space implies the correlative conceptions of eternity and immensity. This argument, further, is inconsistent with the claim that man may and should believe that God is, even although he cannot know what God is, as belief is a state of consciousness, even as knowledge is. (5) Mansel denied, to state briefly some of his conclusions, the moral likeness between God and man, and therefore the possibility of man's judging by reason or conscience what claimed to be the revealed mind and will of God; he admitted the possibility of moral as of physical miracle, that is, the suspension of the laws of right as of force; he rested the claim of the Scriptures to be accepted entirely on external evidences; he thus sought to protect the orthodoxy of his time from attack by a moral and religious scepticism, which, if taken seriously, would be fatal alike to goodness and godliness.

7. Herbert Spencer.—Herbert Spencer attaches himself in some of his arguments to Hamilton and Mansel; but his interest is altogether different from theirs. He is not seeking to protect revealed religion against attack from philosophy, but to vindicate the materialistic method of modern science as the only valid method of interpreting the Universe. His motive is not, however, irreligious, as his desire is to reconcile religion and science, and he is confident that he has called a truce to their age-long conflict. As the most influential of the exponents of Agnosticism, he claims a fuller treatment and closer criticism than any of the writers already mentioned. Following step by step his discussion of the Unknowable in his *First Principles*, we must consider the following questions:—

(1) Does he correctly indicate the relation of science and religion, so as to be warranted in his assumption of the conception which alone can reconcile them? (2) Does the inconceivability of the ultimate religious and scientific ideas lie in their very nature, or only in his statement of them? (3) Is his use of the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge valid, and does it strengthen his conclusion that God is unknowable? (4) Does this reconciliation of science and religion do justice to religion?

(1) In the first chapter Spencer argues that science and religion are co-ordinate, the sphere of the former being what is known, and of the latter that which, though in consciousness, yet transcends knowledge; that each must 'recognize the claims of the other as standing for truths that cannot be ignored'; and that a reconciliation can be effected only by the discovery that what is the ultimate fact, and the first principle of each, is common to both. It is in the most abstract truth of religion and the most abstract truth of science that, he holds, the two coalesce. His claim that science occupies the whole realm of the knowable, so that for religion is left only the region of the unknowable, must at once be challenged. For the self-

conscious personality the categories of science—force, matter, law—are not adequate; and within the realm of the knowable even categories—life, mind, will—must be employed to which physical science does not do justice. Religion contributes a conception, God, to the interpretation of the knowable, which cannot be got rid of by this arbitrary division of the provinces of science and religion. Not a truth common to science and religion is what we have to look for, still less the most abstract truth; but, on the contrary, the abstract categories of science must be supplemented and corrected by the much more concrete categories of philosophy, morality, and religion. It is the same reality which science explains and religion interprets; but the explanation of science is completed in the interpretation of religion. Matter, force, law are less intelligible conceptions than mind, will, personality, God; for the self-conscious spirit of man finds itself in the latter as it cannot in the former. To confine knowledge to objects of sense and such connexions between them as the understanding, with its categories of quantity, quality, relation (substance and causality), may constitute, and to exclude from knowledge the larger and loftier conceptions of a teleology of nature, of a personality in man, and, above all, of the all-embracing, all-sustaining, all-directing, and all-illuminating reality, God, is altogether an arbitrary proceeding. It has already been criticised in dealing with Kant's scepticism regarding the ideas of the pure reason. To deny all value to the knowledge religion claims is necessarily to challenge the validity of the knowledge allowed to science.

(2) Spencer's proof in the second chapter, that science must end in nescience, and religion must be content with awe of the Unknowable, is as follows:

(a) Conceptions are symbolic, when their whole content cannot at once be represented to the mind. These are legitimate, if we can assure ourselves 'by some cumulative or indirect process of thought, or by the fulfilment of predictions based on them,' that there are actualities corresponding to them. Otherwise they are to be condemned as vicious and illusive, and cannot be distinguished from pure fictions. Here, it is evident, he tries to limit conception to representation (*Vorstellung*), and to exclude the idea or notion (*Begriff*). But regarding this restriction, which, it must be emphatically stated, the world's greatest thinkers have not denied because it never occurred to them that it could be made, there are some questions which may reasonably be asked. Is man's thought to be limited to what he can image to himself? Having started from sense-objects, is that alone knowledge for him which can be referred to sense-objects? Or, beginning with these, has he not the right, nay, does it not rest on him as a necessity of his mind, to bring into clearness of consciousness all that is implied in this rudimentary knowledge, whether the ideas so attained have corresponding images or not? Does not his own inner life furnish him with spiritual conceptions, which, although they have no corresponding sensible actualities, are not only bound up with his most real and permanent personal interests, but even make more intelligible to him the world of sense around him, and help him to discover its meaning, worth, and aim? As Kant has surely conclusively shown, the mind has its own connective principles, which, underived from and inexplicable by experience, are yet necessary to experience. If knowledge were as Spencer restricts it, the conditions of its possibility would be excluded from it.

(b) Having prejudged the question by this definition of the conceivable, Spencer proceeds to deal



with the ultimate religious conceptions concerning the origin and the nature of the Universe, and maintains that 'a critical examination will prove not only that no current hypothesis is tenable, but also that no tenable hypothesis can be framed' (p. 30). The Atheistic hypothesis of a self-existent Universe is inconceivable, as it explains one mystery by another; so is the Pantheistic, for 'really to conceive self-existence is to conceive potential existence passing into actual existence by some inherent necessity, which we cannot do.' As regards the Theistic hypothesis, the analogy with human art is properly set aside, as this does not produce its own materials. 'The production of matter out of nothing is the mystery.' Granted an 'external agency,' that must be accounted for; and we must assume 'self-existence,' and that is 'rigorously inconceivable.'

This statement calls for several comments. First, it is altogether illegitimate to identify the ultimate religious conceptions with theories of the origin of the Universe; for these theories hold an altogether secondary place in religion, and religion possesses an inward witness of kinship and fellowship with God which is quite independent of them. Secondly, what Spencer calls the theistic solution is rather the deistic, for which God is an 'external agency,' and the solution of Christian theism combines the thesis of pantheism (immanence) and the antithesis of deism (transcendence) in the synthesis of a conception of God as unity-in-difference—a conception which certainly does not conform to Spencer's arbitrary rule of conceivability, but which for many thinkers of clear vision is altogether luminous. Thirdly, theism is not required to conceive the production of matter out of nothing, as it is not committed to the assertion of an ultimate, absolute dualism of matter and mind, but can conceive the possibility of matter as in God as Spirit. Lastly, that 'self-existence is rigorously inconceivable' is an unwarranted assertion, as dependent existence inevitably leads thought to conceive an existence on which there is dependence, but which is not itself dependent. It is because the existence that explains itself can alone satisfy our thought that we are led, by the application of the category of causality, to seek for existence that does not so explain itself an explanation beyond itself.

(c) After having thus endeavoured to show that all theories of the origin of the Universe are untenable, Spencer fixes his attention on the nature of the Universe. We must assume a First Cause, which is Infinite and Absolute; and, nevertheless, these concepts, all equally necessary, are yet mutually contradictory. Here he borrows freely from Mansel, and indulges in the same verbal jugglery, the futility of which has already been shown. The conclusion, which is supported by such arguments, is put forward as having the support of the religious consciousness itself. 'Not only is the omnipresence of something which passes comprehension that most abstract belief which is common to all religions, which becomes the more distinct in proportion as they develop, and which remains after their discordant elements have been mutually cancelled, but it is that belief which the most unsparing criticism of each leaves unquestionable, or rather makes it ever clearer' (p. 45). Although it may be admitted that the conception of God has changed, as it necessarily must, since man's thought is dependent on experience, yet it must be maintained that the progress has been mainly positive and not negative. Growing knowledge of self and of the world does necessarily correct the conception of God, bringing it into closer harmony with experience; but this conception of God is not less but more rational, moral, spiritual; it answers the question of the mind, the longings of the heart, and the needs of the life more and not less adequately. The religious consciousness will assuredly not sustain the contention that 'this deepest, widest, and most certain of facts that the Power which the Universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable.'

(d) It is not necessary for the present purpose to follow Spencer in his proof, in the third chapter, that the ultimate scientific ideas are also inconceivable; a closer examination would show that

all the difficulties are due to an inadequate method of thought, which tries in vain to reduce the concrete complexity of existence to an abstract simplicity of conception. To give but one instance, he tries to prove that the self which knows cannot itself be known, for the relativity of knowledge involves as ultimate the distinction of subject and object. But that subject and object may be discriminated, it is necessary that both be embraced in the unity of consciousness; in self-consciousness that unity is still unity-in-difference, as the self is object to itself as subject; and it is mere word-play to affirm that the self cannot both be intelligible and intelligent. In fact, self-consciousness is the ideal knowledge, the perfect accord of thinking and being. Assuming for the sake of argument that the ultimate ideas of science are inconceivable, why does Spencer not draw the same conclusion for science and religion? Science with inconceivable ultimate ideas possesses the realm of the knowable; religion with inconceivable ultimate ideas must content itself with the unknowable. How can a system of knowledge be based on inconceivable ideas in one case, and nescience be the necessary result in the other? The proximate ideas of religion—the phenomena of the religious life—have as much claim to be treated as data of knowledge as the perceptions of the outer world with which science occupies itself. This scepticism regarding ultimate ideas undermines science as much as religion.

(3) The argument in the fourth chapter, based on the relativity of knowledge, is borrowed from Hamilton and Mansel. 'The inference,' says Spencer, 'which we find forced upon us when we analyse the product of thought as exhibited objectively in scientific generalization, is equally forced upon us by an analysis of the process of thought as exhibited subjectively in consciousness' (p. 74).

(a) The analysis of the product of thought leads to this conclusion. 'Of necessity, therefore, our explanation must eventually bring us down to the inexplicable. The deepest truth which we can get at must be unaccountable. Comprehension must become something other than comprehension before the ultimate fact can be comprehended.' This ultimate fact, he assumes, will be 'some highly general fact respecting the constitution of matter of which chemical, electrical, and thermal facts are merely different manifestations.' The method of explanation here taken for granted is entirely false. To discover what is common to all phenomena, and to ignore their differences from one another, is not to explain them. The logical universal does not at all account for the particulars it embraces. The abstraction man does not help us to comprehend Caesar, Paul, Luther, Napoleon. It is the most concrete unity—that which combines the most numerous and varied differences in a system within itself—that is the ultimate fact which not only explains all, but is itself explicable. Not in the divorce of existence and intelligence can thought be brought to a halt; but only in such a conception as makes reality most fully rational can its goal be found. Spencer, in looking away from concrete differences to an abstract unity, is looking in the wrong direction for the ultimate fact. Explanation, to be adequate, must be synthetic and not analytic; it must end not in a generalization, but in a system.

(b) In the analysis of consciousness, the relativity of knowledge is said to imply two kinds of relation—the relation of object to subject, and the relation of objects to one another. Because a thing is known only in such relations, Spencer argues that it cannot be known in itself, whatever that may mean. This assumption, that the knowledge of reality adds to reality an element so foreign that



consequently as known it is other than it is as unknown, is an absurdity which has already been sufficiently exposed. Spencer adopts Hamilton's objection, that God as the Absolute must be known either as subject or as object, or as the indifference of both. But what forbids our thinking of God—the object of our knowledge—in so far as God Himself has distinguished our consciousness from His own—as the subject which thinks all things as existent by His will? We as subjects knowing God are, for God, objects which do not limit His infinitude, or determine His absoluteness, because He knows us as existent in distinction from Himself by His own self-determination and self-limitation. Our intelligence which seeks God as its object, and which, on the assumption that the Universe is a manifestation and not a concealment of God, believes that it knows God, must be by God's act delusive, if God does not manifest Himself as He is. It would require much more cogent arguments than these verbal juggleries of Spencer to convince us that God made intelligences in such wise that He Himself could never become intelligible to them. Enough has already been said also about the second sense in which the relativity of knowledge is used. To conceive God is not to think a Being out of all relations, but a Being whose reality is revealed in His relations, constituted by Himself.

(c) While agreeing with Hamilton in this argument from the relativity of knowledge, Spencer differs from him in asserting that the unrelated, though inconceivable, is yet a constituent element of thought. 'Our notion of the Limited,' he says, 'is composed, firstly, of a consciousness of some kind of being, and, secondly, of the consciousness of the limits under which it is known. In the antithetical notion of the Unlimited, the consciousness of limits is abolished, but not the consciousness of some kind of being. It is quite true that in the absence of conceived limits this consciousness ceases to be a concept properly so called, but it is none the less true that it remains as a mode of consciousness' (p. 90). He then tells us that this something is constituted by 'combining successive concepts deprived of their limits and conditions' (p. 95). Here a logical abstraction is supposed to be a reality, and even the reality that explains all; but, as has already been shown, God, to explain the Universe, must be conceived as the concrete unity which embraces all differences, and relates them to one another.

(4) Spencer hopes, in the fifth chapter, that 'in the assertion of a Reality utterly inscrutable in nature,' science and religion will be reconciled. Science is to admit the existence, religion the inscrutable nature of this reality. He thinks that this will not be a vain appeal, as his understanding of the history of religion is that it is developing in this direction. How mistaken he is needs no proof. The religious consciousness does recognize that the abysmal depths of the Divine cannot be fathomed by the human mind; but it does not admit that the truth about God it claims to possess is an illusion. Religious knowledge is valid and valuable, though imperfect and incomplete. Spencer requires religion to give up the conception of God as personal. 'It is just possible,' he says, 'that there is a mode of being as much transcending Intelligence and Will as these transcend mechanical motion.' Nevertheless, he insists on interpreting the Universe which is the manifestation of the ultimate reality as mechanical motion. Rejecting the highest conceivable category as too low for the reality, he insists on applying to its manifestations the lowest conceivable category. He represents the inscrutable mystery as causal energy, while declining to describe it as Intelligent

Will. His system is materialistic rather than idealistic. He gets rid of the personality of religion to substitute not a higher but a lower conception in interpreting the Universe. In surrendering the personality of God, religion surrenders everything; in admitting the existence of this reality, science is in no way restrained in its explanation of the world in terms of matter and motion. In this reconciliation religion loses, science gains, everything.

In the criticism of the authors passed in review the objections to Agnosticism have been stated. But a brief summary may be allowed at the close. The materialistic explanation for which it seeks to find room is inadequate to account for life, mind, morality, religion. The idealistic explanation which it seeks to shut out not only does justice to the highest interests of life, but makes more intelligible the whole process of the Universe as an evolution of spirit. The theory of knowledge on which it rests is sceptical in its result, and this scepticism must extend to science as well as to philosophy and theology. The trust in the reason of man, on which the proof of God's existence rests, is as necessary to give validity to the conclusions of science. The arguments from the relativity of knowledge, the conditionateness of thought, the negative character of the conceptions of the Infinite and Absolute, have the futility of scholastic abstractions and verbal subtleties, and show no direct contact with any intelligible reality. The religious consciousness is altogether misrepresented when it is claimed as confirming the conclusion of the inscrutable nature of the alternate reality. More recent philosophical developments encourage the expectation that Agnosticism will soon be a superseded mode of thought.

LITERATURE.—The works of the authors discussed should be consulted; also Leslie Stephen's *An Agnostic's Apology* (1893). In all books of Christian Apologetics some attention is given to the subject. Specially to be commended are Flint's *Agnosticism* (1903), and Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism* (1903).

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

AGNOSTICISM (Buddhist).—One of the most important and, in some ways, most obscure questions in Buddhism is whether the Buddha was an agnostic, in the sense that he refused to express an opinion upon a future life (transmigration) and on the state of the Buddha after death, and preached only the attainment of 'nirvāṇa upon earth.' We propose, in the first instance, to describe the authorities bearing upon this question, then to discuss them, and finally to draw conclusions.

I. Authorities.—I. When Buddha is asked by King Ajātasatru what are the actual fruits of a 'religious life' (or life of a monk, *brāhmaṇya*),\* he gives an answer in which there is nothing metaphysical. He regards the question, as his interlocutor desires, from the point of view of the present life. In the first place, the monastic state confers a great dignity on the person who assumes it. The slave who has become a monk is honoured by his former master; in the same way the free man is relieved from private cares. There is, however, something better: good conduct, mastery over oneself, food and clothing in sufficiency but without excess, produce a rich contentment.† And there is something better still: the practice of successive 'trances' (*dhyāna*), the knowledge which accompanies them, and the annihilation of all passion, the attainment, in a word, of the state of an *arhat* or of *nirvāṇa* upon earth—these are the sublime fruits of the monastic life.

\* See the *Sāmaññaphalasutta*, Digha, i. pp. 47-86, translated by various scholars, and recently by Ithys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, pp. 56-95, with an Introduction.

† There are many charming descriptions of the happiness of life in the forest among the trees, which are more kindly and complaisant than men (see *Sikkāsamucchaya*, ch. ix.).

2. This sketch of the monastic life will perhaps be more correctly understood if compared with the sentiments expressed by the Buddha when he is questioned on metaphysical subjects. The examples are numerous, and at times widely divergent. We shall confine ourselves to a discussion of the most remarkable. Perhaps the most characteristic is that related in the *Mahāvagga*.<sup>\*</sup> The Buddha is addressed as follows: 'You are said to teach the doctrine of annihilation [that is to say, that there is no life after death, and no future retribution for the deeds done upon earth]. Is that true?' 'I teach,' replied the master, 'the annihilation of desire. . . . There is thus a kind of play upon words; and this passage, in which the problem of the future life is curtly dismissed, confirms the impression left by the dialogue as summarized above.

3. In the 'Net of Brahmā'† the Buddha enunciates a series of propositions, of which some at least are of historical and doctrinal worth. They are presented as strange and alien to Buddhism; and, while some are more specifically condemned, the series as a whole is rejected. The following is the order:—

(1) (a) The universe and the soul are eternal (*śāśvata-vāda*) in the sense that they have had no beginning,—a belief founded upon the fact that some saints have memory of their previous existences.

(b) The universe and the soul are, at one and the same time, eternal and non-eternal, either because Brahmā, the creator of the universe, has neither beginning nor end, while other beings are perishable, or because the soul is eternal and the body perishable.

(2) The universe is (a) limited in space, (b) unlimited, (c) unlimited at the sides and limited towards the top and the bottom, (d) neither limited nor unlimited [the contradiction is not explained].

(3) It is possible to refuse to choose between four propositions (affirmation, denial, simultaneous affirmation of the affirmative and negative, simultaneous denial of the affirmative and the negative) with reference to (a) the existence of another world, (b) the reality of 'apparitional beings,'‡ (c) the fruit of actions, (d) the renewed life of the man who is set free from desire, i.e. of the *arhat*. This refusal is said to be a sign of stupidity and sophistry. Teachers of such doctrine are 'slippery as eels.'

(4) The soul has no cause, that is, it appears in the present world without having passed through a previous existence. In the same way the present evolution of the universe has had no antecedents.§

(5) The soul has, after death, (a) conscious existence, conceived under sixteen different aspects; (b) unconscious existence, under eight different aspects; (c) existence neither conscious nor unconscious, under eight different aspects; or (d) it is

<sup>\*</sup> vi. 31; trans. in *Vinaya Texts*, *SBE* xvii. p. 108 ff.

† *Brahmajāla-sutta*, *Dighanikāya*, l. pp. 1-46, trans. by Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*: 'The Perfect Net.' A Sanskrit redaction of this *sūtra* is known by a quotation in the *Abhidharmakośa*, see Minayeff, *Mélanges Ariatiques de St. Pétersbourg*, vi. 57 ff. The *sūtra* seems to get its name from the fact that it explains how Brahmā, believing himself to be the creator, is caught in the net of error. On the same principle a series of errors is explained. Possibly the Sanskrit *sūtra* did not contain the first part of the Pāli edition, as it is quoted as *Flakandhikā* (*J.R.A.S.*, 1903, pp. 444-446), and occurs in several suttas of the *Dīgha*.

‡ Those that appear without being begotten according to ordinary laws. Either they issue from lotuses, as was the case with the heroes of numerous legends, or the reference is to the first beings, e.g. the *devas* of such and such a paradise, etc. . . . or perhaps it is meant that they are not begotten, as it takes up his abode of himself, etc. . . . In the later dogmatism, to deny the other world, apparitional beings, actions (good or bad), or the *arhat*, is *mithyādrśti* (heresy), which destroys the roots of merit.

§ The Brahmins very often object to Buddhism that it admits the production of being out of not-being (*avatah sañ jāgate*). But this objection is not supported by any Buddhist authorities.

annihilated at death (seven distinct theories, corresponding to seven classes of souls).

(6) Some maintain that *nirvāṇa* is attained in this life (*ditṭhadhammanibbāna*), conceived as the possession either of the pleasures of the senses,\* or of the first, etc., up to the fourth ecstasy (*dhyāna*).†

These opinions regarding the past and the future are theories (*dr̥ṣṭi*=*view*).‡ The Buddha knows the consequences which they entail upon those who adopt them; they form the net in which the ignorant are caught, beginning with Brahmā, who believes himself to be eternal! The Buddha knows far better things, viz., the origin and the end of sensations, and the means of escaping them. He ends by saying that he has destroyed every germ of re-birth in himself; so long as his body lives, it is seen by gods and men; after his death neither gods nor men will see him.

4. Of all the questions raised in the 'Net of Brahmā' only ten appear in the *Majjhima Nikāya*, l. 426.§ These are especially important, for with slight modifications they constitute the list of fourteen questions to which no reply is allowed.¶

(1) Eternity of the universe: Is it eternal? Is it non-eternal?

(2) Infinity of the universe: Is it infinite? Is it finite?

(3) The vital principle (*jīva*) and the body: Are they identical? Are they non-identical?

(4) Continued life of the Tathāgata, i.e. the *arhat*, the saint, 'he whose thought is emancipated': Does he survive death? Does he not survive? Must we assert of such an one at the same time survival and non-survival of death? Must we deny both?

Māluṅkya is sufficiently curious to insist on obtaining an answer to these questions, which he regards as fundamental. The Buddha refuses to reply. He has withheld information on the questions of the eternity or otherwise of the universe,

\* As a matter of fact, the pseudo-Buddhism of the Tantras identifies supreme bliss or *nirvāṇa* with sexual enjoyment.

† Strictly speaking, the possession of the fourth trance is not 'nirvāṇa upon earth,' because this possession is a momentary one. But we may assume that this definition of 'nirvāṇa upon earth' is very like the orthodox conception.

‡ That is to say, erroneous views and speculations; not that there may not be, in a certain sense, a past and a future, a conscious future life, a 'nirvāṇa upon earth,' but this past and this future are not the past and future of an *ego* given as permanent. This comment follows the *Mahāvagga-sutta*, ch. xviii, and the dogmatic teaching of the Pāli Suttas.

§ *Chāla-māluṅkya-sūtra*, translated by Warren, *Buddhism in Translation*, p. 117, and by Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 274 f. See also 'Mahāśūta,' in *Dialogues*, p. 157.

¶ The fourteen 'unelucidated topics' (*avyākhyāta*) of the Sanskrit Buddhist literature are the same as these, with the addition of four concerning the eternity and the infinity of the universe (viz., Is it at one and the same time eternal and non-eternal? or is it neither eternal nor non-eternal?), and the difference that the questions concerning the Tathāgata precede those on the vital principle (see below, p. 224, note 1).

Oldenberg has proved that, in many cases, 'world' must be interpreted as the 'ego' (*Buddha*, p. 271, fr. trans. p. 263). In any case *loka* means *sattvaloka*, world of the living, and not *bhājanaloka*, world-receptacle of living beings. On the other hand, we have seen that 'eternal' is equivalent to 'without beginning.' It is noteworthy that the Sanskrit authorities define 'infinite' as 'having no end in time,' contrary to the interpretation of the Sutta quoted above. The questions, then, regarding infinity will be understood as follows: Will all beings attain *nirvāṇa*? Will no being attain *nirvāṇa*? Will some beings attain *nirvāṇa*, while others will not? Is it false to say that some beings attain *nirvāṇa* and that others do not?

As regards the relations of the *jīva* and *śarīra*, it is difficult to determine the original meaning of the words and the bearing of the question. Certainly nothing is more alien to Buddhist doctrine than to identify the 'vital organ' or 'vital principle' (*jīvitendriya*) with the body. By *Jīva* Buddhism understands the personal and so-called permanent principle denoted by the technical word *pudgala*. *Śarīra* denotes the *rūpastandha*, 'the element of form,' and, by extension, the other *skandhas* (bodily elements under different aspects: sensation, etc.). From the very remarkable fact that the Buddha, on the subject of the *jīva-śarīra*, condemned both the denial and the affirmation of their identity, but was silent upon the doctrines of 'identity and non-identity' and 'neither identity nor non-identity,' the

etc., because knowledge on this point does not help in any way towards the annihilation of the passions.

5. In the 'Dialogue of Vaccha'\* we observe a slightly different attitude on the part of Buddha. When questioned as to the ten points above specified, he condemns the ten 'theories'; they produce suffering, and do not help towards the annihilation of the passions. He himself has no 'theories' (*diṭṭhi*); his teaching (*diṭṭha*, his knowledge) embraces the *skandhas* only (*Pāli khandhas*), the constituent elements of beings, their beginning and their end. In fact, as has been pointed out, all the 'theories' connected with the past or future, and the identity or survival after death of the Ego, presuppose the existence of the Ego. But this Ego does not exist in itself; there is only an aggregation, a complex of *skandhas*.

Vaccha insists, and returning to the four questions concerning the existence after death of the Tathāgata, who is here denoted by a descriptive term, *vimuttachitta*, 'he whose thought is set free,' he receives a formal answer: 'It is wrong to say that the Tathāgata exists after death, wrong to say that he does not exist, wrong to assert survival and the contrary, wrong to deny both.' Vaccha fails to comprehend this, and the Buddha explains: 'Can it be said of an extinguished flame that it has gone to the right or to the left . . . ? Similarly in the Tathāgata there exists no matter, no *skandha* which one could name when speaking of the Tathāgata; and being alien to every conception of matter and *skandhas*, the Tathāgata is deep, immeasurable,† unfathomable, like the great ocean. It is wrong to say that he exists after death, wrong to say that he does not exist . . .'

That is to say, if we understand correctly, it is impossible either to assert or deny, or to say anything about what does not exist, inasmuch as it is not an object of knowledge. But the *skandhas* are the only objects of knowledge, and the *skandhas*, which constituted the man 'whose thought is set free,' have no existence after death, the emancipation of the thought consisting in this, that the thought does not reconstitute the *skandhas* in a new grouping.

6. This comparison of the Tathāgata with the great ocean is repeated in a passage in which it seems to be interpreted in a mystical sense.‡ 'Why has the Buddha not revealed whether he exists or not . . . after death?' To this question, asked by King Pasenadi, a learned nun replies: 'Hast thou a mathematician who could measure the water of the ocean? . . . The ocean is deep, immeasurable, unfathomable. In the same way there exists no matter in the Tathāgata . . .' (as above, § 5).

On examining the comparison more closely, however, we see that it does not hold. The water of the ocean evades measurement because it is too vast, while the Tathāgata after death cannot be calculated, measured, or fathomed because there no

longer remains in him anything capable of being calculated or measured, or, more exactly, anything capable of being known and described.

But why is it heresy to maintain the annihilation of the Tathāgata? Because there is no opportunity of distinguishing between the Tathāgata living and the Tathāgata after death.\* And just as it is wrong to assert that the Tathāgata, during his lifetime, is either distinct from or identical with the *skandhas* either united or singly,—the Tathāgata, even during life, cannot be 'really apprehended,' there is nothing real in him, Buddha is only a name,—so what is true of the Tathāgata is true of the Ego, of any Ego whatever; the Ego does not exist in itself.† This way of looking at the problem is precisely that adopted by the *Nāgārjuna* and the *Mādhyamika* schools. The Tathāgata has no further existence, because there is no Tathāgata. It is the same in reality with all the other so-called Egos. The Buddha has nothing to say about them, because it is impossible to speak about what does not exist.‡

II. Discussion.—We have thus given an account of the chief authorities on which the study of the problem of agnosticism ought to be based. These documents, the agnostic statements of the Buddha bearing upon various problems, and assuming slightly different forms, admit apparently of three different, and even contradictory, interpretations: (1) They furnish us with the ultimate underlying belief in the mind of the Buddha assumed to be an agnostic, and with the official doctrine of the Order, which is 'positivist' in the modern sense of the word. (2) They conceal, for reasons of a practical kind, an implied affirmation touching the future life of ordinary men quite as much as the existence after death of the 'emancipated.' (3) They constitute a formal denial both of the existence of the 'emancipated' and of the Ego.

It is obvious that in itself the strange system, which consists in distinguishing four hypotheses,—affirmative, negative, affirmative nor negative,—and whose results in the passages quoted, is capable of evading an answer, the policy of the 'slippery eel,' as Buddha says, or (2) of asserting the existence of the mystery, but forbidding its discussion, or (3) of denying both the existence and the conceivability of the object in question by closing up 'all joinings and loopholes by which the true facts of the case might escape being caught in the logical net.' §

Let us examine the three interpretations.

1. *Agnosticism*.—The first constitutes one of the most remarkable amongst the numerous systems that Western analysis has recently disentangled from those precepts of the Buddha which are more or less faithfully preserved in the Pāli writings. It is remarkable quite as much for its own sake as for the contrast which it presents to the pre-

\* Dialogue between Yamaka and Sāriputta, *Saṃyuttanikāya*, iii. p. 112; Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 281 f., Fr. tr. p. 279; Warren, p. 138; cf. *Saṃyuttanikāya*, iv. 380. *Anupalabbhamāna*, according to Oldenberg (*Buddha*, Fr. tr. p. 272, note), means 'not to be conceived,' and Warren renders 'you fail to make out and establish the existence of the saint in the present life' (p. 141). In Buddhist logic, *anupalabhi* is 'the non-perception of what ought to be perceived'; there is no jar because, all the conditions necessary to the perception of a jar being fulfilled (light, proximity, acuteness of sight, etc.), I do not perceive a jar.

† According to another school, that of the *Sammitiyyas*, the Ego stands in no definite relation to the *skandhas*, but none the less exists, though 'unnameable' (*avācya*).

‡ We have seen that all Buddhists do not deny the reality of the self, and that the Buddhists who believe in a self call it *pudgala*—the commonest word in the sacred literature for 'somebody,' 'an individual'—in order to avoid the suspicion of heresy which the use of the Brāhmanical word *ātman* would necessarily involve.

§ Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 278. It is thus that the 'four-branched syllogism' is dexterously employed by the *Mādhyamikas*, the best example of which has reference to the origin of things. An object is not produced by itself, nor by anything else, nor by itself together with something else, nor without causes; therefore no object is ever produced. The two last hypotheses, affirmative and negative, neither affirmative nor negative, are usually rejected as absurd, being self-contradictory.

*Sammitiyyas*, not without reason, drew the conclusion that the *pudgala* exists, without any one being able to state what relation it bears to the . . . theory of *avācya* (cf. *Abhidharmak* . . . col. note 1). Buddha (*Saṃ* . . . to say whether there is, or is not, a self (see IDENTITY).

† *Majjhimanikāya*, i. p. 483; translated by Warren, p. 123. The reason of the silence is explained in *Saṃyuttanikāya*, iv. 400; on the Ego, cf. Oldenberg, pp. 272, 273.

‡ *Appameyyo*, 'immeasurable,' also means 'not within the range of knowledge.' The context, however, does not seem to allow this acceptance of the term here. Plays upon words are very frequent in Hindu metaphysics, and the simile of the ocean is the justification in the present instance.

§ *Saṃyuttanikāya*, iii. 100; Warren, p. 138; also Oldenberg, p. 280. Although the . . . of the present article, even more than . . . is the writer's duty to acknowledge to the full the obligation under which he lies to him.

vailing spirit of Hindu religions. Amid the luxurious mythological, dogmatic, mystic, penitential, and ritualistic growth which the period of the Brāhmanas and the Upaniṣads, and of Jainism exhibited, the Buddha had established his Order with stern simplicity and as a strictly moral régime.\* As a matter of fact, mysticism, with the four famous ecstasies (*dhyāna*), which were regarded by the early Buddhists as older than Buddhism,† is one of the chief features of this régime. Buddhists, however, do not claim that *dhyāna* by itself affords any valuable superior knowledge, any supernatural virtue or insight into the Divine. Without disparaging the 'divine eye,' the memory of former births, the passing through walls, etc., which are the natural results of ecstasy, their chief aim is to produce by mental rather than physical means a state of mind full of restfulness and moral insight, to the reality of which experience should testify, and which, in the classical country of the *yogis*, a 'positivist' doctrine, whose only concern is moral happiness, need not be ashamed to own.

The point of view ascribed to the Buddha is exactly that of Ajātaśatru: 'Of what use in the present world is the monastic life, and in general the practice of virtue, the excellent practice?' To this question by itself the reply will be that the importance of the monastic life is essentially in 'this visible world.' It is indeed possible, Buddha seems to say, that virtue may be beneficial in another existence, but experience has clearly proved that, practised as I teach it, and following a middle course between excess and the sorrowful life of penance which Nigantha (founder of the order of the Jainas) preaches, being possessed of all that is necessary,—for the attainment of the condition of an *arhat* is difficult and requires bodily vigour,‡—then virtue produces perfect happiness upon earth. What more do you wish? If you are not satisfied, go elsewhere; sham physicians are legion.

Such, in broad outline and apart from the theory of ecstasy, is the essence of the Buddhism which our neo-Buddhists preach. These conclusions can be reached only by 'doctoring' tradition, and by ignoring in particular all that our authorities say concerning the reward of actions in future births; and that is certainly genuine Buddhism.

It should be noted further (and this gives special colour to his so-called agnosticism) that Buddha never says, 'I do not know.' He sometimes says, 'You are to know nothing about it.' That is entirely different.§ The tradition consistently claims that the Buddha was omniscient (*sarvajña*) not only in the narrow sense of the term, possessing the knowledge of what was necessary for salvation, knowledge of the means which lead to the emancipation of thought—a knowledge which he shared with the Pratyekabuddhas, etc.—but also universal omniscience (*sarvikārajañātra*), the knowledge of all that was and is and is to come.¶

\* From the very beginning Buddhism claims to be a 'middle way.' This middle way, according to many authorities, consists in avoiding the two goals (or extremes) of doctrine—affirmation and denial of a self, existence after death, etc. But the word, in its earlier use, seems to refer to disciplinary or penitential moderation. The Buddhist monk does not indulge in sensual pleasures, but he keeps himself free from the morbid exaggerations of asceticism. See Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, p. 207.

† Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, p. 51, n. 1.

‡ See *Dialogues*, p. 209.

§ This remark, the interest of which is evident, was pointed out to the present writer by A. Barth.

¶ The only passage within the writer's knowledge in which a contrary opinion is suggested is the discussion in the *Tantravārttika*, a work by the Brāhman Kamārila, on the omniscience of the Buddha. Kamārila maintains that all knowledge is derived from the Veda, and not from the teaching of Buddha. And he represents the Buddhist, his antagonist, responding to him in words to this effect: 'Granted that the Buddha does not know the number of the insects, etc., what does that matter?

2. *The agnostic statements may conceal positive affirmations.*—(1) The texts themselves invite us to study the reasons, opportune or otherwise, which justified the Buddha in refusing to answer certain questions of a cosmological or metaphysical nature.

On one occasion the Buddha declares that the world is inconsistent with him, but that he is not inconsistent with the world; that he assents to all to which the world assents, so far as it is based on sound reasons. And, in fact, he sometimes affirms that, since discord and quarrelling are the worst evils, and the absence of discord is the essential characteristic of a monk, one ought to refrain from expressing any opinion.\* Moreover, moral therapeutics, directed towards the emancipation of thought, demands the regular purification of the mind, progressive suppression of all the ideas to which the mind can cling, extending even to unconsciousness of the end in view, since this can be attained only in the suppression of thought. 'To long for nirvāṇa is sheer folly and an invincible obstacle to its attainment.' Thus, on the one hand, the Buddhist should try to win the favour of all, and to choose the more advantageous course or that which involves less evil. 'Just as it is necessary to speak to each in his own language, and to preach to barbarians in the language of the barbarians,' so it is necessary to avoid hurting or offending any one, and to guide each on that path of progress which he is capable of following, to the neglect even of the real truth, that is to say, even by inexact statements. And, on the other hand, the belief, the 'view' (*dṛṣṭi*), which is in itself perfectly justified, that we have passed through innumerable existences before arriving at the present one, must be abandoned, because it is inimical to salvation, inasmuch as it suggests the idea of the permanence of the individual. It is, moreover, in reality false, the test of the truth of any proposition being its accord with the end in view.

(2) Two points, moreover, of capital importance rest upon the most definite testimony. It is certain, on the ground of tradition, that Buddha adopted a very distinct attitude towards the question of action (*karma* [which see]), and consequently the question of existence after death. To quote the texts would be impossible, and perhaps it is of greater interest to recall the historical example of the friendly relations existing between the Order and the sects (Aggikas, Jaitilas) who accepted the doctrine of the fruit of works.†

The early Buddhists believed in retribution for actions, in the influence which earlier existences exercised upon the present, and in a future life conditioned by the accumulated and imputable effects of previous actions.

There is no less evidence that they believed in the possibility of escaping from the circle or whirlpool of existence to the rest of nirvāṇa. 'In the language of that time,' as a very competent judge affirms, 'the word *nirvāṇa* always denoted supreme happiness, apart from any idea of annihilation.'

He knows, and he alone was able to impart to us, saving truth' (see J.R.A.S., 1902, pp. 383 ff.).

It will be noticed that, in the older narrative, Buddha, having attained to *bodhi*, thinks of three persons in succession who are worthy of his teaching. The gods have to inform him of his attainment, 'one of which he is ignorant' . . . . . 'reach the law, and has to be encouraged by Brahmā. These discrepancies were afterwards explained to have been mere affection on the part of Buddha, who was anxious to comply with 'worldly ways' (*lokanuravartana*).

\* Burnout, *Introduction*, p. 458; Kern, *Geschiedenis*, I, p. 276. † *Mahāvastu*, I, 88, 11 (Vinaya Texts, SBE xiii, p. 190): 'If fire-worshippers and Jaitilas come to you, O monks, they are to receive the ordination (directly), and no novice period is to be imposed upon them. And for what reason? These, O monks, hold the doctrine that actions receive their reward, and that our deeds have their results (according to their moral merit).' From this it may be inferred that the chief dogmatic tenet of the primitive Church was the doctrine of *karma*.

It seems, indeed, quite probable that, in the dogmatics of Buddhism, the conception of *nirvāṇa* had been identified, or almost so, with that of annihilation, certain reservations being always made; but that, however far, from the very first, the Buddhists diverted the word *nirvāṇa* from its ordinary acceptation, the ancient definition held its ground—supreme happiness, subject to no re-birth or renewed death.

In spite of the fact that the Buddhists attach a peculiar importance to the conception of *nirvāṇa*, many say, it would be an error to suppose that the religions to restrict the word altogether to the attainment of that perfect of *arhat*-ship, or '*nirvāṇa* upon earth.'

One text declares: 'The disciple who has put off lust and desire, rich in wisdom, has here on earth attained deliverance from death, repose, *nirvāṇa*, immortality.' It is undoubtedly right to say that *nirvāṇa* is not merely the hereafter which awaits the emancipated saint, but the perfection which he enjoys in this life. But if the Buddhist aspires to this release from the passions, in which *arhat*-ship consists, it is, above all, because, like the *jīvanmukti*, this is the pledge of true and final *nirvāṇa*. If the monk 'whose thought is emancipated' is said to have attained deliverance from death, it is really by anticipation, for it does not imply that he will not die: 'All life ends in death'; this really signifies that after death he will enter the abode where death is no more.†

It cannot be denied that Buddhism has a very definite theory concerning a hereafter, the nature of which cannot be explained. Whatever the everlasting abode may be, it is the aim and the essence of religion. It may be conceived as a prolongation of the state of the *arhat*. All other good is said to be purely negative, the removal or the alleviation of suffering, but *nirvāṇa* is good absolute. Would this be so, however, if it were nothing more than *arhat*-ship doomed to extinction at death, which, moreover, according to the ancient texts, does not prevent former wicked deeds from receiving their due punishment?

(3) If, then, Buddha at times refuses to answer, it is not in the manner of the evasive sophist who is slippery as an eel. Nor is it that he himself is ignorant or wishes his disciples to remain in ignorance. But the essential point is that his disciples should learn to distinguish profitable knowledge and thoughts. What is the use of indulging in those idle dreams concerning the universe, past or future existence, or *nirvāṇa*? In the same way the author of the *Imitation*, who assuredly subscribed to the Nicene creed, cuts short his meditations on the Trinity: 'What is the use of being trained in the mysteries of the Trinity if you sin against the Trinity?' What can the Buddha tell concerning the manner of life of the emancipated saint, when emancipation can be attained only by ridding the mind of all thought and all desire? He refuses to satisfy useless curiosity, for *nirvāṇa* is a state essentially indefinable.‡

\* The present writer will not conceal his opinion that the (dīṭṭhadhammanibbāna) possessed from that skillfully pointed out Oldenberg. It signifies, in to be attained during a future life, etc. (*upapadyanirvāṇa*, *antarāparinirvāṇa*, etc.), the *nirvāṇa* to be attained at the end of the present existence. With regard to the state of an *arhat*, it should be observed (1) that there is not actual cessation of suffering (*dukkhāvapaśama* = *nibbāna*, *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* vi. 121), and (2) that it is called '*nirvāṇa* with a residue', in contrast to the real *nirvāṇa*.

† Cf. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 264 f., whose judgment, according to the present writer, ought to be slightly modified. From the earliest texts we are led to think that the Tathāgata and the saints in general were able to prolong their life for an 'age of the world' [see *Aoza or the World* (Buddhist)]. This is very like immortality. On the Vedic beliefs concerning the immortality of the soul and the gradual formation of the doctrine of renewed death (*punarjīva*, i.e. transmigration), see A. M. Boyer's very instructive art. in *J.A.*, 1901, ii. p. 451 f. He states that ordinary immortality means 'long life after death,' and that everlasting immortality is reserved for the saints (p. 474).

‡ At least so far as human powers of understanding are concerned. The intelligent Buddhist sometimes examines the topics of religion, and sometimes adheres to them without pondering over them: 'These matters are understood only by the Tathāgata.' 'Only the Tathāgata knows, we do not know' (*Bodhicattatrabhūmi*).

On the remaining 'non-elucidated topics' it may be said:—

(1) As regards the existence of the Ego and of the universe

3. The agnostic statements are formal denials.—In the two preceding pages tradition has been treated selectively; the theory of the *skandhas* has been laid aside. This theory is found in connexion with almost all the ancient and modern texts. It is consistent with the denial of an Ego. It admits the existence of a phenomenal Ego, which prolongs its existence as long as thought is not 'emancipated.' After emancipation the phenomenal Ego dissolves, the *skandhas* are no longer associated to form the illusory Ego; there no longer exists anything.

The Tathāgata, therefore, does not exist after death; so that the assertions relating to the Tathāgata after death must be understood in the sense of a radical denial, as has been done by the writers of the various dialogues in the *Majjhima* and the *Samyutta* above mentioned.

Moreover, if there is no Ego in the emancipated Tathāgata, there is none in Tathāgata living,—there is no Ego in any being. All speculation concerning the future and the past of the Ego is, therefore, absurd, and what is said about the eternity of the world, etc., must be understood as a formal denial. This is the system of the *Mādhymikas* openly professed in the *Suttantas*.

It seems clear, then, that if we admit the primitive character of the theory of the *skandhas*, and assume the absolute consistency of the early Buddhist speculations, we must ascribe a purely negative value to the Buddha's statements. Thus is obtained a doctrine entirely coherent, identifying *nirvāṇa* with annihilation. All the statements on the one side or the other will find their explanation in practical considerations. On the other hand, the agnostic hypothesis, as far as it concerns the future existence of ordinary men, will be set aside, for the theory of the *skandhas* implies the teaching with regard to actions and transmigration. The question is whether, by such an exegesis, we are not building a new Buddhism on old principles, as the *Mādhymikas* have confessedly done.

III. Conclusion.—Of the three systems expounded above, the third is the system of a large number of *Suttantas*, that is to say, the orthodox doctrine of the Pāli canon, and of the *Mādhymikas*. The second is very probably that of popular Buddhism and of the 'pudgalavādins'; while the first has nothing to support it save the texts above cited and the sympathy of several European scholars. The present writer does not conceal his preference for the second. In order to establish it, or rather to reconcile it with traditional assumptions, a comparative estimate is needed. To this let us finally proceed.

It is generally believed that the earliest Buddhism from eternity, all the texts and the best attested dogmas entirely dismiss the idea that the Ego and the universe are uncaused.

(2) As far as the 'infinity of the universe' is concerned, the text quoted (p. 221) understands by infinity (*ananta*) 'limitless extension in space.' It is very probable that this is the original meaning of the word, and that the word *śaśvata*, 'eternal,' refers to the future as well as the past. In fact, Buddhist cosmology is acquainted with an infinite number of universes. By the term *ananta* the *Mādhymikas* mean 'endless duration in time' (cf. *Saṃ. N.* i. 62; Oldenberg, p. 263). *Anta* is 'end' as contrasted with *ādī*, 'beginning.' The orthodox reply is that the world will continue until the last being has attained emancipation. This moment will probably never come. But in each individual 'the end of the world' (*lokasya anta*) may be achieved by the emancipation.

(3) As to the relation between the *jīva* and the *karira*, it will be noticed that in the list of the fourteen non-elucidated questions, only the two hypotheses of identity and non-identity are examined. The scholastic doctrine explains *jīva* as equivalent to *sattva*, *pudgala*, *ātman*, permanent principle; and denies its existence, in the course of a discussion of its relations, not with the body (*karira*), but with the *skāṇ* *jīvitendriya*, vital faculty, which is in the sense that existence is prole of the succeeding life (except where in certain heavens).

\* See above, p. 221 b, n. II, and 222 b, n. I.

dharma did not lay any claim to originality of doctrine; it shared with the whole of India the belief in the imputation and the retributive effects of action (*karma*), the concatenation of causes, and the possibility of attaining *nirvāṇa*. Nor is there anything to prove that by *nirvāṇa* the Buddhists understood something different from what all others understood by it—a state certainly very difficult to define, but quite distinct from nothingness. Moreover, the Buddha was distinguished, as the texts studied lead us to believe, by a certain contempt for speculation; whence we may conclude that the theory of the *skandhas*, if it existed in germ, had not attained its final form. In the Order there were monks who were opposed, as no doubt the Buddha himself had been, to cosmological or metaphysical speculations; there were also philosophers and 'Abhidharmists,' and it is to these Abhidharmists that we owe the Pāli writings as well as the writings of the Sarvāstivādins.

The question of *nirvāṇa* having been raised, the earliest documents (from Buddha himself ?) had given the reply that nothing could be asserted on the subject, either existence or non-existence, etc.—an answer perhaps childish from the Aristotelian point of view, but sufficiently frank to declare at one and the same time that it is a mystery and that inquiry into it is unnecessary. Such a rejoinder is, in any case, parallel to that suggested with regard to the eternity of the universe; and the former no more seeks to deny the existence of the Tathāgata after death than the latter the actual existence of the universe, or even its eternity. Buddha's only wish, as is said in so many words, was to forbid idle or harmful speculations. It was the philosophers who developed the doctrine of the *skandhas*, the direct result of which is the denial of the Ego (*Sūttantas*), and the indirect result the denial of all phenomena in themselves, and the 'universal void' (*Mādhyanikas*). It is no wonder that the philosophers put an entirely new meaning into the old answer.—Nothing can be said of the Buddha after his death, because there is no longer any Buddha, because there never has been a Buddha even during his lifetime; the two things go together, as the *Sūttanta* expressly states. It is scarcely conceivable that this was the original Buddhist doctrine. But if it had been, it is most probable that a less ambiguous formula would have been found for its expression.

The Buddhist who accepts the revealed texts as they stand cannot have any doubt as to his choice. He must adhere to the third interpretation, the only one which is orthodox and in harmony with accepted teaching. The choice of the historian of religions is more difficult, for it is modified by the manner in which he conceives the orthodox view to have grown up. The present writer confesses to a reluctance to exercise a definite option, but if a choice be required,—which is by no means the case,—he believes that the second interpretation is to be preferred. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

AGRA, the famous Mughal capital, is situated on the right bank of the R. Jumna, in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. Agra does not appear to have been a sacred place to the Hindus, and its religious interest depends on a splendid series of mosques and tombs. On the left bank of the river stood an ancient Hindu town, of which little now remains but traces of the foundations. The Muhammadans first occupied the place in the time of Sikandar Lodi (A.D. 1505). Bābar, the founder of the Mughal Empire, died here in 1530, but neither he nor his son Humāyūn left any monument of their reigns. Akbar founded the modern city in 1558, and the splendid buildings which now adorn it are the work of himself, his

son Jahāngir, and his grandson Shāhjahān. Akbar built the Agra Fort about 1566, and four years later commenced the erection of his new capital at Fathpur-Sikri, 23 miles from Agra, which was occupied for only seventeen years and then abandoned. The site was selected because a famous Musalmān ascetic of the place, Sheikh Salim Chisti, resided there, and Akbar believed that it was through his intercession that he obtained an heir in Prince Salim, afterwards known as the Emperor Jahāngir. At Agra no important religious buildings survive which were the work of Akbar; but to him we owe the splendid Jāmi' Masjid, or 'Cathedral Mosque,' at Fathpur-Sikri, and its magnificent gate, the Buland Darwāza, or 'High Portal,' with a touching inscription, which were completed respectively in 1571 and 1602.

Akbar died at Agra in 1605, and was buried at Sikandra, 5 miles from the capital, in a splendid mausoleum, which he himself had commenced. It differs in plan from every other Mughal monument, the design, according to Fergusson, being borrowed from a Hindu, or more probably from a Buddhist, model. Akbar's revolt from orthodox Islām is marked by the fact that the head of his tomb is turned towards the rising sun, not towards Mecca. The original design was modified by Jahāngir, and the building in its present shape gives the impression of incompleteness. It was finished in 1613. The beautiful tomb of Itmād-ad-daula, Mirza Ghiās Beg, on the left bank of the Jumna opposite Agra, was the work of his daughter, the famous Nūr Mahal, the favourite queen of the Emperor Jahāngir. But it is to the Emperor Shāhjahān, the son of Jahāngir, that we owe the famous buildings which are now the glory of Agra. The Taj Mahal was erected by him as the mausoleum of his beloved wife, Arjūmand Banū Begam, better known as Mumtāz-i-Mahal, 'Eminent of the Palace,' who was married to him in 1612, and died in childbirth at Burhānpur in the Deccan in 1630. It was commenced soon after her death, but was not finished till 1648. This splendid structure is too well known to need further description here. Another beautiful religious building erected by Shāhjahān is the famous Moti Masjid, or 'Pearl Mosque,' which was intended to be the Court Chapel of the Palace. To his eldest daughter, Jahānārā Begam, who tended her unhappy father in the troubles of his later years, is due the Jāmi' Masjid, or 'Cathedral Mosque' of Agra, built opposite the Delhi Gate of the Fort. This was completed in 1644. On the accession of Aurangzeb, who deposed his father Shāhjahān in 1658, the architectural history of Agra closed.

LITERATURE: . . . . . and E. Architecture, 569 ff.; . . . . . of the Taj; Führer, Monumental . . . . . of the N.W.P. and Oudh, 63 ff.; Heber, Journal, ed. 1801, ii. 5 ff.; Sleeman, Rambles and Recollections, ed. V. A. Smith, i. 377 ff.

W. CROOKE.

AGRAULIDS.—Euripides, in *Ion* 23 and 496, speaks of the three 'daughters of Agrauros,' who, according to Apollodorus (iii. § 180), are called Aglauros,\* Herse, and Pandrosos. A rich banquet, the *Deipnophoria*, was offered to them together (Bekker, *Anecdota*, i. 239). They danced, Euripides tells us (*l.c.*), on the northern descent of the Athenian Acropolis, on the green meadow before the temple of Athene, beside the Apollo grotto and the seat of Pan, who piped to them. This is the picture which the votive-reliefs represent, some of which have been found on the spot in question (*Athen. Mitth.* iii. 200). In fact, there lay there beside each other the caves of Apollo and Pan under the Erechtheum, and the temple of Athene;

\* Aglauros or Agrauros—both forms have been used throughout the article. It will be observed also that in the spelling of proper names the Greek forms have been employed, except in familiar words like Erechtheum, Cecrops.



and there, too, lay the sanctuary of Agrauios (Pausanias, i. 18. 2; Herodotus, viii. 53; Jahn-Michaelis, *Arch. Athenarum*, Table vii. and xvi. 3). In it the Attic youth swore allegiance to the standard, calling, above all, on Agrauios (Pollux, vii. 108).

Aglauros is thus an ancient and very sacred goddess of Athens. Her name and her connexion with Pandrosos and Herse, the dewy sisters, show that she was a goddess of agriculture. Later she is, in the same way as Pandrosos, so united with Athene that both appear as secondary names of Athene, or that Agrauios is designated the first priestess of Athene. At quite an early date their connexion was very close; the dismal feast of atonement and cleansing sacred to Athene, the *Plynteria* in Thargelion (May), stood also in relation to Agrauios (Hesych.; Bekker, *Anecdota*, i. 270); the *Arrhēphoria* or *Hersephoria* was associated with Athene and Herse (Istros in scholium to Aristophanes, *Lysistrata*, 642); and the Pandroseion, with the sacred olive tree of Athene, was closely connected with the Erechtheum (Pausanias, i. 27. 2). Athene herself had once been a goddess of agriculture. Aglauros, however, is also united with Demeter, and is regarded as a secondary name for her (*CLA* iii. 372). This proves that Aglauros was originally an independent goddess, who, however, disappeared more and more in consciousness, and for this reason was united with a greater related goddess. This was the case with many other deities who were originally independent. Their memory was, in the end, preserved only in secondary names of related divinities. The important signification of Aglauros is seen, too, in the fact that at Salamis in Cyprus, where she, along with Athene and Diomedes had a common sanctuary, human sacrifice was down to a late date offered to her (Porphyry, *de Abstinētia*, ii. 54). In Athens there were secret rites in her worship (Athenagoras, *Leg. pro Christ.* 1), which the family of the Praxiergidoi seems to have practised (Töpffer, *Attische Genealogie*, p. 133).

In accordance with the serious nature of the feast of Agrauios, the *Plynteria*, her secret rites, and her human sacrifices, is the legend which has developed out of her worship. This we find in a threefold form. (1) Agrauios, along with Herse and Pandrosos, receives from Athene the boy Erichthonios in a chest, with the command not to open it. Aglauros and Herse open it notwithstanding, and in maddened frenzy cast themselves down from the Acropolis (Pausanias, i. 18. 2; Apollodorus, iii. 189). This is obviously meant, too, to explain the situation of their sanctuaries below the Acropolis, while that of Pandrosos was on the top. (2) Aglauros casts herself from the Acropolis in order that she may, in accordance with an oracle, secure the victory for her country against Eumolpos; for this reason a sanctuary to her was founded there (Philochoros, *Frg.* 14). (3) Aglauros is changed by Hermes into a stone, because, being incited by Athene to jealousy, she had refused him access to her sister (Ovid, *Metam.* ii. 708 ff.).

From all this we have as the result that the Agrauides resemble the Horæ and the Graces. They nurse the child Erichthonios, the seed-corn, entrusted to them by Athene, just as Demeter does Triptolemos. In the month Thargelion (May), when the dew ceases and the harvest begins, Aglauros dies.

Aglauros appears in the tradition twice: (1) as the mother of the Agrauides, daughter of Actæus; (2) as their oldest sister, and daughter of Cecrops. Connected with Aglauros are Alkippe, her daughter by Ares, who was seduced by Halirrhothios the son of Poseidon, and Keryx, her son by Hermes, the head of the Eleusinian family of the Kerykes,

who is, however, also called the son of Pandrosos or Herse (Töpffer, *Attische Genealogie*, 81 ff.).

LITERATURE.—Preller-Robert, *Griech. Mythologie*, i. 199 ff.; Robert in *Commentationes Blommee*, 143 ff.

E. BETHE.

AGRICULTURE. — 1. Until recently the theory was held that the human race passed from the life of the hunter to that of the nomad shepherd, and from that again to the life of the tiller of the ground. As a sweeping generalization it is no longer possible to hold this theory; that it is not altogether untrue is shown by what is happening to the Bashkir Tatars at the present day. In their case agriculture has been forced upon them by the danger of starvation. Russian civilization has encroached upon them from the north and west, and the Ural Cossacks from the east, so that the area of their pasture lands, and, as a consequence, the amount of live stock they are able to maintain, have much diminished. Before resorting to agriculture themselves, they employed Russians to farm for them, and farmed part of their land on the *métayage* system. But when the virgin soil is exhausted, the master, who loves the easy life of the shepherd and disdains the hard toil of agriculture, is no longer able to pay for hired labour, and perforce must himself put his hand to the plough (Wallace, *Russia*, new ed. i. p. 265 ff.). The same observation was made regarding the Tatars of the Crimea in 1794 (Pallas, *Travels*, Eng. ed. 1802-3, ii. p. 383). In those parts of the world, however, which are best known to us, there is evidence of a settled agricultural population from the earliest period. Not only in Neolithic times, but from the earlier Stone Age, there is evidence, supplied largely by the excavations of Ed. Piette in various cave-shelters in France, that agricultural plants, and animals at least partially domesticated, were well known (see DOMESTICATION). In Egypt and in Babylon there is evidence of agriculture going back, at a moderate calculation, to the early part of the third millennium B.C., and possibly to a much earlier period. Mesopotamia is the only area for which there is good evidence that some kinds of common cereals grow wild (de Candolle, *Origin of Cultivated Plants*, 1884, p. 358 (common wheat); p. 364 (spelt)). It is in countries with a rich alluvial soil, like Egypt and Mesopotamia, that we should *a priori* expect agriculture to begin. In Egypt a primitive agriculture along the banks of the Nile would be possible merely by casting seed upon the mud left behind by the river when it subsides after flood. Agriculture in the earliest times was probably thus practised before the invention of the plough, the seed being left to sink into the soft mud, or, as represented on Egyptian monuments, being trodden in by cattle.

It is, however, to be remembered that when we consider primitive agriculture, we must discard all generally accepted notions as to its practice. Agriculture at the present day, as practised in most countries of Europe, may be defined as (1) the regular cultivation by the plough and other well-known implements, and with the addition of manure, of (2) definite areas of (3) arable land, held as (4) freehold or (5) on a legally defined tenancy, (6) such cultivation being for the most part in the hands of males. But if we may deduce primitive methods from the practice of such tribes in modern times as combine some agriculture with hunting, and appear to be only in the first stages of agricultural development, primitive cultivation preceded all implements except those of stone and wood. Thus the Navajos and many tribes of New Mexico, who grow [Indian] 'corn, beans, pumpkins, melons, and other vegetables, and also some wheat, and make some attempts at irrigation, dibble the



ground: 'with a short sharp-pointed stick small holes are dug in the ground, into which they drop the seeds, and no further care is given to the crop except to keep it partially free from weeds' (Bancroft, *Native Races of Pacific States*, i. p. 489; cf. H. Ling Roth, *Saravak*, i. p. 402). In Northern Honduras at an earlier period, the natives, according to Herrera, cleared the ground with stone axes, and turned the sod by main strength with a forked pole or with sharp wooden spades (Bancroft, i. p. 719). Dibbling alone is found sufficient in the Amazon area, the ground never being turned up or manured (Wallace, *Travels on the Amazon*, p. 335). In Melanesia, where horticulture rather than agriculture is the form of cultivation, and has reached a high degree of excellence, adzes of stone or shell were used before the introduction of metals. In the New Hebrides and in most of the Solomon Islands the natives use stone; 'the Santa Cruz people, Torres Islanders, and Banks' Islanders used shell, for adzes the giant clam shell' (Codrington, *The Melanesians*, p. 313). Stone adzes, which may have been used by the early inhabitants of France, were found by Piette (*L'Anthropologie*, vii. p. 1 ff.), and stone sickles have been discovered in many places. Early Egyptian stone adzes are figured by De Morgan (*Recherches sur les origines de l'Egypte*, ii. p. 96).

Nor are definite areas of arable land held by individuals. The savage is regularly communistic in his ideas; the land tilled belongs in the first instance to the tribe, though, when a man reclaims virgin forest, what he reclaims is his own heritable property (*Saravak*, i. p. 419 ff.). Areas that are reclaimed from the primeval forest by the joint efforts of the community are naturally regarded as joint property. How this is done is well described by Wallace (*Travels on the Amazon*, p. 217): 'Imagine the trees of a virgin forest cut down so as to fall across each other in every conceivable direction. After lying a few months they are burnt; the fire, however, only consumes the leaves and fine twigs and branches; all the rest remains entire, but blackened and charred. The mandioca is then planted without any further preparation.' If the ground continues to be cultivated and roughly weeded, the trees soon rot, so that they can be removed; grass then springs up, which, if kept grazed, remains open (Wallace, p. 334). In other countries, however, it is not so; in Saravak new land of this nature has to be planted every year, as the tough grass which succeeds a crop of paddy is too difficult for the Dayak to break up till the land has once more become jungle (*Saravak*, i. p. 397 ff.). The landholding systems of the peoples of antiquity and the Teutonic three-field system are descended from a similar system of communistic landholdings (Maine, *Village Communities*, Lect. iii.).

But even wandering tribes may engage to some extent in agriculture. Waitz (*Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, vol. I. p. 406) observes that in North America such tribes would plant a crop, wait to gather it, and go on again. And, even where they are more settled, tribes must from time to time change their habitations, because, as they do not manure their lands, these gradually become exhausted.

From all this it is clear that five of our conditions of modern cultivation (p. 226) do not hold for primitive times, as illustrated by the last survivors of uncivilized races. Nor is the sixth point more true. Primitive agriculture is not altogether, nor to any large extent, in the hands of males. As von den Steinen remarks of the Bakairi of Central Brazil, it is woman that has invented agriculture. Its beginnings, no doubt, arose where hunting and fishing were difficult or unproductive. Just as we have seen that it is with the greatest reluctance that a pastoral people becomes agricultural, so it is with the change from hunting to agriculture. Amongst the most primitive of the native tribes of America it is noticeable that where game is scanty, or the men

Dibbling  
re possible  
their huts,

while the men wandered farther afield as hunters or on the war. . . . reaches an advanced stage before the . . . part of the operations to the men. . . . help in sowing the seed and in reaping the harvest; the hard intermediate toil of weeding is left to the women and children (*Saravak*, i. p. 405). Amongst the South Sea Islanders local custom settles the respective shares of the men and women in the garden work (Codrington, p. 303). If a man has another occupation, he regularly leaves a large part of the agricultural work to the women, as may still be seen in the Peloponnese and elsewhere in Eastern Europe and in the West Highlands of Scotland. In more advanced parts of the British Isles it is only the rapid development of agricultural machinery in the last forty years that has gradually banished women from field-work. But the agricultural duties of primitive woman also brought her important rights. Her labour gave her a right to the soil, which, as the importance of agriculture became more marked, brought her many other privileges in its train, and these privileges had the greatest influence upon the history of family relations (Grosse, *Die Formen der Familie und die Formen der Wirtschaft*, p. 159 ff.). Superstition also recommended leaving agriculture in the hands of women. 'When the women plant maize,' said an Indian to the Jesuit Gumilla, 'the stalk produces two or three ears. Why? Because women know how to produce children. They only know how to plant corn to ensure its germinating. Then let them plant it; they know more than we know' (J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, p. 272, quoting from Payne, *History of the New World*, ii. p. 7). This side of agriculture has been worked out in much greater detail by E. Hahn in *Demeter und Babuo* and elsewhere. (For Africa, see the references in Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religion*, p. 240).

2. The earliest cultivated plants are not easy to define. The carvings on reindeer horns figured by Piette in his *L'Art pendant l'âge du Renne* (plates 17 and 14), and from him by Hoops (*Waldbaume und Kulturpflanzen*, pp. 278-9), come from Meso-Palaeolithic strata, and undoubtedly represent ears of corn. From a late Palaeolithic stratum representations of an ear of winter barley (*escourgeon*), as still grown in France, have been discovered (Piette, in Hoops, *op. cit.* p. 250). In the rock-shelter of Mas-d'Azil, on the left bank of the Arise, Piette found in a transitional stratum between Palaeolithic and Neolithic a small heap of short oval grains of wheat, the precise character of which could not be determined, as, on being exposed, they turned to dust (Hoops, p. 281). From another transitional stratum at Campigny, in the north of France, the print of a grain of barley has been found on a potsherd. From this period stones for grinding corn have also been discovered. From the Neolithic pile-dwellings at Wangen, on the Lake of Constance, 'two varieties of wheat and the two-rowed barley were distinctly recognized both in whole ears and in the separate grain, the latter in quantities that could be measured in bushels' (Munro, *Lake Dwellings of Europe*, p. 497). Before the end of the Stone Age three species of wheat (*Triticum vulgare*, *dicoccum*, *monococcum*), probably three species of barley (*Hordeum hexastichum*,—this was the most widely spread,—*distichum*, *tetrastichum*), and two species of millet (*Panicum miliaceum* and *italicum*), were grown in Europe—naturally in greater variety in the south than in the north of Central Europe. Not only was flax cultivated, but weaving was practised [the fabrics are figured in Forrer and Messikommer's *Prähistorische Varia* (Zürich, 1889), [plates iv. and x.]. Vegetables—lentils, peas, beans, parsnips, and carrots—and poppies were cultivated, as well as vines and fruit trees (Heer, *Pflanzen der Pfahlbauten*; and, more recent and more general, Hoops as above, and Buschan, *Vorgeschichtliche Botanik*). The precise characters of the grain figured on early Egyptian monuments cannot, it is said, be identified. But both in Egypt and in Chaldea it early became the practice to express the value of land in terms of wheat (Maspero, *L'Orient classique*, i. p. 761, n. 2). As already pointed out, botanists regard Mesopotamia and the countries bordering upon it as probably the original home of wheat and barley. As the earliest cultiva

tion of them in Europe appears in the warmer intervals between successive ages of ice, in the earlier of which ice probably extended as far as the Alps, in the latter to the latitude of London and Berlin, they clearly must have been introduced from the Mediterranean basin. It is hardly to be expected that evidence of grain cultivation will be found in the British Isles or other parts of Northern Europe in strata corresponding to those in which Piette has found them in the south of France, for, as Nehring has shown (*Über Tundren und Steppen der Jetzt- und Vorzeit*, 1890), a period when these countries consisted of *tundras* and *steppes* like those of modern Siberia must be postulated as existing for some considerable time after the end of the Ice Age. In such an area, where ice still exists below the surface, agriculture would be impossible. Importation, moreover, from Asia through Russia would have been equally impossible at this period, the Caspian then extending much farther to the north and west, while the northern *Ægean* did not exist (see Ratzel's map in *SSGW*, 1900). From the earliest literature of the Indo-Germanic peoples—the Vedas—it is clear that, though the early Hindus of this stock had large flocks and herds, they also practised agriculture. But the meaning of the word *yava-s* which they apply to grain, and which is etymologically identical with the Greek *ζειν*, 'spelt,' is hard to define. Its modern representative in Persia, Baluchistan, and India seems always to mean barley. A word for *corn*, however, is very likely to vary its meaning according to latitude. Thus, in English, *corn* means to an Englishman wheat, to a Scotsman oats, to an American of the United States maize. The same word amongst other peoples of the same stock is variously applied, meaning to a North German rye, and in Scandinavia barley. The Greeks knew and cultivated wheat, barley, and two kinds of millet. In the classical period the Romans cultivated the same cereals, though the poets write of *far*, 'spelt,' as being the grain which formed the food of the early Romans. The Roman word for wheat, *tritium*, is in origin an adjective, and must have originally meant the threshed or milled grain, from *tero*, 'rub, pound.' Oats and rye are not suitable for warm countries, and were not cultivated by the Greeks and Romans. Oats (*βρόμος*) and rye (*βριζα*) were both known to the Greeks from Thrace. From the former, Dionysos, who came into Greece from Thrace, got the epithet of *βρόμιος*, as being in his northern home a god of beer, not, as in Greece, of wine (J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena*, p. 416). Schrader (in Hehn's *Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere*, p. 553) quotes Dieuches, a doctor of the 4th cent. B.C., for oat meal, which was regarded as superior to barley meal. In both Greece and Rome, probably, barley played a great part in early times. It is to be noticed that *far* is etymologically identical with the English *bere* and *bar-ley*. The most plausible explanation of the name of the Greek goddess Persephone or Pherrephatta (the name occurs in a great variety of forms in the different Greek dialects) was 'the barley-killer,' the first element in the name being from the same root as *far* and *bere*. This harmonizes well with the functions of Persephone, who is queen of the under world during the four months which elapse between the planting of the autumn-sown grain and spring.

3. Implements.—The operations of the farmer vary according to the season of the year, and the character of the implements varies according to the nature of the operations. For Europe the earliest description is given by Homer. On the shield of Achilles four rural scenes are depicted, three of which represent the seasons when the farmer's life is busiest (*Iliad*, xviii. 541 ff.). On the first is shown a rich fallow in which many ploughmen

are driving their teams this way and that: many because, according to Professor Ridgeway's explanation of the scene (*JHS* vi. p. 336), the land that is being ploughed is the common land of the community, and the ploughing must be begun by all the holders at the same time—an ancient practice which is still commemorated in England by Plough Monday, the first Monday after Twelfth Night. The field is broad, and is for triple ploughing (*εὑρέαν τριπλοῦν*, 542). When the ploughers reach the headland (*τέλσον ἀρούρης*), a man comes forward and offers them a drink. 'They then turn their team along the furrow, eager to reach the headland of the deep fallow.' This eagerness is sometimes explained, rather naively, as arising from the prospect of a drink at the other end. More probably the emphasis rests upon the epithet *deep*. A fallow speedily becomes covered with grass and weeds, which, with the very ineffective plough that is still used in Greece, makes ploughing a hard task, even for a strong man. In modern times, even with the best plough, the breaking up of old pasture (which with improved implements would be a task of a similar nature) is a very difficult matter. The threefold ploughing was required partly, no doubt, because the ancient plough was so ineffective. In Egypt, where the ploughing was done in a much more yielding soil, a man is represented (not in the earliest art) as preceding the plough with a mattock, for the plough has no coulter. That Homer looked upon ploughing fallow as very hard work is clear from other passages, in which we are told that 'he who has been holding the plough (*πηκτόν ἀροτρον*) in a fallow all day is glad when the sun goes down and he can hie him home to supper, though his knees totter beneath him as he goes' (*Od.* xiii. 31-34). The oxen in the yoke also feel the strain (*Il.* xiii. 705). Hence, with the development of the plough and of a system of tillage, agriculture of necessity passed more into the hands of men. Moreover, when a pastoral people turns to agriculture, it objects to women having to do with the cattle. 'Among the Bechuanas the men never allow the women to touch their cattle. The ploughs cannot be used except by the help of cattle, and therefore the men have now to do the heavy work' (E. Holub, *JAI* x. p. 11). In countries where cultivation is carried on in gardens rather than in fields, the hoe or mattock remains the regular implement of cultivation. Such countries are the South Sea Islands and a great part of China. So also in the world of the gods, Demeter handed over agriculture, so far as ploughing was concerned, to Triptolemus, who, as the Homeric hymn to Demeter tells us, till then was but a prince (*θεμιστοπῆλος βασιλεὺς*, 473) of Eleusis. Henceforth his name, whatever its original meaning, is identified with *τριπλοῦς*, the word for the triple ploughing. It is, however, probably only Athenian pride that makes ploughing take its rise in the little plain of Eleusis. In such little plains in the Hebrides, the *caschrom*, the little crooked spade, is hardly yet extinct. The plough, in all probability, took its origin in larger areas with deeper soil. Such an area was Boeotia, from which comes the earliest European poem on agriculture, Hesiod's *Works and Days*. A still better example of an area suited for the plough is Thessaly, the bed of an earlier inland sea, drained when the Peneus cut its way through the vale of Tempe. Eleusis had traditions of a connexion with the far north of Greece and Thrace, and it is significant that the word *Triptolemus* by its *pt* instead of *p* preserves a feature which, in historical names, is specially characteristic of Northern Greece.

It is unnecessary to suppose that the *plough* was invented only in one place. Its simplest form is a forked stick with one

A great advance in the development of the cart is marked by the introduction of wheels. There is early history of the wheel is not clear. As, in the early heavy waggon, the axle and wheels turn together, it is obvious that wheels and axle in one block might have developed out of rollers. This view is adopted by Dr. Tylor (*J.A.I.S.*, p. 79), and doubtfully by Dr. Haddon (*Study of Man*, p. 173). Such a primitive arrangement is still to be found in Portugal. On the other hand, Professor Ridge-way contends (*Origin and Influence of the Thoroughbred Horse*, p. 438) that the war chariot with spoked wheels is earlier than the ox cart, which

was modelled upon it. The body of the cart was a creel of wicker work, which could be removed at will. Of farm carts the Romans had two kinds—two-wheeled (*plaustrum*) and four-wheeled (*plaustrum maius*). Since they are termed *stridentia plaustra* (Virgil, *Georgics*, iii. 536), it is evident that they moved with much creaking, like the 'groaning' or 'singing' carts of Spain and Portugal (Haddon, *Study of Man*, p. 186 ff.). The noise is caused by 'the friction of the axle against the wedges in the floor of the waggon which keep it in its place' (Haddon, p. 189). The cattle were harnessed to the pole by a yoke which was fastened by a pin near the end of the pole, and lashed tightly with a thong or cord. Some kind of strap was fastened across under the neck of the animals. The modern forms are figured by Sir C. Fellows (*Journal*, p. 71), the ancient Egyptian by Schäfer in the article already mentioned.

4. Since in the countries round the Eastern Mediterranean the corn harvest comes on in May and June, the industry of autumn is the ingathering of tree fruit and the making of wine and olive oil, just as the making of cider is a characteristic autumn occupation of England, and on the Saxon fount at Burnham Deepdale, in Norfolk (which has twelve scenes representing the months), is taken as the typical occupation for October. Hence the vintage is taken for the autumn scene upon the shield of Achilles. The young men and maidens carry the fruit in wicker baskets, a lad plays on the lyre and sings to them, and they join in singing and dancing (*Il.* xviii. 561 ff.). The vine grows wild round the Mediterranean, and in Asia as far as the Himalayas. Grape seeds have been found in pile-dwellings of the later Stone Age in Italy, and of at least the Bronze Age in Switzerland, and vine leaves have been discovered in the tufa round Montpellier and Meyrargue in Provence (de Candolle, *Cultivated Plants*, p. 192). The use of wine was probably introduced to the Greeks from Asia Minor or Thrace. Hesiod contemplates that his farmer may make a voyage after harvest, but adjures him not to wait for the new wine, in case of bad weather (*op. cit.* 663 ff.). Such a voyage from Boeotia would probably be to Lesbos, or the adjacent mainland, which was famous for its wine. According to all tradition, the use of wine and the culture of the grape were later in Italy, still more so in the countries north of the Alps (Schrader, *Reallexikon*, s.v. 'Wein').

The last of the crops which had more than a local importance was that of the olive. According to de Candolle (*Origin of Cultivated Plants*, p. 283), 'its prehistoric area probably extended from Syria towards Greece.' At Athens, till the development of the mines at Laurium, the trade in olive oil was the only important export industry, the soil being thin and ill adapted for agriculture. The olive, indeed, was supposed to be the special gift of the patron goddess Athene, and the sacred olive trees were protected from harm by heavy penalties. No doubt in early times such heavy penalties alone protected all produce, whether of domesticated plants or animals, against the instinct of primitive savagery to seize it for immediate use without regard to future loss (see TABU and TOTEMISM). The olive, as the Latin form of the word shows, spread from Greece to Italy, and from Italy again to the north of Europe. It is clear from Cato and Varro that in their time the vine and olive crops were regarded as of much greater importance than the growing of cereals. This was the result of the second Punic war. Hannibal devastated rural Italy; the agricultural population had to flee to the towns for protection, and stay there for half a generation while the war lasted, and the farmers themselves were drafted into the army. When

the war was over, the rustics had no capital wherewith to restore their farms; the State was unable to help them, and the wealthy quietly annexed the derelict farms of the poor. With the development of an Empire outside Italy, corn came in payment of taxes on the subject States. With curious lack of economic insight, Gaius Gracchus, who was anxious to restore the rural population, caused this imported corn to be sold at less than its market value, with the result of making it impossible to grow corn for sale in Italy.

It is impossible to enter here into the more advanced departments of agriculture, the use of *irrigation*, which developed early in Egypt and Mesopotamia, and which is also recognized by Homer; and the cultivation of fruit trees by pruning and grafting. Wallace observed (*Travels*, p. 335) that the natives on the Amazon never pruned or did anything else to their fruit trees. On the other hand, the labourers imported from Melanesia into Queensland were much surprised to find black men who had no garden. In the Melanesian islands, in Sarawak, and elsewhere, irrigation has long been practised (Codrington, *The Melanesians*, p. 303; *Sarawak*, i. p. 406).

After the corn harvest was finished, the corn had to be *threshed*. This was done by oxen treading it out on the hard threshing-floor [for the making of which Varro and Virgil (*Georgics*, i. 178-180) give careful directions], or by dragging over it a sledge or heavy toothed plank, as was the Roman practice, and as is still done in Asia Minor (Fellows, *Travels*, p. 51). (Prehistoric methods were probably much simpler, the corn possibly being stripped from the ear by hand). The corn was stored for winter use in carefully plastered underground chambers, so as to escape, as far as possible, the ravages of vermin. As we have seen, corn was stored even in the Stone Age.

The last task in the preparation of corn for food prior to cooking it was the *making of it into meal or flour*. Piette found rubbing stones in a late stratum of the Palæolithic Age (Hoops, p. 280), though these were not necessarily used for corn. Bancroft's description (i. 653) of the methods of the aborigines of Yucatan probably represents approximately very ancient practice. The grain is first soaked, and then bruised on the rubbing stone and wetted occasionally till it becomes soft paste. From the rubbing stone develop the pestle and mortar of later times, which are often mentioned in the life of ancient Athens. But the handmill, with its heavy upper stone and its lighter upper stone, which turns upon the other, goes back to the Stone Age (Hoops, p. 301 f.; Schrader, *Reallexikon*, s.v. 'Mahlen'). As they are often found in the graves of women, it is evident that this also was one of the duties of early woman, as indeed is clear from the literature of all countries from the earliest times.

LITERATURE.—For Mesopotamia and Egypt the representations in art: Perrot-Chipiez for both; the illustrations in Wilkinson (the text is out of date) and Lepsius, *Denkmäler aus Aegypten*; and the books mentioned in the text. For Greece: Hesiod, and incidentally Homer; Theophrastus, *Hist. of Plants*, etc., and *de Causis Plantarum*; with many allusions in Aristotle, Xenophon, and elsewhere (the *Geoponica* belongs to the late Roman Empire, but contains information from earlier sources). For Rome: Cato (its present is not the original form of the work); Varro, who professes to have read Phœnician, Greek, and Latin works on the subject, and was himself competent; Virgil, who, as a farmer's son, and himself a farmer, writes in the *Georgics* with knowledge and interest, though not, of course, in technical fashion [the *Moretum* attributed to him gives an excellent account of a day in the life of a simple rustic]; Columella, elaborate but inexact; Palladius, the greater part of whose work is arranged as a farmer's year, and had much influence in the Middle Ages. Detailed accounts of Greek and Roman agriculture will be found in Baumeister's *Denkmäler des klass. Alterthums*, s.v. 'Ackerbau'; Smith's *Gr.-Rom. Ant.*, and Pauly, s.v. 'Ackerbau' [this, though old, still contains much that is useful]. The agriculture of the Semitic nations is treated in the various Bible Dictionaries; Indian agriculture

in the Vedic Age by Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*. General accounts, especially for the Indo-Germanic peoples, are given, with full references to literature, in Schrader's *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte* [a new edition is in course of publication] and *Reallexikon der indogermanischen Altertums-kunde*. Cf. also Ebelin, *Der Jfug und das Flügen bei den Römern und in Mittel Europa in vorgeschichtlicher Zeit* (Dillenburg, 1904); Meringer, *Indo-germanische Forschungen*, xvi, 183 ff., xvii, 100 ff. (with many illustrations). The cultivated plants (Origin of Cultivated Plants, and Haustiere? (ed. by idbäume und Kulturpflanzen. These works give full references of agriculture are treated also by Hahn, *Die Haustiere*, 1896, *Demeter und Baubo*, 1896, and *Das Alter der wirtschaftlichen Kultur der Menschheit*, 1905; by Sophus Müller, *Urgeschichte Europas*, 1905; and by Hirt, *Die Indogermanen*, i., 1905. Mucke's book (*Urgeschichte des Ackerbaues und der Viehzucht: Eine neue Theorie*, 1893) must be used with caution. P. GILES.

**AHERIA** (Skr. *akhetika*, 'a hunter').—A Dravidian tribe of hunters, fowlers, and thieves, found in North India to the number of 35,447, of whom the majority inhabit the United Provinces and the Panjab. Their religion is of the animistic type, and they worship a host of minor gods or godlings, and spirits not included in the orthodox Hindu pantheon. Some, who are more influenced by Hinduism, follow Devi, the Mother-goddess; but in the United Provinces their tribal god is Mekhāsura (Skr. *mesha-āsura*, 'the ram spirit'), of which they can give no account, but which probably represents a primitive form of theriolatry. Gūga or Zahir Pir, the famous saint round whom has been collected a curious cycle of legend, is worshipped by the agency of a Musalmān officiant (Crooke, *Popular Religion*, i. 211 f.). Another Muhammadan saint worshipped by them is the Miyān or Mirān Sahib of Amroha in the Morādābād district, of whom also strange legends are told (Shea-Troyer, *Dabistan*, iii. 235; Crooke, *op. cit.* i. 217). In a lower stage of animism is Jakhiya, who is apparently a deified sweeper, a member of which caste attends his shrine. To him a pig is sacrificed, and the sweeper officiant rubs a little of the blood upon the foreheads of children to repel evil spirits. Barai and Chāmar, two of the common village godlings, are also worshipped. To the latter the offering is a cake of wheat, but in serious cases a ram is offered, the flesh of which is then and there consumed in the presence of the god. It is a curious fact that the Aherias have appropriated as their patron saint Vālmiki, the mythical compiler of the epic of the Rāmāyana. The sacrifices to the tribal godlings are generally performed by a member of the family which makes the offering, not by a regular priest. In some cases where the victim is not actually slain, it is released after blood has been drawn from its ear. The Aherias stand in great fear of the ghosts of the dead; and when they cremate a corpse, they fling pebbles in the direction of the pyre as they return home, in order to prevent the spirit from accompanying them.

**LITERATURE.**—Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, i. 45 ff., *Popular Religion and Folklore of Northern India*, new ed. 1896, ii. 57.

W. CROOKE.

**AHIMSĀ.**—*Ahimsā* is the Indian doctrine of non-injury, that is, to all living things (men and animals). It first finds expression in a mystical passage in the Chāndogya Upanishad (3. 17), where five ethical qualities, one being *ahimsā*, are said to be equivalent to a part of the sacrifice of which the whole life of man is made an epitome. This is not exactly the same as the Hebrew prophet's 'I will have mercy and not sacrifice,' but it comes near to it. The date of this document may be the 7th cent. B.C. This was also the probable time of the rise of the Jains, who made the non-injury doctrine a leading tenet of their school. (See, for instance, Achārāṅga Sūtra i. 4. 2, translated by Jacobi, *Jaina Sūtrae*, i. 39). It is the first of the five vows of the

Jain ascetics (ib. p. xxiii.); and they carried it to great extremes, not driving away vermin from their clothes or bodies, and carrying a filter and a broom to save minute insects in the water they drank or on the ground where they sat (ib. p. xxvii).

The doctrine has been common ground in all Indian sects from that time to the present. But each school of thought looks at it in a different way, and carries it out in practice in different degrees. The early Buddhists adopted it fully, but drew the line at what we should now call ordinary, reasonable humanity. It occurs twice in the eightfold path,—no doubt the very essence of Buddhism,—first under right aspiration, and again under right conduct (Majjhima iii. 251 = Saṃyutta v. 9). It is the first in the Ten Precepts for the Order (*sikkhā-pādāni*), and therefore of the five rules of conduct for laymen (*pañcha sīlāni*), which correspond to the first five of the Precepts (Vinaya i. 83, Aṅguttara iii. 203). It is the subject of the first paragraph of the old tract on conduct, the Sīlas, which is certainly one of the very oldest of extant Buddhist documents, and is incorporated bodily into so many of the Suttantas (Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 3, 4). Aśoka made it the subject of the first and second of the Rock Edicts in which he recommended his religion to his people, and refers again to it in the fourth. But he had long been a Buddhist before, in the first Edict, he proclaimed himself a vegetarian. The rule of the Buddhist Order was to accept any food offered to them on their round for alms; when Devadatta demanded a more stringent rule, the Buddha expressly refused to make any change (*Vinaya Texts*, ii. 117, iii. 253); and a much-quoted hymn, the Amagandha Sutta (translated by Fausbøll, *SBE* x. 40), put into the mouth of Kassapa the Buddha, lays down that it is not the eating of flesh that defiles a man, but the doing of evil deeds. The Buddhist application of the principle differs, therefore, from the Jain.

It would be a long, and not very useful, task to trace the different degrees in which the theory has been subsequently held. It is sufficient to note that the less stringent view has prevailed. At the end of the long Buddhist domination the practice of animal sacrifices had ceased, and though with the revival of Brāhman influence an attempt was made to restore them, it failed. The use of meat as food had been given up, and has never revived. But the Indians have not become strict vegetarians. Dried fish is still widely eaten; and though there is a deep-rooted aversion to taking animal life of any other kind, the treatment of living animals, draught oxen and camels for instance, is not always thoughtful. Nowhere else, however, has the doctrine of *ahimsā* had so great and long-continued an influence on national character.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

**AHIQAR, THE STORY OF.**—In several versions of the *Thousand and One Nights*, the story of the sage Ahīqār (Ḥaikār, Hīkār, etc.; cf. on the original form of the name, Lidzb. in *ThLZ*, 1899, col. 608) is to be found. The tale is derived from a compilation which was circulated especially among the Christians of Syria (cf. Lidzb. in *ZDMG* i. 1896, p. 152). The contents of the story are as follows:—Ahīqār is minister of Sennacherib, king of Assyria. He is already sixty years old, and has sixty wives in sixty palaces, but no son. He has recourse to the gods (in the Armenian version, to Belshim, Shīmil and Shamin; cf. on this Lidzb. in *Ephem.* i. p. 259) and prays for children, but receives the reply that they have been denied to him, and is advised to adopt his nephew Nadan, and to bring him up instead of a son. Ahīqār does so, devoting the greatest care to the physical and intellectual culture of his nephew, but the young man

turns out a failure. He squanders the property of Ahiqār and commits all kinds of crimes. When he is on this account called in question by Ahiqār, Nadan seeks to devise means to remove his uncle. He contrives an intrigue to represent him as a traitor to the king. The king is deceived, and condemns Ahiqār to death. However, Ahiqār and his wife Ashfeghni succeed in influencing the executioner to spare his life, and to execute in his stead a slave who had been condemned to death. Ahiqār is kept concealed by his wife, and is generally supposed to be dead. The news, too, reaches the ears of Sennacherib's rival, Pharaoh of Egypt, and encourages him to impose on Sennacherib the task of building him a palace between heaven and earth. If Sennacherib should be able to carry out this demand, he would pay to him the income of his empire for three years; but if not, Sennacherib must do the same to him. Of all the advisers of the king, no one is able to comply with the demand of Pharaoh—least of all, Nadan. The king is in the greatest extremity, and bitterly repents the removal of Ahiqār. Then the executioner discloses the fact that he, at the time of the command of the king, did not carry out Ahiqār's execution, and that he is still alive. On hearing this, the king is highly delighted, releases Ahiqār, and sends him to Egypt. He easily solves all problems proposed by Pharaoh, and the latter has to pay the tribute and still other sums to Sennacherib. After his return home, Ahiqār is again installed in his old position, and his nephew is unconditionally handed over to him. Ahiqār reproaches him for his actions, and the effect on Nadan is so strong that he 'swelled up like a skin' and burst asunder.

The importance of this narrative, from the side of the history of religion, consists in the fact that, in all likelihood, it belongs to the lost literature of the Arameans of the pre-Christian era (cf. Lidzb. in *ThLZ* and *Ephem.* l.c.). That the story had arisen in ancient times can be concluded from the consideration that the contents of the tale, with the names of both the principal heroes, are alluded to in the Book of Tobit (14<sup>10</sup>). The connexion of this passage in the Book of Tobit with the story of Ahiqār was first recognized by G. Hoffmann (*Auszüge aus syrischen Akten persischer Märtyrer*, p. 182), but he adopted the view that the story took its rise first in the Middle Ages under the influence of the passage in Tobit. However, the various versions of the story discovered since then make this supposition untenable, and the priority of the story of Ahiqār is now generally recognized. The heathen character of the tale, too, cannot be mistaken, and this is especially prominent in the Armenian version. Among the gods mentioned in the text, the 'God of heaven' takes the first place. He is Bēlsamin, whose worship was widely diffused among the Semitic peoples in the last centuries B.C. and the first A.D. Especially instructive is the passage in which Ahiqār emphasizes the ascendancy of Bēlsamin as the 'God of heaven' over Bel, sun and moon (cf. *Ephem.* i. p. 259).

cf. ... rks mentioned in the text, 186 ff.; Salhani, *Contes* Jagiç, *Byzant. Zeitschr.* Kuhn, in the same, p. 127 ff.; 171 ff.; Lidzbarski, in the *Hand-  
schriften der Egl. Bibliothek zu Berlin* (1896), i. ii. p. 1 ff. (Arabic and new Aramaic version); Dillon, *The Contemn. Rev* lxxiii. (1893) p. 362 ff.; F. C. ...  
Agnes Smith Lewis, *The Sto* Arabic, Armenian, and Slav. (1899) p. 50 ff., 510 ff.; Th. ... RS viii. (1900) p. 23 ff.; Gaster, *JRAS*, N. S. xxxii. (1900) p. 301 ff. (Roumanian version); J. Dashiin, *Kurze bibliographische Untersuchungen u. Texte*, ii. (1901) p. 1 ff.; J. B. i. (1901) p. 287 ff.; P. Vetter, *Theol. Quartalschrift*, lxxvii. (1904) pp. 321 ff., 512 ff., lxxviii. (1905) pp. 321 ff., 497 ff.; Bousset, *ZNTW* vi. (1905) p. 180 ff.; de Moor, *Museon*, N. S. ii. (1901) p. 445 ff.

M. LIDZBARSKI.

**AHIR.**—An important tribe of agriculturists and breeders of cattle, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 9,806,475, of whom the vast majority are found in Bengal (where it is by far the largest caste), the United and Central Provinces, and in smaller numbers throughout N. India. Their name connects them with the Abhiras, a people occupying the Indus valley; and Lassen's view, that the Sūdras, or servile caste of the Hindu polity, with the Abhiras and Nishādas, were a black, long-haired Indian race, occupying what is now the valley of Sind, is perhaps correct. Another suggestion, which would connect them with a Scythian tribe, the Abars, who are believed to have entered India in the 1st or 2nd cent. B.C., is less probable. In N. India their traditions connect them with Mathura, the holy land of Krishna; and the Jādubansi, one of their subdivisions, claim descent from the Yādava tribe to which Krishna is said to have belonged; while another, the Nandbanst of the United Provinces, the Nanda Ghosh of Bengal, claims as its ancestor Nanda, the foster-father of the divine child.

1. *Bengal.*—In Bengal the caste is known as Goālā (Skr. *gopāla*, 'a cowherd'), and in accordance with the legend of their descent they are generally worshippers of Krishna, and therefore members of the Vaishnava sect. But their cult is of a much lower type than the pietistic form of Vaishnavism associated in Bengal with the teaching of Chaitanya. Thus, they have a special feast, known as the Govardhan-pūjā, which takes its name from the holy Mathura hill associated with the cult of Krishna, at which they pray to a heap of boiled rice which is supposed to represent the hill, and make an offering of food, red-lead, turmeric, and flowers to every cow which they possess. In other parts the worship is paid to a mass of cowdung made to represent a human form, presumably that of Krishna. A still more primitive rite is that described by Buchanan (in Martin, *E. India*, i. 194), when at the *Divālī*, or Feast of Lamps, they tie together the feet of a pig, and drive their cattle over the wretched animal until it is killed, after which they boil and eat the flesh in the fields, though on other occasions they are not permitted to taste pork. Here the pig was probably originally a sacred animal, and is sacramentally slain to promote the fertility of the fields (Frazer, *Golden Bough*<sup>2</sup>, ii. 366 ff.).

It is a curious proof of the sympathy which even Hindus of high caste and social position exhibit towards the coarser side of Hinduism, that when, in 1895, the English officer in charge of the Santal country prohibited this brutal rite, a protest was immediately made in the Legislative Council of Bengal by one of its members. It is satisfactory to find that the Lieutenant-Governor supported the action of his subordinate (*North Indian Notes and Queries*, v. 38).

In W. Bengal they have special reverence for the hero Lorik, round whom a cycle of curious legend centres, and for Kāśī Bābā or Kāśināth, the ghost of a murdered Brāhman, which is greatly feared. If he be not propitiated, he brings disease upon the cattle; and Risley describes how, when the plague appears, 'the village cattle are massed together, and cotton seed sprinkled over them. The fattest and sleekest animal being singled out, it is severely beaten with rods. The herd, scared by the noise, scamper off to the nearest shelter, followed by the scape-bull; and by this means it is thought the murrain is stayed.'

2. *United Provinces.*—In the United Provinces, those members of the caste who are initiated into any of the orthodox sects are either Vaishnavas or Saivas, the former preferring the cult of Krishna, the latter that of Siva or of his consort Devī in some one of her many forms, in preference the goddess known as the Vindhyaśālini Devī, who has her temple at Vindhyañchal in the Mirzapur district, and is supposed to be the guardian goddess



of the Vindhyan Hills. In Sahāranpur they have two deities who preside over marriage—Brahm Devatā and Bar Devatā, the former representing the great Hindu god Brahmā, who has an image of gold in human form; the latter the banyan tree (Hind. *bar*, Skr. *raja*). On the night of the wedding the image of Brahm Devatā is brought by the goldsmith and placed upon the marriage-platform. When the binding portion of the rite has been performed, the bride and bridegroom offer to the image sandalwood, rice, flowers, incense, sweetmeats, and cakes, and light lamps before it. The women of the household then bury the image in the kitchen, and raise an earthen platform over it. The members of the family worship this daily by pouring water over it, and on feast days offerings of milk and rich cakes are made to it. This is done until a second marriage takes place in the family, when it is dug up and removed, and its place is taken by a new image. This is a very curious survival of Brahmā worship among a people where we were unlikely to suspect its existence. Except in a few temples specially dedicated to this, the head of the Hindu triad, his cult has now largely fallen into disuse. The worship of the banyan tree is closely connected with the custom of tree-marriage (Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folk-lore of N. India*, ii. 115). Among the Āhir the bridegroom marks the trunk of the tree with vermilion at the same time as he marks the parting of the bride's hair with the same substance—a rite which is an obvious survival of the blood-covenant, marking the reception of the bride into a new kith and kin different from her own.

They also worship the Pāñchoṃpīr (see PANCH-PIRIYĀ) and various minor local gods, the most popular of whom is Kāśināth, a deified ghost, at whose festival pots of milk are set to boil for the refreshment of the godling; and one man, becoming possessed by the deity, pours the contents over his shoulder, and is said never to be scalded. Their special cattle-god in the eastern parts of these Provinces is Bīrnāth (Skr. *vīra-nātha*, 'hero-lord'), who is represented by a collection of five wooden images rudely carved into human form.

3. *Central Provinces*.—A similar quintette of gods of disease is worshipped in the Central Provinces. Here their principal deities are Dūlhā Deo, said to be a deified bridegroom who died on his wedding-day (see DRAVIDIANS), and Budhā Deo, the chief god of the Gonds. As in Bengal, their chief festival is the Divālī, when they go about bedecked with strings of cowry shells, singing and dancing. They also pay much respect to a deified man, Haridās Bābā. He is said to have been a *yogi* ascetic, and to have possessed the power of separating his soul from his body at pleasure. One day he went in spirit to Benares, and left his body in the house of one of his disciples, an Āhir. As he did not return, and the people ascertained that a dead body was lying in this house, they insisted that it should be burned. After this was done, Haridās returned, and when he found that his body had been burned, he entered into another man, and through him informed the people what a terrible mistake had been made. In atonement for their error, they worship him to this day. We have here an excellent example of the world-wide belief in the separable soul. The beliefs of the Āhir in this Province are of a very primitive type, and Russell points to obvious survivals of totemism in the titles of some of the sub-castes.

4. *Deccan*.—In the Deccan the Āhir are known as Gāvli, which is the equivalent of *Goālā*, explained above. Here they are worshippers of the ordinary Hindu gods,—in particular of Siva—and their priests are *jaināms*, or officiants of the Lingāyat (wh. see) sect. Those known as Marāṭha Gopāls worship

the Mother-goddess, the Devi of Tuljapur in the Nizām's dominions, Kānhoba, Khandoba of Jejuri in the Poona district, and Mahāsoba, with offerings of sandal paste, flowers, and food. Each family dedicates a she-buffalo to Kānhoba, or Krishna, rears her with care, and does not load her or sell her milk and butter, but presents these to a Brāhman. Further south in Kānara, the Gollar, a kindred tribe, worship Krishna, Siva under the form of the terrible Kāla Bhairava, and his consort Pārvatī. The rites in honour of these deities are performed after the Lingāyat rule.

5. *Gaddī, Ghosī*.—In N. India, when Āhir are converted to Islām, they are known as *Ghosī* ('a shouter,' Skr. *ghush*, 'to shout after cattle') or *Gaddī*, and follow the Muhammadan rule, with some admixture of Dravidian animism. In Bombay they use many Hindu rites at marriage and birth, worship an image of the goddess Devi at the Dasahrā festival, and of Lakshmi, the goddess of good luck, at the Divālī, when they also adore the Tulasi or holy basil plant, as at the Holi they worship the castor-oil plant.

Quite distinct from these are the Gaddī of the Panjāb Hills, of whose beliefs Rose has given a full account. They are nominally Hindus by religion, worshipping Siva by preference, and, in addition to him, Nāgas or serpent gods, Siddhas or deified ascetics, Birs or heroes, and Devis or Mother-goddesses. The Nāgas, probably as representing the earth in serpent form, receive an offering of beestings, male kids and lambs, first-fruits of all crops, incense, and small cakes. The Siddhas, as befits their wandering life, are presented with a sack, stick, crutch, sandals, and thick bread cakes; the Birs receive a he-goat, a thick woollen cloak, waistband, cap, and fine bread. They and the Siddhas are thus conceived as living a life in another world, much the same as that which they enjoyed on earth. The Devis, as female deities, receive vermilion and trinkets beloved by women, ardent spirits, and a goat. Women have their special worship of Kailū, who is a Bir and the *numen* of abortion. Kailung is one of the chief Nāgas or serpent gods. Like Siva, he is adored under the form of a sickle, which the god always carries when grazing his flocks. Besides these objects of worship, there are the *autārs* (Skr. *avatāra*, 'an incarnation of one of the greater gods'), a term here applied to the ghost of a person who has died childless, and who therefore is malignant and causes sickness. To propitiate this spirit, the sick person puts on clothes which are specially made for him, and wears an image of the spirit round his neck. Thus clad, he worships the *autār*, an image of which is always kept near a stream. The clothes and image are worn as a memorial of the dead man, to keep him in mind and conciliate him. Besides these, they worship a host of malignant spirits—*bātal*, the sprites of rivers and streams; *yoginis*, or rock spirits; *rakshanis* and *banasats*, who are here regarded as akin to the *yoginis*, but are probably in their origin female demons (Skr. *rākshasī*); and spirits of the wood (Skr. *vanaspati*, 'king of the wood'). This would be quite in accordance with the belief of forest tribes, who naturally worship the spirits of trees, rocks, or rivers by which they are surrounded. Chungū is another demon who inhabits trees. He sucks the milk of cattle, and is propitiated with an offering of a coco-nut—a frequent form of commutation of the original human victim, the coco-nut representing the skull—, a plough handle, almonds, and grapes—the usual farmer's gifts. His effigy is made in flour, and to this incense is offered. Gungā, the demon who causes cattle disease, is propitiated by setting aside a griddle cake of bread until the final offerings can be made. Then a piece of iron, something like a hockey stick, is made, and the deity



embodied in this is taken into the cattle shed, where he is worshipped by the sacred fire on a Thursday. A he-goat is killed, and a few drops of the blood sprinkled on the iron. At the same time cakes are offered, and some are eaten by one member of the household, but not by more than one, or the scourge will not abate; the rest are buried in the earth. Every fourth year the deity is worshipped in the same fashion. Kailū is a demon worshipped by women after childbirth, by putting up a stone under a tree, which is sanctified by magic formulæ (*mantra*) and then worshipped. A white goat, which may have a black head, is offered up to the demon by making an incision in the right ear and letting the blood fall on a white cloth—a good example of the commutation of the blood sacrifice. The woman eats some coarse sugar and dons the cloth, which she must wear until it is worn out, thus maintaining a sacramental communion between the demon and herself. If any other woman should happen to wear the cloth, it would cause her divers bodily ills. These facts regarding Gaddi religion are specially interesting, as being one of the best extant accounts of Indian animism as shown in the Panjāb Hills.

LITERATURE.—For Bengal: Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology*, 314 f.; Risley, *Tribes and Castes*, I. 289; Buchanan Hamilton, in Martin, *Eastern India*, i. 194 f., ii. 133. For the cult of Lorik and Kāsi Bāhā: Gait, *Bengal Census*, 1901, i. 197; Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folk-lore*, ii. 160; Risley, *op. cit.* i. 132; *North Indian Notes and Queries*, v. 77. For the United Provinces: Crooke, *Tribes and Castes*, i. 63, ii. 370, 419. For Rājputāna: *Census Report*, 1901, i. 123. For the Central Provinces: *Census Report*, 1901, i. 89, 189; *PASS* lriii, pt. i. 297. For the Deccan and Concan: *Bombay Gazetteer*, xv. pt. i. 297, xvii. 151, 184; *PASS* i. 42. For the Panjāb: Rose, *Census Report*, 1901, i. 119 ff.

W. CROOKE.

**AHMADĀBĀD, AHMEDĀBĀD.**—Chief city of the district of that name in the province of Gujarāt; founded in A.D. 1413 by Ahmad Shāh, from whom it takes its name, and during the 16th and 17th cents. one of the most splendid cities of W. India. The religious buildings illustrate the conflict of the Muhammadan style with that of the Jains to which it succeeded.

'The truth of the matter,' writes Fergusson, 'is, the Mahomedans had forced themselves upon the most civilized and most essentially building race at that time in India, and the Chalukyas conquered their conquerors, and forced them to adopt forms and ornaments which were superior to any the invaders knew or could have introduced. The result is a style which combines all the elegance and finish of Jaina and Chalukyan art, with a certain largeness of conception which the Hindu never quite attained, but which is characteristic of the people who at that time were subjecting all India to their sway.'

Among these buildings the Jāmi' Masjid, or Cathedral Mosque, though not remarkable for size, is one of the most beautiful mosques in the East. This and other buildings of the same class, following 'the most elegant and instructive of Indo-Saracenic styles,' were built during the century and a half of independent rule (A.D. 1413–1573). Their tombs are equally remarkable, that of the King Mahmūd Begadā being one of the most splendid sepulchres in India.

LITERATURE.—Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, 626 ff.; *Bombay Gazetteer*, iv. 202 ff., ix. pt. i. 131.

W. CROOKE.

**ĀHOMS.**—The Āhoms are Shāns belonging to the great Tai family of the human race. This family extends from the Gulf of Siam northwards into Yün-nan and thence westward to Assam. It comprises several divisions, viz. the Siamese, Laos, Shāns, Tai Mau or Tai Khē (Chinese Shāns), Khāmī and Āhom.\* According to Dr. Grierson, the Tai race, in its different branches, is beyond all question the most widely spread of any in the Indo-Chinese Peninsula, and even in parts beyond the Peninsula, and it is certainly the most numerous. Its members are to be found from Assam to far into the Chinese province of Kwang-si, \* Introduction to Dr. Cushing's *Shān Grammar* (Rangoon, 1871).

and from Bangkok to the interior of Yün-nan.\* The Āhoms used to call themselves not 'Āhom,' but, like the Northern Shāns, 'Tai.' Regarding the etymology of the word 'Āhom' there has been some discussion, and various views have been expressed. Dr. Grierson seems to incline to the opinion that the word is a corruption of *Ashām*. *Shān* is the Burmese corruption of *Shām*, which is the true spelling and pronunciation of the name of the well-known tribe. We have not, however, been able to ascertain what is the force of the initial A. The Muhammadan historians called the Āhoms 'Āsām.' They say, when mentioning them, that 'Āsām did this and that.' If this suggestion is correct, 'Āhom' must be a, comparatively speaking, modern corruption.† It is very probable that this tribe gave the modern name to our Province of Assam, the old name for the country being Saumarpih.‡

History.—Gait, in his extremely valuable work, *A History of Assam*, gives a detailed historical account of the tribe. All that need be stated here is that the Āhoms invaded Assam, under the leadership of Chukāphā, from the Shān States in the 13th century. The Āhom *buranjis*, or chronicles, give the exact date, which has been computed by us from their reckoning to be A.D. 1228. The conquest of Yün-nan by Khūlāi Khān took place in the year A.D. 1253, § but it is possible that the Chinese invasions into Yün-nan began some years previous to the final conquest of the country, and the general disturbance of the people which took place in consequence caused some of the Shāns to migrate to other countries, as was the case with the Āhom branch. Probably, however, the Āhoms required but little encouragement to shift their quarters, for the Shāns are restless by nature, and are constantly moving from place to place, even in times of peace. The Āhoms, passing over the Pākai range, which divides Assam from Upper Burma, subdued in turn the different Bārā tribes, i.e. the Morāns, Borāhis, and Chutiās, which they found in possession of the Brahmaputra valley. Although it would seem that the Āhoms, when they first appeared in the Province, were not large in numbers, they must have increased considerably afterwards, for they gradually extended their dominions until in the time of Rudra Singha (1636–1714) they were in possession of practically the whole valley of Assam, and were, moreover, able more than once to repel the Muhammadans who had invaded the country on several occasions, and to defeat the great Kachāri king Nara Nārāyān, as well as the Rājā of Jaintia. The Āhoms probably received a certain number of recruits from their Shān relatives beyond the Pākai; but they seem to have admitted the Bārā people of the country largely into their tribe, and by this means also they probably increased their numbers. At the Census of 1901 those who returned themselves as Āhoms amounted to 178,049, the greater portion of this number being resident in the two upper Assam districts of Sibsagar and Lakhimpur.

The Āhom legend that two brothers, Khūnlūng and Khūnlai, from whom they claim descent, came down from heaven and established themselves at a place called Mūng-Bi-Mūng-Bang, seems to be identical with the Shān legend mentioned by Dr. Cushing, ¶ except that the *habitat* of the Shāns is said to have been the Shweli valley. Mūng-Bi-Mūng-Bang is thought by Sir George Scott to have some connexion with Mōng-Hi-Mōng-Ham, a place in the Hephawung Panna on the bank of the river Mekong in the Chinese Shān States. Wherever may have been the exact abode of the Āhoms before they entered Assam, it is very probable that they formed one of the tribes included in the Shān kingdom of Mūng Mau, which at that time was very large and powerful.\*\* This kingdom was probably identical with what was known to the Manipuris as the kingdom of Pong.††

Physical Characteristics.—The description of the physical characteristics of the Shāns given by Dr. Cushing ‡ is equally applicable to the Āhoms, except that it should be stated that the Āhoms of the Assam valley, owing to intermarriage with the Bārā tribes, which are of Tibeto-Burman origin, exhibit probably fewer Shān characteristics than the people of the Shān States. The statement of the Muhammadan historian, quoted on p. 139 of Gait's *History of Assam*, that the Āhom women are 'very black,' is scarcely accurate, for the Āhom women are among the fairest in Assam, and show a pleasing contrast to the

\* General Introduction to 'Tai Group' in *Linguistic Survey of India* (Calcutta, 1904), vol. ii. p. 59.

† In Assamese, *s* and *sh* become a guttural *h*.

‡ See p. 61 of General Introduction to 'Tai Group' in *Linguistic Survey of India*, vol. ii.; also pp. 240, 241 of *A History of Assam* (E. A. Gait).

§ Dr. Cushing's note in the *Burma Census Report* of 1901, p. 201.

¶ Said to take its name from the Āhom words *pāi*, 'to cut,' and *kai*, 'fowl,' it being the Āhom custom to seek auguries by examining the legs of fowls.

\*\* *Burma Census Report*, 1901, p. 202.

†† See note by Dr. Cushing in the *Burma Census Report* of 1901.

‡‡ For derivation of 'Pong' see *Burma Census Report*, 1901, p. 203.

§§ Cushing in *Burma Census Report*, 1901.

ordinary Kachāri\* woman of the plains, whose skin is frequently dusky in hue, and whose features are hard and ill more capable of  
 of Ar. in the steamy  
 plains of Assam, and by inordinate use of opium, has physically deteriorated, and has become as incorrigibly lazy as the ordinary Assamese riyat. Ahoms are heavy drinkers, consuming large quantities of rice beer, called by them *lau*,† which they brew in their own villages. The *Bihus*, or harvest and sowing festivals, are celebrated by more than usually heavy potations.‡ The *deodhais*, or Ahom priests, distil a spirit from rice in out of the way localities, often in defiance of the Excise laws. The evils of the gambling habit, which affect other races of Indo-Chinese origin,§ do not, so far, appear to have spread among them. In educational matters the Ahoms are more backward than even the ordinary Assamese Hindus, which is saying a good deal. In consequence, both the Ahoms and the Assamese Hindus stand in great danger of being elbowed out of all Government as well as industrial employment by the people of Eastern Bengal. The condition of the old Ahom aristocracy becomes worse and worse each year, owing chiefly to the failure of its members to realize the new conditions of life. Families in Sibsagar which a generation or two back held positions of power and comparative wealth at the Ahom Raja's court are now practically destitute.

**Dress.**—The dress of the Ahom tribesman at the present time possesses nothing to distinguish it from that worn by the Assamese cultivator. It was the Ahoms, however, who probably introduced into Assam the large broad-brimmed hat or *jhāpi*, which is an adaptation of the Shān head covering. The dress of an Ahom nobleman used to consist of a turban of silk or a cap called *semā*, a short coat, *mirjāi*, made of Assamese *nūphā* or *pāt* silk, reaching to the waist, a long coat, also of silk, worn over the *mirjāi* reaching down to the ankles, and a *churid* or silken waist cloth. Ahom females dress in a similar manner to ordinary Assamese women, wearing either silk (varying in texture) or cotton, according to the circumstances of the wearer. All this silk is spun and woven in the Assamese households. Women as well as men nowadays wear the *jhāpi*, a specially large and gaily decorated hat being reserved for the bride on her wedding-day. Formerly the *jhāpi* was an emblem of authority, and none but the great were allowed to wear it in the presence of the Raja. Jewellery is much the same as that ordinarily met with in the valley, although the different articles are sometimes called by different names. The girls of the Deodhai, or priestly clan, tattoo star-shaped devices on their hands and arms, the dye used being prepared in the Ahom or Norā villages. Tattooing takes place when a girl has reached about ten years of age. The Norās, another Shān tribe of Assam, who possess a few settlements in the valley, observe a similar custom.

**Houses and Villages.**—Ahom villages do not differ from those of the ordinary cultivator of the valley, but the houses of the priests (Deodhais) are more conservative than the rest of the village. The houses are built on a platform 4 to 6 ft. from the ground, and are made of bamboo and thatch, the roof being either set up on a central post or on a row of posts. The Deodhai houses are divided into three compartments, *maren* or cook-room, *chāngku* or sleeping-room, and *chāmku* or dining-room. The spaces immediately below these three chambers are used for the loom, cowshed, and pig-sty respectively.

**Food and drink.**—Pigs and fowls abound in the Deodhai villages. Ahoms who have not been Hinduized, sometimes even those who have become the disciples of Vaishnavite gossains, eat pork and fowls, and drink rice beer and rice spirit, much to the scandal of their sanctimonious Assamese Hindu neighbours, who regard them with horror. The Ahoms cultivate rice in the same fashion, using the same primitive plough, as the other peasants of the valley, but, owing to their extremely lethargic habits, fail to reap anything like full benefits from the magnificently rich soil. A large quantity of grain is used up by them in the manufacture of *lau* (rice beer), and they spend probably quite as much money in buying opium as in paying the Government land revenue.

**Exogamous groups.**—The Ahoms are divided into a number of exogamous groups called *phoids* or *khels*, the principal ones being seven in number, hence the term *sātghariā* ('belonging to seven houses') which is nowadays applied to them. The composition of these seven principal divisions has varied from time to time, but they are said to have originally consisted of the following: the Royal Family, the Buragohain, Bargohain, Chiring, Deodhai, Mohan, and Bailong *phoids*.¶ The whole of the superior exogamous groups are divided, further, into two main divisions, called Gohains and Gogois, but there are some decidedly inferior *phoids*, such as the Chao dangs, who were the public executioners in the old days, as well

as Likhans, Gharfaleas and others, with whom Ahoms of the upper classes will not intermarry. For a description of the Ahom system of government, State and social organization, and particularly the *pāt* system, the reader is referred to ch. ix. of Gait's *History of Assam*.

**Marriage.**—Ahoms who have become Hindus observe a modified Hindu marriage ceremony, but the real Ahom rite is the *saklang*. The ritual is contained in a holy book called the *saklang pūthi* (unfortunately no longer available). As the actual ceremony is conducted with some secrecy, and as it is said to be forbidden to divulge its details to anyone but an Ahom, the writer had considerable difficulty in finding out what actually occurs on the occasion; but two reliable authorities, Srijuts Kanakeswar Borphatra Gohain and Radha Kanta Sandikai, E.A.C., were good enough to give him the following description. The bridegroom sits in the courtyard; the bride is brought in, and she walks seven times round the bridegroom. She then sits down by his side. After this both rise and proceed to a room screened off from the guests. Here one end of a cloth is tied round the neck of the bride, the other being fastened to the bridegroom's waist. They walk to a corner, where nine vessels full of water have been placed on plantain leaves, the Chiring Phukan (or master of the ceremonies) reads from the *saklang pūthi*, and three cups containing milk, honey and ghee, and rice frumenty, are produced, which the bride and bridegroom have to smell. Some uncooked rice is then brought in a basket, into which, after the bride and bridegroom have exchanged knives, rings are plunged by bride and bridegroom respectively, unknown to one another, it being the intention that each should discover the other's ring and wear it on the finger. The exchange of the knives and the rings is the binding part of the ceremony. Bride and bridegroom are then taken outside and do *sewa* (homage) to the bride's parents and to the people assembled, and the marriage is complete.

Ahoms used to be polygamous, but one wife is said to be more correct now. Ahom girls are not married till they reach a nubile age—sometimes much later. The marriage expenses seem to be quite out of proportion to the means of the people; for instance, a Deodhai marriage in Sibsagar was reported to the writer to have cost more than Rs. 200 (bridegroom's expenses).

**Death.**—Ahoms generally bury their dead; formerly they invariably did so, but now those who have accepted the Hindu religion resort to cremation. The following is a brief description of the old Ahom rites. The corpses of the poor are buried in the ground without coffins. Those of the rich are reverently laid in boxes; a water-pot, cup, *dā* (stick), *jhāpi* (or large hat), and a *pirā* (or wooden stool) are put inside the box with the corpse. These articles are intended for the use of the deceased's spirit in the next world. The coffin is then lowered into the grave, which is filled in, a large earthen tumulus (*moidām*) being thrown up over it. The Ahom kings were buried at Choraideo in the Sibsagar district, their funeral obsequies being of a much more elaborate nature. A *buranjī*, (Ahom chronicle) describes how at the funeral of Raja Gadādhār Singha, who died in A.D. 1696,\* a number of living persons, who had been the deceased's attendants, were interred with the corpse, together with many articles of food and raiment, and ornaments. It is stated that sometimes horses and even elephants were interred alive with a dead king.

**Religion.**—As the Ahoms are now almost entirely Hinduized, and there are very few of the old

\* Gait, *History of Assam*, p. 163.

\* Kachāris call themselves Bārā.

† Assamese *lau pāni*.

‡ The *Bihus* are Bārā festivals which the Ahoms have adopted.

§ E.g. the Khassias.

¶ This statement is made on the authority of Srijut Golab Chandra Barua, late Ahom translator to the Government.